HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (HPSCI) DRAFT AUTHORIZATION BILL AND ACCOMPANYING REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01152R001001240002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 109
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 16, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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99TH CONGRESS H? }? 2419
1ST SESSION
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1986 for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Commu-
nity Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 8, 1985
Mr. HAMILTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1986 for intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Gov-
ernment, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and
for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That this Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Authoriza-
4 tion Act for Fiscal Year 1986".
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1 TITLE I-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
2 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
3 SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropri-
4 ated for fiscal year 1986 for the conduct of the intelligence
5 and intelligence-related activities of the following elements
6 (or offices, agencies or subelements thereof) of the United
7 States Government:
8 (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
9 (2) The Department of Defense.
10 (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
11 (4) The National Security Agency.
12 (5) The Department of the Army, the Department
13 of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
14 (6) The Department of State.
15 (7) The Department of the Treasury.
16 (8) The Department of Energy.
17 (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
18 (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
19 CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS
20 SEC. 102. The amounts authorized to be appropriated
21 under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of
22 September 30, 1986, for the conduct of the intelligence and
23 intelligence-related activities of the elements (or offices,
24 agencies or subelements thereof) listed in such section, are
25 those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
26 prepared by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
HR 2419 IN
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1 to accompany H.R. 2419 of the Ninety-ninth Congress. That
2 Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
3 Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
4 Representatives and to the President. The President shall
5 provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appro-
6 priate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
7 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERTER-
8 RORISM ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
9 INVESTIGATION
10 SEC. 103. In addition to the amounts authorized to be
11 appropriated under section 101(9), there is authorized to be
12 appropriated for fiscal year 1986 the sum of $15,200,000 for
13 the conduct of the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
14 gation to counter terrorism in the United States.
15 PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS
16 SEC. 104. The Director of Central Intelligence may au-
17 thorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the
18 numbers authorized for the fiscal year 1986 under sections
19 102 and 202 of this Act when he determines that such action
20 is necessary to the performance of important intelligence
21 functions, except that such number may not, for any element
22 (or offices, agencies or subelements thereof) of the Intelli-
23 gence Community, exceed 2 per centum of the number of
24 civilian personnel authorized under such sections for such ele-
25 ment. The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly
26 notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
?1 2419 ?
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1 House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intel-
2 ligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority
3 granted by this section.
4 PROHIBITION ON COVERT ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY
5 OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA
6 SEC. 105. During fiscal year 1986, no funds available to
7 the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense,
8 or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in
9 intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the
10 purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, direct-
11 ly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicara-
12 gua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or
13 individual.
14 TITLE II-INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
15 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
16 SEC. 201. There is authorized to be appropriated for the
17 Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1986 the sum of
18 $21,900,000.
19 AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END-STRENGTH
20 SEC. 202.. (a) The Intelligence Community Staff is au-
21 thorized two hundred and thirty-three full-time personnel as
22 of September 30, 1986. Such personnel of the Intelligence
23 Community Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelli-
24 gence Community Staff or personnel detailed from other ele-
25 ments of the United States Government.
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1 (b) During fiscal year 1986, personnel of the Inteili-
2 gence Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide
3 appropriate representation from elements of the United
4 States Government engaged in intelligence and intelligence-
5 related activities.
6 (c) During fiscal year 1986, any officer or employee of
7 the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is
8 detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from another
9 element of the United States Government shall be detailed on
10 a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee,
11 or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
12 period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
13 functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
14 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN
15 SAME MANNER AS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
16 SEC. 203. During fiscal year 1986, activities and per-
17 sonnel of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to
18 the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
19 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and the Central Intelligence Agency Act
20 of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) in the same manner as
21 activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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1 TITLE III-CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2 RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
3 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
4 SEC. 301. There is authorized to be appropriated for the
5 Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund
6 for fiscal year 1985 the sum of $101,400,000.
7 TITLE IV-PROVISIONS RELATING TO
8 INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
9 SEC. 401. (a) Title V of the National Security Act of
10 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413), relating to accountability for intelli-
11 gence activities, is amended by adding at the end thereof the
12 following:
13 "NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF CERTAIN EXPENDITURES AND
14 CERTAIN TRANSFERS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES
15 "SEC. 502. (a)(1) Funds available to an intelligence
16 agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or
17 intelligence-related activity only if-
18 "(A) those funds were specifically authorized by
19 the Congress for use for such activity; or
20 "(B) in the case of funds from the Reserve for
21 Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency and
22 consistent with the provisions of section 501 of this
23 Act concerning any significant anticipated intelligence
24 activity, the Director of Central Intelligence has, sub-
25 ject to the provisions of section 501, notified the appro-
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1 priate congressional committees of the intent to make
2 such funds available for such activity; or
3 "(C) in the case of funds specifically authorized by
4 the Congress for a different activity-
5 "(i) the activity to be funded is a higher pri-
6 ority intelligence or intelligence-related activity;
7 "(ii) the need for funds for such activity is
8 based on unforeseen requirements; and
9 "(iii) the Director of Central Intelligence or
10 the Secretary of Defense has notified the appro-
11 priate congressional committees of the intent to
12 make such funds available for such activity.
13 "(2) Fund available to an intelligence agency may not
14 be made available for any intelligence or intelligence-related
15 activity for which funds were denied by the Congress.
16 "(b)(1) The transfer of a defense article or defense serv-
17 ice exceeding $1,000,000 in value by an intelligence agency
18 to a recipient outside that agency shall be considered a signif-
19 icant anticipated intelligence activity for the purpose of sec-
20 tion 501 of this Act.
21 "(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply if-
22 "(A) the transfer is being made to a department,
23 agency, or other entity of the United States (so long as
24 there will not be a subsequent retransfer of the defense
25 articles or defense services outside the United States
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1 Government in conjunction with an intelligence or in-
2 telligence-related activity); or
3 "(B) the transfer-
4 "(i) is being made pursuant to authorities
5 contained in part II of the Foreign Assistance Act
6 of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, title 10 of
7 the United States Code (including a law enacted
8 pursuant to section 7307(b)(1) of that title), or the
9 Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
10 of 1949, and
11 "(ii) is not being made in conjunction with an
12 intelligence or intelligence-related activity.
13 "(3) An intelligence agency may not transfer any de-
14 fense articles or defense services outside the agency in con-
15 junction with any intelligence or intelligence-related activity
16 for which funds were denied by the Congress.
17 "(c) As used in this section-
18 "(1) the term `intelligence agency' means any
19 department, agency, or other entity of the United
20 States involved in intelligence or intelligence-related
21 activities;
22 "(2) the term `appropriate congressional commit-
23 tees' means the intelligence committees and the Com-
24 mittee on Appropriations of each House;
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1 "(3) the term `intelligence committees' means the
2 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
3 House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
4 Intelligence of the Senate;
5 "(4) the term `specifically authorized by the Con-
6 gress' means that-
7 "(A) the activity and the amount of funds
8 proposed to be used for that activity were identi-
9 fied in a formal budget request to the Congress,
10 but funds shall be deemed to be specifically au-
11 thorized for that activity only to the extent that
12 the Congress both authorized the funds to be ap-
13 propriated for that activity and appropriated the
14 funds for that activity; or
15 "(B) although the funds were not formally
16 requested, the Congress both specifically author-
17 ized the appropriation of the funds for the activity
18 and appropriated the funds for the activity;
19 "(5) the terms `defense articles' and `defense serv-
20 ices' mean the items on the United States Munitions
21 List pursuant to section 38 of the Arms Export Con-
22 trol Act (22 CFR part 121);
23 "(6) the term `transfer' means-
24 "(A) in the- case of defense articles, the
25 transfer of possession of those articles, and
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1
"(B) in the case of defense services, the pro-
2
vision of those services; and
3
"(7) the term `value' means-
4
"(A) in the case of defense articles, the
5
greater of-
6
"(i) the original acquisition cost to the
7
United States Government, plus the cost of
8
improvements or other modifications made by
9
or on behalf of the Government; or
10
"(ii) the replacement cost; and
11
"(B) in the case of defense services, the full
12
cost
to the Government of providing the
13
services.".
14 (b) The table of contents at the end of the first section of
15 such Act is amended by inserting the following after the item
16 relating to section 501:
"Sec. 502. Notice to Congress of certain expenditures and certain transfers of
defense articles.".
17 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VULNERABILITY REPORT
18 SEC. 402. (a) The Director of Central Intelligence shall
19 review and evaluate the vulnerability of confidential United
20 States Government activities abroad, and information con-
21 cerning such activities, to efforts by foreign powers to detect,
22 monitor or counter such activities, or to acquire such
23 information.
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I (b) Within one hundred and twenty days after the date
2 of enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence
3 shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
4 gence of the House of Representatives and the Select Com-
5 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate a comprehensive report
6 on the matters described in subsection (a), including plans for
7 improvements which are within his authority to effectuate,
8 and recommendations for improvements which are not Within
9 his authority to effectuate.
10 (c) The report described in subsection (b) of this section
11 shall be exempt from any requirement for publication or dis-
12 closure.
13 TITLE V-GENERAL PROVISIONS
14 RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
15 SEC. 501. The authorization of appropriations by this
16 Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the con-
17 duct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise au-
18 thorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
19 INCREASES IN EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW
20 SEC. 502. Appropriations authorized by this Act for
21 salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal em-
22 ployees may be increased by such additional or supplemental
23 amounts as may be necessary for increases in such benefits
24 authorized by law.
0
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99TH CONG.RE`SS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Rept. 99-
1ST SESSION Part I
IlITELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986
May 15, 1985.--Ordered to be printed
Mr. Hamilton, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
REPORT
together with
Minority Views
[To accompany H.R. 2419]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 2419) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1986 for the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, for
the Intelligence Community Staff, for the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having considered
the same, report favorably thereon and recommend that the bill do pass with
amendments.
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1986 for (a) the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S.
Government, (b) the Intelligence Community Staff and (c) the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability system;
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The committee was not convinced that the total amount requested for fiscal
year 1986 was fully warranted. The committee supports a lower level of effort
than that requested by the President in his budget. Therefore, the committee
has recommended deferral of certain proposals, the deletion of others, while a
few items were increased. The overall impact of the recommendation is a
significant reduction in the request. The reductions recommended by the
committee reflect percentage reductions larger than those adopted by the
Committee on Armed Services to the overall FY 86 defense budget.
Further, these reductions are reflected in the total reductions and
resultant growth rate for the overall defense budget recommended by H.R. 1872,
the FY 1986 Defense Authorization Act. In the committee's view the
recommended authorization for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
in this bill represents a reasonable balance between needed capabilities and
prudent cost. The committee has stated repeatedly in the past that increases
of the magnitude requested over the past several years cannot be sustained.
These requests represent a program to increase capabilities and respond to new
requirements, but they also represent funding commitments that already promise
to become difficult to meet in the years to come.
It should be understood that the intelligence budget is largely a subset
of the defense budget. Almost all of the intelligence budget is contained
within the defense budget both for reasons of security and because the great
majority of intelligence activities are conducted by elements of the
Department of Defense. Thus, increases and decreases for intelligence are
largely changes to the defense budget and are not direct changes to the
federal budget as a whole. The Defense Authorization Bill establishes the
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(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 1986 for
the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S.
Government;
(3) Permit the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize
personnel ceilings in fiscal year 1986 for any intelligence elements
up to 2 percent above the authorized levels;
(4) Prohibit the use of any funds available to any agency
involved in intelligence activities for military or paramilitary
operations in Nicaragua;
(5) Provide notice to Congress of certain expenditures and
certain transfers of defense articles; and
(6) Require the Director of Central Intelligence to review and
evaluate the vulnerability of confidential United States Government
activities abroad.
The committee once again has considered the question of public disclosure
of various intelligence budget figures and has concluded disclosure is not in
the public interest. By itself, a single intelligence budget total would
probably not harm intelligence activities or capabilities. Such a number,
however, would be meaningless in a vacuum. It is unclear what number would be
used: The total National Foreign Intelligence Program; Tactical Intelligence
and Related Activities; authorization; appropriation? In any case, the
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description which would be necessary to make the budget figure comprehensible
would itself be highly sensitive. It is in this context that the committee
fears that budget disclosure can be harmful and inconsistent with the primary
purpose of secrecy in intelligence matters.
Intelligence activities and capabilities are inherently fragile. Unlike
weapons systems, which can be countered only by the development of even more
sophisticated systems developed over a long period, intelligence systems are
subject to imrmediate compromise. Often they can be countered or frustrated
rapidly simply on the basis of knowledge of their existence. Thus budget
disclosure might well mean more to this country's adversaries than to any of
its citizens. Further, this information could then be used to frustrate
United States intelligence missions.
The comtmittee recognizes that the best argument in favor of budget
disclosure is public accountability. Because it feels strongly, however, that
the public does not wish congressional oversight to frustrate legitimate
intelligence activities, but rather to guarantee their proper course, the
committee continues to believe the disclosure of any intelligence budget
information is not in the public interest. The committee has made, and will
continue to make, a consistent effort to conduct its oversight and legislative
proceedings in public in order to provide the public with the assurance that
intelligence activities are receiving appropriate congressional scrutiny.
The classified schedule of authorizations and the detailed explanation
found in the annex to this public report contain a thorough discussion of all
budget issues considered by the committee and are available to all Members of
the House. The schedule of authorizations lists the amounts of dollars and
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personnel ceilings for all the intelligence and intelligence-related programs
authorized by the bill. These are directly incorporated into, and are
integral to, the bill itself. It is the intent of the committee that all
intelligence programs discussed in the annex to this report be conducted in
accordance with the guidance and limitations contained therein.
. The National Foreign Intelligence Program budget consists of resources of
the following departments, agencies, and other elements of the Government:
(1) the Central Intelligence Agency; (2) the Department of Defense; (3) the
Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) the National Security Agency; (5) the
Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force; (6) the Department of State; (7)
the Department of Treasury; (8) the Department of Energy; (9) the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; (10) the Drug Enforcement Administration; and (11)
the Intelligence Community Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence. The
Department of Defense Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities [TIARA] are
a diverse array of reconnaissance and target acquisition programs which are a
functional part of the basic force structure and provide direct information
support to military operations. TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Secretary of Defense, include those activities outside the
Defense Intelligence program which respond to operational command tasking for
time sensitive information as well as to national command, control, and
intelligence requirements. These military intelligence activities also fall
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services. Pursuant to their
shared. jurisdiction, both committees have agreed to the amount authorized for
TIARA programs.
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Beginning in February 1985, the Program and Budget Authorization
Subcorrmittee conducted a series of hearings which ran through March. The
budget hearings involved a total of more than 56 hours of testimony with
witnesses from each major intelligence and intelligence-related program.
These budget hearings resulted in written responses to many additional
questions.
The administration requested real growth for fiscal year 1986 over the
arnount Congress appropriated for intelligence in fiscal year 1985, a year in
which there was substantial growth in intelligence spending. in part the
increase resulted from inflation, in part from the need to procure new types
of equipment to provide better intelligence support to combat units, in part
to improve or upgrade existing intelligence systems, in part to develop new
systems and in part to augment personnel levels. The committee is convinced
that U.S. intelligence agencies are performing a vital service for the
national security. As in the past years, the corrnmittee also finds certain
shortcomings in the management and conduct of certain of the nation's
intelligence activities. Recommendations for making improvements in these
areas are contained in the classified annex to this report and the conIInittee
will be pursuing these and other related issues further during the coming
months.
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overall budget limit for defense and reflects all changes to intelligence
programs contained in this bill except for those few programs which are not in
the defense budget. As a result of this close correlation between
intelligence and defense, the committee takes the view that reductions to
intelligence should parallel those made to the defense budget as a whole. The
committee's recommended reductions are somewhat greater than the reduction
currently proposed for the defense budget overall. This reduction still
permits limited real growth in the intellience budget because it contained
more growth than the average growth for defense overall. Budget emphasis on
intelligence was a deliberate decision by the President, Secretary of Defense,
and Director of Central Intelligence. The committee accepts the priority that
has been placed on intelligence, but has recommended reductions which are
commensurate with those applied to defense as a whole and which are
responsible.
