NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 2, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPT(
QO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
Near East and
South Asia Review
)3
NESA NESAR 85-017
2 August 1985
Copy 416
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Near East and
South Asia Review
Israel: Moving to the Right?
Recent Israeli public opinion polls indicate growing support for
hardline parties to the right of Likud, a trend strongly influenced by
the national unity government's perceived failure to deal credibly
with pressing foreign and domestic problems.
The Palestinian Diaspora: Perspectives on Status and Prospects 11
in the Arab World I
Palestinians working in Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia
were surveyed on the way they were treated by their host
governments, their economic prospects and plans, political activities,
attitudes toward the PLO, the US role in the Middle East peace
process, and the issue of a separate homeland. This article
summarizes the results in Jordan and Egypt.
Sudanese People's Liberation Army-Looking for African 15
Help
The southern Sudanese People's Liberation Army, now in its third
year of insurrection against the central government, is seeking aid
from Sudan's neighbors to widen its foreign support and diversify its
bases of operation, but African leaders so far have not provided the
support the SPLA expected.
i Secret
NESA NESAR 85-017
2 August 1985
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
Hassan El Turabi's faction of the Muslim Brotherhood-the Islamic
National Front-is still an important political force in Sudan
despite its isolation following the coup on 6 April, and the ruling
Military Council will try to keep the front's support as a balance to
leftist elements in Sudan.
Since Sri Lanka was granted independence in 1948, most Tamils
have become more aware of their ethnic identity, especially as the
majority Sinhalese have become more assertive in imposing their
language and religion as the national norm, but no single group of
Tamils has been able to define Tamil identity to the satisfaction of
all Tamils.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Iq
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Israel:
Moving to the Right?
Recent Israeli public opinion polls indicate growing
support for hardline parties to the right of Likud, a
trend strongly influenced by the national unity
government's perceived failure to deal credibly with
pressing foreign and domestic problems. Far-right
parties such as the ultranationalist Tehiya-Tzomet
and Meir Kahane's Kach are attracting more
supporters by offering direct, simplistic solutions
particularly attractive to Sephardi voters and
younger, native-born Israelis. In the long run, neither
party is likely to offer serious competition to Likud,
but the increased public support for the far right
probably will encourage Likud leaders to limit the
Labor Party's greater flexibility on Arab-Israeli issues
in hopes of regaining the support of disaffected
rightwing voters.
Polls
Public opinion polls commissioned by the daily
newspaper Maariv in June suggest that Israelis are
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the unity
government and its leaders. These polls suggest that
the growth in support for far-right parties has come at
the expense of Likud:
? According to one such poll, 56 percent of the Israeli
public is dissatisfied with the unity government's
handling of political issues. This was the first time
since last year's parliamentary election that a
majority of Israelis expressed dissatisfaction with
the government.
? Prime Minister Peres's personal popularity also
declined following several months of steady gains.
? Another poll indicates that the far-right parties of
Tehiya-Tzomet and Kach are attracting some
disenchanted segments of the Israeli public. The poll
showed a combined growth of five Knesset seats for
these parties if an early election were called, and a
stabilization of the Likud's backing after several
months of declining popularity. This increased
support for the far-right parties means that their
strength now approaches 10 percent of the
electorate.
? A recent survey by the Van Leer Institute found
that 40 percent of Israel's native-born youth-of
both Sephardi and Ashkenazi origin-supported
Kahane or his ideas, and 11 percent of these would
vote for Kach in an election to the Knesset.
Why a Shift to the Right?
The recent polls show that the far-right parties have
attracted more followers even though the
overwhelming majority of the Israeli electorate
continues to support the mainstream Likud and Labor
parties and their allies. We believe the polls
demonstrate that the government's credibility has
been hurt by its late May agreement to exchange over
1,000 Palestinian prisoners for three Israeli prisoners
of war and by ineffective efforts thus far to deal with
Israel's economic crisis. Other factors may also
account for the far right's gains:
? A deep-seated perception that Labor and Likud are
"soft" on key foreign policy and security issues.
Tehiya-Tzomet and Kach supporters are convinced
Labor would be willing to "surrender" much of the
West Bank as part of a peace settlement with
Jordan and are concerned that neither Labor nor
Likud is prepared to act with sufficient toughness to
preserve the security of Israel's northern border.
The recent hijacking of TWA flight 847 is widely
believed to have been encouraged by the earlier
prisoner exchange carried out by the unity
government.
? Uncertainties about the longevity of the national
unity government and the effectiveness of its
leadership. Few Labor or Likud personalities have
captured the imagination of Sephardi and younger,
native-born Israeli voters, who still see former Prime
Minister Menachem Begin as the only leader strong
enough to lead the country.
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-017
2 August 1985
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
Kach. In last year's election, Kahane won 26,000
votes due, in large part, to his popularity among
Sephardi Jews, who comprise almost half of the
Israeli electorate. The Kach party performed well in
Sephardi strongholds including smaller development
towns, Jerusalem's poor neighborhoods, and moshav
settlements where Sephardi voters are the majority.
In addition, Kach received over 3 percent of the votes
cast in religious moshavs, 2.5 percent of the military
vote, and 5 percent of the West Bank settler vote.
Kahane's platform-aggressively trumpeted by the
party faithful-maintains that the Arab population
of Israel and the West Bank threatens Jewish
predominance in the area and that the Arabs should
be encouraged to leave or else accept second-class
citizenship.
Tehiya-Tzomet. Benefited in the election by co-opting
former Army Chief of Staff Eitan and his supporters.
Although the party has strong ties with leading
figures in Herut, particularly Ariel Sharon, Tehiya-
Tzomet gained votes at the expense of Likud. The
party enjoys particularly strong support among
Jewish settlers on the West Bank.
? A belief by far-right voters that convicted Jewish
underground members should be pardoned by the
government and treated as patriots.
Response to Kach
Likud and Labor both perceive Kahane as a threat,
although for quite different reasons. Labor sees
Kahane as promoting antidemocratic values, and
Likud worries that it may be losing voters to him.
