MFA BRIEFING ON THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00734R000100110011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 13, 1985
• Content Type: CABLE

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MSGNO 5 (STXX) *02/13/85* *08:14:25.6.2*
ZCZC 13:12:29Z (ST)
85 6452085
NC 6452085
TOR: 131241Z FEB 85
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PP RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
STU0026
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHGP #1795/01 0441123
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131113Z FEB 85
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2031
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8619
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1671
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 7040
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 7205
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 3283
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0695
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1429
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN (POUCH)
BT
EZ 1 :
C O N F I DENT I A L SINGAPORE 01795
EZ2:
USCINCPAC FOR POLAD
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ASEAN, CB, VN, SN
SUBJECT: MFA-______
1. C-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO PETER CHAN, SECOND PERMANENT
SECRETARY AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE
ASEAN MEETING IN BANGKOK PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
ASEAN TO EXPRESS ITS SOLIDARITY WITH THAILAND AND TO
AIR PUBLICLY ITS CRITICISM OF VIETNAM'S CONTINUED
OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA. THE MINISTERS AGREED ON THE
NEED FOR CONTINUED MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT
FOR THE COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
C 0 N F I DENT I A L
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` C O N F I D E N T I A L
(CGDK), WITH ALL OF THE ASEAN PARTNERS, INCLUDING
INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA, CONCURRING THAT, TREATER'
`EMPHA TS''SHOULD:-:BE vPLLACED4`AT"THIS=STAGE ONE INCREASING
kILITARY'eP..RESSURE;;ON.VIETNAM AAT THE SAME TIME, THEY
RECOGNIZED THAT THEY SHOULD IAA=IN1T=A`LEXI'BIE
HI?PLOMATIC-POSTUR#. CHAN DESCRIBED THE MINISTERS'
TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH THE THREE LEADERS OF THE CGDK
AS EXCELLENT AND UPBEAT. CHAN SAID THEaDK 1 EADERR
WERE 'CONFIDENT;!THEY -COULDc,,HOLD -THE---BORDER ARE*.
SIHANOUK HAD EXPLICITY ADDRESSED THE SUSPICIONS OF
HIS CGDK PARTNERS CONCERNING AN ALLEGED SECRET DEAL
BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND THE VIETNAMESE BY RULING OUT
THE POSSIBILITY OF SEPARATE TALKS WITH HANOI. CHAN
NOTED THAT .SSUPPORTED~7-SIHANOUK? S'`CALL FOR-~FO(3It=
VPARTY` ItEGOT-I;ATIONS;UBU DOUBTED-THAT $TAI KS k~WOULD-000URb
4BECAUSE OF?'VIETNAMESE`-RELUCTANCEre,TU:f~,DEAL WITH ,THEO
Logo( "ROUGE-9 THE FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE SATISFIED
WITH THE US ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, BUT WANT THE
US TO BE MORE ACTIVE. FTJ1ELCOMEE`ALL IrS4 I P
f,,@RT. SI , .'_ > x MILITARY,7I-NTERVENTI0N DESIGNS D
L IM'I ~V=IET=?` INFLUENCEIN ~'SO ASTAS'I' ~'~A1VD~
MUSAAVIETNAM'IITO` EXTRICATE--,ITSELF ROM CAMBODF'A.
m
lioNOT,H REGION'ITO' TTM'A'SEAN DEMA'RCHE A F? FT. CHAN
EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S
TOUR OF THE REGION HAD ENABLED HIM TO BECOME BETTER
ACQUAINTED WITH THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION. DURING HIS
MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DHANABALAN
CHAN DESCRIBED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S
ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMBODIA AS MORE REALISTIC THAN THAT
OF UNDER SECRETARY RAFEEUDIN AHMED. END SUMMARY.