The committee recognizes that the budget submitted by the Director of
Central Intelligence grew considerably less this year compared to recent
previous years. Additional demands for intelligence will create pressure for
greater growth. The committee believes that very little real growth can be
expected for the next several years.
Amendments
On page 4, line 6, strike everything through line 13 and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
"SECTION 105. During fiscal year 1986, no funds available to the
Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, or any other
agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence
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activities may be obligated or expended, directly or indirectly, for
material assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance including
arms, ammunition, or other equipment or material which could be used
to inflict serious bodily harm or death, or which would have the
effect of providing arms, ammunition or other weapons of war for
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any group,
organization, movement or individual."
On page 6, lines 24-25, strike ", subject to the provisions of section
501,".
On page 7, line 2, strike "Fund" and insert in lieu thereof "Funds".
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIC C'E-RELATED ACTIVITIES
Section 101 lists the departments and agencies for whose intelligence and
intelligence-related activities the bill authorizes appropriations for fiscal
year 1986.
Section 102 makes clear that, with the exception of sections 103 and 105,
details of the committee's recommendations with respect to the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities and personnel ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year
1986 are contained in a classified schedule of authorizations to the bill and
the classified annex to this report. The schedule of authorizations is
incorporated into H.R. 2419 by this section.
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Section 103 authorizes appropriations of $15,200,000 for the
counterterrorism program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Section 104 permits the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize the
personnel strength of any intelligence element to exceed the fiscal year 1986
authorized personnel levels by no more than 2 percent if he determines that
doing so is necessary for the performance of important intelligence
functions. The Director must notify the two intelligence committees promptly
of any exercise of authority under the section.
It is to be emphasized that the authority conveyed by this section is not
intended to permit the wholesale raising of personnel strength in each or any
intelligence component. Rather, the section provides the Director of Central
Intelligence with flexibility to adjust personnel end strength temporarily for
contingencies and for overages caused by an imbalance between hiring of new
employees and attrition of current employees for retirement, resignation,
etc. The committee does not expect the Director of Central Intelligence to
allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed personnel levels set
in the schedule of authorizations except for the satisfaction of clearly
identified hiring needs which are consistent with the authorization of
personnel strengths in this bill. In no case is this authority to be used to
provide for positions denied by this bill.
As introduced, Section 105 would have prohibited any funds available to
any agency involved in intelligence activities being used to support, directly
or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. The section
also had the effect of denying any funds requested for such a purpose in
fiscal year 1986. It would extend the current statutory prohibition for
support to the Nicaraguan "contras" through the end of FY 1986.
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An amendment was adopted by the committee to strike the original language
of Section 105 so as to make clear that the prohibition that applies to
supporting Nicaraguan insurgents or "contras" applies only to the provision of
funds, goods, equipment, civilian or military supplies, or any other materiel,
but does not include the provision of intelligence information or advice to
the contras.
TITLE II--INTELLIGENCE CCt14UNITY STAFF (ICS)
Section 201 authorizes the appropriation of $21,900,000 for the
Intelligence Community Staff (ICS], which provides the Director of Central
Intelligence [DCI] with staff assistance to carry out his intelligence
community responsibilities. The Staff supports the DCI in the execution of
his responsibilities to develop, review, and approve the National Foreign
Intelligence Program budget, to evaluate the performance of foreign
intelligence activities, and to develop issues, goals, and other required
guidance' for the intelligence community.
Sections 202 and 203 provide certain administrative authorities for the
Intelligence Community Staff. Section 202(a) authorizes 233 full-time
personnel for the staff as of September 30, 1986. The Intelligence Community
Staff is composed of a permanent cadre, detailed community personnel, and
contract hirees.
The Intelligence Community Staff is now made up of personnel who are
permanent employees of the Staff and others who are detailed for several years
from various intelligence elements. The purpose of section 202(b) is to
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authorize this staff approach and to require that detailed employees represent
all appropriate elements of the Government, including those engaged in
intelligence-related activities.
Section 202(c) requires that personnel be detailed on a reimbursable basis
except for temporary situations. The Staff's authorized size, in the opinion
of the corrrnittee, is sufficient for the duties which the Staff performs. This
provision is intended to insure that its ranks are not swelled by detailees,
the personnel costs for whom are not reimbursed to their parent agency.
Section 203 provides the Director of Central Intelligence with authority
to manage the activities and to pay the personnel of the Intelligence
Community Staff because the Staff is not otherwise authorized by law.
However, it is the committee's intent that in the case of detailed personnel,
the DCI's authority to discharge personnel shall only extend to discharging
detailed personnel from service at the Intelligence Community Staff and not
from Federal employment or military service.
Section 301 authorizes appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) in the amount of $101,400,000 for
fiscal year 1986. The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for
Certain Employees (Public Law 88-643) authorized the establishment of CIARDS
for a limited number of Agency employees and authorized the establishment and
maintenance of a fund from which benefits would be paid to qualified
beneficiaries.
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The requested CIARDS funds will finance:
(1) Interest on the unfunded liability;
(2) The cost of annuities attributable to credit allowed for
military service;
(3) Normal cost benefits not met by employee and employer
contributions;
(4) The increase in unfunded liability resulting from
liberalized benefits and Federal pay raises.
The benefits structure of CIARDS is essentially the same as for the Civil
Service Retirement System with only minor exceptions. These exceptions are:
(a) annuities are based upon a straight 2 percent of high 3-year average
salary for each year of service, not exceeding 35; (b) under stipulated
conditions a participant may retire with the consent of the Director, or at
his direction be retired at age 50 with 20 years service, or a participant
with 25 years of service may be retired by the Director regardless of age; and
(c) retirement is mandatory at age 65 for personnel receiving compensation at
the rate of GS-18 or above, and at age 60 for personnel receiving compensation
at a rate less than GS-18, except that the Director may, in the public
interest, extend service up to 5 years.
Annuities to beneficiaries are provided exclusively from the CIARDS fund
maintained through: (a) contributions, currently at the rate of 7 percent,
deducted from basic salaries of participants designed by the Director; (b)
matching Agency (employer) contributions from the appropriation from which
salaries are paid, based on the actual rate of contributions received from
participants; (c) transfers from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability
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Fund representing employee and matching employer contributions for service of
Agency employees prior to the date of their participation in CLAIMS, and
contributions for service of integrated Agency employees included in CIARDS
following termination of integrated status; (d) income on. investments in U.S.
Government securities; and (e) beginning in 1977, direct appropriations
consistent with the provisions of Public Law 94-552.
Section 401 adds a new Section 502(a) to the National Security Act of 1947
requiring notice to the Intelligence and Appropriations Committees of the
House and Senate of expenditures for intelligence or intelligence-related
activities in excess of authorized amounts and a new Section 502(b) requiring
that transfers by an intelligence agency of items of military equipment or
services worth more than $1,000,000 per item or service be reported to the
intelligence committees under the provisions of Section 501 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (the Intelligence Oversight Act).
Section 401(a) codifies a section which has long appeared in annual
intelligence authorization acts. Since the fiscal year 1981 Intelligence
Authorization Act, that provision has required that funds spent for
intelligence activities must have been authorized in the amount for which they
are to be spent. If expenditures exceeded the authorized level, the Director
of Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense has been required to
notify the appropriate corrntittees of Congress in advance of the intent to
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exceed authorized levels. In addition, both the fiscal year 1984 and fiscal
year 1985 Intelligence Authorization Acts have included requirements that, in
the case of any reprogramming for an intelligence or intelligence-related
activity or the use of transfer authority by the Director of Central
Intelligence, that the new use of the funds in question be based on unforeseen
requirements of higher priority and that in no event could funds be spent for
intelligence programs which had been denied by Congress.
As redrafted in permanent form, Section 502(a) requires that funds may not
be spent for intelligence or intelligence-related activities unless those
funds have been specifically authorized. Specifically authorized is defined
to mean that the activity and the amounts to be spent for that activity have
been identified in a formal budget request to the Congress and that Congress
has either authorized those funds to be appropriated and they have been
appropriated, or, whether or not the funds have been requested, the Congress
has specifically authorized a particular activity, and authorized and
appropriated funds for that activity.
Section 502(a) also makes provision for the use of funds from the Reserve
for Contingencies to the Central Intelligence Agency. These funds are
authorized and appropriated for unforeseen contingencies that occasion the
need for rapid response. Such funds provide to the President and the Director
of Central Intelligence the flexibility to apply necessary sums to meet
opportunities or address crises that can develop in either the intelligence
collection or covert action arenas. The legislative history of previous
annual authorization acts recognized that funds in the Reserve were authorized
to be spent for such contingencies and therefore need not have been reported
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under the earlier reporting sections. However, the Congress has had, since
1976, an understanding with the Director of Central Intelligence that notice
of all releases from the Reserve for Contigencies would be made to the
Intelligence and Appropriations Committees at the time that each release was
sought, i.e., prior to any funds actually having been expended.
Section 502(a)(1)(B) recognizes that there could be circumstances under
which limited notice could be provided of significant anticipated intelligence
activities, particularly covert action operations, under the Intelligence
Oversight Act. To ensure that reporting of the same event, where funding is
sought from the Reserve, can be treated in the same way under new Section
502 (a) and Section 501, (the Intelligence Oversight Act), Section 502 (a) (1) (B)
makes clear that the reporting requirement with regard to the Reserve must be
"consistent with the provisions of Section 501 of this Act."*
Section 502(a)(1)(C) repeats the language of earlier versions of this
section requiring that if funds are shifted from one program to another, they
must be to satisfy a higher priority activity, the need for the funds must be
based on unforeseen requirements, and that appropriate notice must be given of
the transfer of such funds. These requirements have been in place since
fiscal year 1981 and reflect long-standing reprogramming or transfer
guidelines agreed to by the Congress and the intelligence and defense
communities.
* The committee made a technical change to Section 501 (a) (1) (B) to strike
the phrase ", subject to the provisions of Section 501," which had been
included in the bill as introduced because of a typographical error.
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Finally, Section 502 (a) (2) states that no funds may be made available for
any intelligence activity for which funds were denied by the Congress. This
prohibition applies to the use of all funds available to intelligence
agencies, whether programmed or contingency, and is to be construed strictly.
At the same time, it should be recognized that a program for which funding was
denied by Congress, but which has been restructured in a major way so as to
effectively constitute a new program, is not barred from being funded. Such
programs, however different they may be, if they address the same subject
matter, are matters of congressional interest and, by tradition and agreed
upon procedures, can only be funded by reprogramming. The use of contingency
funds such as the Reserve for Contingencies of the CIA would be an
inappropriate application of funds in such a case. That is because the
Reserve was created to permit flexible response to unforeseen circumstances
that could not have been anticipated. Restructuring programs denied by
Congress does not constitute responding to unforeseen circumstances. it is
the intent of Section 502(a)(2) to continue to prevent the funding for
programs which have been considered by Congress and for which funding has been
denied but not to prevent a restructuring along lines either directed by
Congress or acceptable to it.
Section 502(b) specifies that the transfer of a defense article or service
which exceeds $1,000,000 in value is to be treated as a significant
anticipated intelligence activity, as that term is employed in the
Intelligence Oversight Act (Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947).
The legislative history of the Intelligence Oversight Act makes clear that
all covert action findings made by the President pursuant to the Hughes-Ryan
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Amendment (22 U.S.C. 2422) are significant anticipated intelligence activities
and must be reported to the intelligence committees prior to their
implementation. What is less clear, and where the committee has in the past
experienced some difficulty in receiving satisfactory reporting under the
statute, have been the identification of significant anticipated intelligence
activities undertaken pursuant to an existing finding, but not reported or
perhaps even contemplated at the tine the initial finding was made. An
example of this would be the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors, which was not
brought to the attention of the committee prior to implementation.
Another important area of activity which takes place pursuant to an
existing covert action finding involves the transfer to another country or
faction, etc., of military equipment. If such transfers are made covertly or
clandestinely, they are in effect covert action. As such, they must be
reported under the Intelligence Oversight Act. If, pursuant to an already
approved covert action finding, a transfer rises to the level of significance,
as that concept is expressed by the legislative history of the Act, prior
notice should also be given. Some transfers will be in this category. There
will be other transfers of such equipment that will be de minimis or
inconsequential and which clearly do not rise to a level of great significance.
Although an arms transfer may be below the $1,000,000 threshold triggering
notice under Section 502(b), it must be recognized that it may require notice
under Section 501 because it represents a material change in an authorized
covert action, is a matter of Congressional interest, or there is some other
reason lending significance to the transfer.
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Generally, however, there are several reasons why military equipment
transfers, per se, are important. The provision of military equipment or
services, especially expensive, sophisticated, or very lethal equipment, is a
key aspect for the U.S. foreign policy. Security assistance can enhance the
stability of U.S. allies, discourage aggression by our adversaries, encourage
democracy, etc. It must be carefully devised, reviewed, and implemented lest
it work against U.S. interests.
At the same time, covert transfers of military equipment or services
bypass the established statutory framework for the consideration and approval
of security assistance programs. Being secret, these transfers avoid public
commentary, congressional review and debate. Therefore, they occur without
many of the usual checks and balances built into the Foreign Assistance Act
and the Arms Export Control Act. Because these statutes were intended to lay
out the review and approval process for arms transfers, the general public and
most of the Congress assume that what they do not have notice of does not
occur.
The use of secret arms transfers also can encourage the unwise use of that
capability. Programs that would never have been approved by the Congress
through overt security assistance channels may be attempted. If they are made
covertly, they avoid public debate. Under such circumstances, a transfer
could represent the misapplication of covert transfer authority that might
discredit the foreign policy structure and make justifiable transfers less
likely to be-accepted.
Finally, many covert transfers of military equipment do not stay covert
long. U.S. military equipment, in particular, is unique, especially large or
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expensive pieces of hardware. The discrepancies between current inventory and
those acquired by overt grant or sale will eventually be noticed and, when
they are, the administration then in power and the intelligence agencies
involved will have to produce explanations to those who will demand to know
why the transfers were made secretly.
In the past, prior notice of some transfers of clearly significant kinds
of military equipment was not provided to the intelligence committees until
after they had occurred. Yet Congress, in establishing the Foreign Assistance
Act/Arms Export Control Act statutory review process for arms transfers and
congressional oversight over all intelligence activities, has deemed that arms
transfers are significant. Congress has also structured its congressional
intelligence oversight committees to maintain the appropriate protection of
sources and methods and, at the same time, to keep their respective Houses and
other committees informed of significant intelligence activities.
Accordingly, the committee has adopted Section 502(b) to require prior
notification of all military equipment transfers whose value exceeds
$1,000,000 per unit.
Section 502(b) will not require prior notification of all covert military
transfers, only those which involve expensive, technologically important items
of military equipment. Of course, transfers of items in value less than
$1,000,000 per unit may, for reasons other than the value of the item
transferred, rise to the level of significance and still require prior notice
to the intelligence committees. Thus, the Committee is creating a rule that a
transfer of an item of a value in excess of $1,000,000 is per se
"significant"; and leaving transfers of an item of a value less than
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$1,000,000 to be determined as the Intelligence Oversight Act and its
legislative history dictate. One important means of making such
determinations is through the communication by the intelligence committees to
the intelligence agencies of their concerns and interests through reports,
procedures and budgetary documents.
The judgment of the Committee is that transfers of expensive items of
military equipment would no doubt raise the greatest concern for Congress and
the public. It is in this area that the determination that such transfers are
indeed significant anticipated intelligence activities is by far the clearest
case and it is in this area that it is most important for the Congress to be
able to comment prior to such transfers. It should be clear, as the explicit
reference to Section 501 shows, that the congressional significance of
oversight committees would not approve or disapprove such transfers. They
would receive notice of them that, experience shows, might not otherwise occur
under the executive branch's prior interpretation of the term "significant
anticipated intelligence activity," as used in Section 501.
