THE SOVIET ROLE IN ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00126R000700860004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

EAST ASIA
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The Soviet Role in Asia
by William A. Brown
~arlc-nent be;%ore the Subcommittees
r, Ear ri pt and the Middle E( ml and on
.4s1,1 rz and PacilacA/)irirx cf'the House
V'r-,oln A?t'thirs Comnriltee on October
1.-. lza~.;. Mr. Brown in Deputy Assistant
Sev r, t,rril.li.r East Anion and Pacific.4l:
611 res.'
The Administration welcomes this op-
l-ortunity to testify today before the
House Subcommittees on Europe and
the Middle East and on Asian and
I'acific Affairs concerning the Soviet
role in Asia. Only a handful of issues has
as high a priority in our foreign policy,
?'r, indeed, in that of the Soviets, as
--'vents in this broad are of nations
..tretching from the Pacific Ocean to the
Persian Gulf. The region is of rapidly in-
creasing importance to both East and
West in terms of security, trade, and
;.silitieal development.
Soviet Foreign Policy Style
-.'vier policy toward this vast area con-
prehends a diverse mixture of ethnic,
religious, cultural, and political patterns
:uul is itself diverse. And although it
A?ul'I 14? difficult to identify a unified
.S.,viet perspective or strategy for the
?zttire region, we can speak of a distinct
",vier style in handling problems which
,rise here and. indeed, everywhere,
hen the U.S.S.R. perceives its in-
rest s are engaged.
A few weeks ago this style was re-
e:-le,l with a clarity rarely seen in inter-
'064111A affairs. Once in a very great
A hilt' an event will occur which cuts
Irrough all ambiguities and provides the
.corld with an unvarnished view of a
--rate's motivations and essential
haraeter. The tragedy of Korean Air
!.Ines IKAL) flight #W7 was such an
??~ent. This incident is striking because it
mho -lizes, at one Stroke, so much that
wrong about the character of Soviet
Nihcy toward its Asian neighbors-the
e:ny emphasis on military intimidation,
he easy resort to force, the absen a of
,nv sense of trust, the inability to com-
.unicate, and the paranoia that exists
.zst lrelow the surface of an unconvinc-
ng rhetoric of peace and good will.
It ;also highlights a continuing Soviet
rust rat in m: Moscow's inal-ilit o
art its in -ressive anti Lrowin ? military
r~ seueo its - sal and Ills, '? ? ? wal.
a tan rr:utrt alto a coherent ri~lke'in :-
regional community through which the
e so
economic influence. (Only in rn in c lllw
Soviet nonmt r c iplomacy be said to
be really effective.) In a sense, Soviet
reliance on military power and use of
force is undermining these broader goals
and making it more, rather than less,
difficult for the U.S.S.R. to achieve the
status and influence in Asia which it so
clearly desires.
This failure is serious because it is
clear that the Soviets assign Asia a
priority in their foreign policy second
only to Europe and are devoting increas-
ing resources of every kind to con-
solidate the U.S.S.R.'s position as an
Asian power.
Soviet diplomatic weakness in Asia
has been accompanied, however, by an
unprecedented military buildup aimed at
the United States and its friends and
allies. The U.S.S.R. can now rapidly
deploy large naval and air forces
throughout the Pacific and Indian
Oceans, which for the first time pose a
significant direct conventional threat to
U.S. forces, facilities, and lines of com-
munication and supply. So while we
should not assess the U.S.S.R.'s position
in Asia #ithout noting the very real
problems Moscow Lewes, we cannot af-
ford to be complacent, especially given
the impressive power it can deploy in
the region.
Asia is imprrtant to the Soviets for
several reasons. Three-quarters of the
U.S.S.R. is in Asia, and one-third of the
Asian landmass is Soviet territory. Some
50 million people, or about 20% of the
Soviet population, are Asian. Anti a
major thrust of Russian history for the
last several centuries has ben an exl-:ut-
sion of the Russian, and then the Soviet,
empire to the East. Today, much of the
hope for improving the Soviet economy
depends upon nipping the rich mineral
and energy resources of the Soviet Far
East. In addition, ideology and nation-
alism impel a Soviet assertiveness ill
Asia as elsewhere, as well as a more
general striving, as one high Soviet of-
ficial has put it., to see that no problem,
anywhere, can be solved without Soviet
participation.
