REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF DRAFT PAPER ON THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF NON-PROLIFERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: April 9, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/03/22: CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
NFAC 2043-81
9 April 1981
Chief, Political Military Issues Branch, OPA
F
Chief, uc ear Programs Branch, OSWR
Deputy Chief, Eastern Forces Division, OSR
Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation
Intelligence
SUBJECT: Request for Review of Draft Paper on the
Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation
1. Attached is a paper drafted by State/PM that it
wishes to submit to State/OES as part of what eventually will
be the basic paper on US nonproliferation policy. The draft
follows an outline prepared earlier by State/PM (also
attached). Section I.A.l. of the draft was furnished by
JCS/J-5.
2. This is to request your review of, and comments on
the draft by COB, Wednesday, 15 April 1981.
Attachments:
As Stated
When Removed From Attach-
ment Treat as CONFIDENTIAL
Ar)r)roved For Release 2007/03/22 - P87R00029R000200280038-7
 Approved For Release 209J'J2 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
' ? 10
SUBJECT: Request for Review of Draft Paper on the
Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation
Distribution:
1 - Each addressee
1 - NIC/AG
1 - NFAC Registry
2 - SA/NPI
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-R D.P87R00029R000200280038-7
2:. Political Destabilization
The emergence of additional nuclear weapon states could have a
significant destabilizing effect upon the international political
order. One result could be a gradual unravelling of the Non-prolifera-
tion Treaty and the IAEA safeguards which constitute the foundation of
the global non-proliferation regime. If new states join the nuclear
club, significant holdouts to the NPT may be confirmed in their resolu-
tion not to adhere to the NPT or the Treaty of Tiatelolco, and certain
NPT parties might feel tempted to abrogate the NPT. Others may choose
to follow the path of Iraq and Libya - undertaking an explosive option
as NPT members - significantly weakening the treaty regime.
As more nations obtain nuclear explosives, there could be added
strains on US alliance systems. If radical Third World states develop
nuclear weapons, neighboring countries friendly to the U.S. may feel
coerced and perhaps compelled to seek at least a partial accommodation
or equivalency. This would be particularly true if a Third World state
had enough capability so that there were a perception that it would be
difficult for the U.S. to come to the aid of its Allies and friends.
:In cases involving Middle East oil supplies, even Japan and our NATO
Allies could be subjected to pressure from strategically placed countries
with even a modest nuclear capability.
Proliferation would also adversely affect regional arms control
prospects and. regional balances, especially since many threshold states
are neighbors and rivals; e.g. Argentina/Brazil; India/Pakistan; and
:Israel/Iraq.. If a state in a chronically unstable area or one of
unresolved conflict such as the Middle East achieves nuclear explosives
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
?
2 -
or appears about to do so neighboring states with the requisite
technical capability would be tempted to develop their own weapons
or strike out preemptively at the proliferator. Under the threat
of proliferation it would be more difficult to seek restraint in
conventional arms or to maintain a stable political/military balance
of power.
In a more proliferated world, the Soviets and the U.S. might
have less control over the global nuclear balance than is true now.
The smaller nuclear forces of the UK, France, or the PRC are less
destabilizing than nuclear weapons controlled by radical states or
those with only regional concerns. If a state friendly to the USSR
became involved in conflict with a pro-American state and one or both
possessed nuclear weapons, the danger of superpower involvement and
possible confrontation could be increased. Furthermore, the Soviets
could feel threatened by the emergence of new nuclear weapons states
in contiguous areas such as the Middle East and South Asia and
possibly wish to take countermeasures.
Finally, nuclear proliferation could become a North-South issue of
contention. Some developing nations see the NPT as inherently dis-
criminatory and a potential abridgement of their sovereignty. The
inconclusive results of the 1980 NPT Review Conference indicate the
depth of Third World dissatisfaction with the way that the nuclear weapons
states carry out non-proliferation policies. An attempt by the U.S.
or other industrial states to act against a Third World proliferating
state would probably not have the backing of large segments of opinion,
and would be condemned by many or most developing countries.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
? ?
3. Further and More Dangerous Proliferation
If additional states begin overt tests of nuclear explosives or
moving from crude test devices to nuclear weapons, a new and more
dangerous stage in proliferation would begin. Thus far, no "Nth"
country (including India) has proceeded to the systematic separation
of special nuclear materials, or the assembly and deployment of nuclear
weapons. Additional proliferation however, could begin a chain reaction
of these activities. If a number of countries move toward developing
nuclear weapons, we can also expect some loss of control, and possible
diversion of nuclear materials and even the weapons themselves. It might
not be extraordinarily difficult for terrorists or other subnational
groups to obtain nuclear materials, a task which would be facilitated
by an absence of regular accountability and functioning IAEA safeguards.
