SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: A NATIONAL INTEREST PERSPECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00734R000100050013-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 19, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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0 SECRET 4P
DCI/NIO CONFERENCE
NIO/EA
19 March 1985
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: A NATIONAL INTEREST PERSPECTIVE
The death of Chernenko and the rapid rise of Gorbachev has
heightened interest in appraising what affect those developments may
have on Sino-Soviet relations. Such concern is prudent. A major change
in the relationship could have serious implications for the US.
Therefore, OEA has prepared a typescript, Possible Chinese Motives for
the Overtures to Gorbachev and SOVA has contributed to materials sent to
the NSC by NIO/USSR. These efforts have been timely and quite good.
China watchers and Kremlinologists alike anticipate some improvement in
Sino-Soviet relations, but stopping well short of the "lips to teeth"
relationship of the 1950's. I concur with this assessment, but think we
must also put it in a proper perspective, that is, in terms of China's
perception of its national interest.
China's action since 1949 demonstrates that it has a clear idea of
its long-term goals and objectives and uses them as a guide to strategic
and tactical foreign policy judgments. Some of the more important of
these include:
-- an almost passionate desire to remain independent of either of
the two superpowers (it does not want an instant replay with
the US of its bad experiences with the USSR in the early
1950's);
-- confident of eventually becoming the dominant regional power in
East Asia at the expense of Japan, the US and the Soviet Union;
-- returning China someday to its rightful place as a major player
in world politics; and
-- sustaining economic and military modernization primarily by
borrowing from the West in order to achieve its other
objectives.
Chinese leaders appear to appreciate the "middle Kingdom's" present
weaknesses, its principal security threat, i.e., the Soviet Union and
the importance of the the western nations as a source of technology. At
the height of Sino-Soviet tensions in 1969-1970 they determined to move
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closer to the US to provide protection and began a search for ways to
incorporate essential western technology into their modernization
plans. As tensions subsided somewhat with the Soviet Union and
relations with the US improved the Chinese began readjusting their
policies to be more in line with their long-term goals. They resisted
American overtures for a closer strategic relationship recognizing this
threatened their prized independence and would be viewed as highly
provocative in Moscow. Instead they pressed for greater access to
western military technology and began a series of moves to improve
relations with the Soviets. We should also expect China to readjust its
foreign policy stance tactically again in the future as it takes into
account new circumstances or unanticipated threats to its long-term
objectives.
Such an analysis suggests that US policy initiatives may have some
influence on Chinese tactical thinking, but probably will not succeed in
persuading Beijing to alter significantly its long-term goals. This
need not, however, prejudice US interests as long as our decisions are
based on a keen appreciation of China's ultimate intentions, and we
avoid designing policies based primarily on Beijing tactical
pronouncements and maneuvering. ,
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