Moreover, the Soviets realize that
their presence in Asia is inseparable
from their global strategic position.
They remain aware of the possibility
that, in a general conflict, the Soviet.
Union might have to fight a two-front
war. 'T'hus, the Soviets seek a military
presence in Asia to intimidate all possi-
ble opponents. Besides matching or sur-
passing U.S. military capabilities in the
area, Moscow strives to deter China
from becoming a major military power,
especially one closely linked to the in-
dustrial democracies. It seeks as well to
discourage Japanese self-defense efforts
and to weaken Tokyos alliance with the
United States and growing ties with
China. Its greatest concern is that these
three nations might be developing a pat-
tern of cooperation on security issues
which will isolate the U.S.S.R. in a per-
manently disadvantageous military posi-
tion in Northeast Asia.
In other parts of Asia-where their
security concerns are not quite as acute
as they are in Northeast Asia-the
Soviets, nevertheless, have attempted to
create conditions unfavorable to the
development of political and economic
arrangements which they cannot
dominate or control. Given its tendency
to apply manipulative solutions to such
problems, Moscow has generally fol-
lowed an opportunistic strategy of main-
taining and exploiting local tensions,
projecting influence through supplies of
arms and military advisers, and expand-
ing its own direct military presence.
The Soviets have played upon Sino-
Vietnamese differences, for example, to
install themselves in Indochina. ASEAN
Association of South East Asian Na-
tions) efforts to achieve a political settle-
ment in Kampuchea have been met with
intimidation. They have exploited Indo-
Pakistani tensions, and the war between
Iran and Iraq as well, to expand their in-
fluence in New Delhi and Baghdad
through arms sup ply relationships. And
Moscow has acted with direct armed
force in neighboring Afghanistan in an
effort to achieve the dominance and con-
trol it desires.
Soviet Weaknesses
But despite the heavy commitment of
military resources to the region, the
Soviets must he disappointed with the.
overall results. For this reliance on
armed force has only thrown Soviet
weaknesses into vivid relief. The truth is
that a growing stress on Soviet military
capabilities has been matched by the
atrophy of political and economic in-
struments of foreign policy. Soviet
trading relationships with Asian coun.
tries have declined in the last two
i lev :ales: Moscow's share of total
Japanese trade is proportionally less
now than it. was in I9;11, and Sino-tioviet
trails, is drastically n'ducwi from the
I'Mict level, de'spile a recent upturn.
ecentber 1983 AEPW7-#tHT of ST41t &uFv,v 13
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EAST ASIA
The Korean Peninsula. The Korean
Ienui,ula presents a complicated situa-
ti.,n tier the Soviets. They are probably
nununally satisfied fi-r now with the
status quo, inasmuch as any change
could redound against Soviet interests.
A renewed conflict, for instance, could
bring an unwanted confrontation with
the 1'nited States. Any political move-
invio tor realignment could produce a
in--re pronounced eclipse of Soviet by
('hireese influence in Pyongyang. A more
III %% crful North Korean regime, or any
K, n?ea n regime which dominated the en-
tire peninsula. might prove more asser-
tivt? and Tess amenable to Soviet in-
tluenee. On the other hand, Moscow
knows that North Korea is quickly ap-
pn aching a leadership transition and
that it will have to handle Pyongyang
ver) carefully if it is not to lose ground
to the Chinese who, unlike the Soviets,
have already acknowledged the younger
Kim as his father's successor. This, in
fact, is probably behind recent Soviet
gestures to improve ties with North
Ke vea.
With regard to the Republic of
Kierea (R.O.K.). the Soviets realize that
Iong terns trends indicate the growing
ec.m.'n:ic and political importance of the
R.c -. K. in Asia. Their recent cautious ap-
pre ruches to Seoul-allowing Soviet jour-
nah,ts and cultural officials to travel
there' for international conferences-are
in aekne'wle.dgm eiit of Moscow's interest
Ill fevelolling sumo contacts with the
,oath. Yet again, such subtle diplomatic
gestures are vitiated. as we have seen,
by the easy Soviet resort to military
1')rce in settling problems in the region.
