THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP: OPTIONS FOR CASTRO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00126R001301760005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
mWa LOG6m
The Cuban Military Buildup:
Options for Castro
fret
NIE 8514-84/L
National Intelligence Estimate
November
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N I E 85/4-84/1-
THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP:
OPTIONS FOR CASTRO
Information available as of 15 September 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on 2 October 1984.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 11
The Size and Nature of the Cuban Military Buildup .................... 11
Conventional Deterrence ................................................................. 13
New Equipment ........................................................................... 13
Training ......................................................................................... 15
Military Construction ................................................................... 15
Gaps in Cuban Defenses .............................................................. 15
Offensive Capabilities ....................................................................... 17
Armed Intervention ...................................................................... 17
Regional Air Support .................................................................... 18
Naval Warfare .............................................................................. 19
SIGINT and Electronic Warfare ................................................. 20
Projected Force Improvements ........................................................ 21
The Payoff for Moscow .................................................................... 22
In Peacetime ................................................................................. 22
During a NATO-Warsaw Pact War ........................................... 24
Benefits for Havana .......................................................................... 24
International Implications ............................................................ 24
Domestic Advantages ................................................................... 25
Cuban Intentions ............................................................................... 26
Under Peacetime Conditions ....................................................... 26
During a NATO-Warsaw Pact War ........................................... 26
Influencing Castro's Choice in Wartime ..................................... 27
Annex C: Factors Affecting Cuban Participation in a
European War .....................................................................
Annex D: Castro's Military Options in a NATO-Warsaw Pact War 49
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SCOPE NOTE
Cuba's geographic position relative to the United States has
attracted the attention of American strategists for over a century-
especially as they searched for an American base from which to protect
the approaches to the Panama Canal, much later when Castro came to
power on the island and aligned his regime with the Soviet Bloc. The
buildup of Cuban military forces, supported by an increased volume of
Soviet military deliveries over the last few years, has posed new threats
for US strategic interests in the region. In peacetime, Havana's growing
military strength helps to support leftist governments and revolutionary
movements worldwide and to provide a shield for destabilizing activi-
ties in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. During a NATO-
Warsaw Pact war, Cuba's forces could threaten the southeastern United
States, access to the largest source of US-imported oil, strategic facilities
and pro-Western governments in the Caribbean Basin, and NATO
shipping passing through the Straits of Florida and the Yucatan
Channel.
This NIE addresses Cuba's improved military capabilities, the
political and economic benefits that accrue to Cuba and the USSR
therefrom, and the threats these might pose to US interests in the future.
In addition, the NIE examines Castro's options and intentions concern-
ing offensive actions in peacetime, as well as under the conditions that
might accrue in the event of a European war fought short of a strategic
nuclear exchange. The Estimate presents Havana's reactions to specific
events in terms of general capabilities to conduct off-island actions. The
NIE covers a five-year period and includes a projection of probable
additions to the Cuban arsenal during that timespan.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Cuban Military Capabilities and Intentions
Since the mid-1970s, Cuba's leaders have modernized their obsoles-
cent armed forces as a result of their armed intervention abroad and
their concerns about a direct US military reaction to their foreign
operations. The Cubans-with the support of the Soviet Union-have
improved their military capabilities by:
- Incorporating substantial numbers of new weapon systems-
particularly more modern jet fighters, air defense systems, and
naval combatants-into the force.
- Conducting more sophisticated training, including joint service
exercises and occasional combined exercises with Soviet units.
- Acquiring additional civil air and merchant fleet assets to
improve support for their forces overseas.
- Increasing the capability and size of their reserve forces by
incorporating thousands of combat-experienced reservists, and
forming a huge popular militia.
- Constructing redundant and hardened facilities to improve the
island's ability to withstand a conventional attack.
Prior to this buildup, Cuba was capable of defeating any invasion
force short of a full-scale effort by a major power. Now a campaign de-
signed to render Havana's armed forces impotent would require about
double the effort that would have been needed about four years ago. A
We believe that over the next five years Havana and its Soviet
patrons will continue to raise the cost of any military effort against
Cuba by integrating more modern weapons into the Cuban armed
services. By the end of this decade, Cuba will be an even more difficult
opponent-better able to defend itself, more capable of responding to
requests from revolutionary governments, and more useful to the
Soviets as a surrogate in Third World disputes. These anticipated
improvements to Cuban defenses also will raise costs of effective US
reactions to any particularly provocative Cuban acts-such as acquiring
more capable offensive systems or developing the offensive capabilities
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inherent in existing systems-that would pose new threats to US
interests. This is likely to make the enforcement of US limits on the
overall threat from-and Soviet presence in-Cuba more difficult.
The available evidence indicates that the Cubans plan to continue
to make increases in the size of each of their armed services over the
next five years. Their goal appears to be to fill out and standardize units
already in the field along with making continued improvements in their
already large militia force. All of Cuba's training exercises and the
nature of the bulk of its military equipment indicate that the primary
mission of these forces will be to defend the island, rather than conduct
off-island operations. There is at present no indication that either the
Cubans or the Soviets intend to change the basic mission orientation of
Cuba's armed forces during the period of this Estimate, although
weapon systems with more offensive potential are likely to enter the
Cuban inventory in the longer term.
We believe that over the next five years Havana will receive more
of the same types of weapons now in its inventory, In addition, new sys-
tems that are likely to be introduced in Cuba include:
- Nanuchka-class guided-missile patrol boats.
- Truck-mounted Styx coastal-defense missiles.
- IL-76 heavy transport aircraft.
- Advanced versions of the MIG-23 interceptor.
- A new tactical surface-to-air missile, such as the SA-8.
Barring strong US representations, Moscow may well provide Cuba with
SA-5 surface-to-air missiles as well.
We consider the introduction of other new systems to be possible,
but less likely. Among these are:
- T-72 tanks.
- MIG-25 interceptors.
- SU-24 attack aircraft. (s NF)
In Situations Short of War in Europe
Castro is developing a capability independent of the Soviet Union
to provide air defenses and/or supporting military forces to revolution-
ary groups and leftist governments. Should he choose to implement this
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capability, indications of such activity are likely to be difficult to detect
and ambiguous in nature:
- Havana now is capable of deploying and supporting some
10,000 troops in the Caribbean Basin to reinforce friendly
regimes or to attack lightly defended targets.