While Section 502(b) does not specify how soon before transfer of an item
of defense equipment or service takes place that prior notice must be
provided, the committee is in agreement that ordinarily at least 15 days'
notice should be provided. Further, wherever possible, notice should be
provided prior to the initiation of efforts to effect a transfer, i.e.,
immediately after approval by the appropriate authority. The committee
considered making this a statutory requirement but decided that its experience
was that at least 15 days' notice is normally provided and can be considered
to be reasonable and customary. If extraordinary circumstances arise, the
committee understands that advance notice of less than 15 days may be provided.
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Section 502(b) covers transfers. Transfer in this context means the
transfer of possession and therefore includes loans, bailments or other sorts
of nominally temporary transfers and, in the case of a defense service, the
actual provision of such a service.
The transfers covered by Section 502(b) are transfers of defense articles
or defense services, which mean items on the Munitions List established
pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act.
The value of a defense article or a defense service must exceed $1,000,000
to come under the provisions of Section 502(b). Value is determined, in the
case of a defense article, by the original acquisition costs plus any
improvements or modifications made by the Government or for the Government
(including the cost of the transportation associated with a particular
transfer) or the replacement cost of that article (including transportation)
whichever is greater.
Replacement cost for a defense article still in production would be the
current unit cost. For a defense article no longer in production, replacement
cost would be the. cost of the most comparable defense article of the same type
or category, such as the item of equipment which may have taken the place in
current military inventories of the item no longer in production. Where there
is no comparable defense article, replacement cost may be less susceptible to
accurate determination. In such circumstances, the best way to calculate
replacement cost would be to estimate a reasonable, current cost of production
if the item in question were in production. Whatever method is used should
err in favor of higher value and subsequent notification to the Commiittee.
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In the case of a defense service, replacement value is the full cost to
the Government of providing the services (including the transportation and
other expenses associated with any U.S. personnel providing the service).
Section 502(b) is intended to encompass clandestine or covert transfers.
It explicitly does not include transfers pursuant to the Foreign Assistance
Act or Arms Export Control Act, i.e. foreign aid. It does not include
disposition of excess federal property under the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 nor does it include Economy Act or other
transfers between government departments so long as the items or services
transferred are not in turn provided to a recipient outside the U.S.
Government.
Section 502(b) covers transfers to any type of recipient, including, but
not limited to, foreign governments, foreign factions or insurgent groups, or
individuals. Notice of transfers covered by Section 502(b) is provided to the
intelligence committees of the House and Senate. These committees have as one
of their responsibilities to their respective Houses the duty to inform other
committees or the House itself of matters which, in their view, are of such
significance that they deserve the attention of such other committees or House.
Finally, Section 502(b)(3) makes clear that any transfer of any defense
article or any defense service which has been in conjunction with an
intelligence or intelligence-related activity for which funds were denied by
Congress may not take place. This stipulation, like that referred to in
Section 502(a) regarding denial of funding, should be strictly construed and
applied. Programs involving transfers of military equipment which are major
restructurings of denied programs should be treated in the same way as
restructured programs under Section 502(a)(2).
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Section 402 of the bill requires the Director of Central'Intelligence to
provide a report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees 120 days
after enactment of the bill. The subject matter of the report is to be the
vulnerability of confidential U.S. Government activities abroad, particularly
at U.S. Embassies and Consulates, to efforts by foreign powers (and, in
particular,-their foreign intelligence and security services) to detect,
compromise or otherwise frustrate such activities.
The committee has become very concerned in recent months about the
coordination and effectiveness of U.S. security and counterintelligence
efforts in U.S. missions abroad. For this reason, it is directing that a
report be submitted so that the committee will be in a position to assess on a
comprehensive basis the threat posed by foreign intelligence and security
services to U.S. missions overseas and consider what steps may be taken, both
within the competence of the Director of Central Intelligence and within the
responsibility of other government officials and agencies.
The committee seeks to assure itself that, if counterintelligence and
security efforts are not fully integrated and coordinated in these most
critical United States Government installations, this fact can be known and
measures to resolve this situation identified and quickly implemented. The
committee is of the view that lack of coordination and cooperation between
U.S. Government agencies represents a self-inflicted wound whose hemorrhage
must be stanched and which then must be surgically repaired. The committee
stands willing to consider all appropriate measures to ensure that any
vulnerabilities which stem from the lack of U.S. resources or inadequate
coordination are ended forthwith.
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TITLE V--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 501 provides that the authorization of appropriations by H.R. 2419
shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. H.R. 2419, with the exception of title IV,
authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 1986.
Section 502 provides authority for adjustments to Federal employee
compensation and benefit increases during fiscal year 1986 which are
authorized by current or subsequently enacted law. It obviates the necessity
for a separate authorization for such increases during the fiscal year.
This section also includes contingent authorization for subsequent
appropriations for unbudgeted amounts for salary, pay, retirement, and other
employee benefits in the event Congress acts to restore the Administration's
proposed five percent cut in civilian pay as reflected in the budget request.
The committee believes such a reduction would be ill advised and will support
such arestoration. However, it is the committee's view that funds authorized
for Operations and Maintenance accounts will be sufficient to provide for any
increase in civilian pay above budgeted amounts. The committee expects that
intelligence elements will draw upon such accounts in providing any necessary
increases for civilian pay.
On May 14, 1985, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, a quorum
being present, approved the bill with amendments and ordered it favorably
reported by voice vote.
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With respect to clause 2(1) (3) (A) of Rule XI of the House of
Representatives, the committee has held extensive hearings regarding the
nature and conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the U.S. Government in considering this legislation. This review is outlined
under the scope of the committee review section of the report. A wide range
of recommendations regarding intelligence programs and their management has
been included within the classified annex of this report.
FISCAL YEAR COST PRQJEC,TIONS
With respect to clause 2(1) (3) (B) of Rule XI of the House of
Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
this legislation does not provide new budget authority or tax expenditures.
The committee has attempted pursuant to clause 7 (a) (1) of Rule XIII of the
Rules of the House of Representatives to ascertain the outlays which will
occur in fiscal year 1986 and the 5 years following if these amounts are
appropriated. These estimates are contained in the classified annex and are
in accordance with those of the executive branch.
With respect to clause 2 (1) (3) (C) of Rule XI of the House of
Representatives, the committee has received no report from the Congressional
Budget Office.
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RECQMMD TIONS OF THE CCMMITIEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
With respect to clause 2(1) (3) (D) of Rule XI of the House of
Representatives, the committee has not received a report from the Committee on
Government Operations pertaining to the subject of this bill.
Pursuant to clause 2(1)(4) of Rule XI of the House of Representatives, the
cozzmittee has attempted to determine the inflationary impact of the bill.
The committee finds no adequate method to identify the inflationary impact
of the present legislation. Further, the bill does not provide specific
budget authority but rather authorizations for appropriation. Hence, any
inflationary impact would depend on the amounts actually appropriated and the
strain that short supplies of materials, production capacity or other economic
resources would place on industrial capacity.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are
shown as follows (new matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
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Table of Contents
TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 501. Congressional Oversight
* * * * * *
Section 502. Notice to Congress of Certain Expenditures and Certain
Transfers of Defense Articles.
Section 502. Notice to Congress of Certain Expenditures and Certain
(a)(1) Funds available to an intelligence agency may be obligated or
expended for an intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if--
(A) those funds were specifically authorized by the Congress
for use for such activity; or
(B) in the case of funds from the Reserve for Contingencies of
th Central Intelligence Agency and consistent with the provisions of
Section 501 of this Act concerning any significant anticipated
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intelligence activity, the Director of Central Intelligence has
notified the appropriate congressional committees of the intent to
make such funds available for such activity; or
(C) in the case of funds specifically authorized by the
Congress for a different activity--
(i) the activity to be funded is a higher priority
intelligence or intelligence-related activity;
(ii) the need for funds for such activity is based on
unforeseen requirements; and
(iii) the Director of Central Intelligence or the
Secretary of Defense has notified the appropriate congressional
committees of the intent to make such funds available for such
activity.
(2) Funds available to an intelligence agency may not be made
available for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity for which
funds were denied by the Congress.
(b)(1) The transfer of a defense article or defense service
exceeding 41,000,000 in value by an intelligence agency to a recipient
outside that agency shall be considered a significant anticipated
intelligence activity for the purpose of Section 501 of this Act.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply if--
(A) the transfer is being made to a department, agency, or
other entity of the United States (so long as there will not be a
subsequent retransfer of the defense articles or defense services
outside the United States Government in conjunction with an
intelligence or intelligence-related activity); or
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(B) the transfer--
(i) is being made pursuant to authorities contained in
part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export
Control Act, title 10 of the United States Code (including a law
enacted pursuant to section 7307(b)(1) of that title), or the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, and
(ii) is not being made in conjunction with an intelligence
or intelligence-related activity.
(3) An intelligence agency may not transfer any defense articles or
defense services outside the agency in conjunction with any intelligence.
or intelligence-related activity for which funds were denied by the
Congress.
(c) As used in this section--
(1) the term 'intelligence agency' means any department, agency, or
other entity of the United States involved in intelligence or
intelligence-related activities;
(2) the term 'appropriate congressional committees' means the
intelligence committees and the Committee on Appropriations of each House;
(3) the term 'intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on intelligence of the Senate;
(4) the term 'specifically authorized by the Congress' means that--
(A) the activity and the amount of funds proposed to be used
for that activity were identified in a formal budget request to the
Congress, but funds shall be deemed to be specifically authorized for
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that activity only to the extent that the Congress both authorized
the funds to be appropriated for that activity and appropriated the
funds for that activity; or
(B) although the funds were not formally requested, the
Congress both specifically authorized the appropriation of the funds
for the activity and appropriated the funds for the activity;
(5) the terms 'defense articles' and 'defense services' mean the
items on the United States Munitions List pursuant to section 38 of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 CFR part-121);
(6) the term 'transfer' means--
(A) in the case of defense articles, the transfer of possession
of those articles, and
(B) in the case of defense services, the provision of those
services; and
(7) the term 'value' means--
(A) in the case of defense articles, the greater of--
(i) the original acquisition cost to the United States
Government, plus the cost of improvements or other modifications
made by or on behalf of the Government; or
(ii) the replacement cost; and
(B) in the case of defense services, the full cost to the
Government of providing the services.
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MD ORITY VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES
STUMP, IRELAND, HYDE, CH 'Y, LIVINGSTON AND McEWE.nT
We resolutely oppose the absolute prohibition on material assistance to
the Nicaraguan democratic resistance contained in Section 105 of H.R. 2419.
As the situation in Nicaragua grows ever more grave, a majority of the
Committee acknowledges its dismay at the internally repressive and externally
subversive conduct of the Sandinista regime governing Nicaragua, but refuses
to vote for effective legislation which will help to stop that conduct. We
urge the House to reject Section 105 of H.R. 2419 and to support aid to the
Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Therein lies the opportunity.to achieve a
just, lasting, and verifiable peace in Central America.
SUMMARY
The President's program for Central America of democratic freedom,
economic development, stable security and a negotiated settlement deserves the
support of the American people and their representatives in the Congress. The
President set forth in his April 1985 peace plan, in unmistakably clear terms,
the Nicaraguan contribution required for a just, lasting and verifiable peace
in the region:
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- Nicaragua's implementation of its commitment to democracy made to the
Organization of American States.
- An end to Nicaragua's aggression against its neighbors.
- Removal from Nicaragua of the thousands of Soviet bloc, Cuban, PIA,
Libyan and other military and security personnel.
- A return of the Nicaraguan military to a level of parity with their
neighbors.
To achieve our policy objectives in Central America, the United States
must support the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Both the principles for
which the United States stands and the security interests of the United States
and its allies require such support. Without such support, the Sandinistas
will be free to consolidate and to expand the Marxist-Leninist order they have
imposed on Nicaragua. The repressive and subversive actions of the
Sandinistas since they took power in 1979 shows their intentions clearly.
United States support for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is essential to
ensure the security of our allies in the region and to maintain a chance for
democracy and freedom in Nicaragua.
The Intelligence Committee thwarts this essential effort by adopting the
language in Section 105 of H.R. 2419 prohibiting material aid to the armed
resistance. In the Committee markup of the bill, we offered an
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amendment to provide $28,000,000 in military-related aid to the resistance in
fiscal year 1986. The Committee defeated the amendment by a vote of 6 ayes to
10 nays, divided precisely along party lines. Thereafter, we offered an
amendment to provide $28,000,000 in strictly humanitarian aid to the
resistance. The Committee defeated the amendment by a vote of 7 ayes to 9
nays. We then offered an amendment which provided no money for aid, but
struck the prohibition on aid from the bill. The Committee defeated this
amendment by a vote of 6 ayes and 10 nays, again divided along party lines.
Finally, the Committee adopted the prohibition on material assistance to the
resistance - which is unsatisfactory since it does not provide the support
needed for the resistance, but which is more reasonable than the Democrats'
previous-blanket prohibition - by a vote of 9 ayes to 7 nays.
We offered a full range of options for U.S. policy with respect to the
resistance which would encourage the Sandinistas to cease internal repression
and begin national reconciliation, and would enhance the security of our
allies in the region. Nevertheless, the Committee's majority prefers to
continue the congressionally-imposed abandonment of the resistance, leaving
the Sandinistas free to consolidate the first Marxist-Leninist foothold on the
mainland of the Americas. The Committee majority's tragic policy protects the
Sandinistas from the Nicaraguan people and sets the stage for Communist
expansion in this hemisphere in the coming years. Although the Committee's
majority surely does not intend it to be so, theirs is a prescription in the
long-term for destabilization of Central America and an eventual war in which
American participation will be difficult to avoid.
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The Committee majority's prohibition on material aid to the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance is an unreasonably rigid encumbrance on the President's
authority to conduct foreign policy. Moreover, the prohibition could well
leave the President with no choice in emergency circumstances but to use the
United States armed forces.
Assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is fully consistent
with the principles for which the United States stands and with international
law. Such assistance is essential to serve American security interests and to
ensure the safety of our allies in the region. The roadblocks the Congress
has placed in the way of aid to the resistance should be removed and the
United States should renew its support to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.
The Democrats' leadership apparently believes in the "Little Bo-Peep"
theory of dealing with states which stray into the fold of Communism. That
theory holds that if you leave them alone, perhaps they will come home,
wagging their peace-loving tails behind them. While the Democrats wait for
the Sandinistas to come home to democracy, the Sandinistas trample the
political and human rights of the Nicaraguan people and spread subversion in
neighboring countries.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. THE PRINCIPLES FOR WHICH AMERICA STANDS SUPPORT THE NICARAGUAN
DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE ................................................
II. THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES SUPPORT
THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE .................................
III. THE UNITED STATES HAS ENGAGED IN SUBSTANTIAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE A NE TIATED SE'rTL V1ENT ......................................
IV. INTEENATIONAL LAW SUPPORTS AID TO THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE..
V. CONGRESS HAS PLACED A SERIES OF ROADBLOCKS IN THE WAY OF THE
NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE ...............................................
VI. THE INTELLIGENCE CCM4ITIEE REJECTED A FULL RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR A
SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE POLICY .........................................
VII. CONCLUSION: SUPPORT THE NICARAGUAN DE!4 CRATIC RESISTANCE ................
APPENDIX: UNCLASSIFIED EXCERPTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS OF APRIL 3, 1985 ............................................
SUPPORT THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE
The citizens of the United States of America expect the foreign policy of
their government to support the cause of freedom and to safeguard the security
of the United States and its allies. The United States must continue to
support the forces of freedom and oppose the forces of tyranny and
repression. The Nicaraguan democratic resistance fights for the right of
every Nicaraguan to have a free voice in the governance of that nation, and
the resistance deserves American support.
