SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS THROUGHT THE 1990S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00126R000600700004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

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Central
Intelligence
Soviet Naval Strategy and
Programs Through the 1990s
National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
NIE 11-15-84/D
March 1985
446
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STAT
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NIE 11-15-84/D
SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY AND
PROGRAMS THROUGH THE 1990s
Information available as of 21 December 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board
on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Author of original text:
Captain James M. Eglin, USN, Office of Naval Intelligence
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................. v
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 9
1. CURRENT NAVAL STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS .............. 9
A. Introduction ........................................................................... 9
B. Force Composition, Organization, and Readiness .............. 9
Readiness Philosophy ........................................................ 10
Combat Readiness ............................................................. 10
Personnel Proficiency ....................................................... 11
Materiel Reliability and Maintenance ............................. 11
Sustainability ..................................................................... 11
C. Key Aspects of Military Doctrine ........................................ 11
Unified Strategy ................................................................ 11
Soviet View of General War ............................................ 11
Soviet Wartime Tasks ....................................................... 12
D. Strategic Strike ...................................................................... 12
Protection and Support for SSBNs ................................... 13
The Role of SLCMs .......................................................... 14
E. Strategic Defense .................................................................. 18
Anti-SSBN .......................................................................... 18
Anticarrier/Anti-SLCM/Anti-ALCM ............................. 18
F. Support for Land Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs) 21
G. Interdiction of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) ...... 23
H. Naval Diplomacy in Peacetime and Limited War............ 23
Power Projection ............................................................... 25
Global Reach/Overseas Facilities .................................... 25
1. Trends in Naval Programs ................................................... 27
SSBNs ................................................................................. 30
Attack Submarines ............................................................ 31
SSGNs ................................................................................ 31
Naval Aviation .................................................................. 34
Principal Surface Combatants ......................................... 36
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Page
Amphibious Forces ........................................................... 36
Small Combatants and Mine Warfare Units .................. 38
Replenishment Ships. ........................................................ 38
Other Maritime Supporting Forces (Merchant, Fishing,
Intelligence, Research, and KGB) ................................ 38
J. Trends in Naval Exercises .................................................... 39
K. Command, Control, and Communications ......................... 40
L. Soviet Ocean Surveillance .................................................... 42
M. Radioelectronic Combat ....................................................... 42
II. FACTORS BEARING ON THE FUTURE OF
THE SOVIET NAVY ............................................................... 43
A. Political and Economic Changes ......................................... 43
International Environment .............................................. 43
Economic Environment ................................................... 43
Domestic Political Environment ...................................... 44
B. Key Issues Facing Soviet Naval Planners (1985-2000) ....... 44
Protection and Use of the SSBN Force ........................... 44
Soviet Naval Land Attack Cruise Missiles ...................... 47
Strategic ASW Against Ballistic and Land Attack
Cruise Missile Submarines ............................................ 49
Antisurface Warfare (ASUW) .......................................... 53
Antiair Warfare (AAW) at Sea ......................................... 54
Air Power at Sea ............................................................... 56
Surveillance and Targeting Integration ........................... 56
Protection of State Interests in Peacetime and
Limited War ................................................................. 57
III. PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET NAVY .................................. 58
A. Baseline Estimate .................................................................. 58
B. Alternate Courses of Development ..................................... 66
An ASW Breakthrough ..................................................... 66
Strategic Arms Control ..................................................... 67
Severe Economic Stringencies .......................................... 67
A Shift in Soviet Military Doctrine ................................. 68
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PREFACE
During the two years that have elapsed since publication of NIE
11-15-82, programmatic trends in the Soviet Navy have become more
evident, and several notable developments have occurred. The Soviets
have, for example:
Shifted emphasis in submarine construction from strategic
ballistic missile to general purpose nuclear attack (SSN) units,
and introduced three new SSN classes, all of which probably
incorporate substantial advances in sound quieting.'
Begun construction of the first unit of a new class of probably
nuclear-powered conventional takeoff and landing aircraft
carrier.
Continued the modernization of their surface fleet through
construction of four classes of large cruisers and destroyers with
improved war-fighting capabilities.
Begun at-sea testing of a second family of long-range nuclear
land attack sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and a new
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
Improved their global military reach, particularly by establish-
ing their first true overseas base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam,
with an airfield for surveillance and strike aircraft and a home
port for the newly formed South China Sea Squadron.
Made qualitative improvements in antisubmarine, antisurface,
and antiair warfare weapons and sensors; command, control,
and communications networks; battle management systems;
ocean surveillance capabilities; and radioelectronic combat pro-
grams.
The continued allocation of substantial resources for such programs
underscores the recognition by Soviet leaders of the value of naval
forces in the attainment of wartime and peacetime goals. Coupled with
recent Soviet writings on the nature and conduct of modern warfare,
and trends in major exercises and overseas naval operations since 1982,
these programs also raise questions about the future use of such forces
' For more detailed information on Soviet submarines, see SNIE 11-20-84/D, Soviet Submarine
Warfare Trends, March 1985.F-I
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and whether their development indicates basic changes in Soviet naval
doctrine and strategy.'
Many aspects of Soviet naval developments have already been
addressed in publications by individual departments and agencies,
particularly technical studies and short-term assessments. In contrast to
those studies, the major focus of this Estimate, which updates NIE 11-
15-82, is on the overall significance of current and projected programs
for Soviet naval strategy in the late 1980s and the decade of the 1990s,
including some of the major options open to the Soviets for performing
critical naval tasks. We continue to limit our analysis of Soviet wartime
strategy and force employment primarily to the initial stages of a
general NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. This is mainly because any
meaningful discussion of subsequent naval operations would be too
scenario-dependent and would require estimating the outcome of initial
combat. Moreover, regardless of how the Soviets expect a general war
would evolve-including any contingency plans they have for protract-
ed conventional, limited nuclear, and/or protracted strategic opera-
tions-we believe their naval force employment in the initial stages
would be as described in this Estimate. El
The groundwork for our assessment is laid by outlining the Navy's
current status-its major tasks and the forces that would seek to
accomplish them. In addition to providing a basis for examining future
developments, an understanding of current forces is especially impor-
tant for naval estimates because of the long time needed to develop na-
val systems and the long service life of ships and aircraft. Most of the
submarine and major surface combatant classes and many of the
aircraft that will be in the Soviet Navy of 2000 are in the late stages of
development or already in service today.=
The Soviets recognize that their Navy is facing severe challenges to
the performance of its missions as a result of improvements in Western
naval forces, particularly quieter submarines, longer range SLBMs,
greater numbers of SLCMs, and improving defensive systems. To meet
these challenges, the Soviets support a variety of research and develop-
ment efforts. Many of these programs have been identified, and we can
make some evaluation of their capabilities based on knowledge of past
Soviet programs and current technological state of the art. By
' The terms "naval strategy" and "naval doctrine" are used in this Estimate in the general sense of prin-
ciples by which forces are guided in their actions. In Soviet usage, "military doctrine" and "military
strategy" have very specific meanings. Neither term is applied to an individual service. Military doctrine
comprises the views of the leadership of the Soviet state on the nature of future war and the tasks of the state
and the armed forces in preparing for and conducting such a war. Military doctrine is a starting point for
military strategy, which directs the armed forces as a whole in a complex system of interdependent large-
scale strategic operations. Individual services execute strategic missions but always do so under the overall
unified military strategy. The Soviet Navy's missions are firmly defined by this overall military strategy and
cannot be properly understood outside that context.)
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extrapolating from such information, the general nature of future Soviet
naval weapons and sensors can be discussed. Such extrapolations may
prove wrong, however, because assessments of evolutionary technical
progress may be upset by "breakthroughs" that cannot be predicted on
the basis of an understanding of the current state of the art. This is par-
ticularly important in those aspects of the Soviet effort, such as
nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare and space-based ocean reconnais-
sance/targeting, that involve innovative solutions to naval problems.
This Estimate considers some of the potential consequences of such
breakthroughs in key areas and speculates on how the Soviets might
attempt to exploit their successes=
Finally, the development of the Soviet Navy will occur within the
broad context of changes in the Soviet system and the international
environment. Although a detailed treatment of these subjects is beyond
the scope of this Estimate, some of the possible relationships between
such factors as the post-Chernenko succession, economic problems, arms
control negotiations, and an increased emphasis on influencing develop-
ments in the Third World have been sketched out, especially as they
might affect force procurement=
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Since this Estimate was last produced in 1982, the Soviet Navy has
continued to evolve toward a balanced fleet increasingly capable of
accomplishing a full range of wartime and peacetime tasks. This
evolution has been supported by new weapons and sensors, an ambitious
naval construction program, substantial advances in submarine sound
quieting, heightened use of overseas facilities, and additional operational
experience. We have carefully reviewed these developments and other
evidence pertaining to future Soviet naval strategy and programs. We
conclude that the major judgments of NIE 11-15-82 remain valid
Soviet naval construction programs continue to emphasize larger
ships with increased endurance and technologically advanced weapon
and electronic systems which have enhanced the Navy's capability for
sustained combat and distant area deployments. Within the Soviets'
overall wartime strategy, however, the primary initial tasks of the Navy
remain:
To deploy and provide protection for nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) in preparation for and participation
in intercontinental and theater nuclear strikes.
- To defend the USSR and its allies from strikes by enemy
ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carriers, and-now-long-
range nuclear cruise-missile-armed ships and submarines.
Accomplishment of these tasks would entail attempts to control all or
portions of the Kara, Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland
Seas, the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and the Northwest Pacific Basin,
and to conduct sea denial operations beyond those areas to about 2,000
kilometers from Soviet territory. We continue to believe that virtually
all of the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets' available major surface
combatants and combat aircraft and some three-quarters of their
available attack submarines would be initially committed to operations
in these waters. Other initial naval wartime tasks are: support of ground
force operations in the land theaters of military operations (including
countering naval support to enemy operations in peripheral areas such
as Norway) and some interdiction of Western sea lines of communica-
tion (SLOCs).
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We still believe this wartime strategy will remain essentially
unchanged through this century. Strategic strike-including strikes by
SLCM-armed submarines-protection of SSBNs, and strategic defense
against enemy SSBNs, aircraft carriers, and other major platforms
capable of nuclear attack on Soviet territory will continue to be the
Soviet Navy's primary initial wartime tasks. We expect these require-
ments-particularly the need to counter Western units armed with the
Tomahawk land attack cruise missile-will, however, drive the Soviets
to expand the area in which their Navy would initially deploy the bulk
of its Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet forces for sea control/sea denial
operations-possibly out to 3,000 kilometers from Soviet territory. C
A principal portion of the strategic defense task-the destruction of
enemy SSBNs before they can launch their missiles-will continue to
pose severe difficulties for the Soviets. The deployment of hard-target-
capable US SLBMs, improved British and French SSBNs, and the first
Chinese SSBN probably will increase the importance of this task. The
Soviets also will have to contend with Trident II SLBM-equipped SSBNs
operating in much expanded patrol areas. We do not believe there is a re-
alistic possibility that the Soviets can deploy in the 1990s a system that
could reliably detect and track US SSBNs operating in the open ocean.
We therefore expect that Soviet naval anti-US SSBN operations will
continue to be modest, with relatively few attack submarines stationed in
the approaches to US submarine bases. Operations against non-US
SSBNs-which would become increasingly vulnerable to improved Soviet
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in the late 1980s-should increase=
We believe the Soviets will continue to regard destruction of
Western aircraft carriers operating in Soviet sea control/denial areas as
a critical initial wartime task, requiring coordinated strikes primarily by
large numbers of missile-armed aircraft and attack submarines. Recent
evidence suggests the Soviets believe destruction of US carrier battle
groups, with improved antiaircraft and antimissile defenses, is becom-
ing more difficult during the conventional phase of hostilities.
The potentially most significant aspect of recent Soviet
naval
developments has been an extensive program to improve USSR under-
sea warfare capabilities. Progress in Soviet submarine quieting, evi-
denced in the 0- and S-classes, and sonar and signal-processing
improvements
Only about half of the Soviet nuclear
attack force will be composed of quiet submarines, however, and hence
the US submarine force will still enjoy a significant overall acoustic
advantage in submarine warfare into the mid-1990s.
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The qualitative improvements we now project for the general
purpose nuclear submarine force could-along with other develop-
ments-enable the Soviets by the mid-1990s to reduce somewhat the
number of SSNs dedicated to protecting the SSBN force. We believe
any such frontline submarines freed from this mission would probably
be used primarily to increase the density of ASW barriers in the
forward areas of expanded sea denial zones and/or as SLCM carriers.
Some could be assigned anti-SSBN tasks. A few older SSNs could have
an anti-SLOG role
We remain convinced that Soviet procurement of naval weapons,
platforms and systems over the period of this Estimate will be driven
primarily by requirements stemming from the strategic offensive and
defensive tasks outlined above. We therefore expect the following
developments:
- The size of the modern ballistic missile submarine force will
remain roughly constant-between 60 and 70 units-through
the mid-1990s. The number of SLBM warheads is likely to
increase substantially from the deployment of new missiles with
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
- The Soviets will deploy long-range nuclear-armed land attack
cruise missiles capable of being launched from a variety of
naval platforms. We believe they will be deployed primarily on
newer nuclear-powered attack submarines for use in theater
strike roles and also against some targets in the continental
United States. Deployment of some SLCM-armed submarines
patrolling off US coasts will become a permanent feature of the
Soviet peacetime strategic posture. These units probably will
augment and could eventually supplant Y- and D-class SSBN
patrols near the continental United States. They offer the
potential dividend of complicating US defensive tasks and
forcing a major investment in expanded early warning/air
defense systems to counter them.
The first unit of a new class of nuclear-powered conventional
takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft carrier probably will
become operational by about 1990.
The number of principal surface combatants probably will
decline somewhat, but the trend toward larger average size,
increased endurance, greater weapon loads, and more sophisti-
cated weapon and electronic systems will continue.
The overall number of general purpose submarines will decline,
but the ratio of nuclear- to conventional-powered units will
increase substantially,
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- The Navy's overall amphibious lift capability will increase
gradually. We expect an increase in the size of the naval
infantry from some 16,000 to about 22,000 to 26,000 men.
- One or more new classes of underway replenishment ships may
be introduced, but construction of such ships probably will
continue to receive a relatively low priority. The increasingly
modern merchant and fishing fleets, however, will remain
important factors in naval logistics.
- The number of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) combat aircraft
will increase significantly, with the major change being the first
at-sea deployment of high-performance CTOL aircraft. The
continued production of Backfire bombers and the introduction
into SNA of a Backfire follow-on or, less likely, the Blackjack in
the 1990s will be an essential element in the Soviets' attempts to
expand their sea control/denial efforts against Western surface
forces in vital areas such as the Norwegian, North, and Mediter-
ranean Seas and the Northwest Pacific Basin. Naval Aviation
bombers will also remain a principal feature of Soviet antisur-
face capabilities in other areas such as the Arabian Sea. The
maritime strike mission will receive increased emphasis within
the Soviet Air Force in coming years.
- Major technical improvements in Soviet fleet air defense are
likely. New surface-to-air missiles, guns, and laser weapons
probably will be introduced. About 200 fighter and/or fighter-
attack aircraft operating from the projected new aircraft carriers
will add a new dimension to the Navy's air warfare resources.
- Expansion of both sea control and sea denial operational areas
will be supported by gradual improvements in Soviet capability
to surveil Western surface units and provide targeting assistance
for antiship missiles, particularly within about 2,000 kilometers
of the USSR. Much of the improvement probably will involve
space-based electro-optical and radar systems. These sensors will
enable the Soviets to locate, identify, and track most large
surface units under favorable conditions; however, optimum
tactical exploitation of the information so provided probably
would be difficult to achieve. The Soviets' lack of any signifi-
cant capability to detect deployed submarines, especially in
open-ocean areas, probably will remain their major surveillance
weakness.
The acquisition of more technologically sophisticated and capable
weapon systems and sensors has improved-and will continue to
improve-Soviet ability to wage war at sea. Nevertheless, certain other
factors that impact on overall Soviet naval readiness will degrade their
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capacity to make best use of this hardware. For example, the Soviets still
have problems in:
- Personnel proficiency-a largely conscript force hampered by
stereotyped, narrowly specialized training.
- Materiel reliability and maintenance-poor quality control,
human engineering, and shipboard maintenance.
- Wartime sustainability-inadequate afloat logistic replenish-
ment capability and limited shore-based support.
The Soviets clearly recognize these problems. Their modern combatants
are being built to have, among other things, increased sustainability.
Training and exercises are becoming more realistic. We nonetheless
judge that these aspects of Soviet naval readiness are negative factors to-
day that will be only partially rectified by the year 2000.]
Soviet
possibility of more protracted general warfare. At the same time,
Soviets are clearly improving the capability of their forces to operate
under a wider variety of potential wartime scenarios. We do not
believe, however, that this portends any significant change in the
Soviets' plans for employing their naval forces in the initial stages of
general war, regardless of their expectations of its likely course. Initial
conventional operations would be conducted with an eye toward
escalation; and readiness to conduct SLBM/SLCM strikes and attack
enemy sea-based nuclear forces will probably remain Moscow's major
concerns under any foreseeable circumstances. The importance of the
anti-SLOC mission would increase in the event of a prolonged prehostil-
ities mobilization period or if conventional conflict with NATO became
protracted. These situations could lead the Soviets to mount a major
open-ocean anti-SLOC naval operation. They would almost certainly
want to defer any such operation, however, until after they had
successfully completed their critical sea control/sea denial tasks and had
weakened NATO's capability to defend its sea lanes. Also, through the
1990s, we believe the Soviets will still have insufficient assets to conduct
a major open-ocean anti-SLOC operation in the early stages of a
NATO-Warsaw Pact war simultaneously with their strategic offensive
and defensive tasks, even if such were operationally feasible. Hence, the
relatively low priority of open-ocean SLOC interdiction as an initial
wartime task probably will not change substantially in this century.
In addition to its wartime tasks, the Soviet Navy will continue to
play important peacetime roles, ranging from routine show-the-flag
port visits to support for distant-area client states during crisis situations
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and limited wars. Given the likelihood of continued instability in the
Third World, the use of such naval diplomacy and power projection
techniques probably will increase during the 1980s and 1990s.=
In this regard, there has been heightened Soviet use of foreign
military facilities, especially for reconnaissance and ASW aircraft. The
most significant development has occurred at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam,
with the probable establishment of an operational squadron of ships and
submarines and the basing there since November 1983 of a composite
air unit. Nonetheless, most other overseas facilities-lacking mainte-
nance and support services to sustain combat-will continue to be of
limited wartime utility and will assist primarily reconnaissance and
intelligence gathering tasks. Moreover, although the Soviets will contin-
ue to seek access to Third World facilities, we do not foresee a
substantial expansion in access in the near term in areas where there is
not already a Soviet presence. Despite their limited war-fighting
contributions, Soviet forces abroad are becoming a more significant
factor because they complicate US planning and potentially could
impede, disrupt, or delay Western military operations=
One of the most notable changes in the Soviet Navy during the pe-
riod of this Estimate probably will be the introduction of its first aircraft
carriers equipped to handle high-performance CTOL aircraft. We
believe that the primary mission of such carriers will be to help expand
Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet sea control operations during a
general war. The carriers will also give the Soviet Navy for the first time
an ability to project significant power ashore in distant areas in a limited
war. Together with other force improvements, they will provide the
Soviets the option of using naval force in a number of Third World situ-
ations against all but the most well armed regional powers. We continue
to believe, however, that major Soviet Navy task force participation in
Third World conflicts would be restricted to limited war situations in
which the Soviets judged the risk of escalation to war with the United
States or NATO to be small.
Our best estimate on the future of the Soviet Navy reflects our
judgment that the trends we have observed in ship construction, naval
doctrine, and strategy over the past 20 years will continue. Among the
variables that could dictate a different course for the Soviet Navy of the
1990s are:
A major ASW sensor breakthrough that gives the Soviets the
capability to detect and track enemy submarines in the open
ocean. Although unlikely throughout the period of this Esti-
mate, such a breakthrough would substantially increase the
Navy's ability to perform the critically important strategic
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defensive task of destroying enemy ballistic missile and land
attack cruise missile submarines before they launched their
missiles. It would probably lead to major changes in the way the
Soviets would deploy their general purpose naval forces before
and during general war.
Arms control negotiations, which could play an important part
in determining the role within Soviet strategy and the force
composition of the Soviet Navy in the 1990s. For example,
severe restrictions on sea-launched cruise missile characteristics
and/or deployment would alleviate a serious maritime threat to
the USSR and eliminate much of the pressure to conduct sea de-
nial operations at greater distances from Soviet territory.
Severe economic problems, which could lead to a reduction in
Soviet defense spending in the 1990s. Such a reduction would be
likely to result in cuts in the Navy's budget, perhaps falling
heaviest on major surface ship programs such as the new aircraft
carrier, nuclear-powered cruisers, and large amphibious and
replenishment ships. The net result of such cuts would be a navy
with less capability than the one projected in our best estimate
to control waters beyond the range of land-based tactical
aircraft and to project power in distant areas. Programs consid-
ered essential to the Navy's primary strategic offensive and
defensive tasks probably would suffer few, if any, cuts.
A shift in Soviet military doctrine toward increased emphasis on
protracted conventional war. Such a shift would not change the
priority of the Navy's primary strategic offensive and defensive
tasks but would probably increase the attention paid to SLOC
interdiction and naval sustainability issues)
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Figure 1
Major Soviet Naval Forces a
NORTHERN FLEET
BALTIC FLEET
Major Surface Combatants Aircraft
Cruisers 3 Bombardment
Destroyers 13 Ground attack
Frigates 30 ASW
Submarines
Ballistic missile 6
Cruise missile 4
Torpedo attack 23
BLACK SEA FLEET
PACIFIC OCEAN FLEET
Major Surface Combatants Aircraft
Kiev- class aircraft
1
Bombardment
100
Kiev- class aircraft 2
Carriers
Cruisers 14
Carriers
ASW
107
Destroyers 15
Cruisers
9
Frigates 52
Destroyers
Frigates
20
49
Submarines
Ballistic missile
Submarines
Cruise missile
Ballistic missile
1
Torpedo attack
Cruise missile
2
Torpedo attack
24
alnformation as of 1 December 1984. These figures do not
include units in reserve. Among the other units in the Soviet
Navy are some 172 patrol combatants, 78 amphibious-warfare
ships, 133 mine-warfare ships, 82 underway-replenishment
ships, and 285 other combat aircraft (reconnaissance,
Secret
703905 1-85
Major Surface Combatants
Aircraft
Cruisers
Destroyers
12
17
Bombardment 74
Ground attack 20
95
Submarines
38
Ballistic missile
41
48
Cruise missile
32
Torpedo attack
92
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Bombardment 109
Ground attack 76
ASW 165
31
26
67
refueling, etc.). Black Sea Fleet figures include the units of the
Caspian Sea Flotilla. Naval infantry consists of a division in the
Pacific Ocean Fleet and one brigade in each of the three
western fleets.
