SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00869R000600020001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 131
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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SCIENTIFIC V ALIDITX OF
POLYGRAPH TESTING
A RESEARCH REVIEW AND EVALUATION
A TECHNICAL. MEMORANDUM
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
Office of Technology Assessment
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Office of Technology Assessment
Congressional Board of the 98th Congress
ORRIN G. HATCH
Utah
CHARLES 'vlcC. MATHIAS, JR.
Maryland
EDWARI` M. KENNEDY
Mascachtsetrs
ERNEST F. IIOLLING:S
South Carolina
CLAIBORNE PELI.
Rhode Island
CHARLES N. KI1MBALL Chairman
Midwest Research Institute
EARL BEIS LLINE
University of Alaska
CHARLES A BOWSHER
General Accounting Office
CLAIRE T DERRICK
California Land Comrnission
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.
California
JOHN D. DINGELL
Michigan
LARRY WINN, JR
Kansas
CLARENCE E. MILLER
Onio
COOPER EVANS
10" a
JOEIN H. GIBBONS
,'Ncmvotin~;)
Advisory Council
JAMES C. FLETCHER
University of Pittsburgh
RACHEL McCULLO( H
University of Wi.sconr,in
S. DAVID FREEMAN
Tennessee Valley Authority
GILBERT GUDE
Congressional Research Service
CARL N. HODGES
University of Arizona
WILLIAM J. PERRY
Hambrecht & Quact
DAVID S. POTTER
General Motors Corp
LEWIS THOMAS
ivlemoria] Sloan-Kettering
Cancer Center
This is an (ETA Technical Memorandum that has neither been reviewed nor
approved by the Technology Assessment Board
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SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
POLYGRAPH TESTING
A RESEARCH REVIEW AND EVALUATION
A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM
Technical Memoranda are issued by OTA on specific subjects analyzed in recent OTA
reports or on projects presently in process at OTA. They are issued at the request
of Members of Congress who are engaged in committee legislative actions which are
expected to be resolved before OTA completes its assessment.
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Recommended Citation:
Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation-A Techni-
cal Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
OTA-TM-H-15, November 1983).
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 83-600618
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
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Foreword
This technical memorandum presents the results of the Office of Technology Assess-
ment's (OTA) review and assessment of the scientific evidence on the validity of polygraph
testing. Conducted at the request of Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman, House Committee
on Government Operations, and Rep. Frank Horton, the Ranking Minority Member,
the OTA memorandum is intended to assist the committee in its deliberations on pro-
posed changes in polygraph use by the Federal Government.
As requested, OTA has limited this technical memorandum to issues directly related
to the scientific validity of the polygraph. OTA did not consider utility, privacy, con-
stitutional, and ethical issues, among others that have been raised in the debate over
polygraph testing.
We first discuss the various types of polygraph testing procedures and ways in which
the polygraph is used, and then summarize the judicial, legislative, and scientific con-
troversy over polygraph testing validity. Next, we review and evaluate both prior reviews
of the scientific research on polygraph validity and the individual research studies. Finally,
we discuss the range of factors that may affect polygraph validity and the possibilities
for future research, and present OTA's conclusions about the scientific evidence for cur-
rent and proposed Federal Government polygraph use.
In preparing this memorandum, OTA has drawn on research information available
from a wide variety of sources, including the major Federal Government polygraph users,
the American Polygraph Association, various private polygraph practitioners, and
polygraph researchers both in the United States, and abroad.
In addition to the members of the project advisory panel, this memorandum benefited
from the consultation and review of a large number of persons in the Federal Govern-
ment, universities, and the polygraph community. It is, however, solely the respon-
sibility of OTA, not those who advised and assisted us in its preparation.
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Polygraph Validity Advisory Panel
Edward S. Katkin, Chairman
Professor of Psychology, State University of New York at Buffalo
Joseph P. Buckley Steve Pruitt
President Director of Congressional Affairs
John E. Reid & Associates Public Employees Department, AFL-CIO
Robert Edelberg
Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology
UMDNJ-Rutgers Medical School
Frank Horvath
Associate Professor
School of Criminal Justice
Michigan State University
David T. Lykken
Profesor of Psychiatry and Psychology
University of Minnesota Medical School
Gail J. Povar
Christopher H. Pyle
Associate Professor of Politics
Mt. Holyoke College
David C. Raskin
Professor of Psychology
University of Utah
Harold Sigall
Professor of Psychology
University of Maryland
George B. Trubow
Professor of Information Law and Policy
The John Marshall Law School
Assistant Professor of Medicine and Althea M. I. Wagman
Health Care Sciences Research Associate of Psychiatry
The George Washington University Medical Maryland Psychiatric Research Center
Center University of Maryland School of Medicine
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OTA Polygraph Validity Project Staff
John H. Gibbons, Acting Assistant Director, OTA
Health and Life Sciences Division *
Clyde Behney, Health Program Manager
Fred B. Wood, Project Director
(Communication and Information Technologies Program (CIT))
Leonard Saxe, Principal Investigator and Author (Boston University)"
*
Denise Dougherty, Co-author and Analyst (Health)t
Theodore Cross, Co-author (Boston University)tt
Jack Langenbrunner, Analyst (Health)
Katherine Locke, Research Assistant (Health)
Administrative Support
Ginny Cwalina, Administrative Assistant (Health)
Elizabeth Emanuel, Administrative Assistant (CIT)
Jennifer Nelson, Secretary (Health)
Shirley Gayheart, Secretary (CIT)
Other Contributors
Michael Saks, Boston College
Daniel Ozer, Boston University
Yoram Bar-Tal, Boston University
Mary Beasley, Boston University
Marie Calabrese, Boston University
Molly Zane, Boston University
OTA Publishing Staff
John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer
John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson
Glenda Lawing Linda A. Leahy Cheryl J. Manning
*Since September 1983; H. David Banta served as Assistant Director until August 1983.
**Assistant Professor of Psychology, Boston University.
IOTA Analyst since September 1983; Boston University Graduate Research Assistant until August 1983.
ttGraduate Research Assistant, Boston University.
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Acknowledgments
OTA acknowledges the contribution of the following agencies and individuals that provided information,
advice, and/or substantive reviews of draft materials:
Federal Government Agencies
Department of Defense (Office of Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Army, Air Force,
Navy, Marines, National Security Agency)
Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Drug Enforcement Administration)
Department of State
Department of the Treasury (Secret Service, Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms)
Postal Service
Office of Personnel Management
Central Intelligence Agency
Director of Central Intelligence (Security Committee)
Individuals
Maynard Anderson, Department of Defense
Norman Ansley, National Security Agency
Gordon H. Barland, Barland & Associates
Antonio S. Barrio, Central Texas College System
Louise Becker, Congressional Research Service
William H. Bell, Department of Defense
B. F. Bloomingburg, Naval Investigative Service
Irv Boker, General Accounting Office
Robert A. Brisentine, Army Criminal Investigation
Command
Henry L. Canty, Consultant
Richard P. Clayberg, SRI International
Eileen Correa, Veterans Administration Medical
Center
Ron Decker, Army Military Policy School
Jack Donnelly, Department of Defense
William R. Fedor, Department of Defense
Michelle Fine, University of Pennsylvania
Robert J. Gatchel, University of Texas at Dallas
Fitz Godwin, Army
Lewis R. Goldberg, University of Oregon
Gisli Gudjonson, London Institute of Psychiatry
David L. Hammond, Psychologist
James E. Hardy, Air Force Office of Special
Investigations
Fred Hegge, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
Eric J. Holden, Baker, Holden & Associates
Charles Robert Honts, University of Utah
William G. Iacono, University of British Columbia
Michel Pierre Janisse, University of Manitoba
Richard C. Johnson, Polygraph, Inc.
Scott Kingsley, National Security Agency
Benjamin Kleinmuntz, University of Illinois at Chicago
Circle
Brian E. Lynch, Canadian Police College
Lynn P. Marcy, American Polygraph Association
Paul K. Minor, Federal Bureau of Investigation
L. D. Noland, Army Intelligence and Security
Command
Jesse Orlansky, Institute for Defense Analysis
John A. Podlesny, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Roland Radloff, National Science Foundation
Richard K. Riegelman, George Washington University
Medical Center
John Roberts, Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts
Robert Rosenthal, Harvard University
Akihiro Suzuki, Japanese Institute of Police Science
Julian J. Szucko, University of Illinois at Chicago
Circle
William A. Thomas, American Bar Foundation
Howard W. Timm, Southern Illinois University of
Carbondale
H. Herbold Wooten, Institute of Applied Polygraph
Science
Lawrence S. Wrightsman, University of Kansas
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Chapter
1. SUMMARY
Introduction ...........................
Federal Polygraph Use ..................
Federal Polygraph Policy Changes .......
Polygraph Validity .....................
Findings ..............................
Personnel Security Screening ..........
Criminal Investigations ...............
False Negatives/Countermeasures ......
False Positives ......................
Voluntary v. Involuntary .............
Polygraph Theory ...................
Further Research ....................
Chapter-by-Chapter Overview ...........
Conclusions ...........................
2. VARIETIES OF POLYGRAPH TESTING
AND USES .........................
Introduction ...........................
Polygraph Instrument ..................
Types of Testing Procedures ............
The Pretest Interview ................
Types of Questions ..................
Polygraph Question Techniques .......
Post-Test Interview ....................
Uses of Polygraph Testing ..............
Current Use ........................
Conclusions ...........................
3. CONTROVERSY OVER POLYGRAPH
TESTING VALIDITY ................
Introduction ...........................
Judicial Reviews .......................
Polygraph Findings as Evidence .......
Laws Regulating Polygraphs in
Employment Settings ..............
Federal Debate Over Polygraph Validity . .
The 1960's ..........................
The 1970's ..........................
The 1980's ..........................
Draft Revisions to DOD 5210.48 ......
NSDD-84 ...........................
Administration Polygraph Policy ......
Scientific Validity and Polygraph
Research Reviews ....................
Definitions of Scientific Validity .......
Research Design .....................
False Positives and Negatives .........
Reviews of Polygraph Validity ........
Conclusions ...........................
Contents
3 4. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF POLYGRAPH
3 FIELD STUDIES ..................... 47
3 Introduction ........................... 47
4 Study Selection ........................ 47
4 Studies Excluded .................... 48
4 Studies Included ..................... 49
5 Coding ............................... 51
5 Findings and Discussion ................ 51
5 Variation Among Studies ............. 52
6 Studies Using Panel Criterion
6 and Examiners' Decisions .......... 52
6 Studies Using Confession as a Criterion
6 and Blind Evaluations ............. 54
7 Studies Using Judicial Outcomes
and Original Examiners' Results ..... 56
Other Considerations ................... 56
11 Conclusions ........................... 58
11
11 5. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF POLYGRAPH
12 ANALOG STUDIES ................. 61
12 Introduction ........................... 61
14 Characteristics of Analog Studies ........ 61
17 Study Selection ...................... 62
23 Description of Studies ................ 65
23 Control Question Technique ............ 65
23 University of Utah Studies ............. 65
25 Other Studies ....................... 68
Concealed Information Tests ............ 72
Lykken ............................. 72
29 Davidson ........................... 73
29 Podlesny and Raskin ................. 73
29 Giesen and Rollison .................. 73
30 Balloun and Holmes ................. 74
Bradley and Janisse .................. 75
31 Timm .............................. 75
32 Preemployment Screening ............... 75
32 Correa and Adams .................. 75
34 Barland ............................ 76
35 Findings .............................. 78
36
36 6. FACTORS AFFECTING POLYGRAPH
36 EXAMINATION VALIDITY ......... 83
Introduction ........................... 83
37 Polygraph Examiner, Subject, and Setting. 83
37 Examiner ........................... 83
38 Subjects ............................ 84
38 Setting ............................. 86
39 Countermeasures ....................... 87
43 Physical ............................ 87
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Drugs .............................. 88
Hypnosis/Biofeedback ............... 89
Mental ............................. 89
Research Implications of Factors
Affecting Validity ................... 91
Theory ............................. 91
Scoring ............................. 91
Question Techniques ................. 91
Countermeasures .................... 91
Comparison With Other Techniques ... 92
Field Studies ........................ 92
Conclusions ........................... 92
7. CONCLUSIONS ....................... 95
Introduction ........................... 95
Overall Scientific Conclusions ........... 95
Specific Scientific Conclusions in
Policy Context ...................... 97
Specific-Incident Criminal
Investigations ..................... 97
Personnel Security Screening .......... 99
False Negatives/ Countermeasures ...... 100
Voluntary v. Involuntary ............. 101
Further Research .................... 101
Concluding Comment .................. 102
Appendixes
A. Informed Consent Forms ................ 105
B. Results of the OTA Survey of Federal
Government Polygraph Testing ....... 107
C. Coding Form .......................... 114
D. Acronyms and Glossary ................ 120
List of Tables
Table No.
1. Polygraph Examinations Conducted
by Federal Agencies, 1982 .............. 24
2. Reviews of Field Studies of
Polygraph Validity ..................... 40
3. Characteristics of Field Studies .......... 48
4. Mean Detection Rates as a Percentage
of Total in Field Studies ................ 52
5. Outcomes of Field Studies of Validity .... 53
6. Outcomes of Control Question
Analog Studies of Validity .............. 63
7. Outcomes of Guilty Knowledge
Analog Studies of Validity .............. 64
8. Mean Detection Rates as a Percentage
of Total in Analog Studies of
Control Question Technique ............ 65
9. Mean Detection Rates as a Percentage
of Total in Analog Studies of
Guilty Knowledge Test ................. 65
B-1. Number of Polygraph Exams
and Examiners ........................ 108
B-2. Purpose of Polygraph Exam ............ 109
B-3. Length and Results of Exams ........... 111
B-4. Long-term Confirmation
of Exam Results ....................... 111
B-5. Selected Federal Agency
Polygraph Research ................... 113
List of Figures
Figure No. Page
1. Debate at the Federal Level 1963-83 ...... 33
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Chapter 1
Summary
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Chapter 1
Summary
INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this OTA technical
memorandum is to review and evaluate current
scientific evidence about the validity of polygraph
testing. This memorandum responds to the Feb-
ruary 3, 1983, letter of request from the Commit-
tee on Government Operations, U.S. House of
Representatives, and the need to provide infor-
mation that is relevant to congressional considera-
tion of the polygraph aspects of the President's
National Security Decision Directive-84 (NSDD-
84), proposed revisions to Department of Defense
(DOD) Directive 5210.48 governing the DOD
polygraph program, and the recently revised ad-
ministration policy on polygraph use by Federal
agencies.