Vietnam. The U.S.S.R. has used
military assistance to develop its impor-
tani relations with Vietnam. In fact, the
relai i.,nship between the two countries is
ba r} elf one of mutual military conven-
ience. Hanoi receives support for its
adventure in Kampuchea and a counter
to Chinese pressure. For the Soviets,
the military use of Vietnamese facilities
:urd the diplomatic penetration of
S , nu he:cst Asia they have achieved
i hr?.,ugh Hanoi are of considerable
strategic importance. The bases allow
I he' S,,viets not only to monitor U.S.
sac ;el and air operations in the region
cut also tee extend Moscow's military,
espee?cdh naval, reach from home bases
in the Soviet Far East through
S,eutheast Asia to the Indian lkean and
t he I'.?r,ian (gulf. At the same time, the
S,.vie?t~- have Id?en able tee establish a
nulrtnr~ presence on China's southern
tl:u.-.:wol to demonstrate to other pbar-
,,e> ic;et the ,,nice remote V.S.S.R. is
now a military force to lee reckoned with
throughout every corner of the region.
But there have been costs to the
Soviets in Vietnam as well. Their w,m-
bined aid to Ilanoi now runs to $3-$4
million a day. Moreover. Vietnamese
policies in Kampuchea have serval only
to unify ASEAN, strengthen its links
with the West, and cause it to take on a
more visible political tincture to counter
Hanoi's domination of Indochina. Ob-
viously, the Soviets can try to use Viet-
nam to intimidate ASEAN-as a
visiting ministry of foreign affairs of-
ficial recently did when he hinted that
ASEAN's attitude toward Ilaneci could
lead to Vietnamese assistance to local
communist insurgencies-but so far
such tactics have backfired. And if the
polarization in Southeast Asia continues,
Moscow may again find itself diplo-
matically isolated and unable to convert
its substantial military assets into useful
political influence with the most vital na-
tions in the area.
Afghanistan. The invasion of
Afghanistan and the continuing presence
there of 105,000 Soviet troops have
brought Soviet military plower 400 miles
closer tee the Persian Gulf, improving
Moscow's military access to the entire
region. At the same time, this use of
naked military force has complicated
Soviet relationships with every country
in South Asia and the gulf region and in-
creasc.) regie,ual awareness of Iho Sovie'l
threat.
India and Pakistan. For nror?e than
21) years the Soviet union has capital-
ized on India's perceived security needs,
as well as a convenient fit Ioetwet?n the
Soviet and Indian economies, to build
what is perhaps Moscow's most ingor?-
tant relationship with a non-Marxist
state. In return, India has liven attentive
tee Soviet interests, formally recognizing
the Heng Sanirin regime in I'hnon- Penh
and avoiding public criticism of Soviet
policy in Afghanistan. However, Soviet
actions in Afghanistan have disturbed
this arrangement to the extent Ihat
India has felt oleligeel tee express its
unhappiness with the continuing Soviet
Occupation of that Country.
While close Indo-Soviet ties have
been a valuable asset for India in its
open difficult relations with Pakistan,
Moscow has almost always tried to
maintain a separate relationship and, at
least, some influence with Islamabad
largely inelepx?ndent of its ties with New
Delhi. The invasion of Afghanistan has
seriously hambee'red the Soviets in Ibis
regard. And if the Soviets haul cal
euf:-te'ef that their prose nee in
Afghanistan would make Pakistan more
compliant to Moscow's will, they have
diseeevere.l that their invasion has actual-
ly increased Islamabad's support in both
the West and the Islamic world. enabl.
ing Pakistan to play a major role in the
United Nations and elsewhere, undercut-
ting Soviet efforts to consolidate their
occupation.