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American foreign policy in Nicaragua must stern from the first principles
upon which our great Republic was founded. In 1776 we held, and in 1985 we
still "hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." It is as true
for the Nicaraguan people today as it was for the American people in 1776
that, "when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations. . . evinces a Design to
reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to
throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future
Security." However distant and quaint. these words of the Declaration of
Independence may seem to some in the Nation's Capital today, we believe that
they retain their vital force and should continue to guide us.
The Nicaraguan people know no freedom, and the long train of Sandinista
abuses and usurpations evince most starkly a design to reduce the Nicaraguan
people under absolute despotism. The leaders of the Sandinista regime have
made clear their intentions. On August 25, 1981, Humberto Ortega, the current
Sandinista Defense Minister, said in an address to Nicaraguan military
specialists that "Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our
revolution." In May 1984 Bayardo Arce, a member of the Sandinista party's
nine-member Directorate and Coordinator of its Policy Committee, addressed
leaders of the Moscow-line Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) on the basic goals
of the Sandinista leadership. The speech was not originally intended for
publication, but an unauthorized tape recording was made and the Spanish
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newspaper La Vanguardia printed a verbatim account. Only then did the
Sandinistas' Comandante Daniel Ortega claim publicly -- and falsely -- that
Arce's presentation did not represent official Sandinista policy.
Arce affirmed that "Sandinism is . . . Marxism." He referred to the
leaders of the two parties as "we Communists," and the Sandinista and PSN
parties as "a single force." He predicted that eventually they would "drop
the fiction of a Marxist-Leninist Socialist Party on the one side and those of
the Sandinista Front on the other" and "gradually form a single party." He
explained that for the present, however, "we have not declared ourselves
Marxist-Leninists publicly and officially," because "our strategic allies tell
us not to declare ourselves Marxist-Leninist, not to declare socialism." To
do so would jeopardize the prospects of further Western economic aid to
Nicaragua -- a paradox Arce described as "the first experience of building
socialism with capitalist dollars."
Arce conceded that the Sandinistas had promised the Organization of
American States in 1979 to guarantee "nonalignment abroad, a mixed economy,
and political pluralism" for reasons of expediency. The promise was designed
to keep "the international community" from supporting a U.S. proposal that
might have kept the Sandinistas from victory in July 1979. He noted that the
Sandinistas had to endure the "nuisance" of elections and other "bourgeois
formalities" impeding the "dictatorship of the proletariat." In a similar
vein, in a June 1984 interview with a Soviet press agent, Comandante Ortega,
now the President of Nicaragua, stressed that "we" were holding elections to
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"go beyond the notions of traditional bourgeois democracy" and "to consolidate
the revolutionary government."
According to Arce in his May 1984 speech to the PSN, once the elections
were past, however, "we" could proceed with drafting a "new constitution"
which "will allow . . . for the construction of socialism in Nicaragua." That
socialism would be radical in domestic and foreign policies: "agrarian reform
. confiscations, nationalization of the banks and foreign trade . . . the
Soviet-Cuban military advisers, the internationalism of the revolution . . .
are the facts of the revolution and everything we have done has that dynamic
behind it." Underscoring the Sandinistas' determination to support
like-minded revolutionaries elsewhere and remain allied with the Soviets and
Cubans, Arce said that "imperialism asks . . . us to abandon interventionism,
to abandon our strategic ties to the Soviet Union and the socialist
community." But the Sandinistas "cannot" do either "unless we cease being
revolutionaries."
The outlines of the Marxist-Leninist program to create a totalitarian
state in Nicaragua have become clear. The people of Nicaragua cannot speak as
they choose, buy food as they choose, or live where they choose. Among other
things, the Sandinistas arrest and imprison political opposition leaders who
dare to speak the truth, they control the food supply through block political
control organs, and they force people from their homes to create free-fire
zones to attack the armed resistance.
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Just one month ago, four of us, Messrs. Stump, Hyde, Cheney and
Livingston, sat with La Prensa editor Jaime Chamorro in a small room in the
aging building in Managua housing the newspaper's offices. La Prensa tries to
print the truth, but cannot do so when the truth does not suit the objectives
of the Sandinista regime. For every edition of his paper, Mr. Chamorro must
trudge off to the Sandinistas' office of censorship to seek their seal of
approval. What they do not like, he cannot print, on pain of imprisonment.
This is the Nicaragua of the Sandinistas today.
.The Sandinistas' Nicaragua of tomorrow will resemble even more the
Marxist-Leninist state of which Bayardo Arce spoke, if we do nothing. If the
United States fails to support the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, the
Sandinistas will eventually eliminate their opposition, either by military
defeat or by exile. With no opposition, the Sandinistas will consolidate
their control of the Nicaraguan people, and Ortega's Nicaragua will complete
its metamorphosis into Castro's Cuba.
II. THE SECURITY LUTE=S OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES
SUPPORT THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE
The United States must maintain its security, and the security of its
allies. The Sandinista regime constitutes the principle threat to peace in
the Central American region because of its alliance with Soviet-bloc nations,
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its unwarranted substantial military buildup, and its efforts to subvert the
governments of neighboring nations in Central America.
The Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan axis bisecting the Western Hemisphere poses a
long-term strategic threat to the security interests of the United States.
About two-thirds of America's foreign trade and petroleum passes through the
Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea. In the event of Soviet military efforts
to attack or destabilize Western Europe, at least half of the supplies needed
to defend the Allied Nations would transit the Caribbean Sea. Further
expansion in the Caribbean region of Soviet air and naval power, and the air
and naval power of Soviet proxy states, would constitute a clear threat to the
security of the united States and its allies. New ports and bases in
Nicaragua would materially enhance Soviet capabilities. The security
interests of the United States do not begin and end on the land borders of the
United States.
The United States has an additional security interest in modification of
Sandinista behavior due to the increasing numbers of refugees fleeing
repression. If the United States does not aid the resistance and the
situation deteriorates in Nicaragua, the United States will face the need for
a long-term, massive commitment to refugee aid for hundreds of thousands of
Central Americans fleeing Communism, as they fled it in Cuba, Southeast Asia,
and Afghanistan.
Those who state that Nicaragua constitutes no direct threat to the United
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States have a shortsighted view of the situation. Of course, the United
States faces no current, direct threat of a conventional attack on the United
States, and, although it is less certain, U.S. allies probably will not face
conventional Nicaraguan attack in the immediate future. The United States is,
of course, fully able to meet the threat of conventional attack on the U.S. or
its allies. However, like the Cubans before them, under Soviet tutelage the
Nicaraguans have become specialists in the art of subversion through
low-intensity conflicts. The Nicaraguans have mastered lies, deception and
clandestine paramilitary support techniques so essential to Marxist-Leninist
"wars of national liberation," which, history shows to be truly wars of
national enslavement under the Communist whip. This concern has given way to
gallows humor circulating in some quarters in Central America reflected in the
remark that the only major blessing of Guatemala is its lack of a land border
shared with Nicaragua. Borders have, of course, served poorly to deter the
Sandinistas' efforts to spread Communist subversion to neighboring countries.
In contrast to the long-term threat the Sandinistas represent for the
United States, our allies in Central America face a more direct and immediate
threat from the Sandinistas' offensive military buildup and support for
subversion in neighboring countries. Since the Sandinistas made their
now-abandoned promises to the Organization of American States in July 1979 to
devote their efforts to peace and justice, the Sandinistas have engaged in the
largest offensive military buildup in Central American history.
When the Sandinistas took power in 1979, they had 6,000 soldiers; today
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the Sandinistas' forces encompass 64,000 soldiers, counting only active duty
military and mobilized reserves. Then the Nicaraguan Army had 3 tanks; today
it has 150 tanks. Then the Nicaraguan Army had 31 other armored vehicles;
today it has 200. Then the Nicaraguan military had 8 helicopters; today it
has 25, including a number of Soviet Mi-24 Hind helicopters, the world's
fastest, best-armed attack helicopter. Then the Nicaraguan army had no
missile launchers; today it has 300. The numbers speak for themselves.
It should be noted that the Sandinistas' military buildup commenced
immediately upon their accession to power in 1979, at a time when the United
States was providing $118 million in economic assistance to Nicaragua. Almost
three years later, before the United States had begun its support for military
activities by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, the Sandinistas had
already increased the size of their army from 6,000 to 39,000, a six-fold
increase. Thus, the Sandinista military buildup was not, as some have
claimed, merely a response to the pressure created by the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance operations conducted with United States aid. The
Sandinistas' buildup was already well underway when the United States was
providing economic assistance to the Sandinistas in the hope that they would
fulfill their promises made in 1979 to the OAS.
Just one month ago, one of us, Mr. Stump, inspected the newly-built
Sandinista military airfield at Punta Huete, outside Managua. The Punta Huete
main runway extends 3000 meters in. length (approximately 1.8 miles) by 45
meters (approximately 150 feet). The thickness of the runway exceeds one foot
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of reinforced concrete. The airport has a number of protective structures,
called revetments, with jet-blast deflectors, which are designed for jet
fighter aircraft. The design of the airport does not match the aircraft
inventory of the Nicaraguan military; it matches the aircraft inventory of the
Soviet military. The airport runways have the capability to handle, among
other things, Soviet long-range Bear reconnaissance aircraft which, flying
from Nicaragua, could surveil the critical U.S. defense, intelligence and
space facilities along the west coast of the United States.
The physical evidence alone at the airport demonstrates the Sandinistas'
intention at some point to acquire jet fighter aircraft for the base at Punta
Huete. Furthermore, the senior military escort officers accompanying Mr.
Stump, when questioned, responded that when President Ortega decides to obtain
high performance jet aircraft, the Nicaraguan Air Force will be ready to use
Since January 1, 1981, the Sandinistas have devoted the equivalent of
$520,000,000 to their military buildup. From 1980 to 1984, Communist-bloc
countries and Libya provided over $500,000,000 in military deliveries to
Nicaragua, with almost half of that occurring in 1984 alone. The massive
Sandinista military buildup far exceeds the defensive needs of Nicaragua.
This offensive buildup threatens the security of Nicaragua's neighbors in the
region: Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. The military
forces of these friends of the United States of America have not matched the
Sandinista offensive military buildup.
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The Nicaraguan democratic resistance to a significant extent ties down the
Sandinista military forces inside Nicaragua. Thus, the Nicaraguan resistance
is the first line of defense for El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and
Guatemala. If the Sandinistas succeed in destroying their opposition, or if
the opposition withers on the vine for lack of resources, the Sandinistas will
consolidate their internal control and look outward with the mighty military
force they have created.
III. TEE UNITED STATES HAS ENGAGED IN SUBSTANTIAL DIPLOMATIC
EFFOR'2S TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETiT T
The United States initially adopted a favorable attitude toward the
Sandinistas both before and after they assumed power in Nicaragua. Along with
other member states of the Organization of American States, the U.S. in June
1979 called for installation in Nicaragua of a democratic government involving
representatives of all anti-Somoza groups. The following month, the
Sandinista-led opposition to Somoza assumed power, and the U.S. immediately
commenced aid. The Carter Administration adopted a policy of "friendly
cooperation" which would include "effective and timely assistance." It argued
that the Nicaraguan revolution should be judged by its actions and that the
change in government was due to loss of confidence in Somoza, rather than to
Cuban-Soviet intervention. Operating on these assumptions, within three
months the U.S. had provided $24.6 million in emergency relief and recovery
aid.
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In April, 1980, the Sandinistas packed the Council of State with their
supporters by enlarging the membership from 33 to 47, thus occasioning the
resignation of Alfonso Robelo (a current Nicaraguan democratic opposition
leader) from government. Despite this and other signs that Sandinistas would
move to consolidate their undemocratic rule, the U.S. continued to provide
aid.
Apparently, the Carter Administration believed that this would establish
the good faith of the U.S. and aid the Nicaraguan private sector, thus
encouraging a democratic society and the abandonment of Sandinista
revolutionary ambitions. Despite intelligence reports indicating' Nicaraguan
support for Salvadoran guerrillas, in September 1980, President Carter
certified to the Congress that Nicaragua was not supporting violence or
terrorism in Central America, thus meeting legal prerequisites established by
the Congress for U.S. aid to Nicaragua under the Foreign Assistance Act.
In November 1980, the circumstances deteriorated rapidly. Sandinista
security forces murdered Jorge Salazar, occasioning the temporary withdrawal
of some business and political groups from the Nicaraguan Council of State.
After several months of review and a slowdown in aid disbursements, President
Carter announced the suspension of aid in January 1981, just before leaving
office, and warned that assistance might not be resumed unless the Sandinistas
were more forthcoming. It should be noted that by January, 1981, direct U.S.
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assistance to the Sandinistas totaled $118 million - an average of $40
million per year, which is triple the average of $13 million per year given to
the Somoza regime during the previous 17 years. The U.S. also had encouraged
multilateral lending institutions to provide an additional $262 million.
In its early months in office, the Reagan Administration carefully studied
available intelligence before committing itself to a Nicaragua policy. Only
after reviewing well-documented evidence of Nicaraguan assistance to the
Salvadoran insurgency did it, in April 1981, reverse President Carter's
September 1980 judgment and determine that the Sandinistas were providing
political and logistical support to the Salvadoran guerrillas. This
determination had the effect of continuing indefinitely the Carter
Administration's suspension of aid to the Nicaraguan government.
The U.S. nonetheless continued to attempt to persuade the Sandinistas to
change their policies so that bilateral relations could be improved. With
relations steadily deteriorating, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders
visited Nicaragua,in August 1981 to inform the Sandinistas of the willingness
of the U.S. to resume assistance if certain conditions were met. In
particular, the U.S. sought cessation of Nicaraguan aid to the Salvadoran
guerrillas engaged in subverting the Salvadoran government, but the U.S. also
discussed its desire that Nicaragua halt its unwarranted military buildup and
guarantee political pluralism in Nicaragua. The Sandinista government made no
substantive response to the American overture and, after a very brief period,
the Sandinistas continued their support for the Salvadoran insurgency.
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There were other attempts, bilateral and multilateral, to encourage
negotiations during 1982, all of which the Sandinistas refused to address or
adopt. On March 23, 1982, Honduras presented a six-point regional peace plan
calling, among other things, for a halt to arms trafficking and mutual pledges
of non-intervention. Nicaragua made no substantive response. In April 1982,
U.S. Ambassador Anthony Quainton delivered to the Sandinistas an eight-point
proposal to reduce tensions, which included a joint pledge of non-interference
and called for an end to Nicaraguan support for insurgencies. The Nicaraguans
responded but did not address the U.S. plan. In October 1982 the U.S. and
seven Latin democracies issued the Declaration of San Jose calling for
internal reconciliation and democracy as requirements for regional peace.
Nicaragua refused to discuss the suggested conditions.
At the outset of 1983, the Foreign Ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama
and Venezuela launched the Contadora peace process in an attempt to facilitate
negotiations and regional settlement among five Central American countries.
In April 1983, President Reagan announced the appointment of a Special Envoy
for Central America whose primary focus would be facilitating internal
dialogue and settlement within Nicaragua and El Salvador. Late that month,
the Contadora countries sponsored a meeting of the five Central American
countries, but Nicaragua refused to participate in the proposed multilateral
negotiations. By September, the Contadora nations persuaded the five Central
American countries to join with them in signing a 21-point "Document of
Objectives," three of which deal with the centrality of democracy and internal
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reconciliation to the resolution of regional conflict.
In the meantime, the Nicaraguan opposition also had been attempting to
talk with the Sandinista government. These attempts, some more public than
others, all failed to draw the Sandinistas to the negotiating table. In
December 1983, the opposition Democratic Coordinator ("Coordinadora") issued a
nine-point communique calling for dialogue leading to open elections. Two
months later, in February 1984, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the
primary armed resistance group, offered a ceasefire in exchange for
participation in free and fair elections and even offered to allow President
Ortega to retain office pending balloting. The Sandinistas, however, refused
negotiations with the armed resistance and refused to allow their full and
fair participation in the elections of Autumn, 1984. The Sandinistas have
refused the entreaties of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua to negotiate
directly with the opposition, despite the Coordinadora's acceptance of a
church-mediated dialogue and an additional offer by the Nicaraguan Episcopal
Conference to adopt a mediating role. In contrast with the Sandinista refusal
to carry out open elections or to talk to the opposition, El Salvador, during
the three=year period between March 1982 and March 1985, carried out four free
elections and. undertook direct negotiations with the Salvadoran armed
insurgency, consistent with the urgings of the Contadora countries.
