CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR SERIES ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000200360018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 1, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
pecia Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence
The attached article--the first of five by the C.S. Monitor--is
a fairly accurate representation of some of the key aspects of the
Pakistan nuclear story
very knowledge-
able on many of the specific aspects of the Pakistani nuclear
program.) I plan to prepare a general summary of the author's find-
ings, FYI, after all of the articles are published. Could be that
the articles might help the "world" decide "just how important
stopping the spread of nuclear weapons actually is" (see top, p.2).
25X1
25X1
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ARTICLE A FE RED THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITO
ON PAGE j 30 November 1981
Ambitious third-world states are learning to make nu-,
clear weapons. Today's exclusive "nuclear club" could,
double in the next decade. Safeguards to stop the spread oft
nuclear weapons are under attack. This is the first of five,
articles examining the current dangerous trend.
Pakistan: crash program, secret bids for nuclear technology
By David K. Willis%
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science :Monitor
Vienna, Austria, and Karachi, Pakistan'
A military-ruled 'MusiTim country, sanuvnced between
powerful rivals, so undeveloped it- cannot manufacture.
even a television tube or a radio set, has just made several
drarnatic, covert bids to buy cables and computers to help it !
build and test a nuclear device.
This newspaper has learned that the country - Pakistan
- has secretly tried to get highly sensitive diagnostic co-
axial cable from US and European suppliers.
The cable is used for monitoring underground nuclear
tests. It runs from a test s' -ift in which a device is exploded.
to a monitoring center a safe distance away- Pakistan has
dug jest such a shaft in remote Baluchistan's Chagai Hills
near the Afghan border, intelligence sources confirm.
Hearing about the attempts o u; t e cable, alarmed
United States officials 'umoed into action. They exerted
enough pressure, curect and indirect, on e US and Euro-
pean firms to stop the sales.
But the very bid itself, reportedly made through "front"
companies, indicates to officials how far toward a nuclear,
blast Pakistan has advanced after a clandestine crash pro-gran- over the last decade.
They believe Pakistan will try again and again, under
different covers. They estimate that 1'~tan could have
its first device built b th en fnex t near.
Fs lamaba as a so tied to buyw ig US computer
systems. The first, it claimed, was for high-altitude atmo
sphe.,ic research. The second was said to be for analyzing!
crop rotation results.
When the US Commerce Department demanded that the!
Pakistanis sign a statement promising not to use the com=a
puters for any nuclear purposes whatsoever. peaceful or!
otherwise, they fell silent. Curious. US officials asked ques-+
tions. Pakistani officials replied blandly, "'Nhat.comput-1
ers? W didn't want to buy any computers. .
These developments, plus other more successful efforts"
to acquire nuclear technology (see below), are profoundly!
disturbing for diplomats, officials, and scientists aroundi
the world who oppose the spread of nuclear weapons to of-
ten unstable third-world countries.
The developments illustrate the lengths to which pride,;
vulnerability, ambition, fear, and internal struggles can;
push small nondemocratic leadership elites toward acquir-:
ing nuclear devices as a way to gain power and status.
Pakistan is just one of 10 countries on the nuclear t`lresh-
old. Among the others are India, which exploded a nuclear
device in 1974, Israel, and Sou 'Africa. None of these have,.
signed the 1970 ncc ear Nonpro` tin Treaty
Thus only part of their nuclear fuel cycles are subject tol
inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in Vienna. Other parts are not. All four have the}
know-how, the special skills, and the political incentivesi
needed to build nuclear weapons. Right behind them are:
'a Iraq, determined to push on with its nuclear program.
despite Israel's bombing of its nuclear reactor in June.
o Argentina and Brazil, the giants - and rivals - of
Latin `merica.
o Taiwan , and South Korea skilled, determined, each,
with a_fractious re a ions ip with a communist neighbor.
o Libya, in a special, dangerous category of its-own.
Undeveloped but oil-rich and, erratic. Libya tried to buy a?
nuclear bomb from China in 1970. It has been selling.ura-,
nium to Pakistan and giving it money.
This correspondent set out three months ago on the trail.,
of the atom bomb makers. It began in an idyllic open-air
restaurant in a valley outside Geneva. where a top nuclear;
scientist provided a thorough briefing on technical data.
It was to lead through 12 cities in eight countries in the
Middle East, Europe, and Africa, as well as in the US.
As a result, this newspa r has amassed new evidence
to show that tj devices, and T1 e ability tocetonate
them, are spreading to vo able areas oof [- vor w re
ambition an c t es re i u sa egua s are low.
