IMPACT UPON U.S. SECURITY OF A SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00126R001201660002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 85
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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IMPACT UPON U.S. SECURITY
OF A SOUTH AFRICAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY
Final
April 1981
Technical Note
SSC-TN-1200-1
By: Kenneth L. Adelman
Albion W. Knight (Consultant)
SRI Project 1200
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
SRI International
1611 North Kent Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209
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IMPACT UPON U.S. SECURITY
OF A SOUTH AFRICAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY
Final
April 1981
Technical Note
SSC-TN-1200-1
By: Kenneth L. Adelman
Albion W. Knight (Consultant)
SRI Project 1200
Approved:
Richard B. Foster
Senior Director
Strategic Studies Center
This Technical Note contains the findings relating to a specific set
of research questions. The views and conclusions contained in this
document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted
as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or
implied, of SRI International or any of its clients.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARy
The primary focus of this research project is on the impact upon United
States security interests of South Africa's acquiring an overt nuclear
weapons capability. The research was built upon the five assumptions that:
a) South Africa's government will remain firstly Afrikaner-dominated,
secondly determined to preserve Afrikaner survival regardless of internal or
external opposition, and thirdly strong militarily, economically, and
politically despite assaults to the government; b) the southern African
region will experience less military conflict, due to resolution of conflict
in Zimbabwe, yet still politically tense; c) the global security situation
of the United States will remain serious, if not grave in the decade ahead;
d) the U.S. will move toward lessening its energy dependence though primary
U.S. allies will continue to depend upon Persian Gulf oil; and ,e) nuclear
proliferation will continue to be opposed by the U.S. government.
sit- -
Previous research by the SSC/SRI i
ndicated that South Africa possesses
tin ?....L__7 __s
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vival and the state's security. The critical factor in such a decision will
not be technological but rather Psychological, namely, the politico-strategic
perspectives of the rulers. Due to several factors discussed at length in
the report, such action could be undertaken sooner than one might otherwise
expect or sooner than might seem warranted by those in the outside world.
Afrikaner rulers will make this decision primarily independent of U.S.
security interests, though U.S. actions in Africa and around the world will
influence that decision.
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An overt nuclear weapons capability by South Africa would indirectly
and adversely effect Western access to vital natural resources in several
ways. Should the American reaction to South Africa'a clear acquisition
of nuclear weapons prove too harsh, then Pretoria could conceivably cut off
various critical minerals to the U.S,, thereby halting the flow of metals
key to high technology industries which in turn, are critical to U.S.
national security. Should Washington's reaction be judged insufficient by
northern and black African nations, they too might retaliate by minimizing
or eliminating U.S. access to their resources, including oil. Admittedly,
both types of embargoes would be costly to the African nation(s) undertaking
them, and might be temporary in duration; still, each lies within the realm
of possibility. One possible remedy lies in the prudent expansion of
critical minerals stockpiles so as to permit the U.S. government leeway in
the event of such embargo. Another lies in the careful consideration of
potential U.S. retaliatory threats or even actions to counteract the threat
or reality of a mineral or oil embargo.
An overt nuclear weapons capability by South Africa would adversely
effect U.S. and Western political interests. Western powers would then be
castigated by Third World countries for past nuclear cooperation with the
Republic and would be challenged to impose harsh U.N. economic and political
sanctions. The inevitable Western reaction to such an action by Pretoria
would hurt Western ties to South Africa itself, thereby encouraging the
Afrikaners to proceed towards self-dependence in a host of areas and towards
greater isolation.
Display of such a nuclear capability might inflame the security
situation in southern Africa during periods of relative tranquility, since
neighboring states may then be encouraged to welcome more Soviet and
allied (i.e., Cuban, East German) involvement. During times of real turmoil,
however, this display could dampen the ongoing conflict through its inevi-
table sobering effect upon the Republic's adversaries.
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Within the military realm, an overt nuclear weapons capability by South
Africa would make Western security cooperation with the Republic all the more
imperative yet all the more difficult, It would be imperative since Western
capitals would then be more eager to learn the possible use of this capability
and to influence decisions within this realm. Yet it would be more difficult
due to the higher political barriers which would arise after a South African
nuclear display.
A clear South African nuclear capability might be helpful to Western
security interests in one respect, namely,if Pretoria decided to produce
nuclear anti-submarine weapons. An announced ASW nuclear capability would
enhance South Africa's capability to protect the Cape route during times of
global tension or global confrontation. Since such an ASW weapon could easily
be converted into a nuclear gravity bomb, South Africa could simultaneously
gain a deterrent capability with respect to threats it perceives as looming
from ground assaults in the region. To serve overall Western security inter-
ests in this manner, Western-South African security cooperation would have to
be far more extensive and intensive than presently exists.
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This project on a potential South African nuclear capability continues
many years of research at the Strategic Studies Center of SRI in pro-
liferation-nonproliferation studies and in African affairs.
The basis for studies in the proliferation field was a model of
monitoring nuclear proliferation which was created by Richard B. Foster,
James E. Dornan, Jr., and associates of the Strategic Studies Center.
This model provides an integrative framework for assessing political,
military, economic, and technical factors bearing on nuclear proliferation
tendencies in Nth nations. On the basis of this model, Kenneth L. Adelman
and Albion W. Knight researched and wrote "Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation:
A Case Study on South Africa" for the Defense Intelligence Agency (April
1979).
Studies by the Strategic Studies Center on African security affairs
began three years ago with "U.S. Security Interests and Options in Central
Africa" by Kenneth L. Adelman for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (December 1977). The African program con-
tinued with a study by Kenneth L. Adelman and John Seiler, "Alternative
Futures in Southern Africa," again for the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs (November 1979). This effort was
followed by the case study of South Africa for monitoring nuclear pro-
liferation which Adelman and Knight researched for DIA.
Richard B. Foster
Senior Director
Strategic Studies Center
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I RESEARCH PROBLEM AND ASSUMPTIONS
. . . . . . . . . . .
A. Study Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. World Attention on a South African Capability . . .
B. Summary of South African Capability . . . . . . . .
III UTILITY FOR SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS . . . . . . .
A. Afrikaner World View. . . . . . . . . . .
B. Foundations of South Africa's Politico-
Strategic Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Key Politico-Strategic Perspectives in
Defense and Intellectual Circles. . . . . . . . . .
D. The Utility of Nuclear Weapons: Speculation . . . .
E. The Utility of Nuclear Weapons: One Voice . . . . .
F. South Africa Decision-Making on Security Affairs. .
G. Conclusions: South African Overt Nuclear Weapons
Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PROLIFERATION ON WESTERN
ECONOMIC INTERESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. American Economic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. European Economic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. The Importance of Outside Interests to the
South African Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. The Effect of South African Proliferation
on Economic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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V THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PROLIFERATION ON WESTERN
INTERESTS IN ACCESS TO STRATEGIC MATERIALS . . . . . . . . 31
A. American Resource Interests in South Africa . . 32
B. European and Japanese Resource Interests. . . . . . . 34
C. Soviet Strategy on Minerals . . . . . . . . . . . 36
D. The Effect of South African Proliferation on
Western Mineral Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
VI THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PROLIFERATION ON
WESTERN POLITICAL INTERESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A. African Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B. The Effect of South African Proliferation on
African Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
C. Regional Stability: South Africa Within
the Region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
D. The Effect of South African Proliferation on
Regional Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
E. Conclusions: The Effect of South African Proliferation
on Western Political Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . 56
VII THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PROLIFERATION ON
WESTERN MILITARY INTERESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A. Western Commercial Interests in the Cape Route. 58
B. Western Military Interests in the Cape Route. . . . . 59
1. The Persian Gulf Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2. The Strategic Nuclear Link . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3. Qualifications to the Cape's Importance. . . . . 62
C. Soviet Interests and Capabilities in the Cape Route . 65
D. South African Capabilities on the Cape Route. . . . . 67
E. South Africa's Reaching Out for Allies. . . . . . . . 68
F. The Effect of South African Nuclear Proliferation on
Western Military Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
VIII SOUTH AFRICAN PROLIFERATION AND WESTERN
SECURITY INTERESTS IN GENERAL. . . 74
. . . . . . . . . . .
A. Human Rights and Political Relations with
The Third World . . . . . . . . . . . 74
B. U.S. National Security Interests in the
Decade Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
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1 South Africa's Mineral Importance to the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . 33
2 Percentage of Imports from South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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I RESEARCH PROBLEM AND ASSUMPTIONS
The main problem under investigation in this research project is to
determine the impact upon U.S. security interests of South Africa's
acquiring an overt nuclear weapons capability.
Previously, the same team of primary researchers, Kenneth Adelman and
Albion Knight of SRI's Strategic Studies Center, investigated the matter
of monitoring South African nuclear proliferation. The study found that
"the panoply of technological, political, strategic, and economic factors
all point to the conclusion that South Africa does indeed have the techno-
logical and economic capability to produce nuclear weapons." 1 More
specifically, we found that South Africa has:
? A sufficient scientific and industrial base on which to
conduct a nuclear weapons R&D program;
? A laboratory structure capable of supporting nuclear
weapons development in addition to its existing program
to develop methods of enriching uranium;
? Access to technology needed for nuclear weapons develop-
ment in spite of strong international efforts to isolate
it in military related matters;
? More than adequate resources to support both a nuclear
weapons program and continued strong participation in
the international uranium market;
? the capacity to produce fissionable materials required
for a small number of nuclear weapons, a capability that
can increase over the next five years;
1 Kenneth L. Adelman and Albion W. Knight, "Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation
A Case Study on South Africa," SSC-TN-7552-1, SRI/Strategic Studies Center,
(April 1979).
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A tightly controlled, efficient structure capable of
managing a nuclear weapons development-and-production
program, either covert or overt;
The industrial infrastructure capable
production of nuclear weapons; and
Existing operational aircraft capable
nuclear weapons at ranges appropriate
needs.
The focus of attention in the
of
to
supporting the
delivering
its defense
previous study was, as the title indi-
cates, upon "monitoring nuclear proliferation" and not upon assessing the
impact of such nuclear proliferation. The study at hand does this, as it
examines the implications of South Africa overtly possessing nuclear
weapons upon American security interests both regionally and globally.
This is a critical topic if U.S. policymakers are to anticipate future
events rather than merely to react to present events or alter policies in
response to past occurrences. For we believe that an overt South African
nuclear capability could constitute as momentous an event in proliferation
history of the 1980s as the overt Indian capability did in the 1970s.
Events since the completion of the SRI/SSC study of April 1979 have
enhanced the salience and importance of the subject at hand, i.e., the
impact upon U.S. security interests of an open South African nuclear
weapons program. In particular, the publicly-unexplained September 1979
event in the South Atlantic Ocean below the Cape of Good Hope aroused
world-wide interest as to whether South Africa did conduct, or cooperate
in conducting, a nuclear test at that time.
To best organize the topic, we consider the repercussions upon U.S.
security interests in southern Africa or in the African region generally;
second, upon U.S. security interests throughout the world; and third,
upon U.S. security interests in halting the spread of nuclear prolifera-
tion in general.
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A. Study Assumptions
In order to impose reasonable limitation upon this broad topic, the
following assumptions are made:
First, we assume that South Africa's government will remain over
the near-term future basically as it stands today: Afrikaner-dominated,
determined to preserve its own survival regardless of the opposition,
making reforms to break down the odious apartheid system, but without
reducing the Afrikaners' grip on the power of the state and especially
over their own affairs, and finally retaining a psychologically battered
but militarily, economically, and politically strong entity.
Second, we assume that the region of southern Africa will experience
less military conflict though more political conflict than in previous
years; thereby, we assume that the elected government in Zimbabwe headed
by Robert Mugabe brings a measure of stability to that war-torn state.
Nonetheless, with three black Marxist governments--those of Angola,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe--now upon its borders (or borders of its territory),
South Africa will be assaulted politically in a major way and militarily
more than ever before.
Third, we assume that the global security situation will remain quite
serious. In fact, we believe that American security in the 1980s will be
tested or even endangered given: a period of Soviet nuclear strategic
superiority, the onset of Soviet reliance upon Persian Gulf oil, and the
continued dependence of Western nations upon overseas resources, primarily
Persian Gulf oil, but also minerals from Africa. We assume that if the
Soviet Union's aggressive behavior extends beyond Afghanistan, American
leaders may perceive the nation's security in terms of national survival.
This then would fundamentally alter the U.S. response to an open South
African nuclear capability.
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Fourth and related, we assume that the U.S. will move satisfactorily
on the energy front to reduce its dependence upon foreign oil. Nonethe-
less, the inescapable dependence upon Persian Gulf oil of our primary
allies in Western Europe and Japan will continue to make the flow of oil
-and hence the Cape of Good Hope route--of critical importance to U.S.
security interests. This will be the case throughout the 1980s regardless
of how successful U.S. energy programs, or even those of allied nations,
may prove.
Fifth, we assume that the U.S. government will continue to place high
priority upon its longstanding nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy.
However, whether that policy would be applied rigorously to South Africa or
to any strategically located state (e.g. Pakistan) would depend upon a
number of factors including:
? The status of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic balance and
overall superpower relations;
? The degree of threat to Western resource needs obtained
in the Middle East and Africa; and
? The timing of political events in the United States
--whether an overt South African nuclear capability
occurred before or after the 1980 presidential
election--and of critical events around the world.
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II SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
Before evaluating the impact an overt South African nuclear capa-
bility would have on a number of U.S. national security interests, it is
necessary to sketch the backdrop to this topic. This consists of such
elements as: technological aspects of South African nuclear activities;
possible organizational and management approaches to its work in this
area; the political and military utility a South African nuclear weapons
capability might provide; views of top South African officials on these
matters; and the governmental structure which influences:the..decision-
to have a covert nuclear capability.'
A. World Attention on a South African Capability
The possibility of South Africa acquiring a nuclear weapons capa-
bility raises fears throughout both Africa and the Western world. Such
a possibility was suggested to some observors when in November 1979, a
flash was "heard around the world"--a sudden, blinding light in the
South Atlantic that some scientists considered proof of a nuclear
explosion. It also seemed possible in August 1977 when Soviet intelli-
gence spotted structures in the Kalahari Desert which may be part of
a nuclear-device testing facility, though this is still speculative.
These events set off their own chain reactions with outcries emerging
from every corner of the world. President Carter criticized the Republic
and pledged that the United States would renew its efforts to "encourage
Some of this material has been summarized from the previous SRI/SSC study,
some taken from further research contained in: K. L. Adelman and A. Knight,
"Can South Africa Go Nuclear?" Orbis, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall 1979), pp. 633-647;
and most is the result of research conducted specifically for this study
project.
