THE USSR AND THE THIRD WORLD

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 19, 1984
• Content Type: NIE

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The USSR and th
Third World
National Intelligeace Estimate
MASTER FILE UPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON AP
Secret
NIE 11-101244
19 September 1984
con 539
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NIE 11-10/2-84
THE USSR AND
THE THIRD WORLD
Information available as of 13 September 1984
was used in the preparation of this Estimate,
approved on that date by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE
1
KEY JUDGMENTS
3
DISCUSSION
11
Soviet Opportunities and Challenges in the Third World
11
Before the Mid-1970s
11
From the Mid-1970s
11
Instruments of Soviet Third World Policy
12
Tactical Flexibility
12
Arms Exports and Economic Assistance
13
Active Measures
13
Use of Intermediaries
13
Internal Security Assistance
14
The Soviets as an Alternative to the West
15
Regional Priorities
15
Middle East and Southwest Asia
15
The Mediterranean Region
15
Southwest Asia
17
South Asia
18
Southeast Asia
19
Latin America
20
Africa
21
Soviet Military Capabilities and the Soviet Position in the Third
World
22
The Delivery of Sophisticated Weaponry to Certain Third
World States
23
Political and Military Use of the USSR's Expanding Military
Power
23
Constraints and Vulnerabilities of Soviet Policy in the Third
World
25
US Activism and Soviet Response
25
Insurgencies in Pro-Soviet Third World States
25
Soviet Inability To Remedy Third World Economic Problems
26
Economic Constraints on Soviet Support to Client States
27
Image Problems and Divergent Interests
27
III
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Page
Outlook
28
Prospects for Soviet Policy
28
Effects of Major Variables and Conditioning Factors
29
ANNEX (tables)
31
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
39
iv
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SCOPE NOTE
Despite the diversity?political, economic, cultural, and racial?of
the Third World, the USSR since the time of Lenin has viewed it as a
whole and as a weak link of the West and has fashioned policies to gain
influence there. These policies have undergone some changes reflecting
Soviet adjustment to changed circumstances in the Third World and
Soviet capabilities for exploiting new opportunities. This National
Intelligence Estimate examines Soviet policies toward the Third World
in the last 10 years and assesses the outlook for the remainder of the
1980s.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Third World will continue to be the most volatile arena of US-
Soviet political struggle in the coming years. Its inherent instability will
continue to present the USSR with tempting targets to expand Soviet in-
fluence at Western expense. We believe that Moscow, despite an array
of obstacles and constraints, will seek as vigorously as it has in the recent
past to press its decades-old strategy of Third World penetration.
Moscow's efforts in the Third World began in earnest in the 1950s.
Although the USSR in some instances failed conspicuously, as for
example in Indonesia, Ghana, Sudan, and Egypt, Soviet influence and
presence in the Third World have expanded considerably. This overall
Soviet advance has bolstered the USSR's claim to be a global power, and
has created new threats to US and Western interests. Now the Soviets
have:
? Access to distant air and naval facilities in some eight countries.
? Military assistance programs in some 34 additional Third World
countries.
? Treaties of friendship and cooperation with 10 Third World
associates.
? An increased capability to mount airlift and sealift to distant
places.
? New pro-Soviet regimes in southern Africa, Central America,
and South and Southeast Asia.
? Substantial means for undercutting US interests in the Third
World by encouraging and supporting opposition groups, sub-
version, and insurrection.
These Soviet gains were facilitated by the emergence of exploitable
opportunities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America,
by inhibitions of US policy in the immediate post-Vietnam period, by
the USSR's growing military capabilities, and by a more subtle blending
of tactics.
Over the years, Moscow has refined and improved such techniques
and instruments of policy as:
? A willingness to deal with a wide ideological range of govern-
ments and opposition groups.
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? The exploitation of residual Third World anticolonialism and
anti-US sentiments in particular areas.
? The training and education of increasing numbers of Third
World students, military personnel, and political cadres.
? Friendship treaties to symbolize and dramatize the Soviet
presence in the Third World.
? An increase of arms sales to the Third World.
? The use of active measures.'
? The use of naval and airlift capabilities to -show the flag- and,
in the absence of major opposition, to project limited power into
the Third World.
Since the mid-1970s the USSR has also given special attention to
other techniques:
? The sale of more sophisticated weapon systems to favored
clients.
? The extensive employment of intermediaries to train intelli-
gence services, to provide technical aid, and (in the case of the
Cubans) to deploy combat troops in defense of certain Third
World regimes.
? Perhaps most important, more emphasis on the training of
intelligence and security services and the provision of Praetorian
guards to bolster client regimes and institutionalize Soviet
influence, in the hope of preventing a repetition of earlier
setbacks.
For the future, the primary Soviet objectives in the Third World
will continue to be:
? To obtain political support from Third World entities against
the United States and the West or at least to weaken their ties to
the West.
? To promote the creation of Marxist regimes closely allied with
the USSR, and to protect those regimes, especially from internal
opposition.
? To gain, or deny to the West, access to naval and air facilities
that would be useful in promoting Moscow's foreign policy goals
and that could be used in some crisis or wartime situation.
'The Soviet term active measures is used to distinguish influence operations from espionage and
counterintelligence. Soviet active measures involve activities by virtually every element of the Soviet party
and state structure and supplement traditional diplomacy. They include manipulation of the media, written
or oral disinformation, use of foreign Communist parties and fronts, clandestine radio, economic activities,
military operations, and other political influence operations.
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? To divert and distract the United States by sponsoring or
supporting challenges in the world?some major, some minor.
? To establish commercial relations, so as to acquire hard
currency and cheap raw materials, and pave the way for closer
political ties.
? To prevent China from enhancing its role in the Third World.
? Over the longer term, to enhance Soviet access to regions rich
in strategic raw materials, and to create the potential to hinder
Western access.
In pursuing these objectives, the Soviets have continued to differ-
entiate among Third World regions according to their strategic value:
? The Middle East and Southwest Asia region has always been
and remains by far the USSR's most important Third World
target primarily because of its proximity to the USSR and its
centrality to the larger East-West struggle. We expect, there-
fore, to see Moscow place great emphasis in the years ahead on
broadening its influence with Arab states and exploiting any
opening for penetration of Iran.
? In South Asia the Soviets have the ability to bring military force
to bear. Their occupation of Afghanistan has put Soviet forces
on the border with Pakistan for the first time, and increased
their ability to threaten Iran. But armed resistance by Afghan
rebels has obliged the USSR to concentrate on preserving the
pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. The Soviets are also maintaining
their close relations tvith India, and are trying to induce that
country to bring pressure against Pakistan in order to under-
mine Islamabad's support of the Afghan resistance.
? Southeast Asia is important to Moscow because of its potential
for containing China.
? Africa and Latin America are of less direct strategic impor-
tance to Moscow, but are useful sites of influence for diverting
US resources and fortifying an image of expanding Soviet
power. Central America is particularly useful in this context.
In pursuit of these objectives, Soviet strategy will in particular
stress:
? Support and control of radical regimes. Both directly and
through intermediaries the Soviets will want to make Marxist
revolutions irreversible in those countries?Ethiopia, Angola,
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Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua--that are currently
threatened by insurgents.
Extensive use of intermediaries, especially East Europeans and
Cubans. For their own reasons the Cubans are likely to continue
to provide combat troops to prop up regimes like those in
Angola and Ethiopia, and to be on the cutting edge of support to
revolutionary regimes in Central America. Moscow's other
associates will continue to furnish the USSR valuable services on
occasion in the form of base rights, support of insurrection, and
the applying of military, political, and subversive pressures.
? Supply of sophisticated weaponry to certain Third World
states, such as conventionally armed short-range ballistic mis-
siles, more advanced fighter aircraft, and modern naval plat-
forms and systems, which might alter, but not necessarily upset,
local or regional balances of power, and will probably require
reassurance by the United States and matching support to its
own regional friends.
Military-political use of the USSR's expanding military power.
Soviet military capabilities in distant areas of the Third World
have improved, but remain constrained by certain limitations
and deficiencies of equipment, organization, and force struc-
ture. These deficiencies are likely to limit major Soviet advances
into distant areas within the time frame of this Estimate.
Nonetheless, the Soviets are working to overcome these defi-
ciencies. New systems likely to come into the inventory in the
early 1990s will widen the range of Soviet options in distant
areas and will complicate US policy in the Third World.
? Soviet refusal to curb Third World activities in the interest of
better relations with the United States. Although the Soviets
realize that their aggressive actions have carried some costs and
have affected the overall approach of the West toward the
Soviet Union, we do not expect the threat of political or
economic sanctions will prevent the Soviets from exploiting a
major opportunity to penetrate a key area such as Iran or the
Arabian Peninsula.
Constraints and vulnerabilities the USSR will face in the Third
World will influence its strategy and prospects to a greater extent
than during the late 1970s. Moscow's successes in the Third World have
also created vulnerabilities that may lead to Soviet setbacks. To an
important degree the USSR's successes in the last decade were due to
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special circumstances. In future Third World efforts the Soviets will
confront an array of obstacles, including:
? The renewed US effort to oppose further Soviet and pro-Soviet
advances in the Third World; and the inability of the USSR to
match the much greater power projection capabilities of the
United States.
? The new imperial problems created by the USSR's successes in
the 1970s. There is now much more of an investment to protect.
The Soviets are involved in the defense of certain pro-Soviet
regimes?Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, and
Nicaragua?all of which are confronting varying degrees of
active insurgency.
? An almost certain rise of economic distress in many parts of
the Third World, and an unwillingness on the part of the
USSR to furnish needed assistance, investment funds, and
markets for Third World exports. It is possible that one or more
Third World countries may turn to the USSR for financial aid
and may even repudiate debts to Western creditors. Most Third
World governments, however, will almost certainly consider
that their economic expectations can be best met if they
cooperate with the international lending agencies (from which
the Soviets are frozen out), and will look to the West for
economic succor.
? Growing economic difficulties within the USSR, complicating
Soviet efforts to bear the sharply rising burden of supporting
Cuba, Vietnam, and other costly associates in the Third World
(and Eastern Europe). This type of constraint will probably not
be great enough in itself, however, to deter the Soviets from
taking on new clients if particularly promising opportunities
arise.
? A widespread?indeed growing?desire among Third World
leaders not to permit Soviet or pro-Soviet elements to gain
influence over their countries' destinies: a desire to use the
USSR without becoming fatally caught in its embrace. This will
apply as well for the USSR's own clients. These entities are more
than Soviet agents; they have their own policy aims, some of
which will on occasion conflict with Soviet aims.
The Soviets, nevertheless, still view the Third World as the
Achilles' heel of the West, and will persevere in their efforts to
enhance their power and influence there. Although the special circum-
stances of the 1970s are not necessarily repeatable, the instability and
turmoil likely to prevail in much of the Third World in the late 1980s
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will assure the Soviets abundant opportunities to make advances. The
Soviets will continue to give top priority to efforts to gain influence in
the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Soviet willingness to probe for
openings and advantages in an area of such high sensitivity to both the
USSR and the West will inevitably give rise to risks of miscalculation
and possible superpower confrontation.
But Soviet prospects for success in the Middle East as well as in
the rest of the Third World will depend more than ever on the
interplay of a number of new factors, some of which will be beyond
the direct control of the Kremlin decisionmakers:
? The capability of the Soviet Union to deploy forces and
provide advanced weapons to countries in distant areas will
continue to grow. But acquisition of modern military technol-
ogy gives relatively weak countries the ability to challenge
limited deployments of modern naval and air power.
? Another variable is the capability of the USSR to cope with low-
intensity warfare of the type now besetting a number of Soviet
client states. It is by no means certain that all pro-Soviet
regimes can maintain power in their own countries. If a Soviet
client regime were to be overthrown by anti-Soviet insurgents,
or reached a compromise with the internal opposition by ousting
the Soviets, the consequences for Soviet prestige in the Third
World would be adverse, but hard to assess at this stage.
? Turbulence in the Third World will not be easily controlled
and may precipitate events that neither superpower would find
desirable. It is even conceivable that the United States and the
USSR will find themselves taking parallel actions to prevent
escalation of some conflicts, especially in volatile areas and
situations?such as the Koreas, or the Iran-Iraq or Lebanon-
Syria-Israel arenas. In the main, however, the Soviets will see
regional troubles as presenting opportunities to advance Soviet
power.
There is a possibility that, facing a variety of obstacles, particularly
the intractability of the Third World to great-power dictates or more
vigorous US political and military actions to combat their influence, the
Soviets might deliberately restrain their actions in some low-priority
area to buy time for later opportunities, or in deference to larger East-
West concerns. However, they would be very unlikely to see this as a
permanent retrenchment. They would in no case accept explicit
limitations on their claimed prerogative to expand their power in the
Third World.