The OTA technical memorandum is limited to
a critical review and evaluation of prior research.
The memorandum does not consider, in detail,
other polygraph issues such as utility, ethics, im-
pact on employee morale and productivity, pri-
vacy, and constitutional rights. The technical
memorandum, instead, focuses on the nature and
application of polygraph tests, scientific contro-
versy over polygraph testing, data from field and
simulation studies, and factors that affect test
validity.
FEDERAL POLYGRAPH USE
OTA found that Federal Government use of
polygraph tests has more than tripled over the last
10 years, with about 23,000 examinations con-
ducted in 1982 compared to about 7,000 exams
in 1973. Current use now exceeds the previous
known peak level of use (about 20,000 exams) in
1963. In all Federal agencies except the National
Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA), more than 90 percent of
polygraph testing in 1982 was for criminal inves-
tigations. Only NSA and CIA make significant
use of the polygraph for personnel security screen-
ing-preemployment, preclearance, periodic, or
aperiodic-to establish initial and continuing
eligibility for access to highly classified informa-
tion. However, NSA accounted for almost half
of all Federal polygraph examinations adminis-
tered in 1982. Federal agencies at present make
only limited use of the polygraph for investiga-
tion of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or
classified information-261 examinations (exclud-
ing NSA and CIA) for this purpose over the 1980-
82 period.
FEDERAL POLYGRAPH POLICY CHANGES
The March 1983 draft proposed revisions to the
DOD polygraph regulations (5210.48) authorize
the use of polygraph tests to determine initial and
continuing eligibility of DOD civilian, military,
and contractor personnel for access to highly clas-
sified information (Sensitive Compartmented In-
formation and/or special access). The use of poly-
graph tests in determining continuing eligibility
would be on an aperiodic (i.e., irregular) basis.
These expanded uses of the polygraph would be
part of DOD personnel security screening.
Also, the proposed revisions to DOD 5210.48
provide adverse consequences for refusal to take
a polygraph examination, when established as a
requirement for selection or assignment or as a
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condition of access. Refusal to take an examina-
tion may, after consideration of other relevant fac-
tors, result in nonselection for assignment or
employment, denial or revocation of clearance,
or reassignment to a nonsensitive position.
NSDD-84, issued by the President on March
11, 1983, authorized agencies and departments to
require employees to take a polygraph examina-
tion in the course of investigations of unauthor-
ized disclosures of classified information. NSDD-
84 also provides that refusal to take a polygraph
test may result in adverse consequences such as
administrative sanctions and denial of security
clearance.
would also permit Government-wide polygraph
use in personnel security screening of employees
(and applicants for positions) with access to highly
classified information. The new policy provides
agency heads with the authority to give polygraph
examinations on a periodic or aperiodic basis to
randomly selected employees with highly sensitive
access, and to deny such access to employees who
refuse to take a polygraph examination.
Thus, the combined effect of NSDD-84, the
DOD proposals, and administration policy is to
authorize substantially expanded use of the poly-
graph for purposes of personnel security screen-
ing and unauthorized disclosure investigations.
On October 19, 1983, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) announced that administration policy
POLYGRAPH VALIDITY
In 1965 and again in 1976, the House Govern-
ment Operations Committee concluded that there
was not adequate evidence to establish the validity
of the polygraph. OTA has assessed the research
to determine the present state of scientific evi-
dence.
OTA concluded that no overall measure or
single, simple judgment of polygraph testing
validity can be established based on available
scientific evidence. Validity is the extent to which
polygraph testing can accurately detect truthful-
ness and deception.
There are two major reasons why an overall
measure of validity is not possible. First, the poly-
graph test is, in reality, a very complex process
that is much more than the instrument. Although
the instrument is essentially the same for all ap-
FINDINGS
Personnel Security Screening
OTA concluded that the available research evi-
dence does not establish the scientific validity of
the polygraph test for personnel security screen-
ing. OTA was able to identify only four studies
plications, the types of individuals tested, train-
ing of the examiner, purpose of the test, and types
of questions asked, among other factors, can differ
substantially. A polygraph test requires that the
examiner infer deception or truthfulness based on
a comparison of the person's physiological re-
sponses to various questions. For example, there
are differences between the testing procedures
used in criminal investigations and those used in
personnel security screening. Second, the research
on polygraph validity varies widely in terms of
not only results, but also in the quality of research
design and methodology. Thus, conclusions about
scientific validity can be made only in the con-
text of specific applications and even then must
be tempered by the limitations of available re-
search evidence.
directly relevant to personnel security screening
use (one by DOD). None of these studies specif-
ically assessed validity of polygraph testing for
the purposes proposed by DOD or the administra-
tion, and all had serious limitations in study
design.
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A 1980 survey conducted by the Director of
Central Intelligence Security Committee con-
cluded that the polygraph was the most produc-
tive of all background investigation techniques.
However, this was a utility study not a validity
study, and had many qualifications.
OTA recognizes that NSA and CIA believe that
the polygraph is a useful screening tool. However,
OTA concluded that the available research evi-
dence does not establish the scientific validity of
the polygraph for this purpose.
In addition, there is a legitimate concern that
the use of polygraph tests for personnel security
screening may be especially susceptible to: 1)
countermeasures by persons trained to use physi-
cal movement, drugs, or other techniques to avoid
detection as deceptive; and 2) false positive er-
rors where innocent persons are incorrectly iden-
tified as deceptive.
Criminal Investigations
OTA found meaningful scientific evidence of
polygraph validity only in the area of investiga-
tions of specific criminal incidents. However,
OTA concluded that, even here, findings about
polygraph validity must be qualified. This is
because prior research has used widely varying
types of questions, examiners, and examinees,
among other differences. And there is, to date,
no consistently used and accepted methodology
for polygraph research. Also, the cases selected
in field studies and situations simulated in analog
studies may not be representative of most actual
polygraph testing conditions. Therefore the ability
to generalize from the results of prior research is
limited.
OTA found a wide divergence in the results of
relevant research, due in part to variations in
research quality and design. Six prior research
reviews showed average validity ranging from a
low of 64 percent to a high of 98 percent. OTA's
own review of 24 relevant studies meeting mini-
mum acceptable scientific criteria found that, for
example, correct guilty detections ranged from
about 35 to 100 percent. Overall, the cumulative
research evidence suggests that when used in crim-
inal investigations, the polygraph test detects
deception better than chance, but with error rates
that could be considered significant.
In a typical criminal investigation, the poly-
graph, if used at all, is used only after prior in-
vestigation has been completed, and a prime sus-
pect or suspects have been identified. To the ex-
tent polygraph use in unauthorized disclosure in-
vestigations would be similar, then the available
research provides some evidence of polygraph
testing validity. However, for so-called "dragnet"
screening where a large number of people would
be given polygraph tests in the investigation of
unauthorized disclosures, relevant research evi-
dence does not establish polygraph testing validi-
ty. There has been no direct scientific research on
this application.
False Negatives/Countermeasures
Theoretically, polygraph testing-whether for
personnel security screening or specific-incident
investigations-is open to a large number of coun-
termeasures, including physical movement or
pressure, drugs, hypnosis, biofeedback, and prior
experience in passing an exam. The research on
countermeasures has been limited and the re-
sults-while conflicting-suggest that validity
may be affected. OTA concluded that this is par-
ticularly significant to the extent that the poly-
graph is used and relied on for national security
purposes, since even a small false negative rate
(guilty person tested as nondeceptive) could have
very serious consequences.
False Positives
OTA concluded that the mathematical chance
of incorrect identification of innocent persons as
deceptive (false positives) is highest when the
polygraph is used for screening purposes. The rea-
son is that, in screening situations, there is usually
only a very small percentage of the group being
screened that might be guilty. So, in a typical situ-
ation, there may be, perhaps, one person per
1,000 engaged in unauthorized activity. There-
fore, even if one assumes that the polygraph is
99 percent accurate, the laws of probability indi-
cate that one guilty person would be correctly
identified as deceptive but 10 persons would be
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incorrectly identified (false positives). This poten-
tial problem has not been researched in field or
analog studies and clearly warrants attention.
Voluntary v. Involuntary
NSDD-84, the DOD proposals, and administra-
tion policy authorize adverse consequences for re-
fusal to take a polygraph test. Apart from the eth-
ical and legal implications, which OTA did not
address, it is generally recognized that, for the
polygraph test to be accurate, the voluntary co-
operation of the individual is important. Thus,
OTA concluded that imposing penalties for not
taking a test may create a de facto involuntary
condition that increases the chances of invalid or
inconclusive test results. However, no direct re-
search on this topic was identified.
Polygraph Theory
The basic theory of polygraph testing is only
partially developed and researched. The most
commonly accepted theory at present is that,
when the person being examined fears detection,
that fear produces a measurable physiological re-
action when the person responds deceptively.
Thus, in this theory, the polygraph instrument is
measuring the fear of detection rather than decep-
tion per se. And the examiner infers deception
when the physiological response to questions
about the crime or unauthorized activity is greater
CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The preceding discussion summarizes OTA's
major findings. This section provides a brief chap-
ter-by-chapter overview of the technical memo-
randum.
Chapter 2 describes the varieties of polygraph
questioning techniques and a number of uses for
polygraph examinations, with an emphasis on
Federal Government use. The chapter describes
the polygraph instrument as relatively standard,
and, by itself, unable to detect truthfulness or de-
ception. What is often referred to as "the poly-
graph" is actually a set of relatively complex pro-
cedures for asking questions and measuring phys-
than the response to other questions. However,
the examinee's intelligence level, state of psycho-
logical health, emotional stability, and belief in
the "machine" are among the several other fac-
tors that may, at least theoretically, affect physi-
ological responses.
A stronger theoretical base is needed for the en-
tire range of polygraph applications. Basic poly-
graph research should consider the latest research
from the fields of psychology, physiology, psy-
chiatry, neuroscience, and medicine; comparison
among question techniques; and measures of
physiological response.
Further Research
OTA identified a need for further research on
polygraph countermeasures, polygraph theory,
and polygraph validity under field conditions (for
both screening and criminal investigative situa-
tions). The currently planned Federal research on
countermeasures appears to be inadequate. There
is no known Federal research planned on poly-
graph theory. And the Army's current 10-year
research program to develop a new, perhaps com-
puterized, state-of-the-art polygraph instrument
should be reevaluated to determine if research
priorities and direction need adjustment. Final-
ly, the planned FBI-Secret Service polygraph va-
lidity study needs an extensive independent scien-
tific review.
iological responses in order to detect deception
or establish truthfulness. This chapter discusses
the procedures and their common applications,
and explains why different polygraph testing tech-
niques appear to be required depending on in-
tended uses.
The validity of polygraph examinations to de-
tect deception has long been a controversial issue
Chapter 3 describes how the courts, State
legislatures, and the executive and legislative
branches of the Federal Government have viewed
assessments of scientific validity as central to deci-
sions about polygraph use. Despite many decades
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of discussion, no consensus has emerged about
the accuracy of polygraph tests. The chapter de-
fines scientific criteria for establishing validity and
reviews previous efforts to evaluate the scientific
literature on polygraph testing. Disagreement
about the validity of polygraph testing in the sci-
entific community reflects wide variations in the
criteria used for inclusion of studies in prior re-
search reviews, differences in research design and
definitions of validity among specific research
studies, and, perhaps most important, failure to
clearly differentiate the scientific evidence in terms
of the purposes for which polygraph examinations
are conducted and the techniques employed.
Chapter 4 presents OTA's own analysis of
polygraph field studies in order to make an inde-
pendent assessment of validity. Field studies in-
volve real-life uses of polygraph testing. With one
exception, all of the available field evidence meet-
ing minimal scientific criteria comes from cases
involving specific-incident criminal investigations
using the control question technique. OTA found
no field studies on the validity of polygraph test-
ing for preemployment screening or periodic
screening. Overall, the studies varied in impor-
tant ways with respect to, in particular, the
criteria used to verify truth, and whether original
examiners' decisions or blind evaluation of charts
were used as the basis of comparison with ground
truth. In addition, all studies had substantial prob-
lems of research design, especially with case and
examiner selection. As a result, the studies may
represent a highly select sample of cases. These
caveats limit the confidence that can be placed in
any conclusions about polygraph validity based
on field research.
Chapter 5 parallels chapter 4 and presents
OTA's analysis of polygraph analog studies in
which field methods of polygraph examinations
are used in simulated rather than real-life situa-
CONCLUSIONS
A major reason why scientific debate over poly-
graph validity yields conflicting conclusions is that
the validity of such a complex procedure is very
difficult to assess and may vary widely from one
tions. These analog studies were conducted pri-
marily in psychology laboratories using college
students as subjects. Like the field studies, analog
studies have primarily investigated the control
question technique in specific-incident criminal in-
vestigations, although there are some studies of
an alternative ("guilty knowledge") technique for
criminal investigations and two studies of preem-
ployment screening, one using military intelli-
gence personnel as subjects. While using a more
standardized methodology than field studies, the
analog studies had other kinds of significant re-
search design problems, and the range of error
in polygraph results was greater than in field
studies. The two studies of preemployment screen-
ing were of poor methodological quality, and did
not adequately reflect screening for national se-
curity purposes.
Chapter 6 discusses a number of factors that
may affect the accuracy of polygraph examina-
tions. Some of these account for the variation in
study results discussed previously. Examiner, sub-
ject, and setting characteristics are considered,
with special attention to the use of physical, drug,
and mental countermeasures that may be em-
ployed by individuals to attempt to beat the poly-
graph. This chapter also presents some possible
priorities for further research on factors affecting
polygraph validity.
Chapter 7 highlights the major conclusions and
policy implications of the scientific analysis. Ap-
pendix A includes illustrative informed consent
forms use in Federal Government polygraph ex-
aminations. Appendix B presents the results of
OTA's survey of Federal Government polygraph
use and practice. Appendix C includes the coding
form for OTA's analysis of field and analog
studies. Appendix D provides a list of acronyms
and glossary of key terms.
application to another. The accuracy obtained in
one situation or research study may not generalize
to different situations or to different types of per-
sons being tested. Scientifically acceptable re-
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search on polygraph testing is hard to design and
conduct.