Frequently questions put to officials in these nations:
about nuclear matters met with closed doors. But a num
ber of thoroughly alarmed diplomats, scientists. and offi
cials were willing in private to share details of the rush to
nuclear weapons. They hoped they might slow it down by
directing public attention to its dangers.
. The nuclear trail leads through some of the deepest
impulses of the human mind from fear to moral out-
rage, from hope to a passionate commitment to nuclear':,
power as cheap energy for the future. '
This series is an effort to bring Co light some of the
maneuverings of would-be atom bomb makers. T,.vo of'
them, Israel and South Africa, deny any nuclear tests so
far, but have the diplomatic status that results from an
almost universal belief that they already possess atomic;
weapons, either assembled or in pieces..
The series looks at the state of inspections, safeguards.,
and the IAEA_ It looks at the flow of uranium and skilled
technicians, and it looks at ideas for the future.
Should Pakistan or any of the other states on the
threshold actually detonate a bomb, the nuclear club
would expand for the first time since India let off an
atomic blast in the Rajasthan Desert in 1974. .
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 might announce a new willingness to look at their nuclear
options. International fears would grow.
Even now the world must decide just how important
stopping the spread of nuclear weapons actually is. Is it
ju~ s ne ~o i-"1'cv obiec ve amctngthers? Or is it a para-
murt issue rapkSin? with inflation, oil prices, and foreign
expansionism. Is it the issue of today.
Is it urgent now to. draw up what is dramatically
lacking in today's world: a list of agreed embargoes and
other punishments to be taken against any country that
makes or explodes a nuclear device?
The most urgent case today is Pakistan. President Zia
ul Haq could have a nuclear device - at least one = byI
the end of next year. He could decide, to explode it in a
desperate bid to hang onto personal power, or to defy and
impress India, or to warn the Soviet Union, or to exert
diplomatic blackmail against the United States.
There are four big reasons why Pakistan is in fact a
crucial test case: . ,.
1. Pakistan has 33 million people and aspirations to
lead :be Muslim world. It has accepted money and bought
uranium from Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya. Israel
fears that the rich, unpredictable, terrorist-supporting
Qaddafi could extract nuclear technology from a Pakistan
that needs his cash and political support.
The US is also deeply concerned. Other Arab states!
coulc learn nuclear secrets from Pakistan. So Pakistan is
part of global concern about the Middle Eastarms race.
2. Pakistan has fought three wars with its bitter rival.
India. "How can we tell Pakistan to stop building a nu-
clear weapon when India detonated one in 1974?" one US
.official asks despairingly. "We can ask - but is Pakistan
listening?" If Pakistan lets off a blast, Indian Priin-
ister Ind' andhi will be under severe pressure to re-
spond in kind.
iinerican. Israeli, and other experts say the logical
Indian response - despite Indian denials would be a
hydrogen bomb. It is within India's capacity. It would ex-
pand the H-bomb club to, six nations. It would alarm the
superpowers. The subcontinent arms race, heating up
again with Pakistan obtaining 40 ultrasophisticated US F !
16 jets and India reported to be going after, 150 French
Mirage 2000s after buying Soviet MIG-23s, would take the
most ominous of turns: a nuclear turn. {
3. Pakistan is closely involved with the, three super-
powers. It is allied ,vi` i the United States, opposed to
Soviet troops next door in Afghanistan, and on fairly good
terms with China. Any tilt on the subcontinent affects all
three. A nuclear tilt would alarm all three. Consequences
would e grave e superpowers would try to contain a
nuclear arms race. Pressures on them would be intense.
Right now, the clandestine Pakistani rush toward an atonuc evice is an embarrassment to the Reagan admin
istra on m as gton. It sees 's as a kg ally:
against TV19 cow. ews 6CIbe bid to buy diagnostic cable:
a.nc!-',arge computers for nuclear use has been tightly held
in Washington, partly because so many members of the;
House and Senate are deeply suspicious of Pakistan.
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The number of hydrogen-bomb powWhas remained
at five since 1964; the US, the Soviet Union, Britain,i
Frarce. and China. Neither France nor China has signed
the LVPT.
If a state like Pakistan detonates a nuclear device, or it
it becomes widely known that it has an undetonated bomb,
other threshold states could be emboldened. Prospects for I
a rapid spread of nuclear weapons would grow as this
centt.rv nears its end.
Regional rivalries in the Middle East, in Latin Amer-
ica, in Africa, and in Asia would be more dangerous.