Labor and Likud have joined on occasion in publicly
condemning Kahane's anti-Arab provocations and
worked together to isolate him in the Knesset. With
their strong support, the Knesset voted in December
to curtail Kahane's freedom of movement to prevent
him from entering Arab towns and inciting unrest.
On 9 July, moreover, the Knesset gave preliminary
approval to a draft bill that would restrict the political
activities of extremist parties by excluding from
Knesset elections parties that incite racism. Most
Likud members of the Knesset recognize they are
losing supporters to Kahane and are particularly
supportive of the proposed legislation.
On 25 July, a Kach-dominated coalition took power in
the West Bank local council at Qiryat Arba-
pledging to fire all Arab employees-despite efforts
by Deputy Prime Minister Levy, a key Likud leader,
to prevent the coalition from forming. Labor Defense
Minister Rabin stated to the press that the council's
pledge to dismiss Arab workers was "a clear
expression of discrimination" and contrary to the
basic values of the state. On 29 July the Knesset
finance committee voted to reduce the allocation of
funds to the council to protest the continuation of the
Kach-led coalition. On 31 July the council withdrew
its pledge to dismiss all Arab employees.
Outlook
Labor and Likud success in limiting the appeal of the
far right will be determined by their ability to project
a stronger appeal to Sephardi and native-born Israeli
supporters of Kach and Tehiya-Tzomet. Because
Labor's constituency is composed predominantly of
older, middle- and upper-middle class, European-born
Ashkenazi Israelis, the party probably will be unable
to attract strong voter support from Sephardi and
younger Israeli voters, who see Labor as insensitive to
their concerns.
Likud, on the other hand, has for a generation been
the choice of an ever-growing majority of Sephardi
and young Israeli voters. With this in mind, Likud
leaders probably consider the increased support for
Kach and Tehiya-Tzomet as a passing mood among
the voters reflecting recent disappointments. If an
early election were called, Likud anticipates-
correctly, in our judgment-that most Sephardi
voters would regard it as the most credible alternative
to Labor.
The growth in support for Kach and Tehiya-Tzomet
does not portend a major near-term shift in voter
support to far-right parties. But the evidence of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
increased support for these parties probably will feed
Likud's already strong inclination to trumpet its
hardline foreign policy views and thereby limit
Labor's flexibility in the coalition. In so doing, Likud
would aim to demonstrate its political clout in hopes
of winning back disaffected rightwing voters. Under
these circumstances, Labor would find it difficult to
press for movement on the peace process, the Tabah
dispute with Egypt, and local West Bank issues.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4 _
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
The Palestinian Diaspora:
Perspectives on Status and
Prospects in the Arab World
An external contractor has surveyed Palestinians
working in four Arab countries on the way they are
treated by their host governments, their economic
prospects and plans, political activities, attitudes
toward the PLO, the US role in the Middle East
peace process, and the issue of a separate homeland.
In all, 299 Palestinians from diverse economic
backgrounds were interviewed in 1984 in Jordan,
Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Twenty interviews
with Middle East specialists in the United States
supplemented the field research. Interview data are
fleshed out with descriptions of the host countries'
formal policies and informal practices for handling
both their Palestinian expatriate populations and the
Palestinian question as a political issue. This article
summarizes material from interviews with 98
Palestinians in Jordan and 56 Palestinians working in
Table 1
Distribution of Palestinians
in Selected Arab States, 1980 a
Egypt Jordan Kuwait Saudi
Arabia
Male 28.7 607.1 147.3 69.2
Female 19.8 553.7 129.1 57.8
a Official census data where available or estimates.
b Recent interviews with Palestinian sources place this figure at
more than 125,000 (1984): 62,000 before and after the 1948
partition; 55,000 after the 1967 war; 3,000 after the Jordanian civil
war; and 6,000 in 1982. The official 1976 census reported only
29,162, a number that the Palestinian Statistical Abstract also
reports. Unless post-1980 migration has been much higher than
previously believed, the 1984 figure appears to be inflated.
Thousand
persons
Egypt
Recent data on the education and occupational status
of the approximately 4 million Palestinians living .
throughout the Arab world are lacking. If past trends
persist, however, Palestinians are more highly
educated than their host populations. They occupy
highly specialized professional and technical jobs, and
work in business, commerce, manufacturing, and
general labor positions. The Palestinians were invited
to these states and remain because they possess skills
and experience necessary for the implementation of
modern development projects and plans
Jordan
Over the past five to 10 years, the Palestinians in
Jordan, who comprise over half of the population,
have become better integrated not only economically
but also socially and politically. Economic integration
has proceeded rapidly because of the expansion of the
private sector. Palestinian businessmen and
professionals took advantage of the relatively
unrestricted opportunities to open their own
businesses and contributed significantly to the
Jordanian economic boom. Government job
opportunities for Palestinians are more limited,
especially at higher levels and in security-related
positions.
The generations differ in their attitudes to Palestinian
integration. Younger Palestinians and Jordanians
have enjoyed a common prosperity and lack the
sometimes bitter memories of Jordanian-Palestinian
clashes that have divided their parents, most recently
in 1970-71. Many Palestinian youths regard
themselves as members of the economic elite rather
than second-class citizens.
There are concerns that economic problems on the
horizon will unravel bonds between the Jordanians
and Palestinians and once more lead to civil strife.
25X1
25X1
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-017
2 August 1985
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
Table 2
Palestinian Occupational Structure
in Selected Arab States by Category a
Number of
Persons
Percent of
Total
Employed
Number of Percent of
Persons Total
Employed
Number of Percent of
Persons Total
Employed
Professional/
technical
884
16.8
NA
Administrative/
managerial
230
4.4
NA
Clerical/
administrative
support
769
14.6
NA
Production/
transportation/
general labor
1,222
23.2
NA
Employed
5,264
100.0
NA
Unemployed
14,039 b
NA
511
Total
19,303
NA
22,982
a Based on official census data for years indicated.
b Given the rapid growth in the Egyptian economy after 1976 and
the sharp increase in employment opportunities elsewhere, this
figure was no doubt considerably reduced in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.