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In sum, we believe the Soviets will continue to see their actions in
the Third World primarily as an essential element of East-West
rivalry. The Soviet approach will oblige the West to address the
challenge of Soviet power and more sophisticated tactics, but this should
not obscure the social and economic problems that pave the way for So-
viet penetration. This means that the key external variables determin-
ing Soviet Third World prospects will be the stability or lack of it in
Third World societies; the economic health of the United States,
Europe, and Japan; and the durability of US internationalist foreign
policy, military strength, and national will to commit considerable
power and resources to the Third World arena.
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DISCUSSION
SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
IN THE THIRD WORLD
Before the Mid-1970s
1. Moscow's interest in the revolutionary potential
of what we call the Third World dates to the earliest
days of the Soviet regime. Lenin characterized the
colonial world as the -weak link- of imperialism, and
the Second Congress of the Third Communist Interna-
tional in 1920 accepted his argument that nationalism
and anti-imperialism were revolutionary forces that
deserved support. Over the next three decades, the
Soviets, largely through the auspices of the Comintern,
provided moral and, at times, some financial aid to
fledgling Communist parties in Africa, Asia, Latin
America, and the Middle East. The USSR also extend-
ed some state-to-state economic assistance but mainly
to states on the USSR's border such as Iran, Afghani-
stan, and Turkey. For the most part, however, both the
Communists and national bourgeoisie in the colonial
world were left to their own devices as the Soviets
concentrated on internal or European affairs.
2. It was only after Stalin's death that the Soviets
began a major effort to exploit perceived opportunities
and Western vulnerabilities in the Third World. The
dissolution of the West European empires and the
USSR's economic recovery from World War II seemed
to increase the Soviet potential for establishing influ-
ence in newly independent countries in Africa and
Asia. To many Third World elites the USSR seemed a
bastion of anticolonialism and a model for socialist
development. Moscow offered economic and military
aid to new regimes and cultivated those rulers and
elites deemed susceptible to Soviet influence.
3. The first decade of the new activism in the Third
World was marked by the ebullience and optimism
that characterized the Khrushchev era but did not
produce the expected results. Although Khrushchev's
successors made clear that they intended to put rela-
tions with the Third World on a more orderly footing,
they too ran into problems. They suffered a major
defeat in Egypt when President Sadat expelled Soviet
military advisers and established a cordial relationship
with the United States. Soviet failures there as well as
in Mali, Ghana, Indonesia, Sudan, and Somalia were in
large part attributable to inability to appreciate local
politics and social structures, regional rivalries, heavy-
handedness in dealing with Third World peoples,
insufficient attention to bolstering the internal security
services of client rulers, and insufficient or inappropri-
ate economic and military measures to consolidate
Third World gains. Besides these deficiencies, Soviet
progress in the Third World was adversely affected by
changed circumstances there and changed relations of
the Soviet client states with the West. Nevertheless, the
Soviets were beginning to acquire the naval and airlift
capabilities permitting them to -show the flag- and, in
the absence of major opposition, to project limited
military power into the Third World. On the whole,
however, Moscow's ambitious pretensions to influence
throughout the Third World during the 1950s and
1960s were not matched by its gains.
From the Mid-1970s
4. Soviet policy toward the Third World became
more sophisticated in the mid-1970s, and the Soviets
after some initial hesitation moved aggressively to
exploit new openings. This new policy stemmed large-
ly from the confluence of new opportunities and
improved capabilities.
5. The Soviets had become a strategic superpower
in their own eyes and, they believed, in the eyes of the
rest of the world:
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? They had acquired rough parity with the United
States in intercontinental warfare capabilities.
? Their modernization and strengthening of their
large general purpose armies and tactical air
forces increased their confidence that they could
prevail in a conventional conflict in any of the
major theaters of war on the USSR's continental
periphery in Europe, Southwest Asia, and the
Far East.
? Their efforts in the 1950s and 1960s had resulted
in some increase in naval and airlift capabilities.
? They could count on Cuba and East European
allies to act as surrogates in certain Third World
situations.
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6. Moreover, the Soviets perceived that the world
scene was shifting in ways more favorable to their
aims. They judged that:
? The Vietnam experience and other factors had
reduced the willingness of the United States to
engage its power in the Third World.
? The capitalist world as a whole had been weak-
ened by the oil price revolution and a series of
recessions.
? The oil boycott underscored the importance of
oil resources to the West, and new oil earnings of
the Arabs opened opportunities for the Soviets to
expand arms sales for hard currency.
7. New developments in the Third World provided
major opportunities for the Soviets:
? The collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa
led to new opportunities, especially in Angola,
where a civil war broke out. Taking advantage of
US diffidence, the Soviets and Cubans helped
their favored faction take power and in the
process established themselves in the country.
? Junior officers in Ethiopia overturned Haile Se-
lassie's feudal state and turned to the Soviets for
aid. The Soviets responded and, with the Cubans,
quickly made themselves guarantors of the new
regime's internal security, as well as assisting it to
combat the threat from Somalia.
? A Marxist-Leninist regime came to power in
Afghanistan.
? Sino-Vietnamese hostility gave the Soviets new
leverage and ultimately access to facilities in
Vietnam.
8. Other events seemed to augur new successes:
? The revolution in Iran not only liquidated a
powerful pro-US regime, but gave rise to a
possibility for eventual Soviet penetration of a
very important country and the entire Persian
Gulf region.
? The downfall of the Shah called into Question the
US post-Vietnam strategy toward the Third
World, that of relying on powerful regional allies
to maintain regional influence.
? Longstanding economic and social problems in
Central America were creating a revolutionary
ferment, with the potential for exploitation by
Cuba and the USSR.
9. Despite the lack of any appreciable gains in the
Third World in the last few years, the Soviet balance
sheet since the mid-1970s is impressive. In addition to
Cuba, now even more dependent on Soviet support
than in the past, the Soviets today play a significant
role in Vietnam, Ethiopia (albeit at the cost of their
expulsion from Somalia), Libya, South Yemen, Angola,
Syria, and Nicaragua, and have acquired access to
naval and air facilities in most of these states. The
invasion of Afghanistan, despite the damage to the
USSR's prestige and the inconclusive character of
Soviet operations there, has put Soviet forces on the
border with Pakistan for the first time and increased
their capability to threaten Iran. The Soviet-Indian
relationship, which dates back to the 1950s, has been
maintained as a quasi-alliance of mutual convenience
and fluctuating intimacy. In sum, since the mid-1970s
the Soviets have established themselves in a number of
new locations in the Third World and, despite the new
US activism typified by Grenada and several anti-
regime and anti-Soviet insurgencies, have?so far at
least?been expelled from none.
INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET THIRD WORLD
POLICY
10. Soviet successes in the Third World result in
large part from sheer persistence. But, over the years,
they have also refined some older techniques and
developed some new ones to enhance their access to
Third World states and to maintain their influence in
places where it has been established.
Tactical Flexibility
11. The Soviets have shown a willingness to deal
with a wide ideological range of governments and
opposition groups, rather than concentrate their atten-
tion solely on pro-Soviet or Marxist Third World
entities. The USSR has at times extended military aid
in generous amounts to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, all of
which have openly persecuted domestic Communist
parties. The Soviets also are pragmatic in expanding
and improving ties with nonaligned states?such as
Jordan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Argentina, and Peru?that
have mixed economies and that do not necessarily line
up in support of Soviet diplomatic positions.
12. The Soviets are particularly active in exploiting
those situations in the Third World where local per-
ceptions of US policies have created the greatest
susceptibility to anti-US agitation. The longstanding
US alliance with Israel, the black African perception
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of a softness of US attitudes toward South Africa, and
the historical association of the United States with
Latin American elites provide the USSR with signifi-
cantly enhanced entree to the Arab world, black
Africa, and a sizable spectrum of Latin American
opinion. The Soviets have exploited these perceptions
of the United States to establish or reinforce ties with
Libya, Syria, Angola, and Nicaragua.
Arms Exports and Economic Assistance
13. The export of weapons has become the most
effective instrument of Soviet Third World policy. It
creates an entree to the recipient country's military
forces and a dependence on continued supply of Soviet
equipment, spare parts, and advisers. In some circum-
stances arms agreements also foster cooperation in
other areas, mainly political and diplomatic. Arms
sales now account for as much as two-thirds of total
Soviet exports to the Third World, and also bring in
some $7-8 billion a year in much-needed hard
currency.
14. Complementing the arms program, the Soviets
offer an amalgam of other types of assistance. Expec-
tations of large Soviet economic aid have often not
been realized in the past, but in the last few years
economic aid to Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, and Ethiopia
has risen, indicating a willingness by Moscow to
commit scarce resources to high-priority targets, even
in a time of domestic economic difficulty. The Soviets
are providing an extensive advisory and technical
presence in Africa and the Middle East, and are
currently training more than 50,000 Third World
students in the USSR.' Cuba and Eastern Europe are
also devoting considerable domestic resources to the
training and education of many thousands of students,
military personnel, and political cadres from the Third
World. Moreover, Third World states have become
more pragmatic and are taking advantage of low
Soviet financing fees. Despite these efforts, there can
be no question that the appeal of Soviet economic
assistance and of the Soviet model of economic devel-
opment has lost much of the potential it once had in
the Third World for enhancing Soviet influence.
Active Measures
15. Active measures constitute another technique
used frequently by the Soviets and their East Europe-
an and Cuban associates. In Iran, India, and some
z See annex for tabular data on economic, military, and technical
aid to Third World countries from the USSR, Eastern Europe, and
Cuba.
African and Latin American countries forged docu-
ments, distorted and untrue statements attributed to
Westerners, and other efforts to influence local politi-
cal decisions and embarrass the United States and its
allies have had some effect on local elites and have
advanced Soviet policies. In Iran, for instance, the
Soviets fed the revolutionary government documents
designed to incriminate Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh,
whom they considered pro-American. This may have
contributed to his eventual arrest and execution.
16. The USSR is making a concerted effort to
influence the news output of developing countries. A
typical Soviet arrangement provides for two-way com-
munications links between TASS?Moscow's official
news agency?and the news agency of a Third World
country, exchanges of correspondents, and the services
of an engineer to maintain TASS equipment. The
Soviets also subsidize some journalists from Third
World countries who work in Moscow. Representatives
of TASS and the feature agency Novosti?many of
whom are KGB officers?routinely provide local
editors with Soviet material and recruit agents of
influence in information ministries and national news
agencies. The Soviets are also working within UNESCO
to -break the monopoly- of Western media services in
the Third World. The campaign is having some
success and, as more Soviet-trained or Soviet-subsi-
dized Third World journalists rise to important posi-
tions in their own countries, Soviet opportunities for
influence will increase.
Use of Intermediaries
17. The Soviet Union has become adept at employ-
ing other friendly states to act as intermediaries to
assist in Third World penetration. Intervention by an
intermediary offers particular advantages to the Sovi-
ets, including:
? Less risk of creating a confrontation between the
superpowers.
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? A rationale for plausible denial, which makes US
or Western counteraction more complicated.
? Greater acceptance of the surrogate presence by
local populations?in some cases, greater than
the overt presence of Soviets or Westerners.
? Less damage to Soviet relations with other parties
in regional or intrastate disputes.
? Less chance that the Soviets will be perceived
and criticized as imperialistic, and better oppor-
tunities for Moscow to take advantage of existing
anti-US sentiments.
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18. The activity in the Third World of Soviet
intermediaries varies in magnitude and scope from
discreet training of intelligence services (often provid-
ed by the East Germans) and technical aid (performed
by East Europeans and Cubans) to large-scale deploy-
ment of combat troops (by Cuba). East Europeans can
provide technical services to Third World countries
that complement Soviet military and political pro-
grams and also serve their own (East European) aims
of establishing better economic and commercial rela-
tions in the Third World. The willingness of Fidel
Castro to maintain Cuban combat forces in Africa and
to provide a variety of aid to Central American and
Caribbean leftists serves the cause of Soviet expansion
and complicates US policy planning. Even though the
Cuban forces in Angola have done little to slow the
advance of antiregime insurgents, their presence in
that shaky pro-Soviet state has helped to preserve
Soviet gains. Despite their setback in Grenada, the
Cubans are likely to continue to exploit anti-American
sentiment in a variety of Latin American situations, to
the advantage of Cuba and the USSR.
19. Libya's Colonel Qadhafi for reasons of his own
is engaged in destabilization efforts in moderate, pro-
Western states of Africa and the Middle East. He is
also assisting revolutionary, anti-Western movements
in the Philippines, the Caribbean islands, and Central
America. In his Chadian intervention, he is using his
extensive armory of Soviet weaponry. He employs
Soviet pilots to transport equipment and troops from
Libya to airbases just across the border in Chad, and
uses Soviet technicians to maintain the equipment
there. To the extent that he is able to destabilize Chad,
raise questions in the minds of pro-Western African
rulers about the worth of Western security guarantees,
and threaten allies of the United States, he is serving
Soviet Third World aims. The fact that the Soviets do
not control his activities does not necessarily diminish
his value to Soviet policy.