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South Africa to place all their nuclear power production capabilities
under international safeguards and inspections and encourage them...
to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty." The State Department's non-
proliferation leader at the time, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., told Congress
that it was essential to bring South African capabilities and motivations
within the international safeguards system and the aegis of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. "Whatever policy choices we make, we must focus
our vital interests in keeping Africa free of nuclear weapons." 1
B. Summary of South African Capability2
The management of South Africa's nuclear research could well reside
in an ad hoc interdisciplinary team from a variety of government research
institutions, the most prominent being: a) the Atomic Energy Board
which was established by the 1948 Atomic Energy Act to control nuclear
activities, and maintains a tight security laboratory facility at
Valindaba that could make use of the nuclear expertise of the National
Nuclear Research Center at nearby Pelindaba; b) the Council for Scientific
and Industrial Research (CSIR), which maintains fourteen national research
laboratories and conducts extensive research directly related to weapons
design and the production mission; and c) ARMOR (Armaments Development
and Manufacturing Corporation of South Africa), which also has the
capability to tap the necessary industrial competence but has perhaps
too high a profile. The smartest move for Pretoria would be to place
nuclear weapons research under the aegis of CSIR, either until the program
is revealed publicly or until the number of weapons produced exceeds
the capability of a pilot production line within a laboratory facility.
For nuclear weapons R&D, South Africa can build upon its existing
nuclear-fuels program. Early in the atomic age, South Africa decided
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations,
95th Congress, 1st Session., United States-South Africa Relations:
Nuclear Cooperation (Washington: GPO, 1978), p. 43.
2 This section summarizes conclusions of our earlier cited April 1979
study which are pertinent background to this study.
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to take advantage of its position as a major source of nuclear fuel. In
the mid-1960s, the Atomic Energy Board decided to exploit economically as
many elements of the nuclear fuel cycle as possible, using a light-water
reactor fuel cycle. South Africa has concentrated on the "front end"
of the cycle--extraction and mining--and now leads the world in uranium-
extraction technology. Apparently with British help, it has developed
facilities for the conversion of uranium oxide to gaseous uranium tetra-
flouride and hexaflouride.
To produce nuclear weapons, South Africa must begin uranium enrichment--
surely one of the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. When
used as fuel for light-water pressurized reactors, natural uranium must
be enriched from the 0.7 percent in its natural state to about 3 percent.
On July 20, 1970, Prime Minister Vorster announced that South Africa's
nuclear scientists had developed a new and "unique" method of uranium
enrichment. The Parliament soon authorized the construction of a pilot
enrichment plant at Valindaba, and by April 1975, it was in operation.
Shortly thereafter, Dr. A.J.A. Roux, president of the Atomic Energy Board,
gave the first technical description of the "unique" process at the
European Nuclear Conference in Paris.l
According to its scientists, South Africa's enrichment facilities
used a new "aerodynamic" technique. Through contacts in the West
German program, they were versed in the centrifuge process which is more
energy-efficient than any aerodynamic process. Most likely, South Africa
is developing--as a first-generation production process--a variant of the
Becker-nozzle-aerodynamic-enrichment technique, while exploring other
enrichment technologies. Because of its broad enrichment research program,
its scientists can repidly exploit any breakthroughs in the other techniques.
1 A.J.A. Roux and W. L. Grant, "Uranium Enrichment in South Africa"
(an unpublished paper), April 1975.
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Should South Africa be developing a bomb, it would not need to test
the device, as was feared to be underway during the 1977 "bomb scare" or
the 1979 "flash." As Dr. Edward Teller ca id, "a simple fission bomb can
be built with no testing at all." 1 The simple bomb that devastated
Hiroshima was never tested. Israel most probably has nuclear weapons
capability without having conducted overt tests. It is clearly within
South Africa's competence to have designed a similar fission bomb without
large-scale testing.
Given its technical capabilities, it is Altogether possible that
South Africa'a initial nuclear weapons capabilities would have the
following characteristics. First, it could develop several low-yield
fission-type nuclear devices which could easily be adapted into gravity
bombs or into anti-submarine warfare weapons which could be deployed
from aircraft or from surface vessels. Second, due to its more sophis-
ticated design requirements and high cost of special nuclear material,
it would be unlikely that South Africa would have a nuclear artillery
capability in its initial grouping of weapons. Third, South Africa
would probably not yet proceed into the design of thermonuclear weapons.
The possibility cannot be entirely eliminated if Pretoria was indeed
responsible for the September 1979 "flash" of what was indeed a nuclear
explosion. For the "flash" indicated the possibility of a clean nuclear
device, one without significant fallout and one of a low yield, such as
that compatible with an ASW mission. Such a weapon could involve fusion
weapon techniques. Fourth, South Africa has no evident extensive capa-
bility to launch a program of surface-to-surface missiles adapted for
nuclear offensive of defensive weapons. However the South African Navy
has recently installed and tested a relatively short-ranged surface-
to-surface anti-ship missile on its high speed partrol boats.2 This
Edward Teller, "President Carter's Nuclear Policy Is All Wrong,"
Baltimore Sun, September 10, 1978.
"South African Vessels Using New Missile," Washington Post, May 8, 1980.
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program does establish an early foundation for a later nuclear missile
program should the government so decide.
Regardless of the nature of nuclear weapons that South Africa could
possess or develop, it is not lacking for nuclar delivery systems. More
than 125 of its existing aircraft--including Canberras, Mirage IIIs,
Mirage F-1s, Shackletons, and Piaggios--could be modified for nuclar
bomb delivery. The number of aircraft required for an initial capability
would be quite small.
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III UTILITY FOR SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
With South Africa's capability in the nuclear arena firmly in mind,
we can conclude that the technology would allow South Africa nuclear
deployments as the leadership deemed prudent. The key in this area is
thus quite opposite from that normally considered in proliferation
studies; it is not scientific technology but rather politico-strategic
perceptions. Herein lies the answer to whether South Africa will develop
an overt nuclear weapons capability and under what conditions its leader-
ship would do so. The answers to these two questions in turn influence
how such a capability impinges upon U.S. national security interests.
Analyzing the leadership's politico-strategic perceptions must begin
with the world views of the Afrikaners?(those of Dutch descent who
control all the levers of power in that state), their views of international
affairs, the structure of national security decision-making, and the
presumed and expressed views of the role and effectiveness of nuclear
weapons.
A. Afrikaner World View
The intellectual climate of South African strategic planning and
decision-making begins with the Afrikaner view of the world. Basically,
this considers the Afrikaners as a solitary Christian community in-
creasingly pressed by a broad range of hostile external forces, forces
which originate from among non-Afrikaners in the country and from outside
the country. Communism is,of course, central among these forces. But
Afrikaners often link Communism to elements of Western social life which
they perceive as weakening individual and communal fibre and contributing
to the international successes of Communism, materialism, securlarism, and
liberalism. 1
1 For an especially coherent example, see Alexander Steward,
The World, The West and Pretoria (New York: David McKay Company, 1977).
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This profoundly insular and dogmatic world view has been strained
of late by the impact of urbanization and opportunities for overseas
travel. Nonetheless, it remains widely propagated in all Afrikaner
institutions--schools, churches, universities, and the media. More
importantly, for our purposes, it remains the underlying influence on
official decision-making. Its impact is partially masked and partially
diluted by political discourse which has been more realistic in its
appraisals and by decision-making structures which provide greater
rationality or pragmatism than was apparent in earlier South African
governments.
The central question for our inquiry is which strand--the long-
established, dogmatic one or the new, realistic one--would dominate
in a period of great stress, such as that in which the government
would consider the possible display of a nuclear weapon capacity.
B. Foundations of South Africa's Politico-Strategic Perceptions
South African leaders derive their politico-strategic perceptions
from two general sources. The first is their overall cultural and edu-
cational background,which has been heavily influenced by the dogmatic
character of Afrikaner social science at the university level. Only
since the late 1960s and only on a limited basis have social science
studies been treated with genuine intellectual openness. Even now
the teaching of political science and international affairs in Afrikaner
universities is intimately linked to the teaching of political philosophy,
which in turn is intimately linked to an extraordinarily conservative
theology. With very few exceptions, Afrikaner professors stick closely
to this framework. Their writing and their teaching are preoccupied with
moral issues and take a very narrow view of acceptable or necessary change.
Virtually all officials who completed their university education before
the early 1960s, i.e., those over the age of forty, come from a dogmatic
intellectual perspective. This is of central importance since these men
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dominate South African security policies. Those officials who completed
their studies more recently--the younger set--normally occupy middle-
level posts, though a few have moved into pivotal staff positions in the
Defense Force, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of
Finance, and the Department of Cooperation and Development, among others.
If present efforts to revitalize the public service maintains its momentum,
a larger infusion from this younger generation is likely. The conse-
quential shift in views and attitudes would become significant.'
But in the critical near-term future, the older generation will
dominate the decision-making apparatus. Although these individuals
appear to be remarkably free of the quasi-religious rhetoric and assum-
ptions characteristic of Afrikaner Nationalist politics during the 1950s
and 1960s, they are nonetheless doggedly committed to traditional values.
Outright racism is seldom manifested, but antipathy remains to policies
construable as liberal, individualistic, or materialistic. The most
determined or verkrampte elements articulate their reservations about
change most explicitly, but similar concerns are less coherent and less
articulated by most Afrikaners.
C. Key Politico-Strategic Perspectives
One partial exception to this generational pattern, and an important
one, lies in the defense establishment. South African general officers
are evidently more open-minded in their views than many colonels and
majors. This is in large part due to the opportunities for their training
in the U.K. or the U.S. open to the older generation. Younger officers have
"Civil Service Reform: Bringing in the Experts," Financial Mail
(Johannesburg), 22 June 1979, pp 1043-1045; also, "Public Service
Cut to 22 Departments," The Star (Johannesburg), international
airmail weekly edition, 8 December 1979, p. 3.
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been confined to South African military training, which has become
increasingly systematic in its articulation of the traditional world
view.l
Official perceptions in general are influenced in South Africa,
as elsewhere, by the small cadre (20 or so) of international relations
specialists who teach, publish in South African newspapers and journals,
speak on radio and television, and lecture in military training insti-
tutions. Loyalty to Afrikaner Nationalism is the critical criterion for
intellectual authority, a criterion which dismisses those who are neither
Nationalists nor Afrikaners. The "unacceptable" specialists share the
media and military training facilities--especially the joint staff
course which is the centerpiece of general staff training at the Defense
College at Voortrekkerhooget, a course now also open to high-level
civilian officials. But they do not get professorial appointments in
Afrikaner universities or in the black universities whose social science
studies are also still dominated by politically-reliable Afrikaner Nationalists.
These scholarly Afrikaner Nationalists influence--or more accurately,
reinforce--official Afrikaner Nationalists on the Republic's immediate
priorities. Basically, the politico-strategic perceptions go as follows:
South Africa can no longer afford illusions about Western sympathy or
support. Rather, the priority is to prepare the state to stand alone
in an increasingly threatening environment. Officials share a deep
antipathy toward the U.S. government, especially the current leadership,
believing it cynical in its moral positions and naive in its appraisals
of the Communist global threat. Two time-honored rhetorical themes--total
response to total onslaught, and winning the minds and hearts of the people--
have, under the current government in Pretoria and for the first time
emerged as the touchstones of government policy.
See, for example, Lt. Gen. J. R. Dutton, "The Military Aspects
of National Security," pp 100-121, in Michael H. H. Louw, ed.,
National Securit : A Modern Approach (Pretoria: Institute for
Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, 1978).
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The first key concept of total onslaught comes from conservative
political analysis in Western Europe and in the U.S. But it is augmented
to a great degree by the special Afrikaner notion of potential apocalypse
inherent in surrender to the malevolent forces at work in the world.
Andre du Toit describes the importance to Afrikaners of "the divine
calling and special destiny of the Afrikaner people...this sense of
being a chosen people was revived and codified in a particular inter-
pretation of Afrikaner history." He relates "the significance of certain
central themes such as the prominence given to a cycle of suffering and
death..." 1
Examples of this type of outlook by the Afrikaners abound in their
literature. To show its depth and conviction, we need only quote D,F, Malan,
a future Prime Minister, who said in 1942:
It is through the will of God that the Afrikaner
people exists at all. In His wisdom He determined
that on the southern point of Africa...a People
should be born who would be the bearer of Christian
culture and civilization. He surrounded this People
by great dangers ...God also willed that the Afrikaans
People should be continually threatened by other
Peoples. There was the ferocious barbarian who
resisted the intruding Christian civilization and
caused the Afrikaners' blood to flow in streams.
There were times when as a result of this the
Afrikaner was deeply despairing, but God at the
same time prevented the swamping of the young
Afrikaner People in the sea of barbarianism.2
Andre du Toit, "Ideological Change, Afrikaner Nationalism and Pragmatic
Racial Domination in South Africa," in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler
(eds.), Change in Contemporary South Africa (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975), p. 30.
Quoted in T. D. Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975), p. 248.
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The second key concept, winning the hearts and minds of the blacks
and coloreds, originated in the Defense Force's civic action projects in
Caprivi and Ovamboland. It has increasingly come to dominate Afrikaner
thinking about the entire range of domestic programs affecting blacks.
This approach is reinforced by the panoply of economists, businessmen,
and those few officials with economics training who have been concerned
about the need to stabilize urban black workers if the South African
economy is to continue its growth.
D. The Utility of Nuclear Weapons: Speculation
The preceding world view bears directly on South African
policies. For Pretoria's overall thrust towards self-reliance
accelerated that government's longstanding effort to develop a
weapons capability. Yet more important than that capability's
are the circumstances under which South Africa might decide to
that capability. With one exception--though an important one,
nuclear
has probably
nuclear
existence,
demonstrate
as described
at length later--top-level Afrikaners skirt any discussion on the advis-
ability or utility of nuclear weapons. Hence, the role of South African
nuclear weapons leads to the following conclusions:
? At the minimum, a nuclear device could serve as a "weapon
of last resort" in an ultimate crisis. If survival of
Afrikanerdom were truly threatened, deployment of such
a weapon could render a measure of hope, buy time, or
destroy some of the opposition as they destroy the Afrikaner
people. Targets in this regard would include areas of
fiercest combat within or on the borders, enemy camps or
bases in neighboring states or capitals of those countries
providing sanctuaries and/or forces.
? Short of this worst-case scenario, nuclear weapons could
help against a large-scale conventional buildup--to break
up a concentration of conventional forces against South
Africa's industrial and population centers. While poten-
tially helpful, this contingency is rather remote; such a
concentration of enemy forces would be vulnerable to deva-
stating conventional retaliation by South Africa, without
any need for its military forces to go nuclear.
15
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? Relatively small and clean devices, those with sophistica-
tion and reliability, could be used in tactical battlefield
situations. South Africa has the scientific and technological
sophistication to produce such weapons and may in fact be
doing so at present. But they would have to be small and
clean; otherwise, the fallout and effects would damage white
population centers.
? More probably, nuclear weapons could be set off during combat
to constitute a frightening deterrent against further actions
which endanger Afrikaner survival. In this instance, the
"target" may be some remote and uninhabited area, such as the
middle of the Kalahari Desert--hopefully far from any people
with damage limited to cacti. Still, such a blast would have
a momentous effect on the opponent's morale and even tactics
to a degree far greater than that provided either by rumor that
Pretoria possessed the bomb or a statement that the government
was, if further provoked, about to deploy it.
