IRAQ, ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST PROLIFERATION PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000200310018-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 7, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
7 July 1981
Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence
SUBJECT: Van Doren Paper on Proliferation in the Middle East
passed the attached paper on the subject
to me. I'd be interested in your reactions. Of particular interest
is Van Doren's argument concerning preemptive strikes as a means of
dealing with proliferation:
--they could reinforce a determination to proceed
with a weapons program;
--they materially increase the risk of interna-
tional chaos; and
--they undermine efforts to deal with the prolifera-
tion problem through international law and diplomacy.
Van Doren concludes with a hope that the Israeli bombing of the
Iraqi reactor will result in a renewed determination to prevent further
nuclear proliferation by more effective international efforts (vitality
of NPT regime, full-scope safeguards, strengthened common export
policies, restrictions on nuclear testing', and nuclear weapons free
zones).
UNCLASSIFIED
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IRAQ, ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST PROLIFERATION PROBLEM talc
A report prepared for the Arms Control Association
by
Charles N. Van Doren
(Former Assistant Director for Non-Proliferation,
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
June 25, 1981
(Not for public release until June 29, 1981)
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C O N T E N T S
INTRODUCTION 1
I. Existing Commitments and Access to Weapons-Usable Material 2
A. Iraq
B. Israel
C. Other Relevant Countries
II. Pre-emptive Strikes 25
III. Review of Non-Proliferation Approaches in Light of These Cases 26
A. Continued Signficanceof the Non-Proliferation Treaty
B. Continued Importance and Utility of IAEA Safeguards
C. Prudent Common Nuclear Export Policies
D. Test Ban Treaties
E. Proposals for Nuclear -Weapon-Free Zones
F. International Conventions Relating to Attacks
on Nuclear Installations 40
Appendix A - Extract from Statement by Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein during Cabinet Meeting
June 23, 1981 (FBIS)
Appendix B - Israeli Description of Pakistan's Nuclear
Program (Extract-from letter dated 27 May,
1981 from the Permanent Representative of
Israel to the United Nations)
Appendix C - U.N. General Assembly Resolutions on
establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zones in the Middle East (35/147) and
South Asia (35/148)
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IRAQ, ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST PROLIFERATION PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
The bombing of the large Iraqi research reactor by Israel
has led to many confusing reports on the facts and fragmentary
comments on its implications for non-proliferation efforts. It
is the purpose of this report to provide a clear, objective
summation of published information on the nuclear capabilities
and undertakings of Iraq, Israel and other relevant countries,
and to discuss the various approaches to dealing with pro-
liferation in the light of such information.
Before turning to specific countries, it should be recalled
that the following are necessary to make a nuclear weapon:
(a) a decision to do so, and either the absence of
international commitments not to do so or a
willingness to break or terminate such inter-
national commitments;
(b) the knowledge,skill and manufacturing capabilities
needed to make a nuclear explosive device; and
(c) access to sufficient quantities of highly enriched
uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium.
Since item (c) is usually considered the pacing item, it is
the principal focus of Part I of this.study. Existing and pro-
posed international commitments designed to affect item (a)
are touched on in Part I and discussed at greater length in
Part III. Part II offers some brief observations on pre-
emptive strikes.
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I. Existing Commitments and Access to Weapons-Usable Material
A. IRAQ
Iraq is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
which constitutes a binding international obligation not to
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex-
plosive devices. It is also a party to the Limited Test Ban
Treaty and has in effect an agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) providing for safeguards on all
its peaceful nuclear activities.* My research has uncovered no
evidence of actual Iraqi efforts to develop or manufacture
a nuclear explosive device, as distinguished from its ac-
quisition of materials and equipment that would in time have
been capable of yielding enough special nuclear material to
do so. It is these capabilities that are analyzed in the
answers to the questions below. Such answers do not attempt
to draw any conclusions as to the intentions of Iraq, which
is by no means the only country having such capabilities.**
But since the bombing, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has
expressed the belief that "irrespective of Iraq's intentions
* Its bilateral agreement with France is believed to include
a guaranty independent of the NPT.t-'Tat the nuclear,-.
materials and equipment acquired from France, and any
special nuclear material derived from their use, will be
used for peaceful, non-explosive purposes, and Iraq has
agreed to accept IAEA safeguards to-verify compliance with
this bilateral guaranty. (IAEA-INFCIRC/172/Add. 1).
** For example, several of the major industrial countries
have ready access to large quantities of HEU and separated.
plutonium.
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and of its present or future capabilities, countries should
help the Arabs in one way or another to acquire atomic bombs
to confront the actual Israeli atomic bombs, not to champion
the Arabs and not to fuel war, but to safeguard and achieve
peace:'* (See Appendix A hereto)
Iraq's nuclear facilities are located at the Tuwaitha
Research Center, about 10 miles from Baghdad. The largest
facility (the French-supplied 40 MWth OSIRAK research reactor,
also known as TAMUZ-1), which had not yet become operational,
was destroyed by the bombing. The other principal facilities
at the site are:
a very small (approximately .5MWth French-supplied
ISIS research reactor (also known as TAMUZ-2)
associated with the OSIRAK reactor
a small (2-5 MWth) research reactor'supplied
by the Soviet Union in 1967
separate storage where natural and depleted
uranium are stored
some large hot cells and other research facilities
supplied by Italy
None of these appears to have been seriously damaged. In
addition to the fuel for the reactors, the Iraqis had procured
100 tons of natural uranium (U30 8) fromPortugal, and another
* Statement to Iraqi Cabinet. meeting June 23, 1981 (as reported
and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service),
the most pertinent portion of which is set forth in Appendix A.
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100 tons from Niger*, the intended use of which is not clear.
Under Iraq's safeguards agreement with the IAEA, notification
of receipt of this material was required to be given to the
IAEA, and there appears to be no indication that this was not
done.
The following questions and answers bring out the other
facts pertinent to the capabilities of these facilities to
yield weapons-usable material, as well as a few other issues
that have been raised in the public discussion of the bombing.
(1) Could the Iraqis have obtained enough HEU for a
nuclear weapon from the HEU fuel that they received
for the ISIS and OSIRAK reactors?
The amount of HEU that had been delivered to date (12 kgs)
would not have been enough to enable Iraq to make a nuclear
explosive. Moreover, it had been irradiated '-in the ISIS reactor
as soon as it arrived in Iraq, and thus would not be usable in
a nuclear explosive without first being reprocessed. While
the. large hot cells at the facility were large enough to permit
reprocessing, there appears to be no evidence that they contained
all the requisite reprocessing equipment (mixer-settlers, etc.).**
* As reported in Niger's Journal Officiel.
** In his June 19 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Mr. Roger Richter asserted that they did contain
such equipment, but the basis on which he reached this con-
clusion is not known. He also testified that he had not
seen the hot cells.
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After the reactor had been operated for some time, the
total inventory of HEU on site could have been as high as 35-60 kg,
consisting of some fuel awaiting insertion in the reactor, some
in the reactor, and some in the form of discharged fuel (which
would have contained somewhat less uranium than when it was
fresh and have an enrichment of about 80% - still usable in
weapons if reprocessed). The aggregate of these three quantities
would be more than sufficient to make a bomb, but the following
observations deal with each of the three components of this
aggregate:
-- If any fresh fuel were left unirradiated, it could
be quickly and readily put into a form usable for
nuclear weapons without reprocessing. If, however,
it were irradiated on arrival, its accessibility
would be reduced as noted with respect to the
initial shipment of 12 kgs.
-- While in the reactor, the HEU would not be accessible.
-- After removal from the reactor, the HEU could be
separated only by reprocessing (though this could
be done more readily and require less throughout than
the reprocessing of plutonium).
If arrangements had been made for the prompt return to
France of the HEU in the third category,(which remained a distinct
possibility) it would not have been available for reprocessing.