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DISCUSSION
1. CURRENT NAVAL STRATEGY AND
PROGRAMS
A. Introduction
1. Since 1982, when this Estimate was last pro-
duced, the Soviet Navy has continued to evolve toward
a modern, balanced fleet capable of accomplishing a
full range of wartime and peacetime tasks. This
evolution has been supported by new weapons and
sensors, an ambitious naval construction program,
substantial advances in submarine sound quieting,
heightened use of overseas facilities, and additional
operational experience. The following paragraphs de-
scribe our understanding of Soviet programs and
current naval strategy, particularly how Soviet forces
would be employed initially during a general war.F_
B. Force Composition, Organization,
and Readiness
2. The primary forces of the Soviet Navy consist of
79 ballistic missile and 270 general purpose subma-
rines, 284 large surface combatants, and nearly 1,300
naval combat aircraft. They are organized into four
fleets-the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific
Ocean Fleets (see figure 1). The Soviet Navy maintains
three standing deployed forces: the Mediterranean
Squadron, which draws its forces primarily from the
Northern and Black Sea Fleets; and the Indian Ocean
and South China Sea Squadrons, drawing forces main-
ly from the Pacific Ocean Fleet. Additionally, since
late 1970, the Soviets have maintained about six ships
off the west coast of Africa)
Figure 2
Probable Soviet Ocean Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs)
Indian
Ocean
Pacific
Ocean
TVD
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3. Control of the armed forces of Warsaw Pact
countries in wartime would be transferred to a Soviet
Supreme High Command (VGK), with the Soviet
General Staff as its executive agent. To give this
centralized command structure some flexibility, the
Soviets have divided areas of anticipated military
action into geographical entities called theaters of
military operations (TVDs), including probably four
ocean TVDs (see figure 2). High commands established
in these TVDs probably would directly control those
forces within their respective areas, except for those
forces remaining under the control of the VGK:
- We believe the Northern Fleet commander con-
trols all general purpose military operations in the
Arctic and Atlantic TVDs. Some units, such as
those involved in amphibious operations in the
Northern Fleet area, probably would be subordi-
nate to the command of the Northwestern TVD,
emphasizing operations against Norway. We be-
lieve that, for efficient command and control, a
high command could be created for this TVD. We
also believe that the bulk of the Northern Fleet's
forces would operate within the Arctic Ocean
TVD, encompassing all sea areas north of the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (G-1-UK)
gap. Strategic forces-including SSBNs, aircraft
on strategic missions, and some SLCM-armed
platforms-operating in these ocean TVDs would
be under the direct control of the VGK for
weapon system targeting and launch control.
- The subordination of Pacific Ocean Fleet forces
and the responsibility of the fleet commander
probably are similar to those of the Northern
Fleet. We believe the Pacific Ocean Fleet Com-
mander would control all general purpose mili-
tary operations in the Pacific Ocean TVD. Some
units, such as those planned for operations
against China and the Japanese islands, probably
would be controlled by the high command of the
Far East TVD. Forces in the South China Sea
would probably be subordinate to the Pacific
Ocean Fleet. The Indian Ocean Squadron would
also be subordinate to the Pacific Ocean Fleet-
possibly in a separate Indian Ocean TVD-unless
a high command were formed in the Southern
TVD, in which case, the squadron would be
responsive to the high command. As in the
Northern Fleet, forces performing strategic mis-
sions in the Pacific Ocean TVD would be under
the same degree of direct control.
- The Baltic Fleet, as part of a combined fleet with
the Polish and East German Navies, would be
subordinate to the high command of the Western
TVD. This theater would encompass primarily
operations against West Germany, Denmark, the
Benelux countries, and France, and against
NATO and other forces in the Baltic and North
Seas.
- The Black Sea Fleet, as part of a combined fleet
with the Bulgarian and Romanian Navies-as
well as forces of the Mediterranean Squadron-
would be subordinate to the high command of
the Southwestern TVD, encompassing primarily
operations against Turkey, Greece, and Italy, and
NATO forces in the Mediterranean.
4. Readiness Philosophy. Although Soviet naval
presence has expanded globally in the past two de-
cades, only a relatively small portion of the Soviet
Navy is still regularly deployed away from home
waters. This is largely due to the Soviet approach to
readiness, which differs markedly from that of West-
ern navies. Generally speaking, the Soviet readiness
philosophy stresses readiness to deploy for combat on
relatively short notice rather than routine deployment
of large forces. To achieve a maximum force genera-
tion capability in times of crisis, the Soviet Navy
emphasizes maintenance and in-port/in-area training
rather than extended at-sea operations. Even Soviet
naval units deployed out of area spend much of their
time at anchor or in port. To the Soviet mind, it
apparently is more important to be ready to go to sea
than to be at sea. Under this system, operational
experience and some degree of crew proficiency are
sacrificed to achieve high materiel availability. As a
result of this readiness philosophy, the Soviets, given a
few days' notice, probably would have more than half
of their submarines and major surface combatants
available for combat. That figure would climb to
about 75 percent within three weeks. We estimate
that, given several days' warning, Soviet Naval Avia-
tion would have more than 90 percent of its aircraft
available, although this percentage could be sustained
for only a short time. (s NF)
5. Combat Readiness. The Soviet Navy has greatly
improved its combat capability over the past 10 years,
but problems remain that are likely to hamper its
readiness to perform under varying conflict scenarios.
In particular, the Soviet Navy has been traditionally
postured to engage in a short, intense war occurring
after a period of tension which provides ample notice
to prepare and deploy. This emphasis, coupled with a
reluctance to maximize at-sea operations, has resulted
in deficiencies-by Western standards-in naval per-
sonnel proficiency, materiel reliability, and combat
sustainability. The Soviet Navy has recognized these
deficiencies and has taken steps to correct them. We
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believe that these steps are improving overall readi-
ness, but that, in comparison with some Western
navies, many of these deficiencies remain glaring ones,
which could constitute important disadvantages in a
war lasting more than a month or two.
6. Personnel Proficiency. Much of the Soviet Na-
vy's personnel problem stems from the relatively low
proportion of career personnel-only some 25 percent.
While naval personnel are selected from the better
conscripts, disciplinary and morale problems continue
to be noted. The Navy's three-year conscription period
is insufficient to provide the training and experience
required to take full advantage of increasingly com-
plex weapon/sensor systems and naval operations.
Conscript training is often simple and narrowly spe-
cialized, with little teaching of theory and virtually no
exercises coping with the unexpected. Periods spent at
sea are probably inadequate to acquire full proficien-
cy with equipment or more than rudimentary knowl-
edge of its tactical employment. These problems and
others have been addressed extensively in Soviet mari-
time literature, and numerous measures have been
taken to overcome them. Advanced simulators are
being used more extensively in training, compensating
somewhat for limited at-sea operations. Perhaps the
most effective steps to improve proficiency have been
the increasingly demanding and realistic fleet exer-
cises conducted in recent years.
The
Navy has also stressed exercises involving more combat
support and readiness evolutions, as in the large spring
1984 exercise in the Northern Fleet
7. Materiel Reliability and Maintenance. These
factors have been persistent weaknesses in Soviet naval
readiness. We know the Soviets are aware of these
problems and have tried to improve equipment quali-
ty control in manufacture and preventive mainte-
nance in the fleet. These efforts appear to be bearing
fruit in the newer and more important fleet units, but
casualties are still common. Particularly sophisticated
technical equipment on certain units often require
officers to operate and maintain. The highly automat-
ed A-class submarine, for instance, is alleged to be
manned entirely by officers. Introduction of ever
more complex systems and unfavorable demographic
trends will probably exacerbate this problem in the
future. We thus believe that materiel reliability and
maintenance are and will continue to be negative
factors in the Soviets' overall naval readiness equation
and probably would impose significant limitations in
protracted conflict, particularly if shore-based repair is
infeasible or unavailable. F-I
8. Sustainability. Historic Soviet doctrinal empha-
sis on short war has led to a navy ill-suited for a long
conflict. Although there is some evidence that the
Soviets are examining protracted conventional war as
another contingency option, this factor is not evident
in the overall design of their fleet or in the systems we
project for the future. Certain newer frontline units
are indeed more capable of sustained engagements, as
evidenced by increasing use of nuclear power for
propulsion and the incorporation of greater weapon
loads on new ships and submarines. Nevertheless, they
have little afloat logistic support, and reliance on shore
support is inefficient and impractical. These problems
are exacerbated by the limited endurance of most
afloat naval forces. Most large Soviet combatants can
operate for only a week or so without refueling, and
onboard munitions are generally sufficient for only
one intense engagement. These shortfalls are mini-
mized in peacetime by relying on the merchant fleet
for a large measure of logistic support. Most merchant
ships, however, are ill-suited for operations in a com-
bat environment. We thus believe that, except for the
more modern units which will constitute less than half
of the Soviet fleet by the mid-1990s, sustainability will
prove a weakness for the Soviets in any conflict and a
major deficiency in an extended war
C. Key Aspects of Military Doctrine
9. Unified Strategy. The Soviet military establish-
ment operates under a single national strategy, devel-
oped by the politico-military leadership of the state, to
accomplish wartime goals. This strategy is oriented
primarily toward continental interests and requires the
coordination and integration of all branches of the
armed forces to achieve the USSR's politico-military
aims. This unified strategy, with its emphasis on
interservice coordination and mutual support, is the
basis for the Soviets' "combined arms" approach to
war fighting. The Soviets thereby seek to create
mission-specific combat groupings with war-fighting
capabilities exceeding the simple sum of their compo-
nents.
10. Soviet View of General War. The Soviets'
military writings indicate that they believe a war with
the West would be decisive, be global in scope, and
probably escalate to a nuclear conflict. They generally
depict such a war beginning in Central Europe follow-
ing a period of rising international tensions, with
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hostilities initiated by NATO, although this last point
may be for internal political purposes rather than a
true reflection of Soviet expectations or plans. The war
often spreads to the Far East, as China enters to take
advantage of Soviet involvement in Europe. In the
Soviet view, the conflict would probably evolve
through four stages:
- A conventional phase in which a NATO offen-
sive is checked by the Warsaw Pact, and a Pact
counteroffensive is launched.
- A transitional period of limited theater nuclear
war in which the Pact detects NATO prepara-
tions to use nuclear weapons and preempts.
- A decisive phase with large-scale use of nuclear
weapons, both intercontinentally and within
theater.
-A fourth phase in which residual nuclear and
conventional forces come into play.
Since the early 1960s, and continuing to the present,
the conventional phase usually has been described as
lasting only several days. In the past few years,
however, there have been indications the Soviets may
expect a more protracted, but still relatively short,
conventional war phase. Descriptions of the duration
of the fourth phase also have lengthened.
It. Regardless of the length of the conventional
phase, the Soviets doubt that a war with the West
would be decided at the conventional level. Their
initial conventional operations would therefore be
conducted with an eye toward escalation. During the
initial phase of operations, both sides would attempt to
destroy with conventional munitions as much as possi-
ble of the enemy's theater- and sea-based nuclear
weapons and supporting facilities. The Soviets appar-
ently do not believe that the destruction of potential
strategic assets, such as SSBNs, during the conventional
phase would by itself trigger an escalation to the use of
nuclear weapons.F__1
allows us to estimate the Soviet Navy's initial
wartime tasks with a good deal of confidence. It also
permits an understanding of the Soviets' relative prior-
ities in fighting a war with the West. Since the 1960s,
offensive an de ensive tas s to e
performed concurrently during the first stages of a
war with NATO. These tasks are:
- To deploy and provide "combat stability" (that
is, protection and support) for ballistic missile
submarines in preparation for and participation
in intercontinental and theater nuclear strikes.
- To defend the USSR and its allies from enemy
sea-based strike forces.
- To support ground force operations in the land
theaters of military operations, including protect-
ing Pact sea lines of communication and prevent-
ing naval support to enemy operations in periph-
eral areas such as Norway.
- To conduct some interdiction of enemy SLOCs.
14. The pattern of implementation of these tasks
undoubtedly would vary from fleet to fleet. The
Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets would initially be
concerned with deploying and protecting their SSBNs.
The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, on the other hand,
would initially concentrate on supporting operations in
the land theaters. Combating enemy strike groups,
especially SLCM-carrying platforms and carrier battle
groups approaching the USSR, would also be a major
initial concern of all four fleets.E]
15. The Soviets realize that a conflict may not
unfold as they expect. In this case, they would be
prepared to reexamine their initial force allocations to
these tasks. Readiness to conduct strategic strikes,
including the protection of their SSBN force, and to
attack enemy sea-based nuclear forces, however, prob-
ably would remain their major concerns, regardless of
scenario or length of the conventional phase F_
D. Strategic Strike
16. The Soviets regard strategic strike against ene-
my land targets as the primary naval task. This
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priority stems from the Soviet belief that a war with
the West probably would escalate to the large-scale use
of nuclear weapons and from the capability of subma-
rine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to strike strate-
gically important targets. According to Fleet Admiral
of the Soviet Union Gorshkov, SLBMs give navies, for
the first time in history, the capability to directly
affect "the course and even the outcome" of a war.
The Soviet Navy's 62 modern SSBNs, over half of
which are Typhoon- and D-class units capable of
striking the continental United States while remaining
in home waters, carry a total of 940 SLBMs, or about
2,000 nuclear warheads (as of mid-1984). This repre-
sents about 25 percent of the USSR's estimated de-
ployed strategic warheads.
17. The day-to-day disposition of Soviet SSBNs is
governed by the wartime requirement to generate
maximum force levels on short notice. The Soviet
Navy seeks to maintain about three-fourths of its
SSBNs in an operational status, with the remainder in
long-term repair,
ITo maintain this
high state of readiness, a relatively small portion of the
modern SS13N force-typically about 25 percent or 15
units-is kept deployed at sea. Additional D- and
Y-class units are, however,
of readiness in or near home por
18. Since ~1984, the Soviets have main-
tained a D-class SSBN presence in patrol areas near
the US coasts and have frequently operated Y-class
SSBNs at or inside the landward boundaries of those
nominal patrol areas. An effect of these anomalous
patrols has been to reduce missile flight time to US
targets to roughly that of the Pershing II missiles
aimed at the Soviet Union from Western Europe.
These perturbations in Soviet SSBN deployments are a
politically motivated "analogous response" to NATO
INF deployments in Europe. At current levels they
will not appreciably affect Soviet SSBN force readiness
before about early 1987, after which the adverse
effects would rapidly become significant.
19. We believe most SLBMs would be targeted
against administrative centers, communications facili-
ties, and industrial and soft military targets, largely
because they do not now have the combination of
accuracy and yield to destroy hardened military tar-
gets. Some SSBNs, particularly the forward-deployed
D's and Y's, probably would participate in initial
strikes against the continental United States. The
allocation of SSBNs to initial strikes could increase
somewhat if the Soviets develop a hard-target-capable
SLBM. Now and in the future, however, many SSBNs
probably would be withheld for subsequent strikes or
as a residual strategic force. The Soviets probably
intend to reload for follow-on operations some of their
SSBNs that have participated in the initial nuclear
strikes. We judge their capability is limited, however,
and any reload operation would involve only a few
SSBNs. Moreover, any SLBM reload operation would
face such difficulties as pre-positioning reloading
equipment; delivering missiles, warheads, and propel-
lants; conducting the operation under threat of attack
or collateral nuclear effects; and retargeting. Hence,
the contribution to Soviet striking power of any re-
loading that could reasonably be achieved would be
small, making it unlikely that SLBM reload figures
prominently in Soviet war plans. According to an
alternative view, it is likely that the Soviets' reload
capability is even less than the limited one assumed
above and, therefore, unlikely that reload figures in
their war plans even in a small way. The holder of this
view believes that the Soviets experimented with the
concept of SSBN reloads but decided not to incorpo-
rate it into their war plans. Furthermore, this view
holds that the Soviets have not chosen to increase even
this small reload capability.3
20. Protection and Support for SSBNs. The Sovi-
ets have long been concerned with the vulnerability of
their submarines to ASW forces. Soviet authors fre-
quently cite the experience of the two World Wars to
reject the notion that submarines can ensure their own
survival through concealed operations. Rather, since at
least the 1960s, they have discussed the need to use
general purpose forces, including large surface com-
batants, to protect and support or provide "combat
stability" to ballistic missile submarines. Such writings
strongly imply that providing combat stability to
SSBNs is viewed as critical to the success of the
strategic strike mission and the most important initial
wartime task of a significant number of Northern and
Pacific Ocean Fleet general purpose forces.
21. We believe that the Soviets plan to support and
protect their SSBNs through an echeloned defense in
depth. This defense would likely begin while the
SSBNs are still in port and continue as they are
dispersed and enter assigned operating areas. Surface
combatants, mine warfare ships, and ASW aircraft
3 The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State.F_~
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probably would be used to sanitize SSBN transit
routes. General purpose submarines probably would
escort transiting SSBNs and, along with aircraft, estab-
lish barrier patrols in the approaches to SSBN operat-
ing areas. Surface combatant task groups also would
probably operate in the vicinity of such areas to assist
in combating enemy SSNs and ASW aircraft.
22. Protection of SSBN operating areas entails at-
tempts to control all or large portions of the Kara,
Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland Seas
as well as the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and the area
off the Kamchatka Peninsula. It also involves sea
denial operations beyond these areas to about 2,000
kilometers from Soviet territory. Some facets of the
echeloned defense, such as the operation of attack
submarines in proximity to SSBNs and the protection
of the waters near the ice edge, would serve only one
main purpose-the protection of SSBNs-because the
only Western units likely to be in such areas would be
those attempting to attack the SSBNs. Most of the units
involved in the echeloned defense, however, would
also contribute to other important tasks, particularly
the defense of Soviet territory from attacks by West-
ern forces and the prevention of naval support to
Allied operations in peripheral areas such as Norway
and Korea. Attack submarines, aircraft, and any sur-
face combatants operating near the G-I-UK gap, for
example, would seek to destroy any Western subma-
rines or major surface combatants detected, thereby
protecting both the SSBNs and the Soviet homeland.
Forces operating in these waters, therefore, would be
accomplishing several important tasks at the same
time.
23. We believe that virtually all major surface com-
batants and combat aircraft available in the Pacific
Ocean and Northern Fleets and some three-quarters of
their attack submarines would be initially committed to
conducting "sea control" and "sea denial" operations in
these waters (see figures 3 and 4 and accompanying text
inset), leaving relatively few units available for opera-
tions in areas such as the Central Pacific and North
Atlantic. Given the recent Soviet emphasis on a more
protracted conventional phase of hostilities and the
likelihood that many SSBNs will be withheld from
initial strikes, the requirement to protect SSBNs could
tie down substantial assets for an extended period. The
Soviets probably would be reluctant to release substan-
tial forces from this task until most missiles had been
launched, they perceived that the threat had signifi-
cantly lessened, or the course of the conflict dictated
increased emphasis on other tasks.
24. There are indications the Soviets have also
made some changes to the organization of their forces,
probably to improve SSBN protection, by placing
SSBNs and general purpose forces under a single
command. Within a fleet, forces have historically been
organized in major surface force, submarine, naval
aviation, naval infantry, and naval base (region) com-
mands. The naval base commands were essentially
coastal defense related and had smaller ships and craft
assigned, It appears that some base/region commands
may have been reorganized and given expanded roles
and geographic areas of responsibility. These new
organizations appear to be "mixed force" groups with
surface ship and submarine assets, including SSBNs.
Although the subordination of aircraft in peacetime is
unclear, it is likely that some naval aviation assets-
particularly short- and medium-range ASW aircraft-
would come under operational control of the "mixed
force" commanders during wartime.
25. These developments suggest that during war-
time a fleet's assets not assigned to deployed squadrons
or "independent" operations relatively far from the
Soviet Union would operate as "mixed forces." We do
not fully understand how the operations of the general
purpose forces, normally under fleet control, will be
meshed with those of the SSBNs, a VGK asset. We
believe, however, that the dispersal and deployment of
SSBNs will be governed by a precise, predetermined
General Staff-approved Plan. The force commander
probably would be responsible for the implementation
of SSBN dispersal and protection operations by the
general purpose forces under his command. The fleet
commander probably would be responsible for coordi-
nating the operations of the separate forces. We
believe actual firing orders for the SSBNs would come
directly from the VGK. The Soviets probably intend
that this reorganization will result in simplified transi-
tion to a wartime posture, improved responsiveness to
rapidly developing situations, and increased flexibility
in resource allocations, particularly in the support and
protection of SSBNs.
26. The Role of SLCMs. New sea-launched, long-
range nuclear land attack cruise missiles (SLCMs) will
enhance Soviet offensive strike capabilities. Two sys-
tems are under development. The SS-NX-21 is proba-
bly intended primarily for theater targets in Europe
and Asia; but we believe the Soviets probably will
deploy SS-NX-21-equipped SSNs near the United
States as early as 1985. Such deployments would be
consistent with Soviet statements concerning a "re-
sponse" to NATO INF deployments. Deployment of
SS-NX-21s on submarines would require a trade-off in
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Figure 3
Current Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the Pacific
JAverage minimum
extent of sea ice
United States
Unman
Average maximum
1extent of sea ice
North
Korea
l~l
(to ~, cation $oUth
Korea
Philippines
/
Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatskiy
(administered by
Soviet Unroof
NORTHWEST
-~- ocompiedby PACIFIC
sooie Union since 1945, BASIN
claimed by Japan
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
mission capabilities since they could then carry
fewer ASW and antiship weapons. The Soviets'
second SLCM under development, the SS-NX-24,
probably will be deployed on dedicated SSGNs.
Initial operational capability (IOC) is expected in
1986. We have no direct evidence, but believe the
mission of the SS-NX-24 will also include coverage
of both US and theater targets. If the Soviets employ
SLCMs to attack US targets, the missiles might be
able to avoid detection by the current US surveil-
lance and warning systems, although new surveil-
lance systems such as over-the-horizon radar and
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) air-
Sea control
Sea denial
Less intensive
sea denial
1000
craft probably are more capable of detecting them.
Launching submarines would be subject to detection
by ASW systems. We have no evidence concerning
Soviet doctrine for employment of SLCMs against
US (or other) targets. But Soviet planners could not
be sure that the firing submarines were not being
monitored or the weapons detected during flight.
They would therefore risk losing the advantage of
surprise, giving the enemy warning of the attack.
The subsonic SS-NX-21 would have a particularly
long time of flight, making it unlikely the Soviets
would launch that missile against US targets prior to
ballistic missile launches.
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Figure 4
Current Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the Western TVDs
the nco,po,aoon of Est- a Lama, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union Othe, boundaryrep,esentato
ie es1an1y-th-1.1.e
Greenland
(Denmark)
[A,.,,. ge maximum.
exent of sea ice
?x Iceland
North
Sea
The outer edge of the initial Northern and Black Sea Fleet sea
denial areas generally conforms to the 2,000-kilometer naval
defense thresholds, These initial sea denial areas undoubtedly
would expand or contract to take into account geographic fea-
tures in each fleet area, such as the G-I-UK (Greenland-Iceland-
703907 1 85
Severom
Finland S o v i e t
Union
,Moscow
Mediterranean Sea
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United Kingdom) gap and the Strait of Sicily. Initial sea denial
operations by the Baltic Fleet prghahiv would be limited to the
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Current Sea Control and Sea Denial Operations
The terms "sea control" and "sea denial" are subject
to a variety of interpretations. Generally a state is
considered to have "sea control" in an area if it is able
to sustain surface combatant and merchant ship opera-
tions there with relative security. It is considered to
exercise "sea denial" if it prevents such use of the area
by its opponent
The terms "sea control" and "sea denial" are used in
this Estimate to indicate the type of naval effort the
Soviets probably expect to conduct in various maritime
areas at the beginning of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
Areas labeled "sea control" are those in which the
Soviets probably intend to operate surface forces, as
well as submarines and naval aircraft, for an indefinite
period. Areas labeled "sea denial" are those in which
the Soviets probably expect the major share of the
combat to be conducted by submarines and land-based
strike aircraft. Surface ship operations in these waters
will be either nonexistent or of a short duration at the
initiation of hostilities. The term "less intensive sea
denial" is used to indicate a lower level of effort,
primarily by submarines
The delineation of these areas is heavily influenced by
the impact of geography on Soviet naval operations. The
Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are separated from open-
ocean areas by narrow straits that would be under
Western control at the beginning of hostilities. Northern
Fleet units would have to transit the G-I-UK gap if they
wished to reach the North Atlantic. Most of the Pacific
Ocean Fleet units are in a similar situation with onl
Petropavlovsk having direct access to the open Pacific
The Northern Fleet. A major consideration in
Northern Fleet operations is NATO control of the
passages between Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes, and
the United Kingdom. Soviet wartime operations in the
region of these waters would be likely to involve
primarily submarines, which would attack NATO
forces attempting to enter the Norwegian Sea through
these passages. Operations in this area would contribute
to several tasks, including protecting Soviet SSBNs and
territory and countering Western naval support to
NATO forces in Norway. This area probably would also
be the focus for antiship operations by Backfire bomb-
ers, which are much better suited than the older
Badgers to deal with the likely air defense environment
in this area. Also, Backfire and other bomber attacks
can be expected on ASW, early warning, and air
defense facilities in the gap area. Operations within the
sea control area are likely to involve surface ships,
submarines, and strike aircraft. Farther north, the
Soviets probably intend to use geographic features such
as the ice edge and Soviet islands such as Novaya
Zemlya to facilitate the operation of their forces, partic-
ularly their SSBNs and supporting general purpose
forces.