? At the worst case, South African nuclear weapons might be
employed against Soviet forces only to the extent that Soviet
forces might be advising or supplementing Marxist forces of
Angola, Zimbabwe or Mozambique should such forces invade South
Africa. Additionally, it is possible South African nuclear
ASW weapons could be used against hostile but "unidentified"
submarines attacking shipping near the Cape routes.
Looking only at the military dimension misses the even more critical
political and psychological dimensions. While officially silent on the
military utility of nuclear weapons, South Africa communicates loudly
through its actions that it well understands the political ramifications
of atomic weapons.'
South African officials may not have staged the 1977 "bomb scare" or
the 1979 "flash." But no doubt they have benefited from them, for they
thereby avoided as blatant an act of proliferation as India a few years
ago, yet sparked a cacophony of rumors which accomplished real results.
Afrikaner hardliners were consoled in their belief that the government has
the capacity to create a nuclear bomb, if not possessing the weapon already.
See our earlier SRI/SSC study, "Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation,"
op. cit., pp. 96-97.
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Western leaders were handed a shock in return for all the rhetorical shocks
they have doled out to the Afrikaners. After the dust settled, the West
even seemed pleased by its alledged ability to wrench a pledge from Pretoria.
In August of 1977, President Carter stated: "South Africa has informed us
that they do not have and do not intend to develop nuclear explosive devices
for any purpose, either peaceful or as a weapon ...and that no nuclear
explosive test will be taken in South Africa now or in the future." Those
black Africans taking such words at face value could rest easier, confident
that the apartheid regime would not resort to nuclear weapons and that
Africa would consequently remain free of nuclear weapons. Those black
Africans not so trusting received a new infusion of fear for the might of
Africa's white tribe, trembling precisely as the Afrikaners would wish them
to tremble.
The Utility of Nuclear Weapons: One Voice
The sole window of insight into high-level thinking on nuclear
strategy has come with the elevation of Dr. Lukas Daniel Barnard to the
key post of head of the Department of National Security (DONS), formerly known
as BOSS (Bureau of State Security). This appointment means, firstly,
that Dr. Barnard's clear and sharp views on international affairs are
widely shared among the leadership which appointed him, otherwise he
would not have been chosen; and secondly, that those views will henceforth
receive a complete hearing in the inner circles of the national security
apparatus.
Though only 31 years of age, Dr. Barnard has written extensively since
becoming a professor at the University of the Orange Free State. His
writings include his 1975 dissertation, aptly entitled The Power Factor
in International Relations, which clearly reflects his intellectual
indebtedness to Dooyewierd, a Dutch philosopher who considered all areas
of life directly under the authority of the Kingdom of God. Such a
Christian state, he taught and Barnard reflects, must be militarily pre-
pared and must not recoil from waging necessary and just war as the occasion
arises.
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Dr. Barnard is quite explicit in his admiration of just force, His
writings are filled with Biblical illusions to "the sword of God" and
advocacy for swaardmaggsanksie or "sword-power sanctions." In one of his
early essays, he writes: "In world politics fragmented by sin, the sword
must always be applied justifiably for the punishment of evil. The
attitude that the Christian state may never take up the sword and must
suffer for justice is dangerous cowardice." 1
Such righteousness often defies world opinion: "To always set one's
sails to the wind of ludicrous world opinion with its pathetic double
ethical pretentions is to pawn constitutional sovereignty to the terrorists:'
And Dr. Barnard's contempt, or more accurately, his regret for the West
comes out as well. Writing on the 1975-76 Angola crisis, he concludes:
"The West is so unimaginative with its pragmatic ad hoc strategic and
diplomatic negotiations that it is constantly forced on the defensive.
In international politics, whoever is left continuously plugging defensive
holes will, in the long run, have no answers left to the sly spectrum of
aggressive mechanisms that the communist revolutionary brain can think up." 3
Dr. Barnard's most original and, for our purposes, important writings
bear upon the nuclear question. He has been surprisingly frank on this
usually hushed topic. His main piece in this area, entitled "The Deterrent
Strategy of Nuclear Weapons," like the others, is written in Afrikaans
solely for home consumption. Also like the others it starts theoretically--
with references to leading American strategists--and then brings the argu-
ment down to South Africa's situation. He believes that South Africa can
no longer rely upon the West for its security, partly because Westerners
"Theoretical Approach to International Relations," Tydskrif Vir
Christlike Weterskap, Vol. 10, 1st Quarter (1974), pp. 26-44.
"International and Urban Terrorism," Tydskrif Vir Christlike Weterskap,
Vol. 13, 1st Quarter (1977), pp. 13-30.
"Angola in the International Power Constellations," Journal For Contemporary
History and International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 1, (March 1977), pp. 66-86.
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oppose the racial system there and partly because they are themselves weak,
in will if not in capabilities. "The Western states, which we always
thought to be allies, are being threatened by the greatest leadership crisis
and undermining of moral nerves since the Second World War."
Because of Western weakness, South Africa would be wise not to rely
upon alliance, even if such were available (which he recognizes is not).
History, Dr. Barnard writes, delivers "few examples where states wanted
to seek protection of an alliance under the wings of weak or vacillating
countries." This leads to his belief that obtaining nuclear weapons
would not add to South Africa's already considerable isolation in the
world; thus the costs of obtaining this capability to him are minimal.
And the rewards would be significant, for South Africa could well be
attacked in some type of communist onslaught. The U.S., he points out,
did not shirk from using atomic weapons against the Japanese and the Kremlin
certainly has fewer reservations about using any weapons against the
Afrikaners. Since he believes the threat against South Africa to be
growing over the years, he advocates preparation including developing
a nuclear weapons capability immediately, for when the onslaught comes,
it will be too late.
The value of nuclear weapons, writes Barnard, lies in their deterrence.
This in turn relies upon the perception of that capability. Hence, to
him, South Africa must not only develop nuclear weapons, but must also
announce to the world and convince the world that it possesses such
capability.)
Whether Dr. Barnard's proposal for clear notification of a nuclear
weapons capability will become announced policy or riot-is impossible to
tell. But it is safe to say that it is very close to official policy, if
not identical with it. Indeed, the leadership may believe that the twin
revelations of the alleged Kalahari Desert test site and the satellite-
detected "flash" have conveyed that "notification" Dr. Barnard advocates.
"The Deterrent Strategy of Nuclear Weapons," Journal for Contemporary
History and International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Sept 1977), pp. 74-97.
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F. South African Decision-Making on Security Affairs
The final aspect that needs to be examined to determine when and under
what conditions South Africa would or will possess a covert or overt
nuclear weapons capability involves the decision making process. This
process often leads to--or at least heavily influences--product or policy.
Since the end of 1978, South Africa has undertaken basic changes
in governmental structure in order to enhance both its decision-making
process and implementation of decisions once made. Support for these
changes is widespread among National Party caucus members, civilian and
military officials, Afrikaner businessmen, academicians, journalists and
even among non-Afrikaners.
The long-dormant State Security Council, established in 1970, has
been revived and given both an explicit membership and explicit functions.
Simultaneously, the office of the prime minister has been given a sharply
increased budget for additional staff and new Director-General, J.E. duPlessis,
who is responsible for the coordination of policy implementation. He per-
forms this function as Chairman of a Director-Generals Committee and
carries the Prime Minister's authority to ensure coordination within the
committee. This new structure may remedy past errors arising because
officials were poorly coordinated and quite able to thwart top-level
decisions when they wished.l
In the Director-Generals Committee, the Defense Force, the South
African Police and DONS are represented by their heads, General Magnus
Malan, General M.C. Geldenhuys, and Professor Barnard, respectively.
In addition, senior military intelligence and security branch officers
have been assigned to staff positions in DONS in order to strengthen
coordination between their departments and DONS.
Heribert Adam and Herman Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa
Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) gives too much weight to
bureaucratic inertia (see chapters 7 and 8). For a similar view, see
Stanley Uys, "Seen from the Outside," Financial Mail, 29 February 1980, p. 833.
The Star, International edition, 19 January 1980, p. 5.
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Finally, the head of DONS, Dr. Barnard, now reports only to the Deputy
Minister for Defense and National Security, H.J. (Kobie) Coetsee. This
eliminates the direct back-channel liaison of the former BOSS director,
General van den Bergh, with the Prime Minister, then John Vorster.
What this all means in terms of power is that Prime Minister P.W.
Botha would be unlikely to have as much dominance over security affairs
as his predecessor, John Vorster; he could not singularly order an
Angola-type incursion as did Vorster in 1975. Decisions in the security
realm will be carefully weighed, along with foreign policy and economic
policy priorities. General Malan will surely carry much sway. J.E .
du Plessis's role will give him considerable authority, especially with
the Prime Minister's full backing. Dr. J.H. de Loor, Director-General
for Finance, may carry extra weight because of his vast international
experience and considerable grasp of economic issues. Brand Fourie,
Director-General for Foreign Affairs and Information, has equivalent
experience and may consequently gain authority. Lukas Barnard's youth
and lack of governmental experience will work against his influence among
men with long official tenure and for whom deference is a concomitant of
age and tenure.
What this all means in terms of policy output is that pragmatism in
the security realm is sure to gain and dogmatism consequently to wane.
The new structure will tend to encourage incremental policy decisions,
in which varying combinations of conventional military powers, internal
security resources, and regional economic leverage will be brought into
play on any international problem. This incremental policy will differ
from earlier regional policies--the outward policy, dialogue, detente--which
were erratic in implementation and soon lost in apparent disinterest.'
The key ingredients of an incremental and sustained regional policy
in South Africa are sure to include: economic leverage as both an incentive
and a deterrent; preemptive strikes against guerrilla bases and harsh
James P. Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1973).
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internal security measures against guerrilla bases and supporters so as to
prevent buildups in their force and supply capabilities; attacks on infra-
structure and basic economic structures in neighboring black states lending
assistance to black opponents so as to make them keep control over guerrillas
going into Namibia or South Africa; and continued diplomatic efforts to
enlarge Western governmental support, with the ultimate goal a security
agreement against the threat of a direct attack against the Republic.
These tactics will be adequate for the coming years to cope with
regional attacks and unrest within the country. Only if the Afrikaners
perceive themselves to be in serious danger of survival would their offi-
cials almost predictably resort to the use of nuclear weapons.
But that point of self-defined crisis is not so far off as one might
expect on the basis of the objective factors because of the Afrikaner
Nationalist instinct for morbid contemplation of threats. Maintaining control
of change in both territories (Namibia and South Africa) will remain the
highest of all governmental priorities. So long as the government in
Pretoria perceives itself in control, it is unlikely to shift from the
sequence of conventional instruments of influence outlined above to those
of nuclear instruments.
But the self-perception of control and the realities of control may
not always coincide. Although the South African government is keen at
assessing the military and economic weakness of black neighbors, it is
nonetheless woefully inept at evaluating the feelings of its own black
citizens. An unpredicted, sustained internal revolt could bring Afrikaner
decision-making to the brink of apocalyptic perceptions, but even this is
unlikely anytime soon given the South African capability to contain urban
rioters almost at will.
Only if internal revolt coincides with massive conventional invasion
would the resort to nuclear weapons become necessary. In those circumstances
--probably before the invasion itself, in order to discourage black governments'
support--South Africa might use its potential nuclear capability. The demon-
stration of it then become increasingly possible, as indications of a
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threatening internal and external environment become increasingly apparent.
Dr. Bernard's argument may then appeal to his colleagues, who undoubtedly
share his appraisal of black governments' inability to withstand even
the threat of South African force.
G. Conclusions: South African Overt Nuclear We 2ons Capability
Pulling all these various factors together, we can offer some con-
clusions as to when and under what circumstances South Africa might have
an overt nuclear weapons capability.
The "when" can initially be answered quite simply: any time the
Afrikaner officials deem it essential for their people's survival and
their state's security. The critical element here is not technology--
when South Africa would possess the know-how and the materials to develop
nuclear weapons--but rather the politico-strategic perspectives of the
rulers.
Given this fact, it seems most probable that the leadership would
display a nuclear weapons capability sooner than one might otherwise ex-
pect or, indeed, sooner than might seem warranted by those on the outside
world. This is true for several reasons.
First, the geo-strategic environment of South Africa is unmistakably
slipping. With the recent rise to power of the third Marxist regime in
the region (in Zimbabwe), the Afrikaners feel increasingly threatened,
as indeed they are. This feeling began with the April 1974 coup in Lisbon
which led to the removal of the white colonial barrier stretching from
Angola to Rhodesia to Mozambique. In addition, black consciousness within
the Republic is also unmistakably rising. Hence the serenity South Africa
enjoyed both within the region and within the country between the early
1960s and the mid-1970s is unlikely to be replicated anytime in the fore-
seeable future.
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Second, Western attitudes have generally solidified to the point
where no Western government could readily assure South Africa's security,
unless in the most extraordinary of times. This the Afrikaners readily
appreciate, as manifest in their drive for self-reliance in the security
realm and indeed in the economic and political realms as well. Even with
the advent of a more conservative government in the United States as well
as in London, the political realities are such that any Western security
guarantee for South Africa would be exceedingly difficult to extend and
would lack sufficient credibility even if extended.
Third, Afrikaners tend to adopt a more dismal, apocalyptical view of
the world than most other peoples. As explained above, this is due to
their difficult,indeed tragic history on the continent and to their staunch
Old Testament theology. Regardless of cause, however, the consequence is
a politico strategic outlook by Afrikaners that portends the worst. They
envision a threat even more ominous than that which most outside observers
would envision. This politico-strategic outlook would tend to encourage
the resort to the mightiest possible military--including one with the
ultimate of weapons--to deter or to defeat that threat.
Balancing this world view would be the South African governmental
structure. As recently reorganized and as described above, the decision-
making and decision-implementation processes of government will henceforth
induce greater moderation and caution in security affairs. Yet structure
is often superseded by personality, and the personalities of top South
African officials are still dogmatic and exceedingly security-minded.
Fourth, the top leadership now includes a fervent proponent for a
South African nuclear capability, and an open, credible, clear capability
at that. As mentioned above, Dr. Barnard's views on this most sensitive
and critical of issues must have been acceptable to the leadership to
allow him to head up the Department of National Security. Moreover, his
participation in the highest councils of government now give that posi-
tion forceful representation.
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To these four factors it must be added that South Africa's policies
on nuclear weapons will be made fairly independently of any U.S. security
interests. Whether to develop and display a nuclear weapons capability
will depend almost entirely upon the Afrikaners' sense of domestic and
regional security. It will not depend upon superpower relations, an onset
of conflict in the vital Persian Gulf regions, or any other global con-
siderations. On the other hand, a continuing adverse U.S. strategic
credibility in the face of still expanding Soviet power would be a major
consideration in the minds of the Afrikaners.
Though South Africa will make that decision for its own parochial
purposes, this does not mean that such a decision would not affect U.S.
national security interests. Indeed, it will do so in a number of ways
discussed at length and in depth in the following sections.