The location and form of the HEU was physically verified
by. the IAEA in January, 1981, and had been scheduled for
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reverification by an IAEA inspection in June (which I understand
was carried out after the bombing) and was clearly known by the
French technicians who, under an arrangement recently revealed
by the French* were to be intimately involved in the operation
of the research reactor until 1989.
Reprocessing of the HEU could not legally be pursued with-
out notice to the IAEA, with an opportunity for the IAEA to
review the design of the reprocessing facility in advance, and
the continuation. of safeguards on any HEU or plutonium recovered
therefrom.** Moreover, the removal of the HEU from the reactor
would quickly have become known to the French technicians.
(2) Could the Iraqis have obtained enough plutonium for
a bomb through the operation of the reactor?
Plutonium production of three kinds would be at least
theoretically possible after the reactor had become operational
(which had not yet occurred):
- First, tiny quantities of plutonium would be produced in
the fuel itself, but this would be only a small fraction of a
kilogram per year (as contrasted with the 5-10 kgs required for
a bomb) .
- Second, the empty channels in the reactor core could be
filled with natural uranium (after conversion to U02 or other
suitable form, ai,d fabrication) and plut,ihum produced through
itsbomfardment with the reactor's neutrons. Theoretically,
*As reported in The Energy Daily, June 19, 1981.
**See Iraq's NPT Safeguards Agreement (IAEA-INFCIRC/172).
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this technique might have produced enough material for a bomb
in 1-3 years, but it would affect the operation of the reactor,
require the use of tons of uranium* in hundreds of specially
prepared targets (only relatively small numbers of which
could be inserted during any given period),the cooling of
the plutonium in the spent fuel pond where it could be readily
observed, the use of special casks for its removal from the
cooling pond, and reprocessing. It is highly improbable that all
this could escape the notice of both the IAEA inspectors and
the French technicians. In addition to the need for reprocessing
equipment, this scenario would bring into play the legal
obligations to the IAEA described in the final paragraph of the
answer to question (1) above.
- Third, a "blanket" of. natural uranium oxide could be
placed around the reactor core to produce plutonium in the blanket.
While this approach could theoretically produce as much plutonium
as the second method, it would produce considerable heat, and
special measures -- highly visible both to the IAEA inspectors
and to the French technicians -- would have to be taken to
provide for the removal of this heat. Moreover, the plutonium
produced in the blanket would have to be reprocessed, presenting
the same problems as under the second method.
If misuse of the reactor became known to the French,
they could cease further fuel deliveries, thus shutting down the
reactor and precluding its further misuse.
*See testimony of Albert Carnesale before the Subcommittees of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 25, 1981, The opening
statement of this witness gave an incisive analysis of the central
issues involved in assessing the bombing of Osirak.
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(3) What was the nature of the "secret room" under the
reactor?
The IAEA has stated that "The production of plutonium in
fertile elements located underneath the reactor is practically
impossible since the core is placed on a thick concrete slab
which in turn is lined with a heavy steel plate. These provide
shielding to permit maintenance work on control element drives
located in a vault below the reactor to be carried out."*
There appears to be no evidence that either the vault below the
reactor or any other shielded, enclosed space in it was equipped
or intended for reprocessing or other clandestine purposes,
and the French technicians would undoubtedly be aware of the
nature of their use.
(4) Could lower enriched uranium fuel be used in the reactor?
Yes; the reactor was designed to accommodate the "caramel"
fuel, which the French have been developing. This fuel is
enriched to less than 10% and could not be used for nuclear
explosives. While the first few scheduled fuel shipments were
not of this type (in part because the fuel had not yet been
fully tested) it remained a possibility for later shipments, and
the negotiations for the reconstruction of the reactor may provide
that any further fuel shipments will be of,caramel fuel.
(5) What about the two other small reactors on the site?
The ISIS reactor supplied by the French was very small
*IAEA Press Release PR81/10 - June 12, 1981.
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(about .5_-1-1W th) and incapable of producing significant quanti-
ties of plutonium over many decades. Its fuel load was 12 kg
of 93% enriched uranium -- interchangeable with the fuel for
OSIRAK. In fact, the ISIS reactor was used to irradiate the
initial fuel shipment for the OSIRAK reactor.
The research reactor supplied by the Soviets, which became
operational in 1967, is a 2 MWth pool-type reactor, using fuel
with 10%, 36% and 80% enriched uranium. The recovery of HEU
from the first two types of fuel would be impossible, and the
quantities of 80% enriched uranium involved are understood to
be quite small. Moreover, after use in the reactor the enrichment
level would be lower, and the uranium could only be recovered
through reprocessing. The use of this reactor to produce
plutonium would yield less than a kilogram per year. To
recover either the plutonium or the relatively high enriched
uranium that might be left in part of the spent fuel, reprocess-
ing would be necessary, which would present the problems cited
in the answer to question (1) above. Moreover, reprocessing would
be precluded if the Soviets followed their usual practice of
requiring the return of spent fuel.
The Soviet reactor continues to be under IAEA safeguards,
and a facility attachment spelling out in detail the reports,
records and access required has been negotiated and is in force.
(6) What about the 200 tons of U'308?
As stated above, the intended use of these imports is not
clear. It is conceivable that some of it could be for the
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purposes described in the answer to question (2) above, which
would require its fabrication into forms suitable for insertion
in the reactor.* It is under IAEA safeguards in the sense that
its receipt was required to be reported to the IAEA, which was
also required to be notified if it was upgraded in form. But
it was not subject to routine safeguards inspections before
such upgrading.
(7) What would have been the effect of bombing the reactor
after it had commenced operating?
If the reactor had become operational and was hit in such
a way as to cause the release to the atmosphere of radioactive
materials and gases, the environmental. and health and safety
consequences would clearly have been worse and a source of some
concern. The number of assumptions required to quantify the
:Likely impact on Baghdad, and the number of uncertainties involved,
are illustrated in the Congressional Research Service paper on
the subject made a part of the record of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearings on June 19. That paper concluded
that it would be most unlikely for an attack with conventional
bombs upon the reactor to have caused lethal exposures to radio-
activity in Baghdad, although some people at the reactor site
might receive some exposure.
(8) Doe Iraq have delivery-capabilities for nuclear
weapons?
It does not currently have nuclear-capable missiles, but
may have some Soviet and French supplied aircraft that could be
made capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
*or it might have been acquired with a view to subsequent use for
fuel in a power reactor, which Iraq reportedly has shown interest in
acquiring.
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General Comments - The OSIRAK reactor, its fuel, the import of
:Large quantities of U308, the large hot cells at the site, and
reports that Iraq was considering acquisition of a natural-
luranium-fueled reactor capable of producing substantial quantities
of plutonium, provided some basis for concern. Precautions such
as the irradiation of the fresh fuel on its arrival and the
arrangement for the intimate involvement of French technicians
in the operation of the OSIRA~C reactor until 1989, as well as the
obligations of Iraq under the NPT and its NPT safeguards agree-
ment and the back-up agreement on safeguards,were factors tending
to alleviate such concerns. But at least a theoretical risk
remained that these legal obligations could be violated, abrogated
or terminated and the IAEA inspectors and French technicians
denied access to the facility at some point after it becomes
operational.
B. ISRAEL
Israel is a non-party to the NPT, has not accepted IAEA
* After the outbreak of the war with Iran, there was a period
when the Iraqis made clear to the IAEA that it would not be
feasible for IAEA inspectors to visit the facility (al-
though no visit had been planned for that period); and it
is also understood that at least some of the French technicians
withdrew to Baghdad for a while but kept in touch with the
facility operators. But the French technicians soon returned
to the site, and the IAEA carried out a safeguards inspection
in January 1981. Another safeguards inspection was scheduled
for June 1981, and was in fact carried out after the bombing.
