SOVIET GLOBAL MILITARY REACH

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00126R000400510003-7
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

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Soviet Global Military Reach
Secret
NIE 11-6-84/S
April 1985
Copy 0 2
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ICI I E 11-6-84/S
SOVIET GLOBAL MILITARY REACH
Information available as of 13 September 1984
was used in the preparation of this Study.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Purposes of Soviet Global Military Reach ....................................... 7
Soviet Goals and Objectives ......................................................... 7
Previous Uses of Soviet Forces in Distant Areas ........................ 8
Limitations on Deployment of Soviet Forces in Crises ............. 9
Scope of Soviet Foreign Military Involvement:
How Is It Changing? .................................................................... 9
Soviet Allies: What Are Their Main Contributions to the USSR's
Global Reach? ............................................................................... 21
Regional Military Implications ........................................................ 22
Mediterranean and Middle East .................................................. 23
Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and East Africa ............................. 25
South China Sea and Southeast Asia ........................................... 26
Caribbean and Central and South America ............................... 29
South Atlantic and West Africa ................................................... 30
Soviet Capabilities: How Do New Developments Affect Soviet
Global Military Reach? ................................................................ 31
Aerial Refueling ............................................................................ 32
Merchant Fleet .............................................................................. 32
Airlift ............................................................................................. 32
Soviet Naval Infantry ................................................................... 34
Airborne Forces ............................................................................ 34
Special-Purpose Forces ................................................................. 35
Tactical Air Support ..................................................................... 35
Global Command and Control .................................................... 35
Military Significance of Soviet Forces and Facilities Abroad........ 35
Future Outlook ................................................................................. 36
Potential Soviet Gains and Losses ................................................ 36
The Base Case ............................................................................... 37
Alternative Futures ....................................................................... 37
ANNEX: Levels of Soviet Foreign Military Involvement ................. 41
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SCOPE NOTE
Soviet capabilities to project military power in the areas around the
immediate periphery of the USSR are far superior to Soviet military
capabilities in more distant areas. Formidable Soviet forces have long
existed for operations in areas of Europe, the Far East, and Southwest
Asia that are contiguous to the USSR. Beyond this zone, Soviet military
activities have traditionally been limited principally to military assist-
ance and support for foreign forces. Over the last 20 years, however, So-
viet foreign military involvement abroad has increased significantly.
Soviet forces have made greater use of support facilities overseas, Soviet
naval and air presence at longer ranges from the USSR has been more
frequent, and on a few occasions Soviet forces have become directly
involved in combat overseas. This Study is concerned with Soviet
military capabilities in those more distant areas over the next five to 10
years.
This Study distinguishes between what we term "global military
reach" and the more common notion of military "power projection."
The essential distinction between military reach and power projection
in this Estimate is the nature and scope of military operations envi-
sioned under each concept. Military reach is associated with smaller
scale operations, often in the context of supporting an ally in a regional
crisis. Power projection envisions the deployment of major combined-
arms formations, usually against substantial opposition. Whereas the
projection of US military power, especially to Europe, is vital to US se-
curity, Soviet defense does not require the deployment of substantial
military forces abroad. Indeed, for the United States all major wars in
the last century have been fought beyond American shores. Soviet
wartime experience has been just the opposite. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the two armed forces have been developed with
differing requirements. By our definition, the forces and operational
concepts usually associated with power projection include pre-posi-
tioned equipment, rapid deployment and amphibious forces, foreign
staging and logistic bases, aircraft carriers, and aerial refueling capabili-
ties. These characteristics have generally been lacking in Soviet forces.
Instead we note growing Soviet military involvement abroad of a
different nature, not closely associated with the NATO contingency.
This involvement-which we call global reach-includes provision of
arms, dispatch of military advisers, acquisition of air and sea access
abroad, and small-scale deployment of Soviet forces.
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The military significance of Soviet access to foreign facilities is the
key issue addressed in this Study. More generally, this Study:
- Examines Soviet military involvement in areas beyond the
range of tactical aircraft based in the USSR.
- Describes trends in Soviet access to foreign facilities over the
past two decades.
- Examines new Soviet military developments that affect capabil-
ities for distant military operations.
- Identifies the roles of client governments in Soviet foreign
military involvement.
- In conclusion, discusses the type of military threats that Soviet
forces operating from foreign facilities are likely to pose for US
and friendly forces during the next five to 10 years.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The steady increase in size, capability, range of operations, and
scope of activity of Soviet forces abroad over the last 20 years provides a
global military reach that Moscow did not previously possess. The
military significance of Soviet forces beyond the periphery of the USSR
already has been demonstrated in a variety of ways. In peacetime and
during regional crises Soviet forces abroad have:
- Intervened in Middle East conflicts in defense of allies.
- Supported the intervention of Cuban forces in Africa.
- Directed foreign forces in combat operations.
- Collected intelligence and conducted reconnaissance and sur-
veillance missions.
- Provided support to Soviet allies, including arms, advice, train-
ing, and demonstrations of force.
- Protected the Soviet fishing fleet and other interests abroad.
- Resupplied or provided new military equipment rapidly to
Soviet allies involved in hostilities.
- Evacuated Soviet personnel.
- Established a military presence in new areas and, at times,
increased an already existing military presence, thus complicat-
ing the military planning of adversaries.
In all of these regional activities, however, the Soviets have been
careful not to challenge directly either the United States or other strong
regional powers. This is because, beyond the range of its land-based
airpower, Moscow would have difficulty in rapidly mounting or
sustaining a distant power projection effort even in the face of limited
Third World opposition. Soviet forces deployed abroad are thinly
spread, are vulnerable, and lack offensive punch. In particular, they
lack adequate air defenses, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, at-sea
logistics, staging rights, aerial refueling capabilities, and tactical air
support.
Despite these weaknesses, Soviet forces abroad are becoming more
significant factors in a possible military confrontation with the United
States, particularly just prior to hostilities and during the early stages of
a conflict. For example, they could:
- Attack Western naval targets at the onset of hostilities.
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- Provide targeting information and intelligence.
- Delay some reinforcements.
- Divert some US military resources.
- Disrupt some shipping and air routes.
For the next five to 10 years, Soviet military deployments abroad
will be characterized by three persisting developments: first, Soviet
capabilities for distant military operations will improve, although Soviet
forces are not likely to be deployed in substantially larger numbers;
second, Soviet use of current foreign facilities is likely to be more
extensive even though there probably will not be a significant expansion
in Soviet military access abroad and perhaps it will even decline; third,
Soviet regional allies that act in support of Moscow's interests abroad
will become increasingly capable as they are provided with modern
Soviet arms.
Soviet Capabilities
Several new developments over the next five to 10 years will
improve Soviet capabilities for distant military operations, including:
- Introduction of aerial refueling for fighter and transport
aircraft.
- Improvements in airlift and sealift capabilities.
- Establishment of a global command and control system incorpo-
rating a new airborne warning and control system aircraft,
along with space-based communications, intelligence, and navi-
gation systems.
- Deployment of more capable submarines and surface combat-
ants, especially the large, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
Even with these improvements, however, Soviet forces abroad will
continue to have serious limitations. They probably will remain modest
in numbers, including only about 15 percent of the Soviet Navy. Transit
delays and other factors could limit the rapid augmentation of naval
formations. In addition, many of the foreign facilities used by Soviet
forces will lack adequate repair, refueling, and storage capabilities.
Also, Soviet airlifts to distant areas will encounter problems in overflight
clearances, landing rights, and refueling.
Over the next decade, Soviet military forces still will not be able to
carry out substantial combined-arms operations against major military
opposition in areas distant from the USSR. Soviet intervention in Third
World conflicts probably will be restricted to situations where the risk
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of escalation to a war with the West is judged to be small and Soviet ca-
pabilities to perform higher priority strategic .missions would not be
seriously degraded. In general, Soviet military intervention would most
likely involve naval maneuvers, or the dispatch of pilots, air defense
units, or small contingents of ground forces to bolster local defenses.
Such intervention is most likely in the Middle East, where the stakes are
high and the region close to the USSR.
We do not believe that Soviet forces abroad currently play a major
role in Soviet military doctrine for general war, which remains focused
on the traditional mission of strategic defense of the homeland. Soviet
forces routinely deployed abroad are now, and will remain for the
period of this Estimate, too few and too weak to allow the Soviets to en-
gag( in distant power projection.
Soviet Use of Foreign Facilities
Soviet capabilities for distant military operations have generally
improved with increased access to foreign facilities, although the Soviet
Navy continues to rely primarily on its own auxiliaries for logistic
support. The USSR now has a military presence in most major regions of
the world. Soviet naval forces now maintain a continuous presence in
the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic off the coast of
West Africa, and the South China Sea. Access in Vietnam has grown to
the point where the Soviets have established a naval and air operations
and logistics base at Cam Ranh Bay. (See figure 1.)
Even though much of the past Soviet success in gaining access has
been due to circumstances that are not likely to be repeated, instabilities
in the Third World are likely to provide a few additional opportunities
for Soviet exploitation, and Moscow will continue widespread probing
for additional access. The Middle East region will remain the top-
priority target. In addition to those countries where the USSR already
enjoys routine military access, others may permit more extensive Soviet
access, most notably Seychelles or some countries in West Africa. On the
other hand, Moscow could also lose military access, as for example in
Angola, Guinea, or Ethiopia.
Regardless of these gains or losses, increasing use of foreign
facilities to which the Soviets already have access can be expected,
particularly in Vietnam. A South China Sea naval squadron has
probably been established. The number of submarines, surface combat-
ants, and naval aircraft deployed to Cam Ranh Bay will continue to
grow. Soviet fighter aircraft also are likely to be deployed to Cam Ranh
Bay. In the Caribbean, Soviet aircraft and ships probably will make
more frequent deployments, but we do not anticipate the introduction
of any new Soviet-manned offensive weapons in Cuba.
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Soviet arms transfers will continue to improve substantially the
military capabilities of several Soviet allies. Moscow will export modern
weapons to selected Third World allies, in some cases before they are
made available to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. In addition, joint
military exercises could improve the potential for coordinating com-
bined military operations.
Certain Soviet allies, most notably Cuba, will be willing to act in
support of Soviet interests short of direct confrontation with the United
States. By funneling military supplies and providing troops and advisers,
Cuba can mask the full extent of Soviet involvement abroad.
The foregoing Key judgments are Secret Noforn.
Figure 1
Soviet Military Presence Abroad
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9 Naval access
^ Naval aviation
db Military communications
Ab SIGINT
0 Airlift detachment
A Air defense units
o Combat brigade
Naval operating areas
(Dsurface Qair
,::, intermittent
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DISCUSSION
Purposes of Soviet Global Military Reach
Soviet Goals and Objectives
1. Soviet activities in the Third World are designed
largely to complement Moscow's strategy toward the
United States, the West, and China. Although the
pattern of Soviet involvement in the Third World has
been subject to ebbs and flows, overall Soviet goals
have remained fairly constant: to gain political influ-
ence and, in particular cases, increase Soviet military
potential. Important objectives in support of both of
these goals include:
To promote Third World responsiveness to Soviet
interests and initiatives.
To gain recognition of the Soviet Union's status as
a superpower with global interests and reach.
To promote the establishment of regimes closely
allied with the USSR.
To increase access to military facilities.
To diminish Western, especially US, and Chinese
influence.
- To deny military access to the West.
To increase the potential to hinder Western
access to strategic resources. (u)
2. Since its first major forays into the Third World
in the mid-1950s, the USSR has made impressive gains
toward ensuring, as Gromyko said in 1971, that no
question of substance can be decided without consid-
eration of Soviet interests. The USSR has treaties of
friendship and cooperation with II Third World states
and at least one other-with Libya-may have been
agreed to in principle. Moscow has continuing military
aid relations with nearly 40 countries in the Third
World, and about 20,000 military advisers are scat-
tered throughout the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. In addition, Soviet forces enjoy access
to a niunber of facilities in the Third World. (s NF)
While the growth of Soviet overseas presence and
influence over the last three decades has been impres-
sive, it has not been without costs and setbacks. Two
friendship treaties-with Egypt and Somalia-have
been abrogated. In each instance, the Soviets lost
access to important naval and air facilities. While they
have tried with some success to offset these losses, they
have yet to fully recoup, especially in the eastern
Mediterranean. (u)
4. Moscow employs a variety of instruments to gain
and maintain influence in the Third World and to
secure facilities of military importance. The more
successful approaches involve arms exports, the dis-
patch of advisers, training in the USSR, and, on
occasion, the use of allies. Economic aid has generally
not been a major tool of Soviet influence, except for
Cuba and Vietnam, which receive major trade subsi-
dies. In addition to military and economic assistance,
the Soviets maintain military forces in the Third
World. The bulk of the forward deployed forces are
from the Soviet Navy. They include about 20 principal
surface combatants, 30 attack submarines, several
company- and platoon-size detachments of naval in-
fantry, and 20 to 30 Soviet naval aviation aircraft.