The Contadora countries have persisted in their efforts to facilitate
settlement. In January, 1984, all the countries involved agreed to "Norms of
Implementation" to secure the 21 goals in the 1983 Contadora "Document of
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Objectives." However, these are the only two documents which have been
endorsed by all Contadora member states. When the Central American countries
were unable to reach a consensus in the Spring of 1984, the Contadora foreign
ministers integrated previous work with some suggestions of their own and
presented a draft to the Central American countries in June 1984. This was
redrafted at the end of the Summer of 1984, and Nicaragua announced in
September of 1984 its willingness to agree to the second draft. Although
Guatemala said it looked favorably on this draft, the other Central American
states submitted proposed modifications. These provided that no commitments
would enter into force prior to ratification by all five Central American
countries, that military exercises be regulated rather than prohibited, and
that the Commission on Verification and Control be provided with a budget and
international inspectors. The subsequent negotiation of agreements on
permissible military forces would be simplified, and the interim freeze on
arms acquisitions would be shortened to 60 days. These changes were suggested
because the three countries considered the basic document, largely shaped by
consultations between Mexico and Nicaragua, to be overly favorable to
Nicaragua and particularly weak: on verification procedures, a judgment with
which the-U.S. concurred. The parties have as yet been unable to agree on a
final draft.
The U.S. has from its inception supported the Contadora process and has
periodically engaged in bilateral diplomacy to bolster its prospects and
maintain contact with Nicaraguan leaders. During the Contadora deliberations
last summer Mexico, on behalf of the Contadora group, requested that the U.S.
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undertake bilateral talks with Nicaragua. Secretary Shultz visited Managua on
June 1, 1984, to launch the process. Eventually there were nine rounds of
talks, most of them two days each in length, in December 1984, taking place in
Manzanillo, Mexico. The process concluded and it was agreed that the content
of the talks would be confidential. Ultimately the U.S. decided not to
participate in further talks in this forum because, although discussions were
meant to facilitate the Contadora process, Nicaragua was neglecting Contadora
in favor of the bilateral discussions and was also using the Manzanillo talks
for propaganda purposes. The U.S. said it would be ready to resume these
discussions if Nicaragua was serious about negotiating within Contadora.
In October 1984 Special Envoy Schlaudeman and Assistant Secretary motley
met with President Ortega in New York during a U.N. General Assembly session.
Secretary Shultz also met with President Ortega in March 1985. At that
meeting President Ortega urged the U.S. to resume the Manzanillo talks, and
the U.S. reiterated that it would do so only if the Nicaraguans negotiated
seriously within the Contadora process. The Vice President also spoke briefly
with President Ortega at a reception celebrating the presidential inauguration
in Brazil during 1985. In all these encounters, the U.S. has seen little sign
of Nicaraguan willingness to deal in good faith with U.S. concerns.
With the congressionally-mandated cessation of aid to the contras last
year, the U.S. removed the pressure on the Sandinistas to engage in meaningful
negotiations. The United States can anticipate even greater Nicaraguan
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obduracy in the future than we have experienced in the past three and a half
years, if Congress continues to prohibit effective aid to the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance.
The principles of international law support U.S. efforts to assist the
Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Professor John Norton Moore of the
University of Virginia is a leading commentator and analyst in the field of
international law today, and serves as Chairman of the American Bar
Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security. In an address to
the White House Central America Outreach Group on February 22, 1985, Professor
Moore analyzed the international law issues in the Central American debate.
His analysis appears below in full.
Introduction
"The United States historically has been a leader in seeking to promote
world-order and adherence to law. These are traditional American values that
are embodied in United Nations and OAS Charters. It is, thus appropriate and
important that our actions in Central America and elsewhere be measured
against these standards. In doing so I will look first at the factual
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context, then turn to a legal analysis of that context, and finally, I will
briefly examine a number of persistent misconceptions about the facts and the
law in Central America.
The Factual Context
"After careful review of the evidence, both the Bipartisan Kissinger
Commission and the House Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that
Nicaragua and Cuba are thoroughly involved in efforts to overthrow neighboring
governments in Central America - particularly in El Salvador. These efforts
include:
"-meetings held in December 1979 and May 1980 in Cuba to forge a unified
Salvadoran insurgency under Cuban and Nicaraguan influence;
"--financing of the insurgency and provision of the preponderance of its
weapons and supplies; training of insurgent leaders in bases in Nicaragua;
and
"-support for overall insurgent command and control from bases
established near Managua, and supply, technical and political assistance.
"The resulting ESN insurgency is neither temporary nor small time. It
fields an army about one-fifth the size of the regular Salvadoran armed
forces. To give one example of the seriousness with which it is supported, it
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operates some 67 offices in 35 countries in support of the continuing attack.
"Cuba and Nicaragua have no fund cut-off legislation terminating
assistance to the FAN nor do they have a Boland Amendment ruling out as an
objective the overthrow of the democratically-elected Duarte government of El
Salvador. Indeed, their objective is clearly the overthrow of the government
of El Salvador and its replacement by a totalitarian model.
"Unlike the early days of the Vietnam War where there was great
uncertainty about the facts surrounding covert North Vietnamese action, we are
fortunate today to have separate independent congressional findings of the
facts of Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement in the armed attack on El Salvador.
To,give one example, Congress as a whole found in the Intelligence
Authorization Act of 1984: By providing military support, including arms,
training, logistical command and control and communications facilities to
grasps seeking to overthrow the goverment of El Salvador and other Central
American Governments the Government . . . of Nicaragua has violated Article 18
of the Charter of the Organization of American States . .
Analyses of the Law
"These Cuban-Nicaraguan activities violate:
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
Article 3, 18, and 20 of the revised OAS Charter;
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Article 1 of the hemispheric Rio Defense Treaty;
Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the W. Definition of Aggression;
The unanimously adopted 1965 General Assembly Declaration on
Inadmissibility of Intervention;
The 1970 General Assembly "Friendly Relations" Declaration;
Principle 5 of the Helsinki Accords;
The 1972 United States-Soviet 'principles agreement', and
Even Articles 1, 2 and 6 of the Soviet Draft Definition of Aggression.
"This pattern of ongoing aggression constitutes an armed attack justifying
the use of force in collective defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter and
Article 3 of the Rio Treaty. Indeed, Article 27 of the OAS Charter declares
that such an attack is 'an act of aggression against * * * [all] the American
States,' and Article 3 of the Rio Treaty creates a legal obligation to assist
in meeting the armed. attack.
"The legal obligation under Article 3 is parallel to that under Article 5
of the NAM Treaty in the event of an armed attack against a NATO member and
under Article 5 of the Security Treaty with Japan in the event of an armed
attack against Japan. Article 3 of the Rio Treaty provides:
"The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State
against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the
American States and consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties
undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent
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right of individual or collective self-defense by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations.
"Each of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures
which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in
the preceding proposals.
"The United States response pursuant to this obligation -- in support of
world order and self-determination -- may be overt, covert or both, as has
been the case in virtually every conflict in which America has fought in this
century. No one has ever urged that in response to Nazi aggression in World
War II the allies could not provide assistance to partisan forces or undertake
covert operations in Germany. Assistance to the contras, whether overt or
covert, is a lawful option for the United States in meeting the continuing
Cuban-Nicaraguan armed attack.
Persistent Misperceptions
"Finally, let me turn to two factual and five legal misperceptions
concerning the conflict in Central America.
"Some have assumed that the Sandinista military build-up and hostility to
its neighbors is a response to contra activities. Nothing could be more
clearly in error as a matter of the public record. That record shows:
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"--The United States cut off military assistance to the Somoza regime
during the key phase of the revolution and was a co-sponsor of the OAS
Resolution against Somoza;
"--President Carter invited Daniel Ortega and other Sandinista leaders to
the White House in an effort to have good relations with Nicaragua;
"--The U.S. offered Peace Corps assistance -- which was rejected in favor
of an immediate and massive Cuban and Soviet-bloc presence;
"--The U.S. supplied medical assistance to the new regime;
"--The U.S. gave $118 million in economic assistance to the new regime in
its first 2 years -- more than was given to the Somoza regime in the previous
20 years;
"--The United States supported $292 million in World Bank and
Inter-American Development Bank Assistance for the new Sandinista Government;
"--About a billion dollars in aid collectively came from the western
democracies; and
"--The Kissinger Commission found that the United States 'undertook a
patient and concerned effort to build a constructive relationship of mutual
trust with the new government.'
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"Some have assumed that the record does not support arms shipment from
Nicaragua sufficient to make out an armed attack.
"But:
"---We know of the 1980 FiLN trip in search of weapons to the USSR, East
Germany, Bulgaria, Ethiopia and Vietnam and the massive commitments for arms
as a result of that trip;
"-Weapons serial number assessment.and defector reports both establish
that the preponderance of weapons are trans-shipped from Soviet bloc source,-
"--The goverment of El Salvador regularly captures more arms and
ammunition from the FMLN than it loses to it; and
"-The Department of State has repreatedly detailed weapons intercepts in
reports of February 1981, March 1982, May 1983 and July 1984; and
"--Most importantly, this single factor focus on weapons supply ignores
all other indicators of instigation, financing, training, command and control,
and political and technical support. The intensity of those activities, taken
together, is clearly an armed attack.
"In the contemporary Charter era the predominant armed attack is less
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armies on the march than a covert attack centered on terrorism or assistance
to insurgents. Such attacks are particularly dangerous in that they seek to
create ambiguity about the attack while focusing public attention on the
defensive response.
"Some have urged that a defensive response against El Salvador violates
Articles 18 and 20 -- the strong non-intervention Articles of the OAS
Charter. But these critics ignore Article 22 of the OAS Charter that clearly
provides: 'Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in
accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the
principles set forth in Articles 18 and 20.'
"Thus a response to collective defense pursuant to Article 3 of the Rio
Treaty is patently not a violation of Article 18 and 20. Moreover, Articles
21, 27, 28 and 137 of. the OAS Charter support this same point that actions in
defense under the Rio Treaty do not violate the non-intervention articles of
the OAS Charter.
"Some have asked whether United States assistance to contras is not 'state
terrorism' or exactly what we condemn when undertaken by Cuba and Nicaragua
against El Salvador, but to make such a charge is to undermine the most
important distinction in the United Nations and OAS Charters -- that between
aggression and defense. Nicaraguan actions and United States reactions are no
more equivalent than Nazi aggression and Allied response. Indeed, one of the
great dangers of covert attack as a threat to world order is its ability to
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confuse attack and defensive response -- particularly when the covert attack
is waged by a closed totalitarian society and accompanied by a squid-like
cloud of disinformation and the defense is undertaken by an on democratic
society which inevitably fully debates every facet of its policy.
"Some have urged that international law requires that a defensive response
be overt -- strangely, simultaneously others have urged that law requires that
any response to be covert.
"Neither position is correct. International law requires that existence
of a response to an armed attack be reported to the United Nations and that a
response be proportional. But it does not dictate whether such response be
overt or covert or both. In this case the United States had repeatedly raised
the issues before the United Nations and it is difficult to imagine that a
policy of support for insurgents in Nicaragua is somehow a non-proportional
response to a policy of Nicaraguan support for insurgents in El Salvador.
"We should be clear on this point. The United States is free to fashion a
defensive response against the armed attack on El Salvador that may be overt,
covert or both. My own preference is for a policy I would call quasi-covert
in which we clearly and openly acknowledge we are making a response to the
armed attack from Nicaragua but decline to specify precisely the modalities of
response -- as has been our policy in every conflict in which we have fought.
Such a policy I believe carries less risk of escalation and more opportunity
for the Contadora process than a policy in which we insist on detailing all
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elements of assistance to the contras or even of openly acknowledging the
contra policy.
"Some have urged that United States withdrawal from the Nicaragua case
before the ICJ demonstrates a lack of merit in the United States legal case.
"But the decision of the United States to withdraw was not based on the
merits of the legal case but rather on the conviction that the ICJ had
violated the Statute of the Court in asserting jurisdiction where it had
none. That is, the assertion of jurisdiction where the Court had none was an
abuse of power voiding any legal compulsion to go forward.
"It was also influenced by the reality that only two permanent members of
the Security Council and only 5 out of 16 judges on the Court come from
nations that had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and that
Nicaragua sought to use the case in aid of its disinformation effort to
inhibit a United States defensive response to its armed attack.
"And it was influenced by a realistic awareness that the Court had no
mechanism for. fact appraisal in an ongoing covert armed attack and defensive
response.
"Finally, some have asserted that a contra policy is only consistent with
a United States declaration of war against Nicaragua.
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"But, a declaration of war is not only not required for a lawful defensive
response under international law, some scholars such as Judge Philip Jessup
have argued such declarations are no longer appropriate after the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the UN Charter outlawed war and permitted
force only in defense. There has been no declaration of war anywhere in the
World since World War ii. One reason for this is the feeling that such
declarations inhibit peaceful settlement.
"And there is no such regulation under national law. The War Powers Act
itself is clear on this, that no declaration of war is required in the current
Central American setting.
"Let us be clear: in the face of the Cuban-Nicaraguan armed attack, there
are no national or international legal constraints on Congress supporting
assistance to the contras, whether overt or covert or even on reexamining the
Boland Amendment. No declaration of war or other formality is required.
Indeed, such a declaration is almost certainly undesirable as a matter of
conflict management and support for the Contadora process.
"World order and self-determination are at stake in Central America.
President Monroe stated in the Monroe Doctrine and Congress affirmed in the
1962 Cuban and 1965 Western Hemisphere resolutions that the United States
would not accept efforts to forcefully deprive nations in this hemisphere of
their right to self-determination. Cuba and Nicaragua are engaged in a
serious and sustained attack against El Salvador and other neighboring states
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for precisely that purpose. Congress must agonize about the appropriate
American response to the attacks in Central America, but it should make no
mistake in understanding that self-determination and world order are on the
side of an effective response."
Professor Moore's analysis makes clear that the United States has acted in
a manner fully consistent with international law and that renewed U.S. aid to
the resistance would be fully consistent with it also.
Since December 21, 1982 some form of restriction in United States law has
constrained the United States in supporting the Nicaraguan democratic
resistance. While the United States hobbled the resistance, the Sandinistas'
military buildup and support for external subversion continued apace. TO help
to reverse the Sandinistas' repressive course, the United States.must reverse
its trend toward ever more restrictive laws hampering the resistance.
The Congress first enacted a prohibition on assistance to the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance in late 1982, in the form of the sb-called "Boland
Amendment." The Boland Amendment was adopted as Section 793 of the Department
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of Defense Appropriation Act, 1983 incorporated in the Continuing
Appropriations Resolution for Fiscal Year 1983 (P.L. 97-377). The Boland
Amendment prohibited CIA, DOD and other intelligence entities from using funds
provided by the DOD Appropriation Act, 1983 "to furnish military equipment,
military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any
group or individual, not part of a country's armed forces, for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange
between Nicaragua and Honduras." The period of applicability of the Boland
Amendment was extended by operation of the Preamble and Section 101(c) of the
Continuing Appropriations Resolution for Fiscal Year 1984 (P.L. 98-107) and by
the Preamble and Section 101(a) of the Further Continuing Appropriations
Resolution for Fiscal Year 1984 (P.L. 98-151), including retroactively to the
funding hiatus between November 10 and November 14, 1983. The Boland
Amendment was in effect from December 31, 1982 to December 8, 1983.