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safeguards on some of its principal nuclear activities, but
is a party to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. It has for many
years had a number of highly trained nuclear physicists and
engineers. Its nuclear facilities consist of a safeguarded
tt.S.-supplied research reactor (IRR-1) and the unsafeguarded
facilities at Dimona, including a French-supplied research reactor
(IRR-2). These facilities are more fully discussed below, and
illustrate the difference between a nuclear facility that is
subject to international commitments and safeguards and those
that are not.
In 1968, Mr. Levi Eshkol is reported to have said that
Israel knew how to make a nuclear weapon but from there it was
**
a long way to an application. In an interview in 1969,
Prime Minister Golda Meir said "Israel has no bomb, Israel
***
has no intention of using nuclear bombs." The official,
declaratory policy of Israel for many years has been that it will
Israel has complained that it cannot expect non-discriminatory
treatment by the IAEA. No Israelis are on the IAEA staff.
At the June 1981 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors a
resolution was passed recommending the termination of techni-
cal assistance to Israel by the IAEA and further recommending
that the General Conference of the IAEA (which meets in
September) consider the implications of Israel's bombing
of the Iraqi reactor, including the question of whether
Israel should be suspended from the sights and privileges of
IAEA membership. Even if the General Conference took such
aci.ion, the rights of the Agency under its existing safe-
guards agreement with Israel would continue in force.
** SIPRI, The Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT, p. 30,
citing Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 5 October 1968.
?k** Id. at pp. 29-30, citing International Herald Tribune,
10-11 May, 1969.
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not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle
East. Most recently, former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe
Dayan is reported to have said "We don't have any atomic bomb
now. But we have the capacity, we can do that in a short time.
We are not going to be the first ones to introduce nuclear
weapons, and if the Arabs are willing to introduce nuclear
weapons into the Middle East, then Israel should not be too
*
late in having nuclear weapons too." He is also reported by
the same source to have said that he did not think Israel should
exploit its capacity to produce nuclear weapons unless its
enemies did so, saying "We should not be the first one, but
we shouldn't be too late." For Israel's proposal of a Middle
East Nuclear Free Zone, see Part III.E. below. A pending United
Nations study of Israel's nuclear program is scheduled to be
submitted to the General Assembly in the fall of 1981.
The IRR-1 Reactor - This 5 MWth reactor became operational-in
1960. It uses highly enriched uranium fuel, the last delivery
of which took place before 1977, when the agreement for cooperation
with the United States expired. The aggregate amount of fuel
that had been delivered as of December 31, 1980 was 31.57 kg of
*
uranium enriched to 89.4%. While this amount would theoretically
be sufficient to make one or even two bombs,
most (if not all) of it has been irradiated in the
reactor, thus lowering its enrichment somewhat,
increasing the quantity necessary to make a bomb,
* New York Times, June 25, 1981, p. 1.
t* Department of Energy, NMIS Report 1-29, page 19.
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and making it recoverable only by reprocessing.
Israel is also obligated by a continuing guaranty,
explicitly surviving the expiration of the agreement
for cooperation, that it will not use the material
or equipment supplied under the agreement for co-
operation, or any special nuclear material produced
through the use thereof, "for atomic weapons, or
for research on or development of atomic weapons,
*
or for any other military purpose," and has con-
firmed that this precludes its use in so-called
**
"peaceful" nuclear explosives.
All material or equipment supplied under the agree-
ment, and any special nuclear material produced through
its use, is also covered by a trilateral safeguards
agreement between the United States,. Israel and the
IAEA, under which Israel has agreed not to use
them in such a way as to further any military pur-
pose and has agreed that this precludes its use for
***
the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
The agreement with the United States under which.
the.fuel was furnished provided that it would not
be reprocessed or otherwise altered in form or
****
content without U.S. consent.,.
* TIAS 3311, as amended and as extended by TIAS 8557 (1977).
** Note from the Embassy of Israel dated 13 January, 1975,
appended to TIAS 8019.
*** TIAS 8051, as extended by TIAS 8554 (1977).
**** TIAS 4407, ARt. II.E.
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The IAEA has periodically checked on the continued
presence of this material in the form of spent fuel
elements at the reactor site. Under the applicable
Agency guidelines, the inventory cited above would
permit a maximum frequency of 5 or 6 routine in-
spections per year, and the Agency has the additional
right to carry out special inspections if (a) the
study of a report indicates that such inspection is
desirable or (b) any unforeseen circumstance. re-
quires immediate action. In practice the Agency
does not inspect the facility as frequently as the
maximum stated above.
The Dmona Reactor - This 26 MWth research reactor became
operational at the end of 1963. Since it is not under safe-
guards, there is no definitive information on whether the
reactor has or has not been upgraded, at what rate and in
what manner it has been operated, and consequently how much
plutonium may have been produced in its spent fuel or otherwise.
Unclassified estimates of how much plutonium it may have pro-
duced range up to 10 kg per year.
* IAEA-INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, secs. 57, 53, made applicable to
this reactor and its fuel_ by TIAS 8051.
** Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, Joint Committee Print
96th Cong., 2d. Sess (1980) , p.. 412
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To be used in a nuclear explosive, the plutonium would
have to be reprocessed. If all the spent fuel in the maximum
estimate were reprocessed, it would yield enough material for
over 20 weapons.
Reprocessing Capability - As of December 31, 1978, SIPRI listed
among the world's small scale reprocessing plants and laboratory
scale reprocessing facilties, a facility at Dimona, Israel, the
*
status of which it reported as unknown. The existence of an
unsafeguarded pilot reprocessing facility in Israel is also
reported in IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 19, Oct. 1977, p. 4.
Other Possible Nuclear Materials - Despite a number of investi-
gations, it has never been definitively established what became
of over 200 pounds of weapons-grade HEU that could not be
accounted for at a fuel fabrication facility in Appollo,
Pennsylvania, in the mid-sixties. But some believe that it ended
up in Israel (e.g., April 27 ABC TV documentary entitled "Near
Armageddon", which also evidenced a belief that a missing ship-
:Load of U3O8 from Western Europe may have ended up in Israel).
In either case, if the material is in Israel it is not under
safeguards.
Delivery Capabilities - Israel has missles that are dual capable
r
-- meaning that it would be physically possible to substitute
* SIPRI, Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
(1979), p. 319; reprinted in Nuclear Proliferation Fact-
book (Joint Committee Print, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980).
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a nuclear warhead for the conventional explosive payload which
they currently carry. It also has aircraft that could be
made capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
General Comment - It is generally believed that if Israel does
*
not now possess a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, it could
quickly make them.
C. Other Relevant Countries
In a letter to the U.N. Secretary - General dated May 27,
:L981, the Government of Israel pointed out its perception of
the proliferation risks posed by Pakistan, which (like Israel)
is not a party to the NPT and has not accepted IAEA safeguards
on .sae of its principal nuclear activities and (unlike Israel)
has not ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The pertinent
portion of this letter is attached as Appendix B hereto.
Public testimony by U.S. Government officials has made clear that
Pakistan is building anunsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility
that bears no relationship to the present needs of its civil
nuclear program; that it is building a chemical reprocessing
facility that is currently unsafeguarded; and that there is a,
substantial risk that it might make and test a nuclear ex-
plosive device within the next year or two. In connection with
* There was a widely reported unofficial statement in the mid-sev-
enties by Mr. Carl Duckett, then a Deputy Director of the
CIA, expressing his belief that Israel had 10-20 weapons.
Mr. Duckett was questioned on this subject in the April 27,
1981 ABC TV News Closeup "Near Armageddon: The Spread of
Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East." But see recent statement
by Moshe Dayan quoted in the text above. The present author
does not know which is correct.
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the acquisition of the enrichment facility, the United States
cut off economic and military aid to Pakistan several years
ago, as required by Section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act
unless the President certifies that he has "received reliable
assurances that the country in question will not acquire or
develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so."
(This section is currently in the process of revision, but not
the related Section 669 providing for such a cut-off upon
import of a reprocessing plant or detonation of :a i.nuc.lear. .
explosive device).