Soviet army deployments include a brigade in Cuba
and two regimental-size air defense units in Syria. (s
NF)
5. In addition to military and economic tools, Mos-
cow employs other means to further objectives in the
Third World including clandestine or "active meas-
ures." These are designed to penetrate foreign govern-
ments, support opposition groups, and disseminate
propaganda and disinformation. Active measures in-
clude the use of insurgencies, ethnic or separatist
groups, and other armed resistance elements (some of
which engage in terrorist activities). In addition, local
Communist parties, Soviet-owned commercial compa-
nies, Soviet embassy staffs, foreign intelligence ser-
vices, visiting officials of various Soviet educational,
trade, social, or other organizations, students trained in
the USSR or other Communist countries, labor, stu-
dent, or other mass organizations, and worldwide front
organizations have been used clandestinely. Plans for
such use of active measures are coordinated among the
International Department of the party's Central Com-
mittee, the Committee for State Security (KGB), and
sometimes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
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Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Ministry
of Defense. (s NF)
6. To an important degree the USSR's dramatic
advances in the Third World were due to a combina-
tion of circumstances that are not necessarily repeat-
able. The coincidence of the collapse of the Portuguese
empire and the Ethiopian monarchy in Africa, the
upheaval in Iran, and the aftermath of Vietnam
provided extraordinary opportunities for the Soviets.
Nevertheless, instability and turmoil are likely to
prevail in much of the Third World, providing not
only an abundance of opportunities for Soviet exploi-
tation, but also impediments to consolidation of previ-
ous gains. (s NF)
7. Moscow now has a series of Third World allies to
protect in order to prevent important reverses in the
"correlation of forces." The Soviet leadership is en-
gaged to varying degrees in aiding the defense of pro-
Soviet regimes in Afghanistan, Cuba, Vietnam, Ethio-
pia, Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. Many of
these governments are confronting severe economic
problems, active insurgencies, or other problems for
which Moscow has found no ready solution. Conse-
quently, the Soviet leadership will probably have to
choose between devoting more energy and resources to
defending their allies against domestic challenges or
accepting local compromises that risk undermining
Soviet access or influence, a situation that already may
be emerging in southern Africa. (s)
8. Soviet strategy in the Third World is likely to be
increasingly affected by the USSR's expanding mili-
tary reach. In the past two decades this reach began to
extend beyond the range of land-based Soviet aircraft,
yet Moscow would have difficulty in rapidly mounting
and sustaining a distant power projection effort even
in the face of limited Third World opposition because
of the Soviet lack of adequate air defenses, antisubma-
rine warfare (ASW) and aerial refueling capabilities,
rapid deployment forces, tactical aircraft, at-sea logis-
tics, and staging rights. If time and opposition were not
constraints, however, the Soviets have the capability to
move large nffmbers of troops, armor, artillery, and
crated tactical aircraft by merchant ship to any part of
the globe. We do not know of any overseas country in
which the stakes are so high that Moscow would be
willing to deploy substantial military forces that now
have the primary mission of defense of the homeland.
9. Over the next decade, Soviet military forces will
not be able to carry out substantial combined-arms
military operations successfully against major Western
military opposition in areas distant from the periphery
of the Soviet Union. However, the presence of even
small numbers of Soviet military forces in distant areas
can pose special problems, especially in times of crises
when they could represent a threat. (s)
10. A variety of Soviet forces have been used to
respond to crises in the Third World, including:
- Naval Forces. Naval surface ships and subma-
rines have provided the principal means to con-
centrate Soviet military force in distant areas.
For example, 96 Soviet combatants and auxilia-
ries were deployed to the Mediterranean during
the 1973 Middle East war. Soviet ships also have
provided escort for merchant ships delivering
arms during various crises. In 1977, resupplies for
beleaguered Ethiopian forces at Mits'iwa were
provided by Soviet ships escorted by Soviet naval
combatants. This timely intervention prevented
the loss of this vital port to the Eritrean insur-
gents. In 1979, Soviet naval task groups, includ-
ing cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, de-
ployed to the South China Sea in a show of force
during the Chinese attacks on Vietnam. In re-
sponse to the 1982-83 conflict in Lebanon, the
Soviet amphibious capability was augmented,
probably to assist in evacuation, should that have
become necessary. Soviet naval forces also sup-
ported the Cuban interventions in Angola and
Ethiopia in the mid- and late 1970s.
- Air Defense Forces. Significant Soviet combat
losses have at times been risked by providing air
defense support to embattled clients. Such help
has included surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), air-
craft, and other equipment, as well as pilots and
other combat personnel. The largest direct com-
bat commitment involved the deployment of
almost 10,000 air defense personnel to Egypt in
1970 to defend against Israeli airstrikes. At the
same time, Soviet pilots flew combat patrols for
Egypt. Toward the end of the 1973 Middle East
war, a Soviet air defense missile unit was de-
ployed to Syria. Again in 1983, Soviet air defense
units with about 2,000 personnel were sent to
bolster Syrian air defenses and have remained in
Syria.
- Airlift Forces. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli con-
flict, a Soviet airlift that eventually involved over
350 sorties was begun within three days of the
opening of hostilities. Another Soviet combat
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resupply airlift was implemented four days after
the 1973 Middle East war began. That airlift
involved round trips of up to 6,000 nautical
miles. Other emergency airlifts have included
support to Ethiopia, Angola, and Vietnam during
times of crisis.
- Ground Forces. Other than the brigade deployed
to Cuba in the 1960s, major Soviet maneuver
units have not been deployed beyond the Soviet
periphery. However, in places like Ethiopia Sovi-
et general officers have directed major cam-
paigns even though Soviet troops were not in-
volved. (s NF)
Limitations on Deployment of Soviet Forces in
Crises
11. Lack of offensive punch is the main limitation
of Soviet forces abroad. They are not capable of
projecting power ashore against significant military
opposition, but they are capable of intervening in a
variety of ways in support of an ally abroad. Moscow
would prefer to play a support role by providing
military equipment and supplies quickly to a belea-
guered client. Should direct involvement of Soviet
forces become necessary, in most cases it would proba-
bly take the form of augmentation forces, such as
pilots and air defense forces, rather than a major
expeditionary force. (s)
12. Moscow's ability to expand naval deployments
substantially could be limited by transit delays, short-
falls in logistic and maintenance support, and the
potentially adverse impact on higher priority defense
requirements. Reinforcement of the Mediterranean
Squadron by 10 to 12 surface combatants from the
Black Sea could be accomplished within a week.
Augmentation of Soviet forces in the northwest Indian
Ocean with modern combatants from Vladivostok
would involve a minimum transit of two weeks at a
20-knot speed of advance. For naval forces already
deployed in the vicinity of Vietnam, however, transit
time would be about one week. (s)
13. Soviet airlifts to distant areas also face impor-
tant limitations. The main problems are possible denial
of overflight clearances and landing rights, along with
limitations on refueling. Also the crew-to-aircraft ratio
in Soviet military transport aviation (VTA) is low. This
limits the Soviet ability to conduct sustained airlift
operations. (s)
14. Many of the foreign facilities used by Soviet
forces pose further limitations on more ambitious roles
for Moscow. In most cases, Soviet forces lack direct
control over the facilities. Many ports and airfields
lack adequate maintenance capabilities and storage for
weapons, ammunition, and fuel sufficient to sustain
combat operations. With important exceptions in
Cuba, Syria, and Vietnam, most of these facilities are
not well defended. (s)
15. Another major limitation is the lack of supplies
and military equipment stockpiled abroad for use by
Soviet forces. A substantial amount of pre-positioned
equipment-enough to outfit a total of two divisions
with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery-
has recently been identified in Angola, Ethiopia, and
Mozambique. However, this equipment is maintained
by Cuban personnel and is of the type and vintage
associated with Cuban, not Soviet, troops. It is possible,
but unlikely, that in other countries Soviet arms
provided to allies could be available for Soviet use. For
example, in Libya, substantial equipment inventories
exceed apparent local needs, but most of the equip-
ment is composed of older models no longer used by
Soviet units. It is neither well maintained to ensure
reliability nor configured according to Soviet military
organizations. Furthermore Libyan stockpiles are not
well located to facilitate rapid Soviet use. Similar or
more unfavorable conditions prevail elsewhere, so we
believe that those foreign-based military stockpiles
thus far identified are for host country or client use,
and are unlikely to be planned for use by Soviet forces.
Cam Ranh Bay is the best prepared of the overseas
facilities to support Soviet military operations. But at
this time, only small numbers of air-to-surface missiles
(ASMs) and spare parts are believed to be stored there.
(S NF)
Scope of Soviet Foreign Military Involvement:
How Is It Changing?
16. Moscow's military involvement beyond the So-
viet periphery has increased substantially over the last
two decades both in geographic scope and variety of
forces involved (figure 2). The USSR now has a
military presence in most major regions of the world
(figure 3). The extent of this involvement ranges from
six countries (Cuba, Vietnam, South Yemen, Ethiopia,
Syria, and Angola) where Soviet forces are continuous-
ly present, to 39 countries which currently receive
varying degrees of Soviet military assistance. In be-
tween these levels of involvement we find a Soviet
military advisory presence in 33 countries, of which 15
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Figure 2
Soviet Use of Foreign Facilities
? Air
Naval
Communications/Intelligence
Ground
-- ----------- -
Vietnam
South Yemen
regularly host port calls and seven permit major replen-
ishment and some repair of Soviet naval ships. (s)
17. By most measures, Soviet foreign military in-
volvement has increased dramatically over the past
two decades. Soviet military assistance has increased
nearly tenfold during this period (figure 4). Since the
Soviet military assistance program began in 1955,
equipment deliveries have totaled about $85 billion.
Over half of these deliveries have been made since
1978. Largely as a result of increased military assist-
ance, the total number of Soviet military personnel
outside the Warsaw Pact territory and Afghanistan has
more than doubled in the past decade (figure 5). These
military personnel are mainly advisers and technicians
who are now found in nearly twice as many countries
as was the case in the 1960s (figure 6). There are now
about 20,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians
LIDya
in the Third World. Soviet military advisory groups
(MAGs) with 50 or more personnel have been estab-
lished in 23 countries. In addition, some 62,000 Third
World military personnel have received training in the
USSR or other Communist countries over the past
three decades. (s)
18. The ability to offer a wide range of military
equipment on a timely basis and at low prices is a
great asset in establishing and maintaining relation-
ships in the Third World. By establishing arms rela-
tionships, Moscow gains access to important officials in
Third World countries, particularly officers in the
armed forces. Moscow tries to foster a dependency on
continued deliveries of Soviet equipment and spare
parts. Ultimately, Moscow could use influence ac-
quired in these ways to gain military access, displace
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Figure 3a
Soviet Foreign Military Involvement, Mid-1960s
Soviet military equipment
and advisers
Morocco
0
Algeria
Q.
OGuinea
QGhana
OCon
Figure 3b
Soviet Foreign M iill~ary involvement, id-1970s
Soviet military equipment
Soviet military equipment, adv
and technic'i'ans
So'rlet military equipment, advisers,
dchnicians,and Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty
?~ a Uganda
Tanzania
'OTurkey
~RRorocao ~1 0 Lebaeon 'tan
'Gi y" c V 0
U `nLc. ONorthYemen
o Guinea-Bissau V "0
Yemen
@Equatorial Guinea ~lj BepubL _:
vomit,
A{
Zamfi
0
>{ Madagascar
@)Mozambique
India
Indonesia
Baundery r,pr .. enon
not naoaaaaroy awnomanve.
B o..Sary -r e ... tali on is
Figure 3c
Soviet Foreign Military Involvement, Mid-1980s
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Soviet military equipment, advisers,
and technicians
Soviet military equipment, advisers,
technicians,and Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty
Continuous Soviet military presence,
including all of above
?Guinea-Bissau
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Figure 4
Soviet Military Agreements and
Deliveries to Third World
1-1
Figure 5
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad
I[.t ,"ds nl ad,i.crs, tc a lm icians,
and tro111-11 lnl world
25
Countries with
over 100
Soviet advisers
LPL-JJ- l I___ I. J, -Li I I I I I I I L' 1 I I LJ L LJ~L-J_J I I I
1965 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 1965 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83
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Figure 6
Countries With a Soviet Military
Advisory Presence
Countries with
Soviet advisers
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or offset Western influence, or aggravate tensions in
regions of importance to the West. (s)
19. Despite some significant reverses, Soviet arms
programs have been successful in producing coopera-
tive military relationships with some key Third World
countries and with many less vital ones. In 1983, the
USSR signed agreements with, or made arms deliveries
to, some 36 countries outside Europe. These range
from regular Soviet customers such as Cuba, Syria,
India, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Ethiopia, and Vietnam,
with annual transactions sometimes reaching several
billion dollars each, to intermittent customers such as
Bangladesh and Burundi, with sales of only a few
million dollars. The mid-to-late 1970s was a period of
particularly rapid growth in the arms program as
Moscow exploited the ability of several key customers
to pay higher prices and to pay in hard currency. Since
the early 1980s, Moscow has generally maintained the
high arms export levels reached in the late 1970s, and
new agreements for future exports indicate Soviet
arms exports will continue to grow. (s)
20. Soviet military assistance has been instrumental
in upgrading the armed forces of several Third World
countries-such as Cuba, Vietnam, and India-to the
point where they have become major regional powers.
