EAST ASIA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87S00734R000100010034-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: March 27, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Japanese internal politics. Tanaka's stroke is aooarently wnrte
NIC #01535-85
27 March 1985
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
20 March 1985 East Asia Warning and Forecast
Meeting
Japan, Tanaka's Stroke:
Following opening remarks by the NIO OEA/Japan
Branch presented a review of the events since Tanaka's stroke
27 February and provided the following assessment of that stroke on
than originally reported,
is means a ana a s days as kingmaker are probably over.
Senior members of the Tanaka faction have begun maneuvering to
position themselves for the power struggle likely to take place if
it becomes clear that Tanaka cannot return. Disruptive
inter-factional strife is unlikely to take place until the end of
this Diet session--probably in June or July--when the LDP's major
legislative packages will have been passed.
If Tanaka is out of the picture, the leadership of his faction
will be up for grabs. We doubt that the faction will split, but
subgroups will likely form along the following lines: Takeshita
80-90 members, Nikaido 20-30 members; and Gotoda the remainder. The
passage of Tanaka marks the beginning of a generational change in
this faction and could trigger the long-building ground swell for
generational changes throughout the LDP.
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The impact of this on Prime Minister Nakasone in the short term
is unclear. Tanaka's stroke probably ends any expectations Nakasone
may have had for a third term. As for the LDP, it may suffer some
turmoil as a result of the passing of Tanaka but serious problems
are unlikely. A split within the party is even less likely. As the
next LDP presidential election draws near late next week, Nakasone's
greatest influence will derive from his influence over the selection
of a successor. It is impossible to predict who that will be at
this time.
Japan Trade:
The NIO presented a brief review of the recent round of trade
talks in Tokyo focusing on the confusion resulting in Japan from
these talks. OEA/Japan Branch, gave a detailed
review of the status of MOSS talks. While the previous warning
meeting had been extremely pessimistic on the outlooks for MOSS, the
recent talks in Tokyo have tempered that pessimism though not
greatly. Indications are that technical issues will receive
sufficient attention so that progress can be made, however, in terms
of solving the larger US-Japan trade imbalance, pessimism still
reigns. Sector events that are encouraging include: in the forest
products area, the aid package which the LDP is proposing to assist
those sectors of the lumbering industry that would be impacted by
lower tariffs; In the pharmaceutical area, it appears likely that
foreign clinical tests will be accepted for new equipment thus
easing the problem of US firms attempting to penetrate the US
market; In telecommunications, the number of standards for new
equipment will be reduced; and in the electronics area, MITI has
apparently agreed that software will be protected for the full 50
years by copyright.
We attribute is Change to eir tear ot
retaliation by the US and Nakasone's personal intervention in each
of the areas. His instructions to cabinet officials to take the
necessary actions to ensure that progress is made doubtless had some
positive affect. The list of trade objectives presented by the US
team during the recent talks, however, are being treated by the
Japanese as a shopping list --not requiring rapid action. Indeed,
indications are that they will concentrate on those that they
believe are least disruptive and deal with the rest only in the next
two or three years.
FORECAST:
The outlook for significant progress in the various market
opening sector specific efforts remains mixed. Many in Japan think
the US is naive in expecting that the requested changes will produce
noticeable improvement in the US/Japan trade deficit. There will be
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technical progress in each of the areas and it will be of
significant magnitude that the Economic Summit will not founder on
the issue of Japanese market opening efforts. Nevertheless, this
technical progress is unlikely to produce any significant
improvement in the trade imbalance during the next several years.
US manufacturers, however, should be able to sell more goods to
Japan over the longer term if the yen/dollar misalignment is
rectified.
South Korea:
The results of the recent election contain an air of "deja vu"
(in that the opposition party leadership has returned to those who
led opposition to Chun's rise to power in 1979-80). In this
instance, however, rivalry between opposition factions was
temporarily quelled and their united front permitted a much clearer
reflection of popular feelings. Whether or not this cooperation
will last remains to be seen. We expect the opposition to avoid
raising their most provocative demands in the assembly until the
government shows how far it is willing to go toward accommodation.