But the Pakistani program cannot be fairly considered
in isolation from the Indian program. India, which is also
a non-party to the NPT and has refused to accept IAEA safe-
guards on major parts of its program, (though it is a party to
the Limited Test Ban Treaty) is the only state discussed in
this report that is known to have detonated a nuclear ex-
plosive device. While former Prime Minister Desai appears to
have terminated Indian's nuclear explosive program and no
further explosions have been carried out, it is by no means
clear that Prime Minister Gandhi (who ordered the 1974 test)
will not revive it, especially in light of the developments in
Pakistan. India not only has unsafeguarded research reactors
capable of producinq plutonium, but also two reprocessing
* It is important not to weaken statutory criteria for
Presidential overrides in the case of nuclear detonations.
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plants -- one wholly unsafeguarded at Trombay (which was the
:facility that produced the initial Indian bomb from research
reactor fuel).._ and another near the site of the Tarapur reactors,
which would be safeguarded only when processing safeguarded
spent fuel. Thus there is no question that India has enough
unsafeguarded weapons-usable material. to make several more
nuclear explosives, and has a demonstrated capability to do so.
The Indians do not view their nuclear status only in
relation to Pakistan. They point out that the People's
Republic of China, a contiguous state with which they have
had hostilities, is already a nuclear weapon state.
For discussion of proposals for a South Asian Nuclear
Free Zone, see Sect. III.E. below.
Another relevant country is Libya, which is a party to
the NPT and the Limited Test Ban Treaty and has entered into
a safeguards agreement with the IAEA providing for safeguards
on all its peaceful nuclear activities. Yet Libya's current
leader, Col. Qaddafi, has nevertheless made no secret of his
desire to acquire nuclear weapons. His efforts to date have
been unsuccessful. But i - is a sobering fact that other
x
*This means in effect all of its nuclear activities, since (1) the
NPT precludes explosive military uses, (2) Libya is entirely depen-
dent on imports for its nuclear program, and (3) no exporter has, or
seems likely to, supply it with materials or equipment for non-explosive
military uses (such as naval propulsion).
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countries in this study that are not parties to the NPT would
be under no legal inhibitions against selling him weapons-usable
materials. (NPT parties would at least have to consider whether
such a sale, in the circumstances, would be consistent with
the objectives of the NPT and would have a duty to ensure that
any nuclear exports they made to Libya were in fact subjected
to safeguards under Libya's NPT safeguards agreement). For
non-NPT parties, reliance must be placed on their interests and
good judgment . With respect to Libya's own nuclear program,
it has acquired natural uranium from Niger (some of which may
have been shipped to Pakistan); it has acquired a small research
reactor from the Soviet Union (a 5 MWth reactor involving a
total on-site inventory of about 10 kg of 80% enriched uranium,
which would not be sufficient to make a bomb; this reactor would
be-incapable of producing significant amounts of plutonium in
decades); and it has been negotiating with the Soviet Union
for some time with respect to the acquisition of a nuclear power
reactor. It is not known to have any reprocessing facilities
of its own, and it is to be hoped that the Soviets will follow
their usual practice of insisting upon the return of any spent
fuel, at least from the power reactor if it is built.
Yet another relevant state is Iran::(currently at war with
Iraq), which is also a partyto the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the Limited Test Ban Treaty and has concluded an IAEA safe-
guards agreement covering
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all its peaceful nuclear activities, Nevertheless, had it
proceeded with the former Shah's extremely ambitious nuclear
program (under which four power reactors were actually being
constructed), it might have become of some proliferation concern.
But Iran did not acquire a reprocessing plant, none of the power
reactors is being completed, and the current regime appears
to have little interest in nuclear matters. Iran still has a
5 MWth U.S.-supplied research reactor, fueledwith highly en-
riched uranium, but less than 6 kilograms of such fuel were
shipped to Iran* (which is insufficient to make a bomb), and
the reactor would be incapable of producing enough plutonium for
a bomb even if operated regularly for more than a decade, and
this could not be used without reprocessing.
Egypt recently ratified the NPT, and is the principal propo-
nent of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (described
in Part III.E below). It has for many years had a small (2 MWth)
Soviet-supplied research reactor, fueled with 10% enriched uranium
and not capable of producing significant quantities of plutonium
even if operated for many decades. This will now come under IAEA
safeguards. Egypt has recently negotiated an agreement for
cooperation with the United States, and. is exploring with the
United States and others the possible purchase of several nuclear
power reactors.
* Department of Energy, NMIS Report 1-29, page 19.
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The NPT and Limited Test Ban Treaty status of other states
in the Middle East and South Asian regions are shown in the maps
on the following two pages. None of these other states
currently has capabilities which pose a significant proliferation
risk. But it should be noted that'Morocco, Algeria, and
Bangladesh have taken steps to acquire research reactors, and
Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in establishing a nuclear
research center. Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Syria
are reportedly considering the possibility of acquiring nuclear
power plants.
For a useful recent discussion, in some depth, of the
proliferation problem in the Middle East, South Asia and other
regions of the world, see Yager et al, Non-Proliferation and U.S.
Foreign Policy (The Brookings Institution, 1980).*
* See also SIPRI, The Near Nuclear Countries and the NPT (1972);
Pranger and Tahtinca, Nuclear Threat in the Middle East (1975).
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tates.that
ave signed
but not LTBT
ratified ied State
States that
have not
signed
NPT
Albania 0
Algeria S
Bahrain S
France Guinea 0
Israel P
Mauritania P
Muscat &
tman 0
Niger 0
Pakistan S
Qatar 0
Saudi Arabia 0
Spain- % P
United Arab
Emirates
Uganda
*cureen l
limits tests
to underground,
and behaves as
if it w ere an
NPT party.
is putting a-!
its current
nucl ear
facilit ;es unde
safeguar's .
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?
,Male
F
fi
South Asia
Bpi _wr~ r eye^'a? o. s
a...?.o+?:ale
(LTBT) indicates that state is party to Limited Test Ban Treaty
Diagonal lines indicate state is party to NPT
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II. Pre-Emptive Strikes
This study will not attempt to address many of the weighty
questions arising out of the bombing of the Iraqi facility, such
as (a) its overall impact on the interests of Israel, (b) its
impact on efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East, and
(c) whether or not the use of U.S. aircraft was consistent with
the terms of the agreement under which the aircraft was furnished.
But it is necessary to make a few generic observations about pre-
emptive strikes as ameans of dealing with the proliferation
problem:
o While they may temporarily remove one of the
symptoms of the disease, they cannot cure it. Assuming that
a particular facility was in fact a part of a weapons-
building program its destruction might cause delays in the
program but is most unlikely to stop it and could in fact
reenforce the determination to proceed with it.
o By abandoning the constraints of international law,
they materially increase the risk of international chaos.
if one state feels free to destroy a nuclear facility in
another country, what barriers has it left to retaliation
in kind, or to resort to the same expedient against other
states?
o They undermine efforts to deal with the problem
through international law and diplomacy. The incentive to
accept international constraints and safeguards with respect
to genuinely peaceful,-non-explosive nuclear programs will
be reduced if, despite such acceptance, other states feel free
to destroy such programs.
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To reduce the motivation for preemptive strikes it is
essential that we rededicate ourselves to the task of making
international legal and diplomatic approaches to the problem
as effective as possible. These approaches are discussed in the
final section of this report.
III. Review of Non-Proliferation Approaches in Light of These Cases
Even this rather cursory review of the proliferation risks
in this part of the world suggests the gravity of the problem
and the urgency of major efforts to avoid the addition of a nuclear
weapons dimension to these regional conflicts. It also leads to
the observations set forth below on existing and prospective
measures intended to deal with the proliferation problem.