Some of Moscow's best customers also occupy impor-
tant geographic locations. Soviet success in translating
this military assistance into political influence or mili-
tary advantage, however, is less clear. In some cases-
notably Cuba, Vietnam, and Ethiopia-Moscow's will-
ingness and ability to supply arms have clearly con-
tributed to its gaining influence and access to military
facilities. In other cases the Soviets have reaped no
direct military advantage and only moderate political
influence. Finally, in some cases arms relationships
may actually have drawn Soviet leaders into situations
they would have preferred to avoid. Libya, for exam-
ple, provides an unwanted public linkage between
Moscow and international terrorism. Similarly, Iraq's
dependence on Soviet arms has made it difficult for
Moscow to keep avenues open to Tehran. (s NF)
21. The desire to earn hard currency has become a
significant secondary motive for the Soviet arms trans-
fer program. In the period from 1978 to 1982, almost
three-fourths of the arms delivered went to hard
currency Middle East customers. Soviet earnings from
arms sales currently account for about 15 percent of
Moscow's annual hard currency receipts. In the last
few years, however, declining oil revenues have re-
duced the ability of many customers to pay for arms,
and competition from the West has increased. This has
caused Moscow to make significant concessions, in-
cluding the export of some of the most modern Soviet
weapons and the offer of more attractive financial
terms. Nonetheless, Moscow continues to reap signifi-
cant hard currency earnings from its arms sales. (s NF)
22. The pattern of Soviet arms transfers is impor-
tant in any assessment of Moscow's interests in the
Third World. Most major recipients face active inter-
nal insurgencies or are engaged in conflict with or are
threatened by neighboring states. Most are confronting
foes supported by the West. Geographically, the great-
est concentration of Soviet arms recipients extends
from North Africa eastward to the Indian subconti-
nent: Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Ethiopia, South
Yemen, and India-states generally situated along
major air and sea routes. (c NF)
23. While most of the nearly 40 countries that
receive Soviet military assistance diversify their
sources of arms, 13 rely almost entirely on the Soviet
Union (table 1). Six of these countries have proved to
be the most willing to provide access for Soviet naval
ships, aircraft, and other activities. The extent of
access varies in each case. Several countries, such as
India, Peru, and Algeria, receive substantial quantities
of Soviet arms yet do not permit Soviet military access
to their facilities. Thus, we do not expect that reliance
on Soviet arms will necessarily result in such access. (s)
24. In addition to increased military assistance,
Soviet naval forces also have been a major part of the
growing Soviet involvement abroad. Since 1965, Soviet
naval deployments have risen sharply, from just over
6,000 annual shipdays out of home waters to over
43,000 today.' The most dramatic increase was be-
tween 1965 and 1970, with a more gradual rise having
occurred since that time (figures 7 and 8). These trends
also reflect a wider ranging Soviet Navy. Regular
naval operations were launched in the Mediterranean
in 1964; the Indian Ocean Squadron was formed in
1968; visits by task groups to the Caribbean began in
1969; in 1970 the West Africa patrol began operating;
and in 1979 a regular Soviet naval presence was
established in the South China Sea (figure 9). (s)
25. As the Soviet Navy's area of operations has
expanded over the past two decades, there has been a
corresponding increase in calls on foreign ports (figure
10). Over 500 Third World port calls are now made
annually by Soviet naval ships, mainly to about 10
' These figures do not include deployment of SSBNs, and Acade-
my of Sciences hydrographic and space event support ships. (u)
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Table 1
Military Reliance,'
Middle East North Africa
South Yemen Libya
Syria East Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa Vietnam
Angola Laos
Ethiopia Kampuchea
Madagascar Latin America
Mozambique Cuba
Seychelles Nicaragua
These countries relied on Soviet Bloc or East European sources for
over 90 percent of the military arms they acquired within the last
three years.
Figure 7
Trends in Soviet Naval Deployments
(Shipdays out of home waters)
I I I I 11 1 i iI I i I
1965 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83
Figure 8
Soviet Naval Deployment Patterns
(Shipdays out of home waters)
1965 1970 1975 1980 1982 1983
Secret
countries. Ports in four countries have become promi-
nent in supporting expanding Soviet naval operations.
Vietnam received over 250 Soviet port calls by Soviet
naval vessels last year; Syria hosted over 120 visits; and
Ethiopia and South Yemen each had about 80 Soviet
port calls (see table 2). This access supports long-
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0~ o
U~
w p
to Z
IU-i U
W H
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distance deployitients, but it is not an operational
necessity. Nevertheless, minor repairs and upkeep at Table 2 a
convenient locations enable Soviet naval ships to de Most Frequent Soviet Navy Port Calls, 1983
ploy for longer periods without returning to distant
home ports. Soviet ships at present have access to naval
facilities in Yugoslavia, Syria, Tunisia, and Libya to
Support the Mediterranean Squadron. Soviet ships also Southeast Asia
Vietnam 255
m
int
in
o
o
r
n
a c
ti
p
t
p
t
i
Ethi
p
i
a
a
n
nu
us
ese
ce a
or
s
n
o
a
,
South ) emen, and Vietnam to support their forces in
the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The West
Africa patrol is supported out of Angola, and Guinea
provides some replenishment to Soviet ships in the
South Atlantic. Soviet intelligence collectors off the
cast coast of the United States replenish in Cuba, as do
the naval task groups periodically deployed to the
Angola 36
Caribbean (figure 11). (s)
Guinea 30
26. The extent of Soviet access to these countries
varies in each case, but it includes several of the
following characteristics:
Frequent or overlapping visits so that at least
sonic Soviet ships or aircraft are present on a
nearly contitlttous basis.
I''reedoi s front normal entry requirements or
Figure 10
Soviet Naval Visits
Mediterranean
Syria
122
Tunisia
19
Yugoslavia
Libya
14
14
West Africa
Indian Ocean
Ethiopia
84
South Yemen
74
Mozambique
21
a Data include visits by combatants, AGIs, and naval subordinated
merchant ships and hydrographic ships, but do not include visits by
Soviet space event support ships.
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I I I i I I I I I I I
1966 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82
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Reserved access to ship berths and aircraft ramp
space. In some cases, Soviet logistic ships are
stationed in port, reducing the demand for berth
space in congested harbors. Floating drydocks
that support the Soviet Navy are located in
Ethiopia and Vietnam. Others in Angola and
Mozambique are used to support the Soviet
fishing fleet.
- Fresh water and provisions.
- Workspace, housing, and recreational facilities
for Soviet personnel.
- Storage for parts and fuel.
- Use of repair facilities.
- Soviet control of access to facilities that they use.
(s)
27. The way in which the Soviet Navy functions in
distant areas minimizes the requirement for access to
facilities ashore. The Soviet Navy relies primarily on
afloat logistic support for warships operating in distant
waters, using naval auxiliaries-tankers, cargo ships,
tenders, and repair ships-or merchant ships under
naval contract. Therefore, the Soviet Navy deploys far
more auxiliaries outside home waters than do Western
navies. Frequently the auxiliaries outnumber Soviet
warships deployed by 2:1. Fuel for Soviet ships is
rarely purchased from foreign countries, even in the
Middle East. The Soviets conserve hard currency by
transporting fuel from distant Soviet ports. Mainte-
nance of warships outside of home waters is minimal
compared with that of other navies and is performed
by Soviet repair ships. (s)
28. Nonetheless, the Navy's operational flexibility
can benefit from the simplicity of performing logistic
support in friendly ports, from having a convenient
stopover for crew rest or rotation and mail call, and
from access to a local source of fresh water and
perishable provisions. By performing pretransit and
posttransit upkeep or middeployment maintenance at
such facilities, the Soviets can extend the deployment
period of individual units. (c)
29. Where no access to port facilities exists, the
Soviet ships often use sheltered anchorages in interna-
tional waters for logistic purposes (figure 11). The
Soviet Navy may install a mooring buoy, station
auxiliaries there, and bring in other naval ships for
replenishment and upkeep. A number of such anchor-
ages have been established in the Indian Ocean and in
the Mediterranean. On occasion, Soviet ships use
anchorages in preference to local facilities. For exam-
ple, despite their access in South Yemen, Soviet ships
sometimes refuel or undergo repair prior to entering
Aden. (s)
30. In part, the Soviet Navy can function with the
combination of afloat support and limited shore-based
support because its activity level is lower than that of
Western navies. The Soviet Navy emphasizes mainte-
nance and in-port or in-area training rather than
intensive at-sea operations. Even Soviet naval units
deployed out of area spend about two-fhirds of their
time at anchor or in port, thus conserving fuel and
limiting wear and tear. To the Soviet mind, it appar-
ently is more important to be ready to go to sea than to
be at sea. Under this system, operational experience
and some degree of crew proficiency are sacrificed to
achieve high material availability. Limited Soviet ac-
cess to overseas ports may contribute to the minimal
routine activity level of Soviet ships, but this probably
is not the decisive factor. On balance, then, access to
local port facilities has been an important convenience
but has not been a necessity. (s)
31. The most dramatic change in Soviet forces
deployed out of area has been the increased use of
naval aviation. The deployment of naval aircraft has
increased about eightfold since 1979 (figures 12 and
13). They routinely fly out of Cuba, Vietnam, South
Yemen, and Ethiopia, and occasionally out of Angola,
Syria, and Libya. These flights conduct intelligence,
ocean reconnaissance, and ASW search missions. In
addition, a modest attack capability has been estab-
lished with the deployment of five Badger strike
aircraft and four combat support aircraft to Vietnam.
32. Another significant addition to Soviet foreign
deployments is a series of Soviet intelligence facilities
that have been established in Cuba, Vietnam, and
South Yemen. The Lourdes facility in Cuba represents
the largest Soviet SIGINT collection facility outside of
the Soviet Union.
This facility
not only provides intelligence support to the Soviet
military forces in Cuba but also serves as the principal
intelligence collection facility in the Western Hemi-
sphere. The second-largest Soviet-occupied SIGINT
facility is at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. F_
]The Soviet
facility in Aden monitors forces in the Indian Ocean.
In addition, Soviet SIGINT equipment, and in some
cases Soviet SIGINT advisers, have been provided to
Madagascar, Mozambique, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos,
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Figure 12
Soviet Naval Aircraft Deployments
(Aircraftdays deployed)
Figure 13
Naval Aircraft Deployment Patterns
Thousands of days
6
0 1971) 72 74 76 78 80 82
The large decrease in deployment clays abroad in the early
1970s reflects the loss of access to airfields in Egypt.
Naval air deployments to Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen,
and Vietnam began later in the decade.
Secret
Ai rcraft-
days deployed
Syria
Libya
South
Yemen
North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Nicaragua. We know
that in some cases cooperative arrangements exist 2500
under which intelligence collected in these countries isj
shared with the USSR. (s NF)
33. Additional access has included the establish-
2000
1 -1,
ment of Soviet communications facilities to support r
their naval forces and their military advisory groups.
In some cases, these facilities are colocated with Soviet 1500 r~~
SIGINT sites. (s NF)
34. Soviet military airlift aircraft also have bean
more frequently utilized in the last five years to 1000
provide support to Soviet allies. VTA AN-12/Cub j
contingents are currently deployed to Angola, Viet-
nam, Madagascar, and Mozambique, providing need- 500 Somalia
ed airlift support for the interior of these countries. Guinea
Soviet airlift deployments have been particularly im-
portant in support of military operations in Angola 0 1970 1975 1980 1982 1983
during 1975-76 and again in 1983-84, and during the
early stages of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea,
1979-81. (s)
35. In addition, the Soviet national airline, Aeroflot, Secret
has expanded its international service to 94 countries 303117 (000474) 1084
(figure 14). Aeroflot aircraft, personnel, and facilities
have supported military airlift operations, delivered
military supplies, and collected intelligence. Soviet
officials have deliberately misrepresented Soviet mili-
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Figure 14
Aeroflot's 1983 International Route Network
tary airlift transports as unscheduled Aeroflot flights.
Also, Soviet military transport aircraft often are dis-
guised as civil aircraft. For example, all AN-22s and
I1-76s assigned to operational VTA units bear Aeroflot
markings. (s NY)
Soviet Allies: What Are Their Main Contributions
to the USSR's Global Reach?
36. Soviet military involvement abroad is supplement-
ed by the efforts of its Warsaw Pact allies and Cuba.