Other countries well able to build their own nuclear weap-
ons - Italy, Australia, even West Germany and Japan -
The Senate has a to the first stage of a S3.2 billion
economic-aid and military-sales package over the next six
years. The House is considering it. i ubcommittees in both
chambers gave a green light to the sale of 4.0 F-16 jets. The,
sale is now approved.
The Senate says all aid will be suspended it Pakistani
detonates a nuclear device, without the President being
able to override the cutoff. The House may allow presiden-
tial discretion to remain, subject to two-thirds rhajority~
votes in born douse ana,senate.
Democrats will be angry if
Pakistan does detonate. Knowl-
edge that the aid may stop may
make him wait until he has such,.
aid before he'-pushes the button~~
in Baluchistan. a .i" 's`on is also vital be-
cause any new nuclear test
would inevitably weaken the-
framework of precautions
against the spread of nuclear
weapons.
So far, the framework has
worked remarkably well, given the number of countries
(Canada, Japan, and Australia) that could make weapons
if they chose.
But now the framework is under-fire. The system of
safeguards, inspections,. treaties, talks, export controls,
and intelligence surveillance was jolted when Israel round
i t inadequate to prevent Iraq from g a bomo. Is-
raeli F-16 jets streaked to Baghdad .rune i ann ornoe the
Osirak reactor being built by France:
Many Israelis I talked with agreed with Prime Minis- ,
ter Menachem Begin's basic rationale. To sit in a livigg
room in Jerusalem, and to be told in uiet, cultured tones 11
that Lndiashould now bomb Pakistani nuclear installa-
tions is achillin e rience.
The Israeli raid has set a precedent of one state's tak-
ing direct action long before another state's nuclear
capacities grow. The IAEA, along with US and other ex-
perts, says Iraq was six to seven years away from making,
a nucleardevice.
Israeli officials say Israel would bomb again if neces
sary to keep nuclear weapons out of Arab hands. They;
don't answer a direct question on whether they would
bomb Pakistani nuclear sites as they did Iraq's. Israeli
intelligence keeps close tabs on Pakistan's progress.
"You're not talking about democracies here," says an:
Israeli official in Tel Aviv, on the sunny shore of the blue!
Mediterranean.."You're talking about states ruled by in_,
dividuals. One bullet can change everything. Or a coup."
Take Iran. If the Shah had lived five more years and ac-
quired a bomb, what would (Ayatollah) Khomeini have
done with it?"
Said another Israeli source: "We acted. Now it's time;
for other powers to stop this proliferation."
One of the questions this series will examine is: how? I
By 1990 Iraq may be able to explode a small device, sincei
France is apparently planning to rebuild Osirak (insisting:
on strict safeguards and a lower-grade uranium fuel).
Libya is training unusually large numbers of engineers:
in the US (see next article in this series), Western Europe,,
and the Soviet Union.
Argentina and Brazil will also be on the verge of nu-
clear weapons in the 1990s. So will South Korea and
Taiwan.
Some strategic thinkers, such as Indian government;
adviser K. Subramaniam, see world nuclear proliferation
as a force for stability. They believe that just as the...
US and the Soviet Union have a nuclear stalemate, I
so subcontinent and Mideast rivals would balance i
into a standoff with nuclear weapons. World peace?.i
would not be threatened.
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?
But a far more widespread view is that when one Exclusive evidence amassed by this newspaper in-
s: de in a. regional rivalry obtains nuclear weapons, cludes the Pakistani bid to buy the diagnostic coaxial ca-
its enemies will be under enormous pressure to ble for underground tests. The cable relays data from the
stage preemptive strikes, as Israel did against Iraq. blast site vital for scientists to know how efficient the fis-
Israeli Prof. Ya'ir Evron told me in Jerusalem, sion processis and how to plan for the next test.
for instance, that the spread of nuclear weapons in So far. the effort to stop the sale of the cable has suc-
the Middle East would be highly dangerous. ceeded. It is just one part in a long series of highly classi-
fied actions officials won't discuss in public. It is aimed at '
choking the flow of sensitive technology to countries like :
For many a thoughtful analyst, the. ultimate
nightmare is a scenario outlined to me by a veteran
European nuclear expert in Vienna:
".What worries. me is the unknown, the end of the
road, the system coming apart.
"If Pakistan gets a bomb, or Brazil, or Argen-
tina, well,. that's bad, but it's largely a regional
matter.