It would be impossible for the U.S. and its Allies to guard against crude
terrorist devices using diverted SNM.
As more nuclear weapon states emerge, there would be increased
chances of diplomatic pressures or economic (including petroleum)
blackmail against the industrial states. Under these circumstances,
some nuclear suppliers might further relax their controls on exports of
sensitive materials and technology, leading to accelerated and more
sophisticated proliferation.
Fortunately, only a handful of non-nuclear weapons states would
have the industrial and technological base to move to thermonuclear
weapons and advanced long-range inertially guided ballistic missiles.
A thermonuclear weapons program would require far more resources and
highly trained manpower than is available to all but a few developing
nations (the U.S. should monitor foreign inertial confinement fusion
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
- 4.- ?
research closely, however). While the inability to develop adequate
miniturization of nuclear warheads would prevent most threshold states
from launching ICBMs with high yield weapons, there might be some
proliferation of the technology for shorter range suborbital rockets
which could carry low yield fission warheads.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
? ?
C. Trends and Threats in Threshold States, Non-Proliferation Policy Costs
The acquisition of sensitive facilities and material, while not
itself proliferation, raises some of the same political and security
problems - even if these facilities are safeguarded. Despite attempts
to justify these acquisitions on economic, energy, or technology grounds,
such actions may be perceived by others as an indicator of possible
intentions of developing nuclear weapons option. The emergence of
such "incipient states" could initiate a process of destabilizing counter-
actions. During the highly asymmetical and unstable period of transi-
tional vulnerability, those states which wish to retain regional
superiority or fear a neighboring state's nuclear intentions would
have an incentive to remove nascent threats. Preventive "surgical"
Strikes against the nuclear facilities of proliferating states are
possible. Similarly, countries may be tempted to engage in covert
operations against the nuclear programs of suspected proliferator states;
this is already happening to Iraq.
Awareness of vulnerability to another country's nuclear explosives
could polarize affected countries in a region to form regional alliances
against the proliferator and to seek outside (perhaps superpower)
protection. These alliances might be contrary to U.S. interests
(e.g. "front line" African states entering into relationships with the
Soviets to protect them from South Africa).
As proliferation develops cooperation between nuclear "pariahs"
would be likely to become more common, further reducing U.S. influence
over the actions of these counrries. There already is some degree of
nuclear cooperation between such politically isolated states as Israel,
Taiwan, and South Africa.
 .Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
S
- 2 -
Acquisition of sensitive facilities could also bring into play
L.S. legislative restrictions on security and economic assistance to
states acquiring unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing facilities,
a step which could affect the area's security balance adversely and
increase the incentive to proliferate.
Thus, an actual test of an explosive device is only the last step
in a process which throughout poses significant foreign and security
policy problems, not only in the proliferation context, but for important
regional security concerns.
Iraq is a current example of this process. It is an NPT party,
z.nd we have no direct evidence that it intends to develop a nuclear
explosive option. However, the fact that it is acquiring (generally
:-afeguarded) sensitive technology and equipment in the absence of a
r.uclear power program, when taken with its petroleum reserves, which
cast doubt on the need for nuclear power for development for the foresee-
z.ble future, and its radical political orientation, has begun the same
}:ind of regional and international counter reaction that would be
expected if its imminent intention to proliferate were established. As
could be predicted, the reaction has been strongest from Israel - the
:state with the greatest political/security concern over an incipient
Iraqi explosive capability, and secondarily from ourselves as guarantors
c,f Israeli security. Long before Iraq is actually capable of a nuclear
Explosion we may have an Israeli counter action that poses grave
regional problems. In the longer term, it is probably safe to predict
]Iranian concern, and possibly an Iranian perception of the necessity
to insure itself with its own explosive option on the Pakistan-Indian
n.odel. Likewise, because of the political dynamics of the eastern
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
Arab region, Egyptian reactions to the Iraqi program will have to
be carefully watched.
The Iraqi case also indicates some of the possible difficulties
in dealing with incipeint states. It has leverage over potential
suppliers (oil in the Iraqi case), political backing for the acquisition
of technology from other "non-aligned," and a regional framework which
would be generally favorable to such ambitions because of the area's
preoccupation with a regional conflict. It may be difficult to
identify and deal with the incipient state early on; obviously a
primary indicator will be the acquisition of sensitive facilities in
an area of unresolved conflicts. This seems self evident, but the
cases of Iraq, Pakistan, and the ROK indicate that it is not universally
The threat of proliferation, while reflecting changing technological
capabilities, particularly the industrialization of the Third World,
and the diffusion of technology, is largely (but not wholly) a product
of political insecurity, and the decision to pursue or keep open a
nuclear explosive option, is primarily a political/security decision.
