NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY CHECK LIST FOR THE THE 97TH CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00029R000200260015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 20, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
20 February 1981
Herewith, FYI, a copy of the NP policy STAT
check list for the 97th Congress handed to
me by W. Donnelly at Wednesday's briefing.
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CHECK LIST FOR THINKING ABOUT U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
IN THE 97TH CONGRESS
It seems likely that the policy of the incoming Reagan administration
will differ somewhat from that of the Carter administration concerning
the relation between nuclear power and the spread, or proliferation,
of nuclear weapons to countries
The following check list is intended to indicate those matters which probably
will require attention in forming the Reagan nonproliferation policy
and.. its interaction with the Congressional policy laid down in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The list is in three parts. Part I lists
several overall questions to be considered. Part II is a detailed list which
also includes a column in which the reader can rate the comparative importance
of the items. Part III is a list of known matters that will
require some attention from the Reagan administration and probably from
Congress.
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PART I
PRINCIPAL OVERALL QUESTIONS
1. Linkage.
What linkage is seen between nuclear power and the spread of
nuclear weapons and the ability to make them?
2. The importance of nonproliferation.
How important is it to the U.S. that:
No more nations get nuclear weapons?
Only a few more nations get nuclear weapons?
What price is the U.S. willing to pay to get its nonproliferation
ideas accepted?
3. Purpose of nonproliferation policy.
What does the U.S. want to accomplish?
How does this compare with the present combination of. President
Carter's policy and that of the Nuclear NonProliferation Act?
The Carter Administration emphasized constraints on technology and special
nuclear materials transfers to delay the capacity of other countries to
develop weapons capabilities. The resulting cost has been increased
strains in U.S. relations with a number of countries. Are policies
designed to reassure countries facing security threats likely to deter
them from nuclear weapons programs? At what costs to the U.S.? Should
policy be directed at preventing specific countries, such as Iraq and
Libya, from developing weapons programs while establishing sufficiently
strong and supportive relations with others (perhaps Korea and/or
Pakistan) that we would be able to induce them to manage their capability
with moderation and judgment?
4. Ways and means.
What are the principal means available to the U.S. to carry out
its policy? What changes are happening and likely to happen
to U.S. sources of influence and "leverage" to get other nations
to accept our nonproliferation policies and ideas?
5. Relation to foreign and defense policy.,
Is nonproliferation policy to be treated in vacuum?
To what extent should it interact with and relate to foreign
and defense policy?
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PART II
DETAILED CHECK LIST AND RATING SCHEME
1. Appointments of the political level officials concerned with
proliferation in the Departments of Energy, State, and Commerce;
in ACDA; and the chairman of the NRC. Also appointments to the
NSC.
-2. An early Presidential statement on initial thinking of
the administration to reassure other nations against precipitous U.S.
policy changes, possibly a reaffirmation of reliability of supply
and an indication of the scope and timing of the new administration's
review of nonproliferation policy.
3. A decision on extension of nuclear cooperation with Euratom
during current renegotiation of the existing agreement for for
cooperation. [Needed in March, 1981].
4. A decision by the Department of Energy whether to extend
permission to Japan to reprocess spent nuclear fuels under U.S.
controls at the Tokai Mura experimental reprocessing plant there.
[Needed in March, 1981].
RATING */
Suggested rating scheme: 0 = unimportant, no action required; 5 = minor
importance, action indefinitely deferrable; 10 = some importance, action
deferrable for a while; 15 = substantial importance, early action needed;
20 = utmost importance, immediate action needed.
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is
1. Proliferation risks. Review of the Carter policy of
"no-plutonium-now" with attention to:
-Proliferation risks seen in civil production and use of
plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
RATING */
-Risks of new reprocessing, plutonium fuel fabrication, and
enrichment plants in non-nuclear weapons states.
-Assessment of proliferation risks as seen by the U.S. and
as indicated in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation of the Carter administration.
Foreign perception of U.S. nonproliferation policy and
its goals.
2. Initial statement of the new administration's nonproliferation
policies and how they differ from those of the Carter
administration.
3. Review of the relation of U.S. nonproliferation policy to
U.S. foreign policy and to U.S. defense and national
security policy.
4. Review of the relation of U.S. nonproliferation policy to
domestic policy for development, regulation and use of
nuclear power.
5. Consideration of the implications of the International Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Evaluation, initiated by President Carter, and
of the second NPT Review Conference for U.S. nonprolifera-
tion policy and its administration.
6. Detailed review and reconsideration of the Nuclear NonProlifera-
tion Act of 1978 in the light of the findings and recommenda-
tions of the Comptroller General's three year study of the act,
due in March 1981, with respect to:
-Fundamental policy statement;
-Purpose of export licensing criteria and procedures;
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MATTERS FOR LONGER TERM ATTENTION, CONTINUED
ITEM RATING
-Purpose of post export controls, their criteria and
procedures;
-Renegotiation of existing agreements for cooperation,
especially the requirement for retroactive application;
and
-Sanctions against violations of nonproliferation
commitments.
