SOUTH KOREA: CHUN WALKS A TIGHTROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00734R000100030039-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: August 21, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100030039-0
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NIO/EA
21 August 1985
SOUTH KOREA: CHUN WALKS A TIGHTROPE
South Korea enters the countdown to the 1988 Seoul Olympics with signs
of growing internal stresses and strains. President Chun, who has
promised to step down in 1988, remains fully in charge, but increasingly
finds himself caught between the pressures for political reform from a
small but vocal legislative opposition and demands to keep the lid on by
influential hardliners, particularly within the military. Student
demonstrations and other disruptions planned for this fall appear
genuinely to frighten him, probably because similar activities were a
major factor in the fall of two previous Korean regimes. But if he
follows his instincts and uses heavy-handed tactics against his critics,
he may well run afoul of the U.S., which has already begun to consider
options designed to moderate Chun's rule.
U.S. policymakers give President Chun overall high marks for his
handling of the pressures surrounding the return of Kim Dae Jung and the
1985 elections. Although Kim's airport reception left much to be desired,
Chun acted with remarkable restraint during the weeks before and after the
opposition leader's arrival and the election itself was free of blatant
irregularities. Subsequently, his actions, however, indicate a move away
from moderation and towards a more hardline approach. Recent key
appointments favored those advocating a tougher stance and few moderates
are consulted by the Blue House on important matters. The controversial
draft campus stabilization law--including "reeducation centers" for
radical students--favored by the President is indicative of his present
state of mind.
Some Department of State officials already advocate that the U.S.
intervene to pressure Chun to moderate current policies. They believe
Chun is orchestrating anti-regime demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy in
Seoul to build a case for a crackdown on dissidents, especially campus
radicals. Such acts, they believe, could result in widespread protests
and increased instability. They recommend that it's time to get tough
with Chun.
Most officials, however, continue to believe that such a strategy
would undermine Chun and create the very conditions the U.S. seeks to
avoid. They accept that heavy-handed tactics could bring Chun down before
1988, but argue that the military also poses a threat. Since U.S. policy
envisions an orderly transition of power in 1988, their objective is to
maintain stability until then. Consequently, they advocate being
supportive of Chun. publicly to include favored treatment in terms of a
meeting with the President this fall, but privately pressuring Chun to
remove the most repressive elements of his program such as locking up
radical students in "reeducation centers".
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Chun retains the support of the military even though he is generally
disliked by many of its key leaders. Vocal dissatisfaction that surfaced
shortly after Kim Dae Jung's return among key generals seems to have
dissipated with the advent of Chun's new tougher posture, and probably in
part explains the President's harsher attitude. As long as Chun
effectively manages the anticipated student unrest on the campuses this
fall, overt opposition from within the military is unlikely to be a
problem. But should Chun attempt to go back on his word to step down in
1988, his support from the military could vanish, increasing the prospects
for a coup dramatically.
Chun's true intentions in this regard are not clear. U.S. access to
him has dwindled over the years to the point where contacts are infrequent
and most often unproductive. Presumably, the President recognizes the
limits of his mandate from the military and his unpopularity among Korean
voters. But his efforts to score a diplomatic spectacular before 1988 by
arranging a summit meeting with the North Korean strongman, Kim Il-sung,
suggests he may still harbor hopes of finding a way to perpetuate his rule
beyond the Olympics. Any attempt to stay on would almost certainly
precipitate a crisis.
Keeping the generals and other hardliners happy until 1988, of course,
increases the prospects for political and social turmoil. Many Koreans
view Chun's rule as illegitimate because of the way he seized power and
his handling of the Kwangju incident. Most remain quiescent for now,
however, having given priority to the traditional values of stability and
the requirements of national security. But excessive force against campus
demonstrators this fall or other acts of repression against opposition
leaders could trigger wider protests. If, on the other hand, he is too
lenient or shows signs of giving in to opposition demands for a greater
political role, he risks angering the military. In short, Chun must
manage each potential crisis deftly by walking a tightrope in order to
retain his "mandate of heaven".
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Approved For Release 2010/02/23: CIA-RDP87SO0734R000100030039-0