Downward trends in Gulf aid, smudged type
prospective declines in remittances from Jordanians
working abroad, and a decline in trade with Iraq will
imperil the Jordanian economy over the next several
years. For many Jordanians, the old tensions remain
just below the surface, and economic stresses could
trigger them again. Despite this residue of the past,
Palestinians in Jordan do not expect a massive return
of expatriate labor from abroad and hope that
integration will not unravel.
The Jordanian Government is following a laissez-faire
policy toward the prospect of absorbing thousands of
returning Palestinians, based on a belief that the
process will not be precipitate, that those returning
can be reintegrated, that their skills will be useful in
boosting the Jordanian economy, and that their assets
will help fill Jordanian investment needs. In any case,
the government apparently believes it can do little
ahead of time to deal with problems that might arise.
Jordanian Palestinians are grateful to King Hussein
and the Jordanian Government for granting them
citizenship and providing educational and health
benefits as well as economic opportunities. They
appreciate Hussein and his effective leadership but
avow that "He is not our King."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
The 1979 rapprochement between Hussein and
Arafat and subsequent close coordination of policy
between them produced a climate within which
Palestinian integration has become possible. It has
also produced a mutual dependency and need for
moderation on both sides. Jordanian Palestinians
support the PLO and Yasir Arafat's leadership. They
would oppose any effort by Arafat to undermine
Hussein, however, and assert they would abandon
support for Arafat if he were to attempt a more
radical course in Jordan.
Palestinians in Jordan constitute a moderate public
and see themselves as a major stabilizing element.
Although they describe themselves as apolitical, the
more educated Palestinians support Hussein's efforts
to provide for wider political participation in Jordan.
"People are tired of taking orders-from the
government, the Army, and the police." In these
sentiments they do not differ from other educated
Jordanians.
Expressing more sorrow than anger, Jordanian
Palestinians characterize US policies on the peace
process as self-destructive. They fear that, unless
progress can be made toward a real settlement,
moderate Arab governments will not survive the
instability that is likely to be triggered by prolonged
stalemate.
Jordanian Palestinians espouse the cause of a separate
homeland, although for the young, this notion is more
an abstract concept than an emotional commitment.
For now, Jordanian Palestinians believe that there are
other alternatives and have successfully made
themselves at home in Jordan. The sentiment for a
separate state will continue to weaken so long as these
other options ensure their political and economic
security and provide for improved political
participation.
Egypt
Along with Jordan, Egypt has gone the farthest of the
Arab states in accommodating homeless Palestinians.
Citizenship is possible, few restrictions inhibit
Palestinian activities, and all the privileges of native
citizens are available with the one exception of
holding public office. (The government has recently
broadened the privilege of employment guarantees for
native university graduates to include Palestinians.)
Egyptian policy has been more consistent than that of
Jordan because of the greater perception of threat
from Palestinians held by Jordanians.
The goal of full restoration of Palestinian rights is an
article of faith in Egypt's domestic political scene.
Egypt's commitment to the Camp David process and
subsequent political investment in working peacefully 25X1
for a resolution of the Palestinian problem compel it
to continue working in that vein for a satisfactory
resolution. Consequently, its policy position reinforces
its treatment of its Palestinians.
The Palestinians in Egypt are grateful for their
relatively broad opportunities in Egypt. But the
opportunities available are decidedly limited.
Egyptian living standards are the lowest of the four
states in this study and are deteriorating.
Unemployment among Palestinians is even higher
than for native Egyptians. Few are wealthy, most
work on government projects, and a few are small
businessmen. Only the wealthiest-successful
businessmen, professionals, and highly skilled
technicians-along with PLO representatives and 25X1
employees would consider permanent residence a
desirable option.
The political behavior of Palestinians living in Egypt
differs little from that of native Egyptians-they
consider themselves apolitical. They support the PLO
and Yasir Arafat's leadership and generally
disapprove of Egyptian participation in the Camp
David accords, although these views are stated 25X1
without animosity. They have no intention of
translating this sentiment into political action.
As in other Arab states, the quality of expatriate
Palestinian support for the PLO seems to be more
intellectual than emotional. They accept the notion of
a separate Palestinian state and would support such a
state should it come about. But they would not
necessarily choose to live there, choosing instead to go
where better economic opportunities beckon.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
Regarding US Middle East policy, Egyptian
Palestinians have no expectation that the United
States will act to help them. They have a slim hope
that Egypt and Jordan acting together might promote
a resolution but believe that Egypt would have to put
distance between itself and the United States to be
effective in this effort. These Palestinians believe that
the United States is a necessary participant in any
peace process but have lost their idealism about what
the United States stands for
The contractor believes that economic problems may
be driving the Egyptian Government to assign lower
priority to the Palestinian question. Alternatively,
should domestic affairs worsen and a strong rightist
trend threaten the regime, President Mubarak might
have to consider taking a more radical stand on the
Palestinian question if this is the only way he can
salvage his political fortunes. The Palestinian issue is
a likely one for Mubarak to choose to demonstrate a
sharp break with the United States and with Camp
David should this scenario occur.
In sum, although assimilation into Egyptian society is
available to Palestinians, the prospect of sharing
increasing poverty with equity alongside native
Egyptians is not attractive. Only a minority would
consider Egypt a place in which to reside
permanently. Relocation to a new Palestinian state or
to another state with favorable economic
opportunities is the goal for the majority. In the
meantime, Palestinians in Egypt, like those elsewhere,
desire to get on with their lives, provide for their
families as best they can, and avoid becoming
ensnarled in the political debate over their future.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Sudanese People's Liberation Army-
Looking for African Help
The southern Sudanese People's Liberation Army
(SPLA), now in its third year of insurrection against
the central government, is seeking aid from Sudan's
southern neighbors to widen its foreign support and
diversify its bases of operation. Decisions by Kenya,
Uganda, Zaire, and the Central African Republic
(CAR) to back the insurgents would strengthen the
SPLA and intensify the civil war. African leaders so
far have not provided the support the SPLA expected,
however, and we believe they will continue to limit
their aid. Those leaders fear a loss of backing for their
own governments, are unsure of SPLA intentions, and
are reluctant to endorse intervention in another
African state.