20. But there are limits to the ways in which
intermediaries can be used effectively. Pro-Soviet
governments in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, and
Afghanistan are too hard pressed by active and threat-
ening insurgencies to do more for the Soviet cause than
survive. South Yemen is a desperately poor country
with internal political problems, Vietnam is preoccu-
pied with establishing control over Indochina, and
Libya's Qadhafi is a mercurial, unpredictable leader,
not amenable to advice from the Kremlin. North
Korea sometimes acts in ways useful to the Soviets,
such as providing arms to Grenada. But most often
North Korea's actions in the Third World are designed
to serve its own purposes. In these circumstances, the
USSR is riot likely to be able to count firmly on any as-
sociates except Cuba and Eastern Europe to run
interference in new Third World advances.
Internal Security Assistance
21. The Soviets have learned from their own set-
backs, such as their ouster from Egypt, and from
developments over which they had little control, such
as Salvador Allende's downfall in Chile, that they must
try to institutionalize political influence. This has
caused them to give renewed attention to the goal of
creating Leninist-style police-state regimes in client
countries where they can do so. The Soviets have been
most successful in this endeavor in Ethiopia and
Angola. Moscow is, therefore, putting more emphasis
on the training and enhancement of the clients' securi-
ty services and intelligence organizations, drawing
upon Cuban and East European expertise.
22. The Praetorian guards thus provided to client
rulers are intended both to protect the local ruler and
to safeguard Soviet interests by keeping the local ruler
under firm Soviet direction. The Soviets are moved
not so much by a desire for ideological affinity on the
part of the clients as by a belief that lasting Soviet
influence and protection against the changing direc-
tions of local nationalism and political factionalism
require the creation of disciplined ruling elites loyal to
Moscow wherever possible. The Soviets sometimes
interfere in the domestic politics of unstable client
states like Angola and South Yemen to assist the
advancement of dependable political figures at the
expense of those thought to be wavering in allegiance
to the USSR. The Soviets also hope to propagate the
belief in the Third World that Soviet-sponsored re-
gimes are irreversible.
23. Either directly or through surrogates, the Sovi-
ets are engaged in training political cadres in order to
bring the ruling parties of the client countries more
closely in line with the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and hence more responsive to Moscow. These
programs are also aimed at improving the effective-
ness of the parties as instruments of local control, and
at creating agents of Soviet influence. Soviet endeavors
in this field have been particularly successful in Cuba,
South Yemen, Angola, and Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, for
example, Moscow for years has pressed Chairman
Mengistu to create an Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist par-
ty and has provided ideological and political training
to scores of potential party leaders. The Soviets believe
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that, by the establishment of such a party in Septem-
ber 1984, they have reached a more solid institutional
relationship with their client, and have come closer to
their aim of making the Ethiopian Marxist revolution
irreversible.
The Soviets as an Alternative to the West
24. What Moscow offers the Third World today is
no longer a program for social and national develop-
ment so much as an alternative to Western influence.
Soviet arms deliveries and patronage for authoritarian
local elites attempting to assure their own power
positions are particularly important in this regard. The
10 friendship treaties signed since 1971?with Iraq,
South Yemen, Syria, Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozam-
bique, Afghanistan, India, and Vietnam?illustrate
Moscow's growing web of Third World ties. Friend-
ship treaties with Somalia and Egypt, agreed upon
during this period, have been abrogated. For the Third
World treaty partners, the agreements constitute a
reassurance that they are not totally isolated and in
most cases they signify a marginal commitment by the
USSR to their security. But the published treaty
obligations are so vague and ambiguous that the
Soviets are not bound to act in critical circumstances.
For the USSR, however, the treaties have a certain
symbolic value as a measurement of Soviet influence
in the Third World.
REGIONAL PRIORITIES
25. Toward the Third World as a whole, Soviet
policy objectives will continue to be those that have
evolved over the last 30 years:
? To gain, or deny to the West, military facilities
that would be useful in promoting Moscow's
foreign policy goals and that could be used in
some crisis or wartime situation.
? To divert and distract the United States by
sponsoring challenges in the Third World?some
major, some minor.
? To obtain political support from Third World
entities against the United States and the West,
or at the least to weaken their ties with the West.
? To promote the creation of Marxist regimes
closely allied with the USSR.
? To establish commercial relations so as to acquire
hard currency and cheap raw materials and pave
the way for closer political ties.
? To prevent China from enhancing its role in the
Third World.
? Over the longer term, to enhance Soviet access to
regions rich in strategic raw materials, and to
create the potential to hinder Western access.
26. The USSR in addition to these general objec-
tives in the Third World also has regional priorities
that are based upon both geographic and functional
considerations.
Middle East and Southwest Asia
27. The Middle East and Southwest Asia area is the
USSR's top-priority target in the Third World. Prox-
imity to the Soviet Union and the security of Soviet
territory, oil resources, vested interests of the United
States and the West, influence over the Islamic world,
and concern over the impact of revolutionary Islamic
ideas on the Muslim peoples of Soviet Central Asia
make this the Third World region most critical to the
East-West balance of power and give it that priority. A
long-range Soviet goal is to enhance influence in the
Persian Gulf area to the point at which Moscow could
exercise some degree of control over Persian Gulf oil
with a resulting leverage over Western Europe and
Japan. The Arab-Israeli dispute, the Gulf war, and the
Soviets' willingness to supply arms promptly, lavishly,
and cheaply provide them some entree into the region.
28. Soviet influence is still hampered mainly by two
factors: Soviet military power lacks a credible capabili-
ty to intervene on behalf of Arab allies massively and
rapidly enough in most Arab-Israeli conflict scenarios
to contain Israeli military power. And lack of any
relations or bargaining leverage with Israel makes it
impossible for the Soviets to get by diplomatic means
what potential Arab clients most need, Israeli conces-
sions. These factors, along with traditional Islamic
distaste for Communism and a growing awareness of
Soviet -neo-imperialist" behavior in dealings with
clients, still leave the USSR distinctly inferior to the
United States as an effective superpower in the Middle
East, notwithstanding the region's proximity and the
United States' loss of its Iranian ally. The very impor-
tance of the region to the West obliges the USSR to
consider carefully possible Western reactions to any of
its moves.
The Mediterranean Region
29. Syria. Syria is currently the Soviet Union's
principal ally in the Middle East and its key to
influence in the region, but the relationship is one in
which the two countries are heavily dependent on
each other. The Soviets, particularly in the past two
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years, have supplied to Syria an extensive array of
conventional weapons and a modern air defense sys-
tem. The Soviet Union is the only country willing and
able to provide the arms Syria feels it needs. Over
5,500 Soviet troops man the SA-5 missile sites, operate
the advanced early warning and command and control
systems, train and assist in the operation of the SA-2,
SA-3, and SA-6 missile sites, advise combat units, and
instruct pilots. Syria, for its own reasons, is pursuing
some policies pleasing to the Soviets, such as blocking
US peace initiatives, aiding anti-American groups in
Lebanon, and providing access to the ships of the
Soviet Mediterranean Squadron and to Soviet naval
reconnaissance aircraft. But the Syrians persist in some
policies that are counter to Soviet aims, such as
collaboration with Iran against Iraq, the ouster of Yasir
Arafat from Lebanon and the backing of Arafat's
rivals in the Palestine Liberation Organization, and
pursuit of an independent policy in Lebanon. The
inherent instability of Syrian politics also gives rise to
Soviet concern about the future of the Soviet-Syrian
relationship.
30. Moscow almost certainly believes that the de-
parture of US forces from Lebanon in 1984 was a
major victory and a vindication of the risks it took in
playing an active role in Syria's air defense after the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Soviets will
try to press their advantage by isolating the United
States further from moderate Arab countries. But the
Soviet gains are limited. Indeed, the departure of US
forces, if coupled with a decreased Israeli threat, may
lead to a reduced Soviet presence in Syria, rather than
an increase in access to naval and air facilities.
31. Despite all of this, the Syrians and Soviets need
each other and will continue to collaborate on most
issues. Soviet officials have told American academics
that they would have no choice but to support Damas-
cus in a crisis. Moscow would be likely to take a
number of steps to bolster the Syrians if their positions
in Lebanon came under intense military pressure from
Israel or the United States.'
32. Egypt. Egypt is a major Soviet target. Although
the inability to reestablish close ties with the Egyptians
has been a disappointment to the Kremlin, Moscow is
working hard to improve relations. High-level Soviet
visitors to Cairo and the resumption of ambassadorial
representation attest to the keen Soviet interest. There
is, however, little that the Soviets can offer to Egypt to
offset the benefits of the Camp David agreements and
their aftermath. Many Egyptian officials remember
the frictions associated with the massive Soviet pres-
ence in Egypt from 1968 to 1972. Egypt is likely to
remain an elusive target of Soviet Middle East policy.
33. Libya. The Soviets and Libyans have developed
a complementary relationship based on a shared hos-
tility toward Western, particularly US, influence and
strengthened by the supply of modern Soviet weapon-
ry to Libya. Libya is one of the USSR's principal
sources of hard currency as the result of arms sales
surpassing $15 billion since the 1970s. Although the
long-term objectives of the USSR and Libya differ in
many ways, Moscow considers Libya's promotion of
radical factions in Africa to be furthering its own goal
of undermining regimes and groups supportive of the
West. Moreover, the pace of military cooperation
picked up when Qadhafi in 1981 began allowing
Soviet warships and naval aircraft to make periodic
visits to Libya. The Soviets' public support for Libyan
policies has increased along with their improved ac-
cess, and as US-Soviet relations have deteriorated. Last
spring, for example, the Soviet media adopted a pro-
Libyan line during the siege at the Libyan People's
Bureau in London.
34. The Soviets have generally regarded Qadhafi's
machinations against the pro-Western regimes of Su-
dan and Somalia and his support of revolutionary
movements in the Middle East and Central America as
consistent with their own foreign policy objectives. On
the other hand, Moscow recognizes that many Third
World countries oppose Qadhafi's expansionist ambi-
tions and that Qadhafi is a mercurial, unpredictable
leader, not amenable to advice from the Kremlin.
Consequently, Moscow tries to take advantage of
Libya's adventurism, while avoiding close public iden-
tification with the Libyan regime and acknowledging
no responsibility for its actions.
35. Jordan. For the next year or two, the Soviets
will probably concentrate on Jordan, hoping to wean
King Hussein away from close military and political
alignment with the United States and toward at least a
more nonaligned position. By offering arms on favor-
able terms, the Soviets are pursuing their classic
approach to a prospective client. Hussein, who has
become increasingly miffed at his role as a secondary
US ally, and at what he sees as Washington's lack of
appreciation for his role in the Palestinian situation,
has pursued closer relations with Moscow both for
what he can get out of it, and to make the United
States pay more serious attention to Jordanian sensitiv-
ities and requirements. Under Hussein, Jordan is not
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likely to come under Soviet influence. To a consider-
able extent, Moscow's success in its Jordanian policy
will depend more upon Jordanian perceptions of the
US Middle East policy than upon anything that the
Soviets offer to Amman.
Southwest Asia
36. Iran-Iraq War. The Iran-Iraq war has been
more a challenge to the Soviets than an opportunity.
Ideally, the Soviets would like to be the close ally of
both states, and in practice have tried hard not to
antagonize either belligerent. Although the USSR
would prefer the war to end, it has benefited from the
reduction of oil exports from the belligerents and the
resulting maintenance of a fairly stable world oil price.
The USSR has also realized a significant gain in hard
currency from arms sales: from 1979 through 1983 the
Soviets exported almost $8 billion worth of arms to the
belligerents ($7.07 billion to Iraq and $0.8 billion to
Iran), which was more than 30 percent of all Soviet
arms sales to the Third World in this period.
37. The Soviets are now trying to exploit fears of
escalation to improve their contacts with the moderate
Arab states such as Kuwait and Jordan. From Mos-
cow's point of view the least favorable outcome of the
Iran-Iraq conflict would be a clear-cut victory by
either side, which could mean the emergence of a
Persian Gulf power less susceptible to Soviet influence.
The Soviets would respond to a renewed Iranian
offensive by increasing the flow of arms to Iraq.
Despite its latent difficulties with the current regime
in Baghdad, the USSR would not want to see a
fundamentalist Shia government in Iraq, of the type
that the Iranians would prefer. The Soviets also have
mixed feelings about the effects of a possible Iranian
victory on the conservative Arab Gulf states. The
USSR would welcome a weakening of the monarchies
in these states, but recognizes that the immediate
effect of Iranian expansionism would be to push the
Gulf states much closer to the United States. The
alternative prospect of fundamentalist Islamic regimes
in the Gulf states is also unappealing to Moscow. To
avoid outcomes of this sort, the USSR would favor a
negotiated settlement of the Gulf war, and ideally
would like to be the mediator.
