WARSAW PACT NONNUCLEAR THREAT TO NATO AIRBASES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00126R000700800007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

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Secret
Warsaw Pact
Nonnuclear Threat
to NATO Airbases
in Central Europe
Secret
N1E 11/20-6-84/DS
January 1985
Copy 0 2
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N I E 11/20-6-84/DS
WARSAW PACT
NONNUCLEAR THREAT
TO NATO AIRBASES
IN CENTRAL EUROPE
Information mailable as of 2 O(tober
1984 was used in the )reparation of this
Estimate.
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CONTENTS
Pane
SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS ........................................... 1
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 9
A. General ............................................................................. 9
B. Warsaw Pact Concepts for a War Against NATO
in Europe ......................................................................... 9
II. WARSAW PACT AIR FORCE STRUCTURE AND
THREAT TO NATO CENTRAL REGION AIRFIELDS 11
A. Tasks ................................................................................. 11
B. Forces ............................................................................... 13
C. Command, Control, and Communications ................... 13
D. Conventional Munitions ................................................. 13
E. Logistics and Support ...................................................... 14
F. The Air Operation ........................................................... 16
G. Future Developments ..................................................... 17
III. SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES .......................... 1S
A. General ............................................................................. 18
B. Force Development ......................................................... 18
C. SRBM Force Structure in the Western TVD ................ 20
D. SRBM Missile Storage and Transport ............................ 20
E. Impact of Future Systems .............................................. 20
F. SRBM Threat Assessment ............................................... 23
IV. SOVIET SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES-SPETSNAZ.... 23
A. Introduction ..................................................................... 23
B. Missions ............................................................................ 23
C. Organization .................................................................... 23
D. Employment of Special Purpose Forces in the NATO
Central Region ................................................................ 24
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V. AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS ........... 25
A. General ............................................................................. 25
13. Employment .................................................................... 25
C. Airfield Attack ................................................................. 26
VI. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER GROUPS (OM(;s)........... 26
A. General ............................................................................. 26
B. Missions ............................................................................ 26
C. Employment .................................................................... 26
D. Capabilities: Theory Versus Practice ............................ 26
E. Force Developments ....................................................... 26
V11. CRUISE MISSILES, RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE
CO''\IPLEN, AND SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE
THREATS ............................................................................. 27
A. Current Developments ................................................... 2 7
B. Future Developments ..................................................... 27
C. Reconnaissance Strike Complex System ........................ 27
D. Surface-to-Air Missiles .................................................... 27
VIII. AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO OF A WARSAW
PACT NONNUCLEAR AIR OPERATION AGAINST
NATO CENTRAL REGION AIRFIELDS ........................ 27
A. General ............................................................................. 27
B. The Air Operation ........................................................... 28
C. Summary: Future Soviet Airfield Attack Capability.... 31
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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS
Soviet planners regard NATO's tactical air forces in the Central
Region as a formidable threat to their ground, air, and naval forces in a
conventional conflict. The Soviets recognize that NATO's air assets
provide the bulk of the NATO theater nuclear capability and that the
success of NATO ground force operations is dependent upon tactical air
support. The Soviets consider the early attainment of air superiority and
the destruction or neutralization of NATO's theater nuclear forces to be
critical to the Pact's chances for victory in Europe.
The Soviets plan to conduct a Theater Strategic Operation (TSO)
against NATO in Central Europe, an area the Soviets describe as the
Western Theater of Military Operations (WTVD). It would be charac-
terized by multiple, successive front operations supported by the
Strategic Air Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Baltic Fleet,
and controlled by a single high command of forces in the TVD. We be-
lieve the Soviets plan to complete this operation in a period of 20 to 30
days.
We would also expect that, concurrently with initiating a war
against NATO in Central Europe, the Soviets would attack NATO's
northern and southern regions, but at lesser intensity, to keep NATO
from shifting forces from the flanks to Central Europe. We would
expect some limited simultaneous air operations against key NATO
airfield complexes in Norway designed to establish air superiority over
the Norwegian Sea and adjacent waters in order to reduce the
vulnerability of air and naval operations in the area.
Pact military planners assign their air forces three general tasks for
conventional war in a continental TVD-to gain and maintain air
superiority, to destroy the nuclear delivery capability of the enemy, and
to support the ground forces. Other theater support roles for the air
forces would include close air support, neutralization of enemy reserves,
aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare, airdrop/airlanding operations,
and airlift of supplies.
To accomplish their goals, the Soviets have a nonnuclear operation-
al concept, the air operation,' designed to neutralize NATO air, air
' For the purposes of this Estimate the term "the air operation" refers to the initial air operation
involving multiple massed air raids conducted over a period of several days during the initial phase of
hostilities.
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defense, and theater nuclear resources during the first several days of
hostilities. Supporting forces could include short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs), special purpose forces (Spetsnaz), airborne, and other assets.
The Soviet General Staff, acting as executive agent for the Supreme
High Command (VGK), would perform the initial planning and
allocation of air forces among commands. The Western theater com-
mand would perform the detailed planning and direct the theater air
operation.
We believe Pact planners regard destruction of' NATO aircraft as
the primary way of gaining air superiority and expect airfield attacks to
account for many of the aircraft NATO would lose during the air
operation. Key to the neutralization of NATO air assets would be the
destruction or degradation of NATO airbases. In an attempt to destroy
or neutralize NATO's nuclear capability, the Pact would concentrate
attacks on those bases from which they expect nuclear delivery aircraft
to operate and would also assign high priority to bases housing air
defense fighters. The prevention of the early use of these assets might
well be enough for the Soviets to regard a preemptive air operation as
having fulfilled its objectives.
We believe these to be the principal characteristics of an air
operation conducted against NATO's Central Region:
- The Pact would most likely commit elements of two to four
strategic air armies, three to five front air forces including non-
Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) air forces, and various air defense,
transport, and Baltic Fleet naval aviation units in a series of
major air raids designed to achieve as much tactical surprise as
possible.
- Each major raid would begin with a concerted effort to establish
corridors through NATO air defenses, which Pact aircraft
would then use to attack airfields, surface-to-surface missile
launchers, nuclear weapons storage facilities, command, control,
and communications facilities, and other priority targets.
SU-24 Fencers and Soviet medium bombers would constitute
the primary force for attacking airfields and possibly nuclear
storage facilities.
- Fighter-bombers from the air forces of the fronts would he used
to suppress air defenses and to attack fixed installations (to
include airfields) and missile launchers. Other tactical and
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strategic aircraft would provide fighter cover, escort, reconnais-
sance, and radioelectronic combat missions. NSWP air defense
fighters would provide strategic air defense of their homelands.
Aircraft operations would be supported primarily by employ-
ment of SRBMs, artillery, and Spetsnaz to attack critical
surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, command, control, and com-
munications sites, and airfields within range.
- Some Soviet and NSWP bomber, fighter-bomber, and fighter
aircraft would be withheld for nuclear operations.
We believe that the Pact could have available 2,600 to 4,100 fixed-
wing aircraft for operations against the NATO Central Region and that
it probably has contingency plans for initiating the air operation from a
variety of different postures. For offensive air operations in Central
Europe, the Warsaw Pact could draw from:
- Strategic Aviation.
- Soviet Air Forces of the Groups of Forces in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia and the three Western military districts.
- National Air Forces of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland.
- Baltic Fleet air forces.
The heart of the air operation would be a series of daylight airfield
attacks designed to destroy a portion of NATO's air forces sufficient to
establish strategic air supremacy and to reduce substantially NATO's
nuclear strike potential. Airbases housing fighter and fighter-bomber
wings with nuclear strike roles would be likely top-priority targets.
Soviet military writings note that front aviation also would make small-
scale attacks against NATO airfields between the massed air raids in
support of front objectives.
We believe that, if aircraft attrition rates were substantially higher
than expected, the Soviets could be forced to cancel the air operation af-
ter only one or two massed air raids-before it accomplished its
objective of attaining air supremacy. Factors affecting attrition rates
would include:
- Higher-than-expected survivability of NATO's ground-based air
defenses.
- NATO airborne warning and control system aircraft and look-
down/shootdown fighters limiting opportunities for Pact air-
craft to evade NATO defenses by flying at low altitudes.
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The Soviet reliance on deep attack by medium bombers, which
are relatively large and unmaneuverable, and hence particular-
ly vulnerable to SAMs and fighters unless properly supported.
The lack of fighter escort for any bombers used in attacks
against the United Kingdom.
- The proliferation of hardened aircraft shelters at NATO air-
bases would force the Soviets to concentrate on closing runways,
which would require more air raids over a longer period of time
and hence greater exposure to NATO air defenses.
The Soviets do not have enough hardened shelters to protect
most of the aircraft that would deploy forward from the
western USSR in the event of a massive reinforcement. NV e
doubt that a large-scale reinforcement by second-echelon front
aviation would be likely under most circumstances, however.
until the ground forces of the affected second-echelon fronts
also deployed forward.
If the Soviets chose to start the war with the air operation, we be-
lieve achievement of tactical surprise would be difficult. Warning of the
attack could allow NATO sufficient time to launch most of its aircraft.
exacerbating potential Pact aircraft attrition and making the NATO
airfields less lucrative targets.
We believe the large number of aircraft that the Soviets would rise
in the massed air raids combined with the loss of control facilities
during combat would strain Pact airspace management capabilities and
lead to some confusion. Deterioration of command, control. and
communications resulting from NATO air attacks would also lead to
greater confusion during subsequent raids. Additionally, bad weather
would limit the size and effectiveness of the air raids or even force the
postponement of the air operation.
We have no evidence that the Soviets would plan to employ
chemical weapons during the air operations in the nonnuclear phase of,
a war with NATO. The use of chemical weapons is not a standard, inte-
gral feature of the nonnuclear phase of war. The Soviets probably
calculate that large-scale use of chemical weapons would cause NATO
to retaliate with nuclear weapons. However, because of the significant
Soviet offensive capability, the prudent planner cannot discount their
use. While we judge chemical weapons would be employed massively
only in the context of transition to the nuclear phase of war, should the
success of the air operation be jeopardized by the use of conventional
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munitions only, the Soviets would consider the use of chemical weapons
against selected targets during the nonnuclear phase. (s)
Through the year 1995, the air forces of the Military Districts and
Groups of Forces (MD/GOF) are expected to remain stable in overall
size with a slight decrease in numbers of fighters and some growth in
ground-attack elements. Though the current MD/GOF organization
will remain mostly stable, the Soviets may introduce improved tactics
and pursue expanded objectives within the context of the air operation.
