ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ MEETING WITH INDONESIAN FOREING MINISTER MOCHTAR, FEBRUARY 15
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP87S00734R000100110014-8
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 27, 2010
Sequence Number:
14
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Publication Date:
February 20, 1985
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MSGNO 33 (STXX) *02/20/85~ *04:15:19.6.1*
zCZC 09:13:542 (ST)
85 6507501 SSO
TOR: 2008062 FEB X35
NC 6507501
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY
EZ2:
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ASEAN, ID, XC
00 RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
00 RUEHC
DE RUEHC 10745 0510523
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 P 2005112 FEB 85
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0000
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0000
ZEN/BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN POUCH
BT
EZ 1:
F.STAyTE ~0507?~.5_~
~nzs~
2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WOLFOWITZ MET WITH INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR
KUSUMAATMADJA IN NEW YORK ON FEBRUARY 15 FOR ONE AND A
HALF HOURS. MOCHTAR WAS IN NEW YORK FOR A MEDICAL
CHECK-UP AND HAD NO OFFICIAL PROGRAM SCHEDULED.
INDONESIAN DEPUTY UN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR
POEDJI KOENTARSO, AND EAP/IMBS ACTING DIRECTOR LAPORTA
SAT IN ON THE MEETING. CONCERNING CAMBODIA AND THE
RECENT ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN BANGKOK,
1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.
~S~SD~TIiAT~TI~E~'MINSTERsIAIAMMU1d-IQi~E~WAS
S E C R E T
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SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ WITH THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE FEB.
11"12 ASEAN MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE IN BANGKOK AS RELATED
TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMBODIA AND TO EXPLAIN THE NUANCES IN
THE MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE. MOCHTAR LED OFF BY OBSERVING
THAT THERE IS A FEELING THAT COUNTRIES SHOULD BE
APOLOGETIC ABOUT AIDING THE KHMER RESISTANCE BUT, IN
PRINCIPLE, THERE IS NO REASON WHY THE RESISTANCE SHOULD
NOT BE SUPPORTED, ESPECIALLY AS THE USSR IS OPENLY
SUPPORTING VIETNAM. HOWEVER,~~`~_ ,,.
`??'?'
~MEANT,,~MORE'~AS ~A~ POLITICAL-~GESTURE'~'.OF 'SUPPORT? FOR THAILAND
SAND THE KHMER RESISTANCE~RATHER THAN AS A SPECIFIC CALL ~'
FOR INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. SHE ALSO SAID THAT
INDONESIA "FOR THE TIME BEING" WOULD CONTINUE ITS PRESENT
POLICY OF PROVIDING ONLY NON-LETHAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
NON-COMMUNIST KHMER GROUPS IN THE HOPE OF PRESERVING SOME
DEGREE OF ASEAN "FLEXIBILITY" IN DEALING WITH VIETNAM.
MOCHTAR ALSO DISCUSSED PLANS FOR HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO
HANOI. ON CHINA, MOCHTAR DID NOT SEE PROSPECTS FOR
NORMALIZATION BECAUSE OF PRESIDENT SOEHARTO'S STRONG
VIEWS ABOUT PRC COMPLICITY IN THE ABORTIVE COMMUNIST COUP
IN INDONESIA IN 1965. REGARDING ASEAN PROPOSALS FOR A
SOUTHEAST ASIAN ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY
(ZOPFAN) AND A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE (NWFZ), MOCHTAR
BELIEVED THAT U.S. INTERESTS IN SEALANES PASSAGE FOR
NAVAL SHIPS COULD BE MANAGED AND INDICATED THAT ASEAN IS
LOOKING CAREFULLY AT THE NEW ZEALAND SITUATION TO SEE IF
SOME ACCOMMODATION IN THIS REGARD COULD BE WORKED OUT.
OTHER TOPICS INCLUDED THE PHILIPPINES AND PACIFIC
COOPERATION. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
3 ? QDT;A ANA, '~ ~ _E;ASEAN';FOREIGN~`MINISTERS"~ '~
CONFERENCE '~ MOCHTAR SAID HE WANTED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANT
4. MOCHTAR CONTINUED. THA1~ ~I~'Qj~-~TLS'~?O~j Ip
~UK~~0F~T1IAehLAN~,,Dt;SO INDONESIA DECIDED TO TAKE A
POSITION "NOT T0O DIFFERENT" FROM THE OTHERS.