Such decisions will reflect not only regional circumstances, but also
any perceived shift in the overall US-Soviet force balance, as well
as the emergence of radical Third World regimes. No state is likely
to take the nuclear option because of a direct Soviet threat, but
it well may do so if it feels threatened by a Soviet client and
perceives it does not have adequate US or other support. Likewise,
unstable international security situation offers more scope for
rnaneuvare in a regional context of radical regimes more or less
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
? i
independent of the Soviets. The technology of the decision may be dual
purpose, but it is neutral; there is no necessary connection between
technological capability and an explosive option. There is no doubt,
however, that the spread of technological capabilities is continually
making the political decision easier to implement. This argues for a
continued "activist" US non-proliferation policy, not only in regard
to the means of proliferation, sensitive materials and equipment,
but also toward the perceptions of insecurity. Thus a basic component
of a non-proliferation strategy, the most important one in the long
term, must be to alleviate perceptions of insecurity, and we will need
a comprehensive strategy toward each specific threat to deter or delay
a decision to go nuclear.
It should be added that some proliferation threats do not fit this
general pattern. Brazil, Argentina, and to a large extent India
seem to fall into a different category. Brazil and Argentina seem
locked into a rivalry for continent wide prestige and leadership, as
well as rivalry for status as a world power, where security is less
of a factor, that impels them to keep open the nuclear explosive option.
The security related tools available to us in dealing with Brazil and
Argentina may be less important in dealing with the problem than the
political/diplomatic ones. The case of India is of'another type. By
the time of its test it had overwhelming conventional military industrial
superiority over Pakistan. It is predominant in its region. Presumably
while its options are open, it would long since have embarked on
weaponization, if it felt a major threat from China.
Its explosive test may therefore have been more related to prestige
and non-aligned leadership, as well as confirming its superiority
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
?
?
over Pakistan. It may also be largely beyond our ability to effectively
influence the Indian program, except insofar as we are able to affect
that of Pakistan.
While non-proliferation policy has obvious benefits, it should
be recognized that there are political and material costs as well,
and a comprehensive strategy which attempts to alleviate the perceived
insecurity which is at the root of proliferation decisions will require
the most "tools" to make it effective. Some of these possible costs
are:
-- Friction with our major allies over supply of sensitive
facilities and materials to Third World countries.
-- Continued charges of "discrimnation" on the provision of
nuclear technology by the Third World which could
eventually have adverse effects on the NPT, IAEA or other
international regimes.
-- The necessity to provide some form of security assurances,
economic assistance or military assitance where we might
not otherwise do so, or not do so to such a degree. In
some cases, this could be perceived as our being "black-
mailed" by the threat of proliferation.
-- Spill over from bilateral nuclear issues into general
bilateral relations. Our attempt to stop the sale of
sensitive facilities to Brazil and the Tarapur,issue are
perhaps the foremost examples. But even with modified
policies, we will have legal and political constraints
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-R DP87R00029R000200280038-7
0 0
in the pursuit of non-proliferation objectives which will
affect relations in general (e.g. Symington-Glenn Amendments).
Use of intelligence assets. Much of our active pursuit
of non-proliferation relys on the intelligence community.
-- Maintenance of a cooperative posuture on nuclear arms
control. Whatever the reality and the possibilities, the
US needs to be seen as being ready to discuss nuclear arms
control. This opens us to various pressures in the CD,
UN and other international fora.
These costs present a speical problem in relation to some of
our friends who are potential proliferators - Korea, Taiwan and Israel.
In the case of Korea, maintenance of a troop presence and US nuclear
weapons, desirable as it may be for other reasons, may in part be
necessary to prevent a nuclear option. An attempt to proliferate would
require the use of US leverage which could be harmful to our relation-
ship in general. To assure non-proliferation in both Korea and Taiwan
we may have to decline some military cooperation (rockets, etc.) which
might otherwise be advisable. In the case of Taiwan, a continued
military supply relationship, although also desirable for other reasons,
is a part of non-proliferation policy, but has costs vis-a-vis the PRC.
The case of Israel could be particularly difficult. An Israeli
explosive test, or other overt evidence of a nuclear explosive
capabilities, given the legal constraints, would present us with
very serious problems. It would undermine all non-proliferation policy
for the region, and perhaps set off a nuclear arms race with the
gravest implications for regional security and stability.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
?
?
II. Suggested Strategy
We need an integrated approach of direct political incentives
and security measures, together with the non-security measures
elsewhere considered, in order to dissuade potential threshold states
from the explosive option. This is especially important since denial
of sensitive technology and equipment, while still fundamental, is
not fool proof. Since every country is different both in the forces
that determine its nuclear policies and its susceptibility to US
influence, it is impossible to formulate and execute a generalized
:non-proliferation policy. Measures that produce desired results in
one situation may not even be available in another.