Future air operations will reflect the advances in air technology
and in operational art and tactics, and are expected to differ from
current operations only by degree. We believe the new-generation
ground attack aircraft will pose a greater threat to NATO airfields
because of their ability to carry improved standoff munitions, low-
altitude penetration capabilities, improved onboard and escort electron-
ic warfare systems, better navigation systems and sensors for adverse
weather attack, and air-to-air refueling capability for extended range.
This enhanced attack capability will require fewer aircraft to achieve
desired target damage criteria/norms. In this way, the air operation will
be able to maximize the effectiveness of aircraft available to the Soviet
planner.
Concerning munitions, we believe future Soviet tactical air-to-
surface missiles will have increased launch ranges, improved accuracy,
and improved night and adverse weather capability. The Soviets will
deploy more effective munitions for airfield attack, including a dual-
stage runway-penetrator bomb for increased runway damage, aerially
delivered mines to hinder runway repairs, and precision-guided bombs
with electro-optical seekers for attacking high-value point targets.
We believe the Soviets will continue to face complicated com-
mand and control problems in mass air operations in the Central
Region, with future air combat control requiring real-time knowledge
of the status and location of both friendly and enemy aerodynamic
assets. The Soviets will increase both the capacity and capability of their
air communications by large-scale use of digital data communication
systems coupled to onboard computers and displays, and will continue
to advance those technologies necessary to allow direct communication
satellite access from airborne platforms, with emphasis upon expanding
the number and types of aircraft with communication satellite
capability.
The current SRBM nonnuclear threat to NATO airbases is
marginal. The SS-22 and the Scud missile lack sufficient accuracy to be
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effective in a conventional airfield attack role. Further, the SS-22 would
not constitute a significant threat to airfields because limited numbers
will restrict it primarily to the nuclear role. While the more accurate
SS-21 is available in sizable numbers and continues to he deployed, its
short range restricts its participation in the air operation to attacking the
forwardmost elements of NATO's air defense system.
The SRBNI threat will grow during the period 1955-95 with the
deployment of the improved SS-23, which will have the requisite range
and accuracy (50 meters CEP) to attack airfields. The degree of this
threat will depend on the numbers of the system deployed. on othcr
competing targets, and on whether specialized airfield attack munitions
are developed. Improvements to the SRB\I force will give the Soviets an
option to employ it in a pin-down attack against some critical airhases
and for neutralization of air defense sites in penetration corridors. Such
attacks could significantly improve the chance of success of the initial
massed air raid. Overall, while SRBNIs will probably play a greater role
in the air operation, we do not believe they will become in Soviet eyes
the primary instrument for gaining air superiority in the \ATO (ventral
Region.
We believe that, during the period of this Estimate, Soviet special
purpose forces in the WTVD will constitute a significant threat to the
airfields of the NATO Central Region, and would be inserted prior to
and during hostilities to conduct missions of reconnaissance arid sabo-
tage against NATO airfields, air defense, nuclear delivery forces, and
other associated facilities. The vast majority of Spetsnaz will not cross
the border before the beginning of conventional hostilities, and the
Soviets would rely on the confusion of war, and the opening of
penetration corridors during the air operation, to allow insertion of
Spetsnaz by aircraft.
We believe their primary missions are to search for difficult-to-
locate mobile missiles and command posts, to monitor preparations at
airfields for nuclear strikes by NATO, and to assess the effects of Soviet
air and missile strikes. Consequently, we believe Spetsnaz direct attacks
would be limited to a few airhases in the Central Region, if these forces
are to perform their other, high-priority missions.
We believe airborne attacks against 'NATO main operating bases
during the early phases of the air operation are unlikely unless the
Soviets obtain air superiority over at least a major segment of the
Central Region. More likely would be attacks by air assault troops on
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small civilian and military airfields just in front of advancing Soviet
forces to secure airlieads. Although the VGK might opt for an airborne
operation on the first or second day of the air operation, we believe the
Soviets would wait until later to ensure some degree of air superiority
and availability of transport aircraft.
A significant development in operational employment and combat
organization of Soviet Ground Forces has been the development and
employment of tank-heavy exploitation forces at front and army levels
called operational maneuver groups (ONIGs)-a concept intended for
high-speed offensive operations deep into the enemy rear area. ONIG
operations are planned to disrupt the stability of the enemy rear and the
movement of enemy reserves, to destroy major weapon systems, and to
facilitate the advance of the first echelon and the commitment of the
second echelon. Specific targets include nuclear delivery systems and
depots, airfields, critical terrain, river crossing sites. and connnand
posts.
While the OMG is a major component of Soviet combined arms
operations, we do not believe it is a major threat to NATO main
operating bases in the early days of an attack. The 0MG would become
a threat only over a period of days following a successful conunitment.
Although the Soviets are developing two significantly different
types of long-range land-attack cruise missiles, current evidence leads its
to believe these are nuclear equipped. By the early 1990s, Soviet long-
range cruise missiles will probably have improved CEPS (10 to 30
meters with area correlator update). Cruise missiles with nonnuclear
warheads would facilitate attacks against airfields, air defense s\ steams.
and command and control facilities, but we cannot assess the likelihood
at this time.
Within the last several years the Soviets have been experimenting
with the reconnaissance strike complex (HSC) system, which appears
designed to counter long-range artillery systems delivering precision-
guided munitions or submunitions. We believe the HSC; is organized to
attack critical mobile targets and that it is unlikely that the Soviets
would use RSCs to attack NATO airfields. Virtually all NATO military
airfields already are known to the Soviets.
Although unlikely, certain Soviet SAM systems could possibly be
employed in emergency situations in a surface-to-surface role. Surface-
to-surface use would be inefficient and severely constrained by inade-
quate warheads and limited ranges. We believe the limited surface-to-
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surface capability of the Soviet SAM systems does not presently pose a
conventional threat to NATO airfields.
In summary, we believe that, for the period of this Estimate, the
air threat will continue to be the single most significant threat to NATO
airbases of the Central Region, followed by the SRBM and Spetsnaz
threats. We believe that in the future the Soviets will be able to project
airpower deeper into NATO's rear areas through advanced aircraft and
weaponry operating under more effective and higher capacity com-
mand, control, and communications systems.
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DISCUSSION
1. This Estimate examines the Warsaw Pact nonnu-
clear threat to NATO airbases in the Central Region.
Succeeding chapters address the threat posed by Pact
air forces, surface-to-surface missiles, special-purpose
forces (Spetsnaz), cruise missiles, and airborne and air
assault forces. The final chapter integrates the various
threat elements in an illustrative scenario, depicting
likely Pact actions against NATO airfields in the early
(nonnuclear) phase of an attack. The Estimate also
projects the threat into the 1990s to illustrate how it
may evolve as the capabilities of the various threat
elements develop.
2. Soviet planners regard NATO's tactical air forces
in the Central Region as a formidable threat to their
ground, air, and naval forces in a conventional con-
flict. The Soviets recognize that NATO's air assets
provide the bulk of the NATO theater nuclear capa-
bility and that the success of NATO ground force
operations is dependent upon tactical air support. The
NATO Central Region contains the greatest concentra-
tion of airbases, air defense, and tactical nuclear assets
in Western Europe. There are approximately 40
peacetime NATO airbases including 10 nuclear deliv-
ery bases, nine air defense bases, seven aerial ports of
debarkation, and a number of colocated operating
bases, (See figure 1.) Additionally, there are other air
defense, nuclear, command, control, and communica-
tions, and logistics facilities that will also be competing
targets. The Soviets consider the early attainment of
air superiority and the destruction or neutralization of
NATO's theater nuclear forces to be critical to the
Pact's chances for victory in Europe.
3. The Soviets recognize that NATO would have to
depend upon its tactical air forces to redress the
imbalance in ground forces. In addition NATO tacti-
cal air forces are also a primary nuclear delivery
means which the Pact would want to neutralize during
the nonnuclear phase of the theater conflict. The
Soviets have a nonnuclear operational concept, the air
operation,' designed to neutralize NATO air, air de-
fense, and theater nuclear resources during the first
several days of hostilities. The air operation is a
combined arms operation with the air forces as the
primary threat to NATO airbases. Supporting forces
could include surface-to-surface missiles, artillery,
Spetsnaz, airborne, and other assets. While the Soviets
would hope to destroy NATO air and nuclear assets,
the prevention of the early use of these assets might
well be enough for them to regard a preemptive air
operation as having fulfilled its objectives.
4. We have no evidence that the Soviets wvould plan
to employ chemical weapons ((WW') during the air
operations in the nonnuclear phase of a war with
NATO. The use of chemical weapons is not a stan-
dard, integral feature of the nonnuclear phase of war.
The Soviets probably calculate that large-scale use of
chemical weapons would cause NATO to retaliate
with nuclear weapons. However, because of the signif-
icant Soviet offensive capability, the prudent planner
cannot discount their use. While we judge chemical
weapons would be employed massively only in the
context of transition to the nuclear phase of war,
should the success of the air operation be jeopardized
by the use of conventional munitions only, the Soviets
would consider the use of chemical weapons against
selected targets during the nonnuclear phase.
B. Warsaw Pact Concepts for a War Against
NATO in Europe
5. We believe the Soviets plan to conduct a Theater
Strategic Operation (TSO) against NATO in Central
Europe, an area the Soviets describe as the Western
Theater of -Military Operations (WTVD). It would be
characterized by multiple, successive front operations,
with few or no pauses, supported by Strategic Air
Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), and the Baltic
Fleet and lasting 20 to 30 days.
For the purpose of this Estimate, the term "the air operation"
refers to the initial air operation involving multiple massed air raids
conducted over a period of several day s during the initial phase of
hostilities.
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6. We would also expect that, concurrently with
initiating a war against NATO in Central Europe, the
Soviets would launch attacks against NATO's northern
and southern regions, but of lesser intensity. The Pact
almost certainly would conduct secondary offensives
or holding actions in the flank areas to keep NATO
from shifting forces from the flanks to Central Europe.