The Baltic Fleet. Operations of the Baltic Fleet in
wartime would be heavily influenced by Western con-
trol of the narrow Danish straits and by the proximity
of the Baltic to major ground and air operations in
Central Europe. It is likely that the major effort of the
Fleet and the East German and Polish Navies would be
directed at controlling the Baltic through the use of
surface units, submarines, and a variety of aircraft,
including naval fighter-bombers. The Pact would also
attempt to deny NATO the use of the North Sea as an
operating area for aircraft carriers and a transit area for
amphibious groups and logistic units. The principal
weapon in such operations probably would be medium
and tactical bombers, although they would have to
overfly NATO territory to reach their targets. Because
of its narrow straits and shallow waters, the Baltic is a
particularly good area for the employment of mines
The Black Sea Fleet. The Soviets and their Roma-
nian and Bulgarian allies would employ surface, subma-
rine, and air assets in sea control operations within the
Black Sea. Sea denial operations by the Soviets in the
eastern Mediterranean could involve prehostilities rein-
forcement of their Mediterranean Squadron. Unless the
Pact actually controlled the Turkish straits, however,
Soviet attempts to continue sea denial operations in the
eastern Mediterranean would be hampered by the
difficulty of reinforcing the Mediterranean Squadron
with additional surface ships and submarines once
hostilities had begun. Air operations in the Mediterra-
nean would also be constrained by the need for aircraft
based on Pact territory to penetrate Western air de-
fenses. Although significant numbers of Soviet surface
units would be involved in initial operations in the
Mediterranean, the Soviets probably do not expect these
would survive more than a few days. The brunt of the
subsequent sea denial effort would be carried by sub-
marines and aircraft
The Pacific Ocean Fleet. Soviet control of the Sea
of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk would depend on
sealing off several narrow waterways, ranging from the
Korea Strait in the south to the Kuril Strait at the tip of
the Kamchatka Peninsula. Dense defensive minefields
probably would be laid in these waters. Sea control
operations would also be conducted east of the Kam-
chatka Peninsula to protect the approaches to Petropav-
lovsk, the only major Soviet naval base with direct
access to the open ocean. Sea denial operations would
also be conducted in the East China Sea, the northwest-
ern Pacific, and possibly the northern Philippine Sea.
The outer edge of the sea denial area is less easily
defined than in other fleet areas because such efforts
cannot be focused on narrow waterways through which
Western units must pass.cc
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E. Strategic Defense
27. Anti-SSBN. The Soviet Navy's most critical
defensive task is the destruction of enemy SSBNs
before they can launch their missiles. The Soviets
recognize, however, that there is a wide gap between
the importance of this task and the capability of their
current forces to carry it out. Soviet writings acknowl-
edge the enormous firepower present in even a single
Western SSBN and recognize the desirability of at-
tacking such units during the conventional phase of
hostilities. They also recognize, however, that they do
not now have the capability to detect US SSBNs
operating in open-ocean areas or to maintain a passive
trail if a chance detection occurs. The deployment of
the US Trident missile system, whose greater range
opens up even larger ocean areas that must be
searched, further complicates the Soviets' task. The
Soviet Navy, realizing the magnitude of the problem
and its own shortcomings, probably will concentrate its
anti-SSBN efforts on choke points and the approaches
to enemy SSBN bases, rather than attempting to search
larger ocean areas. On occasion, surface combatants,
attack submarines, intelligence collectors (AGIs), and
aircraft have conducted joint ASW operations off the
Rockall Bank, west of the US and British SSBN bases
near Holy Loch, Scotland, during major exercises. We
Figure 5
TU-22M Backfire
Bomber With AS-4
Antiship Missile
have also seen operations off SSBN bases in the United
States by AGIs operating with SSNs and by Bear F
ASW aircraft staging from Cuba. We therefore believe
that the Soviets would attempt to have intelligence
collection ships, nuclear attack submarines, ASW air-
craft, and possibly even surface combatants off West-
ern bases in the period preceding hostilities and
attempt to detect and trail SSBNs leaving port. Once
hostilities commenced, they would attack any subma-
rine they held in contact. Some of their best ASW
submarines probably would be used in this effort,
although the number would be small relative to the
number committed to protect Soviet SSBNs
28. Anticarrier/Anti-SLCM/Anti-ALCM. The So-
viets continue to have great respect for the aircraft
carrier's importance in US naval strategy. They regard
aircraft carriers as not only the backbone of American
general purpose naval forces, but also an important
nuclear reserve force that could play a significant role
in determining the outcome of the final phases of
hostilities. Writings and exercise activity indicate the
Soviets expect US carrier battle groups to undertake
vigorous offensive actions in the maritime approaches
to the USSR. They believe that carrier battle groups
would attempt to use the Norwegian, the North, and
the eastern Mediterranean Seas and the northwestern
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The introduction of the Backfire bomber in 1974 into
the Navy significantly improved Soviet strike capability
against NATO surface forces. Because of the high-speed
air-to-surface missile it carries, its variable flight pro-
files, its maneuverability, and its high-speed capabilities
and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment, the
Backfire has a greater probability of penetrating or
avoiding NATO naval air defenses and attacking targets
in the open ocean than does the Badger.
Some 110 aircraft are in service with Soviet Naval
Aviation (SNA), and additional aircraft are being deliv-
ered at the rate of about 11 to 13 per year. The first
deliveries of the improved performance Backfire C
variant have occurred and production of the B variant
probably has ceased. SNA Backfires are currently orga-
nized into five complete regiments (two in the Baltic
Fleet, one in the Black Sea, and two in the Pacific). For
wartime operations, the Soviets would deploy and
disperse aircraft from their peacetime locations to those
areas from which they could best operate against
Western surface units, especially US carrier battle
groups and SLCM-armed platforms. The Soviets often
deploy Backfires from one fleet area to another for
exercises; in particular, Baltic Fleet aircraft annually
deploy to Northern Fleet bases.
Although the Backfire is capable of carrying a variety
of ordnance-including bombs and mines-its principal
antiship weapon is the AS-4 missile. The AS-4 can be
armed with either a conventional or nuclear warhead,
has a speed of Mach 3 plus, and has a maximum range
of some 400 kilometers, although in training it is fired
from much shorter ranges. In wartime, each SNA
Backfire would carry one or two of these missiles,
depending on the range to the target. To concentrate
their firepower, the Soviets probably would allocate at
least two regiments (roughly 40 aircraft) to attack each
carrier in a battle group. In the past two years, Backfire
operations over ocean areas have become more fre-
quent. In September 1982, the first use of the Backfire
in a simulated strike against a US carrier battle group
occurred when Pacific Ocean Fleet units operated
against two US carriers east of the Kuril Islands.
Backfire aircraft subsequently conducted open-ocean
operations during the worldwide exercise of September
1983 and the 1984 spring exercise, ranging as far
forward as the G-I-UK gap in the Atlantic and south of
the Kuril Islands in the Pacific.)
The Soviets undoubtedly view the Backfire as a vital
part of their strategic defense forces to keep Western
carrier battle groups and other SLCM-armed ships from
striking important targets within the Soviet landmass.
The Backfire will continue to be an essential feature of
Soviet antisurface capabilities in areas such as the
Norwegian, Mediterranean, and Arabian Seas and the
Northwest Pacific Ocean
Pacific Ocean to attack Warsaw Pact territory, de-
ployed naval forces including SSBNs and their sup-
porting forces, and Pact ground force operations.
Destruction of aircraft carriers, then, is a critical
element of several important Soviet naval tasks.=
29. Cruise missile submarines and strike aircraft
carrying air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) are the Soviets'
primary anticarrier weapons. In addition to more than
300 naval Backfire (see figure 5 and inset) and Badger
strike aircraft, some elements of the Air Armies of the
Supreme High Command (AAVGK) are also assigned
maritime strike tasks (see figure 6). AAVGK Bear B/C
aircraft have routinely been involved in simulated
strike missions against naval targets during Northern
and Pacific Ocean Fleet exercises. AAVGK Backfires,
Badgers, and Blinders have also been involved in
antiship exercises. Additionally, the first overwater
attack training by SU-24 Fencer tactical bombers
probably subordinated to the AAVGK occurred in
1984. One squadron of Bear B/C aircraft has been
modified to Bear G's and now carries the AS-4 ASM-
the same missile carried by the Backfire. We believe
all of the 65 to 70 AAVGK Bear B/C's will be
30. In wartime, these forces would attack carrier
battle groups crossing fleet defensive thresholds, gen-
erally some 2,000 kilometers from Soviet territory.
Antiship-missile-equipped surface combatants would
also be used in areas where they are in proximity to US
carrier battle groups at the outset of hostilities or as
carrier battle groups approach Soviet sea control areas.
Soviet doctrine emphasizes preemptive or "first salvo"
strikes against carriers before they can launch air-
strikes. The Soviets would attempt to use tactical
surprise and coordinated multiple missile strikes on
different threat axes to overwhelm battle group de-
fenses. Recent evidence suggests the Soviets believe the
destruction of US carrier battle groups, with improved
antiaircraft and antimissile defenses, is becoming more
difficult during the conventional phase of hostilities.
31. The deployment by the US of sea-launched,
long-range, nuclear land attack cruise missiles in sub-
marines and surface ships poses an additional dilemma
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Figure 6
Selected Soviet ASM-Carrying Strike Aircraft
Fuselage
Length
(meters)
Maximum Speed
at Optimum
Altitude (knots)
Normal
Payload
Maximum Unrefueled
Radius (nm)a
Maximum Radius
With Prestrike
Refueling (nm) a b
CIA Assessment
Naval Aviation
and VGK Air
39
1,050
1 AS-4 or 2 AS-4s or
bombs or mines r
1,825-2,150 with bombs d
1,750-2,075 with I AS-4 d
2,825-3,200 with bombs d
2,700-3,100 with I AS-4 d
Armies
1,400-1,650 with 2 AS-4s d 2,600-2,900 with 2 AS-45 d
DIA/Army/Air
Force Assessment
Naval Aviation
and VGK Air
Armies
39
1,150
1 AS-4 or 2 AS-4s or
bombs or mines =
2,900 with bombs r
2,800 with I AS-4
2,550 with 2 AS-4s ?
4,000 with bombs e
3,850 with I AS-4
3,650 with a AS-4s
Naval Aviation
and VGK Air
Armies
35 510 2 AS-5s or 2 AS-6s or 1,220 with 2 AS-5s 1,850 with 2 AS-5s
bombs or mines
? These radii are achievable only under optimum conditions and they
would be unrealistic in most wartime situations. They allow for only a
minimum fuel reserve, and they do not allow for such variables as
loitering, high-speed flight, indirect routing, low-altitude flight, or com-
bat maneuvering. Allowances for such variables reduce combat radius,
usually substantially. Realistic maximum radii for theater missions under
wartime conditions probably would be some 30- to 50-percent lower.
b Assumes that aircraft are refueled by a Bison A tanker at the optimum
point for maximum distance.
Backfires technically could carry three AS-4s. With three missiles,
however, Backfire performance--including range-would be substantial-
ly degraded, and we do not consider such a payload likely in wartime.
d The longer radius values in the assessment of the Backfire by the
Central Intelligence Agency are based on an assumed aerodynamic
design which is optimized for subsonic performance, while the shorter
radius values are based on an assumed compromised design. CIA has
considered both designs because they represent reasonable upper and
The Badger C (Modified) retains the capability to carry a
single AS-2, and it may carry AS-5s in place of AS-6s.
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for the Soviets. The potential destruction these weap-
ons can cause and the range from which they can
reach targets in the Soviet Union will ensure the
SLCM-armed force is accorded a priority at least
equal to that of aircraft carriers. In the case of surface
ships, the Soviets would attack these units in much the
same manner they would aircraft carriers. SLCM-
armed submarines are a more difficult problem-one
compounded by Soviet inability to distinguish those
units armed with Tomahawks from the rest of the
Western SSN inventory. We have no evidence to
indicate what specific measures the Soviets would
undertake to destroy these submarines. Extension of
the sea control/denial areas farther from the Soviet
landmass, augmented ASW barriers, and attacks in or
near their bases are measures that could be employed.
We believe the Soviets most likely would attempt to
ameliorate this threat primarily by extending farther
seaward and increasing the density and depth of their
ASW barriers.
32. With regard to the national air defense role of
the Soviet Navy in general, and its anti-ALCM role in
particular, the Navy and Air Defense Forces (ADF)
are developing an operational relationship to improve
both air defense of the fleet and the homeland. A
major impetus behind this effort to extend seaward
their air defense coverage is the threat posed by highly
accurate cruise missiles launched from well beyond
Soviet borders by US strategic bombers and naval
platforms. The Soviets believe they can better counter
this threat by extending their air defense capabilities
beyond coastal waters. They probably have developed
the capability for direct communications between
ADF authorities and Navy facilities and ships. Joint
training has thus far been concentrated near shore
with the ADF responsible for coordination and inte-
gration of air assets. We believe, however, the prob-
lems of integrating each service's air defense assets into
a cohesive force have not been resolved. Further, the
lack of appropriate, continuous joint force training,
competing mission requirements, and the failure to
implement any comprehensive doctrine or command
structure for long-range joint operations indicate the
Soviets apparently are not vigorously pursuing this
option. In the near term, we believe Moscow will
continue its practice of according individual service
requirements a higher priority than joint-force opera-
tions as the primary means of meeting both naval and
homeland air defense requirements. The Soviets are,
for example, developing the Air Force Mainstay
AWACS aircraft for forward air defense operations,
while the Navy concurrently has two classes of ships-
the Marshal Nedelin and a large, nuclear-powered
auxiliary designated BAL-AUX-2 (see figure 7)-
which probably incorporate new generations of inte-
grated command, control, and communications equip-
ment necessary to extend fleet air defense and battle
management capability. Similarly, the deployment of
the large CTOL aircraft carrier under construction
will enhance substantially the Navy's ability to con-
duct antiair warfare at greater distances from the
USSR. Although these systems and others are being
developed to satisfy primarily service requirements,
they will offer opportunities for additional and per-
haps more effective joint force air defense operations.
F. Support for Land Theaters of Military
Operations (TVDs)
33. Although the Soviet Navy has acquired increas-
ingly important strategic offensive and defensive tasks,
support for combined-arms operations in the continen-
tal TVDs remains a major responsibility of the Baltic
and Black Sea Fleets and a secondary responsibility of
the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets. In wartime,
the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets would join with navies
of other Warsaw Pact nations to form the Combined
Baltic and Combined Black Sea Fleets, respectively.
The broad objectives of these combined fleets would
be to gain control of the Baltic and Black Seas and to
help secure access to the North and Mediterranean
Seas. In the Baltic, initial naval operations would focus
on destruction of NATO submarines, missile-armed
patrol combatants, and naval aviation forces. Western
carrier battle groups would become primary targets,
especially for aircraft, as they moved into the North
Sea. Amphibious landings in support of ground and
airborne attacks on West Germany and Denmark also
are likely. In the Black Sea, initial naval operations
would focus on supporting the movement of ground
forces along the western littoral and assisting in seizing
the Turkish straits. Romanian and Bulgarian naval
forces would be primarily responsible for patrol duties
along their own coasts. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet
would assist Mediterranean Squadron operations
against Western carrier battle groups and amphibious
forces. The Northern Fleet would also conduct am-
phibious operations in support of ground forces opera-
tions against northern Norway. The wartime role of
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Figure 7
Soviet New Construction Possible Command and Control Ships
Marshal Nedelin AGE En Route
Operations in the Pacific
Ocean Fleet
BAL-AUX-2 Fitting Out at
Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad
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the Pacific Ocean Fleet's amphibious elements is less
well understood. These forces could be used for the
seizure of vital straits such as La Perouse or could be
retained to defend Soviet coastal regions. Additionally,
Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) troops could conduct
limited objective raids in support of a major ground
operation against China or reinforce defenses on the
Kuril Islands. Forces in each fleet area would also be
committed to defending the coastal SLOCs essential to
the reinforcement, resupply, and mutual support of
the ground forces
G. Interdiction of Sea Lines of Communication
(SLOCs)
34. The Soviets view SLOG interdiction as a less
urgent initial task than providing combat stability for
their SSBNs and defeating the West's nuclear-capable
naval strike forces. They believe that Warsaw Pact
forces would defeat the main grouping of NATO
forces in Central Europe or the war would escalate to
theater nuclear conflict before NATO's seaborne rein-
forcement and resupply of Europe or US forces in the
Far East became a critical factor. Only a few forces-
primarily diesel attack submarines-would therefore
be allocated to open-ocean SLOG interdiction from
the outset of hostilities. The Soviets probably plan to
use such units for attacks on shipping primarily to
disperse and tie down NATO naval forces and to
reduce the efficiency of NATO military shipping.
Initial Soviet anti-SLOG efforts would also probably
include a bombing and mining campaign against
European ports by some SNA aircraft and attack
submarines. Such actions probably would be intended
to complicate NATO naval operations and facilitate
performance of the Pact's more critical initial tasks.
We have no evidence whether the Soviets intend to
mine US ports, harbors, or coastal waters prior to or in
the early stages of a general war. The Soviets could
increase their emphasis on SLOC interdiction during a
war with the United States and its allies in response to
their perception of a changing strategic situation. One
circumstance that could motivate the Soviets to widen
their emphasis on SLOG interdiction would be the
lengthening of the war into a protracted conventional
conflict. Another circumstance might be a conflict that
began after a prolonged period of mobilization during
which NATO began the reinforcement and resupply
of Europe by sea. In such a case, the Soviets might see
interdiction as an urgent task at the beginning of
hostilities. Regardless of the circumstances, the Soviets
would almost certainly want to defer mounting any
major open-ocean anti-SLOG naval operation until
after they had successfully completed their initial sea
control/sea denial operations and had weakened
NATO's capability to protect its sea lines
H. Naval Diplomacy in Peacetime and
Limited War
35. In addition to its wartime tasks, the Soviet Navy
is assigned the important peacetime role of serving as
an instrument of state policy or, in more traditional
terms, conducting naval diplomacy. Today, Soviet
naval forces maintain a continuous presence in the
Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic off
West Africa, and the South China Sea. They also
conduct deployments to the Caribbean (see figure 8).
Although the level of presence has fluctuated within
and between geographic areas, the overall level of
Soviet surface ship and submarine presence in distant
areas has remained relatively stable since 1974. Opera-
tions by Soviet naval aircraft have, however, increased
considerably since 1979 (see figure 9) and were high-
lighted by the basing of strike aircraft at Cam Ranh
Bay, Vietnam, in November 1983 and the near contin-
uous deployment to Cuba of Bear D/F since early
1983. These out-of-area operations reflect the Soviets'
interest in supporting friendly regimes, expanding
their position in the Third World (especially in areas
of potential Western vulnerability), balancing Western
presence, and countering potential strategic threats.
Although strategic military concerns remain promi-
nent in Soviet distant operations, particularly in the
Mediterranean, the Navy is performing important
tasks related to the projection of Soviet power and
influence in the Third World.
36. Along with routine show-the-flag deployments
and port visits, Soviet naval forces have demonstrated
support for friendly nations and sought to inhibit the
use of hostile naval forces against Soviet allies. During
recent Third World crises the Soviets have augmented
their naval presence in the areas of conflict: the
Angolan civil war in 1975; the Ethiopian-Somali con-
flict in 1977-78; the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979;
the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979-80; Lebanon and
Angola in 1982-83. Such use of Soviet naval forces is
likely to continue in future distant-area crises. We do
not believe, however, the Soviets would deploy major
naval forces in response to a Third World crisis in an
area other than the Mediterranean and possibly the
South China Sea and Indian Ocean, if they judged the
crisis involved a high risk of escalation to general war
with the West. The Soviets would probably fear that,
if war broke out, such forces would be out of position
to perform the initial wartime tasks of rotectin
SSBNs and the sea approaches to the USSR[
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Figure 8
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
by Region, 1975-84
ii] Caribbean Sea
Atlantic Ocean
Mediterranean Sea
West African Watersa
Data through 30 September 1984.
West African ship-days for 1975 are included in
Atlantic Ocean data for that year.
Figure 9
Overseas Deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation,
1976-84
? Syria, IL-38 May and TU-16 Badger
Libya, IL-38 May
Ethiopia, IL-38 May
South Yemen, IL-38 May
Vietnam, TU-16
Vietnam, TU-95 Bear D and F
Angola, TU-95 Bcar D
F I Cuba, TU-95 Bear D
El Cuba, TU-95 Bear F
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37. Power Projection. Although Soviet amphibious
forces were developed to conduct assault landings on
the maritime flanks of the USSR in support of ground
theater operations, they could undertake limited as-
sault operations against modest opposition in many
areas of the Third World. The amphibious landings
conducted on Socotra Island in May 1980 and in Syria
in July 1981 demonstrate an interest in and a nascent
capability for distant-area projection. The Soviet Navy
has never conducted large-scale amphibious landings
away from the periphery of the USSR. Exercise
ZAPAD-81 in the Baltic, however, included a large-
scale amphibious exercise that for the first time used
ships drawn from all four Soviet fleets. Units involved
included the aircraft carrier Kiev, the helicopter carri-
er Leningrad, and the amphibious assault ship Ivan
Rogov. We believe one of the purposes of this unusual
gathering of forces was to test planning concepts for
amphibious operations in distant areas. Despite these
developments, it is still doubtful that a Soviet amphibi-
ous task force could carry out a successful landing
abroad against substantial opposition, in large part
because of the lack of adequate tactical air support,
either land- or sea-based.
38. Global Reach/Overseas Facilities. Soviet mili-
tary involvement abroad primarily is intended to help
establish and maintain pro-Soviet regimes and minimize
US influence. In addition to these political benefits, some
military utility also accrues from foreign involvement:
selected allies are strengthened and become more willing
to act as Soviet surrogates; Soviet presence enhances the
perception of Moscow as an expanding military power
whose interests must be considered; and Soviet defenses
are strengthened through a network of intelligence
gathering, early warning and support facilities. Soviet
forces now deployed abroad could not themselves influ-
ence the outcome of a general war with the West and
are not a significant factor in Soviet defense planning.
Operating in conjunction with their overseas allies,
however, Soviet forces in those areas have a growing
capability to complicate US military planning and to
impede, disrupt, or delay Western military operations.
Modest, combined naval exercises have been conducted
in recent years with Cuban, Syrian, Vietnamese, and
South Yemeni Navies. Such exercises with some Third
World clients are likely to increase in sophistication. We
also foresee no slackening in Soviet efforts to expand
their access to foreign facilities, but these facilities, in the
near term, will continue to serve essentially as support
bases and staging areas from which to wield influence.
Most will lack adequate infrastructure to support sus-
tained, high-tempo military operations
39. The Soviet facility at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam
(see figure 10)-their first true overseas military
"base"-is an anomaly in this pattern. It accommo-
dates the largest concentration of Soviet naval assets
deployed outside the USSR. The Soviets now have in
place air-to-surface missile loading and handling
equipment, ordnance ranges, and communications and
intelligence facilities. In addition, the seven surface
combatants and four submarines usually present are
supported by seven naval auxiliaries. The combatants
and submarines probably now form an operational
squadron. A group of 16 TU-16 Badgers (including 10
of the ASM variants), four TU-95 Bear D's and four
TU-142 Bear F's, and 14 MIG-23 Flogger C's and G's
is based at Cam Ranh Bay. This constitutes the first
deployment of Soviet bombers with ASMs outside the
Warsaw Pact since 1970. We believe that, in the next
two years, the submarine and surface combatant
presence there could double. Unlike other facilities
abroad, the Soviets could defend this base against
moderate opposition and sustain combat operations in
the South China Sea from it in the initial stages of a
general war. Soviet forces there could be used to:
- Counter Chinese SSBNs.
- Attack Western facilities in the Philippines.
- Attack Western SLOCs in the South China Sea.
- Augment the Indian Ocean Squadron.