These countries are dependent on the Soviet Union, but
appear to pursue their own goals in the Third World.
Nevertheless, their assistance complements that of the
Soviet Union and, whether by intention or not, furthers
Soviet goals by providing additional resources and skills.
Moreover, their efforts tend to mask the full extent of
Soviet involvement, (s)
37. For the USSR, intervention by an ally offers
several advantages over the direct use of Soviet personnel
or resources: there is less risk of military confrontation
between the superpowers; the ally may have greater
understanding of a particular region; and the ally's
presence sometimes is more acceptable than a Soviet
presence. Finally, Soviet prestige is not fully engaged,
making it easier for Moscow to extract itself should its
ally ultimately fail. (s)
38. Specific roles vary, but the Soviets themselves
typically occupy senior advisory positions in key party,
government, and military bodies. This facilitates Sovi-
et penetration of the main power bases in many Third
World countries. East Germans frequently work with
police and internal security units, and about 1,400
serve as military advisers overseas. Other East Europe-
ans are involved to a lesser extent in a variety of roles.
Over 40,000 Cuban military personnel are involved
abroad. Another 21,000 Cuban civilian advisers, tech-
nicians, and construction workers assist in agricultural,
media, and rural development programs. (s)
39. Cuba has been the most active Soviet ally.
Castro has some 30,000 combat troops in Angola and
3,000 to 4,000 troops in Ethiopia. In addition, there
are 5,000 to 6,000 Cuban military advisers in Ethiopia
and another 2,500 to 3,500 Cuban military personnel
in Nicaragua. Castro's willingness to send large num-
bers of troops into combat situations has been most
useful to Moscow. In addition, Castro has been willing
to provide an indirect conduit for Soviet military
deliveries. In Grenada, for example, military weapons
being funneled through Cuba pointed toward a major
military expansion to support a force of some 6,300
personnel. Secret Soviet military assistance agreements
with Grenada were valued at some $25 million over
five years. Cuban forces can also fill a gap in situations
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where local forces may be too weak to stand alone and
direct Soviet intervention is not desirable or is limited,
such as in Angola and Ethiopia. (s)
40. In addition to Cuba and the Warsaw Pact
countries, other countries that share similar world
views and are highly dependent on Soviet aid may
cooperate with the USSR in the Third World. Vietnam
fits these criteria; however, we do not expect to see
Vietnam involved outside of Southeast Asia. North
Korea's growing involvement in the Third World is
notable. More than 450 North Korean military advis-
ers are operating abroad, but to date there is little
evidence of direct coordination between Moscow and
P'yongyang. (s)
41. Soviet allies probably are of greater value to
Moscow in peacetime competition, or in regional
crises, than they would be during a general war with
the United States. Cuban troops, in particular, serve as
convenient substitutes for Soviet military personnel,
often without risking the kind of Western response
that might occur with more direct Soviet involvement.
In a general war, however, Soviet allies abroad would
probably be left to fend for themselves as their lines of
communication to the USSR and Cuba would proba-
bly be severed. (c)
Table 3
Soviet Military Involvement Abroad a
Naval Naval Military
Access Aviation Communica-
tions
a See annexes A and B for more detailed discussions of the nature and
extent of Soviet military access.
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Regional Military Implications
42. The Soviet Union has established a military
presence in most major regions of the world. Soviet
naval forces now maintain a continuous presence in
the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlan-
tic off the coast of West Africa, and the South China
Sea. In addition, Soviet forces use facilities for a
variety of purposes in about a dozen countries beyond
the periphery of the USSR (table 3). (c)
43. This combination of access and military pres-
ence is useful to the Soviet Union for political and
military purposes during peacetime and in regional
crises. Whether or not the Soviets would, or could, use
these forces and facilities in a military confrontation
hinges on a number of factors, including the military
utility of forces operating in distant areas, the threat to
specific forces, the need for these forces elsewhere,
and the likelihood that they could be successfully
redeployed. Moreover, the ability to conduct such
operations would require at least the tacit support of
Third World leaders whose countries host Soviet mili-
tary forces. Each leader would have to calculate the
consequences of siding with the Soviet Union opening
his country to military retaliation. (s)
44. Nevertheless, continued Soviet probing for ad-
ditional military access can be expected for a variety
SIGINT Airlift Air Defense Combat
Facilities Detachment Units Brigade
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of purposes. The Middle East-Persian Gulf-Southwest
Asia region is the top-priority target, principally be-
cause this Third World region is so near to the USSR
and is more critical than any other to the East-West
balance of power. Southeast Asia is next in impor-
tance. It provides a useful base for exerting pressure on
China and Japan and has the potential to threaten sea
lanes to the Indian Ocean. Latin American and south-
ern African countries have intrinsic political and
economic importance to the USSR, and also are of
interest to Moscow in terms of their potential to
distract and disperse US political, economic, and
military resources. (s)
Mediterranean and Middle East
45. The Middle East-Mediterranean region is the
only area beyond the Soviet borders where Soviet
combat forces have been directly involved in conflict.2
But the history of Soviet military involvement in the
Middle East-Mediterranean region has been frustrat-
ing for Moscow. Soviet naval forces were deployed on
a continuous basis beginning in 1964 (see box). Follow-
ing the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Soviet forces gained
access to Egyptian ports and airfields. From 1968 to
1972, Soviet reconnaissance, ASW, and strike aircraft
flew Mediterranean maritime patrol missions from
Egyptian airfields. Soviet use of all air and most naval
facilities in Egypt was terminated in 1972, however,
resulting in the loss of their investment in building the
port of Mersa Matruh. In 1976, Soviet use of Alexan-
dria for naval combatants, particularly submarines,
also was terminated by Egypt. These air and naval
facilities have never been adequately replaced. In
addition to such losses of military access, Soviet allies
repeatedly have been defeated on the battlefield,
despite massive aid programs. Indeed, Syria blamed its
defeat at the hands of Israel in 1982 on the poor
performance of Soviet weapons. (s)
46. Soviet military involvement is extensive in Syria.
The Soviets train and advise the Syrians on several
systems, advise other combat units, and instruct pilots.
We believe that the Soviet military advisory personnel
assigned throughout the Syrian air defense system
probably can become involved to a great extent in the
2 Moscow has been willing to risk becoming involved in conflict
elsewhere, however. For example, Soviet forces in Cuba were
potentially at risk in 1962. Also, Soviet VTA detachments have
supported host country combat operations in Vietnam, Angola, and
Ethiopia. (u)
The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
The Mediterranean Squadron has a much more im-
portant conventional wartime role than do other routine-
ly forward deployed Soviet naval forces. The normal
composition of the Squadron is about 45 ships including
nine attack submarines, nine surface combatants, and
about 30 other ships and auxiliaries. Surface units are
deployed mainly from the Black Sea Fleet and subma-
rines usually come from the Northern Fleet. The Squa-
dron's peacetime roles are to monitor Western naval
forces, maintain a Soviet military presence in the area,
patrol choke points, provide support to clients, and be
positioned for possible combat operations. Squadron
units spend 60 to 70 percent of their time at anchor.
Continuous Soviet naval deployments to the Mediterra-
nean began in 1964 and, after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war,
the force became formally designated as a squadron (the
Fifth Eskadra). (s)
During regional conflicts, particularly Arab-Israeli
wars, the Squadron has always been reinforced, but it has
not played a combat role:
- In the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, the Squadron rose
to 96 ships, including 29 major surface combatants
and 23 submarines. During this conflict, it provided
escort for Soviet merchant ships carrying military
supplies to Syrian and Egyptian ports, and main-
tained surveillance of the Sixth Fleet.
- Soviet naval activities in response to the June 1982
Israeli invasion of Lebanon were much more low
keyed. The Squadron was augmented with only
five combatants and one submarine, even though
the US Sixth Fleet was increased in size. Again,
Soviet units monitored US naval units, and other
Soviet major surface units paid prolonged port visits
to Tartus, Syria, in part to deter Israeli attacks. (s)
control aspect if there is a need. The Soviet role in
Syrian air defense goes back to 1973. During the 1982
war, more advanced air defense missile systems were
deployed with Soviet personnel, and an integrated air
defense network was established under Soviet tutelage.
(S NF)
47. In addition to the extensive Soviet involvement
in Syrian air defenses, Soviet advisers are found in most,
if not all, combat and combat support units down to
battalion levels, as well as at base workshops and all of
the military schools. Soviet advisers also serve with
Syrian Air Force squadrons at radar sites and airbases.
(S NF)
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48. Facilities in Syria are used mainly to support
Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean. A Soviet
storage barge is continuously stationed at the port of
Tartus and provides upkeep for Soviet submarines in
the Mediterranean. Also, Soviet auxiliaries shuttle wa-
ter, spare parts, and supplies from Tartus to Soviet
combatants in the Mediterranean. Since 1981, Soviet
naval reconnaissance aircraft have deployed to Tiyas
airfield four times, three of which have been since
September 1983. The first three deployments were
concurrent with Soviet Mediterranean Squadron exer-
cises. We expect Soviet use of naval and air facilities in
Syria to continue at about the current level. (s NF)
49. As the largest and most important Arab state,
Egypt has been and will continue to be a major target
of Soviet interest. Many Egyptian officials, however,
remember the problems associated with the previous
extensive Soviet access to Egyptian facilities from 1968
to 1976. Thus, barring a sudden political change in
Cairo, there is little prospect for renewed Soviet access
to Egyptian military facilities. (s)
50. Soviet access in Libya includes Soviet IL-38
naval reconnaissance aircraft that have periodically
deployed to Umm Aitigah airfield. In addition, Soviet
naval combatants show the flag at Tripoli and are
replenished and repaired at Tobruk, using Soviet
support ships. (s)
51. The construction of a Soviet-designed military
airfield at A] Jufra has raised concern about its future
use. Soviet strike aircraft, if deployed to Libya, could
pose a major threat to naval operations in the Mediter-
ranean. However, we expect Al Jufra to be used
mainly by Libyan TU-22 bombers and transport air-
craft. While Soviet aircraft could use the airfield, it is
less conveniently located than Umm Aitiqah for mari-
time patrols. Also overflight restrictions by neighbor-
ing states could impede VTA staging from Al Jufra
directly into the African subcontinent. (s)
52. Arms sales have been the main feature of the
Soviet-Libyan relationship. In the past four years,
Qadhafi has signed arms agreements with Moscow for
over $9 billion. The Soviet military presence has
increased since 1977 and now totals nearly 1,500
personnel, although there are a number of indications
since last spring that the number has declined, primar-
ily because of Libya's financial difficulties. Both Mos-
cow and Tripoli have been wary in the past of too
close an entanglement. In recent years, however,
Qadhafi has suggested in threats aimed at the United
States that he might permit further Soviet access to
bases in Libya. Although the Soviets presumably
would like more extensive access to Libyan port
facilities and perhaps contingency use of Libyan air-
bases, Qadhafi probably will resist such arrangements
unless he believes his regime is seriously threatened.
(S NF)
53. Algeria has slowly, but steadily, distanced itself
from the USSR over the last five years. All three of the
Algerian armed services have been equipped and
trained by the Soviets, and, until 1983, the Soviet
Navy conducted repair and replenishment activities in
Annaba harbor. They used Soviet support ships be-
cause they were not allowed to use Algerian shore
facilities. In 1983, high-level pressure from Moscow,
including visits by then Chief of the General Staff
Ogarkov, backfired when even use of Annaba harbor
was denied. Since that time, Soviet access has been
limited to occasional port calls. Algiers has been
diversifying its sources of arms, purchasing equipment
from a number of Western countries over the past few
years, and we anticipate that the Soviet advisory force
will decrease. Furthermore, the Soviet Navy is unlike-
ly to gain access to naval facilities in Algeria over the
next five years. (s NF)
54. In Yugoslavia, Tivat has been used regularly
since 1974 for repair and refurbishment of Mediterra-
nean-deployed Soviet submarines and submarine
tenders. Moscow has, on occasion, pressed for wider
access, but the Yugoslavs have not been willing to
expand the support of Soviet naval ships to other ports.
Nonetheless, Soviet probing for facilities will continue
and, even at current levels of use, Tivat provides
important support to the Mediterranean Squadron.
(S NF)
55. In Tunisia, Soviet naval vessels have been mak-
ing several calls each year since 1974. These port calls
include visits to Tunis, Safaquis, and Susah to show the
flag, for provisions, and for crew rest. In 1977 Soviet
naval ships and submarines began to use the Menzel
Bourgiba shipyard in Bizerte for repairs. But in 1979,
the Tunisian Government banned repair of all foreign
submarines. In mid-1984, however, this ban was lifted
and a Soviet submarine entered the yard for repairs.