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IV THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PROLIFERATION ON
WESTERN ECONOMIC INTERESTS
To gauge the effect of an overt South African nuclear capability
upon American security interests in general, it is essential to spell
out those interests clearly. This will be done in regard to American
and Western: a) economic interests in terms of loans, trades, and
investment; b) mineral interests in terms of open access to South
African and indeed African strategic resources; c) political interests
in terms of general relations throughout the continent as well as on its
tip; and, most importantly, d) maritime interests in terms of the flow of
essential resources, including oil, around the Cape of Good Hope.
After concise presentation of these four American and Western
interests in South Africa, analysis will be offered as to how these interests
would be affected by South African proliferation.
A. American Economic Interests
U.S. investment in South Africa is placed between $5 billion and
$6 billion: $1.8 billion in direct investment; $2.2 billion in private
bank loans; and almost $2 billion in portfolio investment (primarily gold
stocks). This investment, over 20 percent of total foreign investment
in that country, is concentrated in the computer industry, transportation,
energy, and steel.
Since 1960, U.S. investment in South Africa has spiraled tenfold in
volume and almost twofold in percentage of total foreign investment.1
For further analysis see William N. Raiford, South Africa: Foreign
Investment and Separate Development, Issue Brief No. 11378078,
Congressional Research Services of the Library of Congress,
February 16, 1979.
26
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The bulk of American investment in South Africa comes from "Fortune 500"
firms. A mere four corporate giants--General Motors, Mobil, Texaco, and
Ford--account for half of all U.S. investments there; of the top 50
American corporations, 29 have operations in the Republic.
In spite of the passionate drive among religious and university groups
in the West for divestiture, U.S. firms plan to increase their capital
investments in South Africa by some $277 million in 1980 as compared to
$230 million in 1979. This estimate by the U.S. Department of Commerce
would constitute a rise of 20 percent. It is largely attributable to
increased investments in the mining sector, particularly in large uran-
ium projects just beginning. Also increased will be American loans to
South Africa, which already constitute some one-third of South Africa's
total foreign debt.'
U.S. commercial involvement in South Africa is increasing for the
simple reason that business is good there. During the period of Western
economic slowdown in 1977 and 1978, the return on investment for American
companies there was an impressive 10 percent, again according to Commerce
Department figures. Some companies, like the auto industry, have been
hit hard by declining sales,but others such as mining, computer, and
electronics sectors have been growing at a substantial 20 percent clip.2
In spite of the profits and the increases on top of the already sizable
dollar investments and loans, South Africa represents a minuscule 1.12
percent of total U.S. private direct investment overseas and received
only 1.25 percent of the total foreign loans written by U.S. banks.
U.S. firms employ less than 1 percent of the black South African work
1 Africa Confidential, December 15, 1979.
2 Desaix Myers III and David Liff, "The Press of Business," Foreign Policy,
No. 38 (Spring 1980), p. 148.
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force. For American companies which are involved there, South African
operations are measly, representing under 1 percent of total assets,
sales, or profits) In short, U.S. investment in South Africa is of
some, though not of major, importance.
Trade with South Africa, though likewise small, has been rising of
late. In 1976, the U.S. sale of $1.3 billion--mostly in transportation
equipment, chemicals, computers, communications equipment, and aircraft--
represented some 1.5 percent of total U.S. exports. America's long-
time favorable trade balance with South Africe has disappeared with the
soaring price of minerals. In 1978, American imports from South Africa
totaled $1.5 billion while U.S. exports amounted to $1.2 billion.2
Given the continuing high price of minerals and the continuing American
reliance on South Africa's supply, it could have been anticipated that
U.S. purchases from South Africa would climb by nearly 70 percent from
1978 to mid-1979.
B. European Economic Interests
European economic interests are far more substantial, Europe pro-
vides South Africa with the bulk of its commercial links with the rest
of the world. South African trade with the EEC (which has a total GNP
of $1 trillion) is at least three times that with the U.S. (whose GNP
is $1.5 trillion). Consequently, European economies would suffer far
more than the American economy from any disruption in trade with South
Africa. It is for this reason that the Europeans have been resistant to
any types of economic or political sanctions against the Republic. As
recently as March 1980, it was announced that "none of the EC partners
is in favor of an oil boycott of South Africa by the EC .,,3
For further analysis see U.S. Senate, U.S. Corporate Interests in
South Africa, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-
committee on African Affairs, January 1978, pp. 1-14.
Financial Mail (Johannesburg), April 20, 1979, p. 211.
"EC Not Receptive to Oil Boycott Against South Africa," U.S. Department
of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report,
Western Europe, March 27, 1980, p. B-1.
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Britain has the most at stake. At least 10 percent of all British
direct foreign investment is located in South Africa.' The most
successful British industries depend most heavily on South Africa.
In such sectors as electrical machinery, plastics, and motor vehicles,
the South African market takes between 6 percent and 9 percent of all
British exports. Many of these industries are "among the all too
few British industries which do not seem marked for extinction, either
by Japanese or LDC price competition or by U.S. or German high tech-
nology.i2 The British Association of Industries estimated that a
trade boycott of South Africa would increase British unemployment by at
least 70,000 persons and wipe out an export market worth nearly $1
billion per year-neither of which the lame British economy could easily
carry.
C. The Importance of Outside Interests to the South African Economy
From Pretoria's vantage Point, foreign economic interests are highly
significant. Indeed, foreign investment is said to have been responsible
for one-third of that country's economic growth rate in recent years.
Hence, a top economic advisor, Simon Brand, dubbed the international
companies as the "engine of growth" for the South African economy. The
petroleum market, automobile industry, and a computer manufacturing sector
are all dominated by multinational corporations.3
D. The Effect of South African Proliferation on Economic Interests
An overt nuclear weapons capability would adversely affect Western
economic interests in South Africa in two respects.
U.K. Ministry of Trade and Industry, Trade and Industry, February 25,
1977, p. 532.
Lawrence G. Franko, "The European Stake in South Africa,"
The Washington 0uar erly Vol. 2, No. 2, (Spring 1979), p. 88.
Myers and Liff, op. cit., p. 148.
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First, a display of such a nuclear capability would most likely
accompany and reinforce the perception of a rising security threat to
the Republic. American and European companies, already somewhat wary
of becoming heavily involved in such a seemingly precarious political
and military state, would shy away further. Many of these firms would
actively divest themselves of their holdings in South Africa so as to
minimize the anticipated losses. South Africa's credit rating and rat-
ing for international investment would plummet, as it did immediately
after the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 and the Soweto uprising of 1976.
This time, such a rating would probably dip further and stay lower for
a longer period than was the case in the past, again because of South
Africa's overall declining strategic environment.
Second, with the advent of a nuclear weapons capability there, re-
sistance to private investments and loans to South Africa would rise
enormously in Western states. This would be true whether Pretoria dis-
played such a capability in times of relative tranquility--as advocated
by Dr. Barnard--but even more so if displayed in times of relative
turmoil. The religious and university groups within Western countries
already have a substantial backing to cut all economic (or any other)
ties with the racist government in South Africa. Given the passionate
American and European feelings against further nuclear proliferation
anywhere in the world--on top of the passionate abhorrence of the
apartheid system--the divestment drive could well prevail if South
Africa displayed a nuclear device.
This would injure American economic interests but only to a minimal
extent. As explained above, U.S. investments, loans, and trade there
are quite minor in terms of total U.S. overseas economic interests. But
the same cannot be said for Western Europe, and particularly not for
Great Britain, whose economic ties to South Africa are extensive. South
Africa's going nuclear would severely damage European economic fortunes
and, even more so, the economic welfare of the Republic itself. This in
turn must be an important factor discouraging the Afrikaner leaders from
openly displaying a nuclear weapons capability.
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V THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PROLIFERATION ON WESTERN
INTERESTS IN ACCESS TO STRATEGIC MATERIALS
It has long been true--though only recently has it been widely
recognized--that the United States and indeed all industrialized demo-
cracies rely heavily upon overseas resources. Western economies and
the manufacturing support base for their national security is increas-
ingly dependent upon critical materials from the Third World.
The vital importance of access to mineral supplies is best summarized
by Amos Jordan and Robert Kilmarx as they discussed the "major difficulties
ahead in insuring reliable, adequate raw materials" to the industrialized
world:
Among these problems is, first, the high con-
tration of certain critical raw materials in a
limited number of countries of questionable
reliability or physical security from the perspec-
tive of the eastern industrialized nations.
Second, political instability or hypernationalism
in many minerals-exporting countries create an
inhospitable climate for minerals investment and
operations, making it likely that production
capacity will lag behind increasing demand.
Third, steeply rising costs of minerals projects
and operations, as well as increasing problems
associated with raising sufficient investment
capital are also contributing to shortfalls in
needed minerals investment rates. Fourth,
increasing cartelization efforts and movements
toward international buffer stocks and price
stabilization measures are creating distortions
in minerals producing and consuming sectors.'
Amos A. Jordan and Robert A. Kilmarx, "Strategic Mineral Dependence:
The Stockpile Dilemma," (Beverly Hills/London, SAGE Publications, 1979,
The Washington Papers No. 70), p. 10.
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Relating these overall Western interests to South Africa, we find a
heavy reliance as illustrated in Table 1 on the following page.
A. American Resource Interests in South Africa
Relating this interest specifically to U.S. national interests, we
find that America currently obtains 56% of its vanadium imports from
South Africa; 44% of its antimony; 30% of its chromite ore; 27% of its
gold; 33% of its platinum group requirements; and 10% of its manganese.
Chromite, vanadium, and antimony are crucial to the production of alloyed
steels because of their anticorrosive properties and are essential in
high-technology industries. Substitutes are not currently available for
any of them. Outside of South Africa and Zimbabwe, the only known major
deposits of chromite, vanadium, manganese, and platinum are in the Soviet
Union. The only known substantial reserves of antimony are in China.
Chromium is probably the most critical of the critical materials,
and the one over which South Africa holds most dominant sway. The U.S.
imports 89% of its chromium, with about one-third of its chromite and
just over one-third of its ferrochromium coming from South Africa. World
resources of recoverable chromite are estimated at 18 billion tons
(16 billion in South Africa), sufficient to meet any conceivable demand
for centuries. Although some materials can occasionally be used as a
substitute, the National Materials Advisory Board concluded in 1979 that
No substitutes exist or are likely to be developed
for chromium in the high-strength steels, high
temperature metals and corrosion-resisting alloys
that are essential in the manufacture of jet engines,
petrochemical and power ?lant equipment, and various
other critical products.
National Materials Advisory Board, Contingency Plans for Chromium
Utilization, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Science, 1978), p. 2.
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South Africa %
of world
production-1977
South Africa %
of world
reserves-1978
U.S. net
import reliance
(% of consumption
1977)
% of U.S.
imports (1973-76)
from S. Africa
Antimony
17%
5%
52%
44% (ores)
41% (oxide)
34%
81%
89%
30% (chromite)
34% (ferrochrom.)
Diamond
20%
21%
100%
23%
(gems &
industrial)
57%
51%
60%
27%
Manganese
23%
78%
98%
10% (ore)
32% (ferromang.)
Platinum-
Group
Metals
Uranium
(f or
Western
World only)
37% 49% 37% 56%
Sources: Financial Mail (Johannesburg), September 28, 1979, "Mining Survey
Supplement," pp. 10-13, and Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity
Summaries, 1978, U.S. Department of-the Interior.
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The United States is strategically more vulnerable to
a long-term chromium embargo than to an embargo of any
other natural resources, including petroleum...)
B. European and Japanese Resource Interests
What would constitute a grave danger for the U.S. in terms of mineral
unavailability would constitute a real catastrophe for our allies. Their
mineral dependence is far more acute than ours. While France gets 65% of
its mineral imports from its former African colonies, the U.K., West
Germany, and Japan are heavily dependent on South Africa for minerals.
These countries also rely on Pretoria for uranium, in which the U.S. is
self-sufficient. South Africa supplies over 40% of Japan's uranium re-
quirements and is also becoming an increasingly important resource for
France and Germany.
For the most part, black Africa is not a viable alternative source
for asbestos, chrome, vermiculite, manganese, and antimony. The vast
majority of all EEC mineral imports from Africa come from South Africa,
as illustrated in Table 2 on the following page. Europe and Japan lack
the strategic stockpiles held by the United States. Neither, quite under-
standably, would be comfortable with relying upon the Soviet Union for
nearly all of its chrome, platinum, or gold. Nor are they content to count
on the U.S. generously sharing its strategic stockpile with them in the
event of disruption of South African supplies. For a variety of commercial
considerations as well, Europe and Japan would be far more adversely dis-
rupted by a cutoff of the South African supply than would the U.S.2
1 National Materials Advisory Board, op. cit., p. 16.
2 Franko, op. cit., pp. 85-95.
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA
Mineral Commodity
EEC as a whole
United Kingdom
West Germany
France
Japan
Platinum group
24
37
Antimony
9
(ore only)
95
50
14
15
Vanadium
42
60
50
31
62
Chrome ore
--
30
29
17
37
Ferrochrome
31
15
43
20
87
Manganese ore
31
43
52
40
43
Ferro-Manganese
--
27
14
--
--
Asbestos
13
--
--
--
35
Source: Africa Confidential, January 17,
1979.
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C. Soviet Strategy on Minerals
The Soviet Union is keenly aware of this minerals link. Indeed, Soviet
interest in Africa began with Lenin's prediction that capitalism's demise
would come as the West was cut off from Third World resources and markets,
particularly those in Africa. The Soviet press and officials frequently
mention a "strategy of denial," intended either to deny or credibly threaten
to deny strategic minerals to the West. One Izvestia article, for example,
tells how Africa's "abundant natural resources" form the base for Western
economic and military strength. To survive, the West has "to keep Africa
as a raw material reserve and market for the monopolies" since it is
"imperialism's...strategic bridgehead."' This strategy of denial becomes
credible when South African reserves are. added to those of the USSR: for
platinum group metals, vanadium, and manganese, the combined percentage of
world reserves adds up to 99%, 97%, and 93%, respectively, and for chrome
it is 84%.2
At times the Soviet Union has added some bite to its considerable
bark by implementing elements of this strategy. It halted chrome shipments
to the United States from the outbreak of the Korean War until the early
1970s. It manipulated the world cobalt market in June of 1978: two weeks
prior to the second invasion of Shaba--which produces some half the
Free World's supply of cobalt--the Soviet Union made major and unusual
purchases, nearly cornering the entire cobalt market. This transpired
even though the USSR possesses vast cobalt quantities of its own.
1 V. Kudryavtsev, "Plot Against Africa," Izvestia, August 14, 1976, as
reproduced in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVIII,
No. 22, September 15, 1976, p. 1.
2 Peter Janke, "The Soviet Strategy of Mineral Denial," Soviet
Analyst, Vol. 7, No. 22 (November 9, 1978), p. 5.
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The most recent display of Soviet attempts at this strategy likewise
centers around cobalt. At the beginning of this year, the Soviet Union
agreed to furnish at least $85 million worth of military equipment--
including MIG-21s--to Zambia, allegedly for cobalt. This is important
since Zaire and Zambia together possess nearly half of the entire world's
cobalt. As Business Week concluded, "Soviet purchases of Zambian cobalt,
no matter how small, are bound to disrupt the U.S. market. Cobalt supplies
are tight and any Soviet diversion of Zambian exports would force releases
from the national defense stockpile, which still is less than halfway
to its original inventory objective."1
Even though the Soviets focus on this "strategy of denial," any
realization of this strategy in terms of South Africa is quite remote.