The Soviets probably regard Cam Ranh Bay as an
important base with growing wartime utility; howev-
er, they undoubtedly realize their ability to defend it
against a concerted attack by Western forces is very
limited and would probably remain so even if addi-
tional defensive systems were deployed.
40. Like Cam Ranh Bay, Soviet access to well-
developed facilities in Cuba is also a special case. Such
access could enable the Soviets to more easily sustain
naval deployments in the Western Hemisphere. Ex-
cept for a fleet tug and maintenance and support
personnel, there are no Soviet naval forces permanent-
ly assigned to Cuba; however, Soviet naval task forces
deploy regularly to the Caribbean and use Cuban
facilities for replenishment, maintenance, and support.
Deployed Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft routinely
conduct reconnaissance and ASW missions against the
US east coast from Cuban airfields. These deploy-
ments serve to signal Moscow's support for the Castro
regime, underscore Soviet interest in the region, and
provide naval training and surveillance opportunities.
Any deployed forces in Cuba, however, would contrib-
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ute little to Soviet war-fighting capability in a general
war with the West. Although basing some naval forces
in Cuba, especially missile-carrying submarines and
aircraft, could complement Soviet naval strategy by
diverting US resources in wartime, we believe Moscow
will eschew such a policy. The Soviet (and Cuban)
leadership probably will continue to view the risks
inherent in the confrontation with the United States
that would follow such an action as outweighing the
potential benefits.)
1. Trends in Naval Programs
41. The Navy's share of the Soviet defense budget
has remained basically unchanged in recent years-
about 20 percent. Much of this share has been devoted
to ship construction programs, including a variety of
surface platforms ranging from small patrol craft to
large cruisers. The lion's share of the construction
budget, however, continues to be devoted to subma-
rines (see figures 11-13).
42. The most notable trend over the past decade has
been an evolution toward what Admiral Gorshkov
calls a "balanced fleet"-that is, a navy capable of
fighting at both the nuclear and conventional level as
well as protecting state interests in peacetime. As late
Figure 11
Soviet Naval Spending-
Allocation of Naval Procurement,
by Platform, 1974-83
General purpose
submarines 30
Amphibious ships I -
Aircraft carriers 2-
Auxiliaries 3--- -
Carrier aircraft 4
Minor so lace
combatants 7 Major surface
combatants 10
as the mid-1970s, the Soviet Navy could be described
as a fleet with capabilities maximized for a short,
intense war that rapidly escalates to the use of nuclear
weapons. The small weapons loads and limited endur-
ance of most surface combatants severely limited the
Navy's ability for sustained combat. In the 1970s,
however, new classes of generally larger, more sophis-
ticated ships incorporating greater endurance, larger
weapon loads, and extensive communication and elec-
tronic warfare systems began to enter service, resulting
in enhanced capabilities for sustained conventional
combat and distant-area deployments.
43. In recent years, the salient feature of Soviet
naval program development has been Moscow's em-
phasis on modernizing and upgrading the general
purpose submarine force. Since 1978, general purpose
submarine construction has accounted for over three-
fourths of the number of submarines built and about
60 percent of the total annual tonnage. Five different
classes are now under construction, some units of one
other class are being converted (Y-SSBN to Y-SSN),
and we believe the first units of several additional
classes will be launched within the next few years.
Annual production over the next decade is expected to
average about 10 units, seven or eight of which will be
0 1965
"'these graphics are based on estimated Soviet defense costs in rubles
prepared by the Econometric Analysis Division of CIA's Office of Soviet
Analysis, using the methodology customarily employed in calculating the
costs of Soviet defense activities.
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I t -`f I I'- I I `'I
80
Air Defense
Navy
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Figure 12
Major Soviet Surface Combatants in Productiona
BLK-COM-2
aircraft carrier
A
Kiev class
aircraft carrier
Kirov class
guided-missile cruiser
Slava class
guided-missile cruiser
Yp?m' /
Udaloy class
guided-missile destroyer
Sovremennyy class
guided-missile destroyer
Krivak-III-class
guided-missile frigate
Major
Propulsion
Full-Load
Year
Units in
Armament
Displacement
Operational
Operation
(metric tons)
40-60 aircraft
Combined
65,000-75,000
1990
0
(CTOL F/A, VSTOL
nuclear and
and helicopters)
steam
26-30 ASW helicopters
and VSTOL fighters
SS-N-12 antiship
cruise missile
SA-N-3, SA-N-4 SAMs
SUW-N-1 ASW rocket
(Unit 4 extensively
modified; new SAMs,
radar)
Steam
37,000
1976
3
SS-N-14 ASW missile
SA-N-6 SAM
SS-N-19 antiship
cruise missile
4 helicopters
(Unit 2 extensively
modified)
Combined
nuclear and
steam
28,000
1980
2
SS-N-12
SA-N-4
SA-N-6
130-mm guns
Gas turbine
12,000
1982
1
SS-N-14
Gas turbine
8,000
1981
4
SA-NX-9
2 ASW helicopters
SA-N-7 SAM
Steam
7,300
1981
130-mm guns
SS-N-22 antiship
missile
I helicopter
SA-N-4
Gas turbine
3,900
1984
1
ASW helicopter
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Figure 13
Soviet Submarines in Production
Armament Propul
sion
Submerged
Displacement
(metric tons)
Year
Operational
Units in
Operation
20 SS-N-20 Nuclea
SS-N-15/SS-N-16/
Torpedoes (22)
ssible submarine SAM
P
r
27,000-29,000
1983
3
o
16 SS-NX-23
Torpedoes (16)
24 SS-N-19 Nuclea
r
13,900
1981
2
SS-N-15/SS-N-16/
Torpedoes (16-18)
Mkula-class SSN
Possible SS-NX-21 Nuclea
r
8,250
1985
1
SS-N-15/SS-N-16/
Torpedoes (28)
Possible SS-NX-21 Nuclea
r
9,700
1985
1
SS-N-15/SS-N-16/
Torpedoes (32)
Possible SS-NX-21 Nuclea
r
8,200
1984
1
SS-N- 15/SS-N-16/
Torpedoes (28)
Possible SS-NX-21 Nuclea
r
10,000
1985
1
1_
SS-N-15/SS-N-16/
Torpedoes (16)
Torpedoes (18) Diesel
3,000
1981
6
Possible submarine SAM
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nuclear powered. We believe general purpose subma-
rine construction will continue to receive the Navy's
top priority in resources through the early 1990s. -
44. SSBNs. Beginning in the mid-1960s and continu-
ing through the late 1970s, the Soviets allocated consid-
erable resources to their SSBN program. During this
period, the construction rate of Y- and D-class SSBNs
averaged about five per year and accounted for more
than half of Soviet nuclear submarine construction.
Although construction rates have tapered off and SSBN
force levels have stabilized to accommodate the level
agreed to in the SALT I Protocol of 62 modern units
and 950 launch tubes, the SSBN force still receives
significant emphasis, as evidenced by the construction
of the D-IV and Typhoon classes.
45. The D-class series (the D-IV being the latest
modification) is basically an extension of Y-class SSBN
technology. Fourteen D-Ills and one D-IV have been
built to date. Two more D-IVs are under construction.
A follow-on to the D-III's SS-N-18 SLBM, designated 25X1
SS-NX-23, began at-sea testing in late 1984. The SS-
NX-23 is longer ranged and more accurate than its
predecessor and probably is intended for the D-IVs
and backlit into D-IIIs. System IOC could be achieved
as early as 1986. Since the summer of 1981, D-class
submarines have conducted regular patrols near and in
the marginal polar ice zone and probably have sur-
faced through the ice to launch SS-N-8 SLBMs. The
Typhoon is the USSR's first entirely new SSBN design
since the Y-class was introduced in 1966 (see figure
14). It is significantly quieter than earlier SSBNs and
incorporates ice-penetrating features in its design to
facilitate surfaced launches from within the icepack.
Typhoon may already have conducted under-ice oper-
ations. Three Typhoons have been built to date, and
Figure 14
Typhoon-Class SSBN Operating in the Barents Sea, 1984
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Figure 16
O-Class SSGN
then as older E-IIs and J's are retired. To avoid a
decrement in the overall SSGN force, the first unit of a
new SSGN class displacing about 7,000 tons and armed
with 10 to 12 antiship cruise missiles, probably a
version of the SS-N-22, will probably appear within
the next two years. About 10 could be built by 1995.
We also project six units of an O-class follow-on by the
turn of the century. Quieter than the O-class, these
submarines will be armed with a long-range antiship
cruise missile possibly incorporating some signature
reduction technology. Yet another SSGN, designed to
carry the SS-NX-24 SLCM, probably is being built and
could be launched in 1985. Additionally, the retrofit of
the SS-N-12 antiship cruise missile into some E-IIs will
probably continue. We expect more than half the E-II
force will be so modified by the end of the decade,
and the modified units should remain in service well
into the 1990s.
53. We believe this robust general purpose subma-
rine construction program is being driven primarily by
Moscow's intention to close the technological gap
between Soviet and Western submarines, Western
advances in submarine noise reduction and sensor
improvement have made increasingly uncertain the
capability of much of the current Soviet force to carry
out its wartime missions. Hence, since the introduction
of the V-111-class SSN in 1979, the Soviets have
steadily reduced the technological inferiority of their
newest submarines. Progress in Soviet submarine
quieting, evidenced in the 0- and S-classes, and sonar
a of the Soviet nuclear attack force will be com-
posed of quiet submarines, however, and thus the US
submarine force will still enjoy a significant overall
acoustic advantage in submarine warfare into the mid-
1990s. Other factors behind this Soviet submarine
building program probably include:
- A deficiency in the number of submarines re-
quired to carry out the wide range of missions
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assigned to the force. For example, although the
Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets probably
would use about half of their available diesel-
powered attack submarines to aid in SSBN de-
fense, such units are less capable than SSNs
which can operate in the under-ice environment
increasingly used by Soviet SSBNs.
- Obsolescence, About half the current Soviet force
is aging and increasingly plagued by mainte-
nance problems.
- New mission requirements, represented by the
SLCM-carrying SSNs and SSGNs we project.
- The US naval expansion program, particularly
the proliferation of land attack cruise missile
platforms.
Finally, because of the large numbers we project for
these new Soviet nuclear attack submarines in the
1990s, they should give Moscow additional flexibility
in the employment of its overall submarine force in
critical strategic offensive and defensive wartime
tasks.
54. Naval Aviation. The Soviets have embarked on
a major program to upgrade their sea-based aircraft
capability. The most visible evidence of this is the
probably nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, designed to
handle conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) air-
craft, being constructed at Nikolayev on the Black Sea
(see figure 17). The carrier probably will be 300 to 315
meters long, displace 65,000 to 75,000 tons, and carry
up to 60 aircraft, somewhat smaller than most US
attack carriers. We believe the eventual aircraft com-
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plement will include airborne early warning, fighter,
and attack (or possibly fighter-attack) aircraft. On-
board ASW capability probably will be provided by
helicopters. Sea trials for the carrier are projected in
1988. Initial operational capability could be achieved
in 1990, but full operational capability with a fully
worked up air group is unlikely before the mid-1990s.
As many as five CTOL carriers could be constructed
by the turn of the century.
55. Construction continues at Saki naval airfield in
the Crimea, which we believe will be used in the
development of an aircraft for the new carrier and to
train the initial complement of pilots. To date, the
Soviets have constructed catapults and associated
steam lines, arresting gear, and supports for an aircraft
barricade. Only a steam source appears required to
complete the catapult system at Saki. Additionally, one
fixed ski jump ramp has been erected and a second,
possibly hydraulically powered, variable angle, ski
jump is being built. These ramps may be associated
with the development of an improved vertical/short
takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft to replace
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Forger. A possible prototype, has been seen in
the Moscow area. We expect the Forger follow-on to
have better range, endurance, payload, avionics, and
flight characteristics than Forger. Candidate CTOL
aircraft for the new aircraft carrier have yet to be
positively identified. Since there are no indications of
an entirely new aircraft in development, it is probable
that a modified version of an existing aircraft will be
56. Acquisition of land-based Backfire medium
bombers continues, and the first improved perform-
ance C variants have entered SNA's inventory. The
Backfire force is supplanting the Badger C/G as the
primary airborne strike arm of the Soviet Navy as
evidenced by increased levels of weapons delivery,
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missile loading, mining, and mobility training. We
believe a follow-on aircraft will begin to supplant
Backfire in the mid-1990s. That aircraft probably will
be a new (as yet unseen) aircraft similar in size and
range to Backfire. If a Backfire follow-on (Peripheral
Attack Bomber) is not produced, a naval version of the
AAVGK's Blackjack bomber could enter the SNA
inventory in the mid-1990s.
57. Bear F Mod 3 aircraft production apparently
resumed in mid-1984 after about a two-year hiatus due
to Bear H (ALCM platform) production. This resump-
tion will enable replacement of the Bear F Mod l's and
2's in the Pacific Ocean Fleet. The Bear F Mod 3 is the
Soviet Navy's most capable ASW aircraft and repre-
sents a substantial improvement over the Bear F Mod
l's and 2's. Bear F Mod 3 operations have included
regular deployments to Cuba and occasional forays into
the eastern Pacific. The Soviets apparently believe the
Bear F Mod 3 can be effective in detecting, tracking,
and localizing Western submarines, including SSBNs,
when properly cued.
58. The new Helix helicopter is entering the fleet in
numbers and has operated from Kiev-class guided-
missile helicopter carriers (CVHGs) and Udaloy guid-
ed-missile destroyers (DDGs). Helix A is an ASW
helicopter equipped with dipping sonar, while Helix C
is a search and rescue/utility version. Helix B, not yet
operational, probably is an amphibious assault support
helicopter
59. Principal Surface Combatants. Building pro-
grams for seven classes of major surface combatants
are ongoing. In addition to the new carrier being built
at Nikolayev, fitting out of the fourth and last Kiev-
class CVHG continues, with sea trials expected in
1985. This unit will have improved early warning
radar and close-in air defense systems. A multifaced
planar array radar has been installed which uses
advanced signal-processing and data-handling tech-
niques to detect and track multiple targets, The
SA-NX-9 or "Udaloy SAM" system probably will be
the sole SAM installed. We believe this system will
have a much improved capability to engage low-flying
targets such as cruise missiles. The second unit of the
Kirov-class guided-missile cruiser has entered the or-
der of battle. The SS-N-14 standoff ASW weapon
system is absent from unit two, and the SA-NX-9 has
augmented the SA-N-4 system. A third unit began
construction in 1983. We believe four units will be
built by the early 1990s. The first unit of the Slava-
class guided-missile cruiser is operational, two others
continue to fit out slowly in the Black Sea, and a
fourth may be under construction at Nikolayev. Un-
like the Kiev and Kirov classes, Slava does not incorpo-
rate the Soviets' newest weapons and sensors except for
the SA-N-6 system. These ships may be intended
primarily for operations in the eastern Mediterranean
and the Sea of Japan against Western high-value units.
The Sovremennyy- and Udaloy-class guided-missile
destroyer construction programs remain active. The
7,300-ton Sovremennyy is equipped with the SS-N-22
supersonic, sea-skimming cruise missile, a target-desig-
nating helicopter, and two twin-barreled 130-mm
guns. Four of these antisurface warfare ships are
operational and six others are under construction. The
Udaloy class, slightly larger than Sovremennyy, is
primarily an antisubmarine warfare ship. It is
equipped with Kirov-type bow-mounted and variable-
depth sonars, SS-N-14 standoff ASW weapons, and has
the capability to embark two Helix ASW helicopters.
Udaloy-class production is expected to reach 12 units
before ending in the early 1990s. As noted, most of
these major surface combatants carry antiship missiles
with conventional and nuclear capabilities and ranges
from 100 to 550 kilometers. This surface-to-surface
missile arsenal provides a formidable standoff antisur-
face warfare strike capability for a surface force
traditionally lacking effective air cover. Except for the
1960s design Grisha class, there are no frigates under
construction for the Soviet Navy. Production of a class
based on the standard Krivak hull, designated Krivak
III, is under way at Kerch, but these ships will be KGB
subordinated. The KGB Maritime Border Guard in the 25X1
Pacific received the first of these units in late 1984,
We are not sure why a ship as large as a Krivak is
assigned to the KGB; however, historically, this organi-
zation has had responsibilities in coastal ASW, and the
Krivaks could serve as command ships for such opera-
tions. Their size also allows them to participate in the
protection of the Soviets' 200-nautical-mile expanded
economic zone. Figure 19 shows five of the seven
major surface combatants currently under construc-
tion.
60. Amphibious Forces. Amphibious forces in the
Soviet Navy have lower priority than the submarine,
air, and surface combatant programs. No new large
amphibious ships have been produced since the second
unit of the Ivan Rogov-class LPD was completed in
1982. Construction of LSTs for the Soviet Navy has
continued in Poland, and a new, large LST class may
be planned. The Soviets continue to pursue an active
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program for the development and production of air-
cushion vehicles. At least 70 units are in service and
construction of two distinct classes is continuing. In
addition, the three Kasp-B wing-in-ground vehicles
being developed in the Caspian Sea are probably naval
subordinated. While such units could have a wide
range of maritime applications because of their high
speed and load capabilities
use in amphibious warfare is the most
likely mission. The Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) since
1979 has undergone a substantial reorganization and
an equipment modernization program. All three SNI
regiments in the Western Fleets have expanded to
brigades, and combat support units have been added
to the Pacific Ocean Fleet division. Manning has
increased from 14,000 to about 16,000 troops. The
introduction of artillery and antitank battalions as well
as new equipment such as the T-72 tank and 82-mm
automatic mortar has increased SNI's organic fire-
power. Currently, the Soviet Navy does not have
sufficient lift capacity to accommodate all of the SNI.
The Soviet merchant fleet is, however, the most
militarily adaptable in the world. Combining amphibi-
ous ships with merchant roll-on/roll-off ships (Ro/Ros)
and barge carriers (as has been seen in exercises), the
entire SNI and more than three motorized rifle divi-
sions could theoretically be lifted. Some ground force
units routinely train for amphibious assault landings
or, more commonly, as followup forces
61. Small Combatants and Mine Warfare Units.
The Soviets continue to regard small surface combat-
ants and mine warfare units as important elements of
their Navy. These units are particularly useful in the
confined waters of the Baltic and Black Seas, but they
are also assigned important roles in the echeloned
defense of Soviet territory and SSBN operating areas
in the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet areas. Small
surface combatants now in series production include
the Nanuchka and Tarantul guided-missile patrol
combatants, equipped primarily for antiship opera-
tions, and the Pauk (see figure 20) and Muravey patrol
boats, whose major role is ASW. Mine warfare units in
production include the Sonya-class minesweeper and
the Natya (now built for export only). The Soviets also
are continuing to develop a helicopter mine counter-
measures capability. A large number of these naval
units-in addition to most principal surface combat-
ants and all combat submarines-are also capable of
minelaying.
62. Replenishment Ships. Construction of logistic
support ships is sporadic and also has a lower priority
than that of surface combatants and submarines. The
most important unit built in recent years is the
Berezina, a 37,000-ton multipurpose replenishment
ship completed in 1977. No further units of this class
have been built, nor are any other underway replen-
ishment ships known to be under construction. The
number of naval logistic support ships capable of
transferring strategic and tactical missiles to combat-
ants remains small. The generally low priority accord-
ed replenishment ships probably is linked with several
aspects of Soviet naval practice and doctrine, includ-
ing a heavy reliance on merchant tankers to support
naval operations, the intention to operate many naval
units relatively close to Soviet territory, and a belief
that the war is unlikely to be so prolonged that
replenishment at sea would affect its outcome. The
Soviets also prefer to improve the sustainability of
their naval combatants by increased capacities in the
units themselves rather than by emphasizing the con-
struction of auxiliary vessels. Thus, new-construction
surface combatants such as the Kirov and Slava in-
clude features such as greater endurance (including
nuclear power on the Kirov class) and larger missile
loads.
63. Other Maritime Supporting Forces (Mer-
chant, Fishing, Intelligence, Research, and KGB).
The Soviet Union operates well-developed maritime
supporting forces integral to Moscow's concept of
seapower. These forces have an important role in
furthering Soviet naval objectives through intelligence
collection, logistic support to naval forces, and partici-
pation in naval exercises and operations. Additionally,
their daily presence on all the world's oceans under-
scores Moscow's claim as a major maritime power, and
their generally unrestricted access to world ports
provides another means for spreading Soviet influence.
The Soviet merchant fleet, with over 1,700 vessels, is
among the largest commercial fleets in the world. In
peacetime, the merchant fleet provides logistic support
to deployed naval forces. Replenishment (primarily
fuel) of Soviet naval units deployed out of area is
commonplace, and the use of merchant vessels in this
role permits Moscow to use littoral ports as contingen-
cy logistic bases. Most tankers and cargo ships are not
suitable for operations in contested waters during
combat because they are not fitted for underway
replenishment. Nevertheless, Soviet merchant ships
generally incorporate other design features that en-
hance their military utility. Exercises indicate the
Soviet merchant fleet has an important wartime role as
floating, dispersed logistic bases (including in the
marginal ice zone of the Arctic) and Ro/Ro ships in
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Figure 20
Pauk Patrol Combatant
Unclassified
304677 1-85
support of amphibious operations. Recent evidence
suggests the Soviets have experimented with using
Ro/Ro ships as VTOL aircraft carriers, and we believe
they probably will develop the capability to modify, as
required, at least some Ro/Ros for VTOL operations.
The Soviet fishing fleet is by far the world's largest
with about 3,500 oceangoing ships registering more
than 7.5 million tons. These vessels operate worldwide
and provide ancillary support to the Navy-primarily
intelligence collection. The military adaptability of the
fishing fleet, while less than that of the merchant fleet,
is diverse and includes replenishment and mine war-
fare. The Soviet Navy's intelligence collection ships
(AGIs), some 60 in number, monitor and report pri-
marily on Western naval forces' locations, tactics,
characteristics, and capabilities. AGIs routinely patrol
in the vicinity of Western SSBN bases to provide
information on movements and to collect signals and
acoustic intelligence. In 1980, the initial Balzam-class
unit, the first AGI built from the keel up as an
intelligence collector, was completed. The second is
now operational and a third will be in 1985. The
Soviet research fleet, larger than the rest of the world's
combined, includes over 70 civilian and 100 naval
oceangoing ships, which conduct research of actual or
potential military value. Information so gathered con-
tributes to the Soviets' increasingly precise knowledge
of the oceans and helps enable the Navy make opti-
mum use of its weapons, sensors, and platforms as well
as facilitating naval planning. Four new classes of
research ship have been introduced into the civilian
fleet since 1980, and eight more ships are under
construction or on order. The KGB Maritime Border
Guard maintains a coastal defense force of about 8,000
men and over 250 ships, primarily patrol craft such as
the Grisha-III and Pauk classes. In wartime the KGB
fleet would be subordinate to the Navy and continue
its role of patrolling coastal waters; it can function in
both the ASW and antiship roles, particularly in the
Baltic and Black Seas. The Soviet commitment to
maritime supporting forces is not expected to diminish
during the period of this Estimate.
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fleet
67. We believe Soviet naval exercises will continue
to be conducted within the framework of theater
requirements to enhance and refine combined-arms/
joint operations effectiveness. The maritime emphasis
in these exercises will center on survival of strategic
forces and command, control, and communications
systems through dispersal, deployment, and layered
defense; destruction of hostile forces entering sea
denial areas; and support of ground force operations.
The continued Western threat to Soviet SSBNs will
ensure substantial emphasis on ASW, but the prolifera-
tion of US land attack cruise missiles will cause
modifications in "defense of the homeland" doctrine.
Platforms carrying these missiles probably will be
engaged outside their maximum launch ranges. Future
Soviet naval exercises, therefore, probably will be
conducted at increasingly greater distances from home
waters, especially as new platforms such as the CTOL
carrier; Kirov-class CGNs; O-class SSGNs; and M-, S-,
and Akula-class SSNs are fully integrated into the
K. Command, Control, and Communications
68. The Soviet Navy depends heavily upon a
smoothly functioning, reliable command, control, and
communications system for its effectiveness in combat.