The use of Tunisian yards complements Soviet ship
repair at Tartus, Syria. Therefore, Moscow will at-
tempt to maintain access to Tunisia, especially for
submarine repair. (s)
56. Moscow also is interested in Malta. The Soviet
Union leases 200,000 tons of POL storage space at a
NATO-built terminal in Malta, but Malta's policy on
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naval calls and the terms of the 1980 neutrality
agreement with Italy lirnit direct Soviet military ac-
cess, so the fuel is used by the Soviet fishing and
merchant fleets. While Moscow could abuse the lease
agreement and use merchant tankers to dispense fuel
from Malta to Soviet naval ships, the risks would
outweigh the gains in all but the most extreme circum-
stances. (s)
Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and East Africa
57. The region around the Arabian Peninsula has
been an important target for Soviet foreign military
involvement. The primary Soviet goals in the area are
to minimize or eliminate the Western military pres-
ence and to promote regimes responsive to Soviet
interests. A long-range Soviet goal is to enhance Soviet
influence in the Persian Gulf area to the end that
Moscow could exercise some degree of control over
Persian Gulf oil with resulting leverage over Western
Europe and Japan. Soviet naval operations in the
Indian Ocean began in 1968 at a time when British
forces were being pulled back from east of Suez.
Ashore, the USSR has concentrated on Somalia, South
Yemen, and Ethiopia. After being expelled from
Somalia, Soviet support forces were moved in 1978 to
Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen). Both of these loca-
tions provide important support to the Indian Ocean
Squadron. (See box.) (s)
58. Shore facilities in the region enable the Soviet
Indian Ocean Squadron to conduct more extended
deployments and moderately reduce reliance on auxil-
iaries by allowing repairs, substantial replenishment,
and crew rest. The region's airfields enable periodic
monitoring and surveillance of maritime regions sur-
rounding the Arabian Peninsula in support of the
squadron. Communications sites support command
and control for the squadron, and SIGINT sites pro-
vide intelligence on targets of local interest. (s)
59. In Ethiopia, Moscow has gained access to Dah-
lak Island in the Red Sea and has established a small
naval air reconnaissance presence at Johannes IV
Airfield near Asmera.3 These facilities are austere, but
provide refueling, repair, and staging bases for Soviet
naval and air units. Dahlak has become the primary
maintenance and repair facility for the ships of the
Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron. A floating drydock, a
Soviet depot ship, an auxiliary tanker, a water and fuel
barge, and a stores ship are stationed there, and a small
3 Two Soviet IL-38 May aircraft were destroyed by insurgents at
Johannes IV in May 1984 and have yet to be replaced. (s)
The Indian Ocean Squadron
Since 1968, the size and composition of Soviet naval
forces in the Indian Ocean have fluctuated widely.
When Soviet interests are at stake, Soviet naval forces
have been augmented and have aided Moscow's clients.
For example, during the 1977-78 Ogaden war, the
squadron was increased to 32 ships and provided direct
support to Ethiopia. (s)
For the past year or so, the squadron generally has
consisted of about 25 ships including two to four
principal surface combatants; up to two attack subma-
rines, one of which may carry cruise missiles; one or two
amphibious ships; a mine warfare ship; an intelligence
collector; three or four research ships; and about 1.4
auxiliaries. The squadron suffers from the same general
defects of other Soviet naval forces deployed to distant
areas: lack of adequate air defense, limited logistic
support, and a poor capability for antisubmarine war-
fare. In the past, the squadron has at times been
augmented by V-class attack submarines and cruise
missile submarines. (s)
During normal peacetime operations, the squadron
monitors Western naval forces in the Indian Ocean,
patrols the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al Mandeb,
provides support to Soviet friends, and serves to main-
tain a Soviet presence in the area. (s)
naval infantry contingent provides local security. Un-
like at the former Soviet naval base at Berbera,
Somalia, there has been little investment in fixed
facilities at Dahlak. Instead, the Soviets rely on their
auxiliary ships. (s)
60. Moscow has repeatedly sought to upgrade facili-
ties in Ethiopia and substantially increase the number
of personnel on Dahlak Island. A small increase in
Soviet personnel on Dahlak has occurred, but Ethiopi-
an officials have refused to allow Soviet upgrading of
the ports of Aseb and Mits'iwa. A variety of irritants
plague the relationship between Addis Ababa and
Moscow. These include Ethiopia's continued failure to
repay its debt to the USSR. (s NF)
61. In South Yemen, the Soviet Indian Ocean
Squadron uses the port of Aden, but the harbor
apparently is considered too open, congested, and
insecure for dockside use by Soviet combatants. Conse-
quently, nearby anchorages are often used. Also, Sovi-
et Naval Aviation aircraft make use of facilities in
South Yemen. IL-38 May aircraft conduct reconnais-
sance missions from Al Anad. In addition, the Soviet
naval communications facility that was originally in-
stalled at Berbera was moved to Aden in 1978. (s NF)
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62. Over the next five years or so, Ethiopia and
South Yemen will continue to be pressed to expand
facilities for Soviet use. As a result, substantial im-
provements in communications and SIGINT facilities
could be achieved with continued use of transportable
Soviet equipment. Also, pressure to upgrade the capac-
ity of Dahlak and Aden to provide more effective
support to the Indian Ocean Squadron can be expect-
ed. Soviet-sponsored projects to lengthen the runways
at Aden could result in Bear reconnaissance or ASW
aircraft deployments. Such a move would bring nearly
the entire Indian Ocean within the range of Soviet
surveillance aircraft. Eventually, Soviet strike aircraft
could be deployed to the region, but this would
encounter opposition from host countries and neigh-
bors. (s)
63. Despite already considerable use of facilities in
South Yemen, North Yemen also is a target for Soviet
penetration. Moscow will continue to offer military
aid to North Yemen as an inducement to improve
relations. A Friendship and Cooperation Trade was
signed in October 1984. Currently, there are 500 to
750 Soviet military advisers in South Yemen and
another 500 in North Yemen. Each of these small
countries has received over $1 billion in Soviet arms.
64. Several Soviet naval ships have called at Mauri-
tius every year since the country became independent
in 1968-except for 1983, when only one naval subor-
dinated research ship made a port visit. Visiting ships
take on water and provisions, but not fuel. Mauritian
permission for official Soviet port calls has varied
according to the state of Soviet-Mauritian relations. In
1984, the Mauritians began negotiating with the Sovi-
ets for delivery of a merchant ship, and, subsequently,
Soviet naval vessels were allowed port visits. But, other
than port visits and provisioning, any greater Soviet
military access to Mauritius is unlikely to be allowed.
(S NF)
65. Soviet attempts to gain additional military ac-
cess along the Indian Ocean littoral have focused on
Mozambique, Seychelles, and Madagascar. Mozam-
bique has a leftist government, depends upon Soviet
military aid to ward off a growing insurgency, uses
two Soviet-piloted VTA transports. Although Maputo
permits numerous Soviet naval port calls, the Mozam-
bicans have turned aside Soviet requests for increased
access to air and naval facilities. Bilateral relations
have cooled since March 1984 when Maputo signed an
agreement with South Africa to limit support for
resistance groups in both countries. The USSR has
criticized the move as well as Maputo's expanded ties
to the West. Mozambique remains dependent upon
Soviet military assistance. Nevertheless, a breakdown
of the agreement with South Africa could again
increase the threat to the Machel regime, leading to
new requests for increased Soviet and possibly Cuban
military assistance. (s NF)
66. Moscow's influence in Seychelles has increased
since 1978, when Soviet military assistance was first
provided. The small Soviet Embassy in Victoria has
expanded to about 80 personnel as the USSR has
become the primary source of arms. In addition,
Soviet landing ships with naval infantry have made
port visits at times when President Rene feared a coup.
For Moscow, Seychelles serves as a stopover point for
VTA and Aeroflot flights en route to southern Africa.
(S NF)
67. We believe that there is an even chance that
Soviet naval reconnaissance and ASW aircraft will
gain use of facilities in Seychelles. Any decision by
Rene to allow such access will necessarily take into
account economic assistance from Western nations,
especially France, and the importance to the islands'
economy of Western tourism. Should the Soviets gain
access to Seychelles, this would improve Soviet capa-
bilities to monitor activities in the Indian Ocean. More
frequent visits by Soviet naval combatants are expect-
ed but not a continuous Soviet surface naval presence
in the region. (s)
68. In Madagascar, Moscow would like to use the
former French naval base at Diego Suarez. However,
use of this facility has been denied to all foreign
warships. Also, the Soviet military advisory presence
was reduced in 1983, largely because Madagascar has
failed to repay its heavy debt to the USSR for arms
purchases. Nevertheless, some Soviet advisers have
been assisting in establishing a small number of
SIGINT sites, probably to monitor regional military
communications. Overall, the prospects are poor for
Soviet military access to ports and airfields in Mada-
gascar. (s)
South China Sea and Southeast Asia
69. Since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict,
there has been a significant buildup of Soviet naval
forces in the South China Sea, and Hanoi has permit-
ted the establishment of an important Soviet air and
naval logistic and operations base in Vietnam. Al-
though Soviet forces have used facilities at Ho Chi
Minh City, Da Nang, and Haiphong, the focus of their
activities has been at Cam Ranh Bay where they have
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South China Sea Squadron
The number of Soviet Navy submarines and surface
ships deployed to Cam Ranh and the South China Sea
has grown continuously since 1979, especially during
the last two years. In 1983, Soviet force levels in this
area averaged about four submarines, two to three
surface combatants, and 14 to 15 auxiliaries. The
submarine forces have included nuclear-powered cruise
missile, nuclear-powered torpedo attack, and diesel-
powered torpedo attack types. In mid-1984, two guid-
ed-missile patrol boats and two ASW frigates were
deployed to Cam Ranh, improving capabilities for
coastal defense. (s)
nition lighter, a salvage ship, and a deperming ship.4
Construction at Cam Ranh Bay continues. Since 1979,
two piers have been refurbished and four floating
piers have been installed. An athletic recreation area
has been built adjacent to the piers, and a nearby
compound is used for Soviet naval administration and
limited billeting. Construction at the airfield includes
a munitions storage area, a POL facility, a missile
storage area, expansion of the motor pool area, and
barracks that could accommodate 500 to 1,500 person-
nel, depending on how the space is distributed be-
tween storage and billeting. (s NF)
established support facilities for submarines, surface
ships, naval aircraft, communications, and SIGINT
collection. From this base in Vietnam, Soviet forces
can monitor military forces in the region and support
Soviet deployments to the Indian Ocean. The offensive
potential of Soviet forces complicates military plan-
ning in the region. (s)
70. Soviet naval aviation capabilities also have been
substantially improved. A composite squadron of eight
long-range Bear aircraft is now stationed at Cam
Ranh, twice the number deployed in 1.980. This
squadron includes four Bear D reconnaissance aircraft
and four Bear F ASW aircraft. Also, in late 1983 a
squadron-sized unit of TU-16 Badgers deployed to
Cam Ranh. This second composite squadron currently
includes five Badger missile strike aircraft, two tank-
ers, one reconnaissance variant, and one electronic
warfare support variant. Some air-to-surface missiles
and loading equipment have been identified in Viet-
nam. The arrival of the Badgers not only expanded
Soviet reconnaissance capabilities, but also constituted
the first deployment of Soviet bombers with air-to-
surface missiles outside the Warsaw Pact since 1970.
These bombers add a new dimension to Soviet offen-
sive capabilites in the region. (See figure 15.) (s NF)
71. The Soviet Navy base at Cam Ranh now sup-
ports the largest concentration of Soviet ships routinely
deployed at any facility outside the Soviet Union. This
typically totals 22 to 30 ships. Rather than constructing
extensive facilities ashore, the Soviet Navy generally
relies on a group of depot and support ships to provide
replenishment and maintenance. Since 1980, the num-
ber of support ships and craft has grown and now
includes a repair ship, a stores barge, fuel barges,
oceangoing tugs, oilers, a submarine tender, an ammu-
established that could locate and track forces in the
South China Sea, Philippine Sea, and eastern Indian
Ocean. Subsequently, additional SIGINT sites have
been established in Vietnam. (s NF)
73. A small naval infantry security force also has
been stationed at Cam Ranh Bay, and a naval infantry
obstacle course has been constructed there for training.
The growing Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay sug-
gests that the Soviet naval infantry security force there
may be expanded. (s)
74. Despite disagreements, the Soviet-Vietnamese
alliance is unlikely to rupture any time soon. Vietnam
is heavily dependent on the USSR for military and
economic aid and for backing against China. Since
1980, Soviet military and economic aid to Vietnam has
never totaled less than $1.3 billion per year. However,
there are some drawbacks for Moscow to the burgeon-
ing Soviet-Vietnamese military relationship. It repre-
sents a substantial economic burden as well as a
significant obstacle in Sino-Soviet relations. It also
undermines Soviet efforts to improve relations with
those Southeast Asian nations that are threatened by
Vietnam's increased military capability. On the other
hand, most Southeast Asian nations, particularly Indo-
nesia, consider China to be the long-term threat. (s)
75. Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay will increase. More
naval units will be deployed to Vietnam, and an
operational naval squadron has probably been formed.