Next, the Congress imposed a cap on aid to the resistance of $24 million
for FY 1984. The $24 million cap provision was adopted as Section 775 of the
Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984 (P.L. 98-212) and, in identical
form, as Section 108 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1984 (P.L. 98-215). The $24 million cap provision stated that, during fiscal
year 1984, not more than $24,000,000 of the funds available to the CIA, DOD,
and other intelligence entities could be obligated or expended "for the
purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly,
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group,
organization, movement, or individual." The $24 milion cap provision applied
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from December S. 1983 to September 30, 1984. It should be noted, however,
that any funds used in fiscal year 1984 prior to enactment of the $24 million
cap provision would count against the cap.
Congress enacted a temporary complete prohibition on aid to the resistance
while it tried to sort out this and other issues in the annual appropriations
fiasco at the beginning of fiscal year 1985. The terary full prohibition
was adopted as Section 106(c) of the First Continuing Appropriations
Resolution for Fiscal Year 1985 (P.L. 98-441). The provision prohibited the
CIA, DOD and other intelligence entities from using any funds provided by the
continuing resolution "for the purpose or which would have the effect of
suooorting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual." The
continuing resolution, and therefore the period of applicability of the
temporary full prohibition, was extended three times (P.L. 98-453, P.L.
98-455, and P.L. 98-461). The temporary full prohibition applied from October
1, 1984 to October 11, 1984. It should be noted that, although the First
Continuing Appropriations Resolution did not become law until October 3, 1984,
its restrictions applied retroactively to funds used during the funding hiatus
on October 1 and 2, 1984.
Finally, Congress enacted the complete prohibition currently applicable in
fiscal year 1985, subject to a possible release of $14 million. The provision
was adopted as Section 8066 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act,
1985 as incorporated in the Further Continuing Appropriations Resolution for
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Fiscal Year 1985 (P.L. 98-473). Section 801 of the Intelligence Authorizaton
Act for Fiscal Year 1985 (P.L. 98-618) also incorporated this provision by
reference. The provision prohibits the CIA, DOD and other intelligence
entities from using funds available to them in fiscal year 1985 "for the
purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly,
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group,
organization, movement, or individual." However, the provision allows
otherwise prohibited use of $14,000,000 if, after February 28, 1985, the
President reports to Congress that Nicaragua continues support to external
insurgencies and he explains and justifies the need for assistance for
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, and the Congress approves such
assistance by joint resolution. The President transmitted such a report on
April 3, 1985. [See Appendix]
In response to the President's report, the Senate approved expenditure of
the $14 million by a vote of 53 yeas to 46 nays on April 23, 1985. On the
same day, however, the House failed to do so by a vote of 180 yeas to 248
nays. Thus, the full prohibition on military support for the resistance,
which took effect on October 12, 1984, remains in effect.
The policy of the Congress since December 21, 1982 has been to hamstring
and finally to prohibit completely military aid to the Nicaraguan democratic
resistance. The Sandinistas did not accept this congressionally-imposed olive
branch and move into good faith negotiations aimed at producing a just,
lasting and verifiable peace in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas did not stop their
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military buildup after Congress acted to stabilize the size of the resistance
forces by prohibiting aid needed to expand those forces. The policy of the
Congress squeezed the resistance, but left the Sandinistas free to work their
will.
The Democrats' most often repeated objection to a policy of aid to the
resistance has been their allegation that the Administration seeks to
"overthrow" the Sandinistas. Overthrow of the Sandinistas has never been the
Administration's objective in fact, nor has the Administration ever stated
overthrow to be its objective. The Administration has sought to encourage the
Sandinistas to modify their repressive behavior and to participate in good
faith in achieving a pacific settlement of outstanding issues. The
Administration has not sought military victory over the Sandinistas by proxy
war, but insists that the Sandinistas live up to their promises made to the
OAS in 1979.
Aid to the resistance in past years, before Congress ended it, had two
aims: hampering the flow of arms shipments from Nicaragua to insurgents in
neighboring countries and applying pressure on the Sandinista regime to
encourage it to end repression and subversion and to begin to negotiate in
good faith. Had the aid continued as planned, greater progress toward pacific
settlement of problems in the region probably would have occurred, as the
Sandinistas would have had an incentive to negotiate instead of grandstanding
for world opinion, buying time to consolidate power, and relying on the U.S.
Congress-to keep them safe.
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Much confusion has resulted from casual use of the word "overthrow." The
Adidninistration is quite candid in its assertion that it wishes to prevent
Sandinista internal consolidation, because once the Sandinistas fully emplace
the typical methods of totalitarian control, they can freely carry out their
Marxist-Leninist domestic and foreign policy agenda at a later date. The
Administration - and the Contadora nations - have thus insisted that a vital
element in any settlement is allowing in Nicaragua a truly free election in
which all Nicaraguans may participate on fair terms. How the Sandinistas fare
in such an election will be determined by the Nicaraguan people - not by
force of arms.
Thus, the Administration has placed its trust in democratic pluralism
rather than in a military routing of the Sandinistas. The resistance provides
essential pressure on the Sandinistas to encourage them to move towards
democratic pluralism. If U.S. support for such pressure is established and
maintained on a consistent basis, as it has not been in the past due to
congressionally-imposed prohibitions, a just, lasting and verifiable peace may
be achieved. Limited aid to the resistance would bring pressure on the
Sandinistas to modify their conduct; it would not bring military victory in
the form of a forcible overthrow of the Sandinistas by the resistance.
Some, however, have claimed that U.S. insistence on a move toward
democracy in Nicaragua represents a "double standard," since the U.S. has not
insisted on bringing about democracy in all countries, e.g. other Communist
countries, and has been willing to coexist with them. The United States
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formulates its policy in a real world, not a world of academic theoreticians.
Certainly the U.S. would support democracy everywhere, but the U.S. has an
especially important obligation to pursue it in Nicaragua. Nicaragua is a
Corznunist, expansionist regime on the mainland of this continent at a distance
from the U.S. covered in a two-hour flight from our borders. Nicaragua
threatens the security of nations allied with the United States. Moreover,
the U.S. has a special obligation to correct things in Nicaragua.
The U.S. was instrumental in helping establish and initially settle the
Sandinistas in power. Like other member states of the Organization of
American States, the U.S. politically supported their takeover on the basis of
their promises of democracy and a better life for Nicaraguans. Once they were
in power, the U.S. supplied them with unprecedented funds - $118 million -
and successfully urged the international community to give or lend much more.
The Nicaraguan people increasingly are oppressed by totalitarian controls; the
U.S. bust acknowledge its part in bringing about that fate, however
innocently. We have a greater obligation actively to attempt to rectify the
situation than would be the case in another country cursed with a repressive
regime.
When the Sandinistas first took power in 1979, the United States provided
substantial economic assistance. The Sandinistas thanked us by establishing a
-Leninist repressive state and engaging in an unwarranted substantial
Marxist
military buildup. From late 1982 to the present, Congress reduced and then
prohibited U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. The Sandinistas
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-- always consistent -- again thanked us by increasing their repression and
armed forces. The efforts of the Congress to appease the Sandinistas by
removing U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance have proved completely
counterproductive. The time has come for the Congress to reverse course and
support the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.
VI? THE INTELLIGENCE CC ITTEE REJECTED A FULL RANGE OF OPTIONS
FOR A SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE POLICY
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence rejected a full range of
options for a successful resistance policy at its markup of H.R. 2419. In
support of the President's program, we offered the following amendment:
"Strike Section 105 and insert in lieu thereof:
"'SEC. 105. There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1986
the sum of $28,000,000 to the Central Intelligence Agency for support of
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by the Nicaraguan democratic
opposition."
The amendment would have restored the U.S. support for the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance needed as an effective counterweight to Sandinista
efforts to consolidate power. The signal the U.S. would send merely by
reaching a domestic consensus to provide aid to the resistance, coupled with
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the aid itself, would have constituted a powerful incentive to the Sandinistas
to moderate their behavior and engage in national reconciliation in good
faith. The Committee rejected the amendment by a vote of 6 ayes to 10 nays,
on a straight party-line vote.
We next offered the following amendment to provide humanitarian assistance
to the resistance through the Department of State:
"Strike Section 105 (containing the Nicaragua prohibition) and insert in
lieu thereof the following:
"SEC. 105. (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of State for fiscal year 1986 the sum of $28,000,000 to be
obligated.and expended solely to furnish to the Nicaraguan democratic
opposition food, clothing, medicine and other humanitarian assistance.
"(b) The term 'humanitarian assistance' as used in this section does not
include any weapons, weapons systems, ammunition or any other equipment or
material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death.
"(c) At any time after October 1, 1985, if the President determines that
negotiations based on the Contadora Document of Objectives of September 9,
1983 have failed to produce an agreement and that other trade and economic
measures have failed to resolve the conflict in the Central American region,
the President may submit a report to the Congress setting forth a detailed
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statement of the reasons for which negotiations or other measures have failed
to resolve the conflict in the region and requesting a specified amount of
funds for additional assistance of such a nature as he deems appropriate to
the Nicaraguan democratic opposition, and such funds shall be available for
such assistance upon enactment of a joint resolution described in subsection
(d) of this section, notwithstanding the prohibition contained in subsection
(a) of this section.
"(d) For the purpose of subsection (c) of this section, 'joint
resolution' means only a joint resolution, introduced after the date on which
the report of the President under subsection (c) of this section is received
by the Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as
follows: 'That the Congress approves the use of funds described in Section
105(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986.'
"(e) The procedures applicable in the Senate and House of Representatives
with respect to the report and the joint resolution to which subsection (c) of
this section refers, shall be as provided in Section 8066(c)(2)-(7) of the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 (Public Law 98-473), and this
subsection is enacted by the Congress in the manner and with the effect stated
in Section 8066(c)(8) of that Act."
A Member of the Committee objected to consideration of the amendment as not
germane to the bill. Arguing that humanitarian assistance did not meet the
definition of "intelligence and intelligence-related activities" contained in
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Rule XLVIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and that it thus lay
outside the scope of the intelligence authorization bill, that Member
attempted to prevent consideration of, and a vote on, humanitarian aid to the
resistance. The Chair sustained the point of order.
We then modified the humanitarian assistance amendment to make it clearly
germane to the bill, by specifying that a Department of State intelligence
element would administer the assistance and that delivery of the assistance
would be accomplished at unannounced times and places in a clandestine
fashion. The amendment provided:
"Strike Section 105 (containing the Nicaragua prohibition) and insert in
lieu thereof the following:
"SEC. 105. (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research for fiscal year 1986
the sum of $28,000,000 to be obligated and expended solely to furnish to the
Nicaraguan democratic opposition food, clothing, medicine and other
humanitarian assistance.
"(b) The term 'humanitarian assistance' as used in this section does not
include any weapons, weapons systems, ammunition or any other equipment or
material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death.
"(c) At any time after October 1, 1985, if the President determines that
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negotiations based on the Contadora Document of Objectives of September 9,
1983 have failed to produce an agreement and that other trade and economic
measures have failed to resolve the conflict in the Central American region,
the President may submit a report to the Congress setting forth a detailed
statement of the reasons for which negotiations or other measures have failed
to resolve the conflict in the region and requesting a specified amount of
funds for additional assistance of such a nature as he deems appropriate to
the Nicaraguan democratic opposition, and such funds shall be available for
such assistance upon enactment of a joint resolution described in subsection
(d) of this section, notwithstanding the prohibition contained in subsection
(a) of this section.
"(d) For the purpose of subsection (c) of this section, 'joint
resolution' means only a joint resolution, introduced after the date on which
the report of the President under subsection (c) of this section is received
by the Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as
follows: 'That the Congress approves the use of funds described in Section
105(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986.'
"(e) The procedures applicable in the Senate and House of Representatives
with respect to the report and the joint resolution to which subsection (c) of
this section refers, shall be as provided in Section 8066(c)(2)-(7) of the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 (Public Law 98-473), and this
subsection is enacted by the Congress in the manner and with the effect stated
in Section 8066(c)(8) of that Act.
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"(f) The humanitarian assistance furnished by the Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research under subsection (a) of this section
shall, to ensure the success of its delivery, be delivered at unannounced
times and places in a clandestine manner."
The Committee rejected the amendment by a vote of 7 ayes to 9 nays.
We then offered a simple amendment to strike Section 105. Although the
amendment would have provided no funds for support - humanitarian or
otherwise - to the resistance, it would have permitted the President to
provide such assistance from contingency funds based on a new Presidential
covert action program finding, in the event circumstances deteriorate rapidly
in Central America. The Committee rejected this amendment by a vote of 6 ayes
to 10 nays, on a straight party-line vote.
Finally we offered as an amendment congressional findings of fact
concerning Sandinista conduct based on two of the findings in the FY 1984
Intelligence Authorization Bill plus findings based on subsequently received
intelligence. A Member objected to the amendment's consideration on grounds
of germaneness, and the Chair sustained the point of order.
Since none. of the reasonable options we offered commanded a majority of
the Committee, the Committee then adopted, by a vote of 9 ayes to 7 nays, an
amendment narrowing the Democrats previous blanket prohibition. The only
virtue of Section 105 as reported by the Committee is that it is not as bad as
the blanket prohibition upon which the Democrats have previously insisted.
The Committee's majority simply will not vote for assistance -- even if it
is purely humanitarian assistance -- to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.
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Their refusal to provide any assistance may finally seal the fate of Nicaragua
under totalitarian Sandinista control, unless the House rejects the
Committee's position and supports aid to the resistance, as we urge.
VII. CONCLUSION: SUPPORT THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE
We have expressed our views at great length because the issue of United
States policy toward the Sandinista regime and the Nicaraguan resistance will
determine the course of events in Central America for generations to come.
The United States faces the supreme test of its ability to advance its
interests in the face of the expansion of Communism close to home. The
national interest requires both that we avoid a war involving the U.S. armed
forces and that we effectively resist the establishment and expansion of
Communism on the mainland of the Americas. Support for the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance is the wisest course.
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TO THE CONGRESS OF APRIL 3, 1985
Under Section 8066 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985,
contained in the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY 1985 (P.L.
98-473), the President, on April 3, 1985, submitted a comprehensive Top Secret
report to the Congress on the Nicaragua situation.
Despite the availability of the President's report to every Member of the
House of Representatives, few Members (other than Members of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence) availed themselves of the opportunity to
read it.
Because of the importance of the President's report to an informed
understanding of United States policy in Central America, the unclassified
portions of the report released by the White House on April 10, 1985, are
reprinted below.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
April 10, 1985
U.S. Support for the Democratic Resistance
Movement-in Nicaragua
Unclassified Excerpts from the President's Report to the?Conaress
Pursuant to-Section 8066 of the Continuing Resolution for
?Y-1795, PL 98-473.
CONTENTS
I. U.S. Goals in Central America
II. Nicaragua-'s Role in Central American Conflict
A. Sandinista objectives and strategy
3. Nicaraguan militant buildup and alignment with the
Soviet Bloc
C. Support for armed insurgency in El Salvador and other
activities against Central American Governments
D. Internal consolidation
III. Efforts to Resolve Central American Conflict
A. U.S. objectives toward Nicaragua
B. Bilateral and regional diplomacy, 1979-85
C. Strategy of pressure and support for armed opposition
IV?. Policy Alternatives and U.S. National Interests
V. Presidential Determination
A. Description of proposed program
B. Justification
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1. U.S. Goals in Central America
United States policy toward Nicaragua must be viewed in the
overall Central American context, where we have a fundamental
interest in the-development and preservation of stable societies
able to sustain social, economic, and_ political change without
coming under the sway of the Soviet Union or its allies. As the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central. America stated,
"Central America is both vital and vulnerable and whatever other
crises may arise to'claim the nation's attention, the United
States cannot alford to turn away from that threatened region."
A hostile or destabilized Central America close to our border
would pose an unacceptable threat to our vital interests in
Mexico, the Panama Canal, and the Caribbean sea lanes.