Similarly, we would expect some simultaneous air
operations against key NATO airfield complexes in
Norway, although more limited than those against the
NATO Central Region. Such actions would be de-
signed to establish air superiority over the Norwegian
Sea and adjacent waters to reduce the vulnerability of
air and naval operations in the area.
II. WARSAW PACT AIR FORCE STRUCTURE
AND THREAT TO NATO CENTRAL REGION
AIRFIELDS
A. Tasks
7. Pact military planners assign their air forces
three general tasks for conventional war in a continen-
tal TVD-to gain and maintain air superiority, to
destroy the nuclear delivery capability of the enemy,
and to support the ground forces. Soviet theorists
believe the initial task is to obtain air superiority;
however, the destruction of NATO nuclear delivery
means and associated facilities would be carried out
simultaneously. Although the Soviets recognize that
the battle for air superiority would be continuous, the
first several days of hostilities appear to be critical in
their planning. During this period they would commit
the bulk of their air forces to the air operation in a
theaterwide attack against NATO airfields and air
defense installations as well as attacks against surface-
to-surface missiles, nuclear-capable artillery, and com-
mand, control, and communications facilities. Other
theater support roles for the air forces would include
close air support, neutralization of enemy reserves,
aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare, airdrop/air-
landing operations, and airlift of supplies.
8. The Soviet General Staff, acting as executive
agent for the Supreme High Command (VGK), would
perform the initial planning and allocation of air
forces among commands. The Western theater com-
mand would conduct the detailed planning and direct
the theater air operation.
9. We believe Pact planners regard destruction of
NATO aircraft as the primary means of gaining air
superiority, with airfield attacks to account for many
of the aircraft NATO would lose during the air
operation. In an attempt to destroy/neutralize
NATO's nuclear capability, the Pact would concen-
trate attacks on those bases from which it expects
nuclear delivery aircraft to operate. Pact planners
would also assign high priority to bases housing air
defense fighters.
10. The principal characteristics of the air opera-
tion against NATO's Central Region are likely to be:
- The Pact would most likely commit elements of
two to four strategic air armies, three to five
front air forces, including non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact (NSWP) air forces, and various air defense,
transport, and naval aviation units in a series of
major air raids designed to achieve as much
tactical surprise as possible.
- Each major raid would begin with a concerted
effort to establish corridors through NATO air
defenses, which Pact aircraft would then use to
attack airfields, SSM launchers, nuclear-weapons
storage facilities, command, control, and commu-
nications facilities, and other priority targets. (See
figure 2).
- SU-24 Fencers and Soviet medium bombers
would constitute the primary force for attacking
airfields and, possibly, nuclear storage facilities.
- Fighter-bombers from the air forces of the fronts
would be used to suppress air defenses and to
attack fixed installations (to include airfields) and
surface-to-surface missile (SSM) launchers. Other
tactical and strategic aircraft would provide
fighter cover, escort, reconnaissance and radioe-
lectronic combat (REC) missions. NSWP air de-
fense fighters would provide air defense of their
homelands.
- Aircraft operations would be supported primari-
ly by employment of short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs), artillery, and Spetsnaz. Attacks would
focus on critical surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites,
command, control, and communications sites,
and airbases within range.
- Some Soviet and NSWP bomber, fighter-bomber,
and fighter aircraft would be withheld for nucle-
ar operations.
11. In general, the Pact would have available 2,600
to 4,100 fixed-wing aircraft to draw upon for opera-
tions against the NATO Central Region (see table 1).
The number of aircraft available for the first massed
raid of the air operation would vary according to the
extent to which the Pact moved additional tactical and
strategic air units within range of NATO targets. The
Pact probably has contingency plans for initiating the
air operation from a variety of different postures
ranging from employing in-place forces to moving
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Figure 2
Illustrative Penetration Corridors
Denmark
Airfield serving as aerial
port of debarkation
HAWK missile coverage
against high-altitude
targets
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Table 1
Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Combat Aircraft
Available for Use in the Air Operation in the
Western Theater of Military Operations a
August 1984
Origin
Smolensk AA, Baltic Fleet,
and East German, Polish,
Czechoslovak tactical Air
Forces
Probable participant if not
committed to SWTVD
780
770
210
510
360
Reconnaissance/
ECM
Possible participants if Soviet
Second-Echelon Front avia-
tion participates
Reconnaissance/
ECM
Total
Belorussian Military District,
130
180
50
360
2,990
Reconnaissance/ 60
ECM
1,110
4,100
East German, Polish, Strategic interceptors 780
Czechoslovak air defense
aircraft
a Only about 85 percent of these totals would be available for
sustained operations.
additional aircraft to bases within striking range of
NATO targets prior to, coincident with, or after
launching the initial assault. During the execution of
the air operation, most of the air support for front
ground operations would be provided by helicopters.
12. For offensive air operations in Central Europe,
the Warsaw Pact could draw from:
- Soviet Air Forces of the Groups of Forces in East
Germany and Czechoslovakia and the three
Western military districts.
- National air forces of East Germany, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Poland.
Although some air units of the Baltic, Belorussia, and
Carpathian Military Districts could be moved forward
to support the initial air offensive, we believe it
probable that the majority would remain in the west-
ern USSR at the outbreak of hostilities, and then move
forward as required.
C. Command, Control, and Communications
13. We believe the Soviets continue to face compli-
cated command and control problems in mass air
operations in the Central Region. The current Soviet
Air Force command and control is supported by HF,
VHF, and UHF communications systems. Future air
combat control will require real-time knowledge of
the status and location of both friendly and enemy
aerodynamic assets. An integrated targeting network
would be required for target tracking, hand off, and
engagement. The Soviets will continue to maintain a
vigorous research and development program to up-
grade their command, control, and communications
systems and emphasize communication security.
14. We expect the Soviets will increase both the
capacity and capability of their air communications by
large-scale use of digital data communications systems
coupled to onboard computers and displays. Airborne
use of communication satellites will enhance air com-
munication flexibility and permit high-capacity com-
munications to take place over longer paths.
15. The Soviets will continue to advance those
technologies necessary to allow direct communication
satellite access from airborne platforms. Future em-
phasis will be placed on expanding the number and
types of aircraft with communication satellite capabi255X1
ity. The advent of direct broadcast satellites, expectea
shortly, will enable aerodynamic systems to pass data
to individual ground units over almost limitless ranges.
D. Conventional Munitions
16. Soviet conventional munitions design philoso-
phy has traditionally emphasized simplicity, minimum
expense, reliability, and gradual evolution despite a
technology base adequate to develop more complex
and costlier weapons. We estimate that the more
complex weapons will be introduced in an evolution-
ary manner. In the 1990s, there will be smaller,
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smarter ordnance with increased effectiveness (see
chapter VIII).
IT. Bombs. The Soviets currently hale a aside
variety of gravity bombs ranging in weight classes
from 50 to 3,000 kilograms. General purpose and
fragmentation bombs are available in both low-drag
and high-drag versions. The high-drag versions are
retarded by ballistic drag rings or parachutes. The
parachute-retarded bombs are believed to be suitable
for release from 50 to 500 meters above ground level.
18. The Soviets are assessed to have a runwa~
penetration bomb consisting of a parachute retarda-
tion assembly, booster rocket, and a concrete penetrat-
ing warhead. The retardation assembly serves to orient
the bomb downward to minimize ricochet and to
provide for low-altitude (300 meters) operation. The
rocket motor, possibly ignited by a pyrotechnic delay,
burns assay the parachute and accelerates the war-
head. The warhead is designed to perforate the pave-
ment and descend into the base below. The warhead,
provided with a short delay train fuzing, is expected to
detonate below the pavement, producing extensive
cracking, buckling, and heaving of the runway. The
assessed physical characteristics and performance for
the runway penetration bomb are presented ill table 2.
19. The Soviets are also assessed to have deployed a
500-kg semiactive laser-guided bomb using the same
technology (for example, optics, guidance, and control)
as is used with the AS-10 guided missile. This bomb
can be employed with either a ground-based or air-
Table 2
Estimated Runway Penetration Bomb
Characteristics
Length
eight
Warhead weight
High-explosive (TNT) weight
Impact \eloclty
Angle of impact
Penetration, rnaxinnun
Crater diameter size h
Radius of pavement damage h
2.500 millimeters
250 kilograms
L5O kilograms
35 kilograms
260 titers per second
45 to 55 degrees
1.5 meters
3 to 5 meters
t5 to 20 meters
Perforate 0.5 meter reinforced concrete and I meter in base beloss
In concrete.
borne target cicsiguator ,tnd is capable of being rc-
leased in Icsel flight, in a disc', or in a disc toss
maneuscr. It could hr used witli am aircraft capable
of cam tug it 500-kg store and is assessed to use a FAB-
500 bomb warhead and to be capable of (T'I's of 5 to
10 meters. 'I'lic guided bomb is intended for use
against high-priority targets when' accuracy is needed
to ensure destruction. The Sosiets are also assessed to
have operational fuel air e\plosisc (FAI!) bombs ill the
250- to 500-kg class that are assessed to be compatible
with most Sosict aircraft.
20. Tactical Air-to-Surface ,%Iissilcs (TASAls). Since
1971 the Soviets have produced and deployed tactical
air-to-surface missiles (TAS\1) employing anliradiation
hoofing (ARID, scmiactise laser (S.I,). beam rider,
and command guidance systems. The current Soviet
TASV1s will probably he used as a baseline for the
evolutionary deselopinent of Iutiir' TAS\1 s~stc?nis
possibly employing adsanccd guidance sv stems as well
as improved propulsion. Future TAS\1 design features
will prohahl' include lighter weight missile structures
providing for it higher warhead mass. Future TASyls
could proside the Sox iels an improved conventional
air-to-surface missile capability for attacking VATO
airfields and air defense s}stcm, and cornrnand, con-
trol, and communications facilities jsec table :3).
21. 'I'hc Sosiets arc now strisitw to develop new
TAS\ls that proside greater launch ranges, lower
launch altitudes. launch and lease, telesision guid-
ance, improved accuracy against fixed and mobile
targets, the ability to attack higher frequency radar
and conununications s~stouts, all-sv'ather operation,
and operations in a countermeasures ensiroutnent.