The extent to which the Navy will achieve its com-
mand, control, and communications goals (and, hence,
its combat objectives) will be determined by the
operational skill of Soviet naval commanders as much
as by any combination of technical capabilities and
organizational details. The Soviet style of command
and control is dramatically different from that of the
United States. Russian heritage, Marxist ideology, and
Soviet wartime experience have convinced Moscow's
military planners that they must apply a serious
scientific approach to wartime command, control, and
communications. While the US planner is inclined to
doubt that theory will ever solve a practical military
problem, his Soviet counterpart is taught that there is
nothing more practical than good theory. A recent
series of articles on the theory of the navy, in the
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Soviet journal Morskoy Sbornik, is a good example of
how these convictions affect the professional issues
which any world navy must address. This discussion
included specific treatment of a related theory of
command, control, and communications, itself a prod-
uct of a 20-year national effort to improve the effec-
tiveness of Soviet combat forces by refining their
theoretical understanding of command, control, and
communications
69. Soviet command, control, and communications
theorists currently enjoy a decade lead over the United
States in applying their work to practical problems.
Specifically, they appear to have developed unique
and relatively sophisticated techniques for measuring
the contribution of command, control, and communi-
cations systems in practical military terms. These
techniques significantly enhance the Soviet Navy's
capability to:
- Design more rational command, control, and
communications systems that can function
smoothly in combined-arms operations.
- Use these systems more effectively in combat.
- Plan better countermeasures to US military
systems.
The results are a Soviet naval command, control, and
communications system that, with regard to strategic
forces, includes highly centralized VGK control of the
use of strategic weapon systems (that is, targeting and
launching) and decentralized fleet control of other
aspects of strategic force operations (for example,
allocation of platforms to specific operating areas).
Operations of Soviet general purpose naval forces are
usually under decentralized control by fleet authori-
ties.
70. The decision latitude afforded most Soviet gen-
eral purpose force commanders, combined with the
Soviet penchant for a scientific approach, requires
them to use mathematical models of combat in the
preparation and execution of wartime plans. This is
profoundly different from the US approach to war-
time decisionmaking, which relies heavily upon the
personal attributes of the commander. The efficacy of
the Soviet Navy's approach is limited by a number of
technical factors including the availability of small,
high-speed, large-memory computers and sophisticat-
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71. Potentially, the use of computer-aided decision
support systems offers significant improvements in the
quality and timeliness of naval command and control.
Because these systems are intended to ensure that the
commander considers all relevant factors in reaching
an acceptable decision within the context of the 25X1
overall plan, the net effect could be to improve the
general quality of combat decisions. There also is
reason to expect that these systems will improve the
timeliness with which Soviet naval commanders can
plan combat operations and respond to changes during
the implementation of those plans. Although the Soviet
approach apparently requires the commander to em-
ploy a computer in his combat planning and decision-
making, we cannot predict his behavior using our
limited knowledge of his models.
72. Besides decision quality and timeliness, the
designers of Soviet naval command, control, and com-
munications systems place heavy emphasis upon
achieving their greatest possible "combat stability"-
having high confidence that forces can be controlled
regardless of enemy actions. They expect the United
States to attempt to disrupt their control from the
outset of hostilities through concerted attacks, jam-
ming, and deception efforts. They believe continua-
tion of effective command, control, and communica-
tions, especially relative to their SSBN force, could be
a decisive factor in a general war. Soviet designers
divide combat stability into three broad categories:
survivability, jam resistance, and reliability. Trends in
the Soviet Navy's command, control, and communica-
tions systems reflect years of integrated planning to
achieve gradual improvements in combat stability.
The current structure of this system includes features
such as:
- The continued construction of bunkered com-
mand posts at echelons ranging from the Main
Naval Staff to flotillas.
- Installation of hardened antennas at some of
these sites and construction of new very-low-
frequency (VLF) communications facilities.
- Expansion of the single extremely-low-frequency
(ELF) communications facility.
- The availability of large numbers of high-fre-
quency (HF) communications vans at the nation-
al and fleet levels to augment communications
and support field-deployed command posts.
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Equipping a variety of naval ships with commu-
nications capabilities that provide for flexible
seaborne command and control.
- An increase in the number of naval units capable
of receiving targeting data directly from satel-
lites.
The modification of submarines for communica-
tions relay. Three former G-class ballistic missile
submarines (SSBs
have been modified for such use. Further, we
believe the Soviets are interested in developing
submarine command posts.
The development of airborne naval command
posts. The first such platform, a modified IL-22
Coot, was identified in 1978.
- The use of manned spacecraft for ocean
reconnaissance.
- Continued access to and expanding use of foreign
facilities-in Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, South Ye-
men, Vietnam, Libya, and Syria-for Soviet
naval air reconnaissance operations.
Such improvements have reinforced the Soviets' major
ocean surveillance strength-the ability to detect and
identify surface ships, especially aircraft carriers, in
the maritime approaches to the Soviet Union. Detec-
tion probability against surface ships can still be
reduced by Western cover and deception techniques
such as emission control (EMCON) against SIGINT
collection. Radar satellites are also limited by weather
and by the difficulty of identifying contacts.
a near-real-time imaging satellite
- Development of a modified TU-142 Bear as a
VLF communications relay platform for subma-
rine support.
- Development and use of new and sophisticated
communications that offer increased efficiency,
reliability, and security.
- Improvement in the survivability and capacity of
existing HF installations.
efficiency of command and control
L. Soviet Ocean Surveillance
73. Soviet ocean surveillance is designed to provide
information primarily on the location, identity, and
movements of foreign naval surface forces, especially
those posing a threat to the Soviet homeland or forces.
Its most important elements are land-based SIGINT
stations, space-based ELINT and radar satellites, AGIs,
and reconnaissance aircraft. Ships of the merchant and
fishing fleets also can be tasked to conduct surveil-
lance. Recent improvements include:
- Installation of land-based SIGINT stations in
Vietnam, South Yemen, and Madagascar.
- Construction of the third and probably last unit
of the Soviet Navy's largest and most capable
AGI class, the Balzam. Two units of this class are
in service.
system, w is cou make a significant contribution to
Moscow's ocean surveillance capabilities by monitor-
ing port areas to provide real-time intelligence on the
arrival and departure of Western naval forces. This
new photoreconnaissance system probably will be-
come operational in the late 1980s.
maritime
It
is doubtful that such systems could improve their
satellite surveillance capability much before the early
1990s. In any event, the Soviets' major surveillance
weakness will remain their lack of any significant
capability to detect deployed submarines, especially in
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M. Radioelectronic Combat
74. The operations of Soviet naval forces and the
design of their electronic equipment are deeply influ-
enced by the Soviet concept of radioelectronic combat
(REC). This concept emphasizes the importance of
both denying the enemy the use of his electronic
systems and of protecting Soviet systems from disrup-
tion. The REC concept applies equally to sensors and
to command, control, and communications systems.
This concept has broader application than the Western
notion of electronic warfare (EW) and includes wide-
spread, integrated use of:
- Attacks on enemy electronic emitters.
- Emission control.
- Surprise.
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- Multisensor integration.
- Redundancy of command, control, and com-
munications.
- Active electronic countermeasures (jamming).
- Passive electronic countermeasures (chaff).
- Deception, to include decoys.
The prime focus of this concept is to ensure that Soviet
forces can operate more effectively than their oppo-
nents in a common EW environment. Ideally, this
would be accomplished by ensuring the reliability of
Soviet command, control, and communications sys-
tems exposed to hostile EW through jam proofing and
redundancy of the Soviets' own equipment, together
with offensive EW and covert tactics to degrade
enemy electronic systems. Although the Soviets have
encountered problems with both REC equipment and
training, they regard REC as a fundamental principle
of modern, electronically dependent warfare and vital
to the success of naval operations.
II. FACTORS BEARING ON THE FUTURE
OF THE SOVIET NAVY
A. Political and Economic Changes
75. As Soviet leaders formulate their naval plans for
the period of the late 1980s and 1990s, they face major
political and economic uncertainties. They view the
fluid international situation as requiring a strong naval
posture, both to protect established Soviet interests and
to exploit situations in which the use of naval forces
can increase Soviet influence. Soviet perceptions of
Western and Chinese naval improvements and of
opportunities for the use of naval forces in the Third
World are likely to be among the arguments for
continued qualitative improvement in Soviet maritime
power. On the other hand, problems in the Soviet
economy probably will increase the opportunity costs
associated with defense. To maintain even a modest
rate of economic growth, the Soviets must allocate
more resources to capital investment and improve
labor productivity. The competing demands for eco-
nomic resources could be reflected in domestic politi-
cal tension, particularly during a period of leadership
including major improvements in both strategic and
general purpose naval forces. They probably do not
anticipate any substantial improvement in relations
with China and believe that instability is likely to
persist in border areas such as Iran and Poland. They
probably will continue to view the Third World as
fertile ground for the expansion of Soviet influence
and will align themselves selectively with states and
insurgent movements in that area. On the whole, the
Soviets' expectations regarding international develop-
ments probably will support their traditional belief in
the value of military power as a cornerstone of foreign
policy. Such expectations probably will favor the
continued development of Soviet naval power, for
both its nuclear and conventional wartime value and
for its peacetime role in promoting the image of the
Soviet Union as a global power and projecting power
and influence in distant areas.
77. Economic Environment. Soviet leaders in the
late 1980s and 1990s will probably be operating in an
environment characterized by increasing economic
resource constraints. Poor agricultural performance, a
slower increase in labor productivity, a low rate of
GNP growth, labor shortages, and shortfalls in energy
production will require tougher choices among de-
fense, investment, and consumption. We project about
a 2-percent annual average growth in GNP through
1990. We believe defense spending will grow at about
the same rate over the period, and the defense burden
will remain at about 14 percent of GNP. The regime
can, however, determine to an important degree how
GNP is distributed. The defense share, for instance,
could be varied from 12 to 18 percent, albeit with
serious implications for economic growth in the 1990s.
We believe the Soviets will seek to continue the policy
of the past 20 years of balanced and large-scale force
development. Even so, any competition among the
services for resource allocations probably will increase,
and the flow of at least some new weapons into the
stock of Soviet military equipment probably will not
be as rapid as in previous decades. An accelerated
high-technology arms race with the United States,
such as in space-based strategic defensive systems,
could have severe implications for procurement of
traditional military equipment and for long-term So-
viet economic growth.
transition
76. International Environment. The Soviets view
the international arena as a shifting combination of
threats and opportunities likely to last indefinitely.
They will continue to be concerned about the prospect
that the United States will augment its defense efforts,
78. The Soviet Navy's case for justifying its share of
resource allocation is likely to include arguments based
primarily on its evolving role in a NATO-Warsaw
Pact war-the need to counter a growing Western
naval threat to Pact territory and forces and to
improve the Soviet Navy's capability to strike the
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United States and its allies. Naval programs will also
be supported in terms of their contribution to the
USSR's capability to defend and expand Soviet influ-
ence in the Third World during peacetime and limited
war situations, but any programs that cannot be solidly
defended as essential to the NATO-Pact scenario are
the strategy and programs, underlving the Navy's role
in Soviet military strategy.
B. Key Issues Facing Soviet Naval Planners
(1985-2000)
81. Protection and Use of the SSBN Force. The
ability to deploy and protect the SSBN force in
preparation for and participation in strategic and
theater strike operations will continue to be the single
most important task of the Soviet Navy throughout the
period of this Estimate. Although sea-launched cruise
missiles will expand the number of potential naval
strategic platforms, the bulk of the Soviet Navy's
strategic capabilities will remain in the SSBN force.
We expect this force to be further modernized and
upgraded through the continued production of Ty-
phoon- and D-IV-class units and the introduction of a
new SSBN by the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s,
Typhoon- and D-class SSBNs will have largely re-
placed the Y-class force, resulting in:
- A substantial increase in the number of sea-based
strategic warheads because, for example, the Y-
class SSBN carries only 16 warheads while one
Typhoon carries 20 SS-N-20 missiles, which
likely to be more susceptible to pruning.
79. Domestic Political Environment. It is unlike-
ly that Konstantin Chernenko will be in office beyond
this decade. His departure might result in a struggle
for power that could be reflected in defense policies. It
is not possible to predict the nature and timing of
changes in military policy that could result from
changes in national leadership, particularly because
Chernenko's immediate successor could well be from a
new generation of leaders. Information is sparse con-
cerning the attitude toward defense of the younger,
leading contenders in the succession. Insofar as such
information exists, it suggests they would continue to
place a strong emphasis on military spending. We have
no specific information on their attitude concerning
naval issues. During any succession period, variations
in policy could occur. It would, however, be difficult
to change basic priorities until a new leader could
consolidate power. During the jockeying for power,
the defense effort probably would not be significantly
redirected. Few aspirants for leadership would risk
antagonizing the military or placing themselves in a
position to be accused of selling defense short. Once
power is consolidated, however, severe economic pres-
sures could contribute to sharp changes in the direc-
tion of the Soviet defense effort such as those that took
place under Khrushchev
80. During the same period of transition in the
Soviet political hierarchy there will also be changes in
the leadership of the Soviet Navy. Fleet Admiral
Chernavin, Chief of the Main Naval Staff, seems most
likely to succeed Admiral Gorshkov. Whoever gains
the top post is unlikely to acquire immediately the
high degree of authority that stems from Gorshkov's
continuity as commander of the Soviet Navy since
1956. The views of a new leader, however, are likely
to have been affected by a different operational
background. Although any such officer probably will
have had experience as a fleet commander and will
thereby have become familiar with all types of naval
platforms and operations, it is possible that he will
favor some shifts in emphasis in Soviet naval programs
and policies. It is unlikely, however, that the personal-
ities or individual backgrounds of a new Soviet naval
leadership would cause major near-term changes in
1980s.
- A less vulnerable SSBN force because almost all
units could strike targets in the continental Unit-
ed States from within the Arctic icecap and/or
from home waters and some units-all D-IVs (see
figure 21) and Typhoons-will be quieter.
- A significant increase in strike capability with 25X1
deployment of the SS-NX-23, and later the SS-
NX-23 and SS-N-20 follow-on SLBMs. A small
number of SLBMs could have a hard-target
capability
82. The size of the SSBN force in the 1990s could be
affected by the status of East-West arms limitation
agreements and developments in strategic offensive
and defensive technology. If the SALT I limit of 950
modern submarine launch tubes remains in effect, the
number of SSBNs would decline somewhat in the
1990s because Y-class units would have to be retired
on a more than one-for-one basis to compensate for the
greater number of tubes carried by the Typhoon
SSBNs. In the absence of arms limitation restrictions,
we believe the Soviets would increase the size of the
SSBN force along with increases in the rest of their
strategic arsenal. Whether or not the Soviets continue
to abide by arms control restrictions, evidence on their
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strategic force programs suggests they will not signifi-
cantly alter the proportion of the overall strategic
arsenal assigned to SSBNs in the 1990s. It is possible
the Soviets could put greater reliance on SSBNs,
however, if:
- Their concern for the survivability of silo-based
ICBMs, because of improved capabilities in pro-
gramed US forces, causes them to rely in the
1990s more on mobile forces-mobile ICBMs
and SLBMs-than we anticipate.
- They achieve a better hard-target kill capability
for MIRVed SLBMs than we anticipate, and thus
depend more on SLBMs for targeting ICBM silos.
83. On the other hand, the Soviets would probably
reduce the number of SLBM launchers if arms control
negotiations resulted in a treaty requiring substantial
cuts in the overall strategic arsenal. While we cannot
predict whether the Soviets would reduce their SLBM
force more than their ICBM force, SLBM reductions
could be more severe if:
- The Soviets perceive that US ASW capabilities
are so good that Soviet efforts to protect their
SSBNs cannot keep up with US advances, and
their SSBN force would thus become increasingly
vulnerable.
- The Soviets continue to rely on ICBMs alone for
hard-target capabilities, and thus reduce the
ICBM force proportionally less than other force
elements.
- The Soviets conclude that they can provide
adequate enough strategic force survivability
through their mobile ICBM deployments-possi-
bly augmented with ABM protection-to reduce
their dependence on SSBNs for survivability.F
84. We believe that the Soviets will continue to
regard their SSBN force as vulnerable to enemy ASW
forces through the 1990s. In this time frame, the SSBN
force will consist primarily of older D- and Y-class
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units-in the 1990s, Y- and D-class units will compose
over three-fourths of the force; in 2000, D-class units
will still constitute well over half of the force. The
perceived requirement to protect and support these
SSBNs is unlikely to change. Typhoon and follow-on
SSBNs will be quieter than Y's and D's and thus less
vulnerable to acoustic detection. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that the Soviets will regard them as capable of
ensuring their own survivability. The Soviets probably
foresee no slackening in Western interest in ASW and
expect that the positive effects of their quieting pro-
grams will be at least partially negated by improve-
ments in Western ASW capabilities. Moreover, the
Soviets' concept of SSBN protection is based on their
apparent judgment that all submarines are inherently
vulnerable to ASW prosecution, particularly as they
exit and enter port, if they are not protected by
friendly forces. The Soviets, therefore, do not regard
SSBN vulnerability as a short-term problem that will
disappear as new, quieter classes are introduced. The
requirement to protect and support SSBNs will thus
remain an integral part of the strategic strike mission
and the most important initial wartime task of a large
portion of Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet general
purpose forces through the remainder of the century.
85. We expect that Typhoon-, D-, and the projected
new class SSBNs would be deployed in wartime
primarily in "bastions" close to Soviet territory or
under ice in the Arctic. Other measures to decrease
the vulnerability of Soviet SSBNs could include:
- Further improvement to the ELF communica-
tions system for more reliable communications
with SSBNs at patrol depth or under ice.
- Sheltering of some SSBNs in tunnels.
unnel complexes under construction at
Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet SSBN bases
which could provide concealment and some pro-
tection from nuclear weapons effects for a limit-
ed number of SSBNs, although protected units
could be blocked in the tunnels by accurate
missile strikes.
- Wider deployment of self-defense surface-to-air
missile systems and decoys capable of being
launched from submerged submarines.
- Moderate success in broad area search.
spaceborne radar
y the mid-1990s such a
against encroaching US SSNs operating at shal-
low depths. Extensive success in this or other
ASW programs would have more far-reaching
implications, which are covered later in this
Estimate (see "Alternate Courses of Develop-
ment-An ASW Breakthrough").
- Possible installation of towed passive acoustic
sonars to enhance ASW self-protection on the
newest SSBNs.
86. Although such a move is unlikely, the Soviets
might choose to deploy a few Typhoons to open-ocean
areas in southern latitudes. The Soviets might use such
open-ocean deployments to complicate the US defen-
sive problem by requiring ASW forces to conduct
open-ocean search in vast areas where SOSUS cover-
age is limited. This could increase the survivability of
SSBNs in bastions by dispersing enemy ASW forces.
Notwithstanding this potential benefit, the disadvan-
tages of deploying SSBNs to distant areas would make
this an unlikely option for wartime deployment. In
particular, the transit through potentially enemy-con-
trolled waters argues strongly against Typhoon deploy-
ments to southern latitudes.
87. We do not believe that likely changes in Soviet
SLBM capabilities or in Soviet perceptions of NATO's
ASW capability will lead to significant changes in the
way Soviet SLBMs would be employed in wartime. A
substantial number of SLBMs probably would still be
withheld from the initial strategic nuclear exchange
for subsequent strikes and as a residual force. One
consequence of such a withholding policy is a need to
sustain SSBN protection operations during the nuclear
as well as the conventional phase of hostilities. The
greater endurance features evident in the Soviets' new
general purpose forces will be useful in this task
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88. The Soviets will probably continue to allocate 25X1
SLBMs for initial strike operations against soft targets
in the United States. SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 SLBMs
launched from D-class units and SS-N-20 SLBMs from
Typhoons would assume more of the Soviet Navy's
initial strike role in the near term as Y-class SSBNs are
retired, converted, or dedicated to theater roles. The
Navy's ability to participate in counterforce strikes
will be enhanced considerably if the accuracy of
SLBMs is improved to the point where they would be
effective against hardened targets such as ICBM silos. 25X1
All agencies agree that the Soviets place a high priority
on achieving improved accuracy for the SLBMs 25X1
planned for testing in the middle and late 1980s and 25X1
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residual force.
current guidance systems. The technologies for achiev-
ing this include both radio update and MaRVs that use
terminal guidance. The Soviets will probably adopt
one or possibly both of these concepts, but there are
different interpretations of the available data. One
view " holds that, by the late 1980s, the Soviets will
have the capability to deploy warheads for the SS-N-
20 follow-on which, using an external update to its
guidance system, will achieve an accuracy of about
200 meters. Additionally, in the early 1990s, they
could begin deployment of a MaRV system with a 50-
to 100-meter CEP. Another view 5 holds that the
Soviets are considering the development and deploy-
ment of an accuracy MaRV for future SLBM systems.
The MaRV, if fielded, however, would not be avail-
able for deployment before at least the early 1990s.
Furthermore, the first-generation Soviet MaRV proba-
bly would not achieve the full potential accuracy of 50
to 100 meters. All agencies believe that, despite the
increased utility for initial nuclear strikes that a hard-
target capability could provide, many such SLBMs, if
deployed, would probably still be withheld from the
initial exchanges for use in subsequent strikes or as a
90. The SS-NX-21 is expected to become operation-
al in 1985. It is compatible with standard Soviet 53-cm
torpedo tubes, although some minor modification to
the tube is necessary. We believe the SS-NX-21 is now
capable of carrying only a nuclear warhead and has
some form of position update navigation system, per-
haps a terrain matching system. With this system,
accuracies of 100 to 150 meters are possible. It is
assessed to have a maximum range of about 3,000
target capability
89. Soviet Naval Land Attack Cruise Missiles.
The Soviet Navy is developing two sea-launched land
attack cruise missiles. One, designated SS-NX-21, is
similar to the US Tomahawk, and the other, SS-NX-24,
is a larger, supersonic missile. If deployed with terrain-
matching guidance, both systems could have a hard-
91. We believe that the primary application of the
SS-NX-21 will be as a submarine-launched weapon for
nuclear strikes against theater targets, but it probably
will also be used during initial strikes against targets in
the continental United States. We believe the initial
deployment will be on some V-II1 submarines. A
kilometers at subsonic speeds.
Central Intelligence Agency
The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
Navy
5 7 e o er of this view iic the D?nuty Director for Intelligence,
specially modified V-III has been used for the at-sea
tests of the SS-NX-21. All V-111s are equipped with
suitably advanced communications and navigation
systems but would need additional fire control equip-
ment to support the deployment of the SS-NX-21.
There are currently 20 V-111s in the Soviet operational
inventory. It is possible that a few could begin opera-
tional deployment with the missile in 1985. If the
Soviets do not deploy the SS-NX-21 on V-111s, its
deployment will be extremely limited for several years
because the other candidate SSNs will be available
only in small numbers. Four new classes of SSNs are
candidates to carry the SS-NX-21-the M, S, Akula
and a reconfigured Y-SSBN, designated the Y-class.
92. The Soviets probably have at least two options
for allocating SS-NX-21s to their candidate SSNs. One
way would be to deploy some SLCMs on many such
units. This would not only add considerable flexibility
to the submarine force in carrying out nuclear missions
but also complicate Western defensive problems by
converting an increasing number of Soviet submarines
into land attack platforms. One drawback to this mode
of deployment would be a corresponding reduction in
the number of ASW and ASUW weapons that could
be carried by SLCM-armed submarines, lessening
capabilities in these mission areas. The Soviets, on the
other hand, could deploy large numbers of SS-NX-21s
on a few modern SSNs dedicated to the land attack
mission. This would ease command and control of
these strategic weapons and allow the bulk of the
modern SSNs to remain dedicated to ASW and
ASUW. A major drawback to this option would be the
comparatively reduced strategic strike potential of the
SLCM force. Further, it would create particularly
high-value strategic weapons platforms, which, like
SSBNs, would be considered vulnerable to Western
ASW efforts and-unlike SSNs carrying only a few
SLCMs-would probably require protection by other
forces. We do not know which option the Soviets
might choose in allocating SS-NX-21s to their modern
SSNs. Although the missile could also be installed in
older classes of attack submarines, we believe it less
likely because these submarines are required for im-
portant ASW and ASUW tasks, and some of them-
particularly the diesel-electric units-may not have
sufficient command, control, and communications ca-
pabilities or space for necessary additional fire control
and navigation systems. Finally, it is possible that
patrolling SSBNs might also carry the SS-NX-21 to
increase their strategic strike potential. This would
require, however, a reduction in the number of their
torpedoes.
