NOTES ON THE SEMINAR ON POLICY ISSUES BETWEEN THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000200190002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 23, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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23 September 1980
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Joe Zaring, NIO/WE
FROM OPA/II
SUBJECT Notes on the Seminar on Policy Issues
Between the US and Western Europe
Attached are the notes that I took as rapporteur for
three sessions of the seminar. Following your instructions,
participants are not identified by name, and the general
points made by each speaker are outlined.
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0NCLASSIFIED
?
11:15 Session: The International context--Western Europe's
global interests and perspectives in the next decade
First Speaker
I Introduction
A.. Agreed with the analysis of the threat offered by the
morning speaker.
B. Security issues facing Western Europe can only be
analyzed in a world-wide context.
II Relations between Western Europe and the Soviet Union
A. Western Europe has made a deep investment in.European
detente over the last 10 years or so. Since Afghanistan,
they have attempted to protect these gains from erosion
due to events in other parts of the world.
B. Morning speaker said that Europeans should feel
increasingly insecure but do not; this speaker argued
that Europeans do feel insecure for several reasons.
1. Their exposed geographic position produces nearly
permanent sense of insecurity.
2. The Soviet build-up is an increasing source of
concern among western publics.
3. The implications of the Soviet use of force in
Afghanistan are clear.
4. There is declining confidence in the US connection
that transcends the issue of military strength.
a. Fear that US political system can no longer
provide clear and consistent leadership
b. This in part accounts for Western Europe's
increased assertiveness and independence in
foreign affairs.
5. The breakdown in the tone and direction of US-Soviet
relations is worrisome.
a. They do not see a US vision of how relations with
the Soviets should evolve.
b. This accounts in part for the separate
initiatives by Schmidt and Giscard towards a
dialogue with Moscow.
c.' Western Europe is pessimistic about the
prospects for an improved security situation
over the next 1-3 years. This will produce a
continuous search in European policies for ways
to control or reduce tensions.
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1. More independent initiatives worldwide
2. A search for arms control progress in
Europe-TNF decision could unravel; CDE
likely to be embraced-both mean increased
tensions with the US.
3. Pressure on the US to restore some of the
pre-Afghanistan climate of negotiations with
the Soviet Union. Ironically, US policy will
seem even more inconsistent if it shifts
course.
III Relations among West European nations-a European Foreign
Policy?
A. Actual integration of Foreign policies is and will
remain very limited
B. To the extent that policies have become more coordinated
or unified, it is in opposition to US policies.
1. Watered down sanctions towards Iran and Soviet
Union.
2. Ec Mid-east initiative.
C. Individual nations do show signs of increasing their role
outside Europe (France, UK, FRG), but this does not mean
a European policy or presence.
D. The structural or institutional basis for a truly
European policy is lacking in these activities.
1. Should not overemphasize the increasingly close
France-FRG consultations in this regard. This
special relationship is based heavily on the
special rapport between Giscard and Schmidt.
E. In the area of alliance defenses, the Europeans will
remain dependent on the US.
IV The Role of Western Europe in the Third World (particularly
the Persian Gulf) a
A. An historical reminder-it has always been difficult if
not impossible to create concerted US-WE policies.
B. The threat of the oil supply in the Persian Gulf is a
far more salient issue of common concern than previous
problems like Vietnam, but the difficulties of concerted
action remain high.
C. Europe is generally unwilling to participate in a worldwide,
Western political-military policy. They tend to look at
problems as regional and local, while the US tends to
see them as part of a larger, global, E-W problem.
D. Invasion of Afghanistan forces Europe to recognize
growing Soviet role in Third World, but they will
continue to look to the US to provide a counterpoise
to Soviet power. Ironically, Europe expects the US to
react, but is critical and fearful of over-reaction. On
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the other hand, Europe will also be critical of an
under-reaction by the US to Soviet challenges.