Construction indicates that a composite regiment of 30
to 40 aircraft probably will be stationed there. A base
of this size and scope would require additional air
defenses; therefore, deployment of a Soviet fighter
" Deperming reduces the magnetic signature of ships, thus reduc-
ing their chances of being detected. (u)
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Figure 15
Soviet Naval Air Coverage From Vietnam
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritat
squadron is likely. More advanced training, including
the use of bombing ranges, is probable. We also may
see increased stockpiling of supplies, fuel, ammuni-
tion, and weapons to support Soviet forces in Vietnam.
In addition, Soviet air operations may use additional
airfields such as Phan Rang. An increased Soviet naval
presence also may include additional submarine de-
ployments and naval repair facilities. (s NF)
76. Beyond Vietnam, the prospects for additional
Soviet access in the East Asia-Pacific region are poor.
Soviet naval ships call on Kampuchea from time to
time, but Khmer ports are poorly developed and not
well located so there is no serious Soviet interest in
stationing forces in the country. Soviet probing for
diplomatic and economic access in the South Pacific
islands is likely to continue, but these efforts are not
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likely to be successful, and we do not anticipate Soviet
military access elsewhere in the region. (s)
Caribbean and Central and South America
77. Cuba is the hub of Soviet involvement in the
Western Hemisphere, and continued Soviet military
use of facilities in Cuba seems virtually guaranteed, at
least at current levels, in view of Castro's close rela-
tionship with the Soviet leadership and Havana's
increasingly heavy debt to Moscow. Without Soviet
economic aid and trade subsidies, Havana would be
hard pressed to meet even basic consumption and
investment needs. Virtually all of Cuba's military
equipment and supplies are provided by the Soviet
Union. (s NF)
78. In recent years, the Soviet focus in the region
has been on upgrading Cuban military capabilities.
Soviet military assistance to Cuba jumped from about
$95 million in 1977 to $652 million by 1983. Since
1978, Cuba has received over 150 jet aircraft (includ-
ing 45 MIG-23s), air defense command and control
equipment, three diesel attack submarines, two frig-
ates, four modern land-based ASW helicopters, 11
missile attack boats, nine Turya-class hydrofoil torpe-
do boats, and two amphibious landing craft, plus a
wide variety of other weapons. (s)
79. Both the level of Soviet military presence and
the scope of Soviet activities in Cuba have steadily
increased over the last two decades. Following the
abortive placement of missiles and bombers in Cuba in
1962, a small Soviet Ground Force contingent was
gradually expanded to brigade size. A Soviet signals
intercept facility was established at Lourdes in the
mid-1960s and has grown to become the largest and
most important such facility outside the Soviet Union.
Soviet naval task group visits began in 1969 and
typically involve two principal surface combatants, an
oiler, and, occasionally, a submarine, deployed to the
Caribbean about once a year. The most recent deploy-
ment included for the first time a Moskva-class heli-
copter cruiser and an Udaloy-class ASW destroyer.
Soviet naval aviation deployments to Cuba began in
1970. Such deployments now typically include a pair
of Bear D's, and a pair of Bear F's, which generally
remain for two to four weeks and conduct several
missions per deployment. In 1983, a separate facility
for supporting up to eight Bear aircraft was established
at the Cuban Air Force airfield at San Antonio de los
Banos. Altogether, 7,000 to 9,000 Soviet military per-
sonnel currently are in Cuba, including about 2,800
advisers. Direct communications with the Soviet Gen-
eral Staff are maintained using both satellites and
long-haul, high-frequency communications. (s)
80. Several types of military activities are conduct-
ed from Soviet facilities in Cuba, including SIGINT,
airborne naval reconnaissance and ASW missions, and
naval ship replenishment. The SIGINT site probably
will continue to grow in both size and importance. (s
NF)
81. Soviet Bear D reconnaissance and Bear F ASW
aircraft deploy to Cuba periodically to conduct mari-
time reconnaissance missions and collect intelligence.
Soviet Bear deployments to Angola also have been
staged through Cuba since the loss of air access rights
to Guinea in 1977. A gradual increase will probably
occur in the frequency and number of Soviet naval
aircraft deployed to Cuba. (s)
82. The Soviet brigade in Cuba serves mainly to
provide a symbolic military presence in the absence of
a firmer commitment to defend Cuba. It also provides
local security for Soviet installations. The brigade does
not assist in training Cuban forces, although it has
conducted joint exercises on at least one occasion. We
do not believe that the unit has any broader roles in
the region. Construction activities indicate that the
brigade is likely to receive additional equipment and
probably will slightly increase in size to over 3,000
troops in the near future. (s)
83. A major Soviet interest in Cuba is to protect the
Castro regime. Therefore, bold changes in the Soviet
military posture in Cuba could be counterproductive.
They would significantly alter neither the balance of
strategic forces nor the regional conventional balance.
Furthermore, upgrading Cuban forces provides many
of the same benefits that might be derived from
staging more capable Soviet forces in Cuba, without
risking a strong US response. It also sustains Castro's
dependence upon the USSR, assuring his continued
cooperation in providing military support to pro-
Soviet regimes. (s)
84. Soviet peacetime naval deployments to Cuba
will probably increase in scope and frequency. Minor
logistic problems resulting from increased deploy-
ments of Soviet cruise and ballistic missile submarines
in the Western Atlantic could be eased by calls in
Cuban ports. (s NF)
85. Cuban capabilities for regional power projec-
tion are improving. Currently, Cuban airlift and sea-
lift could-if unopposed-move and logistically sup-
port several thousand troops in Central America.
These capabilities will improve with the introduction
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of IL-76 heavy-lift transport aircraft, and will repre-
sent an increasing threat of intervention and intimida-
tion to other countries in the region. Although major
deployments would be unlikely if Castro anticipates
significant US military opposition, Cuban force im-
provements by themselves may force the United States
and other countries in the region to increase further
their own military capabilities. (s)
86. Elsewhere in Latin America, we expect to see
long-term Soviet efforts to support revolutions and,
where they take hold, attempt to prevent their rever-
sal-El Salvador and Nicaragua being examples of
these two approaches. Direct involvement of Soviet
combat forces in the region is highly unlikely. Howev-
er, Soviet military assistance, as well as political and
economic activities, can provide important contribu-
tions. Diplomatic and commercial activities are impor-
tant aspects of Soviet efforts to support revolutionaries.
The Soviet diplomatic presence in Latin America has
increased by about 1,000 personnel over the past
decade, while over 5,000 Soviet commercial represen-
tatives have been added. At a minimum, this growing
Soviet presence improves intelligence collection oppor-
tunities and potential for subversion. (s)
87. Moscow's cautious approach toward Nicaragua
has been most apparent in the way the Soviets have
handled their arms relationship with the Sandinistas.
From the first secret visit of Soviet generals to Mana-
gua-just one month after the Sandinista takeover-
Moscow has sought to obscure and play down its
military dealings with Nicaragua. (c)
88. While taking steps to minimize and obscure
their direct involvement, the Soviets nonetheless seek
to provide the Sandinistas with enough military assist-
ance to sustain and consolidate their power. Some 100
Soviet military and security advisers continue to work
with the Sandinista security service and the general
staff. Moscow presumably views such assistance as
essential in the struggle against the anti-Sandinista
insurgents and as a way of further consolidating the
leftist regime in Managua against potential political
opponents. (s NF)
89. The increasing militarization of Central Ameri-
ca will be among the consequences of Soviet, Cuban,
and Nicaraguan activities in support of revolutionar-
ies. Governments will be compelled to spend more on
security and this will compound already difficult
economic and social problems, furthering Soviet goals
of fostering instability in the region. (s)
90. Moscow will attempt to improve relations with
other Latin American governments through arms sales,
but the prospects for closer military ties are not good.
Since the US rescue operation in Grenada, Suriname
and other countries have become wary of developing
close ties with the USSR. Also, the loss of Grenada
represents a notable reversal for Moscow. (s)
91. Currently, Peru is the only South American
country that has bought Soviet arms, and continued
generous Soviet arms offers will probably result in
additional purchases, particularly for the Army. Limi-
tations on foreign military purchases placed on Peru
by the International Monetary Fund have made it
difficult for Peru to buy Western arms, even though
the military leadership in Peru, for the most part,
prefers to diversify arms sources and buy from the
United States. Even with additional arms purchases
from the USSR, the military relationship with Moscow
is unlikely to grow to the point that Moscow will gain
military access to Peru. (s)
92. In Argentina, Soviet assistance in developing
two fishing ports could have future military signifi-
cance. Soviet designs reportedly call for depths that
exceed those normally required for fishing vessels.
These ports are to be used extensively by Soviet fishing
vessels. We believe any Soviet military use of these
facilities is extremely remote, however, since it would
entail a major change in Argentine policy toward the
Soviet Union. (s)
South Atlantic and West Africa
93. Although Sub-Saharan Africa is of limited eco-
nomic and strategic value to the USSR, it does provide
some payoffs: acquisition of commodities, gaining
influence with regional states at the expense of the
West and China; and, especially, gaining access to
naval and air facilities. (u)
94. Soviet forces first became involved in West
Africa in response to crises. Naval units responded to
Ghana's seizure of Soviet fishing vessels in 1969 and
reacted to frequent requests for support by Guinea's
President Sekou Toure following raids by exiles in
1970. Since 1970 there has been a continuous Soviet
naval presence in the West African waters of the south
Atlantic. (See box.) Moscow usually maintains a five- to
seven-ship West Africa patrol in the south Atlantic. In
addition, Bear D naval reconnaissance aircraft occa-
sionally fly from Luanda into patrol areas off the
African coast that range as far north as Gabon, as far
west as Ascension, and as far south as the southern tip
of South Africa. Soviet VTA aircraft also stop over in
Guinea en route to Angola. Altogether, Soviet military
involvement in the region serves several purposes
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The West Africa patrol dates to 1970 and usually
includes one or two surface combatants, one attack
submarine, one amphibious unit, one mine-warfare
ship, one or two research ships, and several auxiliaries.
The minesweeeper mainly patrols the fishing areas off
northwest Africa. The patrol provides demonstrations of
support for friendly regimes and conducts ceremonial
port calls that, on occasion, include transiting Soviet
ships. The port of Luanda provides the primary source
of logistic support for the Soviet Navy's West Africa
patrol, and Luanda's airfield serves as a staging base for
Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft that periodi-
cally patrol the South Atlantic Ocean. (s NF)
including: protecting the Soviet fishing fleet; monitor-
ing shipping passing around the Cape of Good Hope;
providing support for the continuous flow of Soviet
military assistance to Angola; demonstrating support
for the Angolan regime; facilitating the transit of
Soviet forces in a crisis; and supporting Soviet efforts
to establish pro-Soviet regimes in the region. (s)
95. Support to Angola has been the top Soviet
priority in this region since 1975, when the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) came
to power with extensive Soviet and Cuban military
assistance. Angola is important to Moscow for several
reasons. The Kremlin would like to install leftist
governments throughout southern Africa, and Moscow
values its access to Angolan military facilities. (c)
96. Moscow has established a considerable degree of
influence over the Government of Angola, but Soviet
economic and counterinsurgency aid and the support
of Cuban troops in country have been insufficient to
maintain internal security in the face of an active
insurgency. Thus, Soviet access to Angolan facilities
may be in jeopardy. Both Cuba and the Soviet Union
have had to increase their military assistance to Ango-
la. Soviet assistance also has been upgraded in the last
few years. For example, SU-22 Fitter aircraft were
provided in August 1984. (s NF)
97. The complex situation in Angola could eventu-
ally impel either a withdrawal or stepped-up commit-
ments on the part of Cuba and the USSR. If the
security situation deteriorates further, Moscow proba-
bly would stop short of sending its own ground combat
troops to Angola during the next year, but there is a
possibility it would send additional advisers. The
chances of additional Soviet intervention-possibly
including pilots and air defense crews-would in-
crease if, in the long run, Cuban forces are unable to
stabilize the military situation. Overall, Moscow real-
izes that a major test of its ability to champion Third
World Marxist nations has taken shape in southern
Africa. (s NF)
98. The death of President Sekou Toure in 1984
raises the possibility of a further reduction of Soviet
access to Guinea. Soviet support for Toure in 1970
included a small naval presence that eventually be-
came the West Africa patrol. By 1973 periodic naval
reconnaissance sorties were flown from Conakry, but
these were terminated by Toure in 1977. Moscow is
likely to retain landing rights for VTA flights en route
to Angola and replenishment of Soviet naval ships at
Conakry. (s NF)
99. In Cape Verde, the Soviet Navy has shown
continued interest in acquiring access to port facilities
and airfields, including requests to build a complete
Soviet naval base. Soviet military access to Cape
Verde, however, is unlikely. (s)
100. Moscow also has made overtures to Benin,
Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, and
Mali in attempts to develop additional access in the
area. Of these, Ghana holds the most promise, but to
date, none of the Soviet efforts have met with success.