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93. We do not know whether the Soviets are devel-
oping a version of the SS-NX-21 with a nonnuclear
warhead.
armed with nonnuclear warheads would be useful
against theater targets (such as US SOSUS facilities)
and for attacks on Iceland, the United Kingdom,
Spain, the Philippines, Guam, and other important
targets that would be difficult to reach and costly to
attack with Soviet land-based aircraft. Non-nuclear-
armed SLCMs could be employed on current attack
submarines with fire control system modification.
Such deployment, however, would involve some trade-
offs for general purpose submarines, reducing their
capability to perform traditional antiship and antisub-
marine tasks because:
-Each SS-NX-21 carried will require a one-for-
one reduction in the number of torpedoes
carried.
- In some instances the operating areas required
for land attack cruise missile launches would
differ considerably from those required for opti-
mum ASW and antiship operations.
94. The Soviets may also be considering placing SS-
NX-21s on some of their principal surface combatants.
limited to strikes against theater targets, although
occasional peacetime deployments of SLCM-armed
surface combatants off the US coasts (for example, to
Cuba) might be viewed by the Soviets as having
significant political value.
95. The Soviets are developing a second family of
long-range, land attack naval cruise missiles, designat-
ed SS-NX-24.
IThe SS-
NX-24 probably will first become operational on the
single Y-class SSGN in 1986 and later be deployed on a
new class of SSGN not yet observed. We have no
direct evidence, but believe the mission of the SS-NX-
24 will probably include coverage of both US and
theater targets.
96. One further aspect of Soviet SLCM deployment
will be as an "analogous response" to NATO INF
modernization. In November 1983, then First Secre-
tary Andropov promised "corresponding Soviet sys-
tems will be deployed in ocean areas" and their
"characteristics will be adequate to the threat. "F
the Soviets have maintained-fort e
97. The successful development and deployment of
SLCMs is undoubtedly an item of high interest to the
Soviet national leadership as well as the naval com-
mand. By giving the Soviet Navy yet another family of
within the next two years.
first ticlass patrols in the western Atlantic and
eastern Pacific in addition to operating Y-class patrols
closer to US shores more frequently. These deploy-
ments almost certainly represent part of Moscow's
interim sea-based "analogous response." Such D-class
deployments could not be maintained near US coasts
beyond about early 1987 without adversely affecting
force readiness. Forward deployment of D-class SSBNs
indefinitely also is unlikely because of the increased
vulnerability of the platforms to US ASW forces.
Moreover, warning time is not truly "analogous" since
flight time of SS-N-8 missiles from these SSBNs to US
targets is 14 minutes or more because depressed
trajectory is not an available option. Hence, while the
Soviets could maintain a token D-class presence for
primarily political reasons, we believe these SSBNs
will eventually be withdrawn. We expect the Soviets
will begin deployment of SS-NX-21-equipped SSNs off
US coasts in 1985. Time of flight of the SS-NX-21 to
likely targets closely approximates that of the US
GLCM deployed in Europe. When operational, we
believe the SS-NX-24 also will be deployed near US
coasts augmenting, or perhaps replacing, continuous
SS-NX-21 patrols. Patrols by SLCM submarines could
eventually replace Y-class SSBN patrols in the western
Atlantic and eastern Pacific. In Soviet eyes, such
SLCM patrols could offer the potential dividend of
forcing the United States to invest in an expanded
early warning/air defense system to counter the new
threat. In any event, we believe it highly likely that
SLCM patrols within range of US targets will become
a permanent feature of the Soviet strategic posture
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nuclear-capable land attack systems, SLCMs could
increase the stature and utility of the Navy within the
Soviet military/political establishment and conceiv-
ably result in the provision of additional assets to
protect the SLCM-carrying units. When deployed,
they will add a new dimension to Soviet Navy capabil-
ities and will complicate the defensive tasks of West-
ern forces. At the same time, SLCMs are a weapon
system with significant potential political value to the
Soviet leadership in future arms limitations negotia-
tions. In fact, it is conceivable the Soviets perceive
SLCMs partly as a bargaining chip for US nuclear land
attack cruise missiles. On the other hand, the Soviets
probably recognize that proliferation of SLCMs could
also represent a significant impediment to future
arms-control agreements since it would be virtually
impossible to verify which submarines were strategic
arms carriers.
98. Strategic ASW Against Ballistic and Land
Attack Cruise Missile Submarines. The Soviets rec-
ognize that their strategic ASW task will become not
only more important but increasingly difficult during
the 1980s and 1990s, During this period they almost
certainly expect:
- Longer range SLBMs to enter service in the US,
French, and British Navies. The US/UK Trident
II D-5 (9,000-km range), for example, will greatly
increase the ocean areas from which such missiles
can strike Soviet territory (see figure 22).
- Western SLBMs such as the US Trident II D-5 to
achieve sufficient accuracy for use against hard
targets.
Western general purpose submarines to be armed
with long-range, nuclear land attack cruise mis-
siles such as the US Tomahawk.
- Western programs to improve SSBN survivability
through noise reduction, more reliable communi-
cations, and better sensors.
99. We expect that the Soviets will seek to improve
the ASW capability of their submarines, surface ships,
and aircraft in several ways, especially:
- Improved sonar systems, most notably better
towed passive arrays, low-frequency sonobuoy
systems, and associated signal-processing equip-
ment.
- Increased emphasis on quieting of all attack
submarine classes.
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- Development of airborne and space-based non--
acoustic sensors.
Such efforts probably will significantly improve the
Soviets' capability to conduct ASW in relatively small
areas. They could, therefore, be vitally important for
the protection of Soviet SSBN bastions against intru-
sion by Western SSNs. Such improvements also could
enhance the capability of Soviet SSNs to detect West-
ern SSBNs as they exit their bases or pass through
choke points. As a result, operations against SSBNs-
particularly non-US units-should increase in the late
1980s. We do not believe, however, that such efforts
will substantially improve the Soviet capability to
counter Western SSBNs effectively because none of
them are likely to solve the Soviet Navy's major
problem-the inability to detect and track SSBNs in
open-ocean areas.
100. We estimate the Soviets will continue to seek
such a detection capability through the development
of sensors whose range or search rate can cover broad
ocean areas. We do not believe the Soviets will seek to
deploy fixed passive arrays similar to the US SOSUS
system in Western SSBN operating areas because of
the large number of arrays needed to have a reason-
able chance of detecting SSBNs and a probable re-
quirement for several shore facilities in Third World
countries to serve as initial processing points for the
data. Approaches which the Soviets may explore in
developing such a capability include:
- Aircraft or a space-based system relying on non-
acoustic sensors. To be effective, such a system
would have to be able to cover broad ocean areas
rapidly and to relay detection data both to shore
facilities and ASW platforms. The development
of such a system would be a logical evolution of
current Soviet use of satellites in monitoring the
activity of Western surface units. We are con-
cerned about the energetic Soviet effort to devel-
op a capability to remotely sense submarine-
generated effects from aircraft or spacecraft.
Although we continue to improve our under-
standing of the nature of the overall Soviet effort
there remain important uncertainties about the
full extent and direction of the Soviet program.
Even if the research effort were to yield an
exploitable phenomenon within the next year,
funds for engineering development were imme-
diately allocated, and development proceeded
without difficulty, however, a fully operational
system could not be in place before the mid-
1990s.
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Figure 22
Soviet Navy's View of Potential Search Areas for Its ASW Operations
,,ffonAPHC"A-3
?f OCENAOH "C-3
,,TPAAAEHT I"C-4 ?' 30, TPAH'AEHT ITT -5
This map from the Soviet Navy's professional upper left; Poseidon, upper right; Trident C-4,
journal indicates an awareness of the challenge lower left; Trident D-5, lower right.)
to Soviet ASW caused by the introduction of
Western SLBMs with longer ranges. (Polaris,
M
k
Sb
ors
oy
ornik (Naval Digest)
No. 6, 1981
"The U.S. Navy by the Year 2000"
uture towed arrays, which we project
for initial deployment by the early 1990s, will
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Secret
703910 1-85
- Programs to analyze passively the low-frequency
acoustic spectrum, which probably will enable
the Soviets to detect submarine noise signatures
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have higher search rates from a combination of
longer detection range and higher speed. If
deployed in large numbers, such as on hundreds
of research ships and intelligence collectors, these
arrays could theoretically provide initial detec-
tion of older Western SSBNs. The arrays, how-
ever, probably would not be effective against the
quieter Ohio-class SSBNs, and their capability
against even the older Western SSBNs while
patrolling would be very limited. In addition,
tactical and technical countermeasures could fur-
ther reduce the vulnerability of older classes.
The development and deployment of a low-
frequency, active sonar operating below 1 kHz.
Such a system has the potential for monitoring
large ocean areas and detecting patrolling SSBNs.
Although Soviet research efforts in this area are
extensive, such a system is unlikely to be fielded
before the late 1990s
101. We do not believe there is a realistic possibility
the Soviets can deploy in the 1990s a system that could
reliably detect and track US SSBNs operating in the
open ocean. For this reason, we expect that the Soviet
Navy will continue to focus its anti-SSBN efforts on
attempting to detect and attack Western SSBNs as
they exit their bases or pass through choke points. If,
however, through some technological breakthrough
the Soviets were able to detect Western SSBNs in the
open ocean, they would then have a new problem of
how to attack them. Such attacks might be conducted
by the traditional technique of deploying surface,
submarine, and/or air units to the datum. This ap-
proach would require that the Soviets deploy larger
numbers of general purpose naval units at greater
distances from Soviet territory than is currently antici-
pated. In addition to attack submarines, these opera-
tions might involve surface combatants, including
carrier battle groups. ASW aircraft operating from
Third World airfields could cover at least some SSBN
operating areas if access rights were granted and the
host country were willing to risk becoming a belliger-
ent. Unless there were a substantial increase in the size
of the Soviet Navy or the detection breakthrough
enabled the Soviets to provide SSBNs protection with
fewer general purpose units, such a change in naval
wartime deployments would require sacrificing much
of the capability to protect the SSBN bastions.
102. The Soviet Navy's strategic ASW problem will
be further complicated by the United States' plan to
arm its newest classes of attack submarines-potential-
ly over 70 units-with the land attack version of the
Tomahawk SLCM. Although there are plans for a
conventional variant, the Soviets are undoubtedly most
concerned with the strategic implications of nuclear-
tipped SLCMs. The employment of such SLCMs will
complicate the Soviet ASW problem in two ways:
- The number of US strategic-missile-firing subma-
rines will triple.
- The range of the nuclear Tomahawk will allow
SLCM-armed submarines to strike Soviet territo-
ry from areas where it will be difficult for the
Soviets to concentrate ASW forces.
103. Much of the defensive requirement against
Tomahawk-armed submarines would coincide with
and overlap other ASW efforts against Western units
within Soviet sea control/sea denial areas. To reach
targets deep within the USSR from the Norwegian Sea
or Northwest Pacific, for example, Tomahawk-armed
submarines would have to approach Soviet territory.
In doing so they would pass through at least some of
the echeloned ASW defenses the Soviets would estab-
lish to protect their SSBNs. Some targets near the
Soviet coast, on the other hand, could be reached by
SLCMs fired from the outer edges of the Northern and
Pacific Ocean Fleets' defensive thresholds. SLCM-
armed submarines operating in these areas would be
able to avoid the bulk of the Soviet ASW defenses in
the Norwegian Sea and Pacific Ocean.
104. One option available to the Soviets to counter
this threat could be to extend the area of sea denial
operations, possibly out to about 3,000 kilometers. The
Soviets probably believe that a capability to conduct
more extended sea denial will largely depend on their
ability to contest the air superiority and ASW capabili-
ty afforded NATO by carrier and land-based aircraft
in areas such as the G-I-UK gap. They probably also
believe that their ability to contest such airspace will
necessitate operations by future surface combatant
task groups, including CTOL aircraft carriers, at
greater ranges from Soviet territory than currently
planned. Any extension of the area for sea denial
operations therefore will probably be accompanied by
a corresponding extension of initial sea control areas-
possibly as far as 2,000 kilometers. This would be more
feasible for the Northern Fleet than for the Pacific
Ocean Fleet. Given improved air cover from carrier-
based aircraft in the 1990s and/or from captured
airfields in Norway, the Northern Fleet could shift the
focus of its ASW efforts away from the SSBN bastions
in Arctic waters southward to the G-I-UK gap. Control
of the gap would both significantly increase Soviet
capabilities to contest Western use of the Norwegian
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Figure 23
Soviet View of Tomahawk Threat
GKakk"
aeAUe=
IQTOKronbM
,p b s
-
n off A.MCTepA,ar.a ).t~ 0 . - .t I
epnHH~
6pncce bo
h! a,4 p K A
0
, / SW,. F , J,?
ti. z
4
/ (BeHao~
` ~A. f.' p n e w T {/
f'" a' 6yzapc00T
J ti?M
~ ~ ' ben paA1~ Y J/r
// i' ba
/ l
d
L',apAN>ru
I
We believe this illustration, although published in
an unclassified Soviet naval journal, accurately
reflects Soviet concern regarding potential use and
employment areas for the Tomahawk. Soviet caption:
This is how NATO strategists propose using Toma-
Secret
703911 1-85
Sea as an SLCM launch area and help protect North-
ern Fleet SSBNs from enemy ASW forces. Access to
the Northwest Pacific Basin, on the other hand, is not
restricted by any choke points that would facilitate a
more forward-oriented ASW strategy. The Soviets,
however, probably do not believe that the threat from
SLCMs would be as great in the Pacific as in the
Norwegian Sea. They probably expect that the major-
ity of US SLCM-armed submarines would be deployed
in European waters from which the more numerous
military and economic targets located in the Western
USSR could be engaged.
Bapwaea f l /
- T-
MUM
M=O-P-E
hawk: from surface ships (1), aircraft (2),submarines
(3), and ground launchers (4).
Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest)
No. 5, 1980
"Attention: Tomahawk!"
Capt. First Rank B. Rodionov
105. The Soviets believe submarine-launched cruise
missiles can also reach targets in the western USSR
when fired from the central Mediterranean and North
Seas, areas where the Soviets plan sea denial operations
against carrier battle groups but probably only limited
ASW efforts (see figure 23). Countering SLCM subma-
rines in these areas could pose some tough choices for
the Soviets. Any additional submarines deployed to
these areas would lessen force allocations for other
missions such as SSBN protection, prosecution of West-
ern SSBNs, and interdiction of Western sea lines of
communication. If the Soviets do opt for increased
ASW efforts in the North and Mediterranean Seas,
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they probably would allocate more diesel submarines
for barrier patrols in the northern entrance to the
North Sea and in the Mediterranean choke points such
as the Straits of Gibraltar and Sicily
106. The Soviets could ultimately decide that the
required allocation of resources and the opportunity
costs involved in countering SLCM-armed submarines
in their patrol areas were too costly. Given their
limited ASW detection capabilities, moreover, the
Soviets probably would be pessimistic about their
ability to counter SLCM-armed submarines in areas
such as the central Mediterranean and the North Sea,
even if substantial forces were deployed there. An
alternate strategy might limit efforts specifically
aimed at the cruise missile submarine to deploying a
few attack submarines in the approaches to Western
attack submarine bases-efforts similar to the Soviets'
anti-SSBN tactics. Major emphasis would then be
placed on countering the missiles themselves through a
combination of improved land-based air defense sys-
tems.
107. Antisurfaee Warfare (ASUW). Although the
Soviets view Western submarines as the major naval
threat to their territory and SSBN havens, their per-
ception of the threat from Western surface forces and
the importance they attach to ASUW are likely to
increase during the next two decades. Carrier battle
groups will continue to be perceived as major threats
to Soviet and Warsaw Pact territory, SSBN havens,
and operations in the land TVDs. Concern with carrier
battle groups will remain high because of:
- Soviet expectations that the number of carriers in
NATO will at least remain constant and probably
increase as the result of US plans to expand to a
15-battle-group navy; the reemergence of sea-
based fixed-wing aviation in the Royal Navy; and
French, Italian, and Spanish carrier construction
programs.
- Expected improvements in the offensive capabil-
ity of carriers by equipping their aircraft with
cruise missiles such as Tomahawk.
- Improvements in the ability of carrier battle
groups to defend themselves against attack
through such programs as the AEGIS air defense
system
108. Further, the Soviets will no longer be able to
concentrate on aircraft carriers as the only Western
surface units posing a significant threat to their terri-
tory. The Soviets are fully aware of US plans to equip
major combatants with the land attack version of the
Tomahawk missile. They realize that this would result
in a substantial increase in the number of Western
surface units capable of striking the USSR with nucle-
ar weapons. This would greatly complicate their stra-
tegic defensive task because any major surface com-
batant would have to be considered a potential nuclear
threat.
109. To meet this threat the Soviet Navy will
continue efforts to improve its ASUW capabilities. Of
particular importance will be:
- Construction of general purpose submarines-
such as the 0-class SSGN and M-, S-, and Akula-
class SSNs-equipped with advanced antiship
torpedoes and cruise missiles. Such construction
is likely to continue into the 1990s.
- Construction of surface combatants equipped
with antiship missiles. The number of major
surface combatants armed with such missiles is
likely to increase substantially as a result of
current construction programs (Kirov, Kiev,
Slava, Sovremennyy) and their projected follow-
ons. There is evidence, moreover, that the SS-N-
14 ASW cruise missile has a secondary antiship
capability.
- Continued production of Backfire bombers for
SNA, enough to equip a projected 10 regiments
by the early 1990s. A probable new bomber with
performance characteristics similar to Backfire
could be introduced in the 1990s to replace the
Navy's aging Blinders and Badgers. Alternative-
ly, Blackjack-a new strategic bomber in devel-
opment-could be introduced into SNA by the
mid-1990s if the Soviets do not produce the
Backfire follow-on. With a combat radius of up
to 4,000 nm, Blackjack is well suited to deliver
large-scale cruise missile attacks at the outer edge
of the expanded sea denial areas we project.
Aircraft introduced in the 1990s are also likely to
incorporate some low observable (stealth) tech-
nology to make them less susceptible to
detection.
- Deployment of more capable sea-based fighter-
bombers, both VSTOL aircraft operating from
Kiev-class ships and CTOL aircraft operating
from a new class of carrier.
The introduction of these new platforms will greatly
increase the number of missiles available for attack
and will coincide with other efforts to improve ASUW
capability. In particular:
- Improvements are likely in antiship missiles,
especially in target discrimination capability, sur-
vivability, and reaction times. For example, the
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SS-N-22-now operational on Sovremennyy- and
Tarantul-class units-is much faster (Mach 2-J
and can approach the target at lower altitudes
than such currently operational
missiles as the SS-N-2 and SS-N-9. Further, an
AS-4 variant, which cruises at about 30-km alti-
tude, above current US fleet defenses, could
eventually be operationally deployed on Backfire
and Bear G bombers.
- The capability of the radar ocean reconnaissance
satellite (RORSAT) to detect ships and distinguish
target size probably will be enhanced. Detection
will be improved by reducing the effects of sea
clutter and rain.
- Evolutionary improvements are likely in the
electronic intelligence ocean reconnaissance sat-
ellite (EORSAT) directed toward increased lon-
gevity, enhanced probability of detection, and
continuous targeting capability through higher
orbits, better sensors, and a wider field of view.
We expect the Soviets will continue to convert
older submarines and equip new surface and
submarine units with the capability to use real-
time EORSAT (and RORSAT) data to support
antiship cruise missile systems.
- Improvements in sensor systems and the expect-
ed development of large, permanently manned
space stations will increase the scope and effec-
tiveness of the Soviet manned space program for
ocean surveillance,
- The development of a synthetic aperture radar
surveillance satellite to provide improved all-
weather, worldwide naval surface locating data is
now probable during the latter period of this
Estimate.
- AAVGK's role in maritime strike operations
probably will increase commensurate with the
increase in threat from Western naval forces.
New AAVGK long-range bombers, possibly in-
cluding the Bear H ALCM carrier and a version
of the Blackjack, probably will be assigned a
maritime strike role, as has the Bear G. These
bombers could attack Western surface targets in
the central Atlantic from Soviet territory.
110. The execution of the ASUW task probably will
continue to be primarily concentrated in areas such as
the Norwegian and North Seas, the eastern Mediterra-
nean, and the northwestern Pacific-the principal
areas from which carrier aircraft and sea-based cruise
missiles could be launched against Soviet territory.
Coordination of Soviet submarine and surface ship
operations with those of land-based medium bombers 25X1
is improved by concentrating ASUW in these areas. 25X1
Soviet ASUW doctrine is likely to continue its empha-
sis on "first salvo" attacks-tracking Western surface
units during the prewar period of tensions and attack-
ing the most important of them with maximum force
at the outset of hostilities. The Soviets undoubtedly
recognize that this goal will become more difficult to
achieve as the number of important targets grows with
the introduction of nuclear Tomahawk, increases in
the number of NATO surface battle groups, and the
wide deployment of improved missile defensive sys-
tems such as AEGIS. The proliferation of high-value
targets is likely to contribute to a greater emphasis on
ASUW operations of extended duration (days and
weeks rather than minutes and hours). Indications of
such emphasis are already visible in exercises and in
weapons-loading features of new units.
111. Although most ASUW operations will be con-
centrated relatively close to Soviet territory, the Sovi-
ets probably will seek in the mid-1980s to extend the
outer edge of the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet
sea denial area somewhat beyond the current thresh-
old of roughly 2,000 kilometers to counter the long
range of Western SLCMs. Some attacks at much
greater distances from Soviet territory are possible.
Among the options they might find attractive for such
operations are the deployment of missile-equipped
aircraft to bases outside the USSR-if the host country
were willing to risk becoming a belligerent-and
equipping SNA with long-range bombers. The Soviets
could also choose to employ the carrier force we
project for the late 1990s against Western aircraft
carriers operating beyond Northern and Pacific Ocean
Fleet sea denial areas. We believe this would be an
unlikely option, however, since these few Soviet carri-
ers would probably be deemed more useful and
survivable in a multipurpose role within the expanded
sea control/denial areas. While the Soviets probably
do not consider the ASUW problem to be as difficult
as ASW, they apparently expect it to remain a major
and growing challenge through the 1990s.
112. Antiair Warfare (AAW) at Sea. The Soviets
recognize that the ability of their surface ships to
conduct ASW and ASUW operations and project
power beyond the range of land-based air cover is
heavily dependent on their capability to defend them-
selves against air attack. The successful use of sea-
skimming antiship missiles in the Falklands crisis
probably has increased the already evident Soviet
concern over the proliferation of these weapons in
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Western navies. The Soviets also realize that Western
use of radar-cross-section reduction techniques will
further complicate defense efforts against cruise mis-
siles. Historically, the Soviets' air defense efforts were
characterized by own-ship defense-in-depth with mul-
tiple weapon systems of various ranges. Recent Gatling
and dual-purpose gun systems and the SA-N-7 and SA-
NX-9 SAM systems continue this philosophy.
113. The SA-N-6 SAM system being deployed on
cruisers of the Kirov and Slava classes, however, is a
long-range system that could provide the Soviets their
first genuine area air defense capability against air-
craft. The system design includes a pulse-Doppler fire
control radar and a digital fire control computer
which should permit short reaction times, good target
detection and tracking, and the capability to engage
six targets simultaneously. The SA-N-6 also is designed
to engage low-altitude, low-radar-cross-section targets,
expected to be less effective, at least in low-altitude,
low-radar-cross-section engagements, than older SAM
systems. We nonetheless expect that the SA-N-6 or
follow-on area air defense weapons will be deployed
on all future cruisers.
114. The Soviets also probably will improve their
defensive systems' signal-processing capability and
will continue to improve radar performance. Other
likely developments in naval air defense will include
improvements in handling multiple targets, better low-
altitude fuzing and target detection in a sea clutter
environment, and additional electronic countermeas-
ures (ECM) and electronic counter-countermeasures
(ECCM).