3. MFA SECOND PERMANENT SECRETARY PETER CHAN CALLED
IN THE AMBASSADOR FEBRUARY 13 TO BRIEF HIM ON THE
RECENTLY CONCLUDED ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING
IN BANGKOK. CHAN CHARACTERIZED THE MEETING AS USEFUL
SINCE IT HAD PROVIDED THE MINISTERS WITH THE
OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH
THAILAND AND TO AIR PUBLICLY THEIR CRITICISM OF
VIETNAM'S CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA. THE
CHAN SAID INDONESIA WOULD RETAIN
ITS MANDATE TO ACT AS ASEAN'S POINT OF CONTACT WITH
VIETNAM, ALTHOUGH MALAYSIA, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ASEAN
STANDING COMMITTEE, WAS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO PROBE
VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS THROUGH THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR
IN KUALA LUMPUR. ACCORDING TO CHAN, ONE OF THE MAIN
OBJECTIVES OF THE MEETING WAS
AS WELL AS TO HIGHLIGHT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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PAGE 0025
THE FACT THAT dV.QLUToIONA'RY:n~CHANGES +IaN''SUPERPOWER
ryRELATIONS `MIGHT4 WORK -TO"-VIETNAM"S "'OISADVANTAGEi'tP
VIETNAM `PERSISTED, IN PURSUING ".A -MILITARY?` SOLUTION "TO'
THE'"CAMBODIAN.:PROBLEM CHAN POINTED OUT THAT
COUNTRIES TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY TOWARD VIETNAM, SUCH
AS FRANCE AND SWEDEN, HAD MOVED TOWARD A TOUGHER
POSTURE SINCE THEY HAD GOTTEN NOWHERE WITH THEIR
EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE VIETNAM TO PURSUE A NEGOTIATED
SOLUTION. CHAN STATED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
DECIDED TO CONTINUE BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO THE COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC
KAMPUCHEA (CGDK). ACCORDING TO CHAN, THERE WAS NO
DISAGREEMENT ON THIS POINT, AND EVEN INDONESIA AND
MALAYSIA HAD CONCURRED WITH THE NEED SUBSTANTIALLY
TO INCREASE SUPPORT FOR THE CGDK.
4. CHAN DEFENDED THIS POSITION BY NOTING THAT A
STRONG DIPLOMATIC POSITION REQUIRED AN EQUALLY STRONG
MILITARY STANCE. PREVIOUSLY, ASEAN'S POSITION ON
THIS MATTER HAD BEEN IMPLICIT, BUT liiAflal
qw11A1m* NMI 11
sTA PORT FOR THE 'CGDI ACCORDING TO CHAN,
INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR, IN EXPRESSING
HIS AGREEMENT, HAD SAID, "WE SHOULD HELP THE
CAMBODIAN PEOPLE TO REGAIN THEIR FREEDOM IN THE SPIRIT
OF TRUE INDONESIAN TRADITIONS." CHAN SAID THE
MALAYSIANS HAD ALSO STRESSED THAT GREATER EMPHASIS
SHOULD NOW BE PLACED ON THE MILITARY STRUGGLE,
ALTHOUGH IT HAD ALSO CALLED ON ASEAN TO MAINTAIN
FLEXIBILITY IN ITS OVERALL APPROACH TO THE SITUATION.
CHAN ADDED THAT THE SOURCE OF MT'~ITARY AID WAS
IMMATERIAL; THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS TO ENSURE THAT
SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES WERE SENT TO THE RESISTANCE
FORCES TO ALLOW THEM TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY. THE
v AS 9wNnv F?R RI A QRees
i TARY SUUPFOR
5. THE MINISTERS HAD ALSO DISCUSSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR
INCREASED COORDINATION AMONG THEMSELVES, AS WELL AS
BETWEEN ASEAN AND THE THREE FACTIONS OF THE CGDK.
THE MINISTERS WEIGHED THE QUESTION OF
S BT T
411181
CHAN REMARKED THAT THE
CGDK'S LIMITED DIPLOMATIC RESOURCES SHOULD BE UTILIZED
IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN ASEAN, SINCE THE ASEAN
NATIONS WERE ALREADY CONVERTED TO THE CGDK CAUSE.