(s)
Soviet Capabilities: How Do New Developments
Affect Soviet Global Military Reach?
101. Soviet force modernization has resulted in
improved capabilities for distant military operations.
However, the priority of the European Theater in
Soviet military planning limits the forces available for
deployments abroad, and the preponderance of Soviet
forces are trained and configured for a war with
NATO in Europe. Nevertheless, the newer, large
surface combatants such as the nuclear-powered Ki-
rov-class cruiser and the Kiev-class vertical takeoff and
landing (VTOL) carriers enhance Soviet capability to
concentrate military power beyond the periphery of
the USSR. Also, since 1965 the Soviet Navy has built a
capability for amphibious assault lift to distant areas
and improvements have been made in Soviet airlift
capabilities. Until the mid-1960s there were no heavy
lift transport aircraft in the Soviet inventory. Since
then, the IL-76 has been introduced, and the airlift
capacity has nearly doubled. Two hospital ships have
been acquired by the Soviet Navy and are used to
support naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and
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South China Sea. Such hospital ships could provide
valuable support during a regional conflict. Additional
developments will further improve Soviet capabilities
for distant military operations. Some of these develop-
ments are discussed below. (s)
Aerial Refueling
102. Soviet aerial refueling capabilities are improv-
ing, and include developmental IL-76 Candid tankers
and Soviet tactical fighter aircraft configured for air-
to-air refueling (figure 16). With appropriate staging
rights, this capability could facilitate distant deploy-
ment of fighter squadrons. It could lead to an im-
provement in Soviet capabilities to provide air cover
for distant military operations, such as in the Mediter-
ranean. Aerial refueling has not been developed pri-
marily for power projection purposes, and refueling
will provide only a marginal improvement in Soviet
capabilities for distant deployments over the next five
to 10 years. (s)
103. Other early applications of aerial refueling
probably will include IL-76 Mainstay airborne warn-
ing and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Military
airlift aircraft also may be adapted for aerial refueling
in order to extend their reach. Both the AWACS and
tanker applications could be involved in future Soviet
distant military operations. We estimate that IL-76
tankers will be operational in 1985. They would be an
important addition to the Soviet tanker force. (s)
104. The plans and activities of the over 1,700-ship
Soviet merchant fleet, Morflot, are closely coordinated
to ensure the rapid transfer of merchant shipping for
military requirements. Soviet merchant ships in some
cases are built to military standards, incorporate so-
phisticated electronic equipment, and participate in
military exercises. In 1983 a merchant ship was modi-
fled for VTOL operations
the Soviets were to take up the program,
t ere ra e over 40 Soviet RO-RO ships that could be
similarly modified. However, there are currently in-
sufficient VTOL aircraft in the Soviet inventory to
provide more than a token effort for such a program.
(S NF)
105. The Central Military Transportation Director-
ate (VOSO) coordinates the military use of merchant
shipping. A computerized management system is used
to maintain control and location data on all Soviet
merchant ships worldwide. Every Soviet shipping
agency has a naval headquarters contingent to plan
and coordinate rapid conversions of merchant ships
for military use. For example, during the 1973 Middle
East war, Soviet merchant ships were rapidly mobi-
lized and delivered over 400,000 tons of military cargo
to Libya, Syria, and Egypt in about 35 days. Similar,
though much smaller, emergency sealifts delivered
military supplies to Angola in 1975 and to Ethiopia in
1977. Soviet merchant vessels have delivered military
cargo to Third World ports, some of which are
unimproved. Over 600 Soviet ships have onboard
cargo-handling capabilities for offloading cargo as
heavy as 40-ton Soviet medium tanks. In addition,
passenger ships have been used to rotate Soviet and
Cuban forces abroad. Soviet merchant ships under
naval subordination also provide logistic support to
deployed Soviet naval ships. (s NF)
106. The number of aircraft in the Soviet Military
Transport Aviation's inventory has stabilized at about
600. However, the range and payload capabilities of
the VTA fleet have improved significantly over the
last several years. These improvements have been
mainly as a result of the introduction of IL-76 Candid
transport aircraft to replace the aging AN-12 Cub
(figure 17). The IL-76 is becoming the backbone of the
VTA. It can carry twice the payload weight to about
five times the range of an AN-12. Over 50 AN-22
Cock aircraft also are included in the VTA inventory.
The AN-22 currently is the only VTA aircraft that can
carry tanks or tracked missile launchers. In addition,
we anticipate the new Condor transport will soon
enter production. VTA capabilities for personnel
transport are augmented as needed with Aeroflot
aircraft. (s)
107. During the past two decades, the Soviet capa-
bility to rapidly initiate large-scale, long-duration air-
lift operations throughout the Middle East and Africa
has been demonstrated on several occasions. This was
particularly evident in the operations mounted by
VTA in support of the Arab states in the 1967 and
1973 Middle East wars. In both instances, the opera-
tions were performed almost exclusively by VTA
transport aircraft, involved round trips of up to 6,000
nautical miles, and were launched on short notice. (s)
108. Nonetheless, problems will continue to limit
Soviet airlifts. Soviet air access to most of the Third
World involves overflight of Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iran,
or Pakistan. Thus, denial of overflight could present
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Figure 16
Candid Tanker
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Figure 17
Soviet Military Transport Aviation
Maximum Payload Capacity
major problems for the USSR. Soviet aircraft have
been forced to adopt longer, less efficient routes when
overflight clearances were denied. In general, most
states essential for overflight want to remain on correct
terms with Moscow and would be reluctant to deny
overflights or inspect suspicious cargo in transit. (s)
110. Airfield size and limitations pose additional
problems for Soviet airlifts to the Third World. Fuel-
handling capabilities often are the major limiting
factor in conducting airlifts. Most of the airfields
currently used by Soviet military aircraft have insuffi-
cient fuel storage to support a major military airlift.
Also, because of the large size of transport aircraft,
they quickly exhaust parking space, limiting the num-
ber of aircraft that can be on the ground at any one
time. Low aircrew-to-aircraft ratios in VTA units are
another limitation, along with the inability of many
VTA aircraft to carry outsized cargo such as tanks and
SAM launchers. But many of these problems will be
reduced with expected improvements in VTA. (s)
Soviet Naval Infantry
111. Over the past four years, the Soviet Naval
Infantry (SNI) has been reorganized and provided with
more sophisticated SAM systems, additional tanks,
armored personnel carriers, and artillery. As a result,
the firepower available at the brigade level has in-
creased by over 50 percent. There also has been a
growth of about 500 troops in each SNI brigade;
however, the Soviet Navy still lacks adequate assault
lift. SNI capabilities also have improved with the
introduction of two Ivan Rogov-class large amphibious
ships with complements including five helicopters and
two large air-cushion vehicles. In some exercises, the
Soviets have used, in addition to assault lift ships,
modern merchant ships to carry SNI troops. Soviet
amphibious ships with SNI aboard are routinely de-
ployed to the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the
South Atlantic off West Africa, and Vietnam. SNI
forces have participated in joint landing exercises.
There are shore-based SNI detachments at Dahlak
Island, Ethiopia, and Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, for
local security. (s NF)
112. Soviet airborne forces currently total at least
50,000 troops and are organized into eight divisions
(seven ready divisions and one training division). Sovi-
et airborne divisions are directly under the operational
control of the Soviet General Staff and thus readily
available for a variety of missions. The primary
mission of Soviet airborne forces is to conduct opera-
tions in enemy rear areas. Significant improvements in
organic firepower, mobility, and air transportability of
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these forces over the last several years have enhanced
their capability to conduct their primary mission and
to be used in a power projection role. These upgrades,
however, are outpacing the capability of VTA to move
these heavier airborne divisions. Airlift support for
either the paradrop or air landing of Soviet airborne
troops and their equipment is provided by VTA.
About 600 VTA aircraft sorties are required to trans-
port one entire airborne division or the combat ele-
ments of six BMD-equipped regiments. (s)
113. Soviet airborne forces could have important
potential for distant military operations against limited
opposition when a military response is required on
short notice. Soviet airborne forces were called upon
during the invasion of Hungary in 1956, of Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968, and of Afghanistan in 1979. Airborne
forces could be part of a future rapid deployment
force. Such forces most likely would be used to support
a beleagured client or to establish a Soviet ground
combat force presence in a crisis area before the West
can respond, thus raising the stakes for Western
intervention. (s)
Special-Purpose Forces
114. The USSR maintains several types of specially
trained, organized, and equipped special-purpose
forces that could contribute to Soviet power projection
capabilities. The Soviet special-purpose forces are
either component elements of the intelligence and
security services or special military units operating
under their control. The bulk of the special-purpose
forces is composed of GRU troops. Some Spetsnaz
troops are organized into brigades of 500 to 1,000 men
assigned to front and army levels. Other Spetsnaz
brigades are found in most military districts and
groups of forces and in each of the four Soviet fleets.
The main missions of these troops are intelligence
collection and direct attacks against selected targets in
the enemy rear area. They also have been used to a
limited extent in special operations and to provide
unconventional warfare training to Third World insur-
gents and to some groups that conduct terrorist opera-
tions. (s NF)
Tactical Air Support
115. Tactical air support for distant military opera-
tions has been a major Soviet shortcoming, but several
developments will improve the situation. For example,
Moscow has been exploring ways of providing ship-
based air support. In a large naval exercise, Zapad-81,
a Kiev-class carrier and a Moskva-class helicopter
cruiser provided modest air support for the amphibi-
ous landing. In the 1990s, the nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier designed for conventional-takeoff-and-landing
(CTOL) aircraft will offer improvements over the
limitations of the Kiev-class carriers. For example, the
12 to 15 VTOL Forger aircraft on each Kiev-class
carrier are neither all weather nor air refuelable, are
subsonic, carry little ordnance, and seldom train in air-
to-air combat tactics. The new class aircraft carrier is
estimated to be capable of carrying from 50 to 60 high
performance aircraft. Also, the introduction of the
Helix B seaborne assault helicopter will improve the
Soviet Navy's capability to provide gunfire support. In
addition, the introduction of aerial refueling for some
tactical aircraft with longer ranges would marginally
increase Soviet capabilities to provide land-based tacti-
cal air support. (s)
Global Command and Control
116. Since the mid-1970s, Soviet military com-
manders have had available communications and in-
formation systems to control military operations on a
global scale. Part of this system includes Soviet mili-
tary communications facilities in support to MAGs
and, in some cases, Soviet naval and ground forces, in
Cuba, Vietnam, Syria, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and
Angola. A variety of developments over the next
decade will significantly enhance the Soviet command
and control network. AWACS capabilities have been
improved with the introduction of the new IL-76
model which could be sent to crisis areas to bolster
local air defenses, to demonstrate Soviet concern, and
to augment existing long-range air reconnaissance
efforts. Secure, reliable, and redundant global commu-
nications are increasingly available to Soviet units and
military advisory groups through a series of sophisti-
cated communications and data relay satellite net-
works. (s NF)
Military Significance of Soviet Forces and
Facilities Abroad
117. Soviet forces abroad currently do not consti-
tute a major part in Soviet general war military
doctrine, which remains focused on the traditional
mission of strategic defense of the homeland. Never-
theless, the steady increase in size, capability, range of
operations, and scope of activity of Soviet forces
abroad over the last 20 years provides global military
capabilities Moscow did not previously possess and
which must now be considered in any future confron-
tation. However, Soviet forces routinely deployed
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abroad are now, and will remain for the period of this
Estimate, too few and too weak to engage in distant
power projection. (s)
118. Military programs and operational patterns
that are intended mainly to support Soviet political
goals in the Third World also have acquired a military
significance that varies considerably from place to
place. The significance also varies with changing
conditions of peace, crisis, and war. In peacetime
competition with the West, Soviet forces and facilities
abroad generally:
- Provide intelligence, reconnaissance, and
surveillance.
- Provide regime support to Soviet allies, including
arms, advice, training, and demonstrations of
force.
- Protect Soviet interests abroad, especially the
large and wide-ranging fishing fleet.
- Conduct training against potential adversaries.
- Support military research and development. (u)
119. In a crisis or regional conflict, perceived as
unlikely to escalate, Soviet forces abroad could:
- Provide intelligence, reconnaissance, and
surveillance.
- Protect rapid resupply and military equipment
delivery operations.
- Rescue and evacuate personnel.
- Plan and direct military operations by foreign
forces.
- Intervene with Soviet or allied military forces.
(S NF)
120. During a regional crisis, it may be difficult to
detect the transition from military assistance and
advisory roles to direct intervention by Soviet forces or
their allies. Crises are often characterized by Soviet
airlift and sealift to provide large quantities of military
equipment. At times, military deliveries have also
been accompanied by increases in the Soviet advisory
presence.
121. In a major military confrontation Soviet forces
currently deployed abroad could:
- Attack Western naval forces at the onset of
hositilities.