East and Central African aid would become vital if
Ethiopia turned against the southern Sudanese
insurgents. Without African cooperation, the
Ethiopian-based SPLA has had logistic problems in
expanding into western Bahr al Ghazal Province and
the strategically important Equatoria Province.
African reticence has forced the SPLA to rely on
support from Ethiopia and other pro-Soviet states. As
a result, the SPLA has become an instrument of
Ethiopian policy toward Khartoum and a vehicle for
Communist involvement in Sudan.
As long as Libyan leader Qadhafi sees advantages in
his new rapprochement with Khartoum, he is unlikely
to resume aid to the SPLA.
We believe SPLA leader Garang has sought help
from Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, and the CAR largely
because he is uneasy about his reliance on Ethiopia
and wants greater freedom of action. Garang also
wants international recognition for his cause that
African backing would generate. Such a development
would help to legitimize the insurgency and
strengthen its hand in future negotiations with the
regime in Khartoum.
Sudanese Government Moves
The Military Council-as did ex-President Nimeiri-
wants African leaders to take at least a neutral stand
toward the dispute in southern Sudan. The council
fears that East and Central African support for the
SPLA will prolong the conflict, embolden the rebels,
and further weaken the morale of Sudanese forces in
the south. As a result, one of the first actions the
council took after unseating Nimeiri was to send
delegates to Nairobi, Kampala, and Kinshasa,
expressing Khartoum's determination to pursue a
political, rather than military, solution to the conflict.
Background
The 12,000-to-15,000-man SPLA, the largest of
Sudan's insurgent groups, depends on Ethiopia for
safehaven and as a conduit for arms. To counter
Khartoum's alleged support for Ethiopian
secessionists, Chairman Mengistu has consistently
backed SPLA leader John Garang with logistic
support and training. Garang's major base camps are
in southwestern Ethiopia. Moreover, Addis Ababa has
helped the SPLA obtain weapons from South Yemen,
and it almost certainly has facilitated SPLA contacts
Libya armed and financed the SPLA through
Ethiopia, but Tripoli's support dropped after the
overthrow of Sudanese President Nimeiri last April.
Options of Sudan's Southern Neighbors
Kenya. The Kenyans have given John Garang enough
aid to show sympathy for the SPLA but not enough to
appear committed to its cause.
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-017
2 August 1985
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
The Southern Provinces
Kenya
Boundary repreaealation
net neeaSSaffly au hOrna[I'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4 _
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
Several factors explain Kenya's support for the
SPLA. President Moi,
a Christian, blames the guerrilla war on ex-President
Nimeiri, who tried to impose Islamic law on southern
Sudanese Christians and whose economic policies
appeared to discriminate against the black African
southerners. Moreover, from Moi's perspective,
Khartoum has been more eager to crush the southern
rebellion than to address legitimate grievances. In
successors adopt his policies toward the southern
Sudanese, Moi might consider giving the SPLA more
backing.
At the same time, however, foreign pressure could
lead Moi to consider reducing-or even ending-
Kenyan support for the Sudanese insurgents. Moi
apparently is concerned that helping John Garang
might result in diminished aid from Western donors
who want a cease-fire in southern Sudan and who
question Garang's ideological leanings.
of also hopes to avoid pressure
from the Arab League-the Saudis in particular-
who share Western interest in a stable Sudan. In
response to Sudanese complaints last March about
Kenya's support for the SPLA, Arab League
representatives in Nairobi put the issue on their
regional agenda, perhaps as a warning to Moi. If
Garang over time appeared both inflexible toward
peace proposals and accommodating toward
Communist interests in the region, Moi probably
would quickly put distance between himself and the
SPLA
If President Moi chose to extend his support, it would
significantly strengthen the SPLA war effort. Nairobi
could permit the SPLA to establish bases in
northwestern Kenya and areas of southeastern Sudan
that since 1956 have been guarded by Kenyan police.
The bases, along with Kenyan money, small arms,
and training, could substitute for those in Ethiopia
and would even shorten SPLA supply lines to some
targets in Equatoria Province. If Moi declared Kenya
a safehaven for the insurgents, the SPLA would gain
an alternative location from which to attract southern
Sudanese recruits, gather intelligence, and contact
Uganda. Kampala's new government under Gen. Tito
Okello, having recently deposed President Milton 25X1
Obote, will be too distracted with internal problems to
address support for the SPLA. In any case, Okello
belongs to the Acholi tribe, which strongly opposed
Obote's support for the Sudanese rebels. The Acholis
are concentrated just below the Uganda-Sudan
border.
victories, the SPLA campaign to seize control of
Equatoria Province started to falter last January, and
with it prospects for a quick, SPLA-produced solution
to Obote's dissident problem in southern Sudan. The
recent coup in Uganda probably will weaken any
Ethiopian incentive to transfer arms to Kampala in
the near term.
Zaire and the CAR. Zairian President Mobutu and
CAR President Kolingba have rejected SPLA
requests for aid and basing rights and are likely to
other potential backers.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
continue their hands-off policy. Both leaders want a
stable Sudan, whose southern population would not
burden them as refugees. Both presidents-Mobutu,
in particular-do not want to give the SPLA
safehaven, because this would undermine their
objections to the presence of Zairian dissidents in
neighboring states.
Both Mobutu and Kolingba fear the Libyan
subversive threat to their governments; it especially
influences Mobutu's policy toward the SPLA.
