JOCKEYING FOR POSITION IN THE EAST EUROPEAN LEADERSHIPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000100080032-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: October 28, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP87R00529R000100080032-1
NIO/EUR
28 October 1986
JOCKEYING FOR POSITION IN THE EAST EUROPEAN LEADERSHIPS
The long-anticipated leadership successions in several East European
countries are already under way, as signs of maneuvering and jockeying for
position are growing in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These pre-succession
power plays, symptomatic of political systems lacking procedures for the
orderly transfer of power, have already led to the semi-paralysis of the
ruling elites; if they intensify, serious instability may result.
Hungary: Kadarism without Kadar?. The fragile state of Kadar's health,
and his continued unwillingness to-relinquish power, have given rise to
feverish maneuvering among his potential successors.
-- Two leading contenders -- Janos Berecz and Karoly Grosz -- were
charged with alcoholism in a recent party document, reportedly
designed to strengthen the positions of Istvan Horvath and
Matyas Szuros, two other heirs presumptive.
-- Kadar, meanwhile, oppose Berecz, whom
Moscow favors, and may trans ter him away trom his power base in
the party secretariat.
-- Other Hungarian leaders, fearful of being swept away in a
Gorbachev-inspired purge of the old guard, are maneuvering in
shifting coalitions to preserve their own positions into the
post-Kadar era.
All of this has important political consequences, both immediate and
potential. Already Kadar has delegated many of the daily affairs of state
to the Secretariat and his personal staff, tough decisions on economic and
political reform are simply not made at all. Gorbachev's concern over the
situation was demonstrated last June when he raised the succession issue
directly with Kadar. Gorbachev was rebuffed then but may be inclined to
intervene more forcefully should divisions deepen.
-- Some speculation has it that Husak will retain the ceremonial
post of head of state but relinquish the party leadership.
-- Othe orecast sweeping changes in the
party presidium, with Strougal, Bilak and other holdovers from
the post-1968 period leaving along with Husak.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP87R00529R000100080032-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP87R00529R000100080032-1
While it is difficult to separate wheat from chaff in this speculation,
it is evident that the Soviet leadership is more deeply involved than we had
thought in the succession maneuvering.
-- One potential candidate -- Jan Fojtik -- was given a chilly
reception in Moscow two weeks ago; another, Milos Jakes, was
greeted much more warmly last week.
-- A rumored Gorbachev visit to Prague has not yet materialized,
but the mere existence of the rumor reveals the depth of
uncertainty now prevailing in the Czechoslovak leadership. And
if such a direct Soviet intervention were to occur, it would
send shock waves through the other East European capitals.
Can we influence the outcomes? Clearly, our influence over succession
processes in Eastern Europe is very limited, but we do have some leverage,
particularly in Hungary and Romania. (There is probably nothing we could do
to influence the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak successions.)
-- In Hungary, for example, an active and imaginative US economic
engagement of the top leadership might help create an atmosphere
that encourages an economic reform course and, indirectly,
strengthens the positions of reform-minded candidates.
-- Similarly, Ceausescu's performance at the recent Warsaw Pact
foreign ministers' meeting gives us an opportunity to
demonstrate our support for Romanian independent-mindedness and
encourage similar behavior under the next regime in Bucharest.
And economic inducements could prove crucial once the
post-Ceausescu era is upon us.
In short, we may not be able to buy the Hungarian and Romanian "elections,"
but we do have a vote.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/07: CIA-RDP87R00529R000100080032-1