A. Continued Significance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
While not a total answer to the proliferation problem,
adherence to the NPT can make a very'real difference in several
respects, as illustrated below:
A
Cl) It means that Iraq is under an international obligation
not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosives;
(_2) The continuing obligation it creates to accept IAEA
safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities in Iraq
means that the highly enriched uranium fuel for the
OSIRAK reactor must be continuously accounted for and
periodically checked physically; that if Iraq produced
plutonium by the use of the OSIRAK reactor, it would
have an international legal obligation to subject that
plutonium to IAEA safeguards, and if it moved
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such material to the large hot cells in the complex
it would have an international legal obligation
to notify the IAEA and to submit design information
on the hot cells to the IAEA in advance, to permit
IAEA inspectors to safeguard the hot cells, and to
follow the plutonium to any subsequent location.
(.3) More generally, the safeguards obligation it
entails provides an acknowledged means of checking
compliance and creating a risk of detection and dis-
closure that can help deter misuse and provide some
reassurance to other countries,
(4) It means that Iraq is under an international
obligation not to transfer any special nuclear
material to any other non-nuclear-weapon state
without IAEA safeguards to verify that it will not
be used in the recipient country for any nuclear
explosive device.
(5) it means that none of the states covered by
this study -- whether or not parties to the NPT --
can import nuclear materials or equipment from any
state party to the NPT (or from France, under its declared
policy of behaving as if it were a party to the NPT
and in accordance with the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines)
without IAEA safeguards on what is imported and on any
special nuclear material derived from the use of such
imports.
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The significance of the first four of these points can
be appreciated when one considers the consequences of their
absence in the cases of Israel and Pakistan:
- There is no international mechanism for checking
on what is going on at Israel's Dimona facility. Assuming
the use of unsafeguarded natural uranium and heavy water*
it could be operated to produce significant quantities
of plutonium, which could then be reprocessed and made
into nuclear weapons without violating any international
undertaking.
- Pakistan's enrichment facility could be completed
and operated to produce highly enriched uranium without
any international mechanism providing knowledge of how
much was being produced or where it went (either in terms
of its own use in a nuclear explosive or its transfer to
another country), or any legal restrictions on its
disposition.
- Pakistan's reprocessing facility could be completed
and operated -- if it could obtain unsafeguarded spent fuel
and unless it becomes subject to safeguards by virtue of an
agreement entered into in connection with the aborted
French construction of a large reprocessing facility** --
The initial load of heavy water was supplied by France. Annual
make-up requirements are small, and can presumably be produced
indigenously by Israel, or possibly purchased.
**This agreement created-a conclusive-presumption that any solvent
extraction reprocessing plant built.Sfn Pakistan for 20 years after
the agreement would-benefit--from the French technology and thus
had to be safeguarded.
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without providing knowledge of. how much plutonium was
being produced or where it went (either in terms of its
use in a nuclear explosive or transfer to another
country), or any legal restrictions on its disposition.
The significance of the fifth point made on page
27 was highlighted in the opening U.S. statement at the 1980
NPT Review Conference, which pointed out that, together with
France, the parties to the NPT comprise all of the world's
exporters of nuclear power reactors and all major exporters
of key components therefor; all of the world's exporters
of enriched uranium; all of the world's exporters of heavy
water (although the Chinese have since exported modest amounts);
94% of all foreign aid donations, and 87% of the funding of
international financial institutions. It added that these
figures demonstrate that -- for non-parties to the NPT -- the
road to developing a nuclear power program in the foreseeable
future must be traveled in cooperation with one or more of
these members of the NPT regime.
F As in the case of any legal obligation (including those
embodied in our criminal codes), it is possible that violations
of NPT obligations could occur. But the existence of the
obligation has deterrent value and provides a clear basis for J\
responses to behavior inconsistent with the obligation. Thus
we do not abandon the laws against first degree murder on the
ground that they have not eliminated all such murders.
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it is also recognized that the NPT contains a provision per-
mitting a party to withdraw on three months'notice "if it decides
that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country,"
advising the U.N. Security Council of the extraordinary events
relied upon. But this provision is unlikely to be lightly resorted
to, and it would provide some time for an international response to
be brought into play. Despite the presence of such a withdrawal
clause in three major multilateral arms control treaties (the
Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the NPT,
which. have been in effect for 17, 13, and 11 years, respectively),
no party has yet exercised this right or seriously threatened
to do so. Moreover, it is possible to provide (as the United
States does, and as the French did in the case of Iraq) for the
continuation of IAEA safeguards on material derived from imports
even in the event of a withdrawal from the NPT.
The recent argument (Washington Post editorial, June 16,
1971 and June 19 testimony of Roger Richter before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations) that the NPT may be subject to abuse
by countries wishing to use it as a cover while they are building
-up the capability to make nuclear weapons, seems to assume that
supplier countries are likely to abandon the exercise of judgment
in their nuclear exports where the recipient has joined the NPT.
This ignores the consensus among the world's principal nuclear
exporting states in the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines, that "In
considering transfers, each supplier should exercise prudence having
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regard to all the circumstances of each case." Thus, for
example, even though Libya is party to the NPT and might assert
its rights under Article IV thereof to the fullest possible
exchange of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful
purposes, it seems most unlikely that any supplier would be so
mesmerized by these considerations that it would ship large
quantities of separated plutonium or highly enriched uranium to
Col. Qaddaf i .
It is important that decision-makers not give so-much
weight to conceivable abuses that they lose sight of the 'very
real advantages of the NPT described above.
B. Continued Importance and Utility of IAEA Safeguards
The utility of IAEA safeguards in verifying the location
and form of highly enriched uranium fuel in Iraq and at Israel's
I.RR-1 reactor was mentioned in Part I, as well as the point that
safeguards agreements require notification to the IAEA of imports
or exports of U308 and of any upgrading of such material, and
provide for routine inspections of any such material that has been
upgraded and notice of any changes in its location or form.
With respect to the risks that plutonium could be produced
through the operation of the OSIP11.K reactor, it is to be noted
that Iraq's safeguards agreement with the IAEA provides for a maximum
annual routine inspection effort of 50 man days at each reactor in
which the inventory or annual throughput (whichever is larger) of
Plutonium exceeds 5 kg or an equivalent anount of highly enriched uranium, and
for an even larger allocation of effort (with a maximum routine
inspection effort no less than 1.5 man years) for other facilities
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containing such quantities of these materials.* It also provides
for special inspections without advance notification** (although
in practice the IAEA has rarely, if ever, failed to provide
some advance notice). While the Agency and Iraq still have
under preparation a facility attachment spelling out in greater
detail the types of reports, records,inspections and other measures
to be routinely applied (which might well include camera
,surveillance to provide the continuity of knowledge between
inspections that is an agreed objective of the safeguards under
this agreement), the inspections to date were carried out under
a provision permitting ad hoc inspections pending the completion
of such a facility attachment. Thus they have not been legally
restricted to three inspections per year, although that micrht have
been the rate provided for in the facility attachment had it been
completed.***
Some of the other advantages of safeguards were mentioned in
the discussion of the NPT above. These include the opportunity
for design review of any facility towhich safeguarded material is
moved, pursuit of any special nuclear material produced through
the use of safeguarded material or equipment, and requirements
designed to ensure that any safeguarded nuclear material or
equipment that is exported to a non-nuclear weapon state
will continue to be under IAEA safeguards (which
* IAEA--INFCIRC /17 2 , sec. 80.
** Id,, sec. 84.
***Mr. Richter indicated his belief that it would in his June 25
testimony before subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
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include an international obligation not to use the material for
any military or explosive purpose), These advantages were
contrasted with the problems in cases where safeguards do not
apply.