'+NE~!LEF3T~T0'~BEABL~E~~-TO -DEAD-W~ = R~ ~' CONSEQUENTLY,
?THIS IS WHY THE GOI HAS NOT PROVIDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO THE KHMER RESISTANCE. DESPITE THIS, 'PHE~ASEA'N~
O~THE+~ASEAN~COUNTR~I~ES~*SHQULD~BE~a~" _EQUALH+Ya~STR! ~
ITS. I~APPRpACH~T9.WA`RD'~n~I~ETNAMBECA(JSE'THERE+~WOULiB~BE~NU
9RT- -A ~~' 'FNMA
~_- - - - COI~NG ~ ~5
r 1L ?31~/11Ly~L ? i ~ .
r _ AMONG Ti~RE : ~~z5~ : cE
MOCHTAR SAID THERE HAS IN FACT BEEN SOME
IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR COHESIVENESS AS A RESULT OF THE MOST
RECENT VIETNAMESE ATTACKS AND THAT THE RESISTANCE
FIGHTERS HAVE BEEN DEMORALIZED. HOW MUCH OF THIS IS
GENUINE, QUESTIONED MOCHTAR, NOBODY KNOWS, AND THERE IS
STILL SOME RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF SON SANN. MOCHTAR
S E C R E T
'~~~I'L"~i~~1'ItY~i~-~bR~. IN POLITICALTERMS.
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S E C R E T
THEN RECOUNTED DIFFICULTIES WITH SON SANN IN CONECTION
WITH SIHANOUK'S FORTHCOMING TRIP TO AUSTRALIA, NOTING
SIHANOUK'S OBSERVATION THAT IT IS "EASIER FOR HIM TO DEAL
WITH THE KHMER ROUGE THAN WITH SON SANN." NEVERTHELESS,
MOCHTAR THOUGHT THERE IS GROWING COOPERATION AMONG THE
SECOND GENERATION OF KHMER LEADERS AND OPINED THAT THEY
ARE IMPATIENT WITH SON SANN'S DILATORY TACTICS.
5. REGARDING THE MILITARY. SITUATION, ~7~~t~SA~ID:.~'TH>v
~II~fER'~RESISTANCE. HAS_ SUFFICIENT--WEAFONS?=`AND::THAT. THE~'~
THAISv ARE "CAREFUL-SIN ~ HANDING THEM -OVER TO ~ THE ~ ~' _
NONCOMMUNIST-~:MILITARY=::ELEMENTS SO'THERE`WOULD BE'REDUCED)
FRISK 'OF "LOSING" THEM., ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ,
REFERRING TO HIS OWN RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN BANGKOK AND
SINGAPORE, NOTED THAT ~~:~AND~~SLTTHI~ASKED.~FOR-`U~~.
~MILITARY~SUPPORT_OF~THE,;RESISTANCE AND~IT"SEEMED__THEY-_ARE9
Q.OOKING -FOR-A-:POI,ITICALLY:::SYMBOLIC~GESTURE:FROM"THE US:-~
lHOWEVER, _.:IN_~S:INGAPpRE.,..~LEE~KUAN_` YEW~~~WHO CHAS .PRESSED US
EF.ORB~ON.-PROVIDING MI_LI~TARY~ -ASSISTANCE?`:.TO'=THE`
~N-COMMUNIST-:KHMERS - "GA~IE-THE -IMPRESSION~_THAT_THERE~IS3
~J0 -IMMEDIATE~NEED_FOR :SUCH'=SURRORT~'THOUGH_~THERE_~MIGHT ~BE`~
~IN.:THE FUTURE. MOCHTAR COMMENTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT
SON SANN IS ALWAYS ASKING FOR MORE ASSISTANCE BUT SOME
OBSERVERS SAY HIS ACCOUNTING FOR PREVIOUS ASSISTANCE IS
NOT GOOD, WHEREAS IN SIHANOUK 'S CASE, DESPITE EARLIER
DIFFICULTIES, EVERYTHING IS NOW ACCOUNTED FOR. MOCHTAR
AGREED THAT THE NEED NOW IS FOR THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER
GROUPS TO GET THEIR FORCES INTO THE INTERIOR OF CAMBODIA
AND TO BUILD UP A GRASSROOTS RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION.