For one thing, a radical or even truly neutral government in Pretoria is
extremely unlikely anytime soon. For another, mineral exports are so
vital to that country's economy that a regime of whatever color or stripe
would be forced to continue mineral production and exportation. Chrome,
vanadium, and manganese--the minerals for which the U.S. is most critically
dependent on South Africa--account for only about 5% of total South African
exports. Yet mining as a whole contributes 13% to South Africa's GNP and
its mineral exports are critically needed to finance imports of techno-
logical and consumer goods. The only significant market for these minerals
lies in the West.
A black radical South African regime seeking to satisfy the accelerated
social and welfare demands of the black population in education, health,
and housing might, in fact, be more likely to expand its mineral exports
than even the present white rulers. Their goals would necessitate in-
creased demand for technology, capital, and foreign management of mineral
3 "The Soviets'New Foothold in Central Africa," Business Week, March 10, 1980.
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resources. Given the Soviet Union's inability to subsidize a sophisticated
economy, any South African government would have little choice but to turn
to the West for trade, investment, and know-how. The recent history of
the continued Western investment in and access to the mineral wealth of
radical African states--Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, and Mozambique--
underscores the point.
We can summarize this section on Soviet strategy in the following
manner: Denial of vital minerals from southern Africa for long stretches
of time is far-fetched, depending as it does on an array of highly unlikely
occurrences. But some type of disruption of the mineral market is possible.
This has happened and is likely to happen again in the case of cobalt.
More major disruptions would affect European and Japanese allies quicker
and harder than the U.S., given their vaster economic reliance on mineral
imports and their smaller stockpiles. Western and Japanese economies could
suffer severe shortages, inflation, and unemployment, were this strategy
to be implemented on a large scale. This would be the case whether the
disruption were caused by the take-over of a radical black government or
by an upward spiralling of internal unrest and/or guerrilla activity in
white-ruled South Africa. Given the precarious economic conditions now
prevailing in the West, these are serious considerations indeed.
D. The Effect of South African Proliferation on Western Mineral Interests
An overt nuclear weapons capability by South Africa would not directly
affect Western resource interests. However this capability could indirectly
affect such interests in important ways, depending upon American reaction
to that open South African capability. Were the U.S. reaction too severe,
then South Africa might retaliate. Were the U.S. deemed to react in-
sufficiently severely, then northern and black African nations might well
retaliate. Either way, the consequences would be grave.
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To take the first contingency: Should Washington's reaction go from
harsh rhetorical measures to concrete economic and other penalties for
Pretoria, then South Africa could in turn respond. It could cut off
critical minerals to the U.S., thereby halting metals key to high technology
industries that are, in turn, key to American national security.
Admittedly, such a move would only be taken in a situation of extreme
South African anger since it would incur considerable costs for Pretoria.
Yet these costs have been downgraded in recent years by South Africa's
broadening its exports to Western Europe and Northeast Asia where high
technology industries are increasing apace. Besides, the soaring price
of gold in recent years gives South Africa windfall earnings, making it
less reliant upon the sale of other minerals.
Though certainly an extreme situation, it is not one that can be
entirely dismissed--particularly for the defense planner whose task, among
other things, is to examine extreme situations. For the South African
leadership has become increasingly cognizant of its mineral resources and
their criticality to the West. When mention was made of a possible U.N.
economic embargo on South Africa two years ago, the South African Minister
of Labor and Mines, Mr. S.P. Botha, told how his country was "sick and
tired of the attitude the West has adopted toward it...the United States
in particular." According to the authoritative Johannesburg International
Service, the Minister went on most pointedly:
Mr. Botha said the United States would have to begin
to realize that in certain areas it was more dependent
on South Africa than the reverse. Sixteen of the 33
minerals the United States needs most were imported
from South Africa, and America would have to begin to
realize that there were other buyers for these
minerals. 1
1 U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Informations Service,
Daily Report, Sub-Saharan Africa, 23 April 1978, p. E-7.
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South Africa need not act alone in this regard. When discussing
his concept of a southern African "constellation of states," Prime Minister
P.W. Botha said that the states in the region "must accept that we have
enough raw materials and material means to work out our own destiny." Two
South African scholars on this topic interpreted this, and other related
policy statements, to mean "that the countries in the region can use their
mineral wealth as a bargaining counter in their foreign relations" since
"they consider their raw materials to be vital to particularly the West..."'
To briefly offer two illustrations: Were South Africa to embargo
chromite ore shipments to the United States, including the substitute
ferrochromite, the remaining sources would be Zimbabwe or the Soviet
Union itself. This would create a most uncertain and indeed precarious
situation, given the finding of the National Material Advisory Board
(fully quoted above) that the U.S. "is strategically more vulnerable
to a long-term chromium embargo than to an embargo of any other natural
resources, including petroleum."
Second is uranium. The Uranium Institute called South Africa the
world's most reliable uranium producer and estimated that South Africa
will supply some 14,000 tons per year by 1990, compared to its current
annual production level of just under 9,500 tons. World demand is
estimated to hit around 67,500 tons by mid-decade and some 90,000 tons
by the next decade.
As explained in our previous report in this area, its large uranium
reserves could permit South Africa to become a leader of a nuclear "pariah
nation" network. For it can supply uranium ore currently and possibly
Deon Geldenhuys and Denis Venter, "A Constellation of States: Regional
Co-Operation in Southern Africa," International Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 3,
No. 3, p. 59.
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enriched uranium subsequently to other nations without having to place
these shipments under International Atomic Energy Agency controls. The
prospect of South Africa becoming head of a nuclear OPEC cannot be lightly
dismissed.'
The second overall adverse effect of an overt South African nuclear
weapons capability could occur if the United States reaction were judged
to be insufficient by northern and black African nations. Out of anger,
they might well retaliate as they have the means to do so.
Here too, two brief examples are offered: It has already been
mentioned that Zaire and Zambia possess nearly halt the world's cobalt
reserves; the Soviet Union has a fifth and its allies some as well.
Hence, were the Soviets somehow to gain leverage over these two Central
African nations, it would thereby control some 80% of the world's cobalt.
Second is the volatile issue of oil, in which Africa looms large.
Nigeria, the world's seventh largest oil producer, provides nearly a fifth
of U.S. crude petroleum imports and thereby ranks second only to Saudi
Arabia. Africa, all told, furnishes close to 40% of crude oil imports or
nearly 15% of the total American consumption. The continent's major
producers--Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria--have high-quality light crude
which makes for higher gasoline yields; their petroleum's low sulfur
content make it more suitable in terms of U.S. environmental standards.
Though Africa's total oil production has not increased greatly over the
past five years, the American share of it has nearly doubled. Last year,
the United States purchased more than half the oil pumped from wells in
Africa.2
1 "Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation: A Case on South Africa," op. cit.,
p. 28 and p. 41.
2 Richard Deutsch. "African Oil and U.S. Foreign Policy," Africa Report
(September-October 1979), p. 47.
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The threat of an oil embargo by these three African suppliers might be
credible, were American response to a South African nuclear display not
deemed sufficiently harsh. All three nations feel quite strongly about
southern African affairs. Algeria and Libya are hostile to America during
the best of times. Nigeria, which is generally cordial to the United States,
feels keenest of any state about American policies in southern Africa. When
it appeared that the U.S. Congress might remove the economic sanctions
against Rhodesia in the fall of 1979, Nigeria issued thinly-veiled threats
of just such an oil embargo. This threat cautioned many members of Congress
and reinforced the Carter Administration in its determination to keep the
sanctions intact.
In essence, American policy-makers would face a clear dilemma in the
aftermath of a South African nuclear weapons display. U.S. officials would
have to undergo careful analysis of the materials that might be lost if
U.S. actions provoked South Africa to embargo its minerals coming here,
and, on the other hand, those minerals that might be lost if the lack of
U.S. actions provoked mrthern and black African nations to embargo their
natural resources coming here.
Posing the issue in this manner exemplifies present U.S. sensitivity
to economic blackmail for political purposes. The only solution lies in
a prudent expansion of the critical materials stockpiles in such a way
that would permit the United States government political leeway in the
event of an actual embargo. It also requires a willingness by U.S. policy-
makers to face the possible penalties involved should either or both
materials embargo threats be executed against the nation. This, in turn,
necessitates considering a range of potential American retaliatory threats
or even actions to counteract the threat or act of materials or oil embargos.
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VI THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PROLIFERATION
ON WESTERN POLITICAL INTERESTS
Any analysis of American and Western relations with South Africa must
encompass the political element. In many research studies, this is done
implicitly. In others, it is done explicitly, which is preferable since
the political factors are often the heart of the matter. To view South
Africa solely as a powerful, minerally-endowed state occupying a certain
geo-strategic territory is to miss its enormous global political importance.
Political considerations are more elusive than those discussed
previously--trade, investment, access to strategic materials--and than that to
be discussed subsequently--the importance of the Cape route. Nonetheless,
these considerations loom large; South Africa as a racist state assumes
importance in U.S. foreign policy and in world politics far beyond what
its resources, trade, location, or population otherwise would warrant.
Were its importance confined to these specific factors, then South Africa
would be relatively neglected on the world stage or at least relegated to
the third or fourth echelon of consideration. But South Africa's racist
system makes this foremost a political consideration to the world as well
as to black African countries. As L.M. Thompson so aptly put it, "To
the rulers of new African states, South Africa is not just a foreign
country with a different way of life. It is an anathema."'
American and Western political interests in this regard are twofold:
first, diplomatic relations with black Africa, relatedly with the Third
World and with the Republic itself; and second the overall political
strategic goal of stability in the southern Africa region, here defined
1 L.M. Thompson, Politics in the Republic of South Africa (Boston:
Little Brown, 1966), p. 200.
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as the absense of large-scale conflict. Each of these two political
factors will be discussed in this chapter.
A. African Diplomacy
Though economically and militarily paramount on the continent, South
Africa is often an albatross hung around the neck of Western policy, more
a liability than an asset. South Africa's participation in and support
of American initiatives are sufficient to make such initiatives unaccept-
able to many black African states. As an actor in antra-African politics,
Pretoria's influence is often limited to those areas in which it can assert
raw physical power.
South Africa has been dubbed a continental power in search of its
continent. Though somewhat an overstatement, the adage has a measure of
truth to it. Pretoria's gross national product swamps those of other
sub-Saharan states (except Nigeria), accounting for a quarter of the con-
tinent's total GNP. Its dole for defense constitutes a third of the total
Africa military expenditures, and its forces are superior to those of any
combination of possible continental opponents. Besides, it stands on its
own in terms of armaments; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimated
that only 5% of its defense budgets in recent years was spent on imported
combat equipment and components. South Africa possesses sub-Saharan
Africa's only well-developed industrial economy, its only sophisticated
financial and communications system, and its only broad managerial and
technological expertise.
Yet Pretoria has been hamstrung from using its power to fashion its
strategic environment. Its racial bigotry sorely undercuts its legitimacy.
To other African states, South Africa stands as a living reminder of their
own past subservience to white rule. The destruction of apartheid remains
one of the sole points of consensus within the Organization of African
Unity, however much the method and timing of its destruction remain points
of contention.'
' For further analysis see John de St. Jorre, A House Divided: South Africa's
Uncertain Future (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie owmen
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Though a political pariah, South Africa is no economic pariah. It
trades feverishly with many African states. IMF data indicate that this
trade represents 4.5% of South Africa's total imports and 11% of its
total exports and is increasing. At least twelve black African countries
are so economically dependent on Pretoria as to face near-ruin if the
UN were to institute economic sanctions against the Republic. While
the O.A.U. calls for such sanctions, some twenty O.A.U. member-states
trade with South Africa daily and 44 have more occasional trade. One
estimate shows that 150 million black African lives throughout the con-
tinent are touched by South African goods daily.'
South Africa stands supreme economically in its own region, as it
accounts for more than 70% of the regional GNP. Botswana, Lesotho,
and Swaziland are economically integrated into the Republic; participants
in a customs union; and dependents for aid, investment, food, and expatriate
skills. Almost 80% of the Republic's mine labor--about 300,000 men--has
come from neighboring states, recently this has fallen by more than half.
Some 60% of Mozambique's foreign exchange earnings--from miners' remit-
tances, fees paid to Mozambique's rail and harbor systems (which handle
more than 15% of South Africa's exports), and the sale of hydro-electric
power from Cabora Bassa--has been derived from South Africa. Zambia's
reliance on the Republic for transit of its mineral exports and for
imports of technical and consumer goods and local stuffs has skyrocketed
over the past year, as has Zaire's for a means of getting its copper off
the continent. Large assistance is given by Pretoria to Malawi's maverick
government; landing rights for South African Airways have been secured
in the Ivory Coast and in Zambia; and South African products can be
found far to the north, e.g., in Gabon and Zaire.
1 Daniel Drooz, "Africa Riddled with Hypocracy," Baltimore Sun,
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Despite impressive economic ties, South Africa's political influence
in black states is quite confined. Mozambique's deep economic dependence
on Pretoria had no apparent influence on Maputo's support for Robert
Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Nor has it doused Botswana's participation as
a Frontline State member. South Africa's striving to undercut the
O.A.U. consensus on confrontation with the white regime, Pretoria's
attempt to prove the economic benefits to black African states of
pragmatism in their political relations, and its efforts to be seen
as a non-aggressive state eager to adapt to its region--all have fallen
far short of Pretoria's goals.
America's guilt by association with South Africa affects relations
throughout the continent where, all told, U.S. interests range from the
highly abstract to the particularly concrete. American political and
economic interests in black Africa are, to a greater or lesser extent,
endangered by ties to South Africa. Though little may in fact come from
black African threats of a total minerals boycott, Nigeria has already
warned foreign corporations to choose between operating there or in
South Africa. In August 1979, Lagos did nationalize the British share of
BP in Nigeria to retaliate for the alleged sale of British oil to South
Africa. 1
However much Pretoria's and Washington's geopolitical perspectives
might overlap--as to the need to resist heightened Soviet-Cuban swash-
buckling in Africa and adhere to a capitalistic economy and Western-type
governmental structure--U.S. identification with South Africa, and vice
versa, often undercuts American interests and policies elsewhere. The
classic example, of course is the Angolan conflict. South Africa's
helping hand turned a broad range of African positions into a more co-
hesive resistance to Western-backed parties, thereby--in the eyes of
The move might, however, have had more to do with the new Thatcher
government's position on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, for the nationalization
happened on the eve of the 1979 Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka to,
among other things, discuss a settlement.
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many Africans--legitimizing Soviet-Cuban intervention. South Africa's
fateful efforts to boost Western interests ended up enhancing Soviet-
Cuban military diplomacy aligning itself with African nationalism--
precisely the reverse of U.S. goals. In restraining Soviet-Cuban military
marauding on the continent, the formation of local power groupings to resist
such incursions--as was attempted during the Angolan civil war--should
remain a key U.S. goal. But overt South African involvement in such a
grouping limits the chances of its success.
