EAST ASIA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00734R000100050007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 27, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
0 SECRET 0
I he Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01535-85
27 March 1985
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting
1. Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on
20 March 1985 to consider the attached subjects.
2. Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held on
17 April 1985 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Recom-
mendations for discussions/warning topics should be forwarded to
this office by COB 5 April 1985.
3. Immediately following the warning meeting, a special
Interagency Philippines Analytic Group will hold its first meeting.
Subsequent meetings of this group also will follow immediately the
monthly East Asia warning meeting.
4. This scheduling is intended to minimize inconveniences and
lost time (to travel) for analysts attending both meetings.
5. Topics for discussion during the first Analytic Group
meeting include:
-- Philippine Tasking Team, status report-~
-- Update on the moderate opposition--INR and,
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
? SECRET ?
6. Attendees from outside agencies are advised to arrive early
to avoid parking problems created by construction work. For your
convenience, please enter the compound through Gate 1. the Route 123
Entrance. Please phone attendance intentions to
and have your clearances verified to.us by your security
office by COB 15 April 1985.
?4
Carl W. Ford,
Attachment:
20 March 1985 Warning Report
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
? SECRET ?
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01535-85
27 March 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: 20 March 1985 East Asia Warning and Forecast
Meeting
Japan, Tanaka's Stroke:
Following opening remarks by the NIO
presented a review of the events since Tanaka'c ctrnkP
ebruary
This means that ana a s days as kingmaker are probably over.
Senior members of the Tanaka faction have begun maneuvering to
position themselves for the power struggle likely to take place if
it becomes clear that Tanaka cannot return. Disruptive
inter-factional strife is unlikely to take place until the end of
this Diet session--probably in June or July--when the LDP's major
legislative packages will have been passed.
If Tanaka is out of the picture, the leadership of his faction
will be up for grabs. We doubt that the faction will slit but
subgroups will likely form
marks the beginning of a generationa change in
t~ii action could trigger the long-building ground swell for
generational changes throughout the LDP.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
OEA
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
4P SECRET 4P
The impact of this on Prime Minister Nakasone in the short term
is unclear. Tanaka's stroke probably ends any expectations Nakasone
may have had for a third term. P, it may suffer some
turmoil but serious problems
are unlikely. split within the party is even less likely. As the
next LDP presidential election draws near late next week, Nakasone's
greatest influence will derive from his influence over the selection
of a successor. It is impossible to predict who that will be at
this time.
Japan Trade:
The NIO presented a brief review of the recent round of trade
talks in Tokyo focusing on the confusion resulting in Japan from
pry s area, the aid package which the LDP is proposing to assist
those sectors of the lumbering industry that would be impacted by
lower tariffs; In the pharmaceutical area, it appears likely that
foreign clinical tests will be accepted for new equipment thus
easing the problem of US firms attempting to penetrate the US
market; In telecommunications, the number of standards for new
equipment will be reduced; and in the electronics area, MITI has
apparently agreed that software will be protected for the full 50
years by copyright. Overall, the Japanese appeared pliable during
the recent talks. We attribute this change to their fear of
retaliation by the US and Nakasone's personal intervention in each
of the areas. His instructions to cabinet officials to take the
necessary actions to ensure that progress is made doubtless had some
positive affect. The list of trade objectives presented by the US
team during the recent talks, however, are being treated by the
Japanese as a shopping list --not requiring rapid action. Indeed,
indications are that they will concentrate on those that they
believe are least disruptive and deal with the rest only in the next
two or three years.
FORECAST:
The outlook for significant progress in the various market
opening sector specific efforts remains mixed. Many in Japan think
the US is naive in expecting that the requested changes will produce
noticeable improvement in the US/Japan trade deficit. There will be
2
SECRET
Sector events that are encouraging include: in the forest
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
? SECRET ?
technical progress in each of the areas and it will be of
significant magnitude that the Economic Summit will not founder on
the issue of Japanese market opening efforts. Nevertheless, this
technical progress is unlikely to produce any significant
improvement in the trade imbalance during the next several years.
US manufacturers, however, should be able to sell more goods to
Japan over the longer term if the yen/dollar misalignment is
rectified.
South Korea:
The results of the recent election contain an air of "deja vu"
(in that the opposition party leadership has returned to those who
led opposition to Chun's rise to power in 1979-80). In this
instance, however, rivalry between opposition factions was
temporarily quelled and their united front permitted a much clearer
reflection of popular feelings. Whether or not this cooperation
will last remains to be seen. We expect the opposition to avoid
raising their most provocative demands in the assembly until the
government shows how far it is willing to go toward accommodation.
Complicating the picture is the struggle now going on amongst Chun
Doo Hwan's advisors. It is not clear as yet whether the hard liners
or the moderates are in the ascendancy, although the former have the
inner track with Chun. However, Chun appears to appreciate both
positions. His recent appointments reflect his efforts to keep both
sides pacified.
In the months ahead we expect Chun Doo Hwan's party to attempt
to keep the opposition united by engaging it in the parliamentary
process and thus trying to prevent splinter groups from leaving,
taking to the streets and rallying students. We doubt that in the
long run Chun will be successful. However, to the extent that he
is, it will reduce the level of violence he has to deal with. We
expect student activism to be higher than in previous years and
potentially more violent if Chun digs in his heels on political
reform. The newly approved activities in which students may
participate also may divert student energies from violent protest.
Nevertheless, the upcoming anniversary of the overthrow of President
Rhee and Kwangju incident will doubtless spark some demonstrations.
The only question is how forceful they will be. If they get out of
hand we expect Chun's hardline advisors to prevail and the military
to act forcefully.
Kim Dae Jung's return to Korea appears to have been more well
timed than we had originally expected. He is rebuilding his
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
SECRET S
following and we expect he will continue to la the foundations for
future political activities.
We doubt that the
widespread public desire to keep the '88 Olympics on track will be
sufficient to force either side to compromise. Likewise we expect
Chun's reaction to be harsh to any perceived threat to his
survival. He is unlikely to yield to pressures from the opposition
even if it jeopardizes the positive benefits he'expects to receive
from the Olympics. If the military is forced to intervene, we doubt
that they will step in support of Chun, rather there will probably
be someone different emerging as the leader of South Korea.
Taiwan:
Three events in recent months have led to a major change in the
complexion of Taiwanese politics. These events were the murder of
Henry Liu, the resignation of the KMT secretary and the resignation
of the Minister of Economics because of the bank scandals. As a
result of these events Chiang Ching-kuo has been under increased
pressure from hardliners who increasingly have become his inner
circle of advisors. This has led to a hardening of US-Taiwan
issues, in particular, the F20 fighter aircraft question. The PRC
is already taking advantage of this harder line position, and
Taiwan's embarrassment over the Henry Liu affair, to strengthen its
position with the US at the expense of Taiwan.
FORECAST:
If CCK dies or is totally incapacitated in the near term we
would expect a hard line administration to take over, further
straining US-Taiwan relations. Taiwan may openly seek to poison the
waters between the US and the PRC. If this happens, the moderates
influence will further decline. The succession scenarios which we
were rather confident about six, months ago are now completely
useless. It is impossible to determine how a succession would take
place today other than to note that hardliners doubtless would come
out in charge.
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3
?
6AM
Carl W. Ford, J .
5
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/14: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100050007-3