E. The division of labor idea
1. Attractive in Europe, but if US carries entire
political-military burden outside the alliance,
the Europeans are relieved of the need to cooperate
politically
2. Europe argues that US tends to be-insensitive to local
factors and political-economic realities, leading
to an overemphasis on military responses
F. A structural problem-there is no visible forum for
US-WE consultations on Third World issues.
1. Consultations would not eliminate any fundamental
differences but could contribute to a greater
sense of shared political responsibilities.
2. It is important for consultations to be visible
to the attentive public in both the US and Europe
to increase the sense of common interests and
cohesion of purpose and even action.
V Conclusion: Generally pessimistic. US and W. Europe likely to
diverge more in the next 5 years in their analysis
of problems and their policies.
Second Speaker
A. Agreed with the pessimism expressed by the other
speakers about the prospects for US-W:..Europe coordination
in dealing with world problems.
B. Proposes to look at the larger, systemic problems facing
the West over the longer term.
II Threat definition.
A. Agrees with previous speakers that this is the important
starting point.
B. West must decide which of two major threats it will
focus on.
.1. The Soviet Uion, which poses the challenge of a
competing empire.
2. The Third World, which can be seen as the "revolting
subjects" in the declining western empire.
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C. Argues that the Third World threat is the more important
one over the long term to both the West and the Soviet
Union.
1. an economic threat resources
2. a threat to the conception the West has of
itself as the proponent of values such as
justice, equality, democracy and freedom.
3. an area for increasing East-West competition.
D. Western Europe inclined to emphasize Third World
problems for the West.
1. economic dependence
2. cannot deal with Soviet threat independently, but
it can develop its own policies for the Third World
and thus satisfy the psychological need to have an
independent role and to influence their own destiny.
3. Sees the Third World threat not posed by Soviet
Union but by LDCs.
E. US emphasizes Soviet threat in the Third World
1. A basic conflict with Europe.
2. For this reason, NATO cannot act versus problems
in the Third World.
3. This is troublesome because the major challenges will
come there, and an alliance loses its vitality
if it never acts.
III How to deal with the Soviet threat.
A. The systemic problem involves the interrelationship
between the global strategic triangle (US-SU-PRC) with
lesser triangles, such as regional power systems or
the maritime triangle (US-WE-Japan).
B. Two ways to control this threat
1. Mechanical approach-continue to contain Soviet
power to the Eurasian continent and even within
Soviet borders.
2. Organic approach-coax the Soviets to join other
triangles and accept the common interests this
would create with other developed nations-an
enlarged Sonnenfeldt Doctrine
C. This speaker's prescription-discard containment and
attempt the organic approach.
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1. Soviet Union much like other emerging great
powers in history; it demands the satisfaction
of seeing its influence and power increase in
the' world.
2. If this drive is. frustrated indefinitely, as was
the case with Germany until 1945, major wars will
have to be fought to make containment succeed.
3. In a nuclear age, this is a blueprint for tremendous
cost and sacrifice; West should allow Soviets to
supplement its strategic parity with geopolitical
parity. Allow Moscow to expand its influence and
power into the Third World, joining the maritime
triangle in what may become the "recolonization",
in practical terms, of the world
4. Advantages of this approach.
a. Allows the continued containment of Soviet
power in Europe and the Far East without
totally frustrating the Soviet demand for
expansion, the historical right of all great
powers
b. an affinity of interest with other maritime
powers in controlling events in the Third World
will be increased
c. would legitimize the Soviet regime internally by
producing success. This would lay the groundwork
for regime liberalization.
d. could resolve the problem of European history,
to wit, the periodic drive of a continental
power for hegemony there, and the resultant
tension this has produced between Eastern and
Western Europe.
D. This analysis is meant for a long term policy approach.
IV How to deal with the Third World threat.
A. A design for control is implicit in the approach to the
Soviet threat.
B. Numerous, autonomous developments make this difficult
to deal with.