Iran and Iraq. Afghanistan ;elsee has
contributed to the erosion of Moscow's
relations with the fundamentalist Islamic
regime in Iran. After the hostage inci-
dent and the severing of Tehran's rela-
tions with Washington, the Soviets en-
jeeyea the best opportunity in nearly a
quarter century to improve their town
position in this strategically important
country. Nevertheless, their perfornr-
ance in Afghanistan, arms sup plie's to
the Iraqis, their identification with the
Communist Party of Iran, and familiar
problems related to expulsion of
Moscow's diplomats for espionage have
all combined to place serious strains on
the Soviet-Iranian bilateral relationship.
Iran remains, however, the most
vulnerable place in the entire region for
new Soviet inroads based upon exploita-
tion of regional tensions and instability
and the direct application of military
force. Given the unpredictability of
events after the passing of Khomeini, as
well as Iran's internal frictions and in-
ternational isolation, the Soviets may
find oplo ort.unil.ies in the future, as they
have found in the past, to interfere
directly or through surrogates in Iranian
affairs. Our own alienation from Tehran.
Soviet proximity, and the dislike of all
Iran's neighbors, for the funelamenialist
regime may make it very difficult to
counter such Soviet moves or assist the
Iranians in cluing so.
The old Soviet game of exploiting
conflict has not worked well to bolster
its position in other areas of the gulf
either. Tire Iraqis clearly art- cOncerneti
about teen great a dependence on the
Soviets, despite their present nee.l for
Soviet arms. The moderate Arnie states
of the Persian Gulf have generally
reacted tee the Soviet inyasien of a fellow
Islamic nation and involvement in the
Iran-Iraq conflict with eonrern. The
major effect appears to have been to re-
affirm the conviction by most of these
countries that the Soviet Union must he
denied access to their territory. Of all
the Arabian Peninsula states facing the
gulf, only Kuwait has diplomatic refa-
lions with the I;.S.S.K.
True to forin, till- Seeviets preol-ahly
calculate I hat it contwurt ion of I he Into
Iraq conllicr-e,l,e ci oil} with tie, char
wiom?r-would serve I', H,-;ekes all
De( her 1983 15
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-EAST ASIA
regional states and make them more
susceptible to Soviet manipulation. It
keeps the Iraqis, dependent on Soviet
arms, on a short leash and demonstrates
to the Iranians that the U.S.S.R. is a
force to be reckoned with. It also keeps
the smaller Persian Gulf states uneasy
and stimulates talk of a Soviet role in
balancing forces in the region. This
game carries some dangers for the
Soviets, especially because of the un-
predictability of Iran; but, on balance,
turmoil serves Soviet purposes well.
Perhaps this fact explains why Moscow
and its allies are the primary arms sup-
pliers to both belligerents.
Soviet Influence and U.S. Policy
I believe that this summary of Soviet
policy in Asia and the Pacific
demonstrates that, despite the dramatic
increase of Soviet military capabilities
throughout the area and undoubted
capacity to exploit opportunities,
Moscow's political influence with in-
dividual governments is very shallow,
uneven, and imbalanced in the extreme.
The situation varies from country to
country. of course, and potentially short-
term success stories such as the Soviet
relationship with Vietnam are notable
exceptions to the general rule. Never-
theless. there are serious weaknesses, as
I have attempted to show, in the
Soviet's ability to build and sustain long-
term relationships in the region or to
participate effectively in Asian political
or economic arrangements. This is
c?sp ccially true in East Asia, where a
Community of interests-as yet mostly
t?COnomic but fraught with lasting
political significance-is quickly emerg-
ing. The Soviets and clients such as
Vietnam are being left out of these
developing relationships, while the
I'nited States and its closest allies in the
area-Japan. Australia, and New
Zealand-are very much a part of these
t rends.
The long-term injury to Soviet in-
Ierests of this voluntary exclusion from
the peaceful political and economic life
of Asia should not be underestimated. It
may not be impossible to imagine
Moscow gaining some important tactical
advantages-especially in use of Viet-
namese facilities and exploitation of
developments in the Iran-Iraq conflict-
through further application of its
familiar militaristic approach. But it is
hard to we how the Soviets can achieve
a incaninggful p?rn-a neat role in the rich
.''nook' and political life of most of this
regi, as w it hout a fuller and richer
,Ii1'I.anacy of their own. The longer the
Soviets wait, the more difficult it, will
become for them to develop constructive
and broad relationships with vital na-
tions such as Japan, South Korea,
Australia, New Zealand, or the members
of the ASEAN grouping. Yet without
such connections, Soviet influence in
Asia is almost wholly dependent on
military power, and this sort of in.
fluence-although significant-is very
limited, indeed.