Because of this contrast, the United States and other
countries have been trying for the past few years to make NPT-type
full scope safeguards coverage* a condition of all future supply
commitments, and international consensus on this seemed nearly
within reach at the 1980 NPT Review Conference. Renewal of these
efforts seems strongly indicated, as does the continuation of
strong efforts to improve safeguards techniques, instrumention,
and implementation,**
Recognition of the need for some improvements in IAEA safe-
guards at facilities such as the OSIRAK reactor, which present
especial difficulties, should not be turned into a denigration
of the importance and utility of safeguards in general. It must
be remembered that the vast majority of nuclear facilities in
the world -- including most of the world's nuclear power
reactors -- which are relatively easy to safeguard with high
confidence are now under IAEA safeguards. The amount of plutonium
produced each year in these safeguarded facilities is tens of tons.
*I.e., a commitment to accept IAEA safeguards not only on all
existing peaceful nuclear activities, but also on any subsequent
peaceful nuclear activities as they arise.
**Another potential safeguards development -- international plu-
tonium storage (IPS) -- is the subject of a separate study by the
;present author soon to be published by the Congressional Research
Service.
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- 34 -
C. Prudent Common Nuclear Export Policies
The cases reviewed in this paper also highlight the desir-
ability of continuing to promote prudent, common nuclear export
;policies. Unpopular as they were among the Third World
*
countries, the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines were in fact
quite modest, sensible guidelines designed to ensure that commer-
cial competition did not lead to bargaining away export con-
ditions intended to prevent further proliferation. While their
primary thrust was to ensure the broadest possible safeguards
**
coverage (and to crystallize French policy in favor of requir-
ing safeguards on their nuclear exports), they also dealt with
the need for great caution in the export of weapons-usable
materials and facilities for their production or recovery. They
helped give impetus to the idea, on which a much broader consensus
was subsequently reached in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation (INFCE), that substitutes could and should be found
for highly enriched uranium fuel for use in most research re-
actors (one example being the caramel fuel the French might supply
***
for the OSIRAK reactor). They also emphasized the need
* IAEA-INFCIRC/254. The basic guidelines (without annexes) are
reprinted as an Appendix to the 1977 Annual Report of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency.
** One of the mechanisms employed being a "trigger list" of items
that should not be exported without triggering safeguards.
There is a need to -hold international consultations on up-
grading this list.
*** The United States and Germany among others, have also done
highly successful work in developing and demonstrating one
use of relatively low enriched fuels in research reactors.
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to design sensitive nuclear installations to facilite the
application of safeguards, and pointed out the desirability
of ensuring that new enrichment capacity be designed and operated
for the production of only low enriched uranium. They recognized
the need, also acknowledged by INFCE, for improved safeguards at
:bulk handling facilities such as reprocessing plants, and for the
)maintenance of agreed levels of physical protection of nuclear
materials and facilities against theft or seizure. They pointed
to the general need for prudence in nuclear exports in the
light of the circumstances of particular cases and for consultations
in difficult cases, and laid the groundwork for.sanctions against
violation of the commonly agreed minimum conditions of export.
It is no indictment of the NPT to concede that-it cannot
carry the entire burden of preventing further proliferation.
Such complementary approaches as those just described are also
needed, as is a lessening by nuclear weapon states of the extent
to which they relate nuclear weapons to their national security.
D. Test Ban Treaties
It is at least a positive feature that Israel and Iraq are
:both parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, as is every other
country of current proliferation concern except Pakistan and
Argentina. This treaty in effect requires that any nuclear ex-
plosions be conducted underground -- which adds to the expense
and difficulty of such testing, but by no means precludes it.
And it means that such states (like the United States) are parties
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to a treaty whose preamble states that they are "seeking to achieve
the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons
for all time", and are "determined to continue negotiations to
this end," and which states in Article I that its provisions are
"without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in
the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including
all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the
Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek
to achieve."
Considerably greater protection against proliferation could
be gained if these states became parties to a truly compre-
hensive test ban treaty. While it may be possible for a state
with a sophisticated scientific establishment to develop a first
atomic weapon without testing, a comprehensive 'test ban treaty
could deprive such countries of reassurance as to whether their
design really worked, hamper their futher refinement of nuclear
weapons, preclude their development of very large yield devices,
and remove the opportunity to demonstrate that they had in fact
achieved a nuclear weapons capability. And it would be an
even-handed treaty. It would prevent further nuclear testing
by the nuclear weapon parties and symbolize some lessening of
their emphasis on nuclear weapons.
The most obvious path toward achieving wide adherence to a
comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapon tests would be to speed
* The NPT has two classes of parties with somewhat different
obligations - nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon
states.
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completion of the trilateral US-UK-USSR negotiations on this
subject in Geneva.
The impact of a threshold test ban treaty on the pro-
liferation problem would be considerably less clear. The
Threshold Test Ban Treaty now before the Senate has merit as a
step in the right direction in the U.S.-Soviet context, and
Mr. Rostow reportedly suggested, in the hearings on his con-
firmation as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, that he could support it. But the fact that it is a
:bilateral treaty and permits nuclear explosions up to 150
:kilotons, would mean that it is not even open to adherence by
the states discussed in this paper and that the threshold is
:Larger than any likely initial tests by these countries.
Moreover, for non-proliferation purposes, retention of an option
to terminate obligations under the treaty after its initial'
five-year period would not provide much reassurance, and the
problem of precluding "peaceful" nuclear explosions by non-
nuclear weapon states not parties to the NPT could be knotty.
* Washington Post, June 23, 1981, p. A.2.
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0
E. Proposals for Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones
The success of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which creates a
nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America, has led to pro-
posals for similar zones in the regions here under discussion.
On December 12, 1980, the U.N. General Assembly adopted by
consensus, in which Israel joined, resolution 35/147, entitled
"Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the
Middle East", the text of which is set forth in Appendix C hereto.
In a letter dated 9 June 1981 to the UN Secretary-General (A/36/315),
the Government of Israel called attention to its own earlier
proposal in the form of a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.8) which
called upon all States of the Middle East and non-nuclear-weapon
States adjacent to the region "to convene at the earliest possible
date a conference with a view to negotiating a multilateral treaty
establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,"
and requested that all such states indicate in the course of
:L981 their consent to the holding of a preparatory conference to
discuss the modalities of such a conference. It stated that
in such a volatile area as the Middle East "a nuclear-weapon
free zone can only be established if each State is contractually
assured of compliance with the commitment by all the other
States in the region to abstain from introducing nuclear weapons
into the region." Taking note of an April 1981 suggestion by
Although U.S. ratification of Additional Protocol I, which
is a precondition to the treaty's becoming binding on
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, is still pending before the
Senate and deserves prompt action.
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Eygpt for a study on the modalities for establishing such a
nuclear weapon free zone, it proposed that such a study be
undertaken by qualified experts from Middle East States, in-
cluding Israel, as also recommended in a 1980 report by the
Secretary-General (A/35/416, para. 248). Finally, the Israeli
:letter stated that "There is no need to wait until all
Governments in the Middle East see their way to endorsing such
a study: undertaking it in the manner proposed by Israel would,
by itself, constitute a valuable step in the direction of
building much needed confidence between the States of the region
prior to the holding of the preparatory conference proposed
above."
On December 12, 1980, the UN General Assembly also adopted
by a vote of 96-3-44 a Pakistani resolution foit the establish-
ment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in South Asia (Res. 35/148,
which is also included in Appendix B hereto). While this resolution
was supported by the United States, it was opposed by India.
This follows a pattern than has obtained since 1974. While
Pakistan has advocated a zone generally limited to the sub-
continent (i.e., excluding China), India has stated that it will
support creation only of a zone which covers'a broader Asian
area, including China, and which results-from consultations
among the potential participants concerning such a zone. In
.1975, India introduced its own resolution supporting this con-
cept of the zone, and that was adopted by the General Assembly
in addition to the Pakistani resolution. India did not introduce
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its own resolution in 1980.
The reluctance of key parties in both of these regions
to actually negotiate with other key parties suggests another
approach which might be considered. This would be based on the
concept of Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, under which
the five nuclear weapon states have agreed not to station
nuclear weapons in the territories of the parties to the zone
and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against such
parties so long as they abide by their obligations under that
treaty. In the Middle East and South Asian regions, it is
conceivable that the nuclear weapon states could agree upon
such a protocol without completion of the regional treaty.