- Havana could covertly position several thousand troops in
Nicaragua using its regular flight schedule-we currently esti-
mate there are some 2,500 to 3,500 Cuban military and security
advisers in Nicaragua.
- In the case of smaller operations in the Caribbean region, Cuba
could now provide some light arms and infantry in a matter of
hours.
Over the next five years, Havana's ability to deploy troops
overseas, particularly in the Caribbean region, will grow as it receives
additional arms and transportation systems. This will pose a significant
threat of intervention and intimidation to Cuba's neighbors, although
Cuba will still lack the capability to successfully attack an opponent
defended by the United States, and off-island Cuban forces will remain
highly vulnerable to US military responses.
We believe that, in the absence of a major war in Europe or the
Caribbean, Havana's most likely strategy will be to continue to use its
military resources in ways calculated to avoid a military response by the
United States. Cuba's probable course, therefore, will be to support
insurgents, subversive elements, and leftist regimes-much as it did in
Grenada, and is doing in Nicaragua and Africa. Cuba currently has
some 45.000 military personnel abroad, the bulk of them in Africa.
We see no signs that Havana intends to undertake major offensive
military actions independent of the Soviet Union during the period of
this Estimate, although its armed forces will have an enhanced capabili-
ty to do so. Castro is unlikely to undertake direct armed aggression in
the Caribbean Basin because he probably believes that such an action
would provoke a confrontation with the United States that might result
in the loss of his vulnerable off-island forces or a punitive US action
against Cuba. Meanwhile, he probably calculates that acquiring new
weapons from the Soviet Union will not provoke a vigorous US response
as long as these weapons are not perceived by Washington as nosing a
significant threat to the US mainland
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How Cuba and the USSR Profit From Their Military Relationship
The Castro government considers the United States its principal
enemy and the greatest threat to the attainment of its basic national ob-
jectives: protecting the Revolution, fostering compatible regimes in the
Western Hemisphere, and supporting,, the spread of international
Communism. The buildup and modernization of the Cuban armed
forces and their facilities contribute to the attainment of these objectives
by:
- Deterring US military actions against Cuba.
- Improving Castro's ability to bolster revolutionary governments
and movements worldwide.
- Increasing the international stature of his regime.
- Prof essionalizing the officer corps.
Castro also derives certain domestic economic and political benefits
from improving his forces. Among these are:
- Enhancing the security of his regime by further militarization
of society.
- Transferring technical know-how to the Cuban economy.
- Reducing the problem of finding jobs for the post-Revolution
generation.
The Soviets have underwritten the conversion of Cuba into a
garrison state to benefit their own strategic objectives, as well as to
respond to Castro's requests. Moscow's strategy is congruent with
Havana's perceived defense requirements at several points:
- In peacetime. A militarily stronger Cuba, and the destabilizing
activities emanating from that Cuba, might cause US policy-
makers and military planners to focus increased attention on the
Caribbean Basin, and possibly redirect certain US political,
economic, and military assets away from the USSR's area of
primary interest, the Eurasian continent. By increasing the
threat to US interests posed by the Castro regime while
simultaneously raising the costs of military action against Cuba,
the Soviets have caused the US Government to reassess its
traditional economy-of-force strategy in the Caribbean Basin.
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- Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere is facilitated by a
secure Cuban state, which creates the opportunity to further
mask the Soviet hand.
- Improved Cuban defenses-and the presence of the 2,900-man
mechanized Soviet brigade-protect Soviet SIGINT and other
assets in Cuba.
- Proficiency in standard Soviet export arms makes Cuban sol-
diers more useful in surrogate roles in Africa and perhaps
elsewhere.
- Modernized Cuban forces visibly demonstrate the rewards of
being a Soviet ally.
- Cuban facilities make possible the regularized deployment of
Soviet air and naval forces in the Caribbean-materially en-
hancing Soviet reconnaissance capabilities against US air and
naval elements in the western Atlantic.
- In wartime. A Cuban threat to regional bases, sea lines of
communication, and the southeastern United States could dis-
tract Washington from events in Europe.
- The United States might use NATO-dedicated military re-
sources against Cuba in anticipation of -or response to-hostile
Cuban acts. At the least-regardless of whether Castro decided
to join in the hostilities-Cuban potential for offensive actions
could cause Washington to withhold forces from the European
theater to deter Havana.
Likely Cuban and Soviet Behavior During a
NATO-Warsaw Pact War
We judge it likely that Castro would seek to ride out the conflict,
hoping to avoid a major attack by US forces. He also would hope that
the superpowers would avoid a nuclear exchange. Havana almost
certainly would mobilize and disperse its forces in preparation for the
worst, but the unpredictable nature of events would keep Cuba's leaders
cautious-fully aware of their vulnerable position, the strength of US
forces, and the advanced alert status of US nuclear delivery systems. F
We do not believe the Cubans would directly attack strategic
regional facilities such as Mexican and Venezuelan oil refineries, the
Panama Canal, or Guantanamo Naval Station because of fear that such
actions would provoke a direct US response against Cuba, serve to
further isolate Cuba in the region, and cut off Havana's vital external
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sources of supply. However, Cuban forces may engage in low-level
harassment and sabotage, including covert efforts against these targets.
We believe that Castro would seek some assurance formula that
would place Cuba in a position of "nonbelligerency" with regard to the
United States, but not necessarily oblige him to intern Soviet forces in
Cuba. He probably would be responsive to US demands that included
political and economic incentives, allowed some room for face-saving
maneuvers, and were backed by highly visible US forces. Moreover,
Moscow might be satisfied with a passive contribution from Havana if
Pact forces were meeting their objectives, some US forces were being
withheld from combat in Europe because of Cuba, and Soviet intelli-
gence collection assets in Cuba were still productive.
There remains a chance that Castro might instead decide on a
much more aggressive course of action during a European war in
response to-or anticipation of-a US attack on Cuba, in reply to
pressure from the Soviets, or in the fatalistic belief-as reflected in
certain of his speeches-that the European conflict would result in a su-
perpower Armageddon. Even though Cuban attacks might temporarily
disrupt the local war effort, we consider it unlikely that any Cuban
military action against the United States would significantly detract
from US participation in the ongoing war in Europe.