According to the US Embassy in Kinshasa, Mobutu
believes Libyan leader Qadhafi is relentless in seeking
his downfall because of Zaire's ties with Israel. As a
result, Mobutu saw John Garang's insurgents as
Libyan agents when Tripoli-before the overthrow of
Nimeiri-openly backed the SPLA. Mobutu might be
tempted to open Zairian territory to Garang's rebels,
however, if he comes to view Garang as anti-Libyan
and Khartoum as willing to support Tripoli's regional
policies.
President Kolingba, for his part, appears resolute in
keeping the SPLA out of the CAR.
Bangui's close ties to France and fears of Libyan
support to CAR insurgents based in southern Chad
will work against Kolingba's supporting the SPLA.
Outlook
The SPLA probably will not get significant help from
East and Central African governments any time soon.
Kenyan and Ugandan leaders-who have supported
the insurgents in the past and whose bases would most
facilitate insurgent operations against key targets in
southern Sudan-almost certainly will continue to
show little enthusiasm for the rebel cause. The
insurgents' flirtation with leftist governments has
turned President Moi against John Garang. Uganda
will continue to shy away from the SPLA because the
new government must devote its resources to its own
survival.
As a result, the SPLA probably will have to continue
to depend on Ethiopia for resources to continue the
war. SPLA leader Garang's military moves and
political postures toward the new Sudanese regime
will remain responsive to Ethiopian Chairman
Mengistu's policy toward Khartoum. Given
Mengistu's deep suspicions of Sudanese involvement
with Ethiopian insurgents, Addis Ababa probably will
continue to back SPLA attacks across the Ethiopian
border into southern Sudan.
If Mengistu and Sudanese leaders agreed to stop
supporting each other's insurgents-an event we
consider unlikely in the next several months-SPLA
operations in the south would drop significantly.
Under such circumstances the SPLA's access to
Kenyan and Ugandan bases and equipment would
become vital, but we believe those African leaders
would still withhold it. Garang could offer President
Moi little to offset the pressure Kenya would face
from its Western friends, moderate Arab states, and
Ethiopia to shun the insurgents and thereby help end
the civil war. As for Uganda, we doubt that Garang
could convince the new government to oppose Acholi
the outcome of the Sudanese civil war.
In any case, cool African reception to SPLA aid
requests almost certainly will spur Sudanese insurgent
efforts to gain more assistance from South Yemen,
Cuba, Eastern Europe, and perhaps even the USSR.
These overtures will give pro-Soviet elements an
opening to influence SPLA policy and help determine
25X1
25X1
9X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4 _
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Sudan: Hassan El Turabi and
the Muslim Brotherhood
Hassan El Turabi's faction of the Muslim
Brotherhood -the Islamic National Front-is still an
important political force in Sudan despite its isolation
following the coup on 6 April. Turabi has openly
supported the ruling Military Council and its promise
to return to civilian rule next year. The council will
try to keep the Front's support as a balance to leftist
elements in Sudan. If the council rejects the Front's
Islamic goals or if a leftist government comes to
power, the Brothers would probably revert to their
pre-1977 clandestine operations and might use
terrorist tactics-seeking support from Libya and
Iran-to further their overall goal of a state based on
an Islamic order.
Background
The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928,
spread to Sudan in the late 1940s. The Brotherhood
recruited among university and professional groups
and within the existing conservative Islamic parties.
In 1964, when the movement emerged openly under
the leadership of Dr. Hassan El Turabi, it was
estimated to have 100,000 or more members.
Under the umbrella of the National Front, the
Brotherhood joined the Ansar Islamic sect's Umma
Party and the Khatmiya sect's National Unionist
Party in opposition to the Nimeiri regime from 1973
to 1977. In 1977 the Brotherhood accepted Nimeiri's
national reconciliation program, following abortive
coup attempts by the National Front in 1975 and
1976. The reconciliation, however, divided the
Muslim Brotherhood. The more radical faction is led
by Sadiq Abdallah Abd al-Majid, who continued
opposition to Nimeiri's regime. Turabi, thereafter,
served as Sudan's Attorney General and later as
presidential foreign affairs adviser. Some of his
followers also were appointed to high government
posts.
Turabi's position with Nimeiri weakened in late 1984
as Nimeiri succeeded in placing part of the blame for
some of the unpopular aspects of his Islamization
campaign on the Brotherhood. On 9 March, Nimeiri
ordered the arrest of Turabi and virtually every other
prominent Muslim Brother. When the Nimeiri regime
was overthrown in a bloodless coup on 6 April, the
Muslim Brothers were released from prison by
Khartoum's new military leadership.
New Tactics-Domestic
The major aim of the Brotherhood is still the
establishment of a state governed by Islamic law. A
key concern of the Muslim Brothers since the release
of its members has been to erase the taint of
association with Nimeiri.
"tolerance and justice for all."
In Turabi's Islamic National Front's version of
Islamic law, amputations would be rare, and the
Islamic alms tax system would be a form of social
security and would not replace current taxes,
according to the US Embassy in Khartoum. Sensitive
to accusations that the introduction of Islamic law
fueled the rebellion in the south, the Front has stated
that Islamic law should not apply in the south and is
campaigning to promote Islam as a religion of
Turabi's faction of the Brotherhood has been trying to
attract the Islamic masses, consolidate its internal
leadership, and find common cause with other Islamic
groups. The Front has been able to organize
demonstrations of moderate size against repeal of
Islamic legislation,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
but many Sudanese-especially the elite-still 25X1
blame Turabi for the excesses in Nimeiri's
Islamization program.
The Islamic National Front has become increasingly
isolated in the freer political climate since Nimeiri's
ouster. The Gathering, the major civilian lobby
composed of trade unions and political parties, has
excluded Turabi's group from membership because of
its close relationship with the Nimeiri regime and its
refusal to cooperate with the Communists and
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-017
2 August 1985
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
A prominent constitutional lawyer, Hassan El Turabi has served as head of the
largest faction of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood since 1969. Turabi, 53,
speaks fluent English and French. Turabi visited the United States in 1960 on a
Foreign Leader Grant and in June 1982 to lecture at various Islamic centers. He
is the son of a shari `a judge and the brother-in-law of Sadiq Al Mahdi, leader of
the Ansar Islamic sect.