"But it could lead, if world events continue to be
as unstable as- tbey- are now, to South Africa being
encouraged to warn black Africa to keep its dis-
tance. Or Israel might quarrel with the US, or 'rice
versa.
"Then something terribly serious might happen:
Western Europe.might see the US as unreliable..
Can you imagine the consequences if the world dis-
covered West ~ Germany was building a bomb -
which it coesu-do very quickly indeed?
"Or Japan?"
Expertr TY?T st literally shudder as they contemplate
the Soviet reaction to intelligence about any West German;
move toward-its own nuclear weapons. Moscow's overrid-
ing concern at the International Atomic Energy Agency in
Vienna, sources report. is maintaining safeguards on the I
Germans. Moscow neither forgets nor forgives the Hitler
invasion, which cost some 20 million Soviet Lives.
Dangers take other forms as well.
The era of fast-breeder reactors, which produce more
nuc..ear material (plutonium) than they consume, is be-
ginning. Larger quantitLis of. uranium than'ever before
will be ferried between reactors and extraction plants.
They will be targets for hijackers and terrorists.
The US and the Soviet Union have thousands of nuclear
warheads in Europe. Experts at the IAEA and elsewhere
worry that a Baader-Meinhof-style gang or a Libyan-fi-
nanced Arab terrorist group might steal one,. decipher the
trigger mechanism, and hold a city for ransom.
the paperback thriller, "The Fifth Horseman" by
Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, imagines Libya.l
has blackmailed H-bomb secrets from French scientists
and threatens to blow up New York City unless the US
forces Israel to yield Palestinians a homeland. So far, it's
only a novel.
Israel derides the ultimate effectiveness of inspections'
of nuclear plants carried out by-the IAEA,the only inter-
national agency responsible for inspections. Two former
IAEA inspectors, Americans Robert Richter and Eman-
uel Morgan, have issued widely quoted criticisms,
Many believe the LAEA is unique and irreplaceable, for
all the faults inherent in a multinational organization.
Israel and South Africa accuse Arab and black states
of playing politics with the LAEA. Developing nations de-
mand the technical assistance (free nuclear technology) i
promised by the NPT in exchange for inspections. Tbeyl
also demand that the US and the Soviets cut their nuclear
weapons stockpiles.
A growing number of developing countries argue that i
the nuclear club just isn't keeping its promises.
LEA members have censured Israel for the Iraq raid.
And they have expelled South Africa.
Paldstan. But Pakistan has been astonishingly successful
in acquiring such technology from a. dozen industrial
countries.
(Officials were amazed and chagrined to discover that,
even as they were squelching the sales, full details of an
improved, late-model diagnostic" cable, made with' fiber
optics, were splashed in full color across 11 pages of the
September edition of? Enemy and TerhnoloEV Review
put-fished by the Lawrence Livermore National Labora-
tory In _pa.
(Title: "Optical Fibers in Nuclear Test Diagnostics."
"Government dollars pay the salaries of officials stopping
no tax money also finances
a magazine telling ever~pnhow to make the cable."
(Any embassy could. do what I did: telephone Liver-
more and ask for the publication to be mailed..It was. )
. But it is clear that President Zia does not intend to stop
assembling a nuclear device and the means to test it.
Pakistan-watchers in Washington see. President Zia
playing a clever game. To Mr. Reagan he stresses the threat
from Moscow. In fact, he has different reasons for wanting
both the nuclear device and US aid. He wants to shore up
Pakistan against its arch rival, India, an to 0 on o power
ins aLEtan.
Ity
Other parts of new Monitor evidence that zeros in on
Pakistan: -
.Confirmation from a variety of intelligence and other
officials that although the Baluchistan tunnel is empty so far.
its size and configuration leave no doubt about its ultimate use.
An underground test would be harder to detect and more
convenient than an atmospheric test, which would scatter;
radioactivity into India, Afghanistan, and perhaps China.
Confirmation that Pakistan is working hard to complete
a plutonium urn-b"Infe of cure neu on reflectors
and explosives o wrap around a plutonium core and com-
press it - "implode" it - into a detonation.
o Details of bow Pakistan has orchestrated dummy com-
panies, private individuals, and authentic trading corpora-
tions in Canada, Turkey. West Germany, Italy. Britain. the
US. and elsewhere to provide parts for enrichment and
reprocessing plants. -
The parts include a West German fluoridation plant to
convert uranium into a gas used by an- enrichment plant:
vacuum valves, evaporation and condensation systems, and
filters from Switzerland: and special electrical inverters that
keep'steel "cascade" vessels spinning at unvarying speeds,
during the centrifuge enrichment process from Britain.