Because of the importance of Central America and the complexity
of the problems there, U.S. policy toward the region has centered
on four interrelated objectives:
-- sucport for democracy, reform and human freedom in each.
country, including genuine national reconciliation, full
respect for-human rights, and popular participation in the
political process--as demonstrated by open, fair, genuine
elections;
renewal of economic development and growth in the region to
.address the root socio-economic causes of turmoil and
conflict and to provide increased opportunity and better
conditions of life for all segments of society;
-- security for the democratic governments of Central America,
to help shield them from guerrilla warfare or
externally-supported subversion as they develop more
equitable, humane, and stable societies; and
-- Support for a political solution to the conflicts in Cent_ai
America, via peaceful dialogue within and among the
countries of the region and for a comprehensive, and
verifiable regional settlement as outlined in the Contadora
Document of Objectives.
These four objectives of the United States are consistent with
the strongest ideals of the American nation and, we are .
convinced, reflect clearly the wishes of the vast majority of the
people in*Central America and throughout this hemisphere.
Progress has been made toward achieving these objectives in 7_l
Salvador and elsewhere in Central America. In Washington, the
Administration and the Congress have demonstrated the broad
consensus that now exists in the U.S. on the need for increased
aid to Central America by passing major economic and security
assistance legislation for fiscal years 1984 and 1985. The
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Contadora process, helped by our bilateral efforts at Manzanillo,
has also made progress in score areas despite major remaining
obstacles. The basic problem of Central America remains
unaltered: a?dedicated Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua,
armed and backed forcefully by Cuba, the Soviet Union, and its
allies, bent on.a massive weapons acquisition program and
continuing active support for armed insurrection and subversion
in neighboring countries, threatens the stability of democratic
governments and fundamental U.S. interests in Central America.
IS. Nicaragua's Role in Central American Conflict
(A) Sandinista objectives and strategy: Since the FSLN's
rise to power in July 1979, real political power in Nicaragua has
rested in the hands of the FSLN National Directorate. Composed
of nine commandantes--three representatives.from each of the
three Sandinista factions--it determines and coordinates overall
Nicaraguan objectives and strategy. The judiciary and the
national assembly are fully subservient to this executive
authority.
While we know there are personal -differences among the nine, as
well as differences on tactics, all nine comandantes are
Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries committed to radical social
change and the export of revolution, disdainful of
democratic-capitalist recyimes, and distrustful of the United
States. .
Having suffered from discord.in the past, the FSLN takes great
care to present a common front, although it has used rumors of
disagreement to play on foreign interest in supporting so-called
"moderate" elements. In need of Western economic support, the
FSLN attempts to hide the most glaring evidence of its Marxist
and dictatorial tendencies. As a result and as an outgrowth of
the "tercerista" strategy.that succeeded against Somoza, it
follows a flexible strategy under which the private sector is
permitted to exist (albeit under systematic confiscation and'
increasing state restrictions), a political opposition can
operate in limited areas (under the tight watch of FSLN and GC'N
control instruments) and elections are carried out (under con-
ditions assuring FSLN control of the outcome, via control of the
media, political assembly, and the basic necessities of life)
It is a strategy dedicated to the long-term survival of the
Sandinistas' grip on power and Marxist-Leninist ideal behind a
facade of moderation.
Eased on the experience of the past five years and on several ;:e?:
Sandinista policy statements not intended for publication (for
example, the September 1979 "72 Hour Document" which set forth
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< a is of the revolution, and CommandanteSayabd0 rcewhichj
h1he'go speech to the Socialist Party--
a confidential seledged as authentic by Nicaraguan senior
have e been acknowledged overridi^.g objectives:
officials), the FSLN has the.following
y
-- the political/ economic transformati nributionro`uincome, et~e
along Marxist lines, marked by red and an expanded state -o-
confiscation of private property,
the economy;
bylete the Sandinista
Sandini t
the establishment and maintenance
the o (demonstrated
?ns
encouragement of facts
control within Nicaragua
groups in labor, political-
and restriction of the opposition;
challenging authentic op-
parties, the press, human rights, and organized religion; the
anizations;"and the contrc
development of Sandinista ^~ssehegFSLN);
all government institutions by
develo meat of closer ties with the Soviet Bloc and
the P the GON's redirection of trade, its voting
-acceptance of
Cuba (shown by 4
pattern in international bodies, its 4c000ance civilian
2,500-3,500 Cuban military purchases and identification with
advisers, and its militoalspin the region) and
Cuban and Soviet Bloc g
support for `.fraternal revolution"riT the
extensive material supp its pattern of support -~-
Centra_ America?(evidenced by
Salvadoran guerrillas as well as similar groups in
Guatemala, Honduras,
en whiC^
is clear from the historical
basic objectivestdethe scribed1above5
entered office with these basic
period of Dower.
have not changed during
Nicara an milita_ buildu and alicnment with the
(B)
Soviet Bloc: As the Sandinistas tdisintegratedf lFig eavinr~ the~uly
19, 1979, Somoza's National Guard significant arr:ed greuP in
Sandinista guerrillas as the only
Nicaragua. With most of. the GuarddrmemberstcapttheaFor f leeinn c
Nicaragua, there was little military before its opposition tcc
without Nicaragua. Nevertheless, long
up arms against it, the GON/FSLN had begun an impressive mil'-tar
p buildup far beyond its defensive needs. The guerrilla
(EPS --.-
army r bey c?e~
army--which was renamed the Popular Sandinista Army
eh of 6,000 troops in July 1979 to abcu=
from an estimated streng 23,750 (army plus activet~'c
16,625 by .ear's and, and to about
by January 1982, when thy. dined
rF:scrves and militia) 19 0 the GOt`
carried out its first major operations; In
which 9S0 the Minirtcr
Y? militia program, s`r
announced a ? voluntary would nventual ly br, 200 , 00 ong.
(iu;~1-,n: to LG.1trd
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The Sandinista military establishment now has over 62,000 men or.
active duty and another 57,000 reserve and militia--a total of
119,000, many by now with combat experience. In contrast,
Sonoza's National Guard usually numbered 6,000 to 7,000
peaked at about 14,000 during the 1978-79 insurrection). Of
Nicaragua's immediate neighbors, Honduras' armed forces number
about 18,000 and Costa Rica has no army.
The number of Cuban military and security advisers in Nicaragua
grew in a similar pattern. About 200 Cuban military advisers
were?repcrted in Nicaragua?in 19th, an were
present by the end of 1980. By beginning
estimate of Cuban military and security advisers in Nicaragua had
S t
risen to 1,500-2-,000. In 1983 and 1984, the number of
Coble
Bloc advisers increased, ?reaching about 2,500 to 3,500
military and security personnel and about 200 Soviet, other Bloc,
Libyan, and PLO military advisers and technicians.
The growth of Soviet Bloc arms deliveries to. Nicaragua lagged
somewhat behind the increase in EPS troop strength and the Cuban
presence, although orders were. accepted as early as 1979. Soviet
Bloc military deliveries totalled about $5 million in 1980, but
rose to about $45 million in 1981, and to approximately $90
million during 198'2.
In late 1979, East Germany agreed to supply Nicaragua with 800
military trucks (1,000 were eventually de livered). During 1980,
Nicaragua-also reportedly signed a secret defense agreement with
Cuba. It also sent about 100 personnel for MiG pilot and
mechanic training in Bulgaria, the first in a series of steps.to
acquire advanced fighter aircraft. in 1980 and 1981,.the GON
sent major missions to the Soviet Bloc to discuss military
assistance. Following the August 1980 visit to Managua of Yasse=
Arafat, the PLO provided military instructors to the GON. In
raid-1981, the GON received its first 25 Soviet T-55 medium battle
tanks (it received about 25 more during 1982, and now has about
110 such tanks, along with about 30 PT-76 light amphibious
assault tanks).
Following the onset of organized insurgent activity in Nicaragua
in early 1982, the Sandinista military continued to grow in.
nurmber of-troops, quantity and quality of weapons, and in the
overall level of Soviet Bloc assistance. Soviet Bloc military
deliveries were about $115 million in 1983 and about $250 million
in 1984. The cumulative amount from 1979 to the present reached
over $500 million.
This weaponry was increasingly sophisticated. In addition to
-delivering more.T-55 tanks, the Soviets 'introduced the PT-76
light amphibious. tank,' multiple rocket launchers, heavy
artillery, helicopters (including the MI-24 Hind assault
helicopter in late 1984),, transport aircraft, about 200 armored
vehicles, patrol boats, and radar.and air defense equipment.
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Considering that there was no significant armed opposition to t
Sandinistas prior to 1982, the pattern of the 1979-1982 GON
military growth and its Soviet connection illustrates that the
Sandinista Government was committed from its earliest days to a
military system with the following facets:
-- a large active force, with large ready reserve and militia
-- a close military relationship with Cuba and the Soviet Bic
as well as Libya and the PLO; and
-- new offensive weapons systems that would further destabili
the then-existing regional military balance (such as she
1981 receipt of the T-55 tanks,-and the GON decision.-In 19
to acquire advanced .fighter aircraft).
(C) Sutoort for armed insurgencv in El Salvador and
activities against other Central American Governments:
Nicaragua's export of revolution to El Salvador, and to a lesse
degree-to the rest of Central America, remains an integral 'part
of Sandinista ideology and foreign policy. Over the past 12-14
months, a compilation of reporting provides convincing evidence
that Managua continues to play a key role as a supply and
communications center, training base, and- headquarters for the
Salvadorai guerrillas. There is enough specific evidence to be
confident; that` the supply effort continues and remains a critic
factor in maintaining the guerrillas' military capabilities..
While there has been a reduction in materiel support to the
insurgency since mid-1984 compared to the sizeable influx durin
1982-83, Managua has an abiding commitment to maintain the
insurgency in El Salvador.
in addition to intelligence evidence, Sandinista officials, suc
as directorate members Tomas Borge.and Bayardo Arce, explicitly
acknowledged at various times in 1984, Nicaraguan support to th
guerrillas both in terms of materiel and communications,
Nicaragua also continues to provide military training to
the Salvadoran guerrillas. A body of reporting over the past
year suggests that a few hundred Salvadoran trainees may be at
Nicaraguan camps at any given time. For example, a new trainin
camp for Salvadorans was established last year near Santa Julia
on Nicaragua's Cosiguina Peninsula. New buildings, a filing
range, and an obstacle. course are hidden in wooded terrain. T'.
isolated location and proximity to El Salvador make the site
ideal for insurgent training and. infiltration. Salvadoran
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evidenee-ssas
trainees receive combat experience fightianti
prior to returning to El Salvador. The pattern
unmistakable. There is?no reason to doubt that Nicaraguan
? support for the Salvadoran guerrillas, in equipment supply, ons training and in command and control oeruerrillc acinues to be
a vital element in outside support for g
Significance of Nicaraguan support tto e nmnt forces. will
External resupply and support asses
remain critical far the Salvadoran insurgents for the fcreseeab
future. A-variety of reports over the past few months indicae
that the guerrillas continue to depend. heavily on Nicaragua:
-- reporting from several sources confirm that the most
? critical need is for ammunition; and
-- in early 1985, ii.dicted that the
Army's increased of f ectivenes
resulted in "substantially fewer" arms captu red`romthbroad.
guerrillas, forcing them to bring
All evidence indicates that Managua will, continue to'provide-
sufficient materiel for the guerrillas to sustain at least
current level-of activity.
Suvoort for Other Central American Radicals:
Sandinista activities. elsewhere in fttheCel.kmericaneregiony
include training and arms suppor radical been key to
in close oooperation'with Cuba. This suppc has potential t Of
unity efforts and attempts to'upgrade the military p
these groups;
Guatemala: Managua and Havana have worked.jointly since
? 1982 to consolidate the
the past year, Managua
the Guatemalan guerrillas, which parallels early support -4c
the Salvadoran rebels;
Honduras: Prior to 1982, Havana and Managua discouraged -
armed struggle in Honduras so as not to endanger-use of t
country as a conduit for shipments
However, as the Honduran government
shipments and disrupt leftist networks, thetCubans subveandsic-
Nicaraguans shifted their policy to
in mid-1983, the Sandinistas infiltrated approximate
100 Cuban/Nicaraguan-trained Honduran insurgents in
unsuccessful. effort to set up a base.for insurgent
operations and made anothen abortive infiltration
effort in mid-1984; and
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reporting from a variety, of sources indicates the
training continues, both in Nicaragua and Cuba, and
includes combat experience against anti-Sandinistas in
northern Nicaragua;
-- Costa Rica: Nicaragua provides arms and training to the
armed wing of the Costa Rican Communist Party, which is seen
by the hardline faction of the party as the backbone of a
potential domestic insurgency.
(D) Internal consolidation: The consolidation of
Sandinista domestic power with a system of extensive internal
control presents a.major-obstacle to Central American stability,
given Sandinista objectives and the lack of democratic checks and
balances to prevent or moderate an aggressive policy supporting
revolution in neighboring countries. Nearly six years after
it seized power, the-FSLN has total control of the vast GON
apparatus and has largely consolidated its power.
Since taking power, the FSLN has moved quickly to confirm its
control of key government functions, and to expand significantly
the government's role in national?lif-e. It'should be noted that
although the FSLN has allowed some opposition role, mainly to
project an image of moderation for external consumption, it has
steadily restricted opposition activity. Its clear goal is the
institutionalization of a.Marxist-Leninist one-party state in
Nicaragua. Following is a checklist of Sandinista actions taken
-so far to.achieve political domination:
-- the placing of FSLN cadre in all GON agencies and assigning
key ministries to National Directorate members;
-- the creation of?a repressive state security/secret police
organization controlled by the FSLN and assisted by Cuban
and East German advisers;
major expansion of the armed forces, controlled by
Sandinistas and creation of the Sandinista militia (both a
source,of armed strength and mobilization of the masse);
creation and expansion of Sandinista mass organizations,
utilizing the literacy campaign and the va=ious groups
(labor., students, and the ubiquitous CDS block cerrtittees)
to build cadres, extend party control, and to intimidate
opposition groups;
expansion of Sandinista representation in the Council of
State, effectively reducing the opposition to a token role
in that body;
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postponing elections five years until the FSLN had full
political control and was able to.ensure favorable results;
active harassment of the political opposition through press
censor'ship, denial of permits for rallies, arbitrary
confiscation of property, and arbitrary price and credit
policies;
-- support of, rival, pro-Sandinista factions 'within all
opposition parties, the media, organized religion, labor,
and non-partisan organizations; and
-- extensive utilization of Soviet Bloc military and other
cadre whose loyalty is toward consolidation of
Marxist-Leninist system.
Blaming FDN activities in early 1982, the government-declared a
'state of emergency" that further curtailed civil liberties and
restricted opposition activities. The FSLN also stepped up CDS
block committee actions against political dissidents, including
individuals, political parties, labor unions, the private sector,
the media, and organized religion. The institution of a draft,
further expansion of the Nicaraguan military and increased
receipt of major amounts of Soviet Bloc weaponry greatly
increased the FSLN's capability to control national life and
intimidate the opposition.
Having taken advantage of its access to GON funds and resources,
and of the fact that opposition forces had been weakened by years
of repression under Somoza and then the Sandinistas, the,FSLN
announced elections for Novem:=r 1984. The flawed electoral
process--during which the FSLN rejected opposition requirements
for minimal guarantees to allow fair participation--demonstrated
that the FSLN-was not prepared to risk its own political power.
From the FSLN's standpoint, however, the elections gave it a
basis to institutionalize its control over Nicaraguan society.
Events following the elections ihdicate the FSLN will use its
control of the Presidency and the new National Assembly to
provide the institutional framework for continued Sandinista
domination. This current phase of FSLN consolidation includes
continuation of political and media controls, aggressive use of
the draft as a device for mobilization and social control,
rejection of armed and unarmed opposition calls for Church-
sponsored dialogues, and proposal of a National Assembly statute
that would severely, limit rights of most opposition members.