Moscow might view a Cuban offensive against the sea lines of
communication in the Caribbean as an appropriate return on its
investment, but an antishipping campaign is in many ways the least
valuable action Castro could take on his own behalf. Such attacks would
make no contribution to Cuba's defense, would focus US military
attention on Cuba, and would squander resources essential to the
defense of the island.
We believe there is little chance that the USSR would deploy
nuclear weapons to Cuba during a period of greatly heightened tension.
We have low confidence in our ability to detect the delivery of nuclear
systems, particularly small cruise and air-to-surface missiles, but securi-
ty measures and field deployment actions probably would signal their
presence before they were operational, assuming sufficient resources
could be devoted to analyzing Cuban activities in such a scenario.
Nevertheless, there are significant gaps in our knowledge of
activities in Cuba. We cannot judge the quality of Soviet intelligence
collection from Cuba, so we are unable to gauge the value of Moscow's
Cuban sites in a European war. We cannot be sure of the quantity of
major weapons-or all of the types represented-in the Cuban arsenal.
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DISCUSSION
The Size and Nature of the Cuban Military
Buildup
1. Since the mid-1970s, Cuba's leaders have mod-
ernized their obsolescent armed forces as a result of
their armed intervention abroad and their concerns
about a direct US military reaction to their foreign
operations. The shipments of arms and military associ-
ated equipment that Havana has been given by the
Soviet Union over the last four years are the largest
since the missile crisis of 1962 (see figure 1). The
equipment now being provided to Castro is not the
latest in Soviet technology, although it is operated by
East European forces and several other recipients of
Soviet military aid. Nevertheless, these systems repre-
sent a considerable improvement in Cuban military
capabilities, bringing the level of Soviet technology in
Havana's forces forward at least a decade, from the
early 1960s to the mid-1970s
Figure 1
Soviet Deliveries of Military Goods to Cuba
as of 31 August 1984
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2. The first indication of a significant improvement
in Cuban military capabilities was the delivery of
improved Soviet guided-missile patrol boats, tanks,
and surface-to-air missiles in 1976. When the dramatic
delivery of MIG-23 jet fighters took place in 1978, the
reequipage was proceeding with great vigor. The 1980
US presidential campaign further heightened Castro's
perception of the threat from the United States. 25X1
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3. According to Castro's comments at the 26th
Anniversary of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed
Forces in December 1982, he asked Moscow to pro-
vide weapons ahead of the established 1981-85 sched-
ule. The evidence to date indicates that not only were
deliveries advanced to 1981 and 1982, but the entire
five-year modernization plan, agreed upon prior to the
US election, was upgraded to provide more weapons to
Cubal
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Table 1
Cuban Military and Security Forces,
Including Deployed Forces
Army (regulars)
100
110-120 135
Army (ready reserve)
60
110-135 135
Air and Air Defense Force
12
18.5 20
Ministry of Interior
(Special Troops)
2
2.53 5
Civil defense b
-
50-100 100
Border Guards
3
3.5 3.5
Police
10
12 15
Subtotal
263
1,197.5- 1,25
1,247.5
0.5
446.2
1,451.5- 1,56
1,537
1.5+
a Prior to 1980, this group was known as the National Revolution-
ary Militia-a largely paper organization that included civil de-
fense. After Castro's edict, it became the Militia of Territorial
Troops, exclusive of civil defense, and received training and arms.
b When mobilized, civil defense includes the police auxiliary,
firefighters, and similar organizations. Some reserve military per-
sonnel may be included in this category.
Conventional Deterrence
4. Prior to the current buildup, Cuba was capable
of defeating any invasion force short of a full-scale
effort by a major power. Now an invading force would
have to mount an even more substantial effort. The
types of equipment transferred to Cuba, the pattern of
indigenous training programs, and the nature of mili-
tary construction programs in progress throughout the
island have greatly increased Cuban defensive capabil-
ities. A campaign designed to render Cuba's armed
forces impotent would require about double the effort
that would have been needed about four years ago. A
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During a NATO-Warsaw Pact War
36. We believe Moscow's present wartime strategy
with respect to Cuba is to attempt to redirect the US
effort in support of NATO toward the Caribbean. The
Soviets probably believe that a Cuban threat to region-
al bases, sea lines of communications, or the southeast-
ern United States would distract Washington's atten-
tion from events in Europe; and would cause US
commanders to expend NATO-dedicated forces and
equipment against Cuban targets. At the very least,
Moscow would hope that, regardless of whether Castro
decided to join in the hostilities, Havana's increased
potential to make trouble in the region would cause
Washington to withhold forces from the European
theater to deter Cuban aggression.
37. In certain circumstances, the Kremlin might be
satisfied with a passive Cuban contribution to the war
effort: that is, in the event the pace of the war in
Europe met Moscow's expectations, if Pact success did
not depend on delaying or destroying US reinforce-
ments
38. We believe there is little chance that the USSR
would deploy nuclear weapons to Soviet forces in
Cuba during a period of greatly heightened tension.
conflict.
Although some Soviet leaders might calculate that the
reduced reaction time and improved accuracy gained
from land-based weapons in Cuba targeted against the
United States could have a decisive deterring effect on
Washington, Moscow's more likely conclusion would
be that the introduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba
would raise, rather than lower, the chance of a nuclear
exchange. We have low confidence in our ability to
detect the delivery of small systems-cruise or air-to-
surface missiles-because Havana's intelligence denial
measures have improved greatly during the buildup
period. However, we believe that security measures
and field deployment preparations almost certainly
would tip off their presence eventually.
Benefits for Havana
International Implications
39. The buildup and modernization of the Cuban
armed forces provides Castro with a number of advan-
tages. He has frequently acknowledged that Cuba
could not defeat a major US military force and could
not depend on Soviet support should the United States
move against him. However, Castro probably calcu-
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Secre
Caribbean Basin. The Caribbean ministates and Cen-
tral American governments must depend on the Unit-25X1
lates that raising the cost of an attack on Cuba gives
him greater freedom to continue his disruptive behav-
ior in other countries. Moreover, from within a garri-
son state, Castro can more readily take advantage of
opportunities to bolster revolutionary movements with
the knowledge that, while the United States might take
action against his exposed off-island forces, an Ameri-
can attack on Cuba is less likely
40. For many of Cuba's neighbors, Castro's power
projection capabilities are the most worrisome aspect
of the military buildup. Even though currently mod-
est, these capabilities are considerable compared to the
limited defenses of the pro-Western states of the
an alliance with Moscow and Havana.
ed States to deter outright Cuban aggression, but are
vulnerable to a domestic coup that could lead to a
"legitimate" request for Cuban forces to bolster a
minority government. Access to a secure port or
airfield would allow Castro to put several hundred
lightly armed troops ashore in a matter of hours, thus
presenting the United States with a difficult fait
accompli.