The Soviets continue to emphasize T \S'N1 antiradia-
tiori inanition AII\I deselopnicnts directed toward
attacking surfact-based air defense (AI)) sseapons and
systems. As AIM." become smaller. lighter, and more
economical, they will probably he c? nsidercd for use
against emitters such as lroposctttcr corninunications
systems, other c?otuinuuications s\stcuts, battlefield
surveillance radars, counlcnnorlar coiinlcrhattery ra-
dars, iaunuers, uasigational transinittcrs. and possibly
airborne emitters as wcll (for example, lark warning
radar and data links!
E. Logistics and Support
22. Sosict logistic doctrine is based on a number of
assumptions including the helicf that a war in [uropc
would irn-olve c?xtrcnicls high pcrsnnncl and materiel
losses, especially ill the initial phase (d a war, as well as
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Table :3
Current Soviet Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles (TASMs)
Initial operational
capabiliti
Warhead FIE/FRAG HE HE
Guidance Beam (.AID ARII
rider
Propulsion Solid Solid Liquid
Carrier aircraft Fishbed Flogger Fencer
Fitter Fitter Fitter
Fencer
Forger
Frogfoot
Solid Solid Solid
Flogger Fencer Flogger
Fitter Fitter Fitter
Fencer Foxbat Fencer
Frogfoot Fulcrum
Flanker
Solid
Flogger
fitter
Fencer
Frogfoot
high consumption rates for supplies, particularly am-
munition and fuel. The Soviets also assume that supply
lines would be extended and vulnerable to enemy air
attacks and long-range weapons. Soviet logistic proce-
dures are governed by a number of basic principles
including centralized planning, priority to combat
supplies, forward distribution, use of all possible re-
sources, and general reliance on rail transportation.
28. The Soviet air logistic system is geared to
support a short-term (less than 90 days), high-intensity
war, and relies heavily on peacetime storage and
stockpiling of ammunition, POL (petroleum, oil, and
lubricants), and air technical supplies. Over the past
few years, however, a substantial increase in POL and
ordnance storage capacities at airfields and in rear-
area depots has greatly enhanced the capability of the
Soviet Air Force to support sustained combat.
"Throughout the Western Theater of Military Opera-
tions, the Soviets have established a network of fixed
depots that have been assessed to contain sufficient
supply stocks to support an initial three-front opera-
tion and subsequent operations for at least three weeks
of intensive combat operations, though with steadily
declining sortie rates. Reserves from central depots in
rear areas-if not required elsewhere-should be
available to support sustained combat operations for
about three months.
24. It is believed that most Soviet airbases in the
forward area are capable of logistically sustaining
three to seven days of combat operations. In a combat
situation, POL will most likely be transported by
existing or temporary tactical pipelines to airfields.
POL storage sites located on airfields usually are
bunkered or partially underground to minimize the
damage from attack. Most of the train operating bases
have been equipped with hydrant refueling, eliminat-
ing the need to refuel aircraft by truck. In addition,
most later model aircraft bunkers allow for the fueling
of aircraft within the hunker.
25. Ammunition stockpiles are dispersed through-
out the Soviet 1 nion and Groups of Forces (GOF). The
larger facilities are both road and rail served with
reveted open storage areas, warehouse sheds, or bun-
kers. We believe that there mad be three to four air-to-
air missile loads for each aircraft at fighter bases, and
one to two air-to-surface missile loads for each aircraft
at tactical airbases with ground attack aircraft that
have an air-to-surface missile (ASM) capability.
26. Ordnance is distributed to air units in peace-
time primarily by rail, either directly to the airfield or
to adjacent railheads, and by track and air transport.
Because both rail and road systems are vulnerable to
interdiction, air transport, including helicopters,
would become more important in wartime to assure
prompt resupply of air units.
27. The Soviet Air Forces rely heavily for aircraft
spare parts on the distribution of spare parts kits with
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each aircraft as it is delivered from the factory or
overhaul facility. These kits include all spare parts and
special tools required for normal maintenance up to
the time of general overhaul, after which new kits are
issued. Individual item requisitions are limited to
replacing only those parts that fail, malfunction, or are
damaged before the expiration of their guaranteed
service life.
28. Common problems experienced with the supply
of parts include inadequate spares to support a higher-
than-anticipated consumption rate, poor distribution
practices, low production quotas, and long leadtimes
associated with ordering new parts. During wartime,
operational air units would attempt to alleviate such
problems by stockpiling parts which have a high use
rate and resorting to cannibalization, particularly in a
short war.
F. The Air Operation
29. The Soviets still regard the air operation as the
primary means of establishing air supremacy and
destroying or neutralizing NATO's nuclear capability.
Overall responsibility for the air operation, a joint
forces operation, is assigned to the high command in
the Western TVD. Nonetheless, the primary role in
destroying NATO's air forces in conventional warfare
remains with the Warsaw Pact air forces.
Their writings have also noted that the initial massed
raids could be spaced as little as seven hours apart.
32. The heart of the air operation would he a series
of airfield attacks designed to destroy a sufficient
portion of NATO's air forces to estahlish strategic air
supremacy as well as substantially reduce NATO's
nuclear strike potential. Airbases housing fighter and
fighter-bomber wings with nuclear strike roles v.ould
be likely top-priority targets. Soviet military writings
note that front aviation also would make small-scale
attacks against NATO airfields between the massed air
raids in support of front objectives.
34. Potential Problems. We believe that, if air-
craft attrition rates were substantially higher than the
Soviets expect, the Soviets could be forced to cancel
the air operation after only one or two massed air
raids-before it accomplished its objective of attaining
air supremacy. Factors affecting attrition rates would
include:
30. Location and Timing of Attacks. We believe
most of the attacks during at least the first few massed
air raids of a conventional air operation in the Western
TVD probably would be conducted by strategic and
naval aviation medium bombers flying low-altitude
defense penetration flight profiles and by Fencers
deployed or based in the forward area. The Soviets
also may intend to attack deeper targets, such as
airbases in France and the United Kingdom, during
the conventional air operation.
31. The timing of the individual massed air raids
would be influenced by several operational con-
straints. Soviet military writers often have noted that
achieving some degree of tactical surprise could be
critical to success because it would allow the Pact to
catch substantial numbers of NATO aircraft on the
ground during the airfield attacks and would reduce
Pact losses to NATO air defenses. Even though the
Soviets have expressed interest in conducting air raids
at night to enhance surprise and impair NATO's air
defenses, military writers repeatedly have rejected this
possibility because of limited training and target ac-
quisition capabilities for offensive operations at night.
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- Higher-than-expected survivability of the
ground-based segments of NATO's air defenses
in the face of suppression attacks involving air-
craft, SEBNIs, and artillery.
- NATO airborne warning and control .system
(AWA(,S) aircraft and lookdown/shootdow n
fighters limiting opportunities for Pact aircraft to
evade NATO defenses by flying at low altitudes.
- The Soviet reliance on deep attack by medium
bombers, which are relatively large, unrnaneu-
verable, and hence particularly vulnerable to
SAMs and interceptors unless properly sup-
ported.
The lack of fighter escort for an' horn hers used
in attacks against the United Kingdom.
The proliferation of hardened aircraft shelters at
NATO airbases would force the Soviets to con-
centrate on closing runways requiring more air
raids over a longer period of time and hence
greater exposure to NATO air defenses.
- The Soviets do not have enough hardened shel-
ters to protect most of the aircraft that would
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deploy forward from the western USSR in the
event of a massive reinforcement. We doubt that
a large-scale reinforcement by second-echelon
front aviation would be likely under most cir-
cumstances, however, until the ground forces of
the affected second-echelon fronts also deployed
forward.
35. If the Soviets chose to start the war with the air
operation, achievement of tactical surprise could be
difficult. Further, if USSR-based medium bombers
participated in the first massed air raid, they would
have to take off from rear area bases well in advance
of the front air forces but could still be detected.
Warning of the attack could allow NATO sufficient
time to launch most of its aircraft, exacerbating
potential Pact aircraft attrition.
36. If NATO were able to launch large numbers of
aircraft before the Pact attack, the Pact would have to
rely heavily on fighter sweeps and escorts to destroy
them. Pact air forces are poorly equipped to conduct
fighter sweeps over NATO rear areas, however, be-
cause of limitations in the air intercept radars and
missiles on their Flogger and Fishbed fighters. This
problem could he partially rectified in the late 1980s
and early 1990s with the deployment of substantial
numbers of the SU-27 Flanker (and to a lesser extent
MIG-29 Fulcrum) AWACS aircraft, Candid tankers,
and an all-aspect infrared-guided air-to-air missile.
37. Finally, the large number of aircraft that the
Soviets intend to use in the first massed air raid
probably would strain Pact airspace management capa-
bilities and lead to some confusion. Deterioration of
command, control, and communications resulting from
NATO air attacks would lead to even greater confusion
in subsequent Pact raids. Additionally, bad weather
would limit the size and effectiveness of the air raids or
even force the postponement of the air operation.
G. Future Developments
38. Through the year 1995 the air forces of the
military districts and groups of forces are expected to
remain stable in overall size with a slight decrease in
numbers of fighters and some growth in ground attack
elements. Though the current MD//(;OF organization
will remain mostly stable, the Soviets may introduce
improved tactics and pursue expanded objectives.
Most changes in the MD/GOF aviation forces will be
evolutionary in nature and occur as a result of advanc-
ing weapon system technology and the Soviet percep-
tions of, the changing threat.
39. Some of the factors we estimate the Soviets use
to plan the size, structure, and objectives of, their
future aviation forces include:
- US strategic air force capabilities.
- US and NATO cruise missile capabilities.
- NATO tactical air force capabilities.
- NATO air defense capabilities.
- NATO tactical and theater strategic nuclear
force capabilities.
-Employment of Soviet A\VA(:S in an offensive
role.
- Soviet army aviation capabilities for close air
support.
- New Soviet aircraft capabilities.
- The adoption of new tactics.
- The Sino-Soviet competition and the Chinese
general purpose force capabilities.
- Soviet aerial refueling.
40. In the principal area of concern, Western Eu-
rope, the Soviets will continue to give high regard to
the capabilities of the NATO tactical air forces, which
they credit with the potential to blunt and disrupt a
Warsaw Pact combined arms offensive aimed at
NATO. We believe they will maintain this view
through the mid-1990s and continue to respond with
the planning and refinement of a more extensive and
efficient air operation.