Advocates of polygraph testing argue that thou-
sands of polygraphs have been conducted which
substantiate its usefulness in criminal or screen-
ing situations. Claims of usefulness, however, are
often dependent on information (e.g., confessions
and admissions) obtained before or after the ac-
tual test, and on its perceived value as a deterrent.
The focus of the OTA technical memorandum
is not whether the polygraph test has been useful,
but whether there is a scientific basis for its use.
OTA concluded that, while there is some evidence
for the validity of polygraph testing as an adjunct
to criminal investigations, there is very little re-
search or scientific evidence to establish polygraph
test validity in screening situations, whether they
be preemployment, preclearance, periodic or
aperiodic, random, or "dragnet." Substantial re-
search beyond what is currently available or
planned would have to be conducted in order to
fully assess the scientific validity of the NSDD-
84, DOD, and administration polygraph pro-
posals.
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Chapter 2
Varieties of Polygraph Testing
and Uses
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Chapter 2
Varieties of Polygraph Testing and Uses
INTRODUCTION
Polygraph examinations have been likened to
psychological testing (cf. 89, 92, 101). As such,
polygraph testing is best described not in the
singular but, instead, as a series of tests. These
tests are designed to assess truthfulness and decep-
tion in situations that range from screening job
applicants to investigations of specific criminal
incidents. Polygraph examiners, employed both
within and outside Government agencies, use a
variety of polygraph testing techniques, each of
which has a somewhat different underlying logic
and demonstrated validity.
The choice of polygraph technique depends
primarily on the circumstances under which the
polygraph is being used. The test of a subject who
is suspected of a specific criminal activity typically
involves application of a different polygraph tech-
nique than the examination of a prospective Gov-
ernment employee. Some variation in technique
is also related to examiners' training, but such dif-
ferences probably affect the way in which a tech-
nique is employed rather than which technique
is used. A description of the instrument used in
polygraph testing and an analysis of the types of
test situations and polygraph techniques are pre-
sented below.
POLYGRAPH INSTRUMENT
Although there are numerous variations in test-
ing procedures, the polygraph instrument itself
is fairly standard. The polygraph measures sev-
eral, usually three, physiological indicators of
arousal. Changes in physiological arousal exhib-
ited in response to a set of questions are taken to
indicate deception or truthfulness. The polygraph
instrument, it should be noted, is not a "lie de-
tector" per se; i.e., it does not indicate directly
whether a subject is being deceptive or truthful.
There is no known physiological response that is
unique to deception (108,122,123). Instead, a pol-
ygraph examiner obtains a subject's responses to
a carefully structured set of questions, and based
on the pattern of arousal responses, infers the sub-
ject's veracity. This assessment has been called the
"diagnosis" of truthfulness or deception (139).
In actual field testing, subjects' physiological
responses are measured by a three- or four-chan-
nel polygraph machine that records responses on
a moving chart. Usually, three different types of
physiological responses are measured. The rate
and depth of respiration is measured by pneumo-
graphs strapped around the chest and the abdo-
men. A blood pressure cuff (sphygmomanometer)
placed around the bicep is used to measure car-
diovascular activity. In modern polygraph instru-
ments, sphygmomanometer readings are electron-
ically enhanced so as to permit lower pressure in
the cuff. The electrodermal response (EDR), a
measure of perspiration, requires electrodes at-
tached to the fingertips. This has also been re-
ferred to as galvanic skin response (GSR) or skin
conductance response (SCR). Each of these physi-
ological assessments has been shown to be related
to physiological arousal (36). There is some lit-
erature to suggest that one or more of the physi-
ological channels (EDR, in particular) is most sen-
sitive (e.g., 123). Actual field testing, however,
almost always involves measurement of all three
types of responses.
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TYPES OF TESTING PROCEDURES
A polygraph examination normally takes any-
where from 1 to 3 hours, although shorter or
longer tests may result in a variety of circum-
stances. The length of an examination depends on
the purpose of the examination, as well as the sub-
ject's attitude and a number of other factors. Ex-
aminations may be very short because a subject
"confesses" or may be lengthy when an examiner
seeks to resolve an inconsistent or inconclusive
pattern of responses. The examination can be di-
vided into at least three components: pretest in-
terview; question procedure; and post-test inter-
view. The actual questioning aspect of the exam-
ination, which may be repeated three or four
times, lasts no longer than a few minutes for each
question set (limited, in some cases, because the
blood pressure cuff can be inflated for only 10 to
12 minutes without causing the subject undue dis-
comfort). Each aspect of a polygraph test is
described below in detail. Unless specifically
noted, generally used polygraph procedures are
described. Federal Government procedures are
often different and, where important such dif-
ferences are noted.
The Pretest Interview
The pretest interview has been considered an
indispensable component of the polygraph exam-
ination (121,139,194). The importance of the
pretest is not only in its role to provide subjects
with information about the examination and to
inform them of their legal rights, but also in its
ability to generate the psychological climate con-
sidered necessary for a valid polygraph test. An
important purpose of the interview is to persuade
a subject that the examination is professionally
conducted and that any deception attempted "will
be very obvious to the examiner" (20). Such in-
structions, it is thought, place truthful subjects at
ease and increase anxiety in subjects who intend
to be deceptive. Persuading subjects about the ef-
fectiveness of the examination should sharpen dif-
ferences between deceptive and nondeceptive sub-
jects in their reactions to questions about a par-
ticular incident.
The pretest also allows the examiner to assess
the effect of special conditions or circumstances
which might affect physiological responsiveness.
Thus, for example, subjects are typically queried
about medical problems and use of drugs that
could influence autonomic responding. Such as-
sessments are usually made without collecting
"hard" data, such as blood samples.
Consent Procedures
Depending on which polygraph method is em-
ployed, as well as the subject's attitude and the
situation under investigation, pretest interviews
may take from 20 to 90 minutes (20,27). One as-
pect of the pretest interview involves obtaining
the subject's consent to be examined. Consent pro-
cedures vary depending on the nature of the in-
terview, most importantly between criminal or
preemployment polygraph tests. According to
Barland and Raskin (20), a typical polygraph ex-
amination conducted as part of a criminal inves-
tigation requires that the examiner advise the ex-
aminee of his or her Miranda rights (or rights
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice). The
subject is also told that the polygraph examina-
tion is voluntary. Subjects should also be in-
formed whether or not the examination will be
observed from outside the room or recorded.
These disclosures are usually included in a writ-
ten form which the subject is asked to sign. Ac-
cording to Reid and Inbau (139), criminal suspects
may already have been informed of their Miran-
da rights and been asked to sign a consent form
before coming to the examination room.
Applicants for employment need not be advised
of their right to speak with an attorney but may,
depending on local laws, need to be advised about
the voluntarism of the examination. In the case
of such employment-related tests, along with a
provision concerning voluntary consent, subjects
will be told how the results of the examination
will be used. Thus, for example, they may be told
that a copy of the test results will be provided to
the sponsor of the exam, that the subject has a
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right to obtain a copy of the test results, that the
subject will not be asked questions concerning
such areas as political activities, union affiliations,
racial or religious beliefs, or sexual activities unless
these areas are specifically related to the issue
under investigation (37).
Examples of consent forms used in criminal in-
vestigations by Federal agencies are shown in ap-
pendix A. The contents of Federal consent forms
vary somewhat by agency, although all require
that the subject "voluntarily" consent to the ex-
amination. Some agencies (e.g., Department of
the Treasury (186)) indicate that the subject has
the right to stop the examination at any time. Al-
though the National Security Agency (NSA) re-
ports that the full cooperation of the subject "is
essential or the results will be inconclusive," NSA
also reports (see app. B) that the polygraph exam-
ination is part of the Agency's security process-
ing, and that failure to complete processing (which
includes polygraph testing) may result in failure
to be accepted for employment. As discussed more
fully below (see Current Federal Government
Use), NSA conducts polygraph examinations pri-
marily in the context of preemployment and peri-
odic security screening; most other agencies con-
duct polygraph examinations as part of specific-
incident criminal investigations.
The remainder of the pretest interview also
varies. In the method taught to Federal exam-
iners at the U.S. Army Military Police School
(USAMPS)," the interview focuses on questions
about the subject's background: employment,
family, education, health, and any previous legal
problems (20). The examiner aims to learn enough
to assess the subject's readiness for the examina-
tion and to prepare anxiety-provoking control
questions, if they are to be used. The polygraph
examiner then explains the polygraph technique
to the subject and queries the subject in detail
about the incident being investigated.
Another form of the pretest interview advo-
cated by Reid (founder of the Reid College of Lie
Detection) in criminal investigations makes use
of a structured series of questions and deempha-
*The USAMPS provides polygraph examiner training for almost
all Federal Government polygraph examiners, with the exception
of CIA and NSA examiners.
sizes gathering biographical data (77,139). Ques-
tions deal with matters such as the subject's sus-
picions about who committed the crime and the
subject's feelings about the test. Questions are in-
tended to provoke so-called "behavioral symp-
toms" (139) that are believed to be indicators of
deception. These symptoms include evasiveness
in answering, or complaints that one's physical
disabilities will invalidate the recordings. When
an examiner who uses the Reid method later
makes an assessment of truthfulness, this infor-
mation is used to supplement the data gathered
from the physiological measures.
Whatever the format of the pretest interview,
if control questions are to be used in the test, the
last part of the interview will be used to design
such questions and review them with the subject.
In this phase, biographical and behavioral infor-
mation collected earlier becomes essential. The in-
formation permits the examiner to tailor control
questions to the individual subject. The process
of designing control questions is complex and is
discussed further in the section below which de-
scribes the control question technique (CQT).
Testing Procedure
Actual testing procedures have been described
in detail by Barland and Raskin (20) and Reid
and Inbau (139). Polygraph measuring devices,
including pneumographs, a sphygmomanometer,
and electrodes, are placed on the subject either
during the pretest interview or at its conclusion.
After the end of the pretest interview, the sphyg-
momanometer is inflated, and the recording of
responses begins. A short period, of about 10 to
15 seconds, is used to observe initial respiratory
cycles (baseline) and to allow any initial response
to fade; then, the examiner asks the first question.
Between each question, the examiner waits about
15 to 20 seconds until the response to the last ques-
tion is finished and physiological response is closer
to baseline. The examiner notes on the chart when
the exam begins, when questions are asked, and
when it ends. Extraneous behavior that affects the
recordings may also be noted. When questions for
the first chart end, the examiner deflates the cuff.
The examiner then inspects the chart and asks
the subject about his or her reaction to the ques-
tions. The usual purpose for obtaining subjects'
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reactions is to allow refinements in the questions.
The questions are reviewed again, and, when nec-
essary, further clarified. The examiner may then
administer a stimulation test, designed to improve
test validity. The examiner will then continue to
test and obtain two or three more charts in the
same way. The examiner may use other stimula-
tion tests between charts, and different question-
ing techniques (see below) to record different
charts. Different questioning techniques may then
be used based on information revealed by the sub-
ject. In most techniques, any new questions would
be discussed with the subject before being asked.
The procedure in preemployment screening or in
other personnel screening tests may differ.
Stimulation Tests
Polygraph examiners typically conduct what is
known as a "stimulation"or "stim" test, designed
to further convince subjects of the accuracy of the
polygraph examination. Although not actually a
part of the pretest, stimulation tests can be given
either before the first actual set of test questions
or after the first chart has been recorded. Stimula-
tion tests are intended to reassure truthful sub-
jects and provoke anxiety in deceptive subjects
(cf. 15). Their effect should be to increase differen-
tial responsivity of deceptive and nondeceptive
subjects to different questions on the examination.
Some research suggests stimulation tests increase
the validity of polygraph examinations (35,149).
The most common "stim" test is a "number"
or "card" test. A subject is instructed to select,
from a deck, a card that has a number, word, or
suit on the back, or to write a number within a
certain range (50,57). Sometimes, the cards are
secretly marked or otherwise arranged so that the
examiner is sure to know the correct answer (139).
Many polygraph examiners claim this is unnec-
essary, however, because the technique is accurate
enough without use of such deception (cf. 123),
and secret markings are not employed by Federal
agencies. The examiner then may repeat a range
of suits, numbers or a set of words, asking the
subject if each is the concealed item. The suit,
number, or word that is actually the concealed
item is supposed to provoke the greatest physio-
logical response. Often, the examiner will show
the subject the polygram (i.e., the actual chart
recordings) to further convince subjects of the in-
strument's efficacy.
Types of Questions
The central element of any polygraph examina-
tion is the test of subjects' responses to a set of
questions or items within questions. How these
questions are structured represents the principal
difference among polygraph techniques. There are
four different kinds of questions or items used in
polygraph testing, different combinations of ques-
tions (generally referred to as question tech-
niques), and different applications for the various
techniques. Distinctions among questions and
techniques are important. Only one type of ques-
tion technique in one application (CQT in crimi-
nal investigations) has been extensively researched
(see chs. 4 and 5); and there are significant dif-
ferences between CQT and other techniques. The
range of questions, techniques, and applications
is described more fully below.
Questions
The kinds of questions that are used for poly-
graph testing have been labeled relevant ques-
tions, control questions, irrelevant questions, and
concealed information or guilty knowledge ques-
tions. Basically, relevant questions are questions
about the topic under investigation (a theft, drug
use, contact with foreign agents). Suspects' re-
sponses to relevant questions are of greatest
interest to polygraph examiners.
Control and irrelevant questions can be
grouped together as questions used for purposes
of comparison to relevant questions. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the name one gives
to a question may depend on the specific context
in which it is used. Thus, one cannot easily give
an example of a relevant question or a control
question because in different situations and at dif-
ferent times during an examination relevant ques-
tions may be used as control questions. Likewise,
irrelevant questions may become relevant, de-
pending on a subject's response (201).
Relevant Questions
Functionally, relevant questions are questions
directly related to the focus of an investigation.
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In the investigation of a theft, for example, a rele-
vant question might be "Did you steal that
money?" or even more specifically, 'Did you take
$750 from Jones' office?" Relevant questions can
be broader, however. In preemployment screen-
ing and periodic or aperiodic screening, the area
of interest may be the subjects' entire background.
Thus, there may be a series of relevant questions,
such as "Have you ever been fired from a job?"
or, "Have you stolen more than $50 in moneys
in any one year from any of your employers?"