Quite aside from this type of specific crisis situation, South
Africa remains a festering sore on Western moves to improve diplomatic
relations with black African states and with the nonaligned nations as
well. To give but one of many possible examples: the Nonaligned Conference
which met in Havana last summer declared that "the imperialist powers"--which
they defined as the major NATO allies, Japan, Israel and Australia--
"cannot escape blame for the existence and maintenance of racist oppression
and the criminal policy of apartheid, because of their political, diplo-
matic, economic, military, and nuclear and other forms of collaboration
with the Pretoria regime to deny the South African people their legitimate
aspirations." Many commentators indubitably dismiss the "nonaligned"
statements as empty rhetoric. Be that as it may, such statements
occasionally reveal true sentiments in the Third World.
B. The Effect of South African Proliferation on African Diplomacy
A clear display of a South African nuclear weapons capability--
whatever the form of that display--would seriously damage Western diplo-
matic relations throughout the continent and beyond. This is true in
terms of the black African nations and their colleagues in the developing
world, and in terms of South Africa itself.
An overt South African nuclear weapons capability would damage
Western relations with Africa and many sympathetic Third World nations,
due to several factors. The decades of Western nuclear dealings with
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South Africa would be highlighted with the intention of demonstrating
that the West provided the apartheid regime with that capability. In this
manner, the always-powerful link between the ruling whites in South Africa
and the whites in the Western world--as perceived by other races around
the world--becomes yet more powerful.
On top of this factor would be the perception of a South African bomb
primarily designed for use against the world's downtrodden people: the
blacks beyond South African borders and/or blacks "oppressed" within.
This perception would make the South African case rather unique
from that of other nuclear-capable states. The United States, Soviet
Union, France, Britain, and China all have nuclear weapons to pose a threat
against each other, that is,against the other major power. Israel
allegedly possesses the weapon against the now-prosperous Arabs and dire
threats posed from that quarter. India has a nuclear "device"--it denies
it has "nuclear weapons"--to face a threat from the major power of China
or the mid-developed state of Pakistan. Hence only South Africa would
have a nuclear weapon perceived as a threat against impoverished minority
peoples, and this would lend the entire issue yet another potent, emotional
dimension.
An overt South African nuclear weapons capability would inevitably
injure Western relations with South Africa as well. Anti-South African
religious and university groups in the West, as mentioned previously, would
prove even more effective in Western nations. Many members of Congress
feel exceedingly strong about nuclear proliferation. A popular outcry
could well provoke Western governments to take complete retaliatory
measures--of what kind and to what degree cannot easily be predicted--
which in turn would invariably chill the already cold relations between
Pretoria and Washington, and Pretoria and Western and Japanese capitals.
In essence, South African proliferation would carry serious
political costs for the United States and its allies in the whole of Africa
and some, though lesser, costs in their relations with the Third World.
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C. Regional Stability: South Africa Within the Region
A United States' major overall politico-strategic goal is for
stability in southern Africa, that is, for avoidance of substantial con-
flict in the area. This in turn depends upon the nature and depth of
South Africa's relations with black states in the region and the effect
of its proliferation on those relations.
One of Pretoria's longstanding foreign policy goals has been the im-
provement of relations throughout the continent and especially within its
own area. The previous incarnation of this approach was called "detente";
the newer one is called a "constellation of southern African states."
Detente flourished as Prime Minister Vorster and his aides traveled
clandestinely around black Africa to launch a dialogue and to gain re-
spectability. Progress was made--how much is debatable, but some--with such
moderate states as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Zaire, Zambia, Liberia, and
Malawi (the latter being the sole black state having diplomatic relations
with Pretoria).
But "detente" was dealt twin blows in 1975-76 from which it has not
recovered. First was Pretoria's military incursion into the Angolan civil
war. Ironically, this grew out of the very same detente policy, as many
moderate Africans begged the Republic to combat the Marxist MPLA there.
But it also sounded its death knell. The first use ever of South African
regulars beyond their national territory was deemed unacceptable by most
black Africans.
Second was the Soweto uprising of June 1976, which made Africans
recoil even more. Blacks without could not be seen as being friendlier
with the Afrikaner regime than blacks within.
The now fashionable "constellation" concept followed on detente's
heels. In his inaugural speech to Parliament as Prime Minister, P.W. Botha
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introduced the full phrase "constellation of southern African states."
He gave it some substance by proposing a series of nonaggression pacts
throughout the region. Foreign Minister R.F. Botha followed this up by
mentioning the possibility of "secretariats" to regulate the affairs of
the 40 million people south of the Kunene and Zambezi Rivers, and the
Minister of Economic Affairs, C.J. Heunis, chimed in with the notion of
a Southern Africa Chamber of Commerce.
The idea of a "constellation" has something to it. In both military
and economic terms, South Africa has increased its regional dominance
since the 1975 Portuguese decolonization. The constellation policy would
no doubt enhance this dominance. In its military aspects, it would involve
"the concept of mutual defense against a common enemy," in the Prime
Minister's words. Nations in the region would not only sign non-aggression
pacts with one another but would also "undertake joint responsibility for
the security of the region," which "will involve the combating and de-
struction of terrorism...and the mutual recognition of borders...a joint
decision to keep communism out of southern Africa."
All of the Prime Minister's points would enhance South Africa. Most
incidents of "terrorism" would be black groups fighting the white leadership;
these urban guerrillas are frequently called "freedom fighters" after they win.
The recognized "borders" would include the homelands within the Republic.
Due to these and other factors, the entire military dimension of the
"constellation" approach is quite far-fetched. As two South African scholars
put it, not only is the idea "politically unpalatable but also infeasible as
long as there is no shared perception of the threat against which they ought
to be protected." 1
The "constellation" policy will prove more successful in its economic
dimension. In recent years, black states have uncomfortably become
more dependent on Pretoria while Pretoria has become less dependent on
them. As briefly mentioned above, black-ruled countries rely heavily upon
1 Geldenhuys and Venter, op. cit., p. 64.
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South African transportation routes and--to a lesser extent--its trade,
private investment, and official economic aid. Major mineral exporters--
Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe--are keenly dependent on South African harbors
and railways. Meanwhile the Republic has become far less dependent on
imported unskilled mine labor, much to the detriment of Malawi, Mozambique,
Lesotho, and Botswana.
Hence, Pretoria has launched its "constellation" policy--as it does
so many things--from a position of strength. Malawi has good political and
economic ties to the Republic, as do Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.
Zimbabwe and Namibia now rest heavily upon the Republic, and naturally the
"independent" or "to-be independent" homelands are even more tightly bound.
The thrust of this policy, then, is to consolidate these relations and,
more vital still, to reach out further.
Two prime targets are, of course, Mozambique and Zambia. Relations
with Marxist Mozambique constitute a model for future relations with independ-
ent Zimbabwe and Namibia, whatever their ideological or political stripe.
Considerable technical aid, equipment, and some economic aid has flowed
from Pretoria to Maputo. In February 1979, South Africa signed a seven-
year agreement to double its exports through the port of Maputo (to 12
million tons), and South African mining companies will finance the rail
lines between Maputo and Komatiport. Pretoria added a sweetener by ex-
tending a $140 million credit in 1979 to Mozambique'for the purchase of
some 100,000 tons of corn and other products. For years after its
independence in 1975, Mozambique had been receiving some 80 percent of
its foreign exchange directly from South Africa based on a traditional
gold-for-labor arrangement (with the gold figured at the old exchange rate
of $42.20 an ounce). Thus, the stoutly capitalistic South Africa had
been subsidizing the militant Marxist Mozambique to the tune of $100
million a year. Then, as now, Pretoria was its major supplier of food,
industrial equipment, and consumer goods. South African technicians
currently operate Mozambique's railways and its ports; nearly 6 percent
of the goods in Maputo go to or come from South Africa (around 17,000 tons
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per day). In return, President Machel has minimized his material support
for South African black nationalist movements.
The same approach has been applied to Zambia and goes back a number
of years. Zambia and South Africa conferred on a Rhodesian settlement and
on Zambia's perpetually deteriorating economy back in the early 1970s
with but a modicum of success.
Since then, economics has spearheaded their cooperation as South Africa
has become Zambia's single largest trading partner. A third of Zambia's
total trade is with the Republic, and Zambia currently has a credit line of
$8 million which it uses to purchase agricultural products. In March 1980,
Zambia ordered 50,000 tons of South African maize and signed contracts for
100,000 additional tons thereafter. Pretoria lent Zambia six locomotives,
is training Zambian locomotive engineers, and has dispatched more than
2,000 railway cars to deliver goods and take out copper. South African
transportation experts estimate that Zambia imports more than half of all
its requirements through the Republic. Regular commercial air transport
opened between Lusaka and Johannesburg in early 1980.
The increasing dependence of its black neighbors as far north as Zaire
should not obscure their longer-term aim of reducing such dependence on the
Republic. This goal became clear during a meeting of southern African
black states in Arusha, Tanzania last year. It was reiterated in April 1980
when the leaders of eight black African nations in the region met in Lusaka,
Zambia to declare their intention to lessen economic dependence upon South
Africa. Six of the eight nations--Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland., Malawi,
Mozambique, and Zambia--are heavily economically dependent on South Africa
while only two--Tanzania and Angola--are not,
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Despite their best efforts, the black African nations are unlikely
to reduce economic dependence on the Republic in the near future.
As one observer put it, "The general assessment of the whirlwind meeting
was that the goal...would take longer than and be nearly as difficult to
achieve as independence for blacks in South Africa." 1 That will be long
and difficult indeed. For one thing, the alternative economic relation-
ships cost money, and none of the black African states have much money.
The sums involved can be enormous. The construction of new rail lines,
harbors, and international airports is very expensive. Development aid
from international agencies and non-African governments can help, but
seldom can it match the sums available from mine workers' wages, South
African tourists' payments, private investment by South African corpora-
tions, technical assistance, foodstuffs and consumer products, or
transportation and rail facilities.
For another thing, the history of economic cooperation between black
African states has been rather feeble. The once-inspiring example of the
East African Community--composed of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda--has
disintegrated and formally ended since each state began fighting with the
other two.
Finally, many of the black African states in southern regions have
economies that are basically similar rather than complementary. These
states usually have automotive assembly plants, cement and textile factories,
and produce coffee, beef, corn, mutton, sugar, and tea. "There is not much
available in any one that the others cannot produce themselves.2 In short,
it seems that the neighboring states' economic dependence will continue or
perhaps even'increase over time, much to Pretoria's liking.
Despite the apparent success of the economic component of the
"constellation" concept, there are severe difficulties involved with its
entire implementation. For one thing, the whole concept is to date more
1 Gregory Jaymes, "Cutting South Africa Tie a Tough Goal for Neighbors,"
New York Times, April 5, 1980.
2 Ibid.
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rhetoric than policy. Again to quote the two South African scholars, it
"lacks a coherent intellectual basis. Without a clear conception of the
substance of the idea, official pronouncements thereon are consequently
vague and often contradictory. This, however, did not inhibit the pro-
ponents of a constellation from publicly expounding their idea with noted
enthusiasm and conviction.tI
Second, and far more importantly, the economic component of the
constellation approach has not and probably will not affect its political
or military aspects. As is clear, the black neighboring states are
staunchly anti-Pretoria in their politics, regardless of how dependent
they are and increasingly become in their economics.
As for the lack of any military dimension to the concept, one need
only to look at the example of Zambia. Recently this nation, so economically
dependent upon South Africa, turned to the Soviets for arms. The government
ordered a squadron of sixteen MIG-21s from Moscow at the cost of some
$85.4 million. Also included in the entire deal were armored cars, tanks,
and personnel carriers, presumably to be run by the more than 200 Zambians
currently in training in Russia. All told, the impoverished or nearly-
bankrupt Zambia government is handing more than $100 million to the
Soviets--reportedly in a barter arrangement for cobalt--which makes it
the largest single arms purchase made by that nation since Independence
fifteen years ago.
For a second example, one need look to Lesotho, a state entirely
surrounded by South African territory and utterly dependent upon it
economically. Nonetheless, Lesotho recently established diplomatic ties
with Moscow and is rumored to be requesting arms from there as well.
Again, no real military threat is posed to Pretoria. But, as in the
case of Zambia, the lesson is clear: the closest of economic ties (even
dependencies) have no political or military spillover.
1 Ibid., p. 67.
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D. The Effect of South African Proliferation on Regional Stability
Obviously, any overt South African nuclear weapons capability would
have a most destablizing effect within the region politically. Black
African governments have repeatedly made clear their deep concern over
this potential capability. Were South Africa to credibly prove the
existence of nuclear weapons by carrying out a demonstration explosion
in the South Atlantic, which carried more credibility than the September
1979 "flash," or in the Kalahari Desert, then African governments would
surely ask the U.N. Security Council to bring immediate comprehensive
sanctions to bear. Their pressure would be far more intense than in the
current climate where South Africa's nuclear capability is clouded. For
example, Nigeria's willingness to use their oil as a political lever on
the West would most certainly be applied should the U.S. not act, in
their view, forcefully against a South African nuclear capability.
Whether any overt South African nuclear weapons capability would have
a devastating regional affect on stability militarily is far less certain.
It seems probable that an increasing number of regional states would then
turn to the Soviets for weaponry; those purchasing Soviet weapons already
might increase their procurements. Military training by the Soviets would
probably increase. More black countries would ask for Cuban or East German
advisors, in small numbers initially, to bolster their confidence if not
in fact their security. All such moves would be most unsettling to those
in Western capitals and to those within the region who are deeply concerned
with security matters in Southern Africa.
Whether this would translate into increased conflict on South Africa's
borders and/or within the Republic itself is less certain. The regional
black states realize that whatever level of arms or outside advisors they
may receive, the South African military would remain predominant even
without resort to nuclear weapons. In a relatively tranquil period, there-
fore, these measures would probably not increase the tempo of conflict
measurably.
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In times of substantial regional turmoil, however, an explosion of a
South African nuclear device might dampen the conflict considerably. The
more precarious the security situation for the Afrikaners, the more dampening
such an explosion might prove--regardless of whether it takes place in a
battlefield situation or, as is more probable, in the South Atlantic or in
an uninhabited desert area. For such an explosion would prove, beyond
anyone's reasonable doubt, that the Afrikaners were keenly aware of their
declining security and were fully prepared to take whatever measures necessary
to assure their people's survival. On top of its tremendous conventional
power would be a real nuclear capability; this would cause increased trepida-
tion among the black states and their Soviet-bloc allies, none of whom would
need convincing that the Afrikaners were fully prepared to expend all of
their military forces in the direst of situations.
E. Conclusions: The Effect of South African Proliferation on Western
Political Interests
As mentioned, Western political interests in the region consist of:
a) diplomatic relations on the continent and with the Third World in general,
and b) stability within the region.