THERE IS ALSO A NEED TO COUNTER THE POLITICAL PERCEPTION
THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE FULLY IN CONTROL IN CAMBODIA BUT,
MOCHTAR NOTED, THE VIETNAMESE ARE NOT MAKING MUCH HEADWAY
AS INDICATED BY THE NEED TO BRING IN TWO NEW DIVISIONS
RECENTLY. MOCHTAR THEN OBSERVED THAT THE KHMER ROUGE IS
DOING VERY WELL, DESPITE THE RECENT DESTRUCTION OF ITS
CAMPS BUT QUESTIONED HOW THE SON SANN GROUP COULD
FUNCTION WELL IN A MILITARY SENSE BECAUSE THEY ARE
LARGELY TOWN PEOPLE WITH FAMILIES, UNLIKE THE KHMER ROUGE
FIGHTERS WHO ARE MAINLY PEASANTS AND YOUNG BOYS.
REGARDING INDONESIAN ASSISTANCE, ?, ~ TTH
~6~I~'I~i~Y~I~TfS~-A*I~D"~;~'O~NON=LETHAL Tc-EI EM~,~'`CLOTEIING.
TES;~MEDINEESPECI~ALL"Y~'QU.ININEABLETS) AND~,;~# ~ ~ Y-:;
'I~EHE~-SAID-THE-~GOI-~_WOULNOT_rCHAN~~~ITS -POL-ICY"~'OF NOT
~OV~D IITG=~'p RMS~i F~ R~THE-'~T I NIE =CBE ~ NG~"
6 -~' AT -IIS1G'PQNED?~tl~~IS_1~~
A~~I~~'A'USE~F~THE'"V=1-E'i'1~'AM1vSE~A~TACKS~,ON~THE~rHA~3^a
~8 B~'E~R" B~'-`VAM~~-~-A'~E'!'PRESS~LNG'I~
~ HBN~S`IsA'N~"A1+#gASSA ' ? R~iMeksHA~Nt rI~RECEI"Y~':~V~tGUF
G'~'~a"~'~'~?~"!'A TTAGKS~`OET~5.~1'HE'.~ORDERO.UL"Dp9
A'R~V~iGS"~TED'~iANOT"'~ r + ~ ~TIiE?~T,?Il~R/~IG
W ITT I -L'~fG?AT~~ 13B1('"-~THEABRUPT~REQUES+T~OF~, T'IiEI~
~i~~wDE~1;NSE~MiN~ISTER~TO"~RETURN~"'ARMED".~FORCE:S'~C_~H~
Q~bT~~MURDAAFI'S~198~1~'V:IS'I'~~fiOgHA~10I~=>~Y~ VISITING~I-1~ONES~I
S E C R E T
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~IN.~EARL~Y-MARCH' AND;~BY.~":THE~`CSIS2'SEMINAR WITH THEE
~VIETNAMESE~;IN JAKARTA BEGINNING FEB.~h18~:"?'~ THE VIETNAMESE,
MOCHTAR`~`OPINED`,~ WANT TO SHOW THERE IS SOMETHING SPECIAL
IN THE INDONESIAN-SRV RELATIONSHIP AND ARE THUS WILLING
TO MAKE THESE GESTURES. MOCHTAR ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE
VIETNAMESE MAY SEE THAT THEY ARE BEING ISOLATED IN VIEW
OF THE USSR AND U.S "PLAYING UP" TO THE PRC.~~~
-- -. , w
BANGKOK MINISTERIAL".~THE~:ASEAN -MiN3STERS ;URGED HIM. TO;~GQ
~HANOI~BEFORE_.THE-VIETNAMESE DEFENSE~:MINISTER!S..VISIT.~
~fO "INDONESIA".AND' BEFORE AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN~~_MINISTER
~IAYDEN'S VISIT~TO HANOI SCHEDULED'FOR MARCH $~. MOCHTAR _
~._~
SAID HIS PLANS PRESENTLY ARE TO TO~NECNOI;?A'AND"POSSIBL'~Y3
- - ~-
Ox CHI MINH~:CITY :EOR''.TWO OR``.'4THREE'~DAYS~BEGINNING.~FEB
~27$~TRYI?NG'`INSOFAR. AS:POSSIBLE TO MAKE IT'A "SOCIAL VISIT!
~BY:'BRINGING'HIS WIFE":~ COMMENTING ON OTHER INDONESIAN
VIEWS ON VIETNAM, MOCHTAR SAID BENNY MURDANI SEEMS TO
HAVE A "SPECIAL WEAKNESS" FOR THE VIETNAMESE, PARTIALLY
BECAUSE OF HIS FEAR OF CHINA AND BECAUSE OF HIS
ADMIRATION OF THE VIETNAMESE AS MILITARY PEOPLE. MOCHTAR
SAID HE HOPES TO MEET WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ
IN JAKARTA IN EARLY MARCH TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AFTER HIS
VISIT TO VIETNAM.