C. Soviet cooperation must be elicited, and this requires
that containment be discarded in this area.
D. Western Europe more likely to support this long term
US approach because it deflects the Soviet threat to them.
E. The key question for US policymakers is this: where in the
third world will we allow the Soviets to expand their
influence? The speaker seems to envisage a re-play of
the "great game" between Britain and Russia in the 19th
Centry in Southwest Asia. This time, the Soviets will
be allowed to expand if they allow the west to dominate
in other areas in the region (e.g. the Iranian oil fields)
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Discussion of the Speaker's Presentations
The Second speaker was asked what it meant to give the
Soviets geopolitical parity. He responded it means not opposing
every Soviet effort at expansion.
First speaker was asked whether Europe would agree with US
about where the Soviets should be allowed to expand. He stated
that Europeans question whether turbulence in the Third World
is in fact the result of Soviet expansionism or due to local
developments.
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OINCLASSIFIED
4:15 PM Session: The prospects for "Europe"
First Speaker
?
This speaker chose to address the questions on the outline
of topics to be considered in the NIE.
I Will the number and importance of interests and problems
the Europeans have in common increase or decline in the 1980s?~
A. The two biggest problems are Energy and the Soviet threat.
1. They cannot be solved or dealt with by individual
nations. If. Europeans are rational they will
respond in a supranational way.
2. Other serious problems that demand supranational
solutions-terrorism, environmental problems,
resource depletion.
B. Energy
1. The OPEC cartel can best be balanced by a unified
consumer group
2. The long term solution-replacing oil with
alternative sources-requires massive investments
and rationally suggests a division of labor on
a European scale, or best of all, on an OECD scale.
3. In the nuclear power field, chances for an
integrative solution are increased by the fact
that France is the leader in nuclear power technology.
Normally opposed to supranational approaches,
France may be amenable to a common approach under
French leadership.
4. EC institutions mitigate the possibility of "every
man for himself" responses to future energy crises.
This constrains fragmentation, although it does
not guarantee collaboration.
C. The Soviet Threat
1. By this phrase, the speaker means not only a
threat of military attack, but also the dangers
of political intimidation, the breakdown of
West European institutions like the EC and NATO
through a process of "Finlandization," and the
control of the Soviet Union over Western energy
supplies.
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2.
Obviously, individual nations lack the capacity
to protect themselves against Soviet power
3.
Argued that
provide for
although in
W.
its
the
Europe alone cannot and will not
own defense in the next few years,
long run this is a possibility.
II Will these interests and problems be perceived by the
Europeans to be shared?
A. Public opinion polls were used to deduce European
perceptions.
B. On some issues, they do see the necessity for European
solutions.
1. Some evidence of a trend back towards a supranational
approach.
2. Since Afghanistan, some shift in perspective back
towards an Atlantic viewpoint.
C.
Until 1979, there had
for NATO at the elite
to varying degrees.
been
and
Since
an appalling decline in support
public levels in all nations
then, a re-birth of sorts in
support, although gradually
D.
The same trends are true in opinion towards the EC.
1. Within the original 6 members, support is very
solid in all parties, even the communist parties
2. Support for unity less strong in the 3 newest members.
E. At elite level, a sample of candidates for the European
parliament suggest these conclusions.
1. Fairly high levels of support for European
approaches to economic problems, including the
energy problem
2. On defense and foreign policy matters,. opinion
is less supportive and more divided across the
party spectrum. Only 37% show full support for
NATO.
Second Speaker
I Introduction
A. The prospects for European unity.
1. In 50's, the growth of institutions gave reason
for optimism.
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2. In 60's and early 70's the personalities
involved gave reason for optimism
3. In 80's there are positive prospects in neither
area.
B. There is a relatively high level of disorganization and
decentralization in European integration.
1. An image of Europe-a convoy of trucks, driving
in line but with many independent steering
mechanisms.