On the first score, overt South African nuclear weapons capability would
damage Western diplomatic relations with developing countries, particularly
those in Africa, and with South Africa. Western powers would be castigated
for their past nuclear cooperation with the Republic. They would likewise
be challenged to impose complete U.N. sanctions against South Africa;
this they would probably refuse or subvert, causing yet more criticism
throughout the Third World. Whatever measures were taken by the
West would seem all too minor to the black African states and to the Third
World. Furthermore, harsh Western political condemnation of Pretoria's move
would further alienate the Afrikaners. Any concrete Western economic or
political punitive measures,i.e., breaking diplomatic relations with Pretoria,
would reinforce this breach between Pretoria and the industrialized
democracies. In short, Western diplomacy throughout black and white-ruled
Africa and in the Third World would suffer considerably.
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As to the second overall Western interest, a South African nuclear
capability would adversely affect the security situation in the region
during relatively tranquil times. Black states would increasingly turn to
Soviet military assistance and advisors, and this would be unsettling to
virtually all parties concerned with stability there. During times of
relative turmoil, however, a South African nuclear demonstration would
have a sobering effect upon its adversaries, and thereby help stabilize
what would then be a rapidly destabilizing situation. Though somewhat
comforting, this scenario nonetheless presumes that the security situation
has become grave indeed at that point.
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VII THE EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PROLIFERATION
ON WESTERN MILITARY INTERESTS
The most obvious yet frequently disputed American and Western security
interest in southern Africa involves the shipping route around the Cape of
Good Hope. It is obvious because South Africa sits astride a shipping lane
that has become among the world's busiest and most important. Yet it is
also frequently disputed since the issues involved today are less clear cut
than those in the past, when control of the Cape route was critical to
British supremacy at sea and to its global security interests. During
World War II, when the Mediterranean Sea was sealed by the Germans, control
of the Cape became central to the Allied war effort in the Middle East and
elsewhere.
These are stark facts. Yet they do not themselves answer the critical
question: Is the Cape route still vital to Western security, given the
changed political, economic, and technological conditions of today? Nor
do they answer the central question of our study: Would South African
nuclear proliferation affect Western security interests in the Cape route?
To answer these questions, we must examine the Western commercial
interests in the Cape route, then Western military interests there, the
threats posed to those interests, South Africa's ability to meet those
threats, and then the role of nuclear proliferation in the entire issue.
A. Western Commercial Interests in the Cape Route
Since the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, the Cape route has become
"the most crowded shipping lane in the world."' The flow of oil in that
"Patrick Wall, "The Vulnerability of the West in the Southern Hemisphere,"
Strategic Review, Vol. IV, Winter 1976, pp. 44-50.
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land has increased twentyfold over the past decade alone. In 1975, some
24,000 oceangoing vessels passed the Cape; 9,476 of them docked in the
adjoining South African ports. The reopening of the Suez Canal may not
diminish the Cape's traffic since some 80% of the ships currently under
construction exceed a weight of 200,000 tons and are thus larger than the
largest ships now able to pass through the Canal (124,000 tons in ballast).
Today, more than half of Europe's oil supplies (some 12 million barrels
of oil per day) and a quarter of its food pass the Cape. By the 1980s,
more than half of America's oil imports may also travel by the Cape route.'
B. Western Military Interests in the Cape Route
Even the most cursory glance at a world map would indicate the im-
portance of South Africa's location, given these transportation figures
and forecasts. Dr. Ray S. Cline has clearly described this importance as
follows:
..a crucial geostrategic fact of life is that the sea
lanes linking the all-important oil sources of the Persian
Gulf with the industries of West Europe and the Americas
pass along both the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic coasts
of Africa and around the Cape of Good Hope. In any 24-hour
period about 55 ships will pass the Cape of Good Hope on
the way between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans... Oil, plus
copper from Zaire, Rhodesian and South African chrome, and
other scarce alloy metals are all vastly important to the
advanced industries of the United States and other in-
dustrial countries. Any prolonged interruption of seaborne
commerce in the South Atlantic would be a disaster.2
Patrick Wall, a member of the British Parliament,has described the
strategic importance of the route to Western European nations as follows:
' L.G. Gann and Peter Duignan, South Africa: War, Revolution or Peace?
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 10-23.
2 Ray S. Cline, "Southern Sea Routes and the Security of the Free World"
in Free World Security and the South Atlantic, Council for Inter-
American Security, (Washington, D.C.: Institute of American Relations,
1979), p. 11.
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Control of Southern Africa or the creation of chaos in
that area could lead to the interruption of these raw
materials so vital to industrialized Europe and thus cause
mass unemployment and leave the European governments with
the choice of surrender or initiating nuclear war.'
Even though of obvious importance, the Cape route is nonetheless of
derivative importance. It may be crucial because of the importance and
volume of the minerals travelling through it and because of the lack of
favorable alternative routes. We will discuss these matters in terms of,
first, the Cape route's importance to the Persian Gulf contingency and,
second, to American nuclear strategic deterrence.
The Persian Gulf Link
In terms of the U.S. Navy's conventional role, the Cape route
has become key to entering the critical Indian Ocean with military force.
Before the Iranian hostage crisis erupted in November 1979, the sole
American facility was, and was planned to be, the small naval depot at
Diego Garcia. U.S. naval presence then consisted of a command ship and
two destroyers that had operated out of Bahrain. In mid-1979, President
Carter ordered two additional destroyers to be there on a permanent basis
and increased the yearly deployments of the Seventh Fleet from three to
four, at least two of these to be led by carriers. With the increased
importance of the Persian Gulf's area and the U.S. security umbrella which
the President proclaimed in his 1980 State of the Union address, America's
presence in terms of ships and facilities is sure to rise markedly.
This is essential if the experience of World War II retains its
validity. As Dr. Geoffrey Kemp has stated, "Perhaps the most important
lesson of World War II for the South Atlantic was the growing importance
1 Patrick Wall, MP, "The Security of the Atlantic Ocean--A British View,"
Free World Security and the South Atlantic, 1979, p. 31.
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of the Middle East oil as a vital material for modern warfare and the need
to insure access to oil supplies and to protect sea lines of communications
in both peace and wartime conditions." 1
Looking at alternative routes to enter the area in a Persian Gulf
contingency, Dr. Kemp pinpointed four. First is the path from the Mediter-
ranean Sea via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea into the Arabian Sea. Though
this is convenient in terms of distance and time, it would be exceedingly
difficult if the conflict were taking place in that exact area, as it probably
would be. The historical record is not comforting in this regard: the Suez
Canal was inoperable during the 1967 and 1973 conflicts and thereafter, while
the Bab el Mandeb Straits were blockaded for periods during 1973, and
would probably be blockaded again during a regional conflict anywhere in
the area.
Second is the path from the South and East China Seas and the
Western Pacific through the Indonesian straits and into the Indian Ocean.
Again this would be convenient in terms of distance and time, but again
it would be terribly vulnerable. Travelling through narrow straits poses
heavy risks of attack from shore-based munitions or air power. Again,
the historical record reveals these problems: in 1971, when the U.S.
deployed a nuclear task force through the straits into the Bay of Bengal,
it was vigorously opposed by many littoral states.
Third is the route from the Western Pacific and South China Seas
around Australia through the Bass Strait and into the Indian Ocean. This
would be a safe route but it does pose problems of distance and time.
Besides, it raises the question of whether the proper naval drawdown
for a Persian Gulf contingency would be from the Pacific Fleet, as it
has been during the Iranian crisis. Most strategists believe that, in
Geoffrey Kemp, "The South Atlantic as a Strategic Theater," U.S.
Maritime Interests in the South Atlantic. A study done for the
Navy in October 1977, p. 1-27.
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times of real conflict, the Pacific fleet would be needed to protect Japan
and other allies in northeast Asia, and that naval deployments should come
from the Atlantic and not Pacific fleets.
Fourth is of course the Cape route, either beginning in the
Atlantic and travelling around the Cape of Good Hope directly into the
Indian Ocean or from the Pacific and passing through the Panama Canal
and then through the south Atlantic and around the Cape, By all accounts,
this would be the safest, quickest, and most beneficial route given the
sizable U.S. naval deployments already in the Atlantic.
The Strategic Nuclear Link
The Cape route also proves important to the U.S. Navy's strategic
nuclear role in deterrence, since its ballistic missile submarines use the
route for deployments into the Indian Ocean. That Ocean's irregular
currents and thermal layers make it capable of baffling Soviet listening
devices. Besides,its location is ideal since the range of Trident sub-
marines allows them to target Moscow, Leningrad and other areas west of
the Urals.
Both the conventional and strategic nuclear roles of the U.S.
Navy would lend importance to the Cape route. This is especially the
case since inclement weather, as well as convenience and economy, induce
most vessels to hug the South African shores, i.e., to stay within 15 or
20 miles of the land, while travelling around the Cape.
3. Qualifications to the Cape's Importance
Having pointed out factors which lead one to hold the Cape route
and in turn South Africa to be of vital importance to Western security,
we must now temper that conclusion somewhat. Many heated arguments are
made to discount these factors and they need to be addressed.
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Even though South Africa has a huge 2,881 kilometer coastline
and sophisticated port facilities around the Cape route, the political
orientation of its government is not--some people contend--key to the
route's safety. Certainly a pro-West regime in South Africa poses no
danger to the security of this choke-point, though it might not in itself
be sufficient to protect it. As discussed in a later section in this
Chapter, it seems that South Africa is not very capable of protecting
the Cape on behalf of the West, nor is its stated policy one of becoming
capable of such protection.
Neither can it be assumed without examination that a neutral/
non-aligned or even radical/anti-West government would ipso facto
threaten the security of the Cape route. A radical leftist regime taking
power in Pretoria with Soviet aid-in itself, a wholly improbable
happening--may not allow Moscow to use its ports for naval operations
against the West. Recent African history indicates that such movements
stress nationalism and are eager to project an image of self-reliance
and independence. Any blatant sign of alignment, such as the granting of
a foreign base, would undercut some of their rationale. This was the case
with Mozambique--which in late 1975 was infuriated by the Soviets' heavy
pressure to establish Russian naval bases there--and by Angola, whose
constitution explicitly prohibits the "installation of foreign bases on
national territory."
The refusal of these two black, Marxist regimes--which came to
power through communist-supplied arms and, in Angola's case, with the aid
of a massive (16-20,000 men) commitment of Cuban combat troops--to give
Moscow bases was unexpected by U.S. policymakers in the mid-1970s. The
rebuff must also have been unexpected by Soviet policymakers. It
certainly dashed the hopes of the architect of the modern Russian Navy,
Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, who publicly called for naval
facilities around the African coast.'
For a full discussion, see: Colin Legum, "International Dimensions
of Violent Communical Conflict," in Africa in the 1980s: A Continent
in Crisis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 49-50.
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But even were a radical regime to come to power in South Africa and
then to allow the installation of Soviet naval facilities, there is yet
another question: Would the Soviets use such bases to blockade or thwart
Western shipping?
The answer here, too, is not self-evident. For a total blockade of
vital Western oil shipments would constitute a casus belli, as Moscow well
appreciates. Should the Soviets seek to spark a global conflict by
halting oil flows, there are far more enticing means than a naval blockade
in southern Africa. Bombing or sabotaging the oil fields or militarily
occupying key oil-producing areas in the Persian Gulf would be swifter,
easier, and surer. Should Moscow nevertheless seek a naval blockade some-
where, the prime areas would be at the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the
Persian Gulf or in the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. All of these
offer the Soviets shorter lines of supply and better opportunities for full
air cover. Such factors, woven together, have led one African specialist to
conclude: "Southern African bases are simply irrelevant to the protection
or intimidation of oil shipments from the Gulf states."'
All things considered, however, this conclusion is too glib and is in
fact too shallow. For a real threat to Western security through disruption
of the Cape traffic may seem remote to some people today, but it cannot
responsibly be dismissed by anyone for tomorrow. The foreign-policy analyst
must contemplate and prepare for contingencies which, however remote in their
William Foltz, "U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa: Economic & Strategic
Constraints," in Rene Lemarchand, American Policy in Southern Africa,
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), Ch. 6., p, 261.
For further analysis of these points see Robert M. Price, U.S. Foreign
Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy
(Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley,
1978), Chapt. 2.
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probability (and this one may not be so remote), would be devastating in
their eventuality.
So the safety of the Cape route must be factored in as one component
of overall American interests in southern Africa. It could be a critical
one in case of a large-scale conventional conflict in the Indian Ocean or
in other places where U.S. naval use of South African ports could prove
key to success. The growing strength of the Soviet Navy and growing world
tensions make the issue all the more critical to U.S. national security.
C. Soviet Interests and Capabilities in the Cape Route
Over the past two decades, the Soviets have concentrated on building
up their Navy which, accordingly, has grown from a strictly coastal defense
force to a blue water navy. In peacetime, the Soviets use their Navy as
a means of augmenting political influence--"showing the flag," among other
things--especially within the Third World. Its Navy is also used for
projection of power, to help supply friendly regimes with arms or forces.
Supplying a client state by sea has become an important role for both
superpowers. The Soviets have steadily been adding to their projection of
intervention capabilities by constructing aircraft carriers, Minsk and
Kiev, with Yak-36 Forger VSTOL aircraft aboard them. In addition, Moscow
has also augmented its amphibious capability by deploying amphibious ships
to all major oceans.
The Soviet Navy is also designed to inhibit or even prohibit Western
counteractions in times of crisis. By positioning its naval vessels
between potential "counter-revolutionary" forces and its allied "revolution-
ary" forces, the Soviets can effectively cordon off an area and perhaps
even a conflict. During the 1973 Middle East War and the 1975 Angolan War,
Soviet forces assumed positions considered "interpository," intended to
discourage U.S. Navy intervention with a flow of supplies.
In its strategic nuclear role, the Soviet Navy is vitally interested
in tracking Polaris and Trident submarines. In its conventional role,
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it seeks to threaten or appear to threaten Western sea lines of communica-
tions to vital friends and allies abroad. In fact, threats to open
unfettered maritime passage have been rising with such technological
advances as advanced satellites for ocean surveillance and communications;
anti-ship missiles; anti-submarine warfare capabilities; and improved
force projection and fleet support capabilities.
To pose a credible threat to vital Western resource needs (pre-
dominantly oil), the Soviets have augmented their forces in the Indian
Ocean. During recent times, they have steadily maintained a force of
18 to 20 ships in that Ocean on a permanent basis, 6 to 8 of which have
been combatants. The new Soviet aircraft carrier, the Minsk, which docked
off Aden in the summer of 1979, caused particular trepidation in Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman by its mere presence in the Persian Gulf area.
All of these factors tend to increase the importance of the Cape
route, if for no other reason than that it seems to the Soviets to be a
.critical area to Western commercial and-military interests. In addition, the
Soviets also may be interested in the Cape route as the key waterway to
link the European Soviet Union with the Soviet Far East. The Northern
Sea route is only open for four months a year; two other usual routes pass
through canals which lie in foreign jurisdictions. Only the Cape route can
provide certain year-round passage for the Russians to pass through inter-
national waterways.' This factor may become increasingly important as the
Soviets augment their forces in the Far East to ward off an increased
threat from the People's Republic of China. Perhaps Peking has realized
this in its own long-range planning, for over the past year it has put
out feelers for open communications with South Africa and has toned down
its past anti-South African tirades.