7. CHINA: RESPONDING TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ'
COMMENT THAT PEOPLE LIKE BENNY MURDANI SEEM TO FEEL THAT
THE U.S. IS NAIVE IN ITS APPROACH TO CHINA, MOCHTAR SAID
THAT SOME MAY THINK THAT, BUT U.S. POLICY IS OPEN FOR ALL
TO SEE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ SAID THAT WE ARE
BUILDING A MORE BALANCED APPROACH TO U.S.-CHINESE
RELATIONS BUT MOCHTAR QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR GENERAL
VESSEY'S RECENT VISIT TO CHINA. IN THIS RESPECT, MOCHTAR
COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE ARE NOT LOOKING FOR LARGE ARMS
PURCHASES FROM THE U.S. AND ONLY WANT MILITARY
TECHNOLOGY; CONSEQUENTLY, EVEN AS A GESTURE, THE VESSEY
TRIP CREATED A LOT OF MISUNDERSTANDING. ASSISTANT
SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ REPLIED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT
WAS TO ENLARGE UPON OUR FEW CONTACTS WITH THE CHINESE
MILITARY AND, ALTHOUGH WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE
CHINESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES, WE CAN TRY TO INFLUENCE
HOW CHINESE MILITARY LEADERS VIEW US.
8. MOCHTAR THEN COMMENTED THAT SOME IN THE GOI WANT TO
DO MORE IN RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHINA BUT THAT PRESIDENT '
SOEHARTO IS "IN NO MOOD" TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS. AS A
RESULT OF PRC SUPPORT OF THE PKI AND THE ABORTIVE COUP IN
1965, IN WHICH A NUMBER OF SOEHARTO'S CLOSEST FRIENDS
WERE KILLED, THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS OF CHINA HAS
BECOME AN "EMOTIONAL THING" WITH HIM. ALSO, MOCHTAR
CITED THE PAST REFUSAL OF JAVANESE KINGS TO BECOME
VASSALS OF CHINA OR TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE CHINESE
EMPERORS, MENTIONING THE RETURN OF ONE CHINESE ENVOY WITH
HIS EARS AND NOSE CUT OFF. SOEHARTO'S VIEW IS THAT THE
CHINESE SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE TOWARD NORMALIZATION
BY SENDING A HIGH LEVEL ENVOY TO INDONESIA.
S E C R E T
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9 . ~3,$~IIIIJNG~G'ANFERENCE ~ COMMEMO.RA~~,ON,;; DESPITE
INDONESIA'S PREVA'LING VIEW ON NORMALIZATION OF
RELATIONS, MOCHTAR SAID THAT THE PRC WILL PROBABLY SEND
SOMEONE, POSSIBLY FOREIGN MINISTER WU, TO THE BANDUNG
CONFERENCE COMMEMORATION IN LATE APRIL; IN FACT, AMB.
KOENTARSO HANDED OVER AN OFFICIAL INVITATION TO THE
CHINESE UN PERMREP THAT MORNING. REGARDING THE
COMMEMORATION PLANS, MOCHTAR SAID THAT SOEHARTO DOES NOT
WANT A SPLASHY AFFAIR, THUS COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN INVITED
AT THE PLENIPOTENTIARY OR AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, EXCEPT FOR
INDIA'S RAJIV GANDHI WHO HAS BEEN INVITED IN HIS CAPACITY
AS NONALIGNED MOVEMENT CHAIRMAN. ALSO, "SURVIVING
PARTICIPANTS" OF THE 1955 CONFERENCE -- SIHANOUK, ROMULO
AND PRAM VAN DONG -- ARE BEING INVITED. BURMA HAS
DECIDED NOT TO ATTEND, HE SAID, BECAUSE IT FEELS ITS
POSITION ON_THE NAM MIGHT BE COMPROMISED.-_,A~D
..