Ba'thists. Turabi had hoped to form a coalition with
other Islamic parties, the Khatmiya's National
Unionist Party and the Ansar's Umma Party, but we
believe these parties currently view Abd al-Majid as a
more attractive partner in political coalitions
preparing for civilian elections next April.
The historically antagonistic relationship between the
Muslim Brothers and the Sudanese Communist Party
(SCP) has worsened as the SCP has become active in
the new political environment and in the Gathering.
Turabi mistrusts and will lobby hard against the SCP
and the Sudanese Bath Party because they oppose the
continuation of Islamic law. He accuses the SCP of
conspiring with Libya to take over Sudan and to bring
Sudan under Soviet influence. The Front ripped down
SCP banners and placards last May in the Khartoum
area, and fighting resulted
between the two parties at the central mosque in
Khartoum and later at an Islamic National Front
rally held in Atbara.
the National Front, similar
to the political parties, is taking advantage of the
unstable political and security situation in Sudan to
infiltrate military and other government organs.
International Policy
We believe that Turabi will seek support from almost
any country likely to give him aid. He will probably
stress Islamic issues with Iran and Libya while
underscoring the Front's moderate stance with Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Although he
adjusts his rhetoric so that potential donors hear what
they want to hear, Turabi is unlikely to compromise
the Front's objectives or become a puppet of a foreign
country.
Although anti-Communist, the Front favors a
nonaligned foreign policy and wants Sudan to
normalize ties with the USSR to balance the pro-US
line taken by the Nimeiri regime. In an interview
Turabi stated that he desires cordial relations with the
United States even though he believes that the United
States is biased against Islamic fundamentalist
groups. Nevertheless, Turabi blames the United
States for Nimeiri's purge of the Muslim Brothers
and for the arrests that came a few days after the visit
to Sudan last March by Vice President Bush.
The Front favors close ties with Egypt and Saudi
Arabia. Turabi has suggested that Egyptian-Sudanese
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4 -
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
Sadiq Abdallah Abd Al-Majid
Sadiq Abd al-Majid joined the Muslim Brotherhood
as a student in Cairo. A journalist by profession, he
became the editor in chief of The Muslim Brothers
and later Al-Mithaq (The Charter), weekly Muslim-
oriented newspapers that supported the Brothers. Abd
al-Majid preceded Turabi as the guide of the
Brotherhood and served on the executive committee
of the Islamic Charter Front. Upon his dismissal
from the Brotherhood in 1980, Abd al-Majid joined
the unified movement of opposition parties. Abd al-
Majid has allied himself with the Umma Party,
thereby increasing the political support of his faction
since the coup. He is employed as a taxi driver in
Khartoum.
relations should not be affected by Nimeiri's
residence in Egypt. Nonetheless, Turabi does not
realistically expect assistance from Cairo or Egypt's
Muslim Brothers. Saudi Arabia has supported both
factions of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood in the
past, but its present relationship with Turabi is not
strong. Saudi Arabia
in the past has given refuge to Turabi's rival-Abd al-
Majid-and, given his increasing popularity, would
probably prefer to back his faction of the
Brotherhood. Nevertheless, the Saudis would
probably increase support for Turabi if the threat of a
leftist government were imminent.
The Islamic National Front supports Sudan's
rapprochement with Libya and hopes for improved
relations with Iran. In a recent interview, Turabi
expressed pro-Libyan views and stressed the
advantages of integration between Libya and Sudan
as both logical and mutually beneficial. In addition,
he claims that Front members have no links with Iran
other than religious ties to the Ayatollah Khomeini
and that they prefer a French-style presidential
democracy to the Islamic regime of mullahs found in
Iran.
Outlook
Despite the gradual decrease in the influence and
popular support of the Islamic National Front over
the past four months, Turabi is still an important
figure. Turabi will most likely make the Front's
The Muslim Brotherhood of Sudan has goals and
tactics similar to those of the Brotherhood in other
countries. It eschews violence and promotes
conversion through education, moral example, and
intellectual appeal. Its overall objective is the
implementation of an "Islamic order" based on
moral and ethical principles. These include:
? Substitution of shari'a, or Islamic law, for
Western-inspired legal systems.
? An economy based on Koranic principles, including
the abolition of interest and the replacement of tax
codes by the traditional zakat, or alms tax, to help
the poor.
? The substitution of a system of "Islamic
consultation" within a single `party of God"for
parliamentary politics.
? The relegation of women to the home to fulfill their
divinely ordered function of bearing and raising
presence felt through its influence among students
and unions and through infiltration of the government 25X1
and political organizations rather than overt political
action. His rigid anti-Communist stand can offset
leftist influence, and this probably will induce the
Military Council to tolerate many of the Front's
activities.
If Turabi finds himself aligned against the ruling
Military Council over the issue of Islamic law, the
Islamic National Front will probably go underground.
The Brothers' proven ability to function as a secret
organization suggests that the Front would continue
to have influence on Khartoum's political scene.
Underground, the Front probably would turn its
attention to building a paramilitary organization,
possibly even engaging in terrorist activities against
the regime with possible support from Libya or Iran.
Nevertheless, Turabi is not likely to become a
surrogate for them.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4 _
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
Tamil Identity in Sri Lanka
Since Sri Lanka was granted independence in 1948,
and particularly since the election of S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike in 1956 and the communal riots of
1958, 1977, and 1983, the definition of identities for
most Tamils has changed. Whereas a Tamil might
have been a Ceylonese first when confronting the
British in the struggle for independence, that same
person probably considers his primary identity as.