2. This complexity does not mean that Europe is
becoming less integrated or unified than before;
the ambiguity should be tolerated by analysts
C. Two major issues for the next five years
1. Potential for conflict between the EC and Japan
2. European monetary integration.
II The Questions under "Prospects for Europe" on the outline.
A. Will the number and importance of common interests and
problems perceived by Europeans increase or decline?
1. Diversity of approach will persist on economic
issues because each nation's situation is different.
2. On security affairs, a common problem of US-Soviet
relations must be dealt with, but diverse responses
will also occur
3. Because each state is organized differently in its
welfare structure, there will be no common approach
to recalibrating their welfare programs in the face
of similar economic challenges
B. What domestic political groups are most likely to
favor "Europe-building"
1. A homogenous Europe ruled by center-right parties is
the most committed to unity for electoral purposes,
but is the least likely to pursue it once in
office-once in power there is less need to actually
achieve progress.
2. If the left ruled in Europe, they would be the least
committed to unity but more likely to pursue it
when in power because this could help them stay in
power.
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0
3. FRG has economic status to serve as core for
economic integration, but it has a security deficit
and is more tied to the US than to European unity
to solve this problem. Bonn also sees itself as
an island of economic stability surrounded by
growing instability and this is a source of
tensions with other states.
C. The role of personalities and leadership. The new
generation of leaders have no sense of committment to
European institutions. Instead, they are pragmatists
coping with national problems as they arise. This is
not conducive to increased unity.
D. The influence of the international context.
1. Afghanistan has highlighted fact that Europe
perceives interests that diverge from US
2. Role of Japan will be important-possibility of
United efforts to block Japanese penetration of
European markets.
E. How is Europe likely to move towards more effective
consensus-building?
1. Most likely source for movement, a crisis that
forces unity if Europe is to survive.
2. If there is no crisis, it can only evolve through
a process of consultation and coordination. Ironically,
this process can blunt the application of power and
influence by particular European states in the world.
3. Future developments will be influenced most by
domestic politics in each nation
F. European attitudes towards US
leadership.
1. Just as confusion exists in US minds, it also
exists among Europeans
2. They simultaneously complain. that there is too
much and too little US leadership on different
issues, and sometimes on the same one.
3. At times, they measure US performance against old
standard of 1950's, when US was the imperial
power. At other times, they measure the current
US performance against their 1970's expectations
of weak and declining US leadership.
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Discussion of the presentations
Second speaker was asked why we should take comfort"in the
confusion that exists in Europe over its future role. He argued
that Europe's caution about its role in the world is a positive
development historically. Prior to 1945, Europeans sought to
control events in and out of their region with their power, and
this was destabilizing for the world. The questioner then asked
whether this was good, as the rest of the world is not at the
same sophisticated stage of. development. Another participant
suggested Europe's caution could also be seen as a sign of
decadence and lost vitality.
Commenting on the polls cited by the first speaker that show
increasing but still modest support for NATO, another participant
asked why no parties have run on an anto-NATO platform. He
suggested that despite what polls say, there is a real consensus
in Europe for NATO and the US security connection. When compared
to previous historical periods, Europeans believe that a relative
increase in security has been obtained.
Another participant followed this comment up by asking why
should the US want to push Europe back into the role of a great
power. The payoffs in the past were mixed, at best, and US
pressure runs counter to the habit of depending on the US that
now exists in Europe. This participant also suggested that the
questions on the prospects for Europe are not relevant to a
study of the policy differences between the US and Europe.
One participant agreed, and argued that European integration
in the 80's is very unlikely. Even the Benelux nations cannot
integrate, and to hope for more ignores the forces of nationalism.
There are other ways to encourage Europe to be more active in
the world than by encouraging integration first.
The first speaker disagreed in part. He agreed that supra-
national action by Europe is a meaningful goal that many Europeans
also hold. Considerable integration has occurred, and we should
not minimize it. Just as there is a habit of depending on the
US in the security area, there is also a habit in Europe-of working
together. This should be encouraged by the US.