38. Iraq. Long before the Gulf war broke out, the
USSR became the main supplier of arms to Iraq, and
was repaid in hard currency. Iraq's hostility to Israel
and the United States and its isolation from other Arab
states helped establish a reasonably close working
relationship between Baghdad and Moscow. Iraq's
radical political stance and its status in nonaligned
circles were also useful to Soviet Third World aims.
But, from the start there were frictions:
? The Iraqis consistently refused to allow the Sovi-
ets military access.
? They put severe limits on the number of Soviets
permitted in Iraq.
? The periodic purges of local Communists added
an element of distrust.
In the early stages of the Gulf war, the Soviets
embargoed arms supplies to Baghdad in the hope of
gaining influence in Iran. As Tehran repeatedly re-
buffed Soviet overtures, however, Moscow became
increasingly disenchanted with Iran. The USSR re-
sumed arms shipments to Iraq in 1981, and negotiated
additional arms agreements the following year when
Iranian offensives resulted in the occupation of small
portions of Iraqi territory. Despite the ups and downs
of the relationship, the mutual interests of Iraq and the
USSR are sufficient to sustain the flow of arms and the
Soviets will make great efforts to prevent an Iraqi
defeat.
39. Iran. The big prize in the Gulf area is Iran. But
gaining influence in Tehran has proved to be elusive
for the Soviets. The Iranians have recently made some
gestures toward improving relations with the USSR,
primarily in order to induce the Soviets to reduce arms
sales to Iraq. Moscow draws scant satisfaction from the
bitterly anti-American stance of the Iran regime,
because the Soviets are clearly cast as the second most
hated outsiders. The USSR puts up with the anti-
Communist, anti-Soviet thrust of Iranian policy in
hopes that the aging Khomeini will soon leave the
scene, and that the successors will take more kindly to
the Soviet friendship offers and to the Communist
Tudeh party. At the same time, Iran has been obtain-
ing Soviet-style arms from North Korea and Libya,
and some directly from the USSR. This creates a
degree of Iranian dependence on Soviet weapons that
the Soviets may hope to exploit in the future, especial-
ly since the primary recipient of Soviet-style arms has
been the Revolutionary Guard, the main internal
security force.
40. It is clear that the Soviets will make a major
effort to gain influence with a successor regime. If,
despite Soviet blandishments, the successor govern-
ment in Tehran takes an anti-Soviet stance, the USSR
will probably resort to subversive efforts, such as
support of Iranian minorities against the central gov-
ernment or the stimulation of internal disorder in Iran
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in order to bring pressure on the regime. If internal
order did fragment in Iran, with or without Soviet
stimulation, the Soviets would try to promote the
establishment of a regime more attuned to Soviet
interests. The worst outcome for the Soviets would be
a return of massive US and Western involvement in
Iran, which the USSR would go to some lengths to
prevent.'
41. Kuwait. Kuwait is the only Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) state that has relations with the USSR.
Kuwait's nervousness over developments in the Gulf
war, its desire for new arms, and its unhappiness with
the US reaction to its arms requests provide opportuni-
ties for Soviet arms sales. The original Soviet-Kuwaiti
arms deal for $258 million in 1982 was supplemented
by an additional deal in the summer of 1984 for an
unknown amount. Soviet military technicians have
gone to Kuwait in the past, but only on a temporary
basis, and the Kuwaitis are likely to continue to resist
the permanent stationing of Soviet military personnel
in their country. Most Kuwaiti military equipment is
of Western origin, and the Soviet share of the arsenal
will remain small. Moreover, the Kuwaitis now earn
more from their investments in the West than they do
from the export of oil. The Soviets have no similar
attractions to offer. In sum, although a fundamental
reorientation of Kuwaiti politics is unlikely, the Soviets
hope that increased contacts with Kuwait will also give
them better entree to the other members of the GCC.
42. The Arabian Peninsula. The USSR has made a
substantial military and political investment in South
Yemen and maintains a large military aid program in
North Yemen, including some 500 Soviet advisers and
technicians. The Soviets will continue to cultivate both
the pro-Soviet regime in South Yemen and the more
nonaligned ruler of North Yemen. They may hope
that their strong presence in the Yemens will induce
Riyadh to open diplomatic relations with them. Mos-
cow may also hope to use its dialogue with Jordan or
Kuwait to gain entree to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the
United Arab Emirates. The Soviets do not expect to
gain much influence in Saudi Arabia in the next few
years but would like at least to establish diplomatic
relations and present themselves as an alternate great-
power supporter for the Saudis.
South Asia
43. Although South Asia does not enjoy the same
status in Soviet eyes as the Middle East and Southwest
Asia region, the Soviets have a capability to bring
military force to bear in this area close to their own
territory. Yet, the Soviets' large-scale employment of
armed forces in Afghanistan has put the USSR on the
defensive in several respects and now shapes its inter-
ests, priorities, and options throughout the region. The
principal Soviet goals in South Asia in the later 1980s
will be:
? To preserve the pro-Soviet regime in
Afghanistan.
? To apply pressure to Pakistan to stop funneling
aid to the Afghan rebels.
? To preserve and strengthen ties with India.
44. Afghanistan. The USSR has made scant prog-
ress in five years of combating Afghan insurgents. The
political base of the Soviet-installed Afghan Govern-
ment is still narrow, the Afghan Army's capabilities
are not improving, and the resistance is as strong as
ever. Yet, the Soviets have no intention of withdraw-
ing, not the least because it would be an admission of
failure. Over the longer haul, the Soviets expect to
prevail over the rebels by outlasting them and wearing
them down. Thus, their most likely policy will be to
persevere, keep up the military pressure on the guer-
rillas, wear down the proresistance support of the
countryside through reprisals, isolate the urban popu-
lace through enhanced internal security, tinker with
the internal Afghan leadership to make it more effec-
tive, and try to gain international acceptance of their
client regime. Over the long run, the USSR expects to
educate a new generation of Afghans to accept Soviet
tutelage.
45. Pakistan. The Soviets believe that Pakistani
support for the Afghan insurgents has been a major
cause of their own problems in Afghanistan, and will
try a variety of approaches to Pakistan in the next few
years in order to reduce that support. The Soviets are
willing to use offers of economic aid in an attempt to
induce the Pakistanis to reduce support of the Afghan
insurgency. At the same time, the Soviets are increas-
ing political and military pressure on President Zia to
coerce him into ending help to the insurgents. Moscow
is sponsoring and aiding a variety of dissident Paki-
stani groups and could supplement this with direct
military pressure on the border from Soviet or Afghan
units against refugee camps in Pakistan, The Soviets
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will continue to exploit Indo-Pakistani tensions to put
pressure on Pakistan. Getting rid of Zia, or forcing Zia
to abandon aid to the Afghan rebels is a major aim of
Soviet policy in South Asia, and would have the
additional benefits of depriving the United States and
China of their principal supporter in South Asia.
46. India. Soviet relations with India have been a
main facet of Moscow's Third World policy for some
30 years. From the point of view of Moscow, India is
important because of its size, strategic location, region-
al dominance, leadership in the Nonaligned Move-
ment, and its role in the containment of China. The
war in Afghanistan has increased Soviet interest in
India, and Soviet efforts to secure Indian help in
muting international criticism of the Afghan interven-
tion and in putting pressure on Pakistan. India finds
the close relationship with the USSR attractive because
it gets modern weapons relatively cheaply, and is the
only Third World country to get Soviet technology for
the production of advanced Soviet-style weapons. It
can settle trade accounts with the USSR by rupee
payments, and the close relationship with the USSR is
a deterrent against China.
47. The Soviets are aware, however, that the Indi-
ans cannot be taken for granted and that the alliance
requires constant cultivation and nurturing. The USSR
is not likely to gain military access rights in India. The
Indians view with apprehension Soviet long-term goals
in the region. They are nervous about the changed
regional balance in South Asia caused by the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan, and are uneasy over the
increased US aid to Pakistan, brought on in part by the
Soviet Afghan policy. The Indians, in their relations
with Pakistan, will take Soviet attitudes into consider-
ation but are unlikely to make them the determinant
of their foreign policy. 5 Overall, the Soviets and the
Gandhi government are satisfied with the current state
of the relationship and neither is likely to attempt any
major alteration.
Southeast Asia
48. Southeast Asia is important to Moscow, princi-
pally because of its potential for containing China, but
also for improving the Soviet naval posture in the
region and for its access to the Indian Ocean.
49. Vietnam. The USSR's posture in Southeast Asia
hinges on its relationship with Vietnam. Hanoi has by
far the largest armed force in the region and has
developed extensive economic and military ties with
Moscow. Since 1978 these ties have been formalized in
a friendship treaty and in Vietnam's membership in
CEMA. Vietnam depends heavily on Soviet aid to
maintain the lengthy conflict in Kampuchea and to
sustain its crippled and mismanaged economy. The
Soviet investment in Vietnam provides:
? Maintenance of a militarily strong anti-Chinese
state on China's south flank, a possible second
front in any Sino-Soviet conflict.
? Potential leverage in Southeast Asian regional
affairs.
? A military presence, with access to important
facilities, along the main sea route between the
Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the oil tanker
route from the Persian Gulf to Japan.
50. There are some persistent frictions and misun-
derstandings in the Vietnam-USSR relationship:
? Hanoi is unhappy over what it considers Soviet
stinginess in aid.
? The Soviets accuse the Vietnamese of squander-
ing aid in mismanaged projects.
? The Vietnamese continue to worry about Sino-
Soviet talks, and possible deals at the expense of
Vietnam.
? Although the Soviets generally support Vietnam
in its Kampuchean adventure, this issue compli-
cates Moscow's relations with other states in the
region.
Nonetheless, the alliance is likely to prevail for many
years, because each side provides the other with
irreplaceable assets: the Soviets give significant aid and
military backing against the Chinese threat, and in
return get access to air and naval bases and intelli-
gence and communications facilities.
51. ASEAN.6 The Soviet alliance with Vietnam
adversely affects Moscow's chances for improved rela-
tions with the ASEAN countries. All ASEAN states are
staunchly anti-Communist and are alert to the dangers
of Soviet penetration. The only opportunity for Soviet
penetration in these countries would come from a
major internal political upheaval in an ASEAN state.
Perhaps the most critical situation looming in the
ASEAN world is the political uncertainty of the
? The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries
are Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Brunei.
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Marcos regime in the Philippines. But the USSR is not
supporting either the Muslim insurgents on Mindanao
or opposition groups in Manila and seems to have very
few assets to bring about a revolutionary change in the
Philippines. Although it appears unlikely that political
events in the capital would jeopardize the US bases,
Moscow would certainly give high priority to attempts
to influence a post-Marcos regime and would support
any faction that promised to close the US bases.
Latin America
52. The principal value of Soviet influence in Latin
America, from Moscow's viewpoint, is to serve as a
means to distract and consume resources of the United
States?political, economic, and military?that might
otherwise be brought to bear on higher priority Soviet
interests. Central America is particularly useful to the
Soviets in this context. Soviet advances there are
especially embarrassing to the United States, and have
the potential for causing dissension in US public
opinion and disagreements among the NATO allies.
An additional value to the USSR, if its outposts of
political influence can be maintained, is to help
project to the world an image of expanding Soviet
power on the international stage.
53. Cuba. Cuba will remain the USSR's single most
important client in the Third World. It is the hub of
Soviet access to the Caribbean area, and its principal
value to the Soviets is its proximity to the United
States. Cuba is ideally located for both Soviet intelli-
gence collection activities and for the threat it poses to
US economic and military interests in the area, and as
an entree for further Soviet involvement. Cuba is also
prized as the premier Soviet ally in military and
technical penetration of the Third World. At the same
time, however, Cuba's proximity to the United States
makes it extremely vulnerable. The Soviets reassure
Castro of their support, but do not want to be publicly
committed to the defense of Castro. For his part,
Castro wants Soviet support but does not want to be
seen as an outpost of the Warsaw Pact and thus a
logical first target in a larger East-West confrontation.
54. Soviet military assistance to Cuba has averaged
about $500 million a year since 1977. Since 1978 the
Soviets have delivered to Cuba over 150 jet aircraft, an
air defense command and control system, three diesel
attack submarines, two frigates, two landing ships,
four modern land-based antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
helicopters, 11 missile attack boats, nine Turya-class
hydrofoil torpedo boats, and a wide variety of other
types of weapons. Meanwhile, Cuban air and sealift
capabilities have increased greatly to the point where,
if unopposed, Castro could unilaterally move and
logistically support some 10,000 troops in Central
America. The Soviet military presence and scope of
activities in Cuba have also steadily grown. A Soviet
signals intercept facility at Lourdes is the largest and
most important such facility outside the Soviet Union.