41. Future air operations will reflect the advances
in air technology and in operational art and tactics,
but are expected to differ only by degree. We believe
the enhanced attack capability of new \11) 'GOF and
Strategic Aviation aircraft will require fewer aircraft
to achieve desired target damage criteria norms. In
this way, the air operation will be able to niaxinnize
the effectiveness of aircraft available to the Soviet
planner.
42. Another factor which is expected to influence
Soviet tailoring of the air forces will be the advanced
design features and performance capabilities of the
new aircraft deployed between now and 1995. We
believe these new-generation aircraft will pose a great-
er threat to NATO airfields because of their abilit' to
carry improved stand-off munitions, low altitude pen-
etration capabilities, better navigation systems and
sensors for adverse weather attack, and air-to-air
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refueling capabilit\ for extended range. Improve-
ments in aircraft reconnaissance sv sterns are expected
to include the expanded use of renuOteI\ piloted
s e?hicles drones.
4:3. During the next decade more Soviet aircraft
sill be equipped ss ith onboard self-protection elec-
tronic ssarfare (I:AV') s' stems. In the escort role. the
imminent deplo\ merit of electronic countermeasures
(F(:\1J Fencer sill gise the Smiets a more credible
capability to provide ENV support for air raids in
\:ATO's rear areas. The combination of improved
onboard and escort E\V systems vs ill significantly
enhance Soviet penetration capabilities.
replace the 1`110G-7 and Scud B. and the SS-22,' an
improved version (rf the SS-12 (Scaleboard). 'I'hese
three systerns are more capable than their predecessors
(see table 5). and tssro of them, the SS-21 and SS-22, are
nosy being deploweel. Although nuclear de'live'ry re-
mains a major role. SRR\1s with iniprosed accurac\
and ss ith nonnuclear warheads become more effective
and attractive for use against fixed and mobile targets
to include airfields and air defense facilities.
H. During the next 10 wears sre beliese' the Soviets
\ Al give emphasis to reequipnrent of the Soviet air
fences based in East Europe, and in this period we expect
the non-Soviet W arsavv Pact countries gradually to
nxrdernize their forces as well. The pace of the \S\V'P
modernization sill be much slower and limited to those
s\sterns the Soviets are silting to release sell to their East
European allies and which thew can afford to purchase.
I loscever. si c anticipate progress in phasing out the older
ge'ne'ration aircraft and broader introduction of newer
aircraft. We believe the WV P countries vv ill receive the
ness generation Fulcrum aircraft about 1990. Tiie
\S\\ P countries will also attempt to expand and mod-
ernize their ground attack capabilities in order to pro-
s ide better support for their own ground forces.
-15. We beliesc' the number of aircraft in future
Fighter and fighter-bomber regiments for almost all types
of new generation aircraft \\ ill be determined b\ the
Soviet estimate of the effectiveness of the new aircraft
but that the three-squadron regimental structure will
remain. :Aircraft inventories (table 4) of the different
types of, units will vary according to the twee of aircraft
assigned, and the operational readiness rate will retrain
about S5 percent.
16. Ober the past 20 'ears, the Soviet L Ilion has
strised to improcc the range, accuracy . and readiness
of its SR 13\1 systems. In the late 1950s, the Soviets
developed the FROG-7. Scud 13, and SS-12 SR13\ls.
schich provided most of the Ground Forces nuclear
striking Posner throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Dur-
ing the mid-to-late 1960s, the Soviets began develop-
ment of two new SRR\ls, the SS-21 and SS-23, to
B. Force Development
48. '['he Soviets elassifv missiles primarily hw opera-
tional range. 'I'actical missiles or rockets) include the
FROG series and the SS-21. Operational-tactical mis-
siles include the Scud series, the SS-22. and the SS-2:3.
49. The Soviets have committed substantial re-
sources to the (levelopnrent of row or improved
SR13\1s ernplo~ing improved inertial or terminal guid-
ance, propulsion, and warhead techlrolog~. Asailable
data oil these systems reflect a definite trend tossard
improved accuracy, greater range. reduced reaction
time, increased reliability and survivability, and
broader warhead options. particularly with Cons en-
tional nuuritions.
50. Through the earl '-to-Ili id-I96(Is. Soviet ss ritings
emphasized that the principal role for tactical and
operational-tactical SRR\Is was as the main nuclear
(helixcry means of the ground maneuver forces. h oss-
ever, bw the late 1960s, an additional role of SR13\ls
could be noted in Soviet theoretical ss ritirigs.:AIthough
nuclear deliver' remained the prirnarw role, serious
consideration vs as being given to the employment of
SR13\ls in a conventional role as well
51. From the Sos ict book entitled :l rt illcril and
Rockets (ed. ylarshal of ;Artiller' Kazakov). dated
1968, are listed these benefits of I(:Al-awned missiles
in terms of range and destructive effect:
- Replacement of a 500- to 1,000-kg isarhead scitli
a quantity of submunitions of total equal weight
The LS \\eapon, and Space s5,lc11), Inlcigcncr Couunittee
proposes to rail(' the SS-22 rnitsile ,%,tcm designator and t ,is:ri
\lod I and \lod 2 d(,ignators to the SSI The SS-12 Alod 2
designator ,could be a,xlgnecl Cl' the inrproccd ac(1111u) \eri:uit of
the SS-12 (chick ha, carried Ihc' 55.22 designator
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Table 4
Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Combat Aircraft Available
for Use in the Air Operation in the Western
Theater of Military Operations, 1995
Fi
ghters
Fighter- Fencer
Medium
Iircunnuis-
Total
B
ombers T\pe
Bomber
since F(: Al
GSFG
2
40
:310 3))
1)
100
(91)
(:F
Fognica -A A
1
20 SOS
100
0 (1
I) ISO 270
I)
0
15
60
1:35 95
:) 0) 130
Smoh'11sk AA
0
O 0
:325 180,
60
355 210,
Baltic Fleet
O
40 0
60
.15
125
East Gcrnumc
0
50 0
0
15
65
Polaod
110
210 0
I)
75
:395
( aochoslocakia
105
155 0
0
75
9:35
Subtotal
675/635
765 210/300
385/240
425
2,460,
2,365
100
0 ISO
I)
45
32_5
775/735
765 390/4SO
385/240
470
2,783/
.2,69(1
13altir Alilitarl District
210
120 30
0
40
130
Belorussian Alilitar} District
240
120 60 :30
0
45
105 4:35
(:arpathian AlilitarV District
160 120
'
120 175,1 60 0,,
O
10
350 335
Subtotal
640/600
,
:360/415 150/60
0
125
1,275/
1.200 ,
Total 1,
415/1,33
5
1,125/1,180 540
385/240
595
4,060/
3,89(1
(:I)1 Strategic luterceplurs
320
0 0
O
0
:320
Polish Strategic Interceptors
:310
0 0
I)
O
.31(1
(acchoslocuk Strategic Interceptors
1-15
O O
0
O
115
Subtotal
775
0 0
0
O
775
Total 2,190/2,110
1,125/1.180.1 540
:385/240
595
4,835
4,665
Table 5
Technical Characteristics of Soviet SRBIis
FROG
SS-21
55-1 c
55-2:)
55-12
55 22
7:A B
Scud
Initial operational capability
196.569
1976
1961
198!
1965
19-7
\layinorm ratter' kilometc'rsl
70
120
:300
5011
900
900
Guida rce
None
Inertial
Iuertial
Inertial
Inertial
III, -III'd
CEP (ntr^trrs) h 380 200-:300 900 00-350 600 :31)0-400
VIthouglr available in 1981, deployment has not been confirmed.
At two-thirds range
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n(rease, the total area of destruction of a single
ilissile.
I'hi snbinunitii II s 111a~ be of the most divers('
I\ I)e and ulc'truiut i\ (' poster: FrakrneutatiutI ar-
im or piercing, slhal)ed charge'. in(endiar\, smoke.
and it ii'rs.
The d(- slru(lise effect of a single I( :\1 warhead
eI Itile's to the sifin tilt aeons Sit b n ()f -10 to i OO of
()lore art ii ii pieces.
52 It (-edit iiii riullion indicates tinit the Soviets
plan for Multiple roles and fire support missions for
their SB13\I fence fhcir ahiIIIy to (-fill)]()% SRB\ls
aWaiist a broad target arra\ and obtain the retlnired or
desir(d target damage' is (lepend(nt un such factors as
I the technical characteristics (d tit(, missiles, sear-
htt,td,_ and gruuud o Ipl)ort etlnil)ment: (2i available
tort t-s and dispositions. (r31 logistics post ere'. including
IIpporl Inuits and missile and ssLit head stocks; 4) target
lilt)') 't 11111 and I I(ati(III caI )aIIIIit es; and i51 a (urn
1 1 aid. coulrol. curd 'i 1111111 Hi Rat tiits sv stmt that pro-
s id(, for the t i t fi e I \ a ) ( . L i t itiotI of .yet" and execution
I d strikes ;Igait st operational Ielliii riwents.
C. SRBM Force Structure in the Western TVD
iii A\ thin the \\ astern l'\ I) there are approsi
nlatel\ ;OO SR13\l transporter-erector-launchers
fi:l s!: of these lailnchirs, 30) are in the Soviet I irons
and 200 are in the inn-Soviet \\ .11 , l s I'm t forces, iSet
table 6 1
S ( \ FfiO(: or SS 21 battalion is nornlallv ,ill oreli-
iate to each lank or nlotori,ed rifle dis ii(),) and
Table (i
\\ (stem 'I'\ 1) SR13\1 La(nlcIfers (August 1954)
I RU(;
>
tiff 21
s1 ail
\ Ii
tiff-?
dal
tit (.
2I
~ti
I
3U
2' I
\(:I
s
u
s
I)
2r,
l
1
12
12
11
Ii,~Iii vlihi,io 1)iOIRI
ih
ii
_'
11
IS
AlIIitaI I)I'tII(I
11
1
60
12
121)
I ,iil~.iiL r
Ai I t.0 1)i~rri~t
111
h
iti
I)
5-1
I .i~I 1:rrnrni)
211
I
20
O
I I
Ih
I)
2))
U
72
y6
Il
25
Il
6J
274
72
32(1
54
726
mri tiIdly has tseo firing batte'rie's, each sv i t I I tsvo 'I'I'l I.s
for a total of four'i'h:I.s per battalion. Some \S\VP
FROC battalions have only tsvo or three '1'[Ls.