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The unfair electoral arrangements and subsequent efforts to
stifle political opposition in Nicaragua were taken after the
Sandinistas had announced on September 20, 1984, their
willingness to accept the draft Contadora treaty which contained
extensive commitments to respect political rights and ensure a
democratic political system.
Sandinista Rejection-of Dialogue: The Nicaraguan armed and
unarmed opposition have consistently emphasized the goal of
genuine democracy in Nicaragua, and have repeatedly offered to
engage in dialogue with the Sandinistas. Significant armed
opposition proposals were made by the Revolutionary Democratic
Alliance (ARDE) on'February 18, 1984, and by the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force (FDN) on February 21, 1984. The unarmed
opposition put forth a nine point proposal in January 1984; and
refined this proposal in September 1984 to address the conditions
necessary for opposition participation in the November elections.
More recently, the unarmed opposition leadership in Managua-
issued a February 22, 1985. proposal for a national dialogue.
in a separate declaration signed in San Jose on March 1--a major
opposition milestone that received wide attention--the
externally-based opposition (including representatives of the,
FDN, the Miskito group MISURA, ARDE, and prominent democratic
civilian. leaders. such as Arturo Cruz)- proposed a national
dialogue to be mediated by the Nicaraguan Catholic Church,
offering to implement a mutual in situ ceasefire and accept
Daniel Or'ega as President until such time as the Nicaraguan
people decided on the matter through a plebiscite. They also
endorsed the minimum requirements established on February 22 by
the internal, unarmed opposition to begin a national dialogue.
in addition to the suspension of armed activities and the
establishment of a ceasefire, these included the lifting of the
state of emergency; absolute freedom of expression; a general
amnesty and pardon for political crimes; a full restoration of
constitutional guarantees and the right of habeas corpus;
guarantees-of the safety of members- of the resistance movement
who participate in the dialogue; and the implementation of these
measures under the supervision of guarantor governments. The
foregoing are not unreasonable demands-of abdication, but rather
the minimum rights of people, in a democratic society.
When Arturo Cruz attempted to fly to. Managua on March 7 to
deliver this proposal to the Nicaraguan Government, the
Government prevented his return, and refused to respond to
either opposition proposal. On March 22, the Nicaraguan
Catholic Church hierarchy (Episcopal Conference) issued a
communique reiterating its support for a national dialogue. and
declaring its willingness to act-as a mediator.
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III. Efforts to Resolve Central American Conflict
(A) U.S. objectives toward Nicaragua: United States policy
toward Nicaragua since the Sandinistas' ascent to power has
consistently sought to.achieve changes in Nicaraguan government
policy and behavior. We have not sought to overthrow the
Nicaraguan government nor to force on Nicaragua a specific system
of government. The changes we seek, listed below, are essential
if Central America is to achieve peace and stability:
termination of all forms o~fNicaraguan support for
insurgencies or subversion in neighboring countries;
-- reduction of Nicaragua's expanded military/security
apparatus to restore military balance in the region;
-- severance of Nicaragua's military and security ties to the
Soviet Bloc and Cuba and the return to those countries of
their military and security advisers now in Nicaragua; and
-- implementation of Sandinista commitment to the Organizaticn
of American States to political pluralism, human rights,
free elections, non-alignment, and a mixed economy.
These goals are supported by all of Nicaragua's neighbors,-they
are consistent with the original goals of the anti-Somoza
coalition and Sandinista pledges to the OAS, and they are
contained in'the September 1983 Contadora Document of Objectives,
which Nicaragua signed together with the other Central American
states. The last of the above objectives has been stressed by
both the Carter and Reagan Administrations. It is directly
related to both the internal situation in Nicaragua and
Nicaraguan's relations with its neighbors, especially unarmed,
neutral, and democratic Costa Rica, which sees the realization of
this objective as a guarantee of its own security.
(B) Bilateral and regional diplomacy 1979-1982: United
States negotiations with the Sandinistas began before they
arrived in. power July 19, 1979. Our efforts to strengthen the
moderate opposition to Somoza succeeded in obtaining from the
Sandinistas their.July 12, 1979 letter to the OAS and their
Basic Statute, in which they made the commitments to democracy,
human rights, and non-alignment cited above.
During 1979' and 1980, the Carter Administration made a major
effort. to achieve good relations with the Nicaraguan Governmer.:..
Total authorized bilateral assistance reached $117.2 million, a:;
the U.S. strongly supported Nicaragua in multilateral aid
institutions. Our central objective was to encourage evolution
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of a democratic system in Nicaragua. Diplomatic contacts were
frequent and at a high level, including Secretary Vance in Quito
in-August 1979., a Carter/Ortega meeting in September 1979, a U.S.
visit by Cor..mandantes Wheelock and Tirado in December 1979,
Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit to Managua in January 1980,
and ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Cheek's visit in September
1980. As late as October 1980, still seeking constructive
relations, the Carter Administration certified that Nicaragua was
not assisting international terrorism.
But by December 1980, the intelligence revealed that the Sandinis-
were supporting the Salvadoran guerrillas, that 600 Cuban militar?.
advisers were in Nicaragua and that pilots had been sent abroad
for MiG training. The military buildup had begun and internal
repression was apparent in the stacking of the Council of. State
in May and the murder of private sector leader Jorge Salazar in
Disbu=semen's of AID and PL-480 sales were suspended
and military assistance to El Salvador resumed. Economic assis-
tance was formally ended by a Presidential Determination April-
14, 1981, that Nicaragua was assisting Salvadoran guerrillas.
This Administration, nevertheless, made two major attempts to
reverse?the deteriorating relations in 1981-82. Assistant
Secra'tary Enders visited Managua in August 198,1, and`presented an
offer, including renewed economic assistance, for an end to
Sandinista support for guerrillas and reduced levels of
Nicaragua's military capability and foreign advisors. The GON
never responded to our offer. Nicaraguan Ambassador'to the U.S.
Arturo Cruz resigned shortly thereafter in frustration over these
developments. In April 1982, we made an eight-point proposal
reiterating the August terms and emphasizing international
verification of arms limitations and reaffirmation of Nicaragua's
earlier commitments to support pluralism, free elections, and a
mixed.economy.' A series of exchanges became increasingly sterile
and concluded in August 1982. We then joined a multi'ateral
effort of eight democracies of the region in October 1982--the
San Jose Declaration--which outlined the essential conditions fc
restoring peace. These governments designated Costa Rican
Foreign Minister Volio to carry-the-declaration to Managua. The
Nicaraguan Government, however, refused to receive him or enter
.into dialogue ort the San Jose principles.
(C) Contadora and Manzanillo 1983-1985: Colombia, Panama,
Mexico, and Venezuela began in January 1983,. at Contadora,
Panama, to mediate a.regional settlement. Meetings among the
five Central American and these four "Contadora Group" governmen-
led to agreement in September 1983 on a Document of Objectives.
This identified twenty-one political, security, and social-econc-
goals whose verifiable implementation would meet our concerns.
We have consistently supported efforts to develop the Document c:
Objectives into a?comarehensive and verifiable agreement.
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By April 1984, the CoDocur..entGofuObjectiveslandaproposednaad-urs
for implementing the
agreement in June 1984. Th4s at a.
basis tates.
bafor further er discussions by the
The Sandinistas made it clear that they would not accept any r element-to which they hsuggestions n1forlitsgimprovementoard called
Central Americans made
for direct negotiations with Nicaragua.
The Contadora group presented a.second draft on September 7.
Nicaragua's insistence on prohibition of military maneuvers was
accepted; timing of security commitments of interest to Nicaragua
was tied to signature; but commitments on foreign advisers and
arms reductions were-left for later negotiation. Verification
was extremely weak.
Nicaragua conditionally accepted the draft on September 21. The
other Central Americans, however, had strong misgivings.
Honduras, E1 Salvador, and Costa Rica developed a series of
Informawere presented to the Contadora. roup l discussions within Contadora since on
proposed amendments
October er 2 20, 19984. . these two drafts of a
last fall have focused on reconciling resumes 'final agreement!"ffortsttoostrengthen verifcation,-will
efforts
1112, these drafts and
be-the focus of discussion.
to
Manzanillo discussionsJune 1, 194 t
beween
Managua, Secretary Shultz proposed
Nicaragua.and the U.S.We made clear from the outset that this
process was designed to faaiccra=ehethe nsiventregionalgsettlement~^C
contribute to the goal of comprehensive, r
ne -nee U.S. Special Envoy between June ShDecembelaudemanr 1984,na11 buttoner
with the Nicaraguan proposals for a
in Manzanillo, Mexico. We made cspecific identified by
comprehensive step-by-step solution to
both sides. But Nicaragua used the talks as a vehicle to try to
resolve its most immediate bilateral.security concerns without
addressing such Contadora objectives as regional arms reductions,
or reincorporation of its insurgents into civil society under
'democratic conditions.-Following Nicaragua's conditioned
acceptance of the September 7 Contadora draft agreement, the
United States attempted to initiate concrete discussions on the
points still at issue in the draft. The Nicaraguan delegation
was unwilling to consider this approach, seeking instead to
"explore" security i--sues only outside the Contadora context.
ttiearaguan diplomacy throughout the Fix years of Sandinista :u=e
has thus been characterized by an effort to bilateralize
negotiations, mi'k_ing a comprehensive sr.ttlement impossible. It
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? 13 .
has at the same time engaged in grandstand diplomacy by making,
public statements inconsistent with'its real negotiating position
and by appeals to the U.S. public and to various international
fora in,search of propaganda advantage.
In sum, it is apparent that the Sandinistas use the negotiating
process to advance their more serious objectives:
-- buy time for internal consolidation;
-- ease external political, economic, and military pressures by
presenting the appearance of reasonableness and flexibility;
? and
-- obtain explicit or implicit guarantees against. U.S.
unilateral military intervention and preclude neighboring
countries from suppo'ting Nicaraguan democratic.opposition.
By the sane token, it is clear that, despite lip service to the
? democratization aspects of Contadora, the Sandinistas are
unalterably opposed to any internal changes that would jeopardize
their control of political life in Nicaragua.
IV. Policy Alternative and U.S. National Interests
The foregq.ing sets forth in detail our objectives regarding
Nicaragua and the enormous obstacles to realizing them posed by
Sandinista ideology, geo-strategic aims, and intransigence. we
have considered the possible alternative approaches to achieving
our policy objectives for regional stability. In doing so, we
have ruled out courses of action that would amount to acceptance
of Sandinista goals and abandonment of our own objectives, and
direct application of U.S. military force.
We are left with reliance upon an array of?policy instruments,
short of direct U.S. military action, to advance our objectives
and deny the attainment of those of the Sandinistas and their
Communist mentors. In the broadest terms', we have two options:
-- first, we can seek through effective pressure to modify
Sandinista behavior while'we help strengthen the political,
economic and military capabilities of the countries directly
threatened'; or
second, we can forego pressure and concentrate on seeking to
contain the effects of Sandinista behavior through.
assistance to neighboring countries.
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The second of these options, containment, would seek to counter
the expansionist activities of the Soviet Union, Cuba and
Nicaragua in Central America by, inter alia, a major buildup of
the security capabilities of the countries directly threatened.
It would mean providing Honduras advanced combat aircraft,
anti-tank and anti-air defense'sytems and underwriting a military
force increase from about 18,000 to perhaps 35,000. In the case
of El Salvador, it would mean more resources and major drives to
slow the guerrillas before the Sandinista pipeline picks up
again. Costa Rica would have to-decide whether to develop new
security capabilities (it now has no army) and host U.S.
exercises-or other measures.
To assure that these countries would have the will to resist in
an environment of increasing Nicaraguan military dominance, the
U.S. would probably have to offer firm guarantees.for resisting
Nicaraguan attack, including Nicaraguan aggression through
unconventional warfare.
U.S. military and naval exercises probably would increase. The
intelligence services of each country would have to be expanded.
Additional economic assistance (a doubling of 1984/85 levels or
more) would be needed to offset the impact of Soviet/Cuban
subversion and political action. We have not attempted to
cost-out this option, but total assistance to the area could rise
from the $1.2 billion per annum level of FY 84/85 to $4-5 billion
per year for the immediate future.
In terms of full realization of our objectives toward Nicaragua,
the containment approach is obviously deficient .in that it is
)assive and does not contemplate' changes in Sandinista behavior.
We do not see such changes occurring under this scenario even if
the steps outlined above are coupled with economic sanctions and
other measures to isolate Nicaragua. Moreover, there are
fundamental obstacles to implementing this strategy in a way that
will achieve-its defensive goals. First is the question of
whether Congress would support the long-term increases in U.S.
material assistance that would be necessary. A half-hearted
"containment" response, or one that lasted for only a year or twc
would only serve to prolong the Central American conflict without
altering its ultimate outcome. Second, we must face the fact
that definitive removal of U.S. support from the anti-SandinistaE
will have, in its own right and apart from any compensatory
measures, a demoralizing effect-on our friends in the region.
This, in turn, will tend to make them more susceptible to
Sandinista intimidation and/or negotiation initiatives, and less
confident in future security relationships with us.
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The flaws in the containment approach, especially. measured
against the long-term commitment of the-Sandinistas and the
assurances of 'political and military support they enjoy from the
Soviet Bloc, would appear to dictate eventual success of,
Sandinista-inspired insurgency throughout the region.
Our conclusion is that continuation of strong pressure on the
Sandinistas is the only effective course of action that will
safeguard our security and those of our friends. Under this
strategy, we foresee the following:
-- resumption of aid to the Nicaraguan armed resistance at
levels sufficient to create real pressure on the Government
of Nicaragua;
-- U.S. economic and security assistance-to-other countries'of
Central America;
-- continued U.S. iesistance on strengthening democratic
institutions, respect for human-rights and reforms;
-- additional military and naval exercises; and
-- active encouragement of a negotiated political solution to
regional problems based on our four objectives and the 21
point Contadora Document of Objectives.
The justification for our proposed approach--the strategy of
strong pressures combined with a negotiating channel to encourac;
a political solution--is treated in Section V below, in terms of
specific objectives such as halting Nicaraguan support for the
Salvadoran guerrillas and encouraging the removal-of Cuban and
Soviet advisors. Of the various approaches, this has the highes
chance of achieving a negotiated solution. It requires far less
U.S. resources than a containment policy and a better chance of
being effective. The resou=ces are now in place but should the
armed opposition be dismantled or break apart, it could not be
put back together again without enormous-effort,-if at all. in
effect, this option would be lost--placing us in an
"accommodationist-or-military response" dilemma at some later
date, when the threat to U.S. interests becomes more obvious and
when the only effective response would be on a larger scale, or
in less favorable circumstances.
V. Presidential Determination
(A) Description of Proposed Program: Assistance provided
to the Nicaraguan democratic opposition forces will be structure
so as to increase their size and effectiveness to the point whe:
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16
their pressure convinces the Sandinista leadership that it has no
alternative to pursuing a course of moderation, to include:
cessation of support to insurgent movements in other
countries;
reduction-in their armed forces;
-- withdrawal of foreign advisers; and
-- acceptance -of the March 1 Peace Proposal and establishment
of a legitimately pluralistic democratic political structure
which will assure that Nicaragua will not continue
activities threatening to their neighbors.
The United States has a clear, undeniable moral imperative not to
abandon those brave men and women in their fight to establish
democracy and respect for human rights in Nicaragua. It is a
traditional imperative stemming from more than 200 years during
which, time and again, we have lent our support--moral and
otherwise--to those around the world struggling for freedom and
independence.
It is not -simply a matter of the $14 million before the Congress
that is the issue. The greater issue is one of the United States
trying to help people who have had a Communist tyranny imposed on
them by foroe, deception and fraud. We cannot consign the.
Nicaraguan people to a Communist dictatorship with no
possibility--if history is any guide--of realizing the freedoms
of democratic goals set forth in their'San Jose unity
declaration. Our responsibility is clear: we must give them'cur
full bipartisan support.
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