Soviet naval air deployments to Cuba are increasing,
and the Soviets now have access to an airfield where
they could support up to eight Bear aircraft. Some
7,000 to 9,000 Soviet military personnel are stationed
in Cuba, including the Soviet brigade of 3,000. This
brigade provides local security for Soviet installations,
protection for Castro against possible local opponents,
and may be intended as a deterrent to a US invasion.
Moreover, the Soviets have further options including
deploying more naval craft to the region and deploy-
ing permanently ASW aircraft or ASW naval craft in
Cuba. Such moves would force the United States to
devote more attention to watching the Soviets there,
and would complicate US regional strategic planning.
55. Nicaragua. Besides Cuba, the USSR values the
success and survival of the radical regime in Nicara-
gua. But clearly the Soviet interest there is of a lower
order. The Soviets are now delivering oil to Nicaragua
and are assuming some other economic costs, but are
not willing to give a security guarantee. Concern over
US reactions is probably the chief reason Moscow has
kept its direct military role in Nicaragua small. The
Grenada operation in 1983 illustrated to the Soviets
the danger of their playing too overt a role in the
hemisphere. A conspicuous Soviet presence in Nicara-
gua would also alienate Mexico, Panama, and other
countries that are uneasy over the growth of Nicara-
guan military power. By operating largely through
Cuba and other intermediaries, such as Bulgaria, the
Soviets have avoided irretrievable commitments to the
preservation of the Sandinista regime. If the Sandinis-
tas consolidate their power and appear to become
more secure from both internal opposition and possible
outside intervention, the Soviets might move more
openly to strengthen their position in Nicaragua.
56. El Salvador. Moscow is probably now taking a
long-term view of the armed struggle in El Salvador.
Whereas the insurgency appeared close to success a
couple of years ago, the failure of the guerrillas and
the political and military aid response of Washington
have probably dimmed Soviet hopes of an early
success. But, even if a quick triumph is now unlikely,
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the Soviets will continue to support and encourage
Western Hemisphere insurgencies to keep the United
States embroiled in controversial conflicts in countries
close to its borders.
57. Peru. Peru is the only major customer for Soviet
arms in South America, and the only one where Soviet
military advisers are accepted. The USSR has shipped
over $1.5 billion of military goods to Peru and is
supplying about 150 military advisers. The Soviets
have maintained their distance from the Maoist "Sen-
dero Luminoso" insurgents. Although key members of
the Peruvian political elite, including the President,
would like to reduce Peru's arms dependence upon the
Soviets, they are hampered by the difficulty and high
cost of obtaining Western arms, particularly in light of
Moscow's continued attractive financing terms.
58. Elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, the
Soviets are interested in maintaining good, if not close,
relations with Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Colom-
bia. They see little chance of political upheaval that
would bring a pro-Soviet regime into office in any of
these countries, but growing trade relations with Ar-
gentina, and clandestine operations in Colombia and
Mexico offer long-range opportunities to build influ-
ence. The Soviets may also try to exploit, in conjunc-
tion with the Cubans, new opportunities for influence
in politically unstable and coup-prone Bolivia.
Africa
59. The USSR's interest in Sub-Saharan Africa is
somewhat different from its interest in regions de-
scribed above. Sub-Saharan Africa is of less immediate
value to the USSR, but does provide some payoffs: a
source of commodities the Soviets must import; influ-
ence with regional states at the expense of the West
and China, thereby enhancing Soviet prestige as a
superpower; and, especially, access to naval and air
facilities. Soviet incursions in Africa do not encounter
the intensity of US resentment that penetration of
Latin America would stimulate.
60. By taking advantage of the breakup of the
Portuguese empire and the fall of the Ethiopian
monarchy in the mid-1970s, the Soviets established
influential positions in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozam-
bique. Cuban combat forces have been of critical
importance in establishing and maintaining pro-Soviet
regimes in Angola and Ethiopia. But all of these
regimes are beset by major insurgencies, and the costs
to the Soviets are rising. Furthermore, the history of
Soviet involvement in Africa is a reminder to the
Kremlin of the impermanence of influence-building
efforts on the dark continent. The earlier failures in
Ghana, Mali, Zaire, Sudan, and Somalia have not been
forgotten, and current Soviet programs in Africa stress
the building of institutional and party connections
rather than the sponsorship of individual political
figures, who are subject to overthrow (Ghana's Nkru-
mah or Mali's Keita) or change of allegiance (Somalia's
Siad Barre). Also, the Soviets are leery of investing
their own scarce resources in an impoverished conti-
nent. Soviet stinginess in economic aid is well known
in Africa, but the insecurity of some African leaders is
so great, and the lure of cheap Soviet weapons and
training so strong, that there will be ample opportuni-
ties for further Soviet incursions in other African
states. Moreover, the liberation struggles in Namibia
and South Africa will give the Soviets continued
opportunities in the region.
61. Southern Africa. In southern Africa, the Soviet
achievements are mixed. Moscow has established a
considerable degree of influence over the Government
of Angola, and to a lesser degree over that of Mozam-
bique. It has acquired air and naval facilities in
Angola. But the Soviet economic and counterinsur-
gency aid has been insufficient to maintain internal
stability in either country. In Angola over 30,000
Cuban forces have not stemmed the insurgent offen-
sives. As a result, Angola recently reached agreement
with South Africa, the principal regional power, by
which the South Africans agreed to withdraw from
southern Angola in exchange for an Angolan pledge to
prevent SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organi-
zation) insurgents from operating in Namibia. Mozam-
bique also continues to be beset by an active insurgen-
cy, and it too has come to terms with South Africa, in
the hope of reducing South African backing of that
insurgency and of gaining Western economic aid. The
Soviets were excluded from the negotiations that
resulted in these agreements.
62. The Soviets, however, show no signs of with-
drawing from the area and are encouraging local
rulers to maintain their Soviet-style state structures.
They may also believe that the South Africans will
prove to be so duplicitous that the agreements between
their clients and the South Africans will fall apart, or
that the infusion of economic aid from South Africa
and the West will keep Angola and Mozambique
afloat while the Soviets strengthen their political and
military ties with these two countries. Soviet deliveries
of major weapons to Angola and Mozambique have
continued unabated thus far in 1984. Still, the progress
of the insurgency in Angola is a continuing cause for
concern. The recent accords have complicated Mos-
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cow's efforts to support SWAPO and the ANC (Afri-
can National Congress). The Soviets have already lost
some influence in Mozambique, and in Angola they
face the prospect of either having to increase their
commitment significantly or seeing the Angolan Gov-
ernment come to terms with the insurgents. Such a
development could lead to Soviet-Cuban frictions over
policy in Angola, and could result in a serious Soviet
setback.
63. Ethiopia. The Soviets probably expect that
their investment in Ethiopia will turn out better.
Chairman Mengistu is totally dependent upon massive
Soviet arms deliveries to sustain his counterinsurgency
campaigns in the northern provinces, and has proceed-
ed with the establishment of a Leninist-style party in
Ethiopia. Despite Mengistu's predilection for Marx-
ism-Leninism and his need for the USSR, there is a
tenuous quality to the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship.
Ethiopian military leaders do not care for the Soviet
military advisers, nor do they value the advice offered.
The Soviets are generally pleased with Mengistu's
establishment of the party in September 1984, but new
tensions are likely to arise concerning its structure and
its responsiveness to Soviet guidance. The Soviets,
Cubans, and East Germans have extensively reshaped
the Ethiopian intelligence apparatus, but the Ethi-
opian service does not trust the advisers and, indeed, is
running clandestine counterintelligence operations
against all foreigners, including foreign Communists.
Moreover, some Ethiopian intelligence officers were
involved with the military in late 1983 in talks about a
coup to oust Mengistu. A military coup by the Army
leadership, unhappy with the Soviet presence and the
setbacks in the counterinsurgency campaigns, could
undo nearly 10 years of Soviet effort in Ethiopia. This
would be a substantial setback for the USSR, which has
put a great deal of effort into the political indoctrina-
tion of party cadres and gains militarily from the use
of air and naval facilities in Ethiopia. Soviet planes use
Asmara Airfield for ASW and reconnaissance missions
over the Indian Ocean, and the USSR has built an
austere naval repair and replenishment facility on the
Dahlak Archipelago in the Red Sea. The Dahlak
facility supports the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron,
and is strategically situated?both in terms of Soviet
sea routes from the European USSR to ports in the
Soviet Far East, and as a partial counter to US use of
facilities in nearby Somalia, Kenya, and Sudan.
64. West Africa. The main motivation for an in-
crease in Soviet activities in the area would be the
possibility of establishing air and/or naval facilities for
reconnaissance and ASW operations in the mid-Atlan-
tic area and for air transport from the USSR and Cuba
to southern African countries. At present the Soviets
have limited air and port access in Guinea and enjoy
port-call privileges in other West African states. Al-
though the Soviets have had thus far moderate success
in developing closer relations with the leftist regimes
of Ghana, Benin, Burkina (formerly Upper Volta), and
Guinea-Bissau, they have been unable to persuade the
Guinean Government to restore access of their naval
reconnaissance aircraft to Conakry Airfield, and they
are still probing for such privileges elsewhere along the
West African coast. The abysmal poverty and inherent
political instability of most of the West African states
may make any one of them a -soft- target of future
Soviet efforts to gain regional military access. Al-
though the Soviets may receive permission to use more
African airfields for Military Transport Aviation
(NITA) flights, they are unlikely to fly reconnaissance
aircraft to any of these countries.
65. Zaire. Elsewhere in black Africa, the Soviets
would probably like to take advantage of any popular
discontent resulting from the IMF-imposed economic
reforms. Zaire is one of the major debtor states in
Africa. Efforts by the Soviets in the early 1960s to
establish influence in Zaire failed, and their support
for dissident Zairian factions in most recent years has
also accomplished little. The dissident groups now
encamped across the border in Angola have deterior-
iated, and currently are incapable of mounting anoth-
er invasion of Zaire. (With outside aid, however, they
could conduct sabotage operations throughout the
country, including the mineral-rich province of Sha-
ba.) So long as President Mobutu is in charge in
Kinshasa, there is virtually no chance for increased
Soviet influence in Zaire, and, even if political turmoil
were to follow Mobutu's demise, Soviet assets would be
insufficient to take advantage of the situation, particu-
larly if those Western countries with investments there
used their own assets to preserve Western influence.
66. The Soviets are also likely to continue to probe
for access rights in small islands in the eastern Atlantic
and the Indian Ocean, and eventually in the Pacific.
They probably still see advantages in establishing
political and military influence in places like Cape
Verde, Madagascar, Seychelles, and Mauritius. Their
best prospects seem to be in Seychelles.
SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE
SOVIET POSITION IN THE THIRD WORLD
67. There is a clear interaction between Soviet
military capabilities and Soviet military access to
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Third World countries. On the one hand, the growth
of Soviet military power, together with the ability to
deliver more sophisticated weapon systems, makes the
Soviet Union appear as a more attractive partner and
thus makes Soviet entree into some Third World states
easier. On the other hand, the USSR's growing military
presence in the Third World enhances its military
power, while some of the money earned from arms
sales can be used to finance other Third World
adventures, or to help sustain the high level of Soviet
arms production. But there is no automatic dynamic
between Soviet military power and Third World
access.
The Delivery of Sophisticated Weaponry
to Certain Third World States
68. The USSR's Third World strategy will almost
certainly involve the exploitation of its most potent
export?armaments. It could supply to certain Third
World states more sophisticated weapons that have a
potential to alter, but not necessarily upset, regional
balances of power to its benefit and to the disadvan-
tage of the United States and its friends in the Third
World. It should be noted that the Soviets have
consistently refused to supply to any Third World
state the equipment, material, or technology for nucle-
ar weapons. We have no reason to believe that this
policy will change in the time frame of this Estimate.
Nevertheless, the trend in Soviet weapons deliveries is
to provide more modern and sophisticated equipment.
(In part, this is driven by the demand of Third World
states for more modern arms.) By delivering advanced
types of arms to selective Third World recipients, the
Soviet Union could aggravate regional tensions, there-
by diverting US attention from other areas where
Soviet interests are more sensitive, and forcing the
United States to respond to new crises. Among the
Soviet options are:
? Introducing new generations of conventionally
armed short-range ballistic missile systems (SS-
21s) into the inventories of Iraq and Libya, as the
Soviets have for Syria.
Supplying North Korea and Vietnam with MIG-
23 fighter aircraft, thereby reversing the previous
Soviet reluctance to send such sophisticated
weapons to these countries. Such deliveries, if the
quantities were large enough, would affect the
military balance of power on the Korean Penin-
sula and Southeast Asia. Friends of the United
States?South Korea and Thailand?would seek
reassurance and matching support from
Washington.
? Delivering or facilitating the delivery of jet
combat aircraft to Nicaragua. This would be a
direct challenge to the United States, in view of
previous US warnings at a high level against such
actions.
69. Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba over the next
year or two will be strongly influenced by the need to
show support for Cuba in the wake of the Grenada
setback and by the belief that the United States is not
likely to tolerate aggressive Soviet actions in the area.