115. In addition to continued work in gun and
missile technology, the Soviets are exploring the poten-
tial value of laser air defense weapons. At least two
such systems likely are in development at the Sarysha-
gan Missile Test Center. It is possible that a shipborne
laser weapon, perhaps a low-energy system designed
to counter electro-optical systems, will be installed on
at least one new ship class by the end of the decade.
We also believe a naval high-energy laser weapon may
be operational by the early-to-mid-1990s. If laser
weapons prove practical in a naval environment, we
expect them to be deployed on many Soviet principal
surface combatants by the year 2000, particularly for
close-in and low-level defense against cruise missiles.
116. Soviet fleet air defense capability will be
further enhanced by the introduction of improved
VSTOL aircraft as well as high-performance CTOL
fighters on the projected new class of aircraft carrier.
The overall effectiveness of the Soviets' efforts to
protect their surface fleet against air attack, however,
will depend on their ability to integrate the operations
of carrier- and land-based aircraft with shipborne
SAM, gun, and laser systems. To this end, the Soviets
have developed an airborne warning and control
system (AWACS)-Mainstay-to coordinate their air
defense assets. We expect up to 60 Mainstay in the
Soviet Air Force inventory by the mid-1990s. Main-
stay's radar system is much improved over that in the
earlier TU-126 Moss airborne early warning (AEW)
tion with new fighter/ interceptors such as Foxhound,
Mainstay could support air defense operations at
greater distances from the Soviet periphery. We ex-
pect that future Soviet carrier-based aircraft will be
made compatible with the AWACS. A carrier-based
AEW aircraft is also expected but no candidate is yet
evident; the Soviets may initially opt to use helicopters
for this mission. We believe the AWACS, AEW, and
most new fighter aircraft will be capable of exchang-
ing information with shipboard air defense command-
ers via digital links. The Round House and Top Knot
data link systems-deployed on Kiev-, Kirov-, and
Udaloy-class units-probably provide the capability to
establish data exchange and communications/naviga-
tion/identification (CNI) nets for a more integrated
and effective air warfare system. Because of lack of
experience in managing complex fleet air defense
operations, however, we believe overall Soviet fleet
AAW effectiveness will improve more slowly than the
individual components during the period of this Esti-
mate and, in the face of improved Western systems
and tactics, is likely to remain a deficiency through
this century.
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117. Moreover, in our judgment, the Navy will not
be able to perform effectively in a national air defense
or joint anti-ALCM system much beyond Soviet coast-
al waters through the 1990s, Competing mission re-
quirements, inadequate training, and underdeveloped
joint command structures probably will limit the Navy
primarily to such measures as deploying radar picket
and possibly command, control, and communications
ships along certain ALCM approach routes to augment
AEW aircraft in providing early warning to shore-
based air defense forces
118. Air Power at Sea. A major change in the
Soviet Navy in the next 10 to 20 years probably will be
the introduction of its first Western-style aircraft
carriers-that is, ships equipped with catapults and
arresting gear and thereby capable of handling CTOL
high-performance aircraft. We expect that the first of
these ships, probably a 65,000- to 75,000-ton unit with
nuclear propulsion, will become operational by about
1990 and that four or five could be built by the end of
the century. Each ship probably could carry an air
group of up to 60 aircraft. We estimate that this air
group would consist of about 35 to 45 fighter-attack;
two to four AEW; and 10 to 12 ASW, reconnaissance,
and utility aircraft.
119. Although aircraft carriers will enhance Soviet
capabilities to project power and influence in distant
areas, we believe their primary mission will be to help
expand the area of Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet
wartime sea control operations. During a general war,
Soviet aircraft carrier operations probably will focus
initially on providing air defense for surface groups
supporting Soviet SSBNs and defending the sea ap-
proaches to the USSR in the Norwegian Sea and
Northwest Pacific Basin. The air cover provided by
carrier-based fighters probably will allow the Soviets
to operate surface units at greater distances from Pact
territory than currently envisioned. Other tasks of
Soviet carrier aircraft could include:
- Conducting ASW with embarked helicopters.
- Attacking Western surface units, especially those
armed with SLCMs.
- Providing air cover for SSNs in sea denial areas.
- Escorting land-based reconnaissance, strike, and
ASW aircraft during part of their operations.
- Attacking Eurasian land bases and facilities.
- Supporting ground force operations.
- Attacking ALCM carriers along certain approach
routes.
- Attacking Western aerial and surface resupply
efforts within Soviet sea control/denial areas.
In conducting such operations, Soviet carriers will
operate with other surface units and possibly subma-
rines and land-based aircraft. Their lack of experience
in such complex operations, however, suggests that it
will be around 1995 before a reasonable standard of
operational proficiency can be attained
120. Although the construction of a new class of
aircraft carrier is the policy of the present Soviet
political and naval leadership, it is the type of program
that could suffer from radical policy shifts or severe
economic problems. The enormous costs involved, not
only for the ships themselves but for the air group,
supporting vessels, and shore-based infrastructure,
could make the program vulnerable to cancellation or
delay if the Politburo seeks to reduce or reorder the
burden of defense expenditures
121. Regardless of Soviet decisions concerning
CTOL aircraft carriers, the Soviet Navy probably will
introduce improvements in its V/STOL aircraft for
the four Kiev-class ships and the new carrier now
under construction. Such improvements are likely to
involve a shipboard ramp for assisted takeoffs and a 25X1
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ance, speed, payload, and air defense capability. 25X1
122. Surveillance and Targeting Integration.
We have already discussed under ASW, ASUW, and
AAW probable Soviet advances in detection and track-
ing by improvements in sonar; AWACS; and manned,
radar, optical, and ELINT satellites. By the year 2000,
these instruments could provide the Soviets with a
broad ocean-area capability to:
- Differentiate more accurately among small, me-
dium, and large surface ships in moderate sea
states and weather conditions.
- Provide accurate locating information and hull-
to-emitter correlation on most unit communica-
tions and radar emissions.
marines near the surface.
123. During the period of this Estimate, the Soviets
will also improve their capability to integrate this
sensor information and provide data in near-real time
to selected attacking platforms through their com-
mand, control, and communications systems. Provision
of this surveillance information will be enhanced by
systems of advanced satellites providing worldwide,
rapid, secure, two-way data link communications and
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large military space stations, possibly in high orbit over
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Soviet Navy will
also have at least two, and perhaps as many as six,
large new ships that may be used in wartime for
processing and disseminating battle information; how-
ever, we are uncertain of precisely how these ships will
be integrated into the Soviet battle management
scheme.
124. These advances probably will provide the So-
viets with a capability to maintain a real-time plot in
large selected ocean areas of nearly all surface units
that continually emit and of most large units practic-
ing emission control. This plot could be degraded,
perhaps substantially, by such factors as bad weather,
high seas, crowded oceans, sophisticated deceptive
emission practices, and other potential countermeas-
ures, including direct attack. We do not anticipate that
atmospheric and space sensor and communications
advances will appreciably enhance Soviet capability to
surveil subsurface targets.
125. Moreover, despite these projected improve-
ments in Soviet maritime surveillance and targeting
capability, use of long-range cruise missiles against
selected surface targets will continue to be hampered
by:
- Number and insufficient geographic spread of
platforms.
- Missile range-though maximum ranges could be
650 to 850 kilometers in the late 1990s.
-- Probable lack of target position update during
missile flight.
Hence, optimum wartime tactical exploitation of the
information provided by surveillance systems on sur-
face targets-particularly those beyond about 2,000
kilometers-probably would be difficult to achieve.
There is little doubt, however, that SSBN protection
against surface and air intruders will be substantially
enhanced by more capable Soviet surveillance and
attack platforms available in the 1990s.
126. Protection of State Interests in Peacetime
and Limited War. Although the primary emphasis in
Soviet naval developments will continue to be on
improving capabilities in a war with NATO, Soviet
writings, construction programs, and exercises indicate
a recognition of the value of naval forces in situations
short of general war. Programs currently identified or
projected by the US Intelligence Community will
result by the mid-to-late 1990s in substantial improve-
ments in the Soviet Navy's capability to project power
and influence in distant areas.
127. The most important improvement will stem
from the construction of aircraft carriers capable of
handling high-performance aircraft. The lack of ade-
quate air support has been the major operational
weakness of Soviet naval forces in distant areas. A task
force of two carriers with a total of some 120 aircraft
would eliminate much of this weakness and should
provide the basis for establishing air superiority in
many Third World situations in which the United
States did not become involved. Soviet writings con-
cerning the use of carriers emphasize their value in
show-the-flag and limited-war situations.
128. Gradual improvements anticipated in amphib-
ious forces also will enhance Soviet capability to
project power in distant areas. We expect continued
modest acquisition of naval amphibious ships, includ-
ing additional LPDs and, perhaps, the first LPHs, as
well as LSTs and LSMs. The Soviets also will continue
exploring the use of advanced cargo ships such as roll-
on/roll-off and oceangoing barge carrier (LASH) ships
in amphibious landings. The Soviet Naval Infantry
(now at a strength of about 16,000) will grow, perhaps
to some 22,000 to 26,000 men. A new Northern Fleet
SNI facility was identified east of Murmansk in Sep-
tember 1984. We believe this will be the home of the
second Northern Fleet SNI brigade. Additional am-
phibious assault forces will be available in all fleet
areas from ground forces units trained in such opera-
tions.
129. We do not believe that these estimated im-
provements will be sufficient to enable the Soviets to
conduct amphibious operations in distant areas during
a war with NATO. Such wartime operations will
continue to emphasize areas on the Soviet periphery.
Nor will such improvements make it practical to
conduct landings in situations in which Western or
even moderately strong indigenous forces would be in
opposition. These improvements, however, will pro-
vide Soviet leaders with a much-improved capability
to overcome the opposition that could be offered by
most Third World countries, especially those that were
intrinsically weak or beset by internal divisions. Such
improvements could also be used to support client
states involved in military operations against other
states or internal opponents.
130. The amount of time spent by Soviet general
purpose units outside home waters is likely to increase
only slightly in the late 1980s and 1990s. Constraints
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on a major increase in regular out-of-area deployments
probably will continue to include:
-The need to retain most naval forces close to
Soviet home waters and in a readiness condition
for rapid deployment to critical wartime operat-
ing areas such as the Norwegian Sea.
- The fuel and maintenance costs of out-of-area
deployments, even at the low levels of activity
typical of Soviet units.
- A recognition by the Soviets that the usefulness of
deployed naval forces is not necessarily a direct
correlation of size, but rather mainly involves
military capability and the political value of any
naval presence as a signal of Soviet interest in an
area.
Changes in out-of-area deployments are likely to be
most significant in terms of the capabilities of the units
involved (new aircraft carriers, Ivan Rogovs, Kirovs,
and so forth) and the areas in which they will operate.
Some areas where the Soviets maintain a permanent
naval presence (Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and
South China Seas, and West Africa) are likely to
undergo further gradual expansion in response to
political imperatives, primarily a desire to support the
maintenance of established "socialist" regimes and the
creation of new ones. To support such operations, the
Soviets will continue their attempts to achieve in-
creased access to foreign facilities.
131. In addition to supporting peacetime naval
operations, the Soviets probably would seek to use
facilities in Third World countries in both a war
against NATO and other lesser conflicts. The most
likely role of such facilities in wartime would be as
positions from which Western force movements can be
monitored during the period of tension before the
outbreak of war. We therefore expect to see continued
efforts to obtain the use of airfields to support re-
connaissance flights, as well as the establishment of
SIGINT, communications, and possibly submarine-
tracking facilities. The Soviets probably will continue
to regard the use, especially the sustained use, of
facilities in Third World countries in wartime as of
questionable value because of their vulnerability and
the possible unwillingness of host governments to risk
becoming belligerents. The advantages to the Soviet
Navy, however, of using such facilities are potentially
substantial, particularly in operations against SSBNs
and carrier battle groups at the outset of hostilities. We
think it likely, therefore, that efforts will be made to
develop relations with Third World countries that will
make wartime use of facilities, especially by aircraft, a
more realistic possibility. The Soviets' major base at
Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnam, is a prime example of such a
facility.7
III. PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET NAVY
132. Our examination of the current role of the
Navy in Soviet military strategy, naval R&D and
construction programs, and the key issues facing Soviet
planners enables us to make a judgment as to the most
likely course of development for the Navy over the
remainder of this century. We recognize, however,
that an estimate covering such a long period of
political, economic, and technological changes must be
viewed with caution. An examination of some less
likely but still feasible courses of development is
therefore included as well. These alternative courses of
development are not meant to be exhaustive but rather
to indicate some of the types of variables that could
change our baseline estimate.
133. We believe that our assessment of the wartime
strategy of the Soviet Navy in NIE 11-15-82 remains
valid. We also continue to believe that this strategy
will be essentially unchanged through the turn of the
century in terms of the major tasks and the composi-
tion of forces to carry out those tasks in the initial
stages of a general war with NATO. We still expect
that the requirement to counter advances in Western
naval offensive capabilities, however, will drive the
Soviets to expand the areas in which their forces would
be deployed for initial sea control/sea denial opera-
tions. They will continue to introduce new weapon
platforms and systems into the Navy and seek to
develop improved war-fighting capabilities for the full
range of anticipated general and limited war situa-
tions. We believe, however, that these changes will
occur within the framework of the Soviets' present
strategy because they probably will continue to view it
as offering the best chance of accomplishing their vital
wartime tasks
134. The single most important task of the Navy
will be to participate in strategic strike, primarily
using SLBMs and probably SLCMs. The importance of
For a full discussion of Soviet use of military facilities overseas
see NIE 11-6-84, Soviet Global Military Reach, November 1984.7
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sea-based nuclear strike assets within the USSR's over-
all military strategy could grow because:
- The number of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads
assigned to SSBNs will increase as the force is
increasingly armed with MIRVed SLBMs.
- Some Soviet SLBMs in the 1990s could be suffi-
ciently accurate to be used effectively against
hardened targets.
- Soviet silo-based strategic systems may become
more vulnerable.
- New sea-launched, long-range nuclear land at-
tack cruise missiles will enhance Soviet offensive
strike capabilities.
- The ASW capabilities of the new classes of attack
submarines now entering the fleet-along with
other measures to protect SSBNs-could enhance
the perceived survivability of the SSBN force.
The combination of increased SLBM accuracy, SSBN
survivability, SLCM deployment, and fixed ICBM
vulnerability will provide powerful incentives for the
Soviet Union to continue the modernization of its
strategic strike capability.
135. We nonetheless believe the Soviets will contin-
ue to regard their SSBNs as vulnerable to enemy ASW
forces throughout the period of this Estimate. Protec-
tion and support for Soviet SSBNs, therefore, is likely
to remain the most important consideration in the
initial wartime deployment of a large portion of
general purpose naval forces of the Northern and
Pacific Ocean Fleets. Pacific Ocean Fleet forces would
be concentrated in the areas of the Northwest Pacific
Basin, the Sea of Japan, and the Sea of Okhotsk. The
Northern Fleet would deploy the bulk of its forces to
the Barents, Greenland, and northern Norwegian Seas,
although the outer edge of what we describe as the
Northern Fleet sea control area probably will expand
to include the southern Norwegian Sea, primarily to
facilitate an extension of sea denial operations beyond
the G-I-UK gap. This would be intended principally to
counter Western SLCM-armed ships and submarines,
but would also support other operations in the Atlantic
(see figure 24). Pacific Ocean Fleet sea control opera-
tions would also expand somewhat (see figure 25). The
major mission of Soviet CTOL aircraft carriers proba-
bly will be to assist in expanding these areas. Concen-
trating forces there will continue to appeal to the
Soviets because it will enhance integration of their
submarine and surface units with the land-based air
support which, even after the introduction of a few
aircraft carriers, will continue to constitute the bulk of
the forces of SNA.
136. The Soviets probably will continue to view
Western SSNs as the primary threat to their SSBN
force and will conclude that the best chance of
detecting such SSNs lies in waiting for them to enter
relatively confined areas where the Soviets will have a
concentration of forces and where their short-range
sensors can be used to best advantage. Expected
improvements in Soviet ASW platforms, sonars, and
tactics (especially in submarines), and fixed-sensor
technology, along with increased use of under-ice
patrols probably will improve-perhaps substantial-
ly-the Soviet Navy's ability to protect its SSBNs.
These developments could enable the Soviets by the
mid-1990s to reduce somewhat the number of SSNs
dedicated to protecting the SSBN force. Any such
submarines freed from this mission would probably be
used primarily to increase the density of ASW barriers
in the forward areas of expanded sea denial zones
and/or as SLCM carriers. Some could be assigned anti-
SSBN tasks. A few older SSNs could have an anti-
SLOC role. We doubt, however, that the Soviets will
view such improvements as sufficient to allow a
significantly lessened initial commitment of forces for
SSBN protection
137. New long-range land attack cruise missiles will
markedly enhance the Soviets' sea-based offensive
strike capabilities. We expect to see them deployed
primarily as part of the weapons load on Moscow's
newest SSNs and on a limited number of dedicated
SSGNs beginning in the latter 1980s. They will proba-
bly have primarily Eurasian theater strike responsibil-
ities but would be employed also against US targets.
Since operating areas required for theater SLCM
launches would in some instances differ appreciably
from those required for optimum defensive tasks,
SLCM-armed SSNs would probably operate through-
out the Soviets' expanded sea control/sea denial areas.
During the initial stages of war, those carrying only a
few SLCMs probably would deploy primarily in the
sea denial areas as part of the Soviets' forward ASW/
ASUW barriers. Dedicated SLCM-armed SSNs/SSGNs
with theater responsibilities would generally patrol
within range of their targets behind the forward ASW
barriers and could be protected by dedicated ASW
assets. Development of nonnuclear SLCM warhead
options would further increase the utility of these
weapons against important theater targets difficult to
reach and costly to attack with land-based aircraft.
SLCM patrols off the US coasts should become a
permanent feature of the Soviets' peacetime strategic
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Figure 24
Future Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the Western TVDs
Q The Unaea State; GOSamme,U has novecogmietl
the incoryo atian of Celonn. Larola. cad Liiha.nia
n~ J ~ (GN is the Soriet Union. Olhea bountlary re0,eaenlalion
~~ ~s nol neceaaar~ly aulhoritatiw. - Ya'~v
Greenland
(Denmark)
j)X
Average maxinyom. p
/IceIand
-;
North `
Sea
Morocco
Mauntanja
703912 1-85
Algeria
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LIII Less intensive sea denial
Libya
Sever~lTi
Turkey
Egypt
Syria
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Figure 25
Future Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the Pacific
Average minimum
extent of sea ice United States
Japani
Macau Mang Kong
(Port) (U.K.)
NORTHWEST
PACIFIC
BASIN
Sea control
Sea denial
Less intensive
sea denial
0 1000
Kilometers
Philippines
posture as early as 1985 and could eventually supplant
the Y-class SSBN presence. These SLCMs will add new
diversity and flexibility to the USSR's strategic strike
capabilities. They also offer the potential dividend of
complicating Western defensive tasks and forcing
substantial investment in expanded early warning/air
~Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatskiy
V
Kuril Islands
Cj
occupie nby 1945,
claimed by Japan
planners cu not be sure o using them in a preemp-
tive strike against the United States without losing the
advantage of surprise and giving warning of the
attack. The long flight time of the subsonic SS-NX-21
makes it particularly unlikely the Soviets would launch
that missile against US targets prior to ballistic missile
launches. SLCMs are especially suitable, however, for
follow-on strikes against industrial concentrations,
command and control sites, and soft military targets
such as bomber bases and ammunition depots.
138. Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet operations
in support of the nuclear strike mission will coincide
with those for a portion of a second important task,
strategic defense. Such operations, together with some
of those of the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets, will seek to
destroy Western aircraft carriers and strategic cruise
missile platforms after they cross Soviet defense
thresholds, now generally some 2,000 kilometers from
Soviet territory. We expect such operations to be of
growing importance to the Soviets because of their
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expectations concerning the proliferation of Western
strategic cruise missiles. To counter Western cruise
missiles launched from surface ships and submarines
and the standoff range these missiles afford carrier-
based strike aircraft, the Soviets probably will seek to
extend the outer edge of the sea denial areas of the
Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets to approximately
3,000 kilometers.
139. Another portion of the strategic defense task-
the destruction of enemy SSBNs before they can
launch their missiles-will pose an increasing dilemma
for the Soviets. The deployment of hard-target-capa-
ble US SLBMs, improved British and French SSBNs,
and the first Chinese SSBN probably will increase the
importance of achieving such destruction. The Soviets
also will have to contend with Trident II SLBM-
equipped SSBNs operating in much expanded patrol
areas. The Soviet Navy's ability to detect and track US
SSBNs in the open ocean, however, probably will not
improve, at least over the next 15 years. This assess-
ment is based on our belief that:
- The Soviets probably will be unable to deploy an
effective broad-ocean acoustic or nonacoustic
sensor.
Soviet SSNs will not be sufficiently quiet-at
least throughout the next decade-to engage in
covert trail, and Soviet ASW aircraft will not be
deployed in sufficient numbers or have adequate
range to maintain contact in US SSBN patrol
areas.
- Overt trail will become increasingly feasible-
particularly in choke points and relatively con-
fined areas-as new nuclear attack submarines
enter the fleet in number, but the Soviets will still
not have sufficient platforms to threaten the US
SSBN force. A decision to use a substantial
number of SSNs in this manner, moreover, would
divert them from other missions such as protect-
ing Soviet SSBNs.
- There will not be a significant increase in access
to new overseas facilities for Soviet ASW and
reconnaissance forces in the coming years, al-
though expansion in operations from presently
available facilities will occur.
We therefore expect that Soviet naval anti-US SSBN
operations will continue to be modest, with only a
relatively few attack submarines stationed in the
approaches to US submarine bases. Operations against
non-US SSBNs-which could become vulnerable to
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140. We believe that Soviet procurement of naval
weapon platforms and systems over the period of this
Estimate will remain driven primarily by require-
ments stemming from the strategic offensive and
defensive tasks outlined above. The importance of
these tasks should provide a solid basis for the Navy to
continue receiving at least the same share of the
defense budget that it has received since the 1960s.
Such an allocation of resources means that the Soviet
Navy will continue to receive new platforms, includ-
ing new classes of large surface combatants, attack
submarines, and aircraft. The production rate will not
completely offset the retirement of older units. The
accelerating cost per ton of new combatants would
make ship-for-ship replacement prohibitively expen-
sive. Indeed, considering manpower/maintenance
constraints, this may not be feasible. The force in the
year 2000 will therefore be somewhat smaller than
that of today. Newer units, however, will generally be
larger than those being replaced and will be equipped
with more sophisticated weapon systems. This leads us
to expect the following developments:
- The size of the modern ballistic missile subma-
rine force will remain roughly constant-be-
tween 60 and 70 units-through the mid-1990s.
The number of units in the overall SSB/SSBN
force (now 79) will decline as older units (G-class
SSBs and H-class and older Y-class SSBNs) are
converted or retired. The new units will incorpo-
rate improved sound quieting, self-defense, com-
munications and propulsion systems, and will
carry as many missile tubes as most or all of those
units retired after 1984. In the absence of an
arms-control or reduction treaty, the number of
SLBM launch tubes carried by the SSBN force is
likely to increase. Regardless, the numbers of
warheads will grow significantly because of the
deployment of new MIRVed systems.
- The first unit of the new class of 65,000- to
75,000-ton nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
probably will become operational by about 1990.
A total of four or five is expected by the year
2000.
The number of principal surface combatants
probably will decline somewhat-to about 260
units. New construction programs are likely to
include one or two new classes of nuclear-
powered guided-missile cruisers (CGNs); two
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new classes of guided-missile destroyers (DDGs);
and three or four new classes of frigates. As a
result of these programs, the trend toward larger
average unit size, greater weapons loads, and
more sophisticated air defense and antisurface
weapons, sensors, and electronic warfare systems
will continue, thereby improving the Soviet Na-
vy's capability for sustained operations.
The overall number of general purpose subma-
rines probably will decline to about 240 units,
but the number of nuclear-powered units proba-
bly will grow substantially to about 70 percent of
the force. New classes probably will include
three SSGN and three SSN classes. These units
should continue the trend toward quieter plat-
forms with improved propulsion and sensors, and
increased command and control capability. Con-
struction of improved diesel submarines with
greater submerged endurance will also continue.