MEETING WITH THE CGDK LEADERS
-----------------------------
6. CHAN DESCRIBED THE ASEAN MINISTERS' TWO-HOUR
MEETING WITH THE LEADERS OF THE CGDK AS EXCELLENT
AND UPBEAT. ACCORDING TO CHAN, THE THREE MOVEMENTS
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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(A TERM WHICH SIHANOUK SAID HE PREFERRED OVER FACTIONS)
WERE NOW COOPERATING WELL. FOR EXAMPLE, SON SANN HAD
STATED THAT HE HAD ORDERED HIS SUPPORTERS TO REFRAIN
FROM HARASSING SIHANOUK LOYALISTS. THE KPNLF HAD
AFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO MOVE AWAY FROM FIXED
CAMPS ALONG THE BORDER AND TO INFILTRATE INTO THE
INTERIOR OF CAMBODIA. ea, , w A -- A : = ~-, r ED
W09CONGENTRATE THEIR>EFFORTS 'IN THE?"lTONLEr-SAP$ REGION
MmKHMER~ ROUGE,''WITH''APPROXIMATELYA20 000-"MEN -OPERATING
AROUND>THE 'TONLE"SAP,"WERE THE PREDOMINANT-'FORCE`,,=IN
4THE INTERIOR, -ALTHOUGH, THE-ANS,-CLAIMEDn:,TO-HAVE-s
INFILTRATED 4000 MEN: 'THE4KPNLF'WASSTILL-ORGANIZING'-
ITSELF-FOR THIS PURPOSE. CHAN SAID THERE WERE
INDICATIONS THAT AS A RESULT OF THE INCREASED
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RESISTANCE FORCES OPERATING
IN THE INTERIOR, VIETNAM WAS EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTY
IN MAINTAINING CONTROL OVER SOME VILLAGES. AT
THE MEETING, KHIEU SAMPHAN HAD SAID THAT THE KHMER
ROUGE WOULD REMAIN IN THE INTERIOR REGARDLESS OF
THE SITUATION ON THE BORDER, WHERE KHIEU SAMPHAN
SAID THE KHMER ROUGE MAINTAINED AN ADDITIONAL 20,000
MEN.
7. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WITH THE
CGDK LEADERS, REMARKED CHAN, WAS TO URGE THEM TO
IMPROVE COMMAND, CONTROL, AND DISCIPLINE. CHAN
SAID THAILAND WAS PROVIDING SUPPORT IN THIS AREA.
HE INDICATED THAT THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERS WERE
CONFIDENT THAT THEIR FORCES COULD HOLD THE BORDER.
CHAN ADDED THAT AN EBULLIENT SIHANOUK HAD SPOKEN OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF A FOUR-PARTY ARRANGEMENT WITH
THE VIETNAMESE, BUT PROMISED TO REFRAIN FROM TALKING
TO VIETNAM ON HIS OWN, THUS ADDRESSING THE SUSPICIONS
OF THE OTHER CGDK FACTIONS THAT HE MIGHT HAVE ENTERED
INTO A SECRET DEAL WITH THE VIETNAMESE, SUSPICIONS
FED BY THE VIETNAMESE FAILURE TO ATTACK THE SIHANOUKIST
CAMP AT TA TUM. CHAN REMARKED THAT SIHANOUK DENIED
THERE WAS ANY SUBSTANCE TO THESE ALLEGATIONS.
8. ACCORDING TO CHAN, SIHANOUK HAD PROPOSED THAT
HE AND SON SANN TRAVEL MORE IN THE FUTURE, BUT SON
SANN HAD BEEN NONCOMMITAL ABOUT HIS TRAVEL PLANS.
CHAN SAID
rTNSEREL_UMWE
US ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
-------------------------
9. WITH CHANGE NOW TAKING PLACE IN SUPERPOWER
RELATIONSHIPS, CHAN SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
AGREED THAT CONDITIONS IN THE REGION WERE
FAVORABLE FOR THE US TO BECOME MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED.