Soviet gestures of support for Cuba might include:
? Introducing MIG-25 high-altitude interceptors
into Cuban inventories, or significantly expand-
ing the Soviet brigade on the island, or both.
These measures would reflect Moscow's solidari-
ty with Castro and send a signal to Washington
that the USSR does not intend to back away from
an active presence in the Caribbean, despite
Grenada.
? Delivering an SA-5 long-range, high-altitude
missile system, which would considerably extend
the range of Cuban air defenses, and indicate a
continued assertive Soviet policy in the Carib-
bean.
The loss of Grenada will not dissuade the USSR from
continuing to probe for opportunites in the Western
Hemisphere, but the Soviets will more carefully weigh
possible US responses.
70. In the Third World, Soviet arms exports have
an advantage over the West because of the USSR's
voluminous stocks of weapons, rapid delivery, and
favorable pricing and financing arrangements. Soviet
disadvantages are also likely to persist: client prefer-
ence for Western equipment, especially where ad-
vanced electronics (for example, avionics) are in-
volved, and client distaste for the political intrusions
and obligations that come with Soviet arms. Also, the
poor Soviet record on maintenance and spare parts
deliveries is well known.
Political and Military Use of the USSR's
Expanding Military Power
71. The Soviet Union is likely to try to make the
maximum political use of its expanding military pow-
er. The Soviets now have a military presence in
virtually every region of the world, with the most
important support facilities in Cuba, Vietnam, Ethio-
pia, South Yemen, and Angola. Soviet SIGINT sites
have been established in three countries and Soviet
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military communications facilities are located in six
countries. Reconnaissance and long-range strike air-
craft and naval units operating from distant bases
would afford the Soviets important intelligence and
limited ASW, anti-CVBG (against carrier battle
groups), and anti-SLOC (against sea lines of communi-
cations) capabilities in time of crisis or limited
hostilities.
72. But Soviet military capabilities in distant areas
of the Third World are constrained by certain limita-
tions and deficiencies of equipment, organization, and
force structure. For instance, the USSR still would not
be able to prosecute successfully a distant operation
akin to the British reconquest of the Falklands, pri-
marily because of limited ASW capabilities, the lack of
aircraft carriers, lack of aerial refueling capabilities for
tactical and airlift aircraft, and insufficient amphibi-
ous capability. Also, the capability of Soviet airlift and
the new fighters and bombers to reach many Third
World countries in a crisis remains dependent on
securing overflight privileges or staging rights. More-
over, the USSR's logistic capability is still limited. The
USSR also lacks depots, pre-positioned equipment
(except in Vietnam), and fuel storage facilities for
deployment in distant areas. These deficiencies are
likely to inhibit major Soviet military advances into
distant areas of the Third World within the time
frame of this Estimate.
73. The extensive Soviet military aid programs in
the Third World offer opportunities to develop per-
sonal and institutional relationships with the military
establishments of Third World states and to seek
acceptance of Soviet installations. Soviet entreaties to
that end have worked best when a regime feels
threatened either by invasion (such as Cuba or Ethio-
pia) or by strong internal opposition (such as Angola or
Guinea). In some cases military aid provided the
entree that Moscow needed eventually to gain some
access to naval and air facilities (such as in South
Yemen and Libya). But India, for instance, has stead-
fastly refused to give the Soviets access to facilities
despite receiving some $6.3 billion in military deliver-
ies over the last 20 years. Iraq also refuses, despite
relying on Soviet military deliveries for its survival in
its war with Iran. Thus, military aid does not automat-
ically translate into access to military facilities.
74. The Soviets have sometimes taken direct mili-
tary action to back allies in the Third World. Soviet air
defense forces have been deployed to a few countries,
and they engaged in combat with Israeli aircraft over
Egypt in 1970. To back up Soviet diplomacy, Soviet
naval units deploy to the South Atlantic, the Mediter-
ranean, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea,
and the Soviets regularly deploy naval aircraft to six
countries.
75. The Soviets are clearly aware of the limitations
of their Third World military power projection capa-
bilities as compared with those of the United States. At
the same time, they are conscious that the political
payoff of visible Soviet military power in the Third
World is not negated by superior military power on
the part of the United States and its allies in these
regions. Local political conditions, a lack of Western
interest in the country, or decisions in the West to
avoid a possible conflict in some instances may leave
the USSR the effective extraregional power in some
Third World encounters.
76. The nature of the Soviet military presence in
the Third World is changing in several important
ways. The deployment of Soviet naval aircraft is
sharply up since 1979, and is again at the level reached
in the early 1970s when Egypt was a Soviet ally.
Reconnaissance and ASW planes regularly use airfields
in Cuba, Vietnam, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Ango-
la, and occasionally in Syria and Libya. In addition,
the Soviets maintain a few strike aircraft in Vietnam.
The support facilities in these countries are kept at an
austere level, in part because the Soviets lack confi-
dence in the permanence of their relationships with
the host countries. These arrangements are sufficient,
however, for the Soviets to expand their ASW/recon-
naissance flights to the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean,
the South China Sea, and perhaps the South Atlantic?
areas that could not be covered except from foreign
bases. Soviet use of Third World facilities is naturally
dependent on the continued approval of the host
country. Each of these countries has to calculate the
benefits, costs, and risks of supporting the Soviets and,
in a time of crisis, most would not want to be drawn
into an East-West confrontation. Moscow seems to
recognize these vulnerabilities in its policy of not
becoming overly dependent on any overseas facility.
77. The Soviets are working to improve their capa-
bilities for military action in distant areas. They are
developing an increasingly sophisticated global com-
mand and control network. The USSR has an expand-
ing long-range airlift capability and is gaining experi-
ence with frequent flights to distant areas. The IL-76
AWACS (airborne warning and control system) air-
craft will soon be operational and could be sent to
crisis areas to bolster local air defenses and demon-
strate Soviet concern. Also, secure, reliable, and redun-
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dant global communications based on satellite systems
are increasingly available to Soviet units and military
advisory groups. The Soviets, moreover, are develop-
ing fighter planes configured for air-to-air refueling,
and are in the process of constructing a carrier for
conventional takeoff and landing aircraft. These sys-
tems now being developed will not begin to come into
the inventory until the early 1990s.
78. The increased Soviet presence in the Third
World and the new systems being developed are
gradually widening the Soviets' range of options in
distant areas and enhancing their ability to come to
the aid of beleaguered pro-Soviet regimes. The Soviets
may also be able to exploit the footholds they now
have to promote or support subversion and insurgen-
cies in neighboring territories. But, through 1995 the
Soviets will still not have the military capabilities in
areas distant from the periphery of the USSR to pose
any direct challenge to the United States or major
regional powers such as South Africa or Israel, which
will themselves be enhancing their own military
capabilities.
CONSTRAINTS AND VULNERABILITIES OF
SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD
79. Over the past few years the momentum of
Soviet advance has slowed, and the previous advances
have created new problems for the USSR. It now has
major investments to defend and is finding the bur-
dens and costs of the empire to be heavy and
increasing.
US Activism and Soviet Response
80. One of the major reasons for the slowing of
Soviet momentum in the Third World has been the
more vigorous and assertive US foreign policy. Among
the indications of the evolving thrust of US Third
World policy are US actions in support of Central
American governments threatened by leftist guerrillas,
the military operation in Grenada, joint exercises with
Egypt, clandestine assistance to the Afghan rebels,
diplomatic support of southern African disengage-
ment, the acquisition of access facilities and pre-
positioning rights for CENTCOM in the Red Sea/Ara-
bian Peninsula area, and the continued deployment of
strong naval task forces to the Mediterranean, the
Pacific, and the Indian Ocean.
81. Also, some of the West European allies have
taken more forceful positions on particular Third
World issues. The determination of the United King-
dom to defend its interests in the Falklands and the
dispatch of French forces to Chad indicate that the
European allies can project limited military power to
protect their own interests in the Third World if they
choose to do so. But the NATO Allies are less support-
ive of US policy in Central America and clearly do not
share the US sense of global responsibility for contain-
ing Soviet expansion.
82. The Soviets have steadfastly rejected the US
notion that they should proscribe their activities in the
Third World for the sake of better US-Soviet relations.
Further, in view of the history of the past 10 years,
Moscow has come to expect that any US retaliatory
measures in such areas as trade or arms control will be
subject to conflicting political and economic pressures
from Allies and domestic interest groups and will
therefore be short lived. The European displeasure
over the American operation in Grenada and the sharp
disagreements between the United States and France
over the timing and nature of a response to the Libyan
invasion of Chad were undoubtedly welcomed by
Moscow. But the Soviets also realize that their aggres-
sive actions have carried some costs and have affected
the overall approach of the West toward the Soviet
Union. In making decisions about future actions,
therefore, they are likely to weigh potential regional
gains and risks as well as possible effects on their
overall posture vis-a-vis the West. In no case, however,
do we expect the threat of political or economic
sanctions to prevent Soviet exploitation of a major
opportunity to penetrate a key area such as Iran or the
Arabian Peninsula.
83. The Soviets, however, may not be convinced of
the permanence of the renewed Western resolve. The
operation in Lebanon was short lived. Domestic US
debate over Central American policy and the Europe-
an and Latin American criticism may suggest to the
Soviets an erosion of US consensus. Overall, the US
success in Grenada, the deployment of US AWACS
aircraft to the Middle East, increased US naval activi-
ty, and other actions have probably affected Soviet
calculations, though we do not know to what extent.
Insurgencies in Pro-Soviet Third World States
84. A major change in the Third World scene is that
the Soviets now have major investments to defend.
They can no longer just prowl, looking for new
opportunities to gain influence, but are involved in the
defense of pro-Soviet regimes in Afghanistan, Ethio-
pia, Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua?states in
which the Soviets have secured major influence since
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1975. These client governments are confronting active
insurgencies, the kind of guerrilla movements that
used to plague only pro-Western Third World states:
? In Afghanistan, more than 100,000 Soviet troops
have been combating guerrilla forces for over
four years. Insurgent attacks on Soviet and Af-
ghan Government targets are on the increase, as
are insurgent-directed strikes in Kabul itself.
? In Ethiopia, the presence of some 6,000 to 7,000
Cuban combat troops (now reduced from earlier
levels of over 10,000) and 1,700 Soviet military
advisers, some of whom are in the field with
Ethiopian armed forces, has had little effect on
countering the persistent separatist insurgencies
in the northern provinces. With Cuban help, the
Ethiopians have reconquered the disputed Oga-
den area in the south, but the conflict with
Somalia drags on, and Somali-sponsored insur-
gents make sporadic raids into Ethiopian-held
territory.
In Angola, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas
control more than a third of the country, inter-
dict the main transportation lines, and have a
political and embryonic economic infrastructure
in liberated areas. The 30,000 or so Cuban troops
in Angola have shown no particular stomach or
aptitude for counterinsurgency. And in neighbor-
ing Namibia, the SWAPO guerrillas, despite
Cuban and Soviet support, have been increasing-
ly ineffective against the South Africans. The
Soviets played no part in the recent Angolan-
South African disengagement arrangements, and
now face the prospect of either increasing their
own commitment or accepting a situation in
which their influence is diminished.
In Mozambique, guerrillas previously sustained
by South Africa operate throughout the country
and are playing havoc with the economy and
with government control in much of the country-
side. As in the Angolan case, the Soviets were not
involved when Mozambique and South Africa
reached agreement to cease support for guerrillas
directed against each other. The agreement re-
flects the Mozambican recognition that the Sovi-
ets and Cubans are unwilling to provide mean-
ingful economic and counterinsurgency aid.
? In Nicaragua, the pro-Soviet regime is beset by a
variety of attacks and harassment by anti-Sandi-
nista guerrillas.
? In Southeast Asia, Nloscow's Vietnamese allies
face powerful Chinese pressure, and in Kampu-
chea are mired in combat with various insurgent
elements.
85. The variety, intensity, and persistence of the
insurgents in pro-Soviet Third World states suggest
that the USSR has no ready solution to the problem.
The Soviets will probably have to devote even more of
their energy and resources in the next few years to
defending their clients against domestic challenges. If
these insurgencies show signs of succeeding, the Soviets
will be faced with extremely difficult choices about
upping their already heavy commitments or seeing
their client governments overthrown.
86. The Soviets also confront problems involving US
intermediaries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
and Israel that provide assistance to insurgents in pro-
Soviet Third World countries. A member of the Soviet
Central Committee International Department re-
marked privately that it was "necessary to step up
considerably the struggle against the imperialist policy
of exporting counterrevolution." The acquisition of an
empire has clearly created new problems for the
Soviets.
Soviet Inability To Remedy Third World
Economic Problems
87. The most far-reaching change in the Third
World with which both the United States and the
Soviets must cope is the drastic, long-term decline in
the economic fortunes of most Third World countries.