(115). Intelligence agencies may ask broad ques-
tions concerning unauthorized contact with for-
eign intelligence agents or involvement in com-
munist activities. Questions in an intelligence
screening may also deal with areas which, poten-
tially, may make an applicant susceptible to
blackmail. It is important to note, however, that
when several relevant questions relating to dif-
ferent issues are used, subjects are not expected
to exhibit physiological responses to all of them;
the relevant questions that do not evoke responses
are used, after the fact, as a type of control
question.
To summarize, relevant questions are questions
about the topic under investigation, but topics can
be very specific (Did you take $750 from Jones'
office?) or cover a long period of time and a varie-
ty of acts (Have you ever stolen money from an
employer? Have you ever had unauthorized con-
tact with a foreign agent?). It is not clear what
effect, if any, the breadth of a relevant question
has on polygraph results, nor has there been any
research done on this issue. As is discussed fur-
ther in chapters 4 and 5, the preponderance of
research evidence concerns the use of relevant
questions to evoke reactions to specific acts.
Comparison Questions
In contrast to relevant questions, which con-
cern issues of direct interest to the examiner, con-
trol and irrelevant questions are used for purposes
of comparison. As noted above, there is no
known physiological response unique to lying.
Thus, a polygraph examination could not consist
merely of relevant questions. If only relevant
items were used, an examiner would not be able
to establish the actual reason for the response.
There are a number of reasons, other than fear
of detection (or another hypothetically lying re-
lated reaction (19)) for a subject to become physi-
ologically aroused during the presentation of rele-
vant questions (48,108,136,194). Even with the
addition of nonrelevant comparison items, it is
necessary to run several polygraph charts using
the same questions (though, perhaps in different
order) to be sure that reactions are consistent. If
several charts are not run, a subject's responses
could be attributed to surprise, physical move-
ment, or some reasons for concern other than a
lying-related cause (203). On the other hand, the
administration of several charts could theoretical-
ly just repeat the initial situation leading to the
physiological response if the cause were not a ran-
dom one (e.g., presence at the scene, knowledge
of the incident, concern over being falsely iden-
tified). Thus, the essence of polygraph testing is
the comparison of responses to the relevant ques-
tions with responses to nonrelevant questions,
which have been labeled control questions and
irrelevant questions.
Control Questions
Control questions, then, are used for purposes
of comparison. Essentially, truthful subjects are
believed by polygraph examiners to be more con-
cerned (and, thus, more physiologically aroused)
about control than relevant questions. The re-
sponses to both control and relevant questions are
compared. However, control questions, like rele-
vant questions, vary in breadth and type. One
type of control question concerns what is hypoth-
esized to be the same kind of issue that is under
investigation at the time of examination. For ex-
ample, a control question for "Did you take the
$750 from Jones' office?" might be "Other than
what you have told me [during the pretest inter-
view], have you ever stolen anything in your life?"
In an investigation of unauthorized disclosure of
classified information, a control question might
be "Have you ever betrayed anyone who trusted
you?" Subjects innocent of the crime under in-
vestigation are presumed to be more concerned
about having ever done anything of this sort (and,
thus, being the "kind of person" who might have
committed the crime under investigation). It is
theorized that although guilty subjects will also
be concerned about control questions, they will
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be more concerned about and thus exhibit more
physiological reactions to relevant questions.
There are a number of views, however, about
what distinguishes a control question from a rele-
vant question. One distinction among control
questions is whether a question is inclusive or ex-
clusive. Inclusive control questions are questions
which include the specific incident under investi-
gation. An example of an inclusive control ques-
tion in an investigation of an internal theft would
be "Have you ever stolen money from an employ-
er?" Exclusive control questions, on the other
hand, cover a period of time not including the in-
cident under investigation. An example is, "Before
age 18, did you ever take anything of value?"
There is some controversy over how far back in
time an exclusive control question must be set for
the subject to consider it psychologically separate
from the incident under investigation and, thus,
not a relevant question. Because inconclusive con-
trol questions may, from the suspect's perspec-
tive, include the act under investigation, some
polygraphers contend that they are really relevant
questions; i.e., they cannot be used for purposes
of comparison. The Federal Government, for ex-
ample, typically uses exclusive control questions
because it views inclusive controls as relevant
questions. Examiners from the private polygraph
firm of John E. Reid & Associates use both inclu-
sive and exclusive control questions.
Other kinds of nonrelevant questions other than
those that cover the same kind of incident as the
one under investigation, or which cover it in a
different way, are also considered to be control
questions. Thus, for example, "Have you ever fan-
tasized about giving a document to a foreign
agent?" is a type of control question used in some
intelligence investigations. In some screening ex-
aminations, in which contact with a foreign agent
is of primary concern (i.e., constitutes the rele-
vant question), "Have you ever done anything for
which you are now ashamed?" could be a con-
trol question. When a different issue than suscep-
tibility to blackmail is under investigation, "Have
you ever done anything for which you could be
blackmailed?" can be used as a control question.
It is noteworthy that in a different context, such
as a broader screening examination, these would
be considered relevant questions.
Control questions, then, are questions for
which the responses are designed to be compared
to responses to relevant questions. In some screen-
ing examinations, relevant questions may func-
tion as control questions after the fact. That is,
if a relevant question produces a relatively mild
physiological response, it may be compared to
other relevant questions that produce greater re-
sponse. Most often, control questions are designed
to be arousing for innocent subjects (i.e., those
who are not being deceptive on the relevant ques-
tions), relative at least to relevant questions. This
is usually the central point of control questions,
and is central to the control question technique
(CQT) discussed below.
Irrelevant Questions
Another type of question used, in part, for pur-
poses of comparison to responses to relevant ques-
tions is the so-called irrelevant question. Examples
of irrelevant questions commonly used in inves-
tigations are; "Are you called [subject's name]?"
or "Is today Tuesday?" Irrelevant questions are
questions which are believed to have no, or very
little, emotional impact on a subject. Thus, such
questions can be used as an indicator of a partic-
ular subject's normal baseline level of arousal; no
universal standard of physiological arousal can
be applied because individuals differ markedly.
Irrelevant questions are hypothesized to serve pur-
poses other than providing a physiological base-
line (139). Perhaps most important, irrelevant
questions interspersed among relevant questions
are hypothesized to provide a type of rest period
for the subject.
Concealed Information Questions
Questions about concealed information are the
fourth type of question used in polygraph testing.
Unlike control and relevant questions, which ask
subjects whether they have committed a crime,
concealed information items aim to detect infor-
mation about a crime that only a guilty subject
would have. Such information might include de-
tails about the site of the crime or the means of
committing it, such as the type of murder weap-
on used. It is hypothesized that guilty subjects will
exhibit a different physiological response to the
correct (relevant) detail than to the incorrect de-
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tails, but that innocent subjects will respond the
same to all the items. Different types of concealed
information tests are described below (see Con-
cealed Information Tests).
Summary
For any technique, deception is detected by
comparison of suspects' physiological responses
on critical or "relevant" questions or items with
their responses on noncritical (irrelevant or con-
trol) items. Greater physiological responses to
relevant items than to noncritical (control, irrele-
vant) items are assumed to be indicative of de-
ception.
Polygraph Question Techniques
Three types of question techniques combining
the four question types are described below: the
relevant/irrelevant (R/I) technique, the control
question technique (CQT),and concealed informa-
tion techniques. Each of these test types tends to
be used for particular purposes; e.g., the R/I tech-
nique is used in the great majority of preemploy-
ment screening interviews, while CQT is normally
used in criminal investigations. There have been
adaptations of these techniques for other uses,
some of which are discussed below. Also, exam-
iners may combine different techniques in an in-
vestigation (see, e.g., 139). In general, R/I has the
broadest potential use while the concealed infor-
mation techniques are the least applicable. Within
each category, particularly CQT, there is consid-
erable variability and several versions of each
technique are employed.
Relevant/ Irrelevant (R/I) Techniques
The R/I technique was the first standard meth-
od of polygraph questioning. The method was de-
veloped by Marston (114), a psychologist and the
original proponent of polygraph examinations.
An adaptation of this traditional technique is used
in most of the preemployment screening con-
ducted in the United States.
However, the R/I technique as used by the Fed-
eral Government involves somewhat different
types of questions than the traditional R/I, and
it must be explained separately. As currently used
by Federal examiners, the R/I relies on a type of
control question, and is claimed to be a version
of the control question technique. The versions
discussed in this section are:
1. the traditional R/I;
2. the Federal version of the R/I; and
3. the R/I as used in typical preemployment
screening tests.
In a traditional R/I examination, the two types
of questions used are relevant and irrelevant ques-
tions. Deceptive subjects are assumed to have a
significantly greater reaction to the relevant ques-
tions than to the irrelevant questions. An under-
lying assumption of this technique is that non-
deceptive subjects should have an equal response
to all questions, because, being nondeceptive, they
would not fear questions about the crime any
more than irrelevant questions.
There are numerous well-recognized problems
with the traditional R/I technique, at least from
the perspective of psychologists who have eval-
uated polygraph test validity (cf. 108,126,136).
First, the intent of the relevant and irrelevant ques-
tions is transparent, which means that the rele-
vant questions are likely to be more arousing for
the truthful as well as the deceptive subjects. Sec-
ond, questions in the R/I technique are not usually
reviewed with the subjects before the test. A larger
response to the relevant question may, thus, be
due to surprise or misunderstanding, as well as
deception. Third, as with any question technique,
reactions may be flattened by drugs or by the gen-
erally reduced responsivity of certain subjects
(136). These effects are probably more difficult
to detect with R/I than with other question tech-
niques.
Because of these problems, the confidence one
can place in the R/I technique is limited (136). As
a consequence, the R/I technique is typically not
used in the case of specific incident examinations
by either public or private examiners. It is used
almost exclusively with employees in nonspecific
investigations. The Federal Government occasion-
ally uses the traditional R/I and also a version
of the R/I which is claimed to function as a con-
trol question test. The Federal Government ver-
sion of the technique is called the general ques-
tion test (GQT). Like the Reid CQT (discussed
below), it uses inclusive control questions, which
pertain to the subject's entire life, such that a com-
plete answer would also include the specific inci-
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dent being investigated. Thus, with a question
like, "Did you ever steal anything from a place
where you worked?" the theft being investigated
would in actuality be part of the answer. Tech-
nically these are seen as "relevant" questions,
because they are pertinent to the incident in ques-
tion. Yet they are claimed to function as control
questions, because they are intended to provoke
a greater response in innocent subjects than ques-
tions about the misdeed provoke.
An adaptation of the R/I technique is the prin-
cipal method of questioning used in preemploy-
ment and periodic or aperiodic personnel screen-
ing. Unlike the questions used with other tech-
niques, R/I questions need not focus on one spe-
cific wrongdoing (20,108). The examiner can,
thus, use the method to assess any number of
issues for which the subject's veracity is to be
evaluated.
In polygraph examinations used to screen em-
ployees, the polygraph examiner usually presents
a series of relevant questions, with several irrele-
vant questions interspersed to provide a baseline.
Most relevant questions ask about past behavior
that might disqualify the subject from a job (e.g.,
employee theft, drug use, fighting on the job, in-
curring a large debt). Some examinations may in-
clude questions about a potential employee's
background or intentions regarding a job, for ex-
ample, "Did you actually graduate from college?"
(201) or "Are you seeking a job with this com-
pany for any reason other than legitimate employ-
ment?" (115). Listed below is an example of ques-
tions from a preemployment screening protocol
used by a commercial firm (115; also see 56,204).
Relevant questions:
Did you tell the complete truth on your job applica-
tion?
Have you deliberately withheld information from your
job application?
Have you ever been fired from a job?
Are you seeking a permanent position with this
company?
Since the age of () have you committed an undetected
crime?
Since the age of () have you been convicted of a crime?
During the past year, have you used marihuana (sic)
more than ( ) per ( )?
Have you used any other narcotic illegally in the past
() years?
Have you sold marihuana (sic) or other narcotics ille-
gally in the past ( ) years?
Have you ever stolen more than ($ ) worth of mer-
chandise in any one year from any of your employ-
ers?
Have you even stolen more than ($) in moneys in any
one year from any of your employers?
Have you ever used a system to cheat one of your em-
ployers?
Have you ever had your driver's license suspended or
revoked?
Have you ever had any traffic citations in the past five
(5) years?
Are you seeking a job with this company for any
reason other than legitimate employment?
Have you deliberately lied to any of these questions?
The method used by John E. Reid & Associates
employs four standard relevant questions:
In the last five years did you steal any merchandise
from previous employers?
In the last five years did you steal any money from
previous employers?
In the last ten years did you take part in or commit
any serious crime?
Did you falsify any information on your application?
These standard questions may be modified de-
pending on admissions made during the pretest
(e.g., a revision may be, "In the last five years
did you steal any merchandise other than minor
office supplies?"). In addition to the standard
questions a fifth relevant question (e.g., concern-
ing the illegal purchase or sale of merchandise;
use of narcotics) may be added depending on the
nature of the job.
The Reid firm also uses what it regards as con-
trol questions in preemployment interviews. Con-
trol questions include, "Did you ever steal any-
thing in your life?" and "Did you lie to any of
the questions you answered during the applica-
tion process for this job?" It is not clear, however,
how the Reid preemployment control questions
differ from the relevant questions. It seems rea-
sonable to suppose that both truthful and non-
truthful subjects (in terms of the relevant ques-
tions) may be just as concerned with the subject
matter of the control questions as they are with
the relevant questions. It is also not clear why
employers would be less concerned with the con-
trol than with the relevant questions.
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In the R/I questioning technique, a diagnosis
of truthfulness or deception indicated is made by
comparison of responses to each relevant ques-
tion with the responses to the irrelevant questions
and the remaining set of relevant questions (or
in the Reid, and Army examples, control ques-
tions). Presumably, an applicant will be decep-
tive on no more than a few questions. These ques-
tions will provoke a greater physiological response
than the others, leading to further inquiries and
an eventual diagnosis (56,204).
Other types of questions are used in some
screening examinations, such as questions about
sexual practices or gambling. Such questions seek
information about an applicant's character rather
than his or her job performance and are consid-
ered by some to be unduly invasive (173). In re-
sponse to this practice, ethical standards have
been developed for use of the polygraph in pre-
employment screening (cf. 154), and some States
(e.g., Illinois) prohibit their use. Preemployment
polygraph examinations fall under the guidelines
for emloyment interviewing of title VII of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
and so examiners are obliged to conduct the ex-
aminations in a way that would not discriminate
on the basis of sex, race, etc. (cf. 154). One cen-
tral principle of ethical standards is that relevant
questions be related to the job applied for.