41. The expansion of the Cuban armed forces also
allows Havana to send forces overseas without signifi-
cantly weakening the island's defenses. These overseas
forces gain practical combat experience while demon-
strating Castro's commitment to support friendly revo-
lutionary movements. Cuba's status and influence in
the Third World also is increased as a result. In
addition, receipt of improved arms visibly demon-
strates Cuba's rising status in the Communist camp,
provides Castro with leverage in his dealings with
Third World nations, and allows potential Soviet client
states to see for themselves some tangible benefits of
Domestic Advantages
42. The Castro regime also derives certain domestic
benefits from an improved military capability. Among
these benefits are:
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- Increasing the domestic stature of the regime and
the armed forces.
- Enhancing the security of the regime by further
militarization of society.
- Prof essionalizing the officer corps.
- Obtaining modern military technology that has a
potential application to the Cuban economy.
- Providing employment for a large percent f
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43. The men who form the military arm of most
revolutionary movements frequently develop their
skills in a "learning-by-doing" fashion. Although Cu-
ba's senior military leaders have been exposed to
Soviet professional military education over the past
two decades, they have learned their trade primarily
through on-the-job experience. Military academies and
war colleges have been constructed to provide a steady
flow of more professional and technically prepared 25X1
officers to assume leadership roles in the larger, more
44. As in most Third World economies, the bulk of
Cuban workers have little opportunity to gain practi-
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Professional Military Education
successor. Should Fidel die or become incapacitated,
we do not believe that Raul's succession to power
would make a substantial difference in the judgments
Havana's long-term commitment to developing a
professional military is attested to by its construction of
new facilities for its military academies and postgradu-
ate military colleges. A new Cuban "West Point" is
under construction outside Havana and a fourth officer
candidate school was completed in 1980. A new naval
academy was built at Punta Santa Ana to produce
officers for the Cuban Navy, Merchant Marine, and
fisheries fleet. The new Cuban Air Academy at San
Julian accepted its first class of about 50 students in
September 1982; the graduates will receive a four-year
college education while qualifying for a fighter pilot
rating. These new facilities will graduate about four
times the number of professional officers each year than
their predecessors did, providing a gradual transition to
a larger, more technically competent officer corps to
replace over a period of two or three decades the
revolutionaries now at the helm.
cal experience with sophisticated equipment. By oper-
ating and maintaining more advanced Soviet weapon
systems, Cuban soldiers collect technical know-how for
eventual infusion into the Cuban economy, particular-
ly in the fields of electronics, communications, and
transportation.
45. Finally, expanding the armed services helps to
employ the fruits of the unprecedented surge in the
Cuban birth rate that occurred in the early 1960s-
almost 90 percent of the Cuban population is younger
than its 58-year-old leader. Castro has failed to whip
up the enthusiasm of the younger generation, who
have come to take the benefits of the revolution for
granted, lack the revolutionary zeal and motivation of
their parents, and have found little opportunity in the
stagnant Cuban economy. Castro probably hopes that
a system of national service-primarily military-
almost from cradle to grave-will provide the disci-
pline and maturity necessary to reinvigorate the Revo-
lution
46. Over the past three decades, Fidel Castro has
proved himself a capable leader under the most trying
circumstances. He remains firmly in control, by far
the most influential member of the revolutionary
cadre that controls Cuba. Fidel's brother Raul Castro,
the present Minister of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces, has been his alter ego at the top from their
days as guerrillas onward and remains his chosen
reflected in this Estimate.
47. We do not believe that Havana will use its
forces to undertake major offensive military actions in
the area during the next five years. Castro's defensive
posture during the events in Grenada clearly demon-
strated his awareness of the vulnerability of his forces
in off-island activity, his recognition of the limits of
Soviet protection, and his surprise at the depth of US
48. In our judgment, Havana almost certainly will
avoid a direct confrontation with the United States,
but will continue to support insurgents, subversive
elements, and leftist governments by providing arms,
advisers, and security specialists. Cuba's role in aiding
the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the New Jewel
Movement in Grenada is typical of its most likely
actions in pursuit of its long-range goal of fostering
ideolorcically compatible governments in this hemi-
sphere.
During a NATO-Warsaw Pact War
49. We believe it is likely that Castro, who tradi-
tionally has sought to keep his options open as long as
possible, would seek to ride out a European conflict in
the hope that the superpowers would avoid a nuclear
exchange. We believe the Cubans are firmly dedicated
to "proletarian internationalism," but not at the ex-
pense of the very survival of the Cuban revolution.
Fear of devastating US retribution remains the key
deterrent to Cuban adventurism, so Havana is unlikely
to come to the aid of Soviet leaders who have refused
repeatedly to formalize a military alliance and who
will remain far from the Caribbean regardless of the
outcome in Europe. Cuba's leaders recognize that the
most they could hope for in a serious crisis with the
United States would be a Soviet threat to escalate in an
area of Soviet hegemony-an empty gesture during a
NATO-Warsaw Pact war
50. We believe that Havana would seek to avoid
issuing a formal declaration of neutrality because it
would require Havana to comply with international
laws regarding the internment of the Soviet brigade
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and termination of Soviet communications and
SIGINT activities in Cuba. It seems more likely that
Castro would opt for some sort of "nonbelligerency," a
status not defined by international law, which might
allow him more flexibility in his dealings with the
combatants and other countries in the region (see
annex C for a fuller discussion of neutrality and other
restraints on Havana's offensive options).