This development poses some formidable barriers to
the Soviet search for influence opportunities. The most
advanced (and most important) Third World countries
are seeking new sources of investment and new access
to markets. The Soviets cannot supply either invest-
ment funds on the scale required or markets for most
Third World products. The generally poor perform-
ance of the USSR in providing economic aid in recent
years is well known throughout the Third World. The
only hope of economic recovery for most Third World
states is through investment and increased exports,
which can come only from the United States and its
Western allies.
88. The most important avenues for North-South
debate and dialogue now and in the near future are
through the international financial institutions, such as
the IMF, in which the Soviets play no part. As long as
the Third World countries believe that it is worthwhile
to remain engaged with these institutions, the Soviets
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will be frozen out of perhaps the most crucial set of
international relations existing today. The problem for
the United States and the West is to sustain the
expectations of Third World countries that economic
recovery can be achieved if they cooperate with the
international lending agencies and look to the West for
investment and export opportunities.
Economic Constraints on Soviet Support to Client
States
89. The costs to the USSR of maintaining a string of
client states are rising because of the economic distress
those countries are experiencing. In addition to the
burden of their own defense establishment, the Soviets
must contend with the economic troubles of their
Warsaw Pact allies. The annual costs of providing
economic and military support to Cuba and Vietnam
are now about $4.5 billion and $1 billion, respectively,
and the poverty-stricken Ethiopians and Angolans are
seeking more aid from Moscow. This comes at a time
when revenues from Soviet exports of energy will rise
only marginally (from $16 billion this year to some
$17-19 billion by 1990), and the Soviets will find it
harder to gain hard currency from their arms exports.
90. Over the next decade the USSR will face a
policy dilemma?how to maintain a balance between
pressure to cut economic costs of subsidizing vital
Third World clients and the need to keep the client
regimes viable. The USSR's reluctance to extend sig-
nificant economic assistance to its clients is likely to
create or exacerbate strains in bilateral relations and
could limit Soviet willingness or ability to exploit
opportunities in the Third World. Some client states?
Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen?
are unhappy with Soviet stinginess on development aid
and are looking elsewhere for help. Although these
regimes are tied to the USSR by their urgent need for
substantial military assistance and will continue to be
dependent for years, Soviet reluctance to furnish
meaningful economic aid might provide openings for
the United States and other Western states to gain
some leverage.
91. Soviet officials acknowledge, moreover, that the
poor domestic economic performance of the USSR is
undermining its credibility as the socialist model for
the Third World. A senior official at a leading aca-
demic institute in Moscow admitted publicly last year
that the dramatic overall decline in growth rates in the
USSR and Eastern Europe diminishes Communism's
attractiveness as an alternative to capitalism. He rec-
ommended greater selectivity in choosing Third
World client states, and more financial support from
the East Europeans in order to compete with Western
economic expansion- in the Third World. Indeed,
within the past two to three years, some Third World
countries which had previously associated capitalism
with colonialism, have begun to turn away from
centrally controlled economic structures and to seek
economic improvement through a gradual adoption of
market-oriented mechanisms. This development is still
too tentative to be termed a trend, but the widening
Third World disillusionment with centrally planned
economies serves to reduce one avenue of Soviet
entree to the Third World.
92. An additional economic problem for the USSR
is the increasing inability of client states to pay hard
currency for the arms and other goods and services
provided by the Soviets. Libya is no longer able to
bankroll the purchases of Soviet arms for its friends.
Indeed, Qadhafi is finding it difficult to sustain his
own high level of arms imports from the USSR, and
Iraq is increasingly impoverished by the war with Iran
and the reduced subsidies from Saudi Arabia and
other Persian Gulf states. The Soviets are unhappy
with the inability of Angola, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and
Zambia to meet arms repayment schedules. Nonethe-
less, the generous rescheduling of terms for Cuba,
Peru, Pakistan, Syria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Viet-
nam indicates that the USSR will not let economic
considerations drive policy on what it deems its major
interests in the Third World.
Image Problems and Divergent Interests
93. The Soviets are also encountering a range of
obstacles, some of which they create themselves, that
limit their influence in the Third World:
? In such countries as Ethiopia, South Yemen, and
Vietnam, where the USSR is the main source of
foreign support, Soviet personnel are recipients
of the usual resentment that stems from a clash
of cultures. Soviet behavior often strikes client
peoples as obnoxious and overbearing.
? The divergence of strategic interests between the
USSR and the Third World clients sometimes
leads to serious misunderstandings and difficul-
ties. The USSR has not always supported the
regional military engagements of Egypt, Syria,
Iraq, and Vietnam in the past, and will be
cautious about involvement in future local con-
flicts, even if this leads to charges of lack of
support by the client state.
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Some Third World countries?for example, In-
dia, Iraq, and Kuwait--refuse to allow the Sovi-
ets access to air and naval facilities even though
some of them receive enormous quantities of
Soviet military aid. They believe they can deal
with the USSR without becoming fatally caught
in its embrace.
? Other Third World states that sympathize with
many aspects of Soviet policy?India, Tanzania,
and Madagascar?are trying to avoid the appear-
ance of close relations with Moscow in order to
preserve their nonaligned image and retain the
support of moderate Third World states.
Despite their greater involvement in Third
World activities, the Soviets have been excluded
from most of the diplomatic maneuvering in the
Arab-Israeli and Lebanon disputes, from the
Rhodesian settlement, from the ongoing Namibia
negotiations, and from the Contadora efforts in
Central America.
OUTLOOK
Prospects for Soviet Policy
94. There is no evidence of reduced Soviet interest
or activity in the Third World, despite the array of
obstacles and vulnerabilities, the rising costs of empire,
and the relative scarcity of major penetration opportu-
nities during the early 1980s. Moscow still views the
Third World as the Achilles' heel of the West. The
radicalization of postcolonial elites and the anti-US
orientation of many -nonaligned- states offer tempt-
ing opportunities for the USSR to insinuate itself in
ruling circles of Third World countries primarily
through military and technical assistance. The preva-
lence of authoritarian styles of government in the
Third World and Soviet willingness to support such
governments facilitates Soviet entree. Moreover, lead-
ers of Third World countries know that the USSR will
not ask embarrassing questions about drug trafficking,
human rights, and democracy. The USSR is likely to
consider the potentially heavy costs worth the effort,
particularly if it can gain influence in key regional
states, threaten or destabilize major allies of the United
States, or acquire military rights and facilities.
95. The Soviets may eventually even benefit from
the Third World debt crisis. Most debt-ridden and
economically depressed Third World countries are
pursuing politically unpopular austerity programs im-
posed by international lending agencies and Western
banks as a condition for further loans. The longer this
situation prevails without perceptible improvement in
the economies of Third World states, the greater the
chances of a dramatic backlash. There is a fair chance
that at some point a Third World government will
conclude that continued attempts to satisfy Western
lenders is not worth the pain and trouble, and that a
repudiation of foreign debts is preferable to continued
economic dictation by international and Western enti-
ties, a step that would bring psychic satisfaction to
sonic leaders. There is also a fair chance for the
overthrow of Third World regimes by groups or
individuals intent on repudiating the debts of the
incumbents. Such actions could open new opportuni-
ties for Soviet influence building.
96. Political instability has been and will continue
to be a common Third World phenomenon. Vulnera-
ble Third World governments will be overturned for a
variety of reasons and many successor governments
will seek aid from any quarter. Soviet offers of
military and security assistance will appear attractive
to rulers whose hold on power is tenuous, or who may
see Soviet military aid as a way of retaining control of
the armed forces. In such cases, the ideological persua-
sion of the Third World ruler will be of less conse-
quence than the prospective gains that the local ruler
and the USSR perceive in establishing a client-patron
relationship.
97. The Soviets will continue to probe in a number
of Third World areas, such as the Indian Ocean states,
West Africa, and the Caribbean, where weak and
impoverished regimes might be attracted by promises
of military and economic aid and where Soviet access
to ports or airfields could extend the reach of Soviet
military power. Even if denied such access, the Soviets
would gain if they persuade Third World states to
refuse similar rights to the West. The ousting of the US
military presence from Iran by the Islamic revolution-
aries was a considerable loss to the United States and a
plus for the Soviets, even though the United States has
taken steps to compensate for that loss and the USSR is
currently on bad terms with the Tehran regime.
98. The virtual certainty that a number of pro-
Western Third World governments will be overturned
in the next few years does not necessarily mean that
the USSR will gain accordingly. Some shaky pro-
Western governments are likely to be replaced by a
different set of leaders who also look to the West.
Other successor regimes will seek nonalignment, and
still others will be open to the highest foreign bidder.
On the other hand, the next few years could also see
the toppling of pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World.
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99. Depending on the speed and extent of Third
World political deterioration, a variety of opportuni-
ties will present themselves to the Soviets. It is reason-
able to assume, therefore, that the USSR in the next
few years will be able to increase its influence in some
Third World countries, but it is virtually impossible to
predict precisely the locale or the nature of Soviet
gains.
100. New Soviet activity in the Third World is
likely, however, to result in some corresponding ad-
vantage to the United States. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan reinforced China's desire to strengthen
ties with the United States, and made Pakistan more
amenable to aiding the United States in support of
Afghan resistance fighters. The progressive strengthen-
ing of the Soviet hold on Ethiopia prompted neighbor-
ing states to seek US security guarantees. And, as noted
earlier, the Soviet alliance with Vietnam adversely
affects Moscow's relations with the ASEAN states, to
the benefit of the West.
101. A constant factor in the outlook for the Soviets'
Third World policy will be their quest for opportuni-
ties to expand their influence to the south, in Iran and
the Arabian Peninsula. Enjoying no appreciable influ-
ence now, their prospects are conditioned by the great
political uncertainties that affect these countries. De-
spite the institutionalization of its Islamic regime, Iran
is bound to experience political turmoil after Khomei-
ni's death that may create opportunities for Soviet
penetration. All the states of the Peninsula are vulnera-
ble to destabilizing social and religious forces that
could open opportunities for Moscow. Soviet willing-
ness to probe for openings and advantages in an area
of such high sensitivity to both the USSR and the West
will inevitably give rise to risks of miscalculation and
possible superpower confrontation.
Effects of Major Variables and Conditioning
Factors
102. To an important degree the USSR's dramatic
advances in the Third World in the past decade were
due to extraordinary opportunities:
? The collapse of the Portuguese empire and the
Ethiopian monarchy in Africa.
? The upheaval in Iran and the coup in
Afghanistan.
? American disillusion with Third World involve-
ments in the aftermath of Vietnam.
Such circumstances are not necessarily repeatable, but
the instability and turmoil likely to prevail in much of
the Third World in the late 1980s will assure the
Soviets abundant opportunities to make advances.
Although we are confident that the Soviets will con-
tinue to make the effort and bear the costs, we feel
that their prospects for success will depend more than
ever on a number of new factors, some of which will
be beyond the direct control of the Kremlin
decisionmakers.
103. Much will depend upon the degree of political
and economic stability in the USSR and in the United
States. A major economic depression in the West or a
dramatic shift of American public opinion toward
isolationism would present the Soviets with opportuni-
ties not otherwise available to them. Conversely, politi-
cal turmoil in Eastern Europe or confusion in Mos-
cow?either in a future leadership succession or in the
subsequent consolidation of power?or economic dete-
rioration in the Soviet empire more dramatic than we
now see could put a severe crimp in Soviet Third
World activities.
104. The growing capability of the Soviet Union to
deploy forces and provide advanced weapons to coun-
tries in distant areas is certain to complicate US policy
in the Third World. Some trends in modern military
technology?for example, cheaper precision-guided
munitions (PGM) systems?give relatively weak coun-
tries the ability to challenge limited deployments of
modern naval and air power. Whether these develop-
ments will offset each other, or give a considerable
advantage to one side or the other, is difficult to
predict. Yet it is worth noting that the USSR is
attempting to extend its overseas empire in an era
when all nations have access to modern weapons. In
this respect, the European imperialists of the 18th and
19th centuries had it easier.
105. Another variable of uncertain dimension is the
capability of the USSR to cope with low-intensity
warfare of the type now besetting a number of Soviet
client states. It is by no means certain that all pro-
Soviet regimes can maintain power in their own
countries. If a Soviet client regime were to be over-
thrown by anti-Soviet insurgents, or reached a com-
promise with the internal opposition by ousting the
Soviets, the consequences for Soviet prestige in the
Third World would be adverse, but hard to assess at
this stage.
106. Meanwhile, the general environment of the
Third World will continue to be turbulent and there-
fore inviting to Soviet penetration, but also not easily
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controlled because of internal and interstate conflicts,
economic distress, and a possibly shifting superpower
balance. Local conflicts will often contain risks of
escalation that both the USSR and the United States
would see as potentially dangerous. It is conceivable
that the United States and the USSR will find them-
selves taking parallel actions to prevent escalation of
some conflicts especially in volatile areas and situa-
tions?such as the Koreas, or the Iran-Iraq or Leba-
non-Syria-Israel arenas. In the main, however, the
Soviets will see regional troubles as opportunities to
advance their power either by acting against the
United States, or by cooperating with it in ways that
gain them entry where otherwise they would be on the
sidelines.