Complicating the picture is the struggle now going on amongst Chun
Doo Hwan's advisors. It is not clear as yet whether the hard liners
or the moderates are in the ascendancy, although the former have the
inner track with Chun. However, Chun appears to appreciate both
positions. His recent appointments reflect his efforts to keep both
sides pacified.
In the months ahead we expect Chun Doo Hwan's party to attempt
to keep the opposition united by engaging it in the parliamentary
process and thus trying to prevent splinter groups from leaving,
taking to the streets and rallying students. We doubt that in the
long run Chun will be successful. However, to the extent that he
is, it will reduce the level of violence he has to deal with. We
expect student activism to be higher than in previous years and
potentially more violent if Chun digs in his heels on political
reform. The newly approved activities in which students may
participate also may divert student energies from violent protest.
Nevertheless, the upcoming anniversary of the overthrow of President
Rhee and Kwangju incident will doubtless spark some demonstrations.
The only question is how forceful they will be. If they get out of
hand we expect Chun's hardline advisors to prevail and the military
to act forcefully.
Kim Dae Jung's return to Korea appears to have been more well
timed than we had originally expected. He is rebuilding his
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following and we expect he will continue to lay the foundations for
future political activities. The military still harbors a strong
dislike toward Kim Dae Jung and because they view his as a threat to
internal political stability they will not hesitate to step in if
Chun is unable to control Kim's activities. We doubt that the
widespread public desire to keep the '88 Olympics on track will be
sufficient to force either side to compromise. Likewise we expect
Chun's reaction to be harsh to any perceived threat to his
survival. He is unlikely to yield to pressures from the opposition
even if it jeopardizes the positive benefits he expects to receive
from the Olympics. If the military is forced to intervene, we doubt
that they will step in support of Chun, rather there will probably
be someone different emerging as the leader of South Korea.
Taiwan:
Three events in recent months have led to a major change in the
complexion of Taiwanese politics. These events were the murder of
Henry Liu, the resignation of the KMT secretary and the resignation
of the Minister of Economics because of the bank scandals. As a
result of these events Chiang Ching-kuo has been under increased
pressure from hardliners who increasingly have become his inner
circle of advisors. This has led to a hardening of US-Taiwan
issues, in particular, the F20 fighter aircraft question. The PRC
is already taking advantage of this harder line position, and
Taiwan's embarrassment over the Henry Liu affair, to strengthen its
position with the US at the expense of Taiwan.
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64M
Carl W. Ford, J .
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01379-85
13 March 1985
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: Proposed Agenda for the 20 March 1985 East Asia
Warning and Forecast Meeting
1. The monthly Warning and Forecast Meeting is scheduled for
Wednesday, 20 March 1985, at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA
Headquarters.
2. Participants should be prepared to discuss the following
topics. Keep in mind that our objective is to identify collection
gaps and make forecasts rather than review current intelligence.
3. At this warning meeting we will discuss and make forecasts
concerning the following topics:
1400-1405 Opening Remarks (NIO)
1405-1415 South Korean Political Stability Chun's Tenuous
Position--Possible Pitfal Is
1420-1430 Resurgence of Conservative Political Forces on
Taiwan--Impact on Internal Policies and Relations
with the U.S.
1435-1440 Japanese Response to US Market Opening Proposals
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SUBJECT: Proposed Agenda for the 20 March 1985 East Asia Warning
and Forecast Meeting
1445-1450 Tanaka's Stroke: Impact and Prognosis for Tanaka
Faction's Future (Japan Branch)
1455-1500 Summation and Closing Remarks
(NIO)
4. ease phone your attendance intentions to
and have your clearances verified to us by your security
office by COB 18 March 1985. Seating in 7E62 is limited, therefore,
timely arrival is suggested. Visitor parking is at a premium and
participants are enouraged to use the shuttle buses or carpool to the
meeting.
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