Canada, and the US. Also, dissolvers; evaporators, and other'
equipment from France. -
Clandestine suppliers have gone on trial in Canada and:
West Germany.
As recently as Oct. 31, a retired Pakistani Army officer
reportedly tried to smuggle from New York 5,000 pounds of
zirconium required to make fuel rods in large wooden crates
labeled as mountaineering equipment.
e The US State Department's stern cables to US embas-
sies in Ankara. Rome, Bonn, and a dozen other capitals that.
order diplomats to tell their host countries of the grave con-:
cern with which the US regards the Pakistani efforts to buy
sensitive items.
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Turkey replied that it bad little Or over private com-
pa.aies and their dealings in items such as inverters, which
a:e also in wide use for textile plants. Other countries an-
swered in the same way.
a Pakistan's secret agreement with Turkey promising
certain amounts of nuclear technology in return for help in
acquiring the parts Pakistan needs. Pakistan and Turkey are
both Muslim countries. Their respective officer corps have
developed close Links.
Thus Turkey, as well as Pakistan, presents a difficult
problem for the US. -
' Pakistan's success in buying the natural uranium it
needs for its Karachi plant. Some is channeled via Libya.
Niger's President Seyni Kountche said in April, "If the devil
asks to sell him uranium today, I'll sell it to him."
This newspaper has learned that the US discounts specu-'
lation.that China may offer a nuclear test site to Pakistan.
In teliigence and other analysts don't believe China would do
it, since it preaches the doctrine of "self-reliance" to other
countries. -
.Nor do they believe President Zia wants to be seen by the
Pakistani military as having to rely on a neighbor to carry
out a test.
Nor do analysts think, some press reports notwithstand-
ing. that either Libya or Saudi Arabia has provided Pakistan
with vast sums for its nuclear program.
Intelligence sources told this newspaper the Pakistanis
are spending only S50 million a year on its nuclear. weapons
pr ogram - some 5250 mil on over t e as live years.
US analysts believe Pakistan's decision to make a bomb
was not made dramatically, on the spur of the moment, as
the BBC's 19E0 documentary "The Islamic Bomb"
suggested.
Rather. American experts say the decision was almost
certainly a more gradual process - "as irreversible," said
one expert, "as US policy to strengthen its defenses. Zia can
no mcre repudiate it - given Pakistan's inferiority complex
toward India, the loss of Dacca and Bangladesh. and his own
need to hang onto power among his own military caste -
than any American president could suddenly stand up today'.
and proclaim total disarmament-.' _ . .
Will President Zia actually push the nuclear test button in
the Baluchistan Desert?
No one yet knows. But experts looking on around the world
are extremely worri ed.
"All we have. is time," sighed one senior policymaker.
Ne're?trying to buy as much time as we can. No one really
believes we can stop him if he is determined. We can slow
him down, and make his job much more e_rpensive. That's
about all." '
Indian sources, highly suspicious of everything Zia does,
nonetheless agree with US intelligence analysts on one point:
ether Zia decides to push or not to push will depend on his
QtrnhoidonaowPr
If he feels that the US F-16s have bolstered his own politi-
cal grip on the Pakistani military and elite, he may continue ,
to prepare for a nuclear blast, but hold off. His progress to-
ward a blast is itself one key stratagem he uses to impress his-
military elite. ,..... .. .
An Indian diplomat said gloomily. "If he holds off, he will
acquire 40 of your F-16 planes over the next five years. Then
he can detonate his device. He'll have bad time to make it
into a smaller bomb, and he'll have the F-16s to deliver them."
He will be even more dangerous. "
An American official wrestling with the problem com-
mented, "Yes, but he knows if he detonates, he'll get no more
spare parts for the F-16s. He must have those parts to keep
them flying-" ' . - .
"Maybe so," another U5 expert'with a frown, "but if
we give him 40 F-i6s, be can fly 20 and use the other 20 for
spares."
Much depends, of course, on what happens in and around
Pakistan. .. .
Pakistani officials told this newspaper they needed the F-
16s because they suspected the Soviets would force the Af-
ghans to launch a- limited strike across, the Afghan-Pakistan
border, using Soviet Central Asian troops dressed in Afghan
uniforms, and Soviet MIG-25 jets flown by Soviet-trained Af-
ghans or (more Likely) Soviet pilots in Afghan uniforms. '' -
When pressed, Reagan administration officials say that.
of course, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is impor-
tant. President Reagan announced July 16 it was a "funda-
mental national security and foreign-policy objective:"'But
all be said about a state's detonation of a nuclear device for
the first time was that he would view. it with "grave
concern." - `
The Reagan administration's idea is to try to remove from
nuclear weapons.