' U.S. Maritime Interests in the South Atlantic, op. cit.
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D. South African Capabilities on the Cape Route
Among the fearful scenarios facing Pretoria is one of a naval block-
ade led by the Soviet Union and sanctioned by the United Nations. Despite
the frequency of the Afrikaners' mentioning this scenario, its probability
remains low over the next decade. No effort has been made to police the
U.N.'s 1977 arms embargo against South Africa, and the Soviet Union may be
quite reluctant to police the exceedingly difficult naval blockade. Key
South African ports are not only critical to the Republic but are also the
economic lifelines for neighboring black states. A total blockade would
ruin these black states. So the blockade would have to be partial, hence
making it far more difficult.
South Africa has been augmenting its Navy for its own national defense
quite steadily. Since the 1977 decision by France to halt sales of sub-
marines and frigates to South Africa, Pretoria has trimmed its naval
doctrine and operations. It has publicly renounced responsibility for
the protection of the entire sea route--if it indeed had ever assumed such
responsibility--and has concentrated its naval energies on the protection
of its own harbors and immediate coastline from direct attack or inter-
ruption of its own shipping. South Africa still plays an air-reconnaissance
role and maintains Silvermine, the Cape communications center designed
to monitor the Indian Ocean and Cape naval and air traffic. It used
such capabilities in the summer of 1979 to track the Soviet carrier
task force moving around the Cape.
The South African Navy will remain basically a coastal defense force
rather than a blue water fleet. It will have little capability for long-
distance maritime presence or patrol. To protect its 2,100 nautical mile
coastline as well as to provide some air-sea rescue work, anti-submarine
detection, and protection of the national 200-mile fishing grounds, the
South African Air Force and Navy work together in their joint headquarters
at Silvermine near Capetown. In April 1979, the South African goverrnnent
announced formation of a new marine security force--consisting of experts
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in radar, explosives, and underwater demolition, and heavily-armed patrol
boats-designed to further protect the harbors and coastline. Such
measures by South Africa are but part of a world-wide trend, namely the
proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons systems among coastal
states, all of whom wish to defend themselves against external interven-
tion and to prevent or at least threaten the use of their coastal seas.
South Africa's Reaching Out for Allies
In order to bolster its own coastal defense--and to help realize its
long-term goal of gaining international acceptance--South Africa has put
out feelers to Latin American nations for a South Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (SATO). The former Commander-in-Chief of South African Defense Forces,
current Minister of Defense, and a top advisor to the Prime Minister,
Gen. Magnus Malan, recently visited his counterparts in Argentina, Chile,
and Paraguay. Previous talks were held with Brazil, but they have cooled
since Brazil now wishes to tighten its ties to the Luso-African states
of Angola and Mozambique. But Chile and Argentina may view cooperation
with South Africa as a welcome means of combatting the Cubans. The
latter (Argentina) may also be interested in nuclear collaboration with
South Africa should the pressures on "pariah" states increase. At present,
Argentina depends upon the U.S. for most of its uranium; since those bila-
teral relations have become strained in recent times, it may now seek an
alternative supplier in South Africa. However, to date, such action does
not seem imminent.
Such feelers are accompanied by talk from the Afrikaners that South
Africa may loosen its ties to the West. In January of 1977, for instance,
P.W. Botha warned in an interview with the London Times that "because of
the way they have behaved towards South Africa, [the Western States]
could no longer take South African support for granted in the event of an
East-West conflict...If it suits us, we can remain neutral."'
1 Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily
Report, Sub-Saharan Africa, p. E-6 (February 2, 1977).
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But such talk of neutrality by South Africa is ludicrous. Despite
the rhetoric, the South Africans long to participate in a Western security
system. To bolster their case, South Africans constantly emphasize past
measures taken to assist the West in times of crisis. During World War I
some 12,400 South Africans died for the Allies. During World War II
another 12,000 lives were given, many by South African pilots who helped
liberate Ethiopia from the Italians.' In 1949, South Africa sent an air
crew to support the U.S. airlift to West Berlin. In 1950, Pretoria dis-
patched an Air Force squadron to serve under the UN Commander in the
Korean War. In 1955 it entered into an agreement allowing the British
Royal Navy to use the Simonstown port in exchange for military equipment.
Since the early 1950s, South Africa has repeatedly asked NATO and
its members to be allowed to join, or at least be permitted to strengthen
its security ties with the West. In March 1974, the French and South
African navies carried out joint maneuvers, much to the joy of Pretoria.
When Britain announced its withdrawal from the Simonstown Agreement in
October 1974, South Africa offered the United States use of its facilities.
Rebuffed by the West in Europe and North America, South Africa moved to
form a South Atlantic Treaty Organization in order to gain acceptance in
a Western military bloc, with all that implies in terms of recognition and
prestige. But nothing ever materialized of this either.
Thus, South Africa is left without any international security
guarantees. Vice President Mondale bluntly informed Prime Minister Vorster
in Vienna in May 1977 that America would not come to the assistance of a
government upholding apartheid in any type of attack.
This was the case, however, largely because Afrikaners were not yet in
control. The British stock was staunchly pro-British, but the
Afrikaners were not; memories of the Boer War still rankled in their
souls, and German National Socialism fired their imaginations.
Afrikaner leaders like John Vorster wanted either a neutral stance
or a pro-Nazi one. He was interned as a result.
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Afrikaners heard the words but harbor the hopes. Many cling to the
belief that, in a time of real crisis, the West would need and welcome
Pretoria's cooperation. They may have a point, if considered in terms of
the West's crisis rather than South Africa's crisis alone. Just as Britain
and the United States were willing to embrace Stalinist Russia to help
overcome a greater foe, Hitlerian Germany, the West might cooperate with
racist South Africa to help overcome a greater foe, the Soviet Union.
While waiting for such a forbidding day to come about, however, South
Africans feign an inkling for neutrality. Despite all the rehtoric, one
informative scholar in this area, Robert S. Jaster, concludes that
neutrality is "not a serious option for South Africa." Economically,
politically, and culturally, the Republic is tied in too tightly with the
West. There is little evidence that the East would believe South Africa's
protestations of neutrality, or even wish South Africa to go neutral or
to join its camp. "Threats to remain neutral thus appear no more than an
angry gesture of defiance" on the world scene and of gathering popularity
on the domestic scene.I
Rather, the Republic wishes not to separate itself further from the
West but to integrate itself further in the West. Again to quote Robert
Jaster: "South Africa remains eager to join in Western defense. Moreover,
South Africa would be willing to pay a high price for admission." If
receiving a "binding, long-term defense pact," the Republic would agree to
UN supervised elections for Namibia, sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(if also supplied with enriched uranium), do more to protect the Cape route,
and make some concessions on petty apartheid. "Much as South Africa wants
to be associated with a Western alliance, however, she would be tough and
demanding in any negotiations."'
Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, Adelphi
Paper No. 159, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 33.
2 Ibid., p. 42.
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And despite all the official talk of neutrality, South Africa still
would like greater Western security measures in its own region. Following
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were a flurry of editorials urging the
West to bolster its defenses, in part by bolstering its presence in
southern Africa. This message was carried in the editorial in The Star
on January 10, 1980. The Citizen in a January 11, 1980 editorial entitled
"Use Simonstown" addressed to Western leaders, read:
You should allow South Africa to join you in the
overall planning of strategy in the Indian Ocean
and South Atlantic. And you should make use of
our naval base at Simonstown--one of the best-
equipped naval stations in the southern
hemisphere--and our vast underground maritime
and communications centre at nearby SiLvermine.
Even were such steps taken--which they would not be, except in times
of overall Western security crisis-there would be problems in cooperating
with South Africa. Not only would there be severe political problems for
any Western government openly doing so, but there would also be military
problems. Because of the persistent strains in relations, service-level
ties to the South African military are rather loose. The lack of long
and close Western-South African military relations of course reduces
possibilities for joint operations and joint planning on both an operational
and strategic level.
Besides, the common basis and background for mutual understanding is
currently lacking. As Jaster notes, South Africa's "decisions are taken
without benefit of the day-to-day informal consultations and exchanges that
make up the bulk of diplomatic cable traffic among states which have a
common concern with global problems and which participate jointly in various
continuing political, military, and economic fora."' Hence a full-scale
military cooperative effort would be difficult to launch on short notice
in a crisis situation.
3 Ibid., p. 38.
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F. The Effect of South African Nuclear Proliferation on Western Military
Interests
An overt South African nuclear weapons capability would make closer
Western-South African military cooperation all the more imperative yet all
the more difficult. It would be imperative since Western capitals would be
most eager to be informed as to the possible use of this capability and
would be eager to influence South African decision-making in the security
realm. Yet this tighter cooperation would be more difficult due to the
higher political barriers which would have to be erected after a South
African nuclear weapons display, of whatever type.
Nonetheless, a South African nuclear capability might be of
military utility to the West if Pretoria decided to produce nuclear anti-
submarine weapons. Such weapons could be modelled after the type produced
by Britain, which recently announced that it had armed its anti-submarine
helicopters with nuclear weapons known as "depth bombs." They could explode
underwater with a force sufficient to destroy an enemy submarine some
distance away; the yield is up to ten kilotons. The British delivery system
consists of naval helicopters which fly from Britain's three carriers, other
warships, and land bases.1
South Africa could follow in Britain's steps. It could produce ASW
nuclear weapons which are easily adapted from the nuclear devices needed
for free-fall fission bombs. Nuclear ASW weapons can be either dropped
from aircraft already on hand or could be delivered with little modifi-
cation from South African surface naval vessels ranging from light
patrol boats to frigates and destroyers. But aircraft-both helicopter
and fixed wing--are the best delivery vehicles for this weapon.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Daily Report, Western Europe, April 7, 1980, p. Ql,
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An announced nuclear ASW capability would vastly enhance South Africa's
capability to protect the Cape route during times of global tension or
global confrontation. Since the ASW weapon could easily be converted into
a nuclear gravity bomb, South Africa could simultaneously gain a deterrent
capability with regard to threats looming from a ground assault in the
region.
Considering the possible contribution a South African nuclear ASW
capability could make to Western security naturally raises the overall
question of Western ties to South Africa. In order to be an effective
contribution, such a South African capability needs to be matched by con-
siderable military consultation and cooperation. Western military and
intelligence officers would need to share more information on the possible
utility of such a weapon, the nature and flow of Soviet submarines, the
probable timing of such deployment, etc.
Technical matters of this type require considerable communications
over an extended period of time. It is most doubtful at present whether
this type of communications is currently taking place, which would set
the stage for the greatest possible contribution by South Africa to
Western security interests around the world.
In addition, whether deployed as an ASW capability or not, South
Africa's overt possession of nuclear weapons in any mode would invariably
set off a hailstorm of criticism and controversy. Since this point
has been made throughout this study, it need only be mentioned to remind
the reader at this point.
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VIII SOUTH AFRICAN PROLIFERATION AND WESTERN
SECURITY INTERESTS IN GENERAL
From the material contained in the preceeding seven chapters of this
report, it is clear that the overall effect of an overt South African
nuclear weapons capability during relative peacetime would be negative.
While there would be some military utility to the West--particularly in
terms of a South African nuclear ASW capability--the economic, political
and ideological repercussions would be negative.
This conclusion would lead U.S. policy-makers to strive to head off
this action rather than to manage it once South Africa clearly displays
a possession of nuclear weapons. Such is a difficult task since this
whole matter is one which touches upon three of the most emotional issues
of our time: 1) human rights and political relations with the Third World;
2) U.S. national security in the dangerous decade ahead; and 3) the spectre
of nuclear proliferation. The primary task for U.S. decision-makers, hence,
is to balance the three in a creative yet realistic manner. This is an
exceedingly demanding challenge since elements of the three are contradic-
tory, as explained below.
A. Human Rights and Political Relations with the Third World
To pursue these goals, the U.S. should distance itself from the South
African government in every manner possible. To withdraw the U.S. naval
attache, cut back on U.S. governmental participation in trade with and
investments in South Africa, and support U.N. resolutions against the
Republic would be consistent with such goals. Whether these steps would
actually foster black rights within that country is highly dubious. None-
theless, these steps would help American relations with black Africa and
generally with the Third World.
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B. U.S. National Security Interests in the Decade Ahead
To advance its own security interests in the decade ahead, the U.S.
should move in the opposite; direction, namely tightening its ties to South
African security officials. It can likewise move to encourage more active
South African measures to protect the Cape of Good Hope sea lanes on
behalf of the entire Western world, and can reopen all channels of communi-
cation of value to U.S. security interests in general. Past reductions of
defense and intelligence contacts with South Africa have had harmful
effects on Western capabilities there while accruing slight if any politi-
cal benefits elsewhere on the continent or around the world.
U.S. security ties to South Africa are valuable in four respects.
First and foremost, a channel thereby remains open for the U.S. to receive
helpful or even critical intelligence at little cost. In 1976, the United
States removed its last electronic intelligence-gathering ship from the
South Atlantic with the understanding that the South Africans would gather
that information and pass it along to the United States. The value of such
information has risen along with expanding Soviet naval--and general
projection-of-power--capabilities. Last year, for example, South African
maritime patrol aircraft kept close surveillance of a Soviet task force,
led by the new aircraft carrier Minsk and two missile cruisers, rounding
the Cape to head for the Persian Gulf.
Second and related, leaving open the channels of communication leaves
open channels for concrete cooperation in a major crisis. Such a crisis
could be on a worldwide scale (conventional or nuclear) or on a regional
scale in such areas as the Persian Gulf. This factor has obviously become
more critical since President Carter declared the Persian Gulf to be an
area of vital U.S. national security concern. Either scenario might force
U.S. officials to swiftly put aside their repugnance of apartheid for the
furtherance of critical Western interests in defeating the Soviets, just as
U.S. officials of the 1940s put aside (or more accurately, overcame) their
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repugnance of Stalin's gulags for the furtherance of critical Western
interests in defeating Hitler. While unlikely at present, such a
contingency cannot be written off in the dangerous decade of the 1980s.
Present strategic planning must allow for the possible use of the
sophisticated South African naval facilities at Simonstown and Durban
in a dire emergency. The world may well witness such an emergency in
the coming times.
Third, Americans can use the military channel to gain insights into
South African military doctrine and planning--factors sure to prove
increasingly important in southern African regional affairs. Among South
African Defense Force senior staff, a residual goodwill and pro-American
sentiment linger. This offers access to an important sector of the
Afrikaner establishment, particularly so at present since the top defense
official wears a second hat as Prime Minister.
Fourth, U.S. officials in South Africa can help push for domestic
change through the military channel, which is also more important than
usual since Prime Minister Botha now continues as Minister of Defense.
Also, the professional military seem among the most reform-prone of all
Afrikaner establishment groups. Military officers realize, better than
the Afrikaner populace at large, that the cure for the nation's cancerous
ills does not lie solely (or even primarily) in the military ward. The
appropriate kind of U.S. attache and diplomatic presence in South Africa
can reinforce such views through daily contacts in informal gatherings.
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