55, Soviet SS-lc Scud brigades are subordinate to
armies and fronts. :V nominal Scud brigade' has three
firing battalions. Each firing hattaliou has hvo firing
batteries, each se ith tsco 'l'[I.s. In actnalit}, Scud
brigade's sat) in structure' from a sis "II' 1, configura-
tion in smile \SVe P brigades, to a high of 27 i'i':i,s in
the tsvo CSF(: front-level brigades. A\ lien initially
dt'plo)ed. the SS-2:3 probahl'1 kill replace the Scud oil
a one-f)r-one basis.
Sb. The SS-22 in l)eacetinle is sub(rdinalc to a
nlilital-v district or Croul) oI Forces and ill wartime
kill become an asset of the theater of military ol)era-
tions ur It-()nt.
D. SRBM Missile Storage and Transport
57. Soviet readiness procedures call for all units to
clear garrison ,areas and asse'tnble' at dispersal points,
using dedicated transport before or at the onset of
hostilities. AV'o currently assess the number of missiles
ill launch units to h( tsvo missiles per launcher for
Scud units. four ntis.siles per launcher for FBOC units,
puree missiles per launcher for 55-21 units. and tsvo
missiles per launcher for SS-22 brigades. On the basis
of an assessment of the earn' ing salacity of Soviet and
\S\V'P support units ssithin the Weste'rn 'IV'I), esti-
inates of four to six missiles per Scutt. 55-21. FROG,
and tsvo per SS-22 launchers are reasonable 'I'bis
includes missiles it launch units, n)ohilc rocket techni-
cal base (I'1'1'Bs), independent missile transport battal-
ion (()RPI)s), and front Rocket 'technical Base
Therefore, multiplying the mi fiber of launchers by
these range's, sst' arrive at at] assessed tlltssile titse'ntor\
available on t)-da' that seotrld be? in launch units and
the rear area support structure (sec table 7).
55. The warhead tv pt's associated with SRB\ls are
nuclear. unitary high csplusisc, subproie(?tile I(.AI,
and ('\V' (sec table' S). 'l ite' possibility ;tlsu gists fur the
deplo'nlent of I(.A1 with concrete penetrators, small
and large area denial ()lines. and small antipersonnel
bornhlots. An) sNste'nl capable of dispensing chemicals
ss,ndd he capable of dispensing biological agents.
E. Impact of Future Systems
59. Although information (III SR13\I warheads is
limited, future sytents could (nlpl \ an' number of
warhead t'l)t's currently assessed to exist for other
Soviet (louver} s' sterns but not \et i(Iontified ur
associate'( seitlu SBB\1s. (;urrenlly, there' is nn direct
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Table 7
Assessed Missile Inventory in the Western TVD
Available on D-Day (August 1984)
Launchers Missiles Launchers Missiles Launchers Missiles Launchers Missiles
Groups of Forces 52 208- 56 224- 144 576- 42 84
312 336 864
Western Military
District
408- 4
612
16-
24
296- 0
444
Table 8
Currently Assessed SRBM Warheads
Warhead Nuclear, HE
ICM/LW
SS-21
and Mod
SS-23 SS-22
and Mod and Successor
Nuclear/LIE Nuclear/HE Nuclear Nuclear
ICM/LW 1(]M a/('
,W ICM /(W I('M a/ ('\V _a
evidence of the Soviets' developing "smart" submuni-
tions for their SRBMs, however, precision-guided mu-
nitions (PGMs) are available for aircraft and artillery
s~ stems.
60. The development and deployment of improved
SRBM airframes, guidance, improved range, war-
heads, and ground support equipment will provide
more reliable, responsive, and flexible systems with
enhanced survivability, enabling Warsaw Pact com-
manders to increase the role and missions of their
SRBM systems with a higher assurance that operations
can be executed successfully without the employment
of nuclear weapons.
61. In terms of an air operation in the Western
TV'D, the Warsaw Pact will recognize multiple gains
sti ith the projected deployment of the improved SS-23
between 1985-1990. When the Soviets develop effec-
tive munitions to complement the projected terminal
guidance capability of the improved SS-23, many of
NATO's air defense aircraft could be pinned down for
significant periods of time (figure 3). Airborne aircraft
could be forced to recover at bases that may not have
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shelters or appropriate support facilities. We believe
the successor to the SS-22 will be available only in
limited numbers, and primarily employed in the
nuclear role. Its range capability may allow the Soviets
to target a few of the highest priority objectives in the
eastern part of the United Kingdom.
62. Although the new generation of SRBMs pro-
vides the Soviets with targeting capabilities not previ-
ously available, there are weaknesses to the missile
system operations which potentially can be exploited:
- Command and Control. The complexity of Sovi-
et operations places a major burden on the
command and control system. The scale and
scope of Soviet operations are predicated upon
complete integration of the forces, meticulous
planning, exact timing, and precise execution. If
execution of these plans and their targeting data
base could be disrupted, it is possible that the
entire operation would be degraded.
Support Operations. Successful interdiction and
prevention of support units to keep pace during
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rapid offensive operations could seriously de-
grade the resupply of missiles for follow-on
operations, although missiles and warheads can
be delivered by air under emergency circum-
stances.
Battlefield Crowding/Disposition. To bring to
bear sufficient missiles to execute D-day strikes
against priority targets in the NATO rear area,
missile units would have to be deployed well
forward. Because of geographic constraints, these
systems could be heavily concentrated. Addition-
ally, the heavy support structure required to
service the missile units would be located in the
proximity of other support units.
storage facilities, air defense, and command, control,
communications, and intelligence of the NATO Cen-
tral Region. In wartime, they are intended to operate
behind enemy lines, independent of regular Soviet
forces, for extended periods of time, conducting recon-
naissance, sabotage, and/or destruction of a wide
variety of key targets. The term Spetsnaz is most
commonly used in reference to the special-purpose
forces of the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of
the Soviet General Staff. GRU Spetsnaz brigades are
assessed to be in 11 of 16 military districts, in the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and probably the
four fleets. The Central and Southern Groups of
Forces and selected armies are assessed to have Spets-
naz companies. Total peacetime strength of active
Spetsnaz units is estimated at 11,000 to 13,000, with
the potential wartime strength of 20,000 to 25,000.
63. The current SRBM nonnuclear threat to NATO
airbases is marginal. The SS-22 and the Scud missile
lack sufficient accuracy to be effective in a conven-
tional airfield attack role. Further, the SS-22 would
not constitute a significant threat to airfields because
limited numbers will restrict it primarily to the nucle-
ar role. While the more accurate SS-21 is available in
sizable numbers and continues to be deployed, its short
range restricts its participation in the air operation to
attacking the forwardmost elements of NATO's air
defense system.
64. The SRBM threat will grow during the period
1985-95 with the deployment of the improved SS-23,
which will have the requisite range and accuracy (50
meters CEP) to attack airfields. The degree of this
threat will depend on the numbers of the system
deployed, on other competing targets, and on whether
specialized airfield attack munitions are developed.
Improvements to the SRBM force will give the Soviets
an option to employ it in a pin-down attack against
some critical airbases and for neutralization of air
defense sites in penetration corridors. Such attacks
could significantly improve the chance of success of
the initial massed air raid. Overall, while SRBMs will
probably play a greater role in the air operation, we do
not believe they will become in Soviet eyes the
primary instrument for gaining air superiority in the
NATO Central Region.
IV. SOVIET SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES-
SPETSNAZ
65. Soviet special purpose forces constitute a signifi-
cant threat to the airfields, nuclear delivery forces and
66. The primary mission of Spetsnaz troops in a
theater war is to reconnoiter and report on activity at
enemy airfields, nuclear storage sites, nuclear weap-
ons delivery locations, and associated facilities. In
order to accomplish this, we believe Spetsnaz teams
would attempt to infiltrate into the target area imme-
diately prior to and at the outbreak of hostilities and
would seek to position themselves near their targets to
facilitate reconnaissance. Clandestine agents already
in the target area would provide intelligence and
logistic support to the teams.
67. The transition to wartime operations would
begin with reconnaissance of predetermined targets
for reporting back via radio to the Front Intelligence
Directorate. The decision to employ Spetsnaz teams in
a direct action role would be made by command
authorities at the front level or higher and would
depend upon circumstances, including, for example,
the nature of the target, the battle situation, the
availability of other resources (rocket, artillery, or air
attack) to respond rapidly, the value of continued
Spetsnaz reporting for repeat strikes by other forces,
and the chances of the enemy immediately employing
nuclear weapons. Some Spetsnaz teams may be initial-
ly assigned targets for sabotage rather than for recon-
naissance. Also, teams assigned reconnaissance inis-
sions against mobile nuclear targets are probably
authorized to attack these targets if launch appears
imminent.
C. Organization
68. Each military district that forms a front in
wartime probably has a Spetsnaz brigade. At least
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Figure 4
GRU Special Purpose Troops (Spetsnaz) Brigade
Spetsna,
13rigade
Brigade 11 cadgcarters Battalion
IIeadqLi it rtcrs Company
& Signals
Estimated up to
I S teams
8 to 10 teams each of
between and 12 men)
8350 radio per team
\KM assault rille & Makaros
pistol per man
303528 8-84
three brigades would be of immediate concern to the
NATO Central Region. Although unconfirmed, a
Spetsnaz brigade is also believed to be present in the
Baltic Military District. Spetsnaz brigades are report-
edly organized as shown in figure 4. The headquarters
company is believed to be staffed by extended-term
personnel, that is, officers and warrant officers who
are proficient linguists and are highly trained in
sophisticated survival techniques.
69. The strength of an "average" brigade is assessed
at approximately 700 personnel. During wartime,
Spetsnaz brigade personnel and associated support
agents for large fronts could number as many as 2,200.
A Spetsnaz brigade at front could have approximately
100 teams of five to 12 soldiers each. Army-level
companies could have as many as 10 subordinate
teams. Considering that sizable NSWP special-purpose
forces exist, albeit of mixed capability, we assess there
could be approximately 300 to 500 Spetsnaz-type
teams available for deployment against the NATO
Central Region.