~FiOP.ES=THE--BANDUNG CONCLAVE~WILL~PRODUCE-A-~DECL-ARATIO~AT
ITERATING~THE~~BANDUNG~PRINChPLES;_-.CIT.ING~GENERAL _~
~ROBLEMS~IN:'VARIOUS-REGIONS -OF THE~WORLD'~(OMITTINE-~_
cSPECIFICS~SUCH-AS~AFGHANTSTAN~AND"CAMBODIA IN ORDER)TO~~
A~VOID`~CONTENTION) ;~ CALLING .FOR ..THE NEED 'FOR IMPROVED' ~`
~.CONOMIC'RELATSONS WITH`"DEVELOPED? NATIONS ~ ; -INCL`UDING ~_
IQNCREASED=MARKET ACCESS. tl~ NT.INUED~~THAT;THE+DRAFT~
DECLARATION WOULD BE WORKED_OUT'CAREFULL-Y INS?ADVANCE_S0'
.:.THER_E- WOULD BE -NO -'!CONFERENCE__ASPECT'_' VTO THE''.BANDUNC
'~
~EREMONI.ES:---~MOCHTAR ALSO SAID THAT HE ENTERTAINED THE
"VAIN HOPE" THAT A DECLARATION OF 90 OR SO COUNTRIES
COULD BE "HELPFUL IN EAST-WEST TERMS" BY FOCUSSING WORLD
OPINION ON THE NEED FOR AN END TO THE ARMS RACE.
10. ~?EA~RAPONS~F~~~ ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WOLFOWITZ ASKED FOR MOCHTAR'S VIEWS ON ZOPFAN AND THE
PROPOSED NWFZ. MOCHTAR,REPLIED THAT TH
~ENSURE_ T'"A ~.~SOUTHEA~T~ASIANN ~IF~-Z,~~~NO~,',~i'~N
INCIDENT. MOCHTAR CONTINUED THAT
I.~T$ONANCE:.'"'W:~TH~.TI~rI:OS~CONIIENTION--WHICH~.TATES ~TIIAT'"SUCA~
'~ASTAL=STATE MOCHTAR SAID THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES
FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS NO WAY TO "POLICE" THE
TRANSIT OF WARSHIPS BUT, UNDER THE LOS TREATY, THERE IS
PROVISION FOR ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF TRANSIT AND OF
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR
.;RIGHT--0F-' PASSAGE bF=WARSH:IPSTHRO.UGHHE?rS~f,,,~RA,~~$,~
tEANTE~~S
HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER PHILIPPINE TERRITORY -
WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NWFZ IN VIEW OF THE U.S. BASES
THERE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ COMMENTED THAT
THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS TO THE PROBLEM: FIRST, THE NATURE
OF THE ARRANGEMENT ITSELF -- WE WOULD HOPE THAT IT IS ONE
WE COULD LIVE WITH
"`S:~Wb~~~~~R~M~C>~Oi~F~?'rFiAN~ASSIIR)C:NN~".~fi.~l
ASSAGE~OF -STRAI-TS:~--FORS%Al~[P-LE,~ wQUESTION'OF,~P.OR~~- ?~'
S E C R E T
- J M
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crEI~CESS. rIS EQUAL:LY..IMPORTANT;~ '~EC0~1D ~:TIiE~POLI.TICAL
MPACT OF, PUSHING A SOUTHEAST ASIAN,NWFZ COULD COMPOUND ~
bUR OBLEMS IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA AND CREATE NEW~.~
{ONES_ IN. THE PHILIPPINES AND JAP,l~J;` MOCHTAR THEN ASKED
RHETORICALLY THAT, IF LATIN AMERICA CAN HAVE A NUCLEAR
FREE ZONE, WHY NOT ASEAN?
11. PHILIPPINES: ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ OBSERVED
THAT MANY FILIPINOS HAVE A LACK OF AWARENESS OF THE
FUNCTION OUR BASES SERVE IN REGIONAL SECURITY TERMS.