51. Havana almost certainly would mobilize and
disperse its forces in preparation for the worst, but the
unpredictable nature of world events under such
unique circumstances would keep Cuba's leaders cau-
tious. If pressed by Moscow, Castro probably would
attempt to compensate for his military inactivity by
increasing anti-Western political, propaganda, and
subversive efforts in the Third World. Even though
Cuba officially remained a nonbelligerent, Castro
could argue with some justification that the mere
existence of his forces was diverting some US attention
and military might from Europe
52. Should Cuba's leaders direct their armed forces
to conduct hostile operations during a war in Europe,
the list of options that follows is arranged in order of
ascending risk-and descending likelihood of employ-
ment:
- Engage in low-intensity warfare in the region.
- Provide services to the Soviets.
- Attack pro-Western governments in the region.
- Attack strategic targets within his reach such as
oilfields in Mexico and Venezuela, the Panama
Canal, and Guantanamo Naval Station.
- Interdict NATO's sea lines of communication.
- Attack targets on the US mainland
53. It is our judgment that the Cubans are unlikely
to directly attack strategic regional facilities such as oil
refineries, the Panama Canal, or Guantanamo Naval
Station. Although Castro's forces might be able to
temporarily disrupt the flow of petroleum from the
region, such an action would leave Havana's own fuel
sources open to retaliation and most likely would result
in further isolation of the Castro regime. Impeding
traffic through the Panama Canal is well within
Cuban capabilities, but, here too, hostile Cuban ac-
tions probably would be counterproductive. The skele-
ton US combat unit at Guantanamo-some 300 to 400
Marines-would be unable to repel a determined
Cuban attack. Such an action would increase the risk
of a US attack on Cuba, however, without significantly
affecting the outcome of the war
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54. Havana might be tempted to take advantage of
US preoccupation with the situation in Europe to
improve its position in Central America. Castro might
attempt to use terrorism, subversion, and sabotage-
techniques in which his forces are competent-to aid
his local allies while avoiding a suicidal confrontation
with the United States. His intelligence apparatus
would keep him fully aware of the ongoing mobiliza- 25X1
tion of US forces-both conventional and nuclear-
and he would expect Washington to retain sufficient
reserves to destroy Cuba.
55. There remains some chance, however, that un-
der certain circumstances Castro might decide on a
much more aggressive course of action.' Unquestion-
ably, Havana would respond to a direct US attack with
every means at its disposal, but the possibility cannot
be excluded that in a highly charged situation Castro
might strike out against the United States or its
regional allies for a variety of reasons that include a
simple miscalculation of US intentions. For example, 25X1
Castro could employ a few thousand lightly armed
troops in actions against pro-Western governments in
the region if he believed that US attention was being
completely absorbed by the war in Europe. We do not
believe that Havana would deploy larger forces or
modern fighter aircraft in off-island actions in the face
of probable US military retaliation.
56. We believe that, while Moscow might view a
Cuban offensive against the NATO sea lines of com-
munication in the Caribbean as an appropriate return
on its investment, an antishipping campaign is in
many ways the least valuable action Castro might take
in his own behalf. Such attacks would make no
contribution to Cuba's defense, would focus US atten-
fine nn ('n}- an.A ,Whirl ennanrl, r rPcniirnPc Pcc,nfial
to the defense of the island. 25X1 '
Influencing Castro's Choice in Wartime
57. We believe the United States would be able to
play upon Castro's fears of holocaust to negotiate an
understanding with Cuba to stay out of the larger
conflict. Before hostilities began, Castro would be most
responsive to US demands that included political and
economic incentives, were couched in such a manner
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as to leave some room for face-saving maneuvers, and
were backed by highly visible forces sufficient to
execute our demands should negotiations fail. Castro
probably would drive a hard bargain, particularly
since buying time would benefit both the Soviet Union
and Cuba, but, in return for a US pledge not to attack
Cuba, he might agree to restrict his aircraft to island
defense and keep his naval combatants in port. He
probably would insist on his sovereign right to mobi-
lize and deploy his armed forces in a defensive
posture.
58. Negotiating limits to Soviet use of facilities in
Cuba probably would prove to be more difficult. We
believe that Castro could be convinced to terminate
Soviet operations from Cuban ports and airbases if he
were sure that Cuba's survival was at stake. Terminat-
ing Soviet intelligence activities through negotiations
would be nearly impossible; Havana has little influ-
ence over Soviet intelligence activities in Cuba, and a
direct confrontation between Cuban :forces and the
Soviet brigade might result. Furthermore, we probably
would be unable to determine whether Soviet intelli-
gence collection had been terminated. If the United
States were to demand that Cuba take action against
its Soviet mentors without leaving some room for
maneuver and face saving, Castro might reach the
conclusion that war was inevitable and move preemp-
tively against US targets
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ANNEX C
FACTORS AFFECTING CUBAN PARTICIPATION IN A EUROPEAN WAR
1. Castro's Choice of Status. If the political and
military situation in Europe were to deteriorate to the
point of imminent conflict, Havana would be forced
to make a decision on what status to adopt in relation
to the hostile camps. Three general choices are avail-
able-neutrality, non belligerence, and belligerence-
each of which poses some costs and benefits to the
Castro regime.
2. Official neutrality (see inset) offers Cuba the best
chance for surviving a great power clash, but would
severely complicate certain Soviet/Cuban relation-
ships. Under international law, Havana would be
obliged to terminate Soviet SIGINT operations and
military transmissions from Cuban territory, intern the
Soviet brigade and military advisers in Cuba, and
force Soviet naval vessels in Cuban ports to put to sea
in short order. Although some of these legalities could
be circumvented, a formal declaration of neutrality
would tie Castro's hands for the duration of the
conflict, severely limit his freedom of action after the
termination of hostilities, and force him into a con-
frontation with his Soviet mentors. A victorious War-
saw Pact almost certainly would consider a Cuban
declaration of neutrality to have been a sellout of the
socialist cause and at least terminate Soviet aid and
support if overthrow of Castro were not feasible.
3. However, a declaration of neutrality would not
impair Cuban support for regional revolutionaries.
Drawdown of NATO forces in the Caribbean Basin
probably could allow Havana to increase its support
for wars of national liberation and leftist governments.