Tamil now that he feels threatened by a hostile
Sinhalese majority. Indeed, for some people that
identity has become so strong and the Sinhalese are
perceived as so threatening, that they may no longer
even consider themselves Sri Lankans. A key question
is who constitutes the Tamil group and by what
standards is it defined. Here, there is persistent
confusion. Some have argued that Tamils are a
linguistic group and, as such, should include the
Tamil-speaking Muslims of the country. As the recent
killings of Muslims by Tamils have demonstrated,
however, at least some Tamils do not consider
Muslims members of the Tamil group. In addition,
the recent riots in the Eastern Province have shown
that neither do the Muslims consider themselves part
of the greater Tamil group.
Traditional Tamil Identity
In the earliest days, ethnic identity was probably not a
problem for most of the Tamils living in Sri Lanka.
Distance, culture, caste, and history separated the
island's Tamil community from the larger body of
Tamils in south India as well as from the mass of
Sinhalese in the south of Ceylon. Through interaction
with the Dutch and Portuguese colonizers, many
Tamils became Catholic but still lived within the
Tamil community without friction. Under the
influence of a unified British colonial administration
beginning in 1815, the term Ceylon Tamil gained
popularity both with the northern Tamils and the
British authorities. This term was accepted because it
differentiated the native-born Tamils of Sri Lanka
from both the Indian Tamils of Tamil Nadu and the
increasing numbers of low-caste Tamils brought from
south India to work the tea plantations in the central
highlands. The term was not meant to differentiate
them from the Sinhalese.
A few, mostly upper class, largely English speaking,
and often Christian, Tamil families became so
"detribalized" that they perceived their primary
identity as Ceylonese, with only a vague secondary
identity as Tamils. Although these people were highly
visible in the early 20th century and during the
independence movement, their numbers were always
small. Yet, they never totally lost their identity as
Tamils. As independence approached and they were
faced with the reality of becoming a permanent
minority in the midst of a potentially threatening
Sinhalese majority, these same Tamils pushed for
equal parliamentary representation with the
Sinhalese.
The disfranchisement of the Indian Tamil plantation
workers immediately after independence must have
had a sobering effect on the Ceylon Tamils and must
have heightened their feelings of Tamil identity. The
election campaign of 1956 included a call for Sinhala
as the only official language of the country and
preferential treatment for Buddhism. Both demands
could only have heightened Tamil fears. The shift in
political parties from the Tamil Congress, devoted to
the protection of Tamil interests, to the Federal Party,
which called for a federal system with a high degree
of self-government and protection of Tamil interests
in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, is both proof
and a symptom of these developments.
The ethnic riots of 1958 and 1981 added fuel to both
these movements. The creation of the Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF) was both a symptom and a
cause for heightened Sinhalese fear that the Tamils
meant to divide the country into a Sinhalese south and
a Tamil north and east to be called Eelam. Calls for
separation are nothing more than the logical extension
Secret
NESA NESAR 85-017
2 August 1985
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
of mutual distrust and fear. Indeed, even the creation
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and attempts
to accomplish separation through violence can be
viewed as symptoms that regular political processes
have broken down and that for some Tamils, at least,
their identity as Sri Lankans has ceased to exist. The
TULF leadership has not firmly repudiated the
growing call to violence. Their reference to the
terrorists as "the boys" and the impression conveyed
to Sinhalese and Tamils alike that maybe "the boys"
will humiliate the Army and government contribute to
both Tamil separatist identity and Sinhalese fear.
The moderate TULF appears to have overplayed its
hand in using the violent excesses of "the boys" to
force the government to deal with the somewhat less
objectionable TULF. Politically it has become
increasingly difficult for moderate Tamil politicians
to repudiate terrorists. At the same time it has
become politically difficult for Sinhalese spokesmen
to bargain with Tamil politicians unless moderate
Tamils repudiate the militants, their acts of terrorism,
and their fervent calls for a separate state.
A Spectrum of Tamil Identity
What do the Tamils want? Politically, what is their
vision of the future? Clearly, a spectrum of Tamil
opinion has evolved. Defining that spectrum in terms
of right and left is not meant to impose a Western
framework, but rather to show how radically different
each Tamil image of the future is.
On the extreme right of the spectrum are the
Colombo Tamils. Since the riots of July 1983,
relatively few of this group are left. The ones who felt
the highest degree of Tamil identity, either because of
internal conviction or as a result of Sinhalese pressure,
probably have already fled. Those who stayed despite
the riots are either so integrated as to believe that
they will be accepted by the Sinhalese, or else have
their escape plans already made in anticipation of the
next round of troubles. The Colombo Tamils have
always opposed separation and probably still do. Their
livelihoods and even their lives depend on the good
will of the Sinhalese majority among whom they live.
In a sense they are the ones who, despite the hardships
and handicaps, have made it in a Sinhalese-dominated
system. They would not take any stand that would
jeopardize that position. More than anything they
probably want peace, security, and a return to
normality. They would gladly accept a unified Sri
Lanka, provided they believed that the police and the
Army would guarantee their security and that the
government would protect their rights. They would
have nothing to gain from a federal political system,
but they would want their language and culture
protected at the national level. Their idealized vision
may be a return to the pre-1955 status quo.
Very close to the Colombo Tamils on the spectrum are
the Indian Tamils. They, too, have learned to survive
in a hostile Sinhalese sea. They have no desire for a
separate state in the north and east because they
would be excluded and would undoubtedly be
punished by their Sinhalese neighbors. Even if they
were somehow included, there is no doubt that they
would be on the lowest rung of the social and
economic ladder in this Tamil state. At best they
could expect mass retaliation on the part of the
Sinhalese if the northern Tamils actually achieved
Eelam. At worst they might be killed or expelled from
Sri Lanka. All they want is to secure citizenship for
their people and a return to the stability that existed
before 1948.
After the Colombo and Indian Tamils on the
spectrum and much nearer the center are the Tamil
moderates of the north. They, like the Colombo
Tamils, want peace, security, and a return to
normality. Politically, they envision some form of
federal system within a unified Sri Lanka, but with a
high degree of local autonomy in which their language
and culture will be preserved. On the national level,
they seek guarantees against job discrimination in the
civil service and university placement for their
children. They want a return to normal economic
conditions: specifically, a reintegration of their
economy with the rest of the country. On the level of
personal security, they want the police and Army to
protect them from violent elements of the population,
whether Sinhalese or Tamil. They also want the
national government to care about them and want to
be able to participate in future governments, not
because they are Tamils but because they share a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
common commitment to free enterprise in Sri Lanka.