107. There is a possibility that, facing a variety of
obstacles, particularly the intractability of the Third
World to great-power dictates or more vigorous US
political and military actions to combat their influ-
ence, the Soviets might deliberately restrain their
actions in some lower priority regions as part of a
policy to cool the East-West power competition and to
buy time for later opportunities. One of the aims of
such a tactic would be to encourage US domestic and
alliance pressures that inhibit US engagement in Third
World areas. However, they would be very unlikely to
see this as a permanent retrenchment. They would in
no case accept formal limitation on their right to
expand their power in the Third World, although they
might signal a more restrained policy by voicing some
ideological line to the effect that now is the time for
consolidation, not expansion.
108. In sum, we believe the USSR will continue to
see its actions in the Third World primarily as an
essential element of East-West rivalry. The Soviet
approach will oblige the West to address the challenge
of Soviet power and more sophisticated tactics, but this
should not obscure the social and economic problems
that pave the way for Soviet penetration. This means
that the key external variables determining Soviet
Third World prospects will be the economic health of
the United States, Europe, and Japan; and the durabil-
ity of US internationalist foreign policy, military
strength, and national will to commit considerable
power and resources to the Third World arena.
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ANNEX
Table 1 Value in million US dollars
Soviet and East European Arms Deliveries to Third World
1975
Algeria
Libya
1980
1983
USSR
29
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
410
25
332
408
112
1,030
101
618
457
Angola
137
4
561
8
Benin
35
10
NA
Congo
NEGL
1
22
NEGL
Ethiopia
1
595
7
388
Guinea
Madagascar
Mozambique
14
1
6
24
14
23
50
29
240
2
Nigeria
71
13
16
Somalia
65
9
Tanzania
Uganda
4
39
10
12
65
Zambia
12
178
3
Nicaragua
3
44
55
Peru
69
1
129
92
Grenada
3
1
Cu ba
Egypt
70
305
650
236
14
2
15
5
31
Iran
95
252
50
15
Iraq
400
85
871
126
1,307
171
Jordan
95
1
North Yemen
4
477
241
South Yemen
37
370
10
312
NEGL
Kuwait
34
Syria
310
41
2,321
181
1,226
76
Afghanistan
36
20
100
9
India
133
11
624
25
657
North Korea
50
NEGL
NEGL
Vietnam
75
1,385
680
Other countries
20
8
16
17
21
42
Total
2,227
274
9,30l
565
7,703
883
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Table 2
Soviet and East European Economic Credits
and Grants Drawn by Third World Countries
Value in million US dollars
1975
1980
1983
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
Algeria
21
6
28
36
42
24.
Morocco
2
9
1
5
2
6
Tunisia
7
4
5
6
Angola
3
1
4
2
Congo
1
7
1
6
4
3
Ethiopia
2
2
63
5
203
16
Guinea
7
1
2
NEGL
4
Mali
4
2
4
Mozambique
11
4
4
31
19
Nigeria
NEGL
24
21
150
35
Seychelles
4
Somalia
16
I
NEGL
Sudan
1
9
6
10
Tanzania
1
1
1
1
2
9
Zambia
5
NEGL
13
NEGL
12
Burma
10
14
Laos
1
Philippines
10
Argentina
3
15
14
10
10
Bolivia
5
9
8
3
2
Brazil
1
4
37
3
15
Grenada
3
Nicaragua
2
79
88
Peru
6
16
8
1
12
Uruguay
1
10
1
Cuba
1,065
3,465
4,100
Cyprus
2
Egypt
80
38
14
31
8
60
Iran
72
23
35
80
10
Iraq
33
32
29
15
36
14
North Yemen
3
NEGL
10
3
3
South Yemen
8
5
26
4
13
23
Syria
35
25
26
24
26
34
Turkey
50
16
45
25
63
30
North Korea
100
260
50
Vietnam
310
1,050
1,025
Afghanistan
17
298
6
354
25
Bangladesh
17
7
4
6
9
8
India
72
19
40
4
75
3
Pakistan
29
4
70
12
65
2
Other countries
10
7
10
23
17
10
Total
1,977
272
5,587
298
6,475
495
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Table 3
Third World Military Trainees in USSR and Eastern Europe
1975
1980
1983
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
Algeria
50
NA
300
200
Libya
600
25
80
115
900
1,200
Angola
10
NA
NA
NA
Benin
70
Congo
NA
30
Equatorial Guinea
200
Ethiopia
100
NA
NA
Guinea
70
10
15
NA
NA
Guinea-Bissau
100
NA
Madagascar
60
60
NA
NA
Mozambique
210
NA
100
NA
NA
Nigeria
100
35
10
Somalia
500
20
Tanzania
490
100
25
NA
NA
Uganda
100
50
Zambia
200
100
Peru
100
85
Nicaragua
200
110
NA
Iran
35
NA
200
Iraq
250
25
NA
100
50
North Yemen
100
1,200
400
South Yemen
180
NA
100
10
Syria
200
50
NA
NA
600
100
Afghanistan
300
800
NA
650
NA
India
100
40
NA
710
NA
Other countries
280
100
10
210
80
Total
3,965
235
2,745
630
4,195
1,840
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Table 4
Third World Technical Trainees in USSR and Eastern Europe
1975
1980
1983
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
Algeria
200
390
250
100
200
100
Libya
100
100
Angola
100
100
50
50
Ethiopia
100
100
100
Guinea
200
50
Mozambique
50
100
150
1,000
Nigeria
25
50
350
250
Sierra Leone
125
Tanzania
100
Nicaragua
25
500
Syria
250
20
50
50
250
50
Egypt
350
300
50
50
25
Iran
200
50
50
50
Iraq
300
50
750
500
500
250
South Yemen
100
Afghanistan
70
100
350
350
500
250
Bangladesh
250
50
India
290
20
240
250
50
Pakistan
130
25
250
250
Other countries
285
90
60
20
65
NA
Total
2,650
1,145
2,325
1,420
2,965
2,700
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Table 5
Third World Academic Students in USSR and Eastern Europe
As of December
1975
1980
1983
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
Algeria
1,100
650
950
1,000
1,340
1,025
Libya
55
60
155
410
Mauritania
165
20
220
75
400
65
Morocco
150
120
300
170
700
320
Tunisia
140
250
490
250
750
110
Angola
50
250
625
860
1,150
745
Benin
105
10
305
30
335
65
Burundi
120
25
100
400
115
330
Cameroon
125
55
100
25
75
50
Cape Verde
400
65
200
65
Central African Republic
275
30
210
250
200
105
Chad
175
15
275
60
65
40
Congo
800
85
800
560
1,240
555
Equatorial Guinea
85
280
225
5
Ethiopia
585
325
2,700
2,060
3,350
1,700
Ghana
115
200
650
350
875
465
Guinea
170
195
605
410
350
' 320
Guinea-Bissau
25
25
235
215
350
210
Ivory Coast
30
240
700
200
250
Kenya
150
150
655
150
360
120
Madagascar
300
120
1,190
185
2,110
215
Mali
370
215
410
225
1,000
250
Mauritius
150
30
170
40
190
30
Mozambique
40
40
300
225
500
2,275
Niger
125
15
160
55
110
45
Nigeria
820
320
1,180
2,090
1,110
1,425
Rwanda
245
160
40
210
30
Senegal
170
25
210
90
205
160
Sierra Leone
365
50
415
60
240
80
Somalia
500
100
10
300
Sudan
600
955
325
1,100
560
1,145
Tanzania
270
360
600
455
620
190
Togo
115
35
400
35
450
20
Uganda
250
40
250
130
345
100
Upper Volta (now
Burkina)
200
15
310
240
Zaire
285
240
45
355
135
160
Zambia
135
160
300
75
200
625
Zimbabwe
75
55
180
95
160
250
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Table 5
Third World Academic Students in USSR and Eastern Europe (continued)
As of December
1975
1980
1983
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
Bolivia
180
60
100
50
190
45
Chile
180
65
35
25
45
40
Colombia
375
85
535
530
2,060
320
Costa Rica
260
60
360
260
1,000
500
Ecuador
190
195
285
535
450
405
_
Nicaragua
120
25
135
95
1,020
405
Panama
130
15
500
140
770
370
Peru
125
65
715
25
720
370
Dominican Republic
150
90
215
80
825
110
Cyprus
490
500
475
700
880
575
Egypt
310
505
295
395
175
260
Greece
90
140
4,600
Iran
20
160
5
255
100
170
Iraq
350
300
250
1,290
400
2,475
Jordan
850
885
2,000
3,525
4,800
3,785
Lebanon
410
55
450
40
900
135
North Yemen
325
85
560
100
2,000
125
South Yemen
250
220
810
330
1,500
335
Bahrain
165
35
140
50
Syria
550
575
2,135
1,695
4,000
500
Israel
190
120
Afghanistan
665
230
4,850
2,975
8,835
2,625
Bangladesh
810
295
660
325
590
110
India
450
95
975
165
1,400
1,105
Nepal
135
550
650
15
Pakistan
100
80
125
70
120
100
Sri Lanka
140
25
300
65
400
75
Other countries
975
470
910
765
1,090
805
Total
17,920
10,410
35,195
27,565
56,070
34,785
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Table 6
Soviet, East European, and Cuban
Economic Technicians in Third World Countries
1975
1980
1983
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
Cuba
USSR
E. Europe
Cuba
Algeria
2,500
3,100
6,000
4,350
170
6,000
5,450
275
Libya
25
5,750
1,000
23,900
3,000
5,200
49,500
3,500
Morocco
450
745
250
2,100
175
2,370
Tunisia
130
320
335
330
240
210
Angola
500
2,770
8,000
1,500
2,000
6,000
Congo
120
175
850
80
250
400
55
200
Ethiopia
Guinea
70
20
1,000
500
900
1,200
700
1,000
500
310
300
195
235
450
350
240
Guinea-Bissau
20
20
200
75
80
150
100
80
Mali
210
25
450
25
500
5
10
Mozambique
10
10
350
620
700
1,000
1,375
1,000
Nigeria
115
90
1,500
850
10
5,300
1,125
Somalia
1,000
150
50
5
Tanzania
200
65
100
30
95
100
100
150
Zaire
10
185
10
185
270
Zambia
155
45
270
10
250
155
Bolivia
40
25
200
15
50
15
Nicaragua
50
45
3,000
230
400
6,200
Grenada
265
50
15
700
Peru
240
100
25
45
40
50
Egypt
1,800
695
365
250
200
205
Iran
2,725
785
2,200
75
2,000
650
Iraq
2,150
425
7,000
3,610
2,000
5,000
10,325
400
Jordan
70
10
1,250
25
650
North Yemen
200
175
30
175
100
South Yemen
175
145
2,000
700
300
550
750
200
Syria
1,000
800
1,000
2,225
1,000
3,000
10
Turkey
300
15
1,500
250
1,500
1,200
Kuwait
25
1,500
700
Afghanistan
920
25
3,000
215
100
5,000
250
100
Bangladesh
390
65
65
50
NA
75
35
India
1,500
165
1,400
140
1,000
150
Pakistan
185
85
750
250
1,000
250
Other countries
835
460
685
1,030
1,095
725
870
720
Total
17,975
14,870
33,565
47,750
20,200
41,085
83,385
20,785
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Table 7
Soviet, East European, and Cuban
Military Technicians in Third World Countries
1975
1980
1983
USSR
E. Europe
USSR
E. Europe
Cuba a
USSR
E. Europe
Cuba a
Algeria
600
65
1,000
15
NA
775
15
NA
Libya
300
35
1,800
150
NA
2,000
800
NA
Angola
1,000
550
17,000
1,200
500
30,000
Congo
30
5
120
10
400
100
NA
200
Ethiopia
5
1,500
200
12,000
1,700
600
9,000
Guinea-Bissau
60
5
50
15
50
55
50
Madagascar
300
200
150
30
Mali
30
5
180
25
150
Mozambique
25
500
50
215
800
800
Somalia
900
100
Tanzania
50
5
140
85
NA
Grenada
5
NA
45
Nicaragua
NA
200
100
60
3,000
Peru
35
150
150
Iraq
930
100
1,000
50
1,200
100
North Yemen
110
10
300
500
10
South Yemen
235
25
1,000
100
500
450
100
400
Syria
2,900
300
3,000
240
5,500
300
Afghanistan
315
35
4,000 b
2,000 b
25
NA
India
270
30
150
435
NA
Other countries
640
65
295
80
160
175
105
25
Total
7,435
785
16,485
1,485
30,730
17,525
2,645
43,520
a Includes Cuban combat troops.
b Excludes troops in integral units.
38
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