Depending on the outcome of the European conflict,
Havana could be even more interested in diverting
American scrutiny from the Castro regime to Central
America
4. Adoption of a nonbelligerent status-not official-
ly recognized in international law-would blur the
technical niceties of neutrality while expressing Ha-
vana's desire to avoid a US attack. The problems of
Soviet sanctuary, intelligence operations, and troop
internment would remain contentious points of negoti-
ation between the United States and Cuba, but, as long
as Havana had some room for political face saving and
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Neutrality
1907 Hague Convention V, Respecting the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons.
Belligerents are likewise forbidden to-
(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless
telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of
communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea;
(b) Use of any installation of this kind established by
them before the war on the territory of a neutral Power
for purely military purposes, and which has not been
opened for the service of public messages.
A neutral Power which receives on its territory troops
belonging to the belligerent armies shall intern them, as
far as possible, at a distance from the theatre of war.
It may keep them in camps and even confine them in
fortresses or in places set apart for this purpose.
It shall decide whether officers can be left at liberty
on giving their parole not to leave the neutral territory
without permission.
1907 Hague Convention XIII, Concerning the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in the Naval
War.
In the absence of special provisions to the contrary in
the legislation of a neutral Power, belligerent warships
are not permitted to remain in the ports, roadsteads, or
territorial waters of the said Power for more than
twenty-four hours, except in the cases covered by the
present Convention.
If a power which has been informed of the outbreak
of hostilities learns that a belligerent warship is in one of
its ports or roadsteads, or in its territorial waters, it must
notify the said ship to depart within twenty-four hours
or within the time prescribed by local regulations.
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refrained from offensive military activity, hostilities
might be avoided. In answer to Soviet demands for
action, Havana could claim to be doing its best while
pointing out the reality of its vulnerable strategic
position. Moreover, choosing nonbelligerence would
not lock Castro into a permanent position, but would
allow him to reassess the situation as the war in Europe
progressed.
5. Cuban nonbelligerence was tested in war games
at the Naval War College in February and April 1984.
This status successfully masked a variety of Cuban
military and paramilitary actions in support of Latin
American allies without causing a direct confrontation
with US forces. As long as Cuba avoided being a party
to the European conflict, Havana was able to continue
to develop allies in the region at minimal risk.
7. A Cuban declaration of war, open alliance with
the Warsaw Pact, or a preemptive attack against the
United States is possible, but almost certainly would
guarantee a devastating response. Only if Castro were
certain that events would lead inexorably to his re-
gime's demise would he be likely to commit his people
to open warfare.
8. Fear of US Retribution.. Overwhelming US
military power is the single most effective deterrent to
Cuban military adventurism. Since the US election in
1980, Castro has cited the US threat to Cuba as the
cause of continued austerity measures and the Cuban
military buildup. He almost certainly expects that in
return for an attack on US facilities, cities, or ships,
Cuba would receive a massive retaliatory airstrike or
even an invasion. Mobilization of US forces would
reinforce his perception of the dangers inherent in his
position, particularly since Cuba lies within easy strik-
ing distance of a large part of US reserve units. Even
after the bulk of US forces were deployed to wartime
stations, Castro would expect Washington to retain
sufficient military strength to devastate Cuba if that
became necessary. From Havana's point of view, the
most awesome threat to Cuba is heightened by a
conventional war in Europe-US nuclear forces would
be at the highest state of alert and would influence all
decisions made in Havana.
9. Soviet Influence. Barring a preemptive US at-
tack upon Cuba, Moscow cannot be sure of Havana's
course of action. It is possible that the Soviets consider
a nonbelligerent Cuba from which they could contin-
ue to collect intelligence more rewarding than a
militarily active Cuba that would put their intelli-
gence assets at risk. If quality intelligence continued to
flow from Cuba and Pact forces achieved their objec-
tives on the Continent, Moscow might well be satisfied
with Havana's passive contribution.
the circumstances.
10. On the other hand, Moscow's objective might be
the diversion of US forces from a European conflict
and expenditure of those forces against non-Warsaw
Pact targets. If so, Moscow could demand active
Cuban military participation in the conflict or even
attempt to drag an unwilling Havana into the hostil-
ities. For example, US naval war games have indicated
that the Soviets through clandestine or covert actions
against either the United States or Cuba could provoke
the hostile response that Moscow might desire under
11. We are unable to ascertain Moscow's intended
role for Cuba, but allowing a conflict in Europe to
develop without committing Castro to hostilities keeps
open the maximum number of Soviet and Cuban
options. By encouraging preemptive attacks by either
the United States or Cuba, the Kremlin would free
Washington from the dilemma of stretching military
resources to cover both the war in Europe and an
undiminished Cuban threat to its strategic rear. =
12. Nationalistic and Ideological Consider-
ations. Cuba's revolution is highly nationalistic and
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firmly dedicated to its own survival. Cuba's leaders are 25X1
intensely loyal to Castro and would be unlikely to
advocate joining a war on behalf of the Soviet Union
without firm assurances about their future. Moreover,
a Cuban decision to initiate a war on the United States
almost certainly would meet popular resistance. There
would be little understanding and support for volun-
teering Cuba to become a martyr for the USSR.
13. Castro has been reminded on several occa-
sions-from the missile crisis of 1962 to recent events
in Grenada-that Cuba is not vital to Soviet interests
and that Moscow will not challenge US military power
in the Caribbean to save its ally. Given these painful
experiences, it is a virtual certainty that Castro would
view with suspicion and mistrust any Soviet attempts
to maneuver Cuba into an attack against the United
States or US forces en route to Europe
14. Costs vs. Benefits. On balance, Havana proba-
bly would calculate that the costs of participating in a
European war far outweigh any benefits to be gained
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thereby. Open hostility might gain the gratitude of the
Soviets, but would threaten Cuba's continued exist-
ence. Castro would be virtually guaranteed that any
hostile action on his part eventually would draw an
overwhelming reaction from the United States while
he was cut off from the Soviet aid upon which the
Cuban economy and military capability are based
15. Castro could improve his position by lowering
the level of hostility in the Caribbean. He could
moderate his nation's vulnerability by negotiating for
access to food and fuel in return for a statement of
"narrow" neutrality or nonbelligerence and restric-
tions on his military forces. Through this approach,
Cuba not only could survive the conflict, but also
might emerge substantially independent of Soviet
economic aid regardless of the outcome in Europe.
Elimination of the last vestiges of the US trade
embargo could help to spread enough Cuban influence
in the Caribbean Basin and diffuse the postwar US
threat to Cuba.