Whether questions meet this criterion depends on
the job; e.g., information about one's driving
record would be important in hiring a delivery
person, but not in hiring a bank teller. Screening
applicants for positions involving national securi-
ty apparently require questions about sexual be-
havior, drug use, and mental health as well as
areas more directly related to national security
(e.g., involvement in espionage). The range of
topic areas covered in national security pre-
employment screening examinations by NSA is
discussed below under Current Federal Govern-
ment Use.
In so-called periodic or aperiodic checking for
internal security purposes, employees are asked
to submit to occasional polygraph examinations.
These examinations can assess drug use, subjects'
own or others' employee theft, and other matters
including job satisfaction and commitment. In this
type of examination, almost all of the questions
are relevant questions and apparent deception
(arousal) in response to any of the items is ex-
plored. Examples of the kinds of questions used
in aperiodic screening in a supermarket (204),
include:
Are you relatively satisfied with this job now?
Do you, as far as you know at this time, intend to stay
with this employer?
Have you ever intentionally underpriced or under-
weighed merchandise?
Is there a particular person at your store that is respon-
sible for damaging merchandise due to real careless-
ness, not caring or intentionally?
The relevant topic areas covered by NSA in a
periodic screening are discussed later. Because of
its use of control questions, the Federal version
of R/I is discussed in the next section.
Control Question Technique (CQT)
The CQT is the most common technique used
in investigations of a specific issue. The CQT was
developed to deal with some of the inherent prob-
lems in the traditional R/I technique (139). Like
the R/I technique, it asks relevant questions about
the crime like "Did you steal the $750 from Jones'
office?" As with R/I, the deceptive subject is
assumed to produce a greater autonomic response
to the relevant than to other questions. But CQT
also adds control questions, which, as discussed
briefly above, are designed to provoke a greater
response in subjects who are innocent and truthful
about the crime being investigated.
As discussed above, control questions are de-
signed to be arousing for nondeceptive subjects.
The questions are designed to cause innocent sub-
jects to be doubtful and concerned about whether
they have actually told the truth or told a lie.
These questions usually probe for past misdeeds
of the same general nature as the crime being in-
vestigated but they are transgressions that poly-
graphers suspect most people have "committed"
or considered committing in some form (139). An
example of a control question might be, "Before
the age of 25, did you ever steal anything from
a place you worked?" Control questions are de-
signed to cover a long period of time, which may
make the subject even more doubtful about the
veracity of answers provided.
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Considerable attention in the pretest interview
is devoted to development of control questions
(139). The process of developing control ques-
tions, reviewing them with the subject, and then
refining them is designed to develop the most ap-
propriate questions, and to convince subjects to
view control questions as seriously as relevant
questions. In addition, the pretest review is de-
signed to get subjects either to be deceptive to con-
trol questions or at least to be concerned about
the accuracy of their recollections (20,37,91,139).
It is considered crucial to produce in the subject
the right psychological set in relation to the con-
trol questions. This set is then thought to lead sub-
jects to be more concerned about control ques-
tions than relevant questions, and so to respond
more to them physiologically. This difference be-
tween response to control and relevant questions
is then the basis for the diagnosis of deceptive or
nondeceptive. Since the subject's psychological set
is so crucial when control questions are used, dif-
ferential responding to relevant or control ques-
tions (and ultimately, the validity of CQT), de-
pends on the nature of the interaction between
examiner and subject. This is true regardless of
the act in question, the particular CQT method
used, or the method of making assessments of
truthfulness or deception. Even the validity of an
entirely computerized system of scoring and diag-
nosis would depend on the nature of the interac-
tion between examiner and subject. In this sense,
CQT examinations, as the technology to conduct
polygraph tests now stands, always require exam-
iners to make important judgments about and in-
terventions in their interaction with subjects.
The polygraph examiner does not tell the sub-
ject that there is a distinction between the two
types of questions (control and relevant). Con-
trol questions are described as intending to deter-
mine if the subject is the "type of person" who
would commit a crime such as the one being in-
vestigated (136). The examiner stresses that the
subject must be able to answer the questions com-
pletely with a simple "yes" or "no" answer, that
the polygraph will record any confusion, misgiv-
ings, or doubts, and that the subject should discuss
any troublesome questions with the examiner (20).
Thus, the situation is set up such that the subject
is persuaded that the examiner wants the truth.
In reality, however, the examiner wants the sub-
ject to experience considerable doubt about 4 is
or her truthfulness or even to be intentionally
deceptive. According to Raskin (91), "Control
questions are intentionally vague and extremely
difficult to answer truthfully with an unqualified
'No'."
To produce the final version of a control ques-
tion, the examiner begins by asking the subject
a broad version of the question used in the pretest
interview. Thus, for example, the question might
be structured, "Did you ever steal anything in
your life?" At this point, different polygraph ex-
aminers use slightly different methods to handle
the discussion of past wrongdoing in response to
the control questions asked during the pretest in-
terview. In the USAMPS method (91), if the sub-
ject confesses to a small transgression in the past
(e.g., taking home pencils from work), the exam-
iner will dismiss it as of no consequence. For other
misdeeds, the examiner will rephrase the control
questions to rule them out (e.g., "Other than what
we have discussed, did you ever steal anything
in your life?"). The examiner will actively in-
tervene to prevent subjects from unburdening too
much of their anxiety over their past wrongs with
the intention of keeping them concerned during
the actual polygraph testing. Any troublesome
past transgressions the subject brings up are ex-
cluded (by such phrases as "Other than what we
have discussed, ... ?") so the subject is always
brought to the point at which he or she answers
"No" to the control question. The control ques-
tion is then ready to be used in actual testing.
The Reid method varies from the Federal meth-
od in some ways (139). If the subject does not ad-
mit to a past wrongdoing, the examiner may
probe until the subject admits to one, even a crime
as small as stealing pocket change from a relative
during childhood. Such transgressions are then
ruled out by adding the kind of exclusionary
phrase discussed above (i.e., "Other than what
we have discussed, ... ?"). However, as in the
USAMPS method, it is assumed at this point that
the subject is either concealing other misdeeds or
is worried that there are others he or she has
overlooked (139). This worry has been heightened
because of the examiner's emphasis on learning
the truth to "ascertain" that the subject is not the
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kind of person that could have committed the
crime referred to in the relevant questions. In
addition to relevant and control questions, irrele-
vant questions are included during the actual in-
terview in order to provide a baseline of physio-
logical responsiveness.
Several versions of CQT are regularly em-
ployed and adaptations depend both on the train-
ing of the examiners and the testing situation. The
Reid version can include relevant questions about
several aspects of the crime (139). For example,
one chart could include questions about break-
ing into an office, stealing a check, and then
cashing it. Examiners who use Reid's CQT make
a global comparison between the responses to the
relevant and the responses to the control ques-
tions. They also note the subject's behavior
throughout the interview (as discussed above, the
Reid technique includes a series of questions in
the pretest interview designed to provoke certain
"behavioral symptoms" in deceptive subjects).
The examiner uses the global comparison of poly-
graph responses supplemented by information
about the behavior of the subject to make a judg-
ment of the subject's veracity. An example of a
Reid control question sequence, excluding the
pretest behavior provoking items, follows (139):
1. Do they call you "Red?" (where the pretest inter-
view had disclosed he is generally called "Red.")
2. Are you over 21 years of age? (or reference is made
to some other age unquestionably but reasonably,
and not ridiculously, below that of the subject.)
3. Last Saturday night did you shoot John Jones?
4. Are you in Chicago (or other city) now?
5. Did you kill John Jones?
6. Besides what you told about, did you ever steal
anything else?
7. Did you ever go to school?
8. Did you steal John Jones' watch last Saturday
night?
9. Do you know who shot John Jones?
10. Did you ever steal anything from a place where
you worked?
In contrast, Backster's (10) zone of comparison
(ZOC) technique makes a diagnosis of deceptive
or truthful from a standardized numerical scor-
ing of the charts. Each relevant question is paired
with a control question. Scores are derived for
each relevant question by comparing it only with
the previous control question. On each physiolog-
ical measure, the examiner derives a "plus" (truth-
ful) score if the subject responds more to the con-
trol question and a "minus" (deceptive) score if
the subject responds more to the relevant ques-
tion. A positive score above a certain criterion
level is diagnosed as truthful, a minus score below
a certain level is diagnosed as deceptive, and
scores in between are considered inconclusive.
A version of ZOC is used by Federal polygraph
examiners. The Federal version differs from the
Backster ZOC in that it may ask about several
aspects of the crime in one chart. Relevant ques-
tions are asked about primary involvement (e.g.,
"Did you steal 7"), secondary involve-
ment (e.g., "Did you help steal ?"),
and so called evidence connecting (e.g., "Do you
know where any of that money is now?"). In ad-
dition to relevant, control, and irrelevant ques-
tions, the Government ZOC test contains a ver-
sion of the peak of tension test (see below), and
"symptomatic" questions of two types. One type
of symptomatic question (e.g., "Do you under-
stand that I'm not going to ask any trick or sur-
prise questions?") is designed to test whether the
examinee trusts the examiner's word that no sur-
prise questions will be asked. A large response is
symptomatic of distrust. A second type of symp-
tomatic question (e.g., "Is there something else
you are afraid I will ask you a question about,
even though I have told you I would not?") is to
test whether there is some other issue the examinee
is concerned about (e.g., another crime) that may
be absorbing his or her arousal.
Other versions of CQT or related techniques
are also used by Federal agency examiners. One,
the modified general question test (MGQT), re-
sembles the Reid CQT with the following differ-
ences: 1) only the polygraph charts are used to
make determinations of truth and deception and
global evaluations using inferences about behavior
are dispensed with; 2) charts are numerically
scored; 3) control questions exclusively concern
a time and place separate from the time and place
of the crime under investigation, with the inten-
tion of clearly separating responses related to the
crime and the control question; and 4) the con-
tent of control questions is always related to the
crime under investigation, i.e., control questions
about theft are used to investigate a theft, con-
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trol questions about assault are used to investigate
assault, etc. Presumably, when unauthorized dis-
closures are at issue, control questions would con-
cern some sort of unauthorized disclosures in the
past.
To summarize, there are a number of control
question techniques, the most commonly used be-
ing the Reid CQT, MGQT, and ZOC. Despite dif-
ferences among them, they share the same premise
and underlying rationale. Use of each of the con-
trol question procedures relies on subjects' not
knowing when they are being asked the relevant
and control questions. If they know which ques-
tions are more important for scoring purposes
they may be able to make anticipatory responses
which could invalidate their charts (see ch. 6).
Concealed Information Tests
Another polygraph questioning technique
works on an entirely different premise than either
CQT or R/I. Instead of detecting deception about
having committed a crime per se, concealed in-
formation tests aim to detect whether a suspect
has information about a crime that only a guilty
subject would have or, in some cases (e.g., the
actual amount of money embezzled) to detect the
information itself. Such information might include
details about the site of the crime or the means
of committing it (e.g., the type of murder weapon
used). Raskin (136) has aptly described these as
"concealed information tests." Concealed infor-
mation tests take two forms: the peak of tension
(POT) test and the guilty knowledge test (GKT).
POT was developed by Keeler (cf. 69) and has
long been used in criminal investigations. The
POT test uses a set of five to nine nearly identi-
cal "yes or no" questions asking if the subject
knows about a particular detail related to a crime.
The detail may be a type of object used, or the
color of an item. One question actually includes
the relevant detail, while the others include plausi-
ble but false details of a parallel nature. The ques-
tions and the sequence in which they are asked
are reviewed with the subject in the pretest inter-
view. The subject is usually instructed to answer
"no" to each question. The question with the true
detail is usually presented in the middle of the
sequence, so that the subject's physiological reac-
tions will increase up to the critical question,
where they will reach a peak, hence the name,
and fall back down again. The card and number
stimulation tests discussed above are actually ex-
amples of POT. Barland and Raskin (20) provide
a hypothetical example of a POT in a criminal
case:
1. Regarding the color of the stolen car, do you know
it was yellow?
2. Do you know it was black?
3. Do you know it was green?
4. Do you know it was blue?
5. Do you know it was red?
6. Do you know it was white?
7. Do you know it was brown?
Occasionally, criminal investigators use the
POT technique to discover and develop additional
information about a case. The examiner asks the
suspect about a series of details, but does not
know which is actually relevant to the crime. The
detail that provokes an exceptional physiological
response is used as a clue in the investigation. For
example, an examiner might use POT to deter-
mine the exact location where stolen goods were
hidden. This kind of examination is called a
searching peak of tension test (20). The searching
POT technique has been used, for example, in
cases in which employees are suspected of hav-
ing stolen money, but there is no evidence about
the extent of the theft (108). The examiner asks
the employee if he has stolen money ranging from
a small amount to the entire amount taken. The
amount that provokes the largest response is
assumed to be the amount of the total that the
employee stole.
The GKT, described initially by Lykken (105,
106) works in much the same way as POT. GKT,
however, often includes a larger set of questions,
and the questions may be of the multiple-choice
type rather than the "yes or no" type. Also, studies
investigating GKT have only used the electroder-
mal response, while POT tests have employed
standard three-channel polygraph recordings. An
example of two questions from a GKT used in a
laboratory study by Lykken (105) is listed below:
1. If you are the thief, you will know where the desk
was located in the office in which the theft occurred.
Was it (a) on the left, (b) in front, or (c) on the right?
2. The thief hid what he had stolen. Where did he hide
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it? Was it (a) in the men's room, (b) on the coat
rack, (c) in the office, (d) on the windowsill, or (e)
in the locker?
There is a major difference, however, in the use
suggested for GKT as compared to the use of the
POT. POT is usually used as a supplement to a
CQT, or as an aid in investigation. GKT, how-
ever, has been proposed as an alternative to con-
trol question techniques (92,107,108). Proponents
argue that GKT may reduce the number of false
positives, because it focuses on specific details that
would be salient only to the perpetrator of a crime
(108,110). Also, they claim, the validity of GKT
can be substantially improved by increasing the
number of questions on the test. Critics claim that
it is especially susceptible to false negatives (136),
that is, guilty persons not detected, and that GKT
proponents do not adequately assess the conse-
quences of false negatives.