PRESSED ON JUST WHAT THE ASEAN MINISTERS HAD IN MIND,
CHAN SAID THERE WERE ADDITIONAL THINGS THAT THE US
C 0 N F I D E N T I,A L
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COULD DO TO DEMONSTRATE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE ASEAN
POSITION VIS-A-VI" CAMBODIA. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE
REFERRED TO A SPEECH "THE PREVIOUS DAY" BY THE
SEVENTH FLEET COMMANDER DETAILING WHAT THE SOVIETS
WERE DOING IN CAM RANH BAY. AMONG OTHER THINGS,
ANz,FELNT,&THE'NUS'ACOULDDOMORE IN THE6WAYOF ?PUBLIC
16TATEMENTS DESIGNED TOr CAUSE VII TORSEE THE` `CFOHT
CHAN REMARKED THAT CHINA WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE A
MORE ACTIVE US ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHICH WOULD
HELP LIMIT THE IMPACT OF THE INCREASED SOVIET PRESENCE
IN THE AREA. CHAN SAID THAT WHILE IT WAS IMPORTANT
THAT THE US SHOULD NOT BE PERCEIVED AS SENDING THE
WRONG SIGNALS TO VIETNAM OR OTHERWISE OFFERING FALSE
HOPES, 'ASEAN HAD,iNOAPROBLEM;kWITH^15DIRECT COMMMUNICATIONN
BETWEEN THE;US ,=AND ,V IETNAM ? ON-TECHNICAL =ISSUES'''4SUCHo
AS-.,'THE'~,FATE ;OF -POW-/M1LrA S CHAN OPINED THAT ASEAN
WOULD SUPPORT ALL US EFFORTS SHORT OF DIRECT MILITARY
INTERVENTION TO REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA AND TO ASSIST VIETNAM IN EXTRICATING ITSELF
FROM CAMBODIA.
10. CHAN SAID ASEAN WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE
IMPLICATIONS OF A MORE ACTIVE US ROLE SINCE
ASSOCIATION WITH THE US WAS NO LONGER SEEN AS A
LIABILITY. THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION HAD EVOLVED FROM
A REGIONAL ASEAN-VIETNAM ISSUE INTO AN INTERNATIONAL
ONE WITH BROADER IMPLICATIONS. ALTHOUGH INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT FOR ASEAN'S POSITION HAD SOLIDIFIED, CHAN
NOTED, ASEAN CANNOT BECOME COMPLACENT. HE SAID JAPAN
SHOULD NOT PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT WAS
"DOING FAVORS" FOR ASEAN IN EXCHANGE FOR ITS SUPPORT.
ON THE CONTRARY, IT SHOULD ACT MORE LIKE A BIG ASIAN
POWER THAT WAS INTERESTED IN AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION
TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM IN ITS OWN RIGHT.
DEMARCHE TO SOVIET AMBASSADORS IN ASEAN
11. ACCORDING TO CHAN, MOCHTAR SAID INDONESIA HAD
MOVED SOONER THAN EXPECTED IN MAKING ITS DEMARCHE
TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN JAKARTA BECAUSE OF THE
FIERCE VIETNAMESE ATTACKS ALONG THE BORDER. MOCHTAR
HAD TOLD THE PRESS THAT INDONESIA HAD AGAIN CALLED
IN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON FEBRUARY 6, BUT CHAN
SAID IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE INDONESIANS HAD, IN
FACT, MADE A SECOND DEMARCHE. CHAN CHARACTERIZED THE
RESPONSE OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN SINGAPORE TO
THE DEMARCHE AS SOFT RATHER THAN HARD.
UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S VISIT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
-----------------------------------------------
12. TURNING TO THE RECENT VISIT OF UN SECRETARY
GENERAL (UNSG) PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO SOUTHEAST ASIA,
CHAN SAID IT HAD PROVIDED THE UNSG WITH THE
OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN A FIRST-HAND FEEL FOR THE
CAMBODIAN SITUATION. THE SECRETARY GENERAL NOW HAD
C 0 N F I DENT I A L
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A BETTER SENSE OF THE SITUATION, ALTHOUGH THERE
WERE STILL GAPS IN HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITIONS
OF THE MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED. DURING PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S
MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DHANABALAN, THE SECRETARY
GENERAL HAD NOTED VIETNAM'S STATED INTENTION TO START
ITS OWN WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA IN TWO YEARS
REGARDLESS OF THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE
WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN FIVE YEARS.
CHAN SAID PEREZ DE CUELLAR ALSO HAD MENTIONED
VIETNAM'S INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE
US. CHAN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE UN SECRETARY
GENERAL WOULD NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH CREDIBILITY TO
VIETNAM'S DIPLOMATIC MOVES. HE SAID VIETNAM'S
ACTIONS MUST MATCH ITS WORDS. NEVERTHELESS, CHAN
DESCRIBED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD
THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION AS MORE REALISTIC THAN THAT
OF UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL RAFEEUDIN AHMED.
ROY
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