Although it is difficult to say how large a group these
moderates are, they comprise the majority of northern
Tamils.
Next on the political spectrum of Tamil opinion are
those Tamils who have become convinced that they
can no longer share a country with the Sinhalese.
These are the Tamil Eelamists, divided into a variety
of groups with different visions of just what Eelam
would be. On the right of this portion of the spectrum
are the bourgeois upper-caste Vellalla Tamils, who
want to maintain their privileged social and economic
position in an independent Tamil Eelam. These people
would not want union with either India or an
independent greater Tamil Nadu, in which they
would again become a minority. This time they want
to be the majority group.
these people see the new Tamil state as being
a kind of Singapore on the Indian Ocean. These
separatists believe the new state would have the same
factors going for it that Singapore did: a hard-
working, well-educated population and a great seaport
(Trincomalee). Because they are basically free
enterprise capitalists, they see the advantages that
Singapore gained by inviting in hundreds of foreign
investors on the best possible terms, and they would
probably move quickly to do the same. Looking to
Israel as another model, they assume that well-placed
overseas Sri Lankan Tamils would help the growth of
the fledgling state with remittances just as Jews
throughout the world support Tel Aviv. These Tamils
appear confident in their belief that their lives will
improve immediately once they achieve Eelam.
Further to the left come those Eelamists who seek a
separate Tamil state, but under a socialist regime.
Those who hold this vision are either lower caste or
from the lower social and economic groups of Tamil
society. They do not want a separate state where
Sinhalese domination would be exchanged for that of
Vellalla overlords. They believe that in a socialist
state they would appropriate the wealth of the richest
northern Tamils and would thus achieve parity with
them or, better yet, become the leaders of their new
country. Substantial numbers of Tamils, including the
majority of the militant separatist groups, hold this
view.
It is difficult to account for the rise of Marxism in an
area of Sri Lanka that has never been a leftist
stronghold. The phenomenon is due in part to young,
frustrated Tamils who see no future in a country
dominated by Sinhalese and who have turned to
violence. They have borne the brunt of Sinhalese
racism: denied access to universities, civil service,
professions, and business. They have become so
alienated that they believe that only a violent struggle
can help them achieve equity.'
Looking Ahead
Sri Lankans in general expect youngsters to be radical
until they finish school and settle down in the
arranged marriages and vocational openings their
parents have prepared for them. For northern Tamils,
however, the paucity of economic opportunity under
the Sinhalese-dominated regime in Colombo and the
general disruption of Tamil society after nearly 10 2bAl
years of political instability have frustrated traditional
expectations. Young people in the north are growing
up increasingly radicalized. They distrust the system
and are shocked and embarrassed by the impotence of
Tamil leaders to redress the glaring wrongs of society.
By referring to them as "the boys," northern Tamil
leaders initially did not show much concern for the
increasingly violent demonstrations mounted by
Tamil youth. But growing frustration has crystallized
the thinking of some of the young militant leaders,
and Marxist rhetoric has become a convenient
rallying cry for several of the most violent guerrilla
bands. Most of the militants fighting today, however,
are motivated by ethnic identity rather than ideology.
Yet their use of Marxist terminology has unwittingly
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret
convinced most Sinhalese that the Tamil liberation
movement is part of an international Communist
conspiracy to take over the entire island and impose a
Tamil-dominated Marxist government.
Further to the left on the spectrum are those Tamils
who wish to merge the Tamil portions of Sri Lanka
with India. This is a fear held by many Sinhalese.
Few Tamils, however, would seek to exchange
domination by the Sinhalese for domination by the
even larger population of India. Further, the largest
Tamil caste, the Vellalla, would lose its relatively high
status if it were joined to the overpowering Indian
caste system. Some guerrilla groups exploit Sinhalese
fears of Indian domination of part of the island to
provoke military excesses against Tamils in the hopes
of winning Indian support.
More appealing to some Tamils and even less
probable is the most radical dream that Tamil Nadu
will secede from India and merge with the Tamil
portion of Sri Lanka to become an independent nation
of more than 60 million Tamils. This would have
great appeal to those Tamils who hold their ethnic
identity above all others. It is the image that is the
nightmare of both Indian and Sri Lankan officials.
There is a political party in Tamil Nadu that keeps
that hope-or nightmare-alive. What the Indian
Government cannot afford is to antagonize its own
Tamils to the point of militant separatism. So far,
India has walked the tightrope carefully. Nonetheless,
one ethnic riot aimed at Tamils anywhere in India
could be the spark that ignites the separatist vision.
With this constraint, India cannot completely cut off
its Tamil citizens' aid to their brethren in Sri Lanka.
Two remaining groups of Tamils do not fit neatly on
the spectrum. They are the refugees living in India
and the wealthy overseas Tamil community. The
great diversity within both groups makes them
difficult to place. All of the refugees in India probably
are pro-Eelam to one degree or another and would
probably be afraid to return home until an
independent Tamil state was created to protect them.
These Tamils could become a major interest group in
south India. Some of the local people will support
them because of the perceived justice of their cause,
and some will hate them for destabilizing the region.
If they were to grow to very large numbers-which
could occur if the situation in the north continues to
deteriorate-they could become a major issue for
New Delhi.
The wealthier overseas Tamils are a different breed
entirely. They send money and give vocal support to
their brethren on the island, but they do not want to
go there themselves. To the degree that they are pro-
Eelam, they hope for an independent, capitalist state,
but it is also clear that these are the people who are
supplying much of the foreign money available to the
militants. Generally, the wealthier overseas Tamils
support the TULF and whatever position on
separation it takes.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4
Secret -
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100130001-4