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U1NLLAO 1r1Eli
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?
7 PM Session: General Discussion
Participant 5 stressed the important role of institutions
in minimizing conflict between the US and Europe. There are
institutions available for consultation, and a failure to use
them will cause problems. On both sides of the Atlantic, there
is a questioning of the capacity of leaders and institutions to
provide leadership, and this must be overcome
Participant 9 commented that the type of leadership needed
is not the command style, but a style like that of the president
of a university. Given the disparate interests and domestic
constituencies of each nation, leadership involves. listening
to the various viewpoints and then attempting to synthesize the
ideas obtained. Achieve consensus when it is possible, but
accept and understand divergence in Europe if that is the
result. Agrees with #5 that a lack of visible collective
institutions for consultations and decision-making on issues
outside Europe is a major problem.
Participant 5 added that summitry is not the answer. In
particular, economic summits cannot be converted into the locus
of political consultation and decision-making. The wrong group
of leaders and working groups participate. The NATO structure
can be made to work, even on out-of-area issues. This requires
replacing the current Secretary General, who is now considered to
be a disaster by all, and improving the mediocre staff of the
permanent secretariat.
Participant'13 disagreed with this emphasis on institutions.
No institutions can resolve the differences in perspective that
exist. All nations are now preoccupied with domestic problems
and this exacerbates difficulty of defining common foreign policies.
Only if common international threats become the priority issue
for leaders will policy differences among the allies decline.
Participant 11 agreed that domestic political problems
complicate the situation. Institutions cannot resolve conflict
caused by domestic coalitions in one nation.facing off with
domestic coalitions in another.
Participant 1 asked how domestic issues can dominate the
scene when all agree that security threats are on the rise.
Participant 13 said that the problem is a disbelief among
western publics that security threats are increasing.
Participant 9 argued that domestic issues were a major
distraction in the past, too. We should not overemphasize
their new importance, although they have become somewhat more
important.
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Participant 5 asserted that blaming domestic factors
for conflict among allies is too facile. Pure stupidity and
ineptness on the part of leaders is at least as important,
especially in the US.
Participant 13 reiterated that domestic influences will
pale if the international environment becomes an arena of high
tension.
One participant asked whether Europe was willing to go to war
over anything.
Participant 12 wondered whether they would if Saudi Arabian
oil was threatened. However, a Soviet move against an oil producer
would change Europe's state of mind diplomatically back to a
cold war outlook.
Participant 13 asserted that Europe doesn't worry about this
because they correctly do not believe that Moscow's intention
is to take over the oil fields.
Participant 1 asked whether Europe's economic troubles
will produce political instability, and cause regime changes
towards the left.
Participant 11 stated that from 1973 to 1980 Europe has
faced economic troubles, and yet political trends are not the
left. We must look for the adaptive mechanisms that are preventing
instability.
Participant 5 warned that we should not jump to optimistic
conclusions. The real, cumulative impact of economic problems
will only be felt in the next five years. Straight line
projections are dangerous.
Participant 12 suggested that the politics of inflation
are confusing; there are no clear winners or losers. This
mitigates the potential for political instability. The cumulative
cost of the "oil tax" will have its greatest impact on secondary
labor markets (Foreign or guest workers) and the middle class
supporters of ruling conservative/center parties. These effects
are not likely to be a problem in the next five years but will
be after that.
Participant 1 expressed interest in the experimentation idea
of speaker 14. How can the Atlantic community accommodate numerous
national experiments in coping with economic problems?
Participant 5 said that in dealing with complex economic
problems, experimentation has merit. However, if this is the
approach towards vital interests, it will threaten western
cohesion and US interests.
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Participant'1 asked what would happen if experimentation
meant economic nationalism and political intervention in
markets on the Japanese model.
Participant 12 expressed optimism, asserting ::that in the
long run tolerance of national divergence will reduce tensions.
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