Their undertaking could be conditioned on specified restraints
by the countries in the region (e.g., refraining from any nuclear
explosion, or the deployment or use of any nuclear weapon).
:Lt would be intended to provide an incentive for such restraints.
IF. International Conventions Relating to Attacks on Nuclear
Installations
In 1977, there was opened for signature a Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, and this Protocol has been brought into force by
several states. It includes the following article:
"Article 56 - Protection of works and installations
containing dangerous forces.
1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces,
namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations,
shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects
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are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release
of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population. Other military objectives located at or in the
vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the
object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous
:Forces from the works or installations and consequent severe
:losses among the civilian population.
2. The special protection against attack provided by
paragraph 1 shall cease: ***(b) for a nuclear electrical
generating station only if it provides electric power in regular,
significant and direct support of military operations and if
such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support.***
3. In all cases, the civilian population and individual
civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection accorded
them by international law, including the protection of the.
precautionary measures provided for in Article 57 [which relate
to planning and decisions upon attacks]. If the protection ceases
and any of the works, installations or military objectives mentioned
in paragraph 1 is attacked, all practical precautions shall be
taken to avoid the release of the dangerous forces.
4. It is prohibited to make any of the works, installations
or military objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 the object
of reprisals.
Neither Israel nor Iraq nor the United States has yet joined
this Convention, and it would not appear literally applicable
to the Iraqi research reactor, which was not an electrical generating
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station. But the establishment of this principle is obviously
relevant. Prime Minister Begin's explanation of the timing of
the recent bombing included the point that bombing it after
it had become operational would have released dangerous forces
of the kind covered by this article.
The Radiological Weapons Convention currently under negotia-
tion in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva does not, in its
present form, deal with the release of radiation by attacks on
nuclear installations, but the Swedish delegation has proposed
that it do so. If this were pursued, it would apply in peacetime
(not only in war) and might correct the regrettable omission of
research reactors, as well as reprocessing and waste handling
facilities (which would present even greater potential hazards
than reactors if bombed)..
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To allow the bombing of the Iraqi facility to devalue
international efforts to prevent further nuclear proliferation
would be both irresponsible and tragic. Instead, it is hoped that
it will result in a renewed determination to pursue such efforts
and make them more effective. In this connection, the vitality
of the NPT regime must be maintained; efforts must be continued
to achieve full-scope safeguards coverage and to improve safe-
guards techniques and implementation; common, responsible nuclear
export policies must be followed, strengthened and improved by
all concerned; and increased attention should be given to the
contributions which could be made by restrictions on nuclear
testing, nuclear weapons free zones, and other relevant international
initiatives. It should become a major, explicit objective of
diplomatic efforts to prevent the addition of a nuclear weapons
dimension to the hostilities in the Middle East and South Asia.
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appendix A
Extract from Statecient by Irani President
Saddam Hussein . duffing Cabinet Meeting June 23, 1981
1,7ednes :ay June 24, 1981)
Irrespective of Iraq's intentions and of its present or future capabilities, I believe
that anyone or any state in the world which really wants peace and security and which
really respects peoples and does not want them to be subjugated to foreign forces should
help the Arabs in one way or another to acquire atomic bombs to confront the actual
Israeli atomic bombs, not to champion the Arabs and not to fuel war, but to safeguard and
achieve peace. Irrespective of the Arabs' intentions and capabilities and even if the
Arabs do not want them and are unable to use them, I believe that any state in the world
that is internationally and positively responsible to humanity and peace must tell the
Arabs: Here, take these weapons in order to face the Zionist threat with atomic bombs
and prevent the Zionist entity from using atomic bombs against the Arabs, thus saving
the world from the dangers of using atomic bombs in wars.
This logic is applied by the United States in its dealing with the Soviet Union and by
the Soviet Union in dealing with the United States. Others also apply this logic coward
each other. I do not believe that the Soviet Union now wants to use the atomic bomb
against the United States or that the United States wants to use it against the Soviet
Union. This is due to the advanced state reached by humanity in its thinking, con-
science and attitudes, including public opinion in the United States, the Soviet Union
and the world at large. I do not believe that either the Americans or the Soviets will
use the atomic bomb against each other. However, both of them and others like them are
always endeavoring to develop their weapons to prevent the eruption of war.
This logic is not to justify the Arabs' acquisition of nuclear technology for military
purposes but is an open discussion with humanity. This discussion is not aimed at
dealing with the Arabs as those who have created a precedent, because the Arabs do not
possess nuclear weapons, but is a discussion to deal with a state that actually exists
in Israel. All experts and all concerned with atomic weapons and the affairs of the
Middle East admit that Israel possesses several nuclear bombs.
What would happen if Israel imposed conditions on the Arabs, they did not accept them
and Israel used nuclear bombs against them? What would happen to the Arabs and mankind
under such blackmail and in such a dangerous situation?
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aooendix B
Israeli Uescri otion of Pakistan's Nuclear Program
(3xtract from letter dated 27 :.iay, 1981 from the Permanent
.~,epresentativz of Israel to the United i ations addressed
to t;;e Secretary-General (A/36/'298))
In his letter dated 3 February 1981 and addressed to Your Excellency (A/36/92),
the Permanent Representative of Pakistan claimed, inter alia, that "the nuclear
research and development programme of Pakistan is geared entirely to peaceful
purposes". * x
on instructions, I have the honour to make the following observations:
A. Pal.istan's nuclear weapons programme
1. Background
Pakistan is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. It has not ratified the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963,
and its nuclear activities are not completely covered by International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
Although Pakistani officials frequently deny their country's intentions
to develop nuclear weapons and maintain that its nuclear activities are
designed for peaceful purposes, there is abundant evidence indicating that
Pakistan aims at' producing nuclear weapons. The Pakistani Atomic Energy
* A/36/50.
81-1)4659 /"'
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Commission, the Ministry of Defence and the '_'nprineerinr Research Laboratories
share responsibility for the country's nuclear activities, and are involved
in a process directed at the establishment of a nuclear infrastructure,
which, on completion, will make Pakistan self-sufficient in the nuclear
field. 1/
In order to obtain weapon-grade material, Pakistan has embarked in
para.llel on the reprocessing of plutonium and on uranium enrichment.
Pakistan is also working on the development of nuclear explosive devices
and on preparations for a test nuclear detonation..
2. The weapons programme
(a) Plutonium course
Since 1972, Pakistan has operated a 13719?1 CANDU (heavy water type)
power reactor located at Paradise Point Sind, near Karachi. This reactor -
known as KANTJPP - is under IAEA safeguards. KANUPP is well-suited for the
production of weapons-usable plutonium since it can be loaded and unloaded
on line. During its eight years of operation, KANUPP has produced spent
fuel containing more than 100 kg of plutonium. A chemical facility is
required to obtain plutonium. Pakistan obtains plutonium from the
irradiated fuel produced in this nuclear power plant through reprocessing
activities carried out at a hot laboratories complex located close to the
Nuclear Research Centre at PINSTECII (the Pakistan Institute of Technology),
near Islamabad. 2/ This facility has functioned clandestinely since 1980, 3/
and produces annually at least 20 lb of plutonium necessary for one explosive
device a year. 4/ Thus it is possible that this reprocessing facility
will provide Pakistan with the necessary quantity of plutonium for one
explosive device by the middle of 1981.
In addition - after obtaining most blueprints. of a French reprocessing
plant: and clandestinely purchasinp components from a variety of countries -
Pakistan has begun constructing at the Chasma Nuclear Centre a large
reprocessing plant (11,NC2), to he completed in 1'A2_19,13. This plant will
enable Pakistan to produce plutonium for at least 10 nuclear explosive
devices a year. In other words, it will enable Pakistan to build a
meaningful arsenal of nuclear weapons. 5/
(b) Enriched uranium course
Pakistan is secretly constructing (near Kahuta, 20 km from Islamabad)
a plant for the production of weapon-trade onri abed uranium by c?cn t. r i fut?c..