16. The Course of the War in Europe. As the
course of the conflict unfolds, Castro's position proba-
bly would become more difficult. Were the Warsaw
Pact forces to overwhelm NATO defenses rapidly,
there would be less pressure on Cuba to participate in
the war, although Havana might feel obliged to
explain its lack of support to the postwar Soviet
regime. Paradoxically, Castro might believe that a
NATO defeat would result in a US attack on Cuba in
order to have an unblemished US sphere of influence
to counterbalance Soviet domination of Eurasia. On
the other hand, every NATO success probably would
bring renewed Soviet pressure on Havana to delay or
divert the tide of US men and material en route to
Europe.
17. A stalemate in Europe is perhaps the most
perplexing situation that Cuba's leaders might face-
pressured by both sides, deprived of external supple-
ments of food and fuel, and able to assist only the
party that could not come to their aid. Havana's safest
course would be to cement regional relationships in
the hope that neither superpower would resort to using
nuclear weapons to terminate the war and both were
too drained by the conventional conflict to take
revenge on Cuba. In short, a brief superpower conflict
would not be in Cuba's interest, and a longer conflict
would be even more dangerous.
18. Tactical Nuclear Weapons. The use of tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe would foreclose many of
Castro's options. He would view the resulting war as
the immediate precursor to his long-anticipated Arma-
geddon between the superpowers: Castro's speeches-
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and Soviet doctrine-have strongly affirmed that
crossing the nuclear threshold "would lead to the end
of mankind." Under these circumstances, Castro's
behavior is unpredictable: he might lash out against
the United States in the belief that American devasta-
tion of Cuba was inevitable, or he might choose a low-
profile defensive posture in the hope that Cuba would 25X1
be ignored in the strategic exchange that followed.=25X1
19. The Impact of Events Elsewhere. Cuba's
proximity to the United States places it in a far more
precarious position than other Soviet allies who might
answer Moscow's call to arms-few Soviet client states
would directly confront US forces were they to make
war on their neighbors. Castro could claim that the
unique circumstances that apply to Cuba would miti-
gate against a Cuban offensive regardless of events in
other theaters, or, if pressed, he might initiate anony-
mous unconventional military actions in areas farther
from the United States in an effort to satisf the
Soviets without increasing the risk to his country
20. Cuban Vulnerabilities. Havana imports over
90 percent of its total petroleum supplies, almost all of
its capital goods and transportation equipment, and
more than half of its food. If Cuba's petroleum tanks
were full at the outset, rationing of fuel might extend
the supply to six months, but food consumption would
drop rapidly to low-protein subsistence levels, and the
Cuban economy would grind to a halt for lack of spare
parts. Cuba would attempt to secure regional sources
of its most needed imports, but lacks the hard curren-
cy necessary to support international trade. With
limited raw materials and practically no finished
products to exchange for supplies, Castro would have
difficulty finding trading partners. Military pressure
could force Havana to consume fuel and food at
higher than subsistence rates and, if supported by a
fuel embargo, might cripple Cuba's armed forces
within a few months.
21. We believe that an unprovoked Cuban offen-
sive against the United States would generate some
popular discontent in Cuba. Havana has voiced con-
cern over the apparent lack of revolutionary fervor
and ambition in Cuba's youth, and many Cubans have
relatives in the United States. Neither of these groups
would be eager to initiate military action against US
targets even if politically prepared in advance. F
22. Castro's forces overseas would be cut off from
their sources of supply and left to their own devices.
These units-are too small to be of much use in Europe,
even if the Soviets could transport them to the war
zone. Only the reduced Cuban military contingent in
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Ethiopia might be capable of reaching a strategic tar-
get-the Bab el Mandeb-but they would face French
Foreign Legionnaires in Djibouti. Castro most likely
would take the same tack he (lid with his forces in
Grenada: call upon them to do their duty without hope
of reinforcement or aid for the foreseeable future.
23. Havana and Moscow are certain to raise the cost
of an attack on Cuba by continuing to upgrade the
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Cuban inventory over the next five years, but outside
their defensive perimeter, Cuban armed forces will
remain vulnerable to an overwhelming retaliatory
blow delivered by a small portion of US forces.
Regardless of Moscow's aid, Havana does not have the
economic, physical, and population resources neces- 25X1
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Basin.
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CASTRO'S MILITARY OPTIONS IN A NATO-WARSAW PACT WAR
1. Should Cuba's leaders direct their armed forces
to conduct hostile operations during a European war,
the list of options that follows is arranged in order of
ascending risk-and descending likelihood of employ-
ment. Washington's preoccupation with the war in
Europe, Soviet pressure for Cuban action, and Castro's
own reading of the postwar environment are the
primary factors that would influence him to refrain
from hostilities or choose from among these alterna-
tives
2. Low-Intensity Warfare. Havana could plausibly
deny its involvement in acts of terrorism, sabotage,
and unconventional warfare conducted in the region.
Special Troops, underwater demolitions teams, or Cu-
ban agents in place are proficient in unconventional
military operations. Elements of such units could be
inserted on short notice along virtually any coastline in
the area by Cuban submarines and patrol craft, fishing
boats, or pleasure vessels. If sufficient time were
available, even commercial vehicles could be used to
pre-position small groups of terrorists and saboteursF-1
3. While it is possible that Castro might turn loose
as many as 2,000 to 3,000 terrorists and saboteurs, we
believe the practical limit of his clandestine transpor-
tation systems to be less than 1,000 people. Even so, a
carefully orchestrated campaign could disrupt the war
effort in selected areas of the United States and
distract US military planners from deploying forces
against their primary adversaries{
4. Services to Combatants. We believe that peace-
time Cuban intelligence collection enhances and com-
plements known Soviet targeting, and that most if not
all Cuban results are shared with Moscow. Cuban
collectors would be employed to monitor US mobiliza-
tion, deployment, and alert status for information
critical to their own defense efforts, and pass their take
to the Soviets without endangering Cuba.
5. The United States would force the termination of
Soviet reconnaissance flights from Cuba early in the
conflict, and, if other. Soviet strategic delivery systems
arrived in Cuba during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war,
Cuban options to remain outside the conflict almost
certainly would be foreclosed. However, war games
conducted by the Naval War College Strategic Studies
Group demonstrated that Havana could provide re-
arming, refueling, and minor repairs to Soviet subma-
rines operating in the region. Punta Movida's newly
constructed submarine handling facilities would be
suitable for servicing operations.