With nuclear recipients (mainly in the Third World), we should
focus on the handful of countries of near to medium term proliferation
concern (e.g., India, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Libya, nd South Africa).
'toward the "threshold state" with generally friendly relations with
the U.S., we could seek to build a broader bilateral relationship
to help increase their sense of security and make nuclear weapons
seem less necessary to them. We would have to rely on more negative
methods of dissuasion with states which whom we have strained or
inimical relations.
Obvious methods of leverage are economic and security assistance,
and conventional arms sales. These tools might bolster the confidence
of insecure states which might otherwise seek nuclear weapons.
Generally, we do not recommend linking economic or military assistance
directly to nuclear policy. We should avoid even an implicit link
with countries which are not already friendly with the U.S. or have
an alliance with us.
Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
?
- 2 =
Bilateral military security guarantees and assurances could be
useful part of the confidence-building process which might lessen
the incentive to build nuclear explosives. Our willingness to create
an enhanced security relationship could include specific assurances,
joint exercises, basing, increased U.S. naval ship and military aircraft
visitations, etc. We must be careful to ensure that an expanded
military relationship with a particular country does not spur a rival
state to initiate or accelerate a nuclear explosives program of its
ow:n. On the other hand, vigorous conventional military support by the
U.S. may be an effective way of dissuading a state from developing
nuclear weapons to answer a beginning nuclear explosives program of
a neighboring state.
We must also consider the proliferation implications of U.S.
overseas force deployments. We must maintain our ability to project
our military power abroad, since a perceived decline in U.S. military
power might be an incentive for states to develop nuclear explosives.
The USG should play close attention to the legitimate security concerns
of threatened Allies which depend on U.S. forces to maintain a
conventional warfare equivalance.
The U.S. should also encourage multinational security-building
agreements. Promoting additional NPT adherence, and expanding IAEA
safeguards and international controls on sensitive nuclear facilities
can reduce the perception of a potential nuclear threat from a regional
adversary. Promotion of nuclear weapon fee zones if feasible might
also help. Promoting peaceful settlement of regional disputes can
also indirectly be a major contribution to non-proliferation.
Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
? ?
For states which depend on the US, we may need to underline the
relationship between US military an3 eocnomic assistance and observance
of non-proliferation commitments. In extreme cases, denial of US
military protection to states violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
cancellation of economic assistance or eligibility for Exim Bank
credits would be possible. Negative pressures such as these can be
effective if a potential proliferator has no readily available
alternative means of support. Where dependence is not so great,
however - as in the case of Pakistan - the termination of arms shipments
or economic assistance may not change nuclear policies.
With industrial states, the primary aim is to achieve better
cooperation with our West European allies and other nuclear suppliers
only only in achieving restrain in transfer of sensitive nuclear
technology, but also in gaining an improved political coordination of
our mutual non-proliferation goals. We will need to work with Western
Europe, Japan, and the USSR to put political pressure on and
consider sanctions for would-be proliferators.
Mutual nuclear restraint and non-proliferation cooperation with
the USSR is both important and difficult in light of our overall strained
relationship. While the Soviets have generally supported US non-
proliferatin objectives, deteriorating East-West relations have helped
increase the global instability which spurs proliferation attempts.
Maintaining scrupulously our conventional and nuclear security
commitments to NATO, Japan, and other key Allies is an essential
contribution to non-proliferation. The presence of US forces in West
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
is ?
Europe and the US "nuclear umbrella" help to prevent any considera-
tion of nuclear weapons in Germany, Italy, or other non-nuclear
weapons-countries. Similarly the US-Japanese defense Treaty and
strong American naval and Air Forces in Western Pacific play a
major role in preserving Japan as a non-nuclear weapon state.
 For del as 07/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
1. lac; t~-= ~^~. ? i,?, ,,a 4 /t-~.~~, .~. roc: t
India's demonstrated nuclear explosives capability and
the advanced state of Pakistan's nuclear program could have
significant consequences for our interests in South and
Southwest Asia. The heightened tension resulting from the
the presence of Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosives could
spur a greater conventional arms buildup, and perhaps a race
for weaponization (India would be certain to win such a race
with its superior technological and industrial base). There
would be a risk that a future Indo-Pakistani conflict could
result in the use of nuclear weapons. A nuc'car arms race
in South Asia might spur such states as Iraq to emulate the
Pakistani program; in the longer run, Iran might also consider
nuclear explosives. Saudi Arabia, Oman, and other friendly
Gulf states would feel even more insecure. Our bilateral
relationships with both India and Pakistan would be hurt;
we might be unable to assist Pakistan further, and our stable
relationship with India would be damaged. Finally, Israel
might become nervous at the possible transfer of technology
from Pakistan to other Islamic countries.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7
Next 25 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2007/03/22 : CIA-RDP87R00029R000200280038-7