Concealed information tests have, according to
several reviewers (e.g., 108,136), other important
limitations. One problem is that they may not be
widely applicable. Knowledge about an incident
may not differentiate between a guilty and inno-
cent person where, for instance, a suspect is pres-
ent at the scene of a crime but claims that some-
one else is responsible (108,136). Furthermore,
concealed information tests require investigators
to gather information that is not always possible
to obtain, or must be disclosed to suspects in other
parts of the investigation (136). In some cases,
publicity about the details of a crime eliminates
the possibility of a concealed information test,
since the information is public knowledge (136).
POST-TEST INTERVIEW
Interspersed among test questioning and meas-
urement of physiological responses are a number
of opportunities for examiners to discuss the test
with the subject. At each occasion, the examiner
reviews the questions, and, depending on the re-
sponses, questions subjects about their responses.
At the end of the examination, the examiner will
make an assessment of whether a subject is being
deceptive or nondeceptive. In some methods, e.g.,
Reid's (139), the assessment is a global one em-
ploying behavioral as well as polygraph data. But
USES OF POLYGRAPH TESTING
As has been implied in much of the above dis-
cussion, polygraph examinations are used for a
variety of purposes. The goal of all such applica-
tions of the polygraph is the detection of decep-
tion or substantiation of truthfulness. The nature
of the test situation, however, leads to important
differences in the way a polygraph examination
is conducted. Unfortunately, the published re-
search literature deals almost exclusively with the
use of the polygraph by police and military ex-
aminers for criminal investigations. The research
literature on a number of important uses of poly-
the USAMPS Backster's ZOC and other methods
attempt to rely strictly on polygraph chart inter-
pretation (11,20). In examinations conducted by
the Federal Government, the final official deter-
mination is made after supervisory review of poly-
graph charts. If the subject is judged to be decep-
tive during the examination, the examiner will at-
tempt to elicit a confession. Usually, this is not
done directly but is couched in terms of providing
the subject with an opportunity to clarify/explain
the responses and differences obtained.
graph testing, such as for national security pur-
poses and for employment screening, is extreme-
ly limited.
Current Use
The majority of uses of polygraph testing ap-
pear to be on behalf of private employers, the next
greatest number are in the context of local criminal
justice investigations, and the remainder are done
by the Federal Government. Of greatest concern
for the present analysis are the numbers and types
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of examinations currently conducted by agencies
of the Federal Government. This section will de-
vote most attention to such uses, although local
government and private use are briefly discussed
in order to place Federal use in context.
Current Federal Government Use
In order to assess the extent of polygraph use
among Federal agencies, the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) conducted a survey of Gov-
ernment use during May 1983. The request for
information was sent to the Departments of
Defense (DOD), State, Justice, Treasury, the U.S.
Postal Service, and the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy (CIA), all of which were believed to employ
polygraph examinations. Information was re-
quested about the number of examinations, pur-
poses, and results, as well as about research con-
ducted and/or planned (see app. B). At the time
of this technical memorandum, all agencies ex-
cepting CIA had provided written responses to
the request for information about the number and
type of polygraph examinations that have been
administered.
CIA declined to respond because of the classi-
fied nature of the information. However, some
data about CIA's use for background investiga-
tions were reported in a 1980 study (165). The
number of polygraph examinations are summa-
rized in table 1. Table 1 indicates that Federal
agencies reported administering a total of 22,597
polygraph examinations in fiscal year 1982. As
shown in appendix B, about half of these were
in the context of criminal investigations. Poly-
graph examinations are also reported to be used
for intelligence and counterintelligence investi-
gations (some (NSA) at aperiodic intervals), and
preemployment screening. The largest single num-
ber of polygraph examinations conducted in 1982
were conducted by NSA, a component of DOD,
primarily for preemployment screening. These
numbers can be compared to previous surveys
conducted in 1963, when Federal agencies, exclud-
ing NSA and CIA, conducted 19,796 polygraph
examinations, and 1973, when 6,946 examinations
(including 3,081 by NSA) were conducted.
As shown in appendix B, NSA reports that it
uses primarily the R/I technique. NSA reports
that counterintelligence-type screening examina-
Table 1.-Polygraph Examinations Conducted by
Federal Agencies, 19828
Department of Defense:
Army Criminal Investigation Command ....... 3,731
Army, Intelligence Command 279
Navy ...................................... 1,337
Air Force ................................. 3,019
Marines .................................. 263
National Security Agency ................... 9,672
Department of Justice:
Federal Bureau of Investigation ............. 2,463
Drug Enforcement Agency .................. 211
Department of the Treasury:
Secret Service ............................. 714
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms ..... 256
U.S. Postal Service ........................... 652
Central Intelligence Agency ................... n.a.c
Totals .................................... 22,597
aData were also reported for fiscal years 1980, 1981, and, in some cases year
to date 1983. See app. B for complete report.
bThe U.S. Customs Service (Department of the Treasury), Department of Health
and Human Services, and Tennessee Valley Authority conduct a limited but
unknown number of polygraph examinations.
?Classifled or partly classified.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
tions-i.e., tests given to NSA (or affiliated) per-
sonnel who already have access to classified in-
formation-would have relevant questions on the
topics of involvement in espionage or sabotage
against the United States; knowledge of others in-
volved in espionage or sabotage against the United
States; involvement in giving or selling classified
materials to unauthorized persons; knowledge of
others giving or selling classified material to un-
authorized persons; and unauthorized contact
with representatives of a foreign government
(187). Examinations that are given to applicants
for employment and contractors who are apply-
ing for access to Sensitive Compartmented Infor-
mation (SCI) consist of questions about the topics
covered in counterintelligence-type aperiodic
screenings (phrased as "Do you plan to com-
mit... 7") as well as questions about a broader
range of issues: involvement in communist, fas-
cist, or terrorist activity; commission of a serious
crime; involvement in adult homosexual activi-
ty; involvement with illegal drugs or narcotics;
deliberate falsification of security processing
forms; treatment for a serious nervous or mental
problem (187). According to NSA, the scope of
specific issue examinations is limited to questions
that are relevant to the issue to be resolved. Pre-
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sumably, specific issue examinations would be
conducted using the control question technique.
Current DOD regulations also allow the use of
polygraph examinations to investigate situations
in which credible derogatory information about
an individual with clearance is provided to of-
ficials. The frequency of this type of investiga-
tion, however, was not reported. Prior to the
President's National Security Decision Directive
of March 11, 1983, use of the polygraph in per-
sonnel investigations of competitive service ap-
plicants and appointees to competitive service
positions was limited to executive agencies with
highly sensitive intelligence or counterintelligence
missions affecting the national security (e.g., a
mission approaching the sensitivity of that of CIA;
see 188). Approval to use the polygraph could be
granted for only 1-year periods. Refusal to con-
sent to a polygraph could not be made a part of
an applicant or appointee's personnel file. See
chapter 3 for a description of proposed changes
in Federal use of polygraph testing.
Non-Federal Government Use
Outside the Federal Government, polygraph ex-
aminations are administered as part of criminal
investigations, as well as preemployment screen-
ing and periodic screening of employees for pur-
poses of controlling internal crime and recom-
mending promotions. Less frequent uses include
examinations in such situations as paternity in-
vestigations and workers' compensation cases. It
has been estimated that over a million polygraph
examinations are given a year (107), 300,000 of
them for employment purposes alone (128).
Both private and police polygraphers use poly-
graph examinations in the process of criminal
CONCLUSIONS
What is often referred to as "the polygraph" is
actually a set of relatively complex procedures for
asking questions and measuring physiological re-
sponses in order to detect deception or establish
truth. Polygraph testing is employed for a varie-
ty of uses, ranging from ascertaining the guilt of
a criminal suspect to assessing the honesty of a
investigations (see 136). In some cases (most typi-
cally, rape and kidnapping cases, but also, for
example, investigations of improper or illegal con-
duct by public officials (177)), witnesses and vic-
tims whose veracity is in doubt are asked to take
a polygraph examination. Suspects who claim in-
nocence may be asked by their defense attorneys
or the prosecution to support their claim by tak-
ing a polygraph examination. In such cases, pros-
ecutors and defense attorneys may make infor-
mal agreements to drop the charges if the poly-
graph examination indicates no deception. Or, the
prosecution and the defense may formally stipu-
late that if deception is indicated, results of the
polygraph examination will be admissible at trial.
In some cases (New Mexico, Massachusetts, and
the 9th Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (8,136,
156,157)) polygraph evidence has been admitted
over objection. Polygraph evidence is also used
occasionally in postconviction proceedings such
as sentencing and motions for a new trial (136).
In polygraph examinations as part of criminal in-
vestigations, some version of the control question
technique is typically used.
The use of the polygraph examination by em-
ployers is reported to be widespread (144). Al-
though it is illegal to ask employees to take an
examination in 19 States and the District of Co-
lumbia, it is legal to do so in 31 States (8,156,157).
Polygraph examinations are used most commonly
in commercial banking, investment banking, and
retail operations. In such settings, both risk of
theft and fraud are high and, in addition, employ-
ee turnover is high. The use of polygraph exam-
inations is also recommended to employers as a
check before making promotion decisions (204).
prospective employee. Because different poly-
graph procedures are required depending on in-
tended use, it is necessary to consider validity by
polygraph technique and situation. In subsequent
chapters, such a variegated analysis is presented
and the scientific and policy contexts are more
fully described.
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Chapter ~;
Controversy Over Polygraph
Testing Validity
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Chapter 3
Controversy Over Polygraph
Testing Validity
INTRODUCTION
The validity of polygraph examinations to de-
tect deception has long been a controversial issue
(cf. 108,136,194,195). Since development of poly-
graph techniques almost 80 years ago, their use
both within and outside the Federal Government
has been the focus of numerous judicial opinions
and, as well, legislative and executive branch
debate. Polygraph examinations have been advo-
cated as a way to ascertain guilt of criminal sus-
pects, to exculpate innocent suspects, to protect
national security, and to maintain employee hon-
esty. Polygraph examinations have, at the same
time, been criticized for providing inaccurate and
misleading information, for failing to detect secu-
rity risks (167), for interfering with the rights of
private citizens (128), and for lowering employees'
morale. At the center of controversy over the use
of polygraph examinations is the question of its
validity: does a polygraph examination actually
identify truthful and nontruthful individuals?
Recent interest in polygraph examinations and
their validity stems from efforts to broaden Fed-
eral Government use. The Department of Defense
(DOD), in late 1982, drafted revisions to existing
regulations (5210.48). DOD proposed expansion
of the use of polygraph tests for preemployment
screening and periodic or aperiodic testing of
employees who have access to highly classified
information. Currently, only the National Securi-
ty Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) are able to use polygraph tests in
this way. Expanded use of polygraph testing in
all Federal agencies was made explicit in a Presi-
dential National Security Decision Directive (Mar.
11, 1983, NSDD-84). In part, the directive requires
agencies and departments which handle classified
information to revise existing regulations to per-
mit use of polygraph examinations as part of inter-
nal investigations of unauthorized disclosure of
classified information. Prior to the directive, in-
vestigations of unauthorized disclosures had to
be referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Employees who refuse to submit to a polygraph
examination could, if NSDD-84 is implemented,
be subject to adverse consequences. In October
1983, DOJ announced that administration policy
would also permit Government-wide polygraph
use in personnel security screening of employees
(and applicants for positions) with access to highly
classified information.
Proposals to expand use of polygraph examina-
tions to maintain national security have renewed
the debate about the appropriateness of various
polygraph techniques and their ability to detect
deception. In order to provide a context for the
present evaluation of scientific evidence on the
validity of polygraph testing, previous assess-
ments of accuracy of polygraph testing are re-
viewed in this chapter. Legal precedents regarding
polygraph testing and congressional hearings on
its use, both within and outside of Government,
are briefly considered. The chapter also describes
scientific criteria for establishing validity and
reviews other efforts to evaluate the scientific
literature on testing.
JUDICIAL REVIEWS
When courts have been called on to resolve dis-
putes concerned with use of polygraph examina-
tions, they have had to consider both the tech-
nique's validity and whether its use, however
valid, interfaces with other values that the law
seeks to protect. The varying decisions reached
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by State appellate courts and Federal circuits (see
8) may in large measure reflect varying beliefs
about the validity of polygraph examinations. In-
deed, for many years, the leading case on the ad-
missibility of novel scientific evidence (Frye v.
United States (58)) was a case about the admissi-
bility of polygraph evidence, and the opinion cen-
tered on the question of validity. The issue of how
a court is to decide the question of any scientific
technique's validity has brought the Frye test into
question in recent years and makes salient the
problem of establishing judicial standards for
assessing validity (60).
Polygraph Findings as Evidence
The Frye case involved a 19-year-old defendant
convicted of robbery and murder. Prior to his
trial, a well-known psychologist and one of the
originators of polygraph testing, Dr. William
Marston, administered a "systolic blood pressure
test" to detect deception (e.g., 114). Dr. Marston
determined, on the basis of this test, that Frye was
truthful when he denied involvement in the rob-
bery and murder. The trial judge, however, re-
fused to permit Dr. Marston to either testify about
the examination or conduct a reexamination using
the blood pressure test in court.
Frye appealed his conviction on the grounds
that relevant exculpatory evidence had not been
admitted. The appeals court, however, concurred
with the initial trial court judgment. The court
reasoned that the systolic blood pressure decep-
tion test was validated only by "experimental"
evidence and was not based on a "well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery." The decision
stated that, "while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
things from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Just when a scientific principle crosses the line be-
tween experimental and demonstrable is difficult
to define."
Ironically, Frye's conviction was later reversed
when another man confessed to the crime, thereby
providing Frye with more convincing corrobora-
tion of his denials of guilt. This did not settle the
case, however, and recent discussion of the facts
of the case indicate that Frye was, indeed, guilty.
The crude polygraph examination conducted by
Marston, thus, appears to have yielded an inac-
curate conclusion.
The Frye test is still used as precedent in most
Federal courts. Subsequent opinions (in areas
other than the polygraph) have tried to better de-
fine that line between "experimental" and "demon-
strative" stages of a scientific innovation. For ex-
ample, the court in United States v. Stifel (190)
held that "neither newness nor lack of absolute
certainty in a test suffices to render it inadmissi-
ble in court." In a second case, United States v.