Thi:: plant i hui1L on thcr hnuis of in format. ion c?oncernin>' 1irnnium
car i ohmi?n t. t.1?chnc)1 q. y t.o t i?n from t.!::, !!!t? nlr?r? tint in t.hc? Netherland:; by
a 1'?ndinr Pakistani ncient.ist, Dr. A. Q. Khan. C/ Paki::tun has estah1i::hed
a chain of "front" companies throughout 14 countries to acquire
clandestinely all the necessary components piece by piece. 7/
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Other activities in the nuclear fuel cycle
A/36/29F
En;,l ish
Pakistan apparently intends to build the plant in phases:
(i) A pilot plant which, already in 1979, was reported to have been
working. f3/
(ii) The assembling of about 1,000 centrifuges which are?expected to
nroduce enough enriched uraniur? for one nuclear explosive device
every two years. This phase is in the process of being completed.
(iii) The assembling of close, to 10,000 centrifuges which in turn could
produce about 150 hg of enriched uranium a year, sufficient to
make about seven nuclear explosive devices a year. 10/
(c) Developr!ent of the first nuclear explosive device
Pakistan is making preparations related to the development of an
explosive device and its testing. For this purpose, it is apparently
acquiring overseas the necessary items and equipment and is preparing a
detonation site in the desert. 11/
The first Pakistani nuclear explosive device will probably be a
plutonium one produced at the hot laboratories of PIPTSTECH. The decision
as to whether and when the first nuclear device is tested will apparently
be influenced by various political considerations facing the country's
leadership.
Pakistan is also actively seeking to achieve self-sufficiency in other
fields of the f
l
ue
cycle.
(a) Uranium mining and purchasing
Pakistan mines, rills and processes uranium ores at the Lera Gazi Khan
mines in the central region of the country. 12/ Several hundred tons of
uranium are being purchased from Niger, either directly or through Libya. 13/
(b) Fuel fabrication plant
Pakistan has built at Chasma a plant to manufacture fuel elements,
apparently using indigenous uranium. 14/'
tI. F(,rc? i rn and t'i ii:irir? i ri t :;ut)r)r,rt
There are reports that Libya and Saudi Arabia have provided extensive
financial assistance to Pakistan. 15/ Saudi Arabia, which expressed
admiration for the Pakistani achievements in the nuclear field, 16/ tried
to influence Pakistan to curtail Iraqi financial support in return for
sharing Pakistani know-how. 17/
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A/36/298
Ennlish
Sources
1? Energy Daily, ?lashin
4 December 1980, p. Don' 30 September 1980, p. 4; Nucleonics Week, N.y.
2. Washing-ton Post, 2; September 198o;
Energy Daily, 30 September 1980, P. 3.
3. Washington post 24
September 1980.
4, Energy Daily, 30 September 1980, p. 4; Washington Post, 23 September 1980.
5. Liberation, Paris, 17 June 1980; The Globe and Mail, Toronto
6. The Times, London, 8 March 1980. 19-21 June 1980.
criminal The Netherlands Government decided to start
proceedings against the Pakistani scientist
13 February 1981; News Bulletin - see Le Monde, Paris,
11 February 1981. The Hague, vol. 166, No. 69,
7. 8 Days, London, 23 June 1979, PP. 9-10.
8. Financial Times
London, 1fi Au(-ust 1979.
9. International Defence Review, Geneva, 1980, No. 2, p. 203.
10. 8 Days, 23 June 1979, P? 11.
11?? Daily Telegraph, London, s , 3 July 1979, p. 5; International Herald Tribune,
18 August 1979, p. 5; The Guardian 30 September 1980, P. 4. London, 17 June 1980; EnergSr~~
12. The
- I -_Hindu, Madras, India, 4 September 1980, p. 8.
13. Nuclear Fuel, New Jersey, 10 December 1979, _
4 January 1980; Nuclear Engineering Internationl,4Suttonncial Times,
February 1980, p, 11, , England,
14?
International Herald Tribune,
2 September
Se
t
98
p
X
0;
ember 1980; Washington p
Tnt~rnn.t.irrnrrl, n~?t~~h~ r-f;~liri? , 2) .)e pternber
Financial Times
Irmo; IV~~~?l,.r~r f:nrT.ir~r?~?r;
J .
16.
The r,j oh' and r~, 19-21 une 1980; Sunday Times. London, 18 January-1981
Al-Medi
.
na, Saudi Arabia, 14 December 1980.
17'.
Sunday Times, London, 18 January 1981.
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U.N. General Asset 1y aesoluti= on -:;sthb1ishraz.^t of
Nuclear-;;eapon-r'ree Zones in the :.idcle East
and South Asia
:
. o>, an dt C
35/147. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East
Date: 12 December 1980 Meeting: 94
Adopted without a.vote Report: A/35/690
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly
commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the
Middle East,
Recalling also its resolution 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it recognized
that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoyed wide support
in the region,
Searing in mind its resolution 31/71 of 10 December 1976, in which it expressed the
conviction that progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
Middle East would greatly enhance the cause of peace in the region and in the world,
Recalling its resolution 32/82 of 12 December 1977, in which it expressed the conviction
that the development of nuclear capability would further complicate the situation and
immensely damage the efforts to establish a nuclearweapon-free zone in the Middle East,
Guided by tae recommendations in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the
General Assembly dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region
of the Middle East, 39/
Recalling also its resolutions 33/64 of 14 December 1978 and 34/77 of 11 December 1979,
Recognizing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East
would greatly enhance international peace and security,
1. Urges all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and
urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of
the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries
concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 40/
2. Invites those countries, pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle
East and during the process of its establishment, to declare solemnly that they will refrain,
on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear
weapons and nuclear explosive devices;
3. Calls upon those countries to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from permitting the
stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and to agree to place all
their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
4a. Fo-ther invites those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclearweapon-free
zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare their support
for establishing such a zone in the region consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, in particular
paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and to deposit those
declarations with the Security Council for consideration as appropriate;
39/ Ibid., para. 63 (d).
40/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.
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5. Reaffirms again its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any
action contrary to the spirit and purpose of the present resolution and the objective of
establishing in the region of the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-fret zone under an effective
system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their
efforts to promote these objectives;
6. Renews its invitation to the Secretary-General to continue to explore the
possibilities of making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in
the region of the Middle East;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item
entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".
35/148. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia
Date: 12 December 1980 Meeting: 94
Vote: 96-3-44 (recored) Report: A/35/691
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December
1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978 and
34/78 of 11'December 1979 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South
Asia,
Reiterating its conviotion that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in
various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to
the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,
Believiag that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in
other regions, will strengthen the security of the Stz:es of the region against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons,
Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States
reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote
their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,
Rec Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions it called upon the States of the South
Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to
make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to
refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective,
Further recalling that, in its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX), 31/73 and 32/83, it requested
the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned
therein and to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,
Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth
Special Session of the General Assembly 41/ regarding the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South As.ia,
Lakin note of
nuclear-weapon-free
1. Reaffirms
in South Asia;
41/ Resolution S-10/2.
42/ A./35/452.
the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a
zone in South Asia, 42/
its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free
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2. Urges once again the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring
non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to
establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any
action contrary to this objective;
3. Calls upon those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively
to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to
promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and td
report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item
entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".
RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 35/148:
In favour: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad,
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen,
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Cabon, Cambia,
Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda,
Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United
States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius.
Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,
Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Central African Republic, Congo,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Lerman Democratic
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Malawi, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe,
Seychelles, Sweden, Ukraine, USSR, United Kingdom, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia.
Absent: Albania, Botswana, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Cuines-Bissau, Madagascar,
Saint Vincent, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Syria.
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