The urgent test case is Pakistan. So far the evidence is
inconclusive. .
The President also stresses that countries will be tempted
to test unless the US and other advanced countries'show
themselves reliable suppliers?of technology and material for
peaceful nuclear reactors. That's a sham break-with the Car-
ter approach, which tried to deny other countries US know-
how unless they committed themselves to international in-
spections and safeguards on all their nuclear facilities.
"Unless you lay out a clear set of guidelines.- breaking
'relations, cutting off trade, suspending other links - states
like Pakistan will continue on with their bomb programs,
figuring no one will really penalize them," complains an
LAEA official in Vienna..
Terrorism remains a threat. Authors Larry Collins and
Dominique Lapier_ e c atm their research revealed President
Gerald Ford had considered clearing Boston in 1974 because.
of an alleged.Palestinian nuclear threa o e city-
It is also said that the FBI main aina an aro~,.._ n~~l~sc
nuclear terrorist alert desk at its headquarters in
WashingtQ0
According to Paul Leventhal, former staff director of the
Senate Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee and founder of the
Nuclear Club; Inc., in Viashiagton, peaceful uses of nuclear
energy already generate enormous amounts of plutonium. It
is a byproduct when natural or low-enriched uranium is
burned in a power reactor.
A typical plant produces a quarter of a ton of plutonium a
year. This, reprocessed, is enough to make as many as 50
bombs the size of the one dropped on Nagasaki.. MNlr.
Leventhal estimates.
Reckoning that a bomb can be made with 10 pounds of
plutonium (the IAEA uses 17.6 pounds, or eight kilograms),;
N r. Levanthal says the world's nuclear power plants today
produce enough plutonium to make 7,700 atomic bombs every
year.
By 1990, he estimates, the world will possess 760 tons of
plutonium (167,200 bombs); By the year 2000, it will be 2,690'
tons, or 591,800 bombs, - -
CON,
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power is like the Chinese..characters for n-
ger?ar
"opportunity" that combine to mean "cri*It.
arouses intense fear, intense hope, an almost religious awe.
The word "uranium" comes from the Greek, meaning, in
part. "heaven." The word "plutonium" comes from another i
Greek word that can mean "hades" or "hell."
Until 1941, plutonium existed only in traces connected
with natural uranium deposits; The Manhattan Project in
World War 11 produced the first manmade quantities.
Now hundreds of manmade tons exist. The IAEA in Vi-
enna in 1980 safeguarded 83 tons ? that's 83,000 kilograms,
enough for 10,000 bombs. The world's plutonium consists of
traces in the atmosphere from the bombs dropped on Hirer
shima and Nagasaki and from nuclear tests, and of byprod-
ucts of the operations of nuclear reactors. Plutonium is pro-
duced when uranium fuel rods irradiated in the cores of
nuclear reactors. Much of it remains locked up in spent
(used) fuel rods in deep storage pools of water. Much of_it has
been extracted ("reprocessed") -to make nuclear weapons in
the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and-China.
A large reactor can produce eight idlograms (17.6 pounds)
of plutonium every two weeks or so. Eight kilograms is the
size of a large orange - enough to make a bomb as big as the-
one dropped on Nagasaki.
Plutonium retains its radioactivity for a quarter of a mil-
lion years. Writing in Harvard's Divinity magazine; profes-
sor of religion and scientist Albert'Blackwell says that if piu-
tonium had been stored in the Great Pyramids of Egypt, it
would still be 90 percent as lethal as it was then. It will re-
main lethal for 50 times as long as any civilization has yet
endured on earth.
Scientists like him believe that by producing plutonium.
the world is asserting self-interest without regard to future
generations. They conclude that a more universal good is
required. Nuclear disarmament and energy conservat3on
and efficiency take on for them "the urgency of religious
obligations."
. Not everyone agrees: Other scientists see nuclear power
as necessary to generate energy and keep the peace. They. dismiss "ban the bomb" marches and antinuclear
demonstrations.
The debate is intense. Scramble the letters that make up
the word "nuclear" and you get "unclear." Humans grapple
in searchnf a higher wisdom.
Next: Trying to stop countries from edging over the nu-
clear threshold.
t-& Zl~