At least one new SS class is expected by the mid-
1990s.
The Soviet Navy's overall amphibious assault lift
capability will increase gradually. A follow-on to
the Ivan Rogov-class assault ship (LPD) and a
new class of tank landing ship (LST) will be
introduced. Construction of smaller units, includ-
ing air cushion vehicles (ACVs), will also contin-
ue. Emphasis on amphibious utility in merchant
ship construction-especially for Ro/Ro and
barge carrier (LASII) ships-will remain un-
changed. Soviet interest in the use of helicopters
in amphibious assault may lead to construction of
a helicopter assault ship (LPH or LHA) in the
1990s. We expect modest growth in the size of
the naval infantry from about 16,000 to about
22,000 to 26,000 men.
The Soviet Navy's underway replenishment ca-
pabilities could be enhanced by the introduction
of one or more new classes of multipurpose
replenishment ships. Construction of such ships,
however, is likely to continue receiving a lower
priority than the construction of the ships they
are intended to support.
The number of fixed-wing naval combat aircraft
will increase substantially, with the major
changes being the first deployment to sea of
high-performance CTOL aircraft as part of the
air group on the first aircraft carriers and the
introduction to SNA of the Backfire follow-on or,
less likely, Blackjack bomber. Maritime strike
aircraft-both SNA and AAVGK-will be an
essential element in the Soviets' attempts to
expand their sea control/denial efforts against
Western surface forces in vital areas such as the
Norwegian, North, and Mediterranean Seas and
the Northwest Pacific Basin. These bombers will
also remain a principal feature of Soviet antisur-
face capabilities in other areas such as the Arabi-
an Sea.
The construction program we project does not overtax
Soviet industrial capacity. Production facilities for
naval equipment have expanded by some 65 percent
since 1970 and could accommodate substantial in-
creases in demand, especially for submarines, if the
Soviet leadership opted to expend the capital resources
and fully mobilize the work force
141. We believe that major technical improvements
in Soviet fleet air defense are likely during the period
of this Estimate. New SAMs, guns, and laser weapons
will probably be introduced and radioelectronic com-
bat measures will continue to receive a high priority.
Fighter aircraft operating from the projected CTOL
carriers of the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets,
probably in cooperation with AWACS and possibly
AEW aircraft, will add a new dimension to the Navy's
air defense resources. Fleet air defenses will be better
coordinated through digital data links between AAW
commanders and surface and air platforms. Nonethe-
less, we expect only gradual improvement in overall
AAW effectiveness because of the complexity of man-
aging and coordinating force air defense, and the
paucity of Soviet experience in that area. In any event,
we cannot confidently assess the net effect of these
changes on the ability of Soviet surface forces to
defend themselves against air attack during a war with
NATO. Such an assessment is highly dependent on
tactical variables. The performance characteristics of
key systems, such as the SA-N-6, are not yet fully
understood. Changes in the Soviet Navy's air defense
systems will be occurring simultaneously with those in
Western antiship capability, including the introduc-
tion of large numbers of cruise missiles. Despite these
uncertainties, the major Soviet commitment to the
construction of large surface combatants persuades us
that the naval leadership probably judges the overall
result of changes in air defense capability as sufficient
to support the wartime deployment of surface units
farther from Soviet territory in a gradual expansion of
their intended sea control areas
142. Expansion of both sea control and sea denial
operations would be supported by gradual improve-
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ments in Soviet capability to surveil Western surface
units and provide targeting assistance for antiship
missile attacks. Improved over-the-horizon targeting
would allow individual Soviet units to make better use
of the range of their missiles, thereby covering a
broader ocean area. Much of the improvement we
expect in surveillance and targeting will involve satel-
lite systems. We believe that the Soviets will introduce
by the early 1990s an improved EORSAT with the
capability to detect and identify additional types of
radars. The new EORSAT is likely to be able to locate
emitting units with an accuracy
sufficient for targeting over a broader area than is
currently possible. By the late 1990s, we believe
further improvements in the EORSAT are likely to
result in near-continuous targeting capability by use of
higher orbits, better sensors, and expanded fields of
view. A new RORSAT probably will also be intro-
duced with improvements in probability of detection
and a wider field of view. It is also probable the
Soviets will produce a new radar satellite for improved
all-weather surveillance. We expect that the improved
EORSAT and RORSAT may be used in cooperation
with a satellite data relay system to provide real-time
battle management information to command authori-
ties ashore. In addition, during the period of this
Estimate, advances in maritime surveillance from
manned space vehicles can be expected, including
routine reporting of naval surface targets. The use of
satellites, however, cannot be considered exclusively in
the context of Soviet naval operations. Such use will
continue to provide one of the many linkages between
naval operations and overall Soviet military strategy.
The Navy's ability to use satellite systems in wartime
would depend on such nonnaval factors as the extent
to which antisatellite warfare would be conducted at
the outset of war and the ability of satellites to survive
Western attack. Recognizing the danger of being
dependent on any single system, the Soviet Navy will
continue to integrate surveillance and targeting sup-
port from satellites with that from traditional plat-
forms such as manned aircraft and possibly from new
systems such as reconnaissance drones.
143. The Soviets probably recognize that future
operations in areas such as the southern Norwegian Sea
will place greater demands on the Navy's command,
control, and communications system because of factors
such as larger operating areas, more emphasis on the
integration of diverse platforms, and the need to
counter a greater number of high-value targets. We
expect the Soviets to respond to this challenge by
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improving their capabilities in technical areas such as
satellite communications, very-low-frequency commu-
nications support to submarines, and low-probability-
of-intercept systems, and by striving for greater auto-
mated data system compatibility. Another major trend
will include increased automation to support battle
management at all levels of the command structure.
We believe that the major emphasis in the command,
control, and communications system will continue to
be on centralized control of wartime operations, but
the creation of "mixed force" groups could indicate an
intention by the fleet staffs to delegate a larger portion
of their battle management responsibilities to lower
command levels.F___1
144. In addition to its primary initial wartime tasks,
the Soviet Navy also will continue to be responsible for
supporting ground forces in the land TVDs and for
interdicting sea lines of communication. Antiship and
ASW operations by the Baltic Fleet in the North Sea
and the Black Sea Fleet in the Mediterranean proba-
bly will receive increased emphasis to counter the
growing capability of Western naval forces to strike
targets in the land TVDs from increased ranges.
Despite increased capabilities for power projection in
distant areas, Soviet amphibious forces will continue to
be structured primarily for landings close to Warsaw
Pact territory during a war with NATO. Initial anti-
SLOC actions probably would include a bombing and
mining campaign against European by some
SNA aircraft and attack submarines.
145. The relatively low priority of open-ocean
SLOG interdiction as an initial wartime task in Soviet
naval strategy probably will not change substantially
through the period of this Estimate. The Soviets will
still have insufficient assets to mount a major open-
ocean anti-SLOG operation in the early stages of a
NATO-Warsaw Pact war simultaneously with their
other, more critical sea control/denial missions. The
naval improvements we project might, however, by
the mid-1990s permit committing some additional
Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet assets (primarily
older SSNs) to open-ocean anti-SLOG actions from the
first days of the conflict without appreciably weaken-
ing their SSBN protection or defense of the homeland
posture. But we believe it is more likely under those
conditions that frontline forces not required for sea
control/denial operations would instead be assigned
other tasks such as anti-SSBN missions (in the case of
submarines) or combined-arms land TVD tasks (in the
case of SNA/AAVGK assets). A prolonged prehostili-
ties mobilization period or a protracted conventional
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war with NATO (that is, one lasting more than a
couple of months) would increase the importance of
the anti-SLOG mission to the Soviets and could lead
them to mount a major open-ocean naval operation
against the US reinforcement/ resupply of Europe. The
Soviets almost certainly would defer any such major
open-ocean anti-SLOG operation, however, until after
they had successfully completed their sea control/den-
ial tasks and weakened NATO's capability to protect
its sea lanes.
146. Soviet naval out-of-area operations in peace-
time will continue to focus on maintaining permanent
presence in areas such as the Mediterranean, Arabian,
and South China Seas, and off the west coast of Africa.
We expect the Soviets will attempt to expand their
level of naval activity in areas such as the Caribbean
and Philippine Seas, and the southwest Indian Ocean
islands. They also are likely to step up efforts to
acquire access to foreign naval support facilities, al-
though they are unlikely in the near term to gain
much access in areas where there is not now a Soviet
presence. The Soviets undoubtedly will continue their
traditional techniques of naval diplomacy ranging
from routine show-the-flag port visits to demonstra-
tions of support for client states during crisis situations
and limited wars. Given the likelihood of continued
instability in the Third World, the use of such naval
diplomacy and power projection techniques probably
will increase during the 1980s and 1990s.
147, A major change in the Soviet Navy during the
period of this Estimate will be the achievement for the
first time of an ability to project significant power
ashore in distant areas in a limited war environment-
that is, one that does not involve a confrontation
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Although we
believe that Soviet naval programs are motivated
primarily by requirements for a general war with
NATO, new platforms and weapon systems will help
to close some of the current gaps in Soviet capability to
conduct such distant area operations. In particular, the
ability to form a task force around two or three CTOL
aircraft carriers will give the Soviet Navy its first
significant capability to provide tactical air support for
ground force operations and amphibious landings by
Soviet or client forces in distant areas. The new
medium-caliber gun and air defense systems on new
classes of surface ships and the probable acquisition of
additional large amphibious ships and a seaborne
assault helicopter (perhaps Helix B) will also improve
the Soviet Navy's capability to conduct opposed land-
ings.
148. These enhanced capabilities will give the Sovi-
ets the option to use naval force in a number of Third
World situations against all but the most well-armed
regional powers. Because the Soviets probably will
have, at most, five CTOL carriers by the year 2000,
they would have to draw on the assets of more than
one fleet to assemble a force sufficient to conduct an
opposed distant-area landing. The assembly of such a
force at a great distance from the USSR would
seriously undermine the Soviet Navy's ability to per-
form its priority strategic offensive and defensive
missions in the event of escalation to general war. We
believe, therefore, that major Soviet naval task force
participation in Third World conflicts will be restrict-
ed to limited war situations in which the Soviets
judged the risk of escalation to a war with the United
States or NATO to be small
149. Perhaps the most compelling argument against
a more ambitious power projection strategy during the
period of this Estimate is our judgment that programs
directly supporting the Navy's strategic offensive and
defensive tasks will continue to receive top priority in
the allocation of the Soviet Navy's budget. Other
factors which cast doubt on a significantly increased
power projection commitment in the near term in-
clude the following:
- The naval infantry's growth has been modest.
Since its reestablishment in 1963 it has grown to
a current strength of about 16,000.
- Only one Berezina AOR was built (IOC 1977),
and no other large naval replenishment/logistics
units are known to be under construction.
150. The likelihood of an ambitious naval power
projection strategy during the period of this Estimate
is further reduced by the practical difficulties involved
in rapidly constructing a large number of GTOL
aircraft carriers, the most important instruments of
such a mission. We estimate that the Soviets will
continue to construct such carriers at the same Nikola-
yev shipyard on the Black Sea that built the Kiev-class
aircraft carriers. This facility has been specially con-
figured at great expense (including the installation of
the USSR's largest overhead gantry cranes) for the
construction of such large warships. We estimate that
this yard, if operating at a normal construction pace,
will be able to launch one large CTOL aircraft carrier
every three or four years, with the first unit being
launched in 1985. It is possible for the Soviets to
construct carriers at a faster rate by using additional,
less suitable shipyards or by placing construction at
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Nikolayev on a crash basis. Neither option is now
being pursued, however, and such practices would be
inconsistent with past Soviet experience when con-
structing new types of large combatants. (Construction
of the new carrier is proceeding at virtually the same
pace as that of the first Kiev-class carrier. Kiev's keel
was laid in 1970 and sea trials followed almost five
years later.) We believe that the Soviets recognize the
complexity of building and operating CTOL carriers
and are likely to develop this capability at a slow-but-
sure pace. For these reasons, we reject the concept of a
Soviet Navy in which power projection by major naval
task forces plays a dominant role.)
B. Alternate Courses of Development
151. Our best estimate on the future of the Soviet
Navy reflects our judgment that the trends we have
observed in ship construction, naval doctrine, and
strategy over the past 20 years will continue. The
following paragraphs discuss three variables that could
precipitate major changes in the Soviet Navy of the
1990s: a major Soviet ASW breakthrough, a strategic
arms reduction treaty, and a severe economic crisis
that forces a cut in military spending; and, as a special
case-not necessitating such sweeping changes-a
shift in Soviet military doctrine toward increased
emphasis on protracted conventional war.
152. An ASW Breakthrough. The development
that would result in the most profound change in
Soviet wartime strategy from that outlined above
would be an ASW breakthrough that gives the Soviets
the capability to detect and track enemy submarines
in the open ocean-a breakthrough derived from one
of the many research efforts they are conducting on
acoustic and nonacoustic sensors. Although unlikely
throughout the period of this Estimate, such a break-
through would substantially increase the Soviet Navy's
ability to perform the critically important strategic
defensive tasks of destroying enemy ballistic missile
and land attack cruise missile submarines before they
launched their missiles. It would also increase the
Soviets' ability to protect their SSBNs, because enemy
attack submarines could be identified and attacked
long before they closed Soviet SSBN bastions
15:3. We believe an ASW breakthrough would lead
to major changes in the way the Soviets would deploy
their general purpose forces, particularly attack sub-
marines, before and during a general war. During the
prehostilities phase, the Soviets probably would opt to
deploy substantial numbers of SSNs to suspected
enemy SSBN operating areas, in choke points, and in
likely transit lanes near enemy submarine bases. These
nuclear-powered attack submarines would attempt to
gain contact and maintain trail on detected Western
submarines. Fewer submarines would be available for
SSBN protection, unless or until the Soviet SSN order
of battle were increased. Surface and air units proba-
bly would also be deployed farther forward. Planning
for these operations probably would lead to a greater
effort to expand access to and acquire foreign facili-
ties, particularly to support ASW aircraft.
154. The development of a reasonable capability to
detect and trail Western SSBNs in the open ocean
would provide the Soviet Navy with a powerful
argument for increased budgetary allocations. The
Navy could argue persuasively that it could not effec-
tively counter enemy strategic submarines and ensure
the survivability of its own SSBNs without a substan-
tial increase in forces, especially in SSN production
rates. Given this choice, the Soviet leadership could
grant the Navy increased funds for a greater SSN
construction effort, perhaps twice as many units Mr
year as the six to seven we currently expect
155. If there were an initial detection break-
through, we cannot rule out the possibility that the
Soviets would explore techniques for destroying sub-
marines, especially SSBNs, by means other than the
traditional reliance on general purpose naval plat-
forms. There have, for example, been references in
Soviet writings to the possible use of land-based ballis-
tic missiles against submarines in the open ocean.
Exploring such a technique would be consistent with
past Soviet interest in innovative solutions to naval
problems
It would also be
consistent with Soviet doctrinal emphasis on a multi-
service approach to the accomplishment of wartime
tasks. The Soviets are probably aware of the myriad
technical problems likely to be encountered in any
such use of land-based missiles including:
- The need to develop a remote sensor that could
precisely locate SSBNs in the open ocean and
constantly update that position.
- The need to develop a system that could rapidly
update the trajectory of a ballistic missile in
flight to compensate for target movement.
- The need to solve fuzing problems associated
with a warhead surviving water impact from
high altitude.
We are skeptical that such problems could be over-
come, at least during the period of this Estimate, and
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believe the Soviets would be unlikely to pursue seri-
ously such a course unless they had high confidence
that the initial detection problem would soon be
solved. This example is mentioned, however, to illus-
trate that a breakthrough in ASW detection could lead
to radical changes, not only in the Navy, but in overall
Soviet military strategy
156. Strategic Arms Control. Arms control negoti-
ations could play an important part in determining the
role within Soviet strategy and the force composition
of the Soviet Navy in the 1990s. For example, severe
restrictions on SLCM characteristics/deployment, or a
ban, would alleviate a serious maritime threat to the
USSR and eliminate much of the pressure to conduct
sea denial operations at greater distances from Soviet
territory. Provisions governing strategic ballistic mis-
sile force levels could have a significant impact upon
general purpose force programs because a substantial
portion of those forces will remain dedicated to pro-
tecting Soviet SSBNs. An arms control provision simply
limiting or freezing SSBN/SLBM levels probably
would have little impact upon Soviet general purpose
programs, although-as we have seen-SSGN/SSN
construction could increase somewhat as facilities ded-
icated to SSBNs shifted to general purpose programs.
Plans to protect Soviet SSBNs probably would not be
affected by such a freeze/reduction. On the other
hand, an agreement calling for a sharp reduction in
land-based ballistic missile systems, which would be
likely to encourage both the United States and the
Soviet Union to move a greater percentage of their
strategic arsenals to sea, could provide strong justifica-
tion for increased production of ASW-capable general
purpose forces to protect the increased number of
Soviet SSBNs. If a treaty encouraging a "move to sea"
were signed, we would expect increases in the produc-
tion of SSNs, Bear F or follow-on ASW aircraft, and
ASW-oriented surface ships such as the Udaloy, Al-
though a US move to sea could also justify an increased
Soviet anti-SSBN effort, we do not believe the Soviets
would allocate significantly increased forces against
Western SSBNs unless they had first achieved an ASW
breakthrough allowing them to reliably detect and
localize enemy submarines in the open ocean
157. Severe Economic Stringencies. The Soviets'
ability to sustain the ambitious naval program we
project in our baseline estimate may ultimately de-
pend upon the health of the Soviet economy and the
willingness of future leaders to continue the current
policy of favoring guns over butter. We have no
evidence of a Khrushchevian inclination within the
next generation of Soviet leaders to bolster the economy
by cutting military spending. Indeed, we believe such
a cut would be unlikely, at least through the 1980s,
particularly in view of the current US military build-
up, the increasing capabilities of Western navies, and
the possibility of the United States' developing effec-
tive space-based defenses against nuclear attack. It
nonetheless is conceivable that the post-Chernenko
elite will be forced to curb military spending, especial-
ly if agricultural performance and the economic
growth rate decline dramatically through the 1980s
and/or arms control agreements allow significant
eeonomiesF---]
158. With the possible exception of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, budgetary cuts driven primarily by
severe economic stringencies probably would fall on
all branches of the Soviet armed forces. Within the
Navy, programs considered fundamental to its pri-
mary strategic offensive and defensive tasks, such as
SSBNs, attack and cruise missile submarines, and land-
based strike and ASW aircraft, probably would suffer
few, if any, cuts. Rather, some cutbacks or slowdowns
in programs relating more to distant-area power pro-
jection and sea control capabilities-such as principal
surface combatants, amphibious ships, and naval auxil-
iaries-could be expected. It is conceivable, however,
that, through a combination of factors, budget cuts
could fall more heavily on the Soviet Navy, resulting
in substantial cuts in surface ship programs. These
factors include:
- A new political leadership that lacks a commit-
ment to building a large balanced navy and/or is
less inclined to use naval forces as instruments of
foreign policy to project Soviet power and influ-
ence in distant areas.
-A new chief of the Soviet Navy who lacks
Admiral Gorshkov's influence within the political
and military hierarchies and/or does not fully
share his vision of a blue-water navy in which
large surface combatants play a prominent role.
Fleet Admiral Chernavin, Gorshkov's most likely
successor, for example, is a submariner and could
be more inclined to push for the construction of
additional attack submarines.
- Technical advances in antiship weaponry and
targeting that convince the Soviets that large
surface ships are too costly and vulnerable, and
that ASW and ASUW tasks assigned to large
surface combatants can be done more effectively
by smaller combatants, submarines, and land-
based aircraf
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159. It is doubtful that the leadership that follows
Chernenko will be inclined to make major policy
departures such as cutting defense spending growth, at
least initially. A decision to make significant reduc-
tions in military spending probably would be impossi-
ble until the next generation of Soviet leaders is firmly
in place; one man has emerged as first among equals;
and the perceived "correlation of forces" permits such
a move. Since this process is likely to take at least
several years, a decision to cut naval programs could
not be made until the late 1980s. By that time, most of
the major surface combatant programs currently un-
der way should be nearing completion. Any reductions
then probably would come in Soviet programs we
project for the late 1980s and 1990s. Programs that
could well be deleted or sharply reduced in order to
comply with a significant cut in naval spending
include:
- The 65,000- to 75,000-ton nuclear-powered air-
craft carriers. The first unit of this class, and
possibly the second, should be too near comple-
tion to be affected by a budgetary decision made
in the late 1980s. The projected follow-on class
would be subject to cancellation.
- New class(es) of nuclear-powered cruisers.
- New classes of large amphibious ships (LPDs and
LPHs) and underway replenishment ships.
In addition, the Soviets may opt for early retirement
of some older destroyers and frigates and construct
fewer units than originally programed of new classes
to follow the Sovremennyy and Udaloy DDGs. Pro-
grams clearly identified with coastal ASW and SSBN
protection, such as the projected follow-on classes for
the Krivak and Grisha frigates, probably would be
least affected by a sharp budgetary cutback.
160. The net result of cuts in surface ship programs
such as those outlined above would be a navy with
much less capability than the one projected in our
baseline estimate to control waters beyond the range
of land-based tactical aircraft and to project power in
distant areas. By the mid-1990s, such cuts could
reduce the overall size of the surface navy by as much
as 20 percent, lessening Soviet capabilities to sustain
current peacetime deployment levels in areas such as
the Mediterranean and South China Seas, the Indian
Ocean, and off the coast of West Africa. The Soviets
probably would attempt to compensate for any reduc-
tion in surface navy capabilities to perform key strate-
gic defensive tasks by relying even more on advances
in antiship missiles that could be launched from
aircraft, submarines, and land, and receive targeting
information from satellites. In addition, they might
stress nonnaval solutions to maritime threats, such as
land-based antiballistic missile and air defense systems
to counter SLBMs and SLCMs, an even greater mari-
time role for the Soviet Air Force, and, possibly, land-
based ballistic missiles against surface targets. =
161. A Shift in Soviet Military Doctrine. Some
open-source Soviet military writings, particularly since
the early 1980s, have dealt with the possibility that a
war with NATO could remain conventional for an
extended but unspecified period. Soviet General Staff
exercises and classified writings continue to portray
Warsaw Pact-NATO wars as lasting no more than a
couple of months and leading to a nuclear exchange.
The discussion of extended conventional warfare in
open-source writings suggests, however, the Soviets are
looking at developments in the military balance which
could reduce the likelihood of either side's quickly
achieving a decided military advantage which would
compel the opponent to escalate to the use of nuclear
weapons.
162. Should Moscow become convinced that a pro-
tracted conventional NATO war was a distinct possi-
bility, we would expect to see discussion of this
doctrine in classified writings. Eventually, we would
notice a trend in their military exercises signaling this
shift, and we would find changes in military construc-
tion, procurement, and development with an even
greater emphasis on sustainability.
163. To develop the capability to conduct protract-
ed conventional naval warfare, aimed primarily at
assisting the Warsaw Pact advance and holding territo-
ry in Central Europe, we would expect the Soviet
Navy to devote increased attention to:
- SLOG interdiction.
- At-sea replenishment and reprovisioning.
- Amphibious warfare and naval infantry develop-
ments
164. It should be noted that, even in a protracted
conventional war, the Soviets would continue to em-
phasize their two current primary missions-strategic
offense and defense-for they could not be sure of
neutralizing NATO's nuclear threat. Such a doctrinal
shift would not therefore entail major changes in
Soviet force employment for these initial wartime
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tasks. Nevertheless, we would expect to see changes - A significant increase in the size of the general
required by anti-SLOC and sustainability require- purpose submarine force through construction of
ments. These would be manifested by: numerous submarines (including new diesel class-
es) with the following characteristics: fast, long-
- More attention to these roles in doctrinal legged, large conventional weapons load, and
writings, relatively cheap.
- Open-ocean anti-SLOC exercises and practice
deployments.
- Construction of numerous replenishment ships,
particularly for submarine support
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