7. Nuclear exports and technology transfer:
-Their current value to the U.S. nuclear industry and
to the U.S. economy; and
-The current state of the "leverage" they provide for
U.S. policy.
8. Direct proliferation:
-What to do about nations suspected of interest in
development of nuclear weapons independently of
nuclear power (Israel, Pakistan, South Africa,
Iraq). Ad hoc responses or contingency planning?
9. Arms control and defense policy linkage:
-Relation of U.S. nonproliferation policy to U.S.
policy for arms control and disarmament, particularly
for SALT, the comprehensive nuclear test ban
treaty, increased plutonium production for weapons, and
no-first-use pledges.
10. Ways and means to limit proliferation -- political and
institutional:
-U.S. nuclear technological. leadership;
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MATTERS FOR LONGER TERM ATTENION, CONTINUED
-U.S. political leadership;
-Promises of reliable nuclear supply; and
-Threats to deny supply.
-U.S. participation in the new IAEA Committee on
Assurances of Supply (CAS).
-U.S. participation in the IAEA's International
Plutonium Storage study, and the possibility of
relaxed U.S. post export controls over plutonium
for States agreeing to such storage and control.
-U.S. participation in the IAEA's International Spent
Fuel Storage study.
-U.S. participation in, or initiation of, negotiations
to establish international or regional (multinational)
arrangements for supply of uranium, enrichment,
reprocessing and other nuclear fuel cycle services.
-Reactivation of the London nuclear suppliers club to
seek stronger controls over nuclear exports and
technology transfers.
11. Ways and means to limit proliferation -- technological:
-Improving light water reactors to reduce the present
need for breeders.
-Developing fuel for breeders that is dangerous
and difficult to divert and misuse.
-Developing enrichment methods incapable of producing
highly enriched uranium (The French approach).
-Improving safeguards technology.
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MATTERS FOR LONGER TERM ATTENTION, CONTINUED
14. Organizational improvements.
-Review of Federal agency assignments, responsibility
and performance relating to nonproliferation for the
Departments of Commerce, Energy and State, ACDA, EPA,
NRC, NSC, and possible transfer of nuclear export
licensing from the NRC.
-Review of interagency coordination for nonproliferation
policy and its administration.
15. Environmental effects of U.S. nuclear exports.
-Review of the effect of environmental reviews for nuclear
exports on the reputation of the United States as a
reliable nuclear supplier.
-The role of the NRC and its proper jurisdiction.
(Note, these questions are now in litigation)
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PART III
LIST OF NON-PROLIFERATION MATTERS LIKELY TO REQUIRE ATTENTION IN 1981.
Most likely matters.
1. The Comptroller General's report to Congress in March 1981 on
his three year study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act and
his possible recommendations for change.
2. Probable proposals from the nuclear industry and other sources
to amend the nonproliferation act.
3. Extension of nuclear cooperation with Euratom for another
year while the U.S. tries to renegotiate the existing
agreement to get Euratom to agree to requirements of the
nonproliferation act.
4. Department of Energy authorization to Japan to continue
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel which is under U.S.
control at its Tokai Mura facility. The present authoriza-
tion expires in March 1981.
5. Department of Energy authorization to Japan and other
countries to transfer spent fuel which is under U.S.
control to the United Kingdom or France for storage
and ultimate reprocessing.
6. Senate approval of the Convention on Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials which the U.S. signed on March 3,
1980.
7. An amendment to Title 18 of the U.S. Code to make
certain offenses involving nuclear materials a punishable
offense. This is needed to carry out the Convention
mentioned above. The administration submitted draft
legislation on August 22, 1980.
8. NRC action on the next exports of enriched uranium to
India for its Tarapur reactors. A license application
for the next two shipments was filed in September 1980.
(The Senate upheld President Carter's authorization
of two shipments in September 1980 by a margin of 2 votes.)
9. A decision by President Reagan whether to continue President
Carter's requirement that exports of highly enriched uranium be
approved by the President.
Likely matters
1. U.S. participation in the IAEA's study of International
Plutonium Storage.
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LIST OF NONPROLIFERATION MATTERS LIKELY TO REQUIRE ATTENTION IN 1981
CONTINUED
2. U.S. participation in the IAEA's International Spent Fuel
Storage study.
3. U.S. participation in the IAEA's Committee on Assurance of
Supply, whose first report is in the spring of 1981.
4. Potential controversey with Pacific Ocean states over the
U.S.-Japan study of a Pacific Spent Fuel Storage Center.
Less likely matters that might, however, arise.
1. Challenges to anticipated increased U.S. production of
plutonium for weapons, in connection with the U.N.'s
Special Session on Disarmament in 1982.
2. U.S. participation in a U.N. Conference on Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy being organized for 1982 or 1983.
The conference was proposed by Third World states and
probably would be critical of U.S. policies and those
of other nuclear supplier states.
3. Problems in renegotiation of the U.S. agreement for
nuclear cooperation with Taiwan in the light of
U.S. derecognition of that State.
4. Delays in renegotiation of other agreements for
nuclear cooperation, which was supposed to be
completed by March 1980.
WHD Revised 11/24/80