D. Employment of Special Purpose Forces in
the NATO Central Region
71. Although a small number of agents might be
inserted covertly, disguised as civilians, before the
beginning of hostilities, the vast majority of Spetsnaz
teams will not cross the border before the beginning of
conventional hostilities. The detection of armed Spets-
naz teams inserted by aircraft before conventional
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hostilities could result in the loss of operational
surprise.
72. Very little is known concerning the methods of
attack a Spetsnaz unit might use against airfields. For
discussion the following method is suggested: a Spets-
naz platoon of about 30 members may be airdropped
as close to the target as possible in the early evening
hours. The unit would divide into four to six teams,
each team with specific responsibilities including cap-
turing vehicles and personnel for the purpose of
infiltrating the target. Automatic mines could be
positioned during the night near the ends of the
landing strip and other airfield facilities. Early in the
morning, several teams might conduct a rapid attack
against exposed aircraft, personnel, and facilities. As
aircraft began to take off, the implaced mines would
automatically activate, destroying the aircraft in the
air. The teams would quickly depart the target area
and hide during the day. During the night, the unit
vNouhl be resupplied with munitions and armaments
by airdrop at a previously arranged location. Similar
actions would be repeated again the following night.
Attacks might also be initiated against pipelines,
powerlines, communication lines, aircraft in the open,
and against fuel dumps with standoff weapons (rock-
ets) received during resupply.
-3. After a mission is complete, the teams may link
up with follow-on forces, be airlifted out of the area if
possible, or exfiltrate separately or in small groups
back to their lines, destroying targets of opportunity
along the way. The composition of a Spetsnaz team
and the weapons and equipment used are dependent
on the mission, means of infiltration, the nature and
significance of the target, the security provided to the
target, the amount of dispersal available in the ene-
m' 's rear, and the depth of the operation within the
enelny s rear.
V. AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT
OPERATIONS
75. Airborne and air assault operations could pose a
threat to NATO airfields, air defenses, and associated
facilities within the NATO Central Region. Early in
the hostilities, targets would include forward-deployed
forces and river crossing sites, and in the later stages of
the offensive, targets would be deeper in the TVD.
The employment of the airborne divisions would be
controlled by the Supreme High Command, and
would be dependent on limited Soviet military trans-
port aviation lift capacity. Also, air superiority and the
nature of the objective would influence the size of the
airborne force to be employed.
76. Opposite the NATO Central Region are four
front air assault brigades in the western MDs and
GSFG, and about 10 air assault battalions. These units
provide the theater, front, and army commanders with
a flexible, well-armed force that could be used early in
a conflict against targets in NATO's tactical depth,
such as air defense assets, command, control, commu-
nications, and intelligence systems, and helicopter
forward area arming/ refueling points (FAARP), as
well as occupation of key terrain and the destruction
of tactical nuclear delivery systems.
B. Employment
77. Airborne Divisions. Although the Soviets
might opt for an airborne operation on the first or
second day of the air operation, we believe they would
wait until later to ensure some degree of air superior-
ity and the availability of transport aircraft. The
Soviets might be more inclined to attempt an airborne
operation early in hostilities against the NATO flanks,
where NATO air and air defenses may be perceived to
be less of a threat.
78. Future airborne operations will probably be of
regimental size to reduce detectability, maintain the
element of surprise, and ease the demands on VTA
assets. This does not negate the fact that the Soviets
could conduct a division-size operation if they deemed
that the benefits of such an operation outweighed the 25X1
inherent risks.
79. Air Assault Brigades/Battalions. Front- and
army-level air assault units will be used early in the
conflict to secure key terrain, raid command, control,
communications, and intelligence installations, and
destroy nuclear delivery and air defense systems. The
depth of employment may be up to 60 kilometers in
an army-controlled operation. The limited fixed-wing
transport assets at front level and competing require-
ments for VTA would influence the size of the
operations. At present, the principal aircraft at front
for conduct of an air assault operation are the MI-8
Hip and the MI-6 Hook.
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 C. Airfield Attack
80. Airfield attacks can be made by airborne or
heliborne forces, depending upon the distance from
Pact forces Soviet writings have stated that fighter-
bombers or attack helicopters would provide initial
preparation fire. lhe assault force, lightly equipped
and armed, would drop, secure the runway, and
eliminate remaining point defenses. Then the main
body of the force world be airlanded, would complete
elimination of resistance. and would secure the base.
81. Airborne attacks on NATO main operating
bases (MOBS) are regarded as unlikely unless the
Soviets obtain air superiority over at least a major
segment of the Central Region. More likely would be
attacks by air assault troops on small civilian and
military airfields just in front of advancing Soviet
forces to secure airheads.
VI. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER GROUPS
(OMGs)
A. General
82. The OMG is a concept for operations intended
to conduct high-speed offensive operations deep into
the enemy rear area. OMG operations are planned to
disrupt the stability of the enemy rear, destroy major
weapon systems, and facilitate the continuing advance
of the first echelon and the commitment of the second
echelon. Specific targets include nuclear delivery sys-
terns and depots, airfields, critical terrain, river cross-
ing sites, and command posts. The OMG also may be
used to interfere with mobilization and the movement
of enemy reserves. The OMG can be employed at
army or front level. R may be designated prior to an
operation as part of the initial plait or during an
operation to exploit an unforeseen opportunity. The
OMG will normally be committed prior to the com-
mitment of second-echelon forces.
B. Missions
83. The OM(; is normally committed through pen-
etrations made by the first echelon in the enemy
defenses with the mission of executing rapid and deep
exploitation early in the offensive, disrupting enemy
lateral maneuver and reinforcement disrupting com-
mand, control, arid communications and logistics; and
seizing key objectives that will ensure the rapid ad-
vance of the main forces. 'these tasks require accurate
and timely target reconnaissance and close coordina-
tion between OM(; elements and other frontal forces.
C. Employment
84. An army OMG may be committed about the
time the first-echelon division is expected to break
through the main defense. A front OMG probably will
he committed when the front's first-echelon armies
attain their immediate objectives. Although the OMG
may be introduced as a single force dispersed in width
and depth, it is more likely that the OMG will come
through the defensive zone in at least two locations
simultaneously to fragment enemy first-echelon forces
and increase the difficulty for the enemy commander
to identify the main attack, and to reduce the OMG's
vulnerability to enemy air and nuclear attack.
85. There are two major offensive variations in how
the operational maneuver group may be employed.
An OMG may act somewhat in isolation, conducting
operations well apart from the axes of the main effort
and separate from the second echelon and reserves. An
OMG may also be employed to execute encirclement
operations.
86. Soviet military planners stress that assault by
airborne and/or heliborne units is essential to the early
success of deep operations by OMGs. These units must
be inserted in sufficient numbers to secure critical
objectives such as airfields, road junctions, bridges, and
fording sites along the principal routes of advance of
OMG forces and to disrupt the cohesiveness and
integrity of enemy defenses. The Soviets anticipate
that this activity would facilitate the OMG operations.
D. Capabilities: Theory Versus Practice
87. High-speed deep operations by operational ma-
neuver groups would be extremely difficult for any
commander to execute successfully. The timing of
commitment, the dispersion, and the rate of advance
envisioned for deep operations pose very complex
problems for commanders and staffs in the areas of
command, control, communications, and intelligence,
and logistics. Intelligence must be extremely good if
the group is to be committed when and where the
enemy is least prepared to oppose it. Resupply of the
OMG will require considerable air and ground cargo
transportation assets, detailed logistics planning, and
reliable ground and air defense to keep open supply
corridors to OMGs on the advance.
E. Force Developments
88. While there appears to be no fixed organization
for an OMG, the New Type Army Corps (NTAC) may
represent a possible solution and probably would be
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used as a front OMG. Should several NTACs be
established in the WTVD for frontal operations, the
NATO Central Region would be faced with the
prospect of additional highly mobile forces that could
be committed early in an attack to facilitate the front
commander's plan of attack against NATO high-
priority targets, such as the airfields, and to exploit
weaknesses in NATO defenses.
89. Though not the primary threat, OMGs could
attack NATO airbases in the early days of the war.
This would occur if the airbase is within the OMG's
zone of operation and the OMG advances sufficiently
to reach the base. This could happen as early as day
three or four of the war for an army OMG and day
five or six for a front OMG.
VII. CRUISE MISSILES, RECONNAISSANCE
STRIKE COMPLEX, AND SURFACE-TO-AIR
MISSILE THREATS
A. Current Developments
90. There are three subsonic cruise missiles: the SS-
NX-21 sea-launched cruise missile, the SSC-X-4
ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), and the
AS-15 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). Deploy-
ment of the AS-15 began in 1984, with the SS-NX-21
and SSC-X-4 expected in 1985-86. The SLCM, SS-NX-
24, will probably be deployed in the period 1985-86. A
GLCM variant may also be fielded. These missiles are
assessed to be nuclear equipped.
B. Future Developments
91. By the early 1990s Soviet long-range cruise
missiles will probably have better CEPs (10 to 30
meters with area correlator update), longer ranges,
lower radar and infrared observables, and improved
engines and fuel types. A conventionally armed (high-
explosive) cruise missile would facilitate attacks against
airfields, air defense systems, and command and con-
trol facilities. If a high-explosive warhead is devel-
oped, however, the range of the missile would be
reduced because of the heavier payload weight. By the
mid-1990s, developments might include a highly ad-
vanced conventional warhead to destroy runways or a
delayed action warhead to deny the use of runways.
Chemical warheads could also be developed for these
cruise missiles.
92. Currently, there is no evidence to indicate the
Soviets are testing and developing medium-range
cruise missiles. We believe, however, that by the early
1990s the Soviets probably will have tested and de-
ployed medium-range cruise missiles as a result of
spinoff technology from the current long-range cruise
missile programs. It is possible that land attack cruise
missiles armed with conventional warheads could be
assigned to theater forces to assist in suppression of air
defense missile sites and airbases, but we cannot assess
the likelihood at this time.
C. Reconnaissance Strike Complex System
93. Within the last several years the Soviets have been
experimenting with the reconnaissance strike complex
(RSC) system, which appears designed to counter inte-
grated systems for target acquisition and fire control.