NOTING THAT THIS IS PARTICULARLY A PROBLEM AMONG
OPPOSITION GROUPS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ SAID IT
WOULD BE HELPFUL IF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS WERE TO HEAR MORE
ABOUT THE VALUE OF THE U.S. BASE PRESENCE FROM OUR OTHER
FRIENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. MOCHTAR COMMENTED THAT THE
U.S. SHOULD KEEP THE PHILIPPINE BASES AS LONG AS THE
SOVIETS ARE AT CAM RANH BUT, NEVERTHELESS, THE BASES
PRESENTLY ARE NOT AS IMPORTANT AS THEY WERE. MOCHTAR
SPECULATED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RENEGOTIATE THE
BASE AGREEMENTS TO GIVE THE FILIPINOS MORE CONTROL,
NOTING THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IS FOR THE U.S. TO HAVE
THE USE OF PHILIPPINE TERRITORY. OBSERVING THAT THE
BASES ARE MORE A FACTOR IN PHILIPPINE DOMESTIC POLITICS
THAN ANYTHING ELSE, MOCHTAR SAID THAT THE FILIPINOS FEEL
COMPELLED TO SHOW THEY ARE GOOD PATRIOTS AND GOOD ASIANS,
SEEKING TO SHED THEIR COLONIAL PAST. MOCHTAR THEN SAID
THE SAME THING IS TRUE OF THE MALAYSIANS, WHO HAD THEIR
INDEPENDENCE "GIVEN TO THEM," AND ESPECIALLY PRIME
MINISTER MAHATHIR WHO HAS EMBARKED ON A NUMBER OF
QUESTIONABLE VENTURES, E.G. THE "LOOK EAST" POLICY, THE
MALAYSIAN CAR, ANTARCTICA AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF MALAYSIAN
POPULATION GROWTH. MOCHTAR ALSO NOTED THAT MAHATHIR
"BERATED" THE ASEAN ECONOMIC MINISTERS AT THEIR RECENT
CONFERENCE IN KUALA LUMPUR ON THE SUBJECT OF INTRAASEAN
TRADE, REMARKING THAT THE MALAYSIANS ARE PROBABLYLOOKING
AT "ALL THOSE CARS LYING UNSOLD."
12. PACIFIC COOPERATION: MOCHTAR SAID HE IS EXTREMELY
PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE 6-PLUS-5 SUBMINISTERIAL
MEETING HELD IN JAKARTA JANUARY 27-28. HE SAID ASEAN HAS
SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING A "PROCESS" FOR PACIFIC
COOPERATION AND ANTICIPATES THAT ASEAN AND ITS PACIFIC
DIALOGUE PARTNERS COULD SELECT A NEW THEME EVERY TWO
YEARS, GRADUALLY BUILDING UP THE COMPETENCE OF THE ASEAN
SECRETARIAT ON A PRAGMATIC AND PROGRAM"ORIENTED BASIS.
AMONG NEW THEMES FOR PACIFIC COOPERATION, MOCHTAR THOUGHT
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WAS MOST PROMISING, FOLLOWED BY
TRANSPORTATION AND TOURISM, RESERVING ENVIRONMENT FOR THE
LAST BECAUSE IT IS SO CONTROVERSIAL. MOCHTAR SAID HE
ALSO WANTS THE DISCUSSION OF PACIFIC ECONOMIC TRENDS TO
ENCOMPASS SUCH SUBJECTS AS INCREASED MARKET ACCESS AND,
IN THIS CONTEXT, THE PRESENT PATTERN OF 6-PLUS-1
DIALOGUES AT THE ANNUAL MINISTERIAL MEETING MIGHT NOT BE
NECESSARY. MOCHTAR SAID THAT IT WAS AGREED TO BRING IN
S E C R E T
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OTHER PACIFIC COUNTRIES (POSSIBLY EVEN THE SOVIET UNION
AND VIETNAM EVENTUALLY) ON AN AD HOC BASIS ON THE PROGRAM
LEVEL, BUT HE BELIEVES THAT THE POLICY PROCESS SHOULD
REMAIN FIRMLY WITH THE 6-PLUS-5 COUNTRIES CONSTITUTING A
"STEERING COMMITTEE," A "VERY SELECT CLUB" IN HIS VIEW.
13. COMMENT: MOCHTAR WAS RELAXED AND EXPANSIVE DURING
THE WIDE-RANGING CONVERSATION. IT WAS.EVIDENT FROM THE
DISCUSSION OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA NWFZ, HOWEVER, THAT HE
NEEDS TO LEARN MORE OF OUR VIEWS ON THE STRATEGIC
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASEAN PROPOSAL - CURRENTLY BEING
PUSHED BY THE INDONESIANS -- AND THE INHERENT
DIFFICULTIES OF PROVIDING FOR AN ADEQUATE STRATEGIC
DEFENSE THAT SERVES THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE U.S.
BUT ALSO OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES. THESE AND
OTHER REGIONAL TOPICS WILL BE PURSUED DURING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY WOLFOWTZ' FORTHCOMING CONSULTATIONS IN JAKARTA
AND KUALA LUMPUR IN EARLY MARCH.
SHULTZ
NNNN
NNDD
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