Brown (189), the court also seemed to be con-
cerned with validity: "The fate of a defendant in
a criminal prosecution should not hang on his
ability to successfully rebut scientific evidence
which bears an 'aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness,' although, in reality the witness
is testifying on the basis of an unproved hypoth-
esis in an isolated experiment which has yet to
gain general acceptance in its field." The Frye test
has been held to be too high a hurdle by some
trial courts, which have replaced it with the test
for admissibility of expert testimony generally:
"testimony by a witness as to matters which are
beyond the ken of the layman will be admissible
if relevant and the witness is qualified to give an
opinion as to the specialized area of knowledge"
(190).
A closely related question for the courts has
been who should determine whether some pro-
cedure has gained general acceptance in its field.
Some have held that the courts must look to the
judgment of the scientific community (e.g., 191).
In other decisions, the court refused to "surrender
to scientists the responsibility for determining the
reliability of (scientific) evidence," and that "a
determination of reliability cannot rest on a proc-
ess of 'counting (scientific) noses.' "
Saks and Van Duizend (145) concluded that
whichever set of tests is employed, the courts are
in a weak position to assess validity directly or
to count scientific noses. The result has been:
1) general deference by the courts to the judgments
of scientific communities; and 2) "numerous in-
congruities ... where less reliable scientific and
technological information is admitted but the ad-
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mission of demonstrably more reliable techniques
is delayed until the requisite consensus has
formed" (145; see, also, 60).
When the courts examine polygraph testing,
they are faced with a series of dilemmas. To which
"particular field" of expertise can the courts turn:
physiology, psychology, polygraphy? If they look
to the data themselves, what are they to make of
it? As the present report suggests, validity assess-
ment involves a complex situation and technique-
specific answer. Even if a final, single accuracy
rate could be established, how should a court use
it. How accurate must a diagnostic or predictive
technique be to be deemed valid for evidentiary
purposes? Regularly admitted psychiatric evidence
is widely recognized (including by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, see Addington v. Texas, (2)) as hav-
ing accuracy rates comparable to flipping coins
(e.g., 55,208). In Barefoot v. Estelle (13) the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that psychiatric pre-
dictions of dangerousness and violent behavior
do not exceed an accuracy level of 33 percent (see
118). Yet, this evidence was held admissible in
Barefoot and sufficiently valid to uphold a deci-
sion to execute a convicted person.
In summary, then, the courts have found them-
selves disagreeing on methods to establish validity
for purposes of admissibility of evidence, where
the critical focus of such judgment should rest.
In addition, courts are inconsistent about what
decision to make on the basis of judicial findings
of fact regarding the validity of a diagnostic or
predictive device.
Laws Regulating Polygraphs
in Employment Settings
As described in chapter 2, screening employees
is the most frequent application of polygraph test-
ing. Many employers argue that use of polygraph
testing for preemployment screening, periodic
checking, and to resolve actual thefts is necessary.
Internal crime has been estimated to cost private
industry up to $10 billion annually (see 172), and
polygraph testing is regarded as a cost-effective
tool. Employers argue that screening applicants,
and periodic checking of employees, are the most
efficient ways to control pilferage, embezzlement,
poaching, and other forms of theft. The need for
polygraph testing is felt particularly in industries
which have high risk of theft and fraud (e.g., com-
mercial banks), high turnover (supermarkets,
other retail operations), or both.
According to Ansley (8), the use of private pol-
ygraph testing is limited by statute in 18 States
plus the District of Columbia. Most of these laws
seek to protect employees from being requested,
required, demanded, or subjected to polygraph
examinations by their employers. Employers are
reported to be able to find ways around these
laws. For example, employers may tell the em-
ployee that they suspect them of theft, but that
if the employee can find a way to demonstrate
innocence, the employer will not discharge the
employee. In addition to polygraph validity, other
polygraph-related concerns include issues of vol-
untariness, invasions of privacy, being compelled
to inform on other employees, inhibiting union
activity, and the polygraph as a cover for racism
and sexism. This list does not exhaust concerns
that have been expressed.
A survey of 143 private firms by Belt and Hol-
den (25), regarding their use of polygraph testing,
yielded a number of interesting findings. Twen-
ty percent of respondents reported using poly-
graph examinations for preemployment screen-
ing, periodic surveys, and investigations of spe-
cific onsite crimes. It is interesting that of reasons
given for using or not using polygraph tests, users
ranked moral or ethical considerations last and
efficiency first; nonusers, however, ranked validi-
ty and reliability second in importance, cost third,
and the availability of qualified operators fourth
in importance. The survey found a positive rela-
tionship between a State having a licensing re-
quirement for polygraphers and employers' use
of polygraph testing. According to Ansley (8), 25
States have licensing requirements for polygraph-
ers; licensing is optional in one State.
Although there is testimony that use of poly-
graph testing reduces employee crime (172), no
formal cost-benefit analyses appear to have been
conducted. In addition, there is no research on
the predictive validity of polygraph results
(72,144). Although employee issues are critical to
proposed Government uses of polygraph testing,
few data are available on Government employees
(see chs. 4 and 5).
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One additional area of controversy has con-
cerned employee rights and employer-employee
relationships. The general matter of invasion of
privacy is particularly pertinent in preemployment
screening and periodic checking. In preemploy-
ment screening, the range of questions that may
be asked has been subject to particularly heavy
criticism. Questions have been reported to include
items concerning union activity, sexual prefer-
ence, and family problems (169); and, in addition,
willingness to make a commitment to the job
(144), and whether the respondent has ever been
tempted to steal (71). During periodic checking,
respondents are sometimes asked not only about
their own possible improper behavior (e.g., un-
derringing in supermarkets), but also about their
level of job satisfaction, intention to remain with
the employer, and activities of their fellow em-
ployees (204). There is some concern about
whether prejudices of the polygraph examiner
based on racial, ethnic, and gender stereotypes
bias employees' responses (144). These assertions
do not appear to have been researched. And no
related claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Acts have been upheld.
One argument against the use of polygraph ex-
aminations in the employment situation is that it
destroys the trust relationship between employers
and employees, and creates employee dissatisfac-
tion. However, the few employee surveys that
have been conducted have not supported this ar-
gument. Apparently, five studies have examined
whether the use of the polygraph causes private
sector employees to be dissatisfied. In one study
(144), 96 percent of applicants were willing to take
a polygraph examination to get a job, 86 percent
of the applicants thought the preemployment ex-
amination was fair, and 88 percent were willing
to take it routinely as a condition of employment.
A problem with the study was that applicants
were surveyed immediately after taking the poly-
graph examination so they may have thought their
responses were part of the screening process. In
the one known survey of Federal employees, the
Air Force (183a) surveyed individuals who had
volunteered to participate in a pilot project on the
use of the polygraph for counterintelligence/se-
curity examinations. About 99 percent of the re-
spondents felt that the examinaton was fair, and
were willing to take an examination for counter-
intelligence purposes.
FEDERAL DEBATE OVER POLYGRAPH VALIDITY
Concern about and debate over Federal Gov-
ernment use of the polygraph have emerged at
several points during the past 20 years. As shown
in figure 1, the history is essentially one of legis-
lative concern triggered by some executive branch
proposal or action regarding polygraph testing.
The questions raised by Congress have included
constitutional and ethical as well as validity issues.
However, the scientific validity and reliability of
polygraph testing has been and is a central con-
gressional concern. This chapter briefly describes
the history of Federal Government involvement
with the issue of polygraph validity.
The 1960's
Congressional interest first intensified in 1963
when controversy developed over an executive
branch proposal to use lie detectors to find the
source of unauthorized disclosures of sensitive or
classified information, sometimes known as
"leaks" (192). The then chairman of the House
Committee on Government Operations asked the
Foreign Operations and Government Information
subcommittee to study the Federal Government's
use of polygraphs. The study found that, exclud-
ing the National Security Agency and Central In-
telligence Agency (for which information was
classified), Federal agencies had conducted 19,796
polygraph examinations in 1963. In 1964, the sub-
committee held hearings and received testimony
from private polygraphers, researchers, and Fed-
eral officials. In a 1965 report (167), the House
Committee on Government Operations concluded
that there was no scientific evidence to support
the theory of the polygraph, and that the research
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evidence as to its accuracy was inadequate. The
committee recommended that further research be
conducted and training for polygraph examiners
be upgraded, and that the President establish an
interagency committee to study and work out so-
lutions to problems posed by Federal Government
use of polygraphs.
Later in 1965, an interagency polygraph com-
mittee of representatives from DOD, CIA, DOJ,
Bureau of the Budget (now Office of Management
and Budget), Office of Science and Technology
(now the Office of Science and Technology Poli-
cy), and other executive agencies was established.
The interagency committee concluded that: 1)
there was insufficient scientific evidence concern-
ing the validity and reliability of polygraph test-
ing; and 2) the use of the polygraph constituted
an invasion of privacy of the individual being in-
terrogated. The committee recommended that the
"use of the polygraph in the executive branch
should be generally prohibited, and permitted
only in special national security operations and
in certain specified criminal cases" (166). The rec-
ommendations made at that time concerning per-
sonnel screening were promulgated as Civil Serv-
ice regulations on regulating the use of polygraphs
in personnel investigations of competitive service
applicants and appointees to competitive service
positions (ch. 736, app. D, of the Federal Person-
nel Manual). According to these regulations,
which are still in effect, only executive agencies
with highly sensitive intelligence or counterintel-
ligence missions directly affecting the national se-
curity such as "a mission approaching the sensi-
tivity of that of the Central Intelligence Agency"
are permitted to use the polygraph for employ-
ment screening and personnel investigations of ap-
plicants for and appointees to competitive service
positions. All other uses of a polygraph to screen
applicants for and appointees to competitive posi-
tions are forbidden.
The regulations also set forth steps for deter-
mining whether agencies met the criteria of hav-
ing a highly sensitive mission, and stipulated that
approval to use the polygraph would be granted
only for 1-year periods. Agencies intending to use
the polygraph for personnel screening were re-
quired to prepare regulations and directives meet-
ing certain minimum standards. The minimum
standards included directives concerning the spe-
cific purposes for which the polygraph may be
used, and directives that a person to be examined
must be informed as far in advance as possible
of the intent to use the polygraph and of the fact
that refusal to consent to a polygraph examina-
tion will not be made a part of the person's per-
sonnel file.
Also in response to the House Government
Operations Committee's 1965 report, DOD pro-
posed, and in part undertook, an extensive poly-
graph research program. And in July 1965, DOD
issued directive 5210.48 (177) to regulate the con-
duct of polygraph examinations and improve se-
lection, training, and supervision of its polygraph
operators. Some of the results of the DOD re-
search program were later reported in a scientific
journal (29), but other reliability and validity
studies proposed were never carried out (183).
Between 1967 and 1973 a number of bills were
introduced which would have either limited the
questions that could have been asked or banned
altogether polygraph use by Federal agencies
(170). None of these bills was enacted.
The 1970's
Ten years after the 1964 hearings, this same
House Government Operations subcommittee
conducted another review of polygraph use by
Federal agencies (169). In 1974 hearings, the sub-
committee found that the use of polygraphs in the
Federal Government had declined substantially
since 1963. In fiscal year 1973, a total of 6,946
examinations were conducted, including 3,081 by
NSA. This compared to 19,796 in 1963, excluding
NSA and CIA. Tne subcommittee also found that
there was not much additional research on poly-
graph validity. The only federally funded studies
conducted had been those reported by the DOD
Joint Services Group (183), and these studies were
considered by DOD to be inadequate for deter-
mining the validity and reliability of Federal
polygraph testing.
In a 1976 report based partly on the 1974 hear-
ings, the House Government Operations Commit-
tee concluded that "the nature of research under-
taken, both federally and privately funded, and
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the results therefrom, have done little to persuade
the committee that polygraphs ... have demon-
strated either their validity or reliability in dif-
ferentiating between truth and deception, other
than possibly in a laboratory situation" (171). The
1976 report concurred with the 1965 report that
"There is no 'lie detector' " (171). Because of the
polygraph's "unproven technical validity" and the
suggestion that the "inherent chilling effect on in-
dividuals subjected to such examination clearly
outweighs any purported benefit to the investi-
gative function of the agency," the Committee
recommended a complete ban on the use of pol-
ygraphs by all Federal Government agencies for
all purposes. However, 13 committee members
dissented, asserting both that the hearings had
been held during an entirely different Congress,
and participated in by an entirely different group
of Members, and that, while testimony at the
hearings represented a wide diversity of views,
no witness had urged prohibition of the polygraph
for all purposes. The dissenters urged adoption
of the recommendations originally proposed and
voted on by the members who had participated
in the hearings. These recommendations would
have, in part, prohibited the use of polygraphs
in all cases except "1) those clearly involving the
Nation's security, and 2) those in which agencies
can demonstrate in compelling terms their need
for use of such devices for their law enforcement
purposes, and that such uses would not violate
the fifth amendment or any other provision of the
Constitution."
The concern with scientific validity and its
implications for the Federal Government's use of
polygraph testing arose again in 1979 at hearings
held on preemployment security clearance proce-
dures by the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Oversight (175).
The subcommittee found that there had been in-
sufficient research on the accuracy of the poly-
graph technique in screening job applicants and
that "gaps in the statistics kept by the intelligence
services do not make it possible to make the clear
judgment that the polygraph is unique and indis-
pensable" (173). The Director of Central Intelli-
gence (DCI) was urged to conduct a study to vali-
date the accuracy of the polygraph for preemploy-
ment screening. DCI did conduct a study in 1980
to examine the utility of polygraph tests, but it
was not a validity study (165).
As shown in figure 1, in addition to interest in
Federal use of polygraphs, Congress has shown
interest in the use of polygraph examinations by
private employers, in part because of constitu-
tional and privacy issues (see, e.g., 169,172,173;
the Privacy Protection Study Commission Report
(128) mandated by Public Law 93-579; and several
laws introduced since 1967). Various congres-
sional committees have questioned the validity of
polygraph testing in a private employment con-
text, in particular as a condition for employment.
Nevertheless, attempts to enact Federal legislation
regulating the use of polygraph examinations by
private employers and/or the Federal Government
have not been successful.
The 1980's
In the recent past, the executive branch has
again taken initiatives concerning the Federal use
of polygraph testing. In April 1982, a DOD select
panel reviewed the DOD personnel security pro-
gram (180) and expressed dissatisfaction because
of inconsistency in polygraph use across compo-
nent programs (as did the U.S. Congress (173)),
and the lack of reinvestigations. The panel ob-
served that military personnel, unlike civilians,
were appointed to NSA and allowed access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) with-
out undergoing a polygraph examination. In ad-
dition, personnel could continue to get clearances
throughout their careers without ever being sub-
ject to reexamination. The DOD panel recom-
mended a broadened application of the polygraph
for security screening purposes, and selective use
of counterintelligence scope polygraph examina-
tions during periodic reinvestigations. The panel
noted that the recommended expanded use of the
polygraph would require changes in DOD Direc-
tive 5210.48.