The RSC also may have been developed out of Soviet
concern for the threat posed by long-range systems
capable of delivering precision-guided munitions or sub-
munitions and is assessed to be able to operate as an
autonomous fire entity to engage ad hoc targets. Howev-
er, it is unlikely that the Soviets would use RSCs to attack
large, fixed sites such as NATO airfields.
D. Surface-to-Air Missiles
94. Although it is unlikely, certain Soviet SAM sys-
tems could possibly be employed in emergency situa-
tions in a surface-to-surface role. We have no evidence,
however, that the Soviets have conducted exercises or
have tested land-based SAM systems in a surface-to-
surface role. The SA-2 and SA-3 strategic SAM systems
are probably capable of operating in a surface-to-
surface mode but at significantly limited ranges-less
than 40 kilometers. Neither the SA-5 nor the SA-10
strategic SAM systems has a surface-to-surface capabili-
ty and as such does not pose a threat to NATO airfields,
although the SA-5 strategic SAM system could be
targeted against critical NATO airborne assets.
95. The effectiveness of Soviet SAM systems is fully
realized when utilized as designed-to acquire, track,
and destroy airborne targets. Surface-to-surface use
would be inefficient and severely constrained by
inadequate warheads and limited range. We believe
the limited surface-to-surface capability of the Soviet
SAM systems does not presently pose a conventional
threat to NATO airfields.
VIII. AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO OF
A WARSAW PACT NONNUCLEAR AIR
OPERATION AGAINST NATO CENTRAL
REGION AIRFIELDS
A. General
96. The Warsaw Pact threat to NATO airfields is a
subset of larger questions of control of the air and control
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over NATO's nuclear escalatory option. Pact planners
believe that NATO's tactical air forces and nuclear
weapons in the Central Region would be a formidable
threat to a successful Pact offensive. Consequently, they
consider that the Pact's early attainment of nuclear and
air superiority would be essential. The Warsaw Pact
plans to achieve air superiority and neutralize much of
NATO's nuclear delivery capability by conducting a
coordinated theaterwide nonnuclear air operation cov-
ering as much as the first week of the war.
97. The air operation is a combined arms operation
consisting of a series of massed air raids executed in
coordination with artillery, air defense forces, SRBM
attacks, electronic warfare, Spetsnaz, and possible
assaults by airborne and heliborne troops. Each massed
air raid would be planned to achieve some degree of
tactical surprise and would be launched through corri-
dors cleared in NATO air defenses, principally by
frontal assets.
B. The Air Operation
98. In general, the Warsaw Pact would have avail-
able 2,600 to 4,100 fixed-wing aircraft to draw upon
for air operations (see table 1 on page 13). On the basis
of Soviet writings, we believe the Soviets would group
and prioritize targets by type (that is, nuclear related,
conventional air, air defense, and command, control,
communications, and intelligence) for the air opera-
tion. Initial Soviet efforts would focus on creating
about four main corridors through NATO air defenses.
Front and army assets, to include aviation, missiles,
rockets, artillery, and radioelectronic combat means,
would play a major role in air defense suppression and
the establishment of penetration corridors. (See figure
2 on page 12.)
99. On the first day of the war, two or three massed
raids would be planned. The main attack force would
be strategic aviation units. The interval between the
time one massed air raid commences and the next
reaches NATO airfields could range from about seven
to 12 hours. However, additional attacks, primarily by
frontal air forces, could occur during the interval. The
number of massed raids would be reduced to one per
day after the first two or three days of conflict.
100. While nuclear-related objectives would be the
first priority for attack, the Pact would seek to suppress
NATO air defense assets before using fighter-bombers
and bombers against nuclear objectives. Front assets
would provide principal support against air-defense-
related objectives. The main strike force of fighter-
bomber and bomber aircraft would be targeted against
the high-priority nuclear and air superiority objectives.
102. During the air operations, current SRBM sys-
tems could pose a threat to a selected number of
NATO airfields and associated facilities. Scuds and
possibly SS-22s employed just prior to the initial
massed air raid could harass or temporarily disrupt
NATO aircraft attempting to respond to the Soviet
attack. Continued SRBM attacks could affect both
sortie generation and recovery operations of selected
NATO airfields. The short range of the SS-21 and
FROG prevent their use against airfields in the Cen-
tral Region at the beginning of the war. Currently,
only about 30 percent of NATO airfields could be
engaged with the SS-21 SRBM system by D+3 and
about 65 percent by D+5 as depicted in the suggested
scenario (figure 6). NATO airfields may also be inter-
dicted when in range of other indirect fire weapon
systems.
103. The use of chemical weapons is not a standard,
integral feature of the nonnuclear phase of war. Soviet
intentions for such use are unclear and the evidence
ambiguous. However, a chemical attack against a
NATO airfield ill prepared for such an event-riot
having the proper chemical protection and decontanri-
nation equipment and facilities-could severely dis-
rupt operations if riot entirely prevent them. On the
other hand, they may determine that use of improved
conventional munitions will provide better results
while avoiding such consequences as the requirement
to operate in a contaminated environment, the unpre-
dictability of chemical weapons, or the risk of provok-
ing an immediate nuclear response by NATO. Never-
theless, the comprehensive chemical warfare
capabilities of the Soviets require that the prudent
planner consider the possibilities of chemical weapons
use from the outset of hostilities.
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D-Day
Figure 6
Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)
Capabilities
t Airfield serving as aerial
port of debarkation
HAWK missile coverage against
high-altitude targets
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C. Summary: Future Soviet Airfield Attack
Capability
104. General. Current Soviet airfield attack capa-
bility suffers from a number of weaknesses. The first is
the limited capability of current Soviet fighters to
provide cover to their attack force. The second weak-
ness is the limited capability of sensors and weaponry
of current fighter-bombers. A third problem area is
the marginal capability of current SRBMs in the
airfield attack role. The fourth weak area involves the
limited Soviet ability to direct the air operation. This is
caused by deficiencies in the current command and
control system that limit the size of the force that can
be effectively employed and directed.
105. Aircraft. The numerical size of the air threat
to NATO airbases will not change significantly by
1995. (See table 4.) However, there will be major
qualitative upgrades to the force, which will result in a
significant increase in the capability of both the air-to-
air and ground attack forces to carry out the airfield
attack mission, particularly opposite NATO's Central
Region.
106. Fighters. While we expect the number of
dedicated fighters to decrease slightly, this will be
more than compensated for by qualitative improve-
ments, which will produce a more offensively oriented
fighter force. Fighters deployed in the mid-1990s will
be highly maneuverable and able to conduct both
close-in and beyond-visual-range attacks. These new
fighters will possess lookdown/shootdown and multi-
target tracking and engagement capabilities. Future
air-to-air missiles may feature ranges up to 150 kilo-
meters by 1995. Semiactive radar and infrared sensors
will probably continue to predominate, though there
will be increased emphasis on fully active seekers.
Further, the Soviet fighter threat is expected to be
enhanced by the development of an aerial refueling
capability. These technological improvements, when
coupled with improvements in Soviet pilot training,
evolving Soviet doctrine, and the deployment of the
Mainstay AWACS could lead to a significant Soviet
capability to project fighters deep into NATO air-
space. This could have a profound impact on the
threat to NATO airbases by increasing the penetrabil-
ity of the Soviet attack force.
107. Fighter-Bomber/Bomber Force. The Soviet
attack force is expected to benefit from some growth
in numbers. However, as in the fighter force, qualita-
tive improvements will be more important. In aircraft,
the primary improvement will involve the deployment
of new aircraft with improved sensors which could
allow accurate night/adverse-weather attacks. These
aircraft will be capable of employing standoff, all-
weather, precision-guided weapons. Future ground
attack aircraft will also feature greater range and
payload, and probably will be air refuelable enabling
deeper strikes to be conducted. Moreover, the penetra-
bility of the airfield attack force will increase due to
improved EW capabilities. These improvements will
consist of more capable escort EW aircraft and more
capable internal EW suites on Soviet aircraft.
108. Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles. We believe
future Soviet TASMs will have nominal ranges in
excess of 50 kilometers with improved accuracy and
improved night and adverse-weather capability. The
missiles will feature lower launch altitudes and launch-
and-leave guidance for increased aircraft survivability.
TASMs could be supplemented by Soviet bombers
carrying improved air-to-surface missiles and conven-
tionally armed cruise missiles.
109. Conventional Munitions. We estimate the
Soviets will deploy more effective munitions for air-
field attack, including a dual-stage runway penetrator
bomb for increased runway damage, aerially delivered
mines to hinder runway repairs, and precision-guided
bombs for attacking high-value point targets. With the
expected deployment of new weaponry, when com-
bined with improved aircraft, air attack remains the
primary threat to NATO airbases.
110. Short-Range Ballistic Missiles/Cruise Mis-
siles. In the future, SRBMs will supplement the air
threat to NATO airbases in the Central Region. The
SRBM threat, while currently marginal, will grow
when the Improved SS-23 commences deployment
during the period 1985-90. This missile will feature
both the range and the accuracy to attack airfields.
The degree of this threat will depend on the numbers
of the system deployed and on whether or not special-
ized airfield attack munitions are developed. Because
of the limited range, the currently fielded SS-21 will
continue to pose a threat to only the forwardmost
elements of NATO's air defense systems. The Soviets
may also develop cruise missiles optimized for nonnu-
clear airfield attacks, but this is unlikely to be a
significant threat in the period of this Estimate.
111. Command, Control, and Communications.
A major improvement in this area will be the deploy-
ment of the Mainstay AWACS, which will enhance
Soviet air battle management. This system will give
the Soviets the potential to extend air power deep into
NATO territory. This will not only improve their
potential to defend their territory, but enhance the
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ability of Soviet escort fighters to engage NATO air
defense aircraft. The Soviets will also improve their
command, control, and communications capability by
continuing to emphasize communications security and
resistance to jamming by fielding new technology.
They will continue to improve both the capability and
the capacity of their air-to-air communications. They
will probably employ airborne use of communications
satellites and extend their communications coverage
into unused parts of the electromagnetic spectrum.
The deployment of the AWACS and improvements in
communications would give the Soviets an improved
capability to project and direct airpower over NATO's
airbases.
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