6. Attacks Against Pro-Western Governments. If
Castro believed that the United States was fully
preoccupied with the war in Europe, he might opt to
deploy a portion of his armed forces to Central
America or the eastern Caribbean. The most likely
forces to be used in off-island adventures are the
Special Troops, the Landing and Assault Brigade, or
lightly armed infantry units. Havana could initiate a
major military action abroad by operating through a
safe air or sea port with these forces, but lacks the
logistics base to support independently larger maneu-
ver elements in the field. Havana might use obsoles-
cent aircraft such as its early model MIG-21s to
support surface actions while a power vacuum existed
in the Caribbean, but the deployment of more modern
Cuban fighters f the island in the face of q US
threat is unlikely.
7. Destroying Strategic Regional Targets. Cas-
tro's forces are capable of attacking strategic targets in
the region, such as the oil resources of Mexico and
Venezuela, the Panama Canal, and Guantanamo Na-
val Station, but each has certain characteristics that
make such attacks counter to Cuban interests and
difficult to prosecute:
- Regional Oil Resources. The US war effort
would be fueled in large part from Mexico and
Venezuela. Cuba could reach the key ports and
refineries only by direct seaborne commando
raids against the facilities, or, in the case of
Mexico, by operating its aircraft through Nicara-
guan airfields. Either way, Cuban forces would
be exposed to foreign reaction and implicated in
an unquestionably hostile act. A campaign
against the ports and refineries might disrupt the
flow of petroleum from the region temporarily,
but would put Havana's own regional fuel
sources at risk. The most likely result of a Cuban
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attack on Mexico or Venezuela would be the
further isolation of the Castro regime.
- The Panama Canal. The Canal is vulnerable to
attack in many forms, but its massive construc-
tion makes its basic structure almost impervious
to conventional explosives. War games have
demonstrated that scuttling merchant vessels in
the locks might be the best method to delay the
flow of traffic through the Canal. Sinking a ship
laden with dry bulk cargo could close a lock for
several days and force local authorities to impose
security restrictions that further impeded passage
for an indefinite period.
- Guantanamo. The skeleton US combat element
at Guantanamo-some 300 to 400 Marines-
would be unable to repel a determined Cuban
attack. At best, Guantanamo would remain an
extremely vulnerable bargaining chip in US-
Cuban negotiations. It would be of little military
value to either side during the conflict.
8. An Antishipping Campaign. From the Soviet
point of view, the best return for Moscow's investment
in Cuba might be earned by a Cuban campaign
against NATO vessels in the sea lines of communica-
tion through the Caribbean (see figure D-1). About 40
percent of the US military goods pledged to NATO
and 85 percent of the fuel necessary to propel our war
effort in Europe are scheduled to transit the sea
channels bordering Cuba. Sinking NATO shipping
would simultaneously decrease the flow of war materi-
als and tie down US forces in this hemisphere, giving
Castro an opportunity to effect the outcome of a war
in Europe. However, from the Cuban perspective, an
attack on NATO shipping is in many ways the least
valuable action that Havana could take and makes no
contribution to Cuba's defense. Instead, such an attack
would focus US attention on Cuba and squander
resources essential to the defense of the island in
support of a benefactor incapable of coming to Ha-
vana's aid prior to the cessation of hostilities in
Europe.
9. The primary threats to NATO sea lines of com-
munication are Foxtrot-class submarines, Styx missiles
fired from Osa and Komar patrol boats, and attack
aircraft, in that order. The Foxtrot is the modern
equivalent of the World War II U-boat-somewhat
larger and more capable than the German submarines
that conducted devastating patrols off the Gulf ports
in 1942. Although Havana could employ its subma-
rines to conduct torpedo attacks and lay mines, addi-
tional training is needed in both applications for these
weapon systems to reach their full combat potential. (s
10. The Styx missile is judged to be at least 70
percent reliable against undefended targets under the
conditions that prevail in the Caribbean. Cuban crews
are proficient in missile operations and could threaten
unprotected shipping, but the likelihood of successful
attacks could be significantly diminished by US air
patrols over choke points. An initial surprise raid
would have the best chance for success; however,
further opportunities could be severely limited by a
fairly small defending force using aggressive counter-
measures in the confined areas adjacent to Cuba. In
any case, Cuba probably would want to keep its Osa
force intact for island defense
antishipping operations.
11. All Cuban aircraft could be used against NATO
shipping, but lack of pilot proficiency in antiship
warfare would limit their effectiveness. Coastal patrols
by armed helicopters have increased recently and
have included firing on vessels violating Cuban waters,
and, although Cuban pilots have not been trained to
conduct air-to-surface or antitank missile attacks on
ships at sea, they might be used to locate targets to be
attacked by other weapon systems.
12. A Direct Attack on the US Mainland. Castro
could opt for a direct attack on the US mainland to
dramatically demonstrate Cuban military ability in
response to or in anticipation of a US attack on Cuba,
in answer to a request for aid from the USSR, or in the
belief that the European conflict was sure to result in a
superpower Armageddon that would destroy civiliza-
tion. Castro would expect that this desperate alterna-
tive would guarantee a massive US response; it certain-
ly violates the primary Cuban objective of survival by
focusing US military attention directly on Cuba.
13. If this option were selected, a full mix of Cuban
military capabilities probably would be employed.
Most likely, terrorists and unconventional warfare
experts would infiltrate into the United States, and
Cuban agents already in place would be activated.
Cuban aircraft could conduct a limited number of
attacks on US mainland targets, the success of which
would depend in great measure on the state of US
defenses. While Cuban raids might temporarily dis-
rupt the local US efforts to support the war in Europe,
it is unlikely that any Cuban military action against
the US mainland would significantly detract from US
participation in the ongoing European war.
50
Secret
25X1
25X1
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/27: CIA-RDP87TO01 26RO01 301760005-7
Figure D-1
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)
Boundary representatior is
not necessarily authoritative.
500 Kilometers
TLT
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Cuba . _
Windward~\\ 11
~__ :~`., ~Passaoe
car ~r