On August 6, 1982, the Office of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense (39) issued a memorandum
requiring employees with SCI access to agree to
submit to polygraph examinations on an aperiodic
basis, and revised DOD Directive 5210.48 accord-
ingly. Later in 1982 and again in early and mid-
1983, further revisions to DOD Directive 5210.48
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were drafted (181). In 1983, the President issued
a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-84)
also authorizing broader use of the polygraph.
Congress responded to these developments by
conducting several sets of hearings, by requesting
OTA and General Accounting Office studies, and
by passing an amendment to the DOD appropria-
tions authorization bill (S.675) putting a morato-
rium until April 15, 1984, on any revisions to
DOD Directive 5210.48 retroactive to August 5,
1982. On October 19, 1983, DOJ announced a
new administration polygraph policy that would
permit further expansion in polygraph use. The
DOD draft revisions, NSDD-84, and administra-
tion polygraph policy are discussed in more detail
below.
Draft Revisions to DOD 5210.48
The draft revisions to the DOD polygraph reg-
ulations have gone through several iterations. For
the purposes of this validity study, a primary pro-
posed revision (as of the March 1983 draft) is to
authorize the use of the polygraph for deter-
mining initial and continuing eligibility of DOD
civilian, military, and contractor personnel for
access to highly classified information (SCI and/or
special access). The use of the polygraph in deter-
mining continuing eligibility would be on an
aperiodic (i.e., irregular) basis (181).
Also, the proposed revisions provide that re-
fusal to take a polygraph examination, when
established as a requirement for selection or
assignment or as a condition of access, may, after
consideration of all other relevant factors, result
in adverse consequences for the individual. Ad-
verse consequences are defined to include non-
selection for assignment or employment, denial
or revocation of clearance, or reassignment to a
nonsensitive position.
Technically, these expanded uses of the poly-
graph are considered to be part of personnel secu-
rity investigations. Use of the polygraph within
DOD is already authorized under the existing 1975
version of 5210.48 for various criminal, counter-
intelligence, and intelligence purposes.
A detailed review of the proposed changes is
beyond the scope of this technical memorandum.
NSDD-84
On March 11, 1983, the President issued a Na-
tional Security Decision Directive intended, ac-
cording to DOJ officials, to help safeguard against
unlawful disclosure of properly classified infor-
mation. One provision of NSDD-84 requires that
persons with authorized access to classified infor-
mation sign a nondisclosure agreement, and that
persons with access to SCI must also agree to pre-
publication review. These provisions are outside
the scope of this memorandum, as is a full analysis
of NSDD-84.
With respect to the polygraph, NSDD-84 in
effect authorizes agencies and departments to
require employees to take a polygraph examina-
tion in the course of internal investigations of
unauthorized disclosures of classified examina-
tions. NSDD-84 also provides that refusal to take
a polygraph test may result in adverse conse-
quences. NSDD-84 permits administrative sanc-
tions, including denial of security clearance, to
be applied even when a person is not subject to
a criminal investigation (184).
Administration Polygraph Policy
On October 19, 1983, DOJ announced a com-
prehensive administration policy on Federal agen-
cy polygraph use. The policy authorizes poly-
graph testing:
1. as a condition of initial or continuing
employment with or assignment to agencies
with highly sensitive responsibilities direct-
ly affecting national security;
2. as a condition of access to highly sensitive
categories of classified information;
3. to investigate serious criminal cases; and
4. to investigate serious administrative miscon-
duct cases including unauthorized disclosure
of classified information (185a).
The policy in essence authorizes use of the poly-
graph on a Government-wide basis for the ex-
panded polygraph uses proposed by DOD. Thus,
for example, the policy provides agency heads
with the authority to give polygraph examinations
on a periodic or aperiodic basis to randomly
selected employees with access to highly sensitive
information, and to deny such access to employ-
ees refusing to take a polygraph exam.
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SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY AND POLYGRAPH RESEARCH REVIEWS
Thus, recent polygraph policy actions have
renewed interest in and debate over the scientific
validity of the polygraph. Reviews of scientific
literature form the principal means to cumulate
research findings and are especially important in
order to assess the validity of polygraph testing.
Single research studies, no matter how well con-
ducted, cannot answer global questions about va-
lidity and must be considered in relation to other
evidence. Both because research evidence about
polygraph testing has rapidly increased, especially
within the last 10 years, and because there have
been disagreements about the nature of evidence
about polygraph testing, there have been a num-
ber of such reviews. These reviews are important,
because they are frequently cited in both legal and
legislative considerations and because they serve
to shape future research.
Underlying each of the reviews is the applica-
tion of a set of criteria, only sometimes made ex-
plicit, regarding the validity of individual studies
and their implications for overall assessments of
polygraph testing accuracy. As introduction to
the scientific reviews, the nature of these criteria
is described. The reviews, themselves, are then
summarized and a preliminary analysis of discrep-
ancies among reviews is presented. More detailed
analysis of individual validity studies is provided
in chapters 4 and 5.
Definitions of Scientific Validity
Validity
The validity of polygraph testing means, in
nontechnical terms, accuracy of the test in detect-
ing deception and truthfulness. The problem of
assessing polygraph validity is especially difficult,
not only because polygraph tests take a number
of forms, but also because validity has different
dimensions and can be measured in a number of
ways. There are, as a result, a number of different
forms of validity associated with polygraph ex-
aminations depending on the type of polygraph
test as well as on its use (e.g., employee screen-
ing v. investigation of a criminal suspect). These
difficulties underlie, in part, the failure to have
developed assessments of polygraph validity that
are accepted by the scientific community.
In order to make explicit the criteria for validity
used in this assessment, below are described sev-
eral dimensions of validity and how they are as-
sessed. This description is based both on standards
for psychological /psychometric tests (cf. 3,5) and
criteria to evaluate research designs (cf. 41,147).
Although criteria for validity can be described ob-
jectively, it should be noted that it is essentially
a qualitative judgment as to whether (or, to what
extent) a given criterion is met. In addition,
assessments of the "preponderance" of evidence
necessary in order to assess the overall validity
of polygraph testing are similarly subjective. In
chapters 4 and 5, a systematic analysis of avail-
able research is attempted, although it should be
recognized that there are a number of ways to
conduct such evaluations, each of which may
yield a somewhat different outcome.
Reliability
Assessment of any test's validity is based on the
assumption that the test consistently measures the
same properties. This consistency, known as relia-
bility, is usually the degree to which a test yields
repeatable results (i.e., the extent to which the
same individual retested is scored similarly).
Reliability also refers to consistency across ex-
aminers/scorers. A reliable polygraph test should
yield equivalent outcomes when subjects are re-
tested and, as well, be scored similarly by indi-
viduals other than the initial examiner. For ex-
ample, if a polygraph examiner reviewed a set of
charts and concluded that a subject was decep-
tive, any other polygraph examiner should be able
to review the same charts and conclude that de-
ception was indicated. This illustrates interrater-
reliability. Such reliability might be affected by
the amount and type of training of examiners.
The present study focuses primarily on validi-
ty because if a testing procedure is not measur-
ing what it purports to measure (validity), it mat-
ters little that it can measure the same thing again
and again. Examiners who consistently agree that
they are seeing "deception" may in fact be measur-
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ing anxiety or some other form of arousal. Relia-
bility is, however, a necessary condition for va-
lidity to be established. A test that is valid will,
necessarily, be reliable.
Construct Validity
Construct validity refers, in broad terms, to
whether a test adequately measures the underly-
ing trait it is designed to assess. A polygraph test
is designed to detect deception. It is therefore im-
portant to clearly define the construct of decep-
tion, and distinguish it from other concepts such
as guilt.
To measure construct validity, it is necessary
to both describe the construct and show its rela-
tion to a conceptual framework. Construct valida-
tion, thus, requires that a test be based on some
theory or conceptual model. Since different types
of polygraph tests have different theoretical bases
(see ch. 2), there are multiple forms of construct
validity for the polygraph. Construct validity is
established by various means. Most important-
ly, based on theoretical predictions of how items
should interrelate or how other tests should inter-
correlate, actual evidence (e.g., scores from simi-
lar tests) is examined. If no such predictions are
possible, it is impossible to establish construct
validity.
Criterion Validity
Although from a theoretical point of view con-
struct validity is most important, from a practical
point-of-view, criterion validity is the central
component of a validity analysis. This aspect of
validity refers, in the case of polygraph examina-
tions, to the relationship between test outcomes
and a criterion of ground truth. In this respect,
criterion validity is what is meant by test accura-
cy. In the absence of construct validity evidence,
however, it is difficult to determine to what ex-
tent criterion validity data can be generalized. In
some situations, it is not clear which aspects of
a test are responsible for accuracy, and what fac-
tors cause a test to be inaccurate.
Research Design
The above validity criteria are those which are
typically assessed in considering evidence about
the usefulness of a test. A related set of validity
crtieria are also used to evaluate the validity of
any single study design. These research design cri-
teria include, most importantly, internal and ex-
ternal validity (cf. 41,147).
Internal validity refers to the degree to which
a study has controlled for extraneous variables
which may be related to the study outcome. Ex-
ternal validity refers to the established general-
izability of a study to particular subject popula-
tions and settings. Internal validity in the case of
a study of polygraph testing is usually enhanced
by the presence of control groups. Typically, such
conditions of an experiment permit analysis of
variables such as different question formats. In
most field studies, internal validity is difficult to
establish since the investigation cannot control or,
in many cases, have definitive knowledge about
whether a subject is guilty or innocent.
External validity is simply the nature of the sub-
jects and settings tested. The broader the popula-
tion examined and the type of setting investigated,
the wider that study's results can be generalized.
In a parallel way, the more similar the research
situation to the "real life" situation, the greater
a study's external validity. Evidence about exter-
nal validity is developed both from investigations
that test a broad range of subjects and situations
and from investigations that identify subject and
setting interactions with polygraph test outcomes.
The broader the population examined and the
type of setting or the more similar it is to the situa-
tion for which one wants to use a test or a the-
oretical construct, the greater a study's external
validity.
False Positives and Negatives
With any test, the possibility exists of false pos-
itives and negatives. False positives are decisions
that individuals are being deceptive when they are
providing truthful responses. Their charts are
scored as showing a "deceptive" reaction for some
other reason. False negatives are decisions that in-
dividuals are not being deceptive when in fact they
are being deceptive. There are a number of rea-
sons why such false outcomes might be obtained
and, in part, they depend on the criteria (e.g.,
amount of physiological change) used to indicate
deception or truthfulness.
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The rate of false positives or negatives is
sometimes difficult to establish because, in re-
search studies, a number of criteria for deception/
nondeception may be applied. Thus, for exam-
ple, in studies which employ numerical scoring
for polygraph charts, depending on the scoring
system (e.g., cutoff points), different diagnoses
will be made. The rate of false positives and
negatives may also depend on the examiner's per-
ception of the "base rate" of guilt/innocence.
In some cases, the examiner will deal mostly
with deceptive subjects (e.g., in certain criminal
investigation contexts) and, thus, may be predis-
posed to make false positive diagnoses. In other
settings (e.g., some personnel screenings), an ex-
aminer may test only a small number of decep-
tive subjects and, then, may be predisposed to
false negative decisions. Regardless of rates,
assessment of conditions that cont 'ibute to either
type of error is a focus of the resea ch literature.
Reviews of Polygraph Validity
Since at least 1973, a number of polygraph re-
searchers and psychologists interested in physio-
logical detection of deception have reviewed avail-
able scientific literature to assess the validity and
reliability of polygraph testing. Most such reviews
focus on studies of criterion validity, although a
growing number of investigations deal with con-
struct validity. The most important difference
among these criterion studies has to do with
whether they are conducted in actual field situa-
tions or in "analog" situations.
Field Studies
For purposes of this technical memorandum,
field studies are those studies or "naturally"
occurring polygraph test situations; i.e., studies
in which the researcher does not exercise experi-
mental control over the situation in which the
crime or other event occurred. Not exercising ex-
perimental control means that the researcher does
not systematically assign people to conditions of,
for example, guilt or innocence. We refer here to
"field" studies but others (e.g., 7) use the ter-
minology "real" cases (v. "laboratory"). Abrams
(1) differentiates between the laboratory and "ac-
tual criminal cases."
In polygraph field studies, polygraph examin-
ers' decisions are compared against some post hoc
determination of whether suspects are guilty or
innocent; i.e., "ground truth." These post hoc
determinations may, in different studies, consist
of confessions by the presumably guilty party,
decisions by a panel of attorneys or judges assem-
bled specifically for a particular study who base
their decisions on investigative files excluding
references to polygraph decisions, judicial out-
comes (dismissals, acquittals, convictions), as well
as other criteria. The fact that determinations of
guilt or innocence are made post hoc makes draw-
ing conclusions from field studies difficult (126).
In real life situations, truth is seldom available
(62).
Attempts to use confessions, panel judgments,
judicial outcomes, and other criteria as indicators
of truth have their own problems. Individuals
may confess to crimes which they did not com-
mit (108). In addition, individuals are sometimes
falsely convicted (34). Panel decisions may be gen-
eralizable only to cases in which sufficient inves-
tigative information is available to make a deci-
sion without the addition of polygraph testing.
One can never be certain that the panel decision
is indeed correct, and the panel and the polygraph
examiner may have been exposed to the same
prior information (62). Thus, while field studies
provide the most direct evidence about polygraph
test validity, they have been criticized because
they do not adequately meet the standards of
"ground truth" to establish criterion validity.
Comparison of Reviews
A number of independent reviews (listed in
table 2) of the field evidence on polygraph testing
were assessed in order to determine reasons for
differences among reviews. The reviews differ in
a number of respects. In part, reviewers' conclu-
sions differ because they include different kinds
of studies and even different studies (despite, in
several cases, having had the same studies avail-
able to them). In addition, some reviews differen-
tiate between accuracy in detecting deceptive v.
nondeceptive subjects, emphasizing the problems
of false positives and false negatives; others ag-
gregated the overall accuracy rates across both
groups of subjects. Finally, there are differences
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