- Provide targeting and intelligence support.
- Delay some reinforcements.
- Divert some military resources from priority
missions elsewhere.
- Disrupt some shipping.
However, we believe these efforts could not be long
sustained. (s)
122. In any conflict involving NATO and the Soviet
Union, Soviet forces deployed at long distances from
the USSR would be most useful during the transition to
war just prior to the opening of hostilities. Soviet
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabili-
ties abroad, as long as they survived and were not
blocked by the host countries, could provide critical
information. To avoid becoming involved in an East-
West conflict, many host countries would seek to deny
the Soviets use of their facilities. (s)
Potential Soviet Gains and Losses
123. The list of Third World countries that allow
some significant Soviet military involvement or access
may change slightly in the next few years. The
number of countries is not likely to grow significantly,
however, and could even decline. Nonetheless, the
Soviets still view the Third World as the Achilles' heel
of the West, and will persevere in their efforts to
enhance their power and influence there. The key
instrument which Moscow uses to gain entree to the
Third World will continue to be military aid. The
USSR can offer a wide range of military equipment at
attractive prices and provide quick delivery. These
military assistance arrangements are often accompa-
nied by Soviet advisers, technicians, and instructors.
Continuing needs for spare parts and maintenance
create additional military relationships. Factors which
facilitate Soviet entree are:
- Insecurity. Soviet or Cuban military support
provided to meet internal or external threats
could evolve into Soviet access to air and naval
facilities. The more a country relies on the USSR
and faces local threats, the greater will be the
opportunity for Soviet military access.
- Ambition. Some regimes seek Soviet support for
their own foreign ambitions, such as Vietnam's
occupation of Kampuchea and Laos. (s)
124. In addition to those countries where the USSR
already enjoys significant military access, Seychelles
may permit the Soviets more extensive military use of
its facilities. Also, in West Africa there is potential for
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additional Soviet military access. Elsewhere, instability
in the Third World could lead to other opportunities,
but we cannot predict where with any certainty. A
few new countries may see value in accepting Soviet
military assistance, while others are likely to become
dissatisfied with their relationships with the USSR
because of the lack of economic aid, the age and
sometimes poor quality of Soviet equipment, the costly
maintenance arrangements, the unavailability of spare
parts, or other reasons. In any event, military assist-
ance does not necessarily translate into Soviet military
access. (s)
125. Most countries will continue to prefer not to
allow the Soviets military access. They view a Soviet
presence as a threat. Soviet officials often are distrust-
ed and thought to be KGB or military intelligence
(GRU) operatives engaged in espionage and subver-
sion. Close association with the USSR could also
jeopardize economic and military ties with the West.
Similarly, Third World countries often consider any
foreign military presence inconsistent with national
independence, particularly when their borders are not
threatened. Even the main attraction-Soviet arms-
often is only an effective inducement because these
arms are not available from preferred sources or are
available from Moscow at significantly less cost. (s)
126. It is by no means certain that all pro-Soviet
regimes can maintain power in their own countries. If
a Soviet client regime were to be overthrown by anti-
Soviet insurgents, or reached a compromise with the
internal opposition by ousting the Soviets, the conse-
quences for Soviet prestige in the Third World would
be adverse, but hard to assess at this stage. We believe
that, among those countries already permitting exten-
sive military access to the Soviets, setbacks are more
likely to occur in Angola, Guinea, or Ethiopia. (s)
127. Well into the 1990s, Soviet forces deployed
beyond contiguous areas will continue to lack substan-
tial offensive punch. Political and military leaders in
Moscow will continue to consider NATO the primary
threat and prepare accordingly. Thus, out-of-area
naval deployments will involve more capable units but
remain modest, representing only about 15 percent of
the Soviet Navy. A continuous Soviet naval presence
will be maintained in the Mediterranean, the Indian
Ocean, the South China Sea, and off the coast of West
Africa. Elsewhere, the Caribbean and the Philippine
Sea are likely to have increased Soviet naval presence,
although the presence may not be continuous. Some
additional strike aircraft probably will be deployed to
Vietnam and perhaps elsewhere. In particular, Mos-
cow would like to improve military access in the
Indian Ocean and littoral. Seychelles affords the best
prospect for this. In the Mediterranean region, token
visits by Soviet strike aircraft to Syria and Libya are
possible, but neither routine nor sustained deploy-
ments are likely. (s)
128. Although Soviet foreign deployments are un-
likely to be significantly more threatening over the
next decade, overall Soviet capabilities for distant
military operations on behalf of a Soviet ally will
improve substantially. VTA and Aeroflot capabilities
to airlift cargo and troops long distances will grow
significantly. Sealift by amphibious and merchant
ships also is improving. The Soviet Navy's capability
for distant, sustained operations will be improved with
several new classes of principal surface combatants
and submarines. Further improvements in naval air
support will be realized with the introduction of a
CTOL carrier and the Helix B seaborne assault heli-
copter. The introduction of an aerial refueling capabil-
ity for Soviet fighters, fighter-bombers, transports, and
AWACS aircraft also will add new potential for distant
military operations. (s)
129. Even with these improvements, however, di-
rect Soviet military intervention in Third World con-
flicts probably will be restricted to situations where
the risk of escalation to a war with the West is judged
to be small and Soviet capabilities to perform higher
priority strategic missions would not be seriously de-
graded. Because of the Soviet stakes in the Middle East
and the proximity of the region to the USSR, Moscow
would consider military intervention there even when
the risks were somewhat higher. In most cases, Soviet
military intervention would take the form of air
defense units or other types of units to bolster local
defense. In any event, the Soviet Navy will continue to
provide support to its allies in the Mediterranean, the
Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and off the coast
of West Africa. Such support could be in the form of a
show of force air defense, radar early warning, or even
"naval interposition." We believe it is highly unlikely,
however, that Soviet naval intervention forces would
be deployed to the Western Hemisphere in a crisis. (s)
130. The Soviet force posture will continue to be
designed primarily for a NATO contingency and the
danger of a two-front war involving China. Third
World concerns will remain secondary and, even with
the force improvements projected over the next de-
cade, Soviet forces abroad will probably remain inferi-
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or to those of the West in the Mediterranean, the
western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless,
Moscow could concentrate additional military re-
sources beyond those projected in the base case, and,
in conjunction with the buildup of certain allies,
attempt to achieve a favorable local military balance. (s)
131. Other developments, which, in our judgment,
are quite unlikely but potentially more threatening,
are possible. The most significant change would be the
development of a more viable forward strike posture.
Such developments are currently accorded a relatively
low probability for several reasons: existing Soviet
military resources may be considered inadequate for
priority missions around the periphery, and thus few
could be spared for more distant deployments; Soviet
forces abroad are vulnerable and host governments
may be unwilling to risk becoming involved as belli-
gerents; and the costs of substantial increases in for-
ward-deployed forces may not be justified by the
potential benefits of marginally improved Soviet secu-
rity and Third World gains. On the other hand, there
are arguments in favor of improving the wartime
potential of forward-deployed Soviet forces. These
include the potential benefits of diverting dispropor-
tionately larger US strike forces that otherwise could
be used against bases in the USSR. Furthermore, Soviet
use of certain foreign facilities could complement
Soviet efforts to extend their defense perimeter. (s)
132. Soviet intentions to develop more ambitious
military roles abroad, including a more viable forward
strike posture, could be suggested by the following
indicators:
- Deployment of ships with equipment pre-posi-
tioned for rapid use by Soviet or allied forces.
- Construction of large fuel storage capacities at
airfields likely to be used to support Soviet
airlifts.
- Installation of coastal defense missiles and de-
ployment of small combatants to defend Soviet
naval facilities abroad.
- Construction of submarine support facilities at
foreign ports.
- Construction of air and naval missile storage and
handling facilities overseas.
- Increased Soviet training combined with Third
World forces.
- Organization of a rapid deployment force head-
quarters with supporting communications units.
- Increased production of long-range aircraft and
nuclear-powered submarines. (s)
133. Should Moscow opt for more substantial for-
ward deployments, these would be likely to include
more attack submarines, more strike aircraft, and
possibly an AWACS aircraft. These would probably be
somewhat older models that become available as new
equipment is introduced for primary roles, similar to
the pattern when the introduction of Backfire bombers
into the Pacific Fleet made some Badgers available for
use in Vietnam. If the Soviet leadership decides to
increase the military potential of foreign facilities,
several additional roles for forward-deployed Soviet
forces could emerge:
- Counter Power Projection. Foreign bases could
facilitate the "interposition" of Soviet forces be-
tween US forces and their objective-however, at
the risk of war. The Soviet base in Vietnam
would best support the development of such a
role. Soviet submarines or aircraft could attack
shipping in important sea lanes. Mines could
block key waterways, and cruise missiles with
conventional warheads could be forward based.
Such forward deployments would still be vulner-
able, but Soviet naval doctrine emphasizes sur-
prise and preemptive strikes against carrier battle
groups before they can launch airstrikes. In
peacetime, more substantial Soviet deployments
also could have important political benefits if
Third World leaders perceive the correlation of
forces in their region favors the Soviet Bloc.
- Integrated Operations. Soviet forces have con-
ducted limited training exercises with Syria,
Vietnam, Cuba, South Yemen, and Ethiopia.
Such exercises could lead to better military coor-
dination. However, they would have to be signif-
icantly larger, more complex, and more frequent
to produce significant results. A division of labor
could be worked out whereby Soviet ships or
aircraft provide early warning and targeting
information to local interceptor squadrons, air
defense units, and coastal defense missile units.
Such integrated military operations could help
offset weaknessess in Soviet power projection
capabilities. For example, tactical air support
could be provided by local forces, with Soviet
AWACS support. Eventually, a separate com-
mand structure could be established to deal with
rapid deployment of forces for distant contingen-
cies. Should Moscow decide to expand capabili-
ties for distant military intervention, pre-posi-
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tinned equipment ships might be a more attrac-
tive option than land-based stockpiles on foreign
territory.
Battlefield Isolation. Future Soviet foreign mili-
tary involvement also could be designed to
preclude outside intervention in situations where
Soviet clients enjoy a favorable military balance.
Soviet intervention in such a role would be
predicated on estimates that Soviet forces would
not encounter a major power. Should a regional
conflict occur, Soviet forces could attempt to
blockade opponents' ports and preclude resupply
by airlift. A network of upgraded ports and
airfields would facilitate such an option. (s)
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NOFORN
Recent Soviet Friendship and
Military F.quipreet Cooperation l-realy
Deliveries With USSR 1,
First Year USSR Soviet Military Soviet Soviet Military Soviet Naval Additional Soviet
Primary Arms Presence d Naval Visits Airlift (VTA) I Aviation (SNA) a Military Presence
Source r
Since Current Since Frequency
Total in 1983
North Africa
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin
Botswana
Ile rundi
Cape Verde
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Mali
Mozambique
Nigeria
Seychelles
Tanzania
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
East Asia
Vietnam
Laos
Kampuchea
Latin America
Cuba
Nicaragua
Peru
Middle East, South
Asia
Bangladesh
Egypt
India
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
North Yemen
South Yemen
1963
1971
1962
1971
1976
1978
1981
1965
1965
1978
1976
1960
1960
1974
1976
1975
1976
1961
1961
1977
1975
1975
1967
1978
1981
1974
1964
1975
1979
1979
1979
1979
1962
1981
1981
1973
1974
1973
1971-76
1968-
76
1971
1962
1967
1972
1958
1981
1984
1962
1956
1979
1968
1956
? Countries receiving Soviet military equipment deliveries within last
three years. Of these 38 countries, 25 also receive military assistance
from Western sources.
a Since 1971, Moscow has signed 13 "Friendship and Cooperation"
treaties with T'Itird World countries, two (Egypt and Somalia) have
been abrogated, and Afghanistan is not included in the scope of this
study.
First year in which the value of arms accords with the USSR
accounted for at least half the value of their total military
agreements.
775 1966 2
2,000 1969 14
1964
20
20 1979
100 1972 1
1970
Military connnunica-
lions, naval support
1980-present Naval support, naval in-
fantry security, military
communications
20 1969 30
55 1976
150
150
800 1977 21
10 1969
5 1967
85 1968
50
2,500 1979 246
500 -- -
7,000- 1967 43
9,000
100
150 1970
20 1969
1965
-
435 1966
Unknown 1968
1,200 1968
25
500 1963
450 1968
a Includes Soviet military advisers, technicians, and troops.
Date of first port call (since 1953) by Soviet naval ship and number
of visits in 1983.
r Soviet Military Transport Aviation extended foreign deployments
of airlift aircraft.
s Soviet Naval Aviation regular, extended foreign deployments.
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1979-present SIGINT,militarycom-
munications, naval sup-
port, naval infantry
security
1970-present SIGINT, military coml-
munications, combat bri-
gade, naval support
Military communica-
tions, SIGINT, naval
support
1981-present Naval support, air de-
fense, communications
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