It is limited first because military
relationships last only as long as the ten-
sions and conflicts which bring them into
being, and Asia is one region where the
trends are toward peace and stability
and away from revolution and war.
Moreover, it is limited because this Ad-
ministration is determined that the
Soviets shall not acquire the dominant
military position in Asia that they seek.
We challenge the Soviet right to military
domination because we wish to live in
peace. But we are confident that we and
our allies throughout the region have the
unity and resources to protect our in-
teresLs and match Soviet military
capabilities at any level Moscow may
choose. The United States also realizes
that, although every nation must provide
for its own defense, we have a special
responsibility as the only country which
can counter the provocative Soviet
nuclear deployments aimed at our Asian
allies and friends and, more importantly,
the only nation which can negotiate with
the Soviets for Incaningful reductions.
We recognize, as well, our respon-
sibility to maintain sufficient. military
power in the region to constrain Soviet
adventurism and underline our commit-
ment to remain an Asian power. In it
decade, the strategic balance in military
power has shifted from one of clear
American superiority to one in which the
balance has been described by senior
military officers as too close to call. In
this context, Asian and Pacific nations
are closely watching U.S. intentions and
performance in Asia to determine the
extent of our long-term commitment to
a major regional security role. Their
risk/benefit analysis will Is' based on
their perception of 11.5. will and ca-
pacity to balance Soviet military power
in their region at whatever levels
Moscow chooses to maintain. Their
perception of our willingness to do this
is likely to he realistic and based on
demonstrated U.S. efforts to enhance its
strategic and conventional forces, as
well as our security and economic
assistance programs designer) to assist
them in attaining greater self-
sufficient-v.
This is even more so in the face of
continued demonstrations of force by the
U.S.S.R. throughout the area-in the
continued assault on the people of
Afghanistan, in the use of chemical
weapons there and in Indochina, and in
the wanton violation of international
standards of morality in the civilian air
corridors which crisscross the region.
We are aware that if we permit the
military balance in Asia and the Pacific
to tip too far against the West, the
U.S.S.R. will he aisle to convert armed
force into political influence and
dominance.
We do not intend to let this happen.
Our firmness on this point is crucial
because the very contrast between the
successful Soviet military buildup and
Moscow's political and economic failures
may result in a greatly increased danger
of military confrontation in the region if
the U.S.S.R. concludes that force is suc-
cessful and opts for even greater
reliance on military intimidation as its
principal geopolitical instrument. With
this in mind, many of our Asian friends
have indicated privately that the future
peace of Asia rests on our commitment
to balance the Soviet threat. We must
maintain our determination and ability
to do so if we are to continue to enjoy a
situation in Asia favorable to U.S. in-
terests.
But we also are mindful of where
our real strengths in Asia reside. As im-
is-rtant as our own military posture is.
our strength is not in arms alone but in
our cultural and political ties with Asia,
the interdependence of the great Asia-
Pacific trading community of which we
are a part, and the ponds which a
talented Asian-American citizenry have
forged between the New World and
some of the oldest and most
sophisticated civilizations on earth.
Our own foreign policy in Asia is
designed to develop these strengths into
broad multifaceted relationships which
will transcend considerations of tactical
convenience and create a lasting com-
munity of common interests between the
United States and the nations of Asia.
To give but one example, our still
developing relationship with China is an
event of momentous importance to both
countries and to the stability of East
Asia. We are, of course, aware of cer-
tain perspectives we share with the
Chinese concerning Soviet activities in
the region. We also recognize that a cer-
tain degree of cools-ration in security
matters cold he natural and mutually
beneficial as the relationship with China
evolves. But the I'nitcvl States will
neilher press this p'v. rilwlity n'.r niak', it
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