LETTER TO RONALD REAGAN FROM JESSE HELMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01152R000400500001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 11, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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Office of Legislative Liaison
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EXECUTIVE. SECRETARIAT
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INITIAL
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' J(nifea %fatez Zenafe
December 11, 1985
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
F 0c,"3;e .
~..PcortL..:-.
History shows that Summit meetings with the Soviet Union have dangers
as well as potential benefits. One danger is that America may fail to
confront the Soviets on certain issues, revealing a lack of American
political will and--resolve. By our own reticence we may convince Soviet
leaders and the world that we are afraid to challenge their dangerous
actions. This in turn is dangerous for deterrence, and world peace, because
American political will is the essence of deterrence.
As you know, nine Senators wrote to you before the Geneva Summit
asking that you discuss the:32 Presidentially. confirmed Soviet SALT.
Violations with Gorbachev. =At-the U.N. in late-October, you promised to do ..--
so. Accordingly, we were extremely surprised to read reports about the
Summit stating that the-State Department prevented all - Summit. discussions of.
the Soviet SALT Violations. - -
By not even raising the specific violations in Geneva, we have -
encouraged the Soviets not- to.make any attempt to reverse- them. Our failure
to confront the Soviets on the violations will be interpreted by Gorbachev
as U.S. appeasement. -If-we are so frightened of these Soviet violations
that we do not even mention than at the highest level, then in effect we
condone than by our silence, which betokens cowardice. Dictators readily
understand appeasement and cowardice, and history shows that when appeased
they continue their provocative behavior.
Our best chance to challenge the Soviets to-reverse their violations
has thus gone completely -unused., -and worse,--our---failure now signals-U.S. --- -
weakness and tolerance of-the dangerous,-ever broadening pattern of Soviet -_.
SALT Break Out- violations.- U.S. -unilateral compliance- with SALT --I -and- SALT -- -= -
II in the face of-manifold confirmed =Soviet- SALT Break- Out violat-ions from--= - --
both has gone beyond-appeasement and bas--become abject U.S. -unilateral-_
disarmament. -_ -__
Mr. President,-Gorbachev-threatened at the Summit that- "all -restraints - - -
will be blown-to the winds," and, as-confirmed by the Soviet SALT Break -Out :_ - -
Violations tha-mselves,-this Gorbachev- threat constitutes a Soviet admission
of their violations. - - - I
We therefore request- that your November 15, 1985 Response to Soviet
Violations Paper be made-public as soon as possible, and that you report
urgently on the 8 new Soviet SALT violations which appeared on the eve of-
the Summit. We hope that you will now finally propose proportionate --
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The President
December 11, 1985
Page 2
responses to the Soviet SALT Break Out violations, whose threatening danger
to world peace was accentuated by our failure to confront the Soviets over
then at the Summit. We will strongly support you.
Very Respectfully,
Annex: Failure to Raise Soviet SALT!Violations At Summit
Copies to:
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense.
Chairman, JCS --
Director, CIA
Director, ACDA -
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Annex: Failure to Raise Soviet SALT Violations At Summit
History shows that Summit meetings with the Soviet Union have dangers
as well as potential benefits. One danger is that America may fail to
confront the Soviets on certain issues, revealing a lack of American
political will and resolve. By our own reticence we may convince Soviet
leaders and the world-that we are afraid to challenge their dangerous. -
actions. This in turn is dangerous for deterrence and world peace, because
American political will is the essence of deterrence.-
Pledge On Summit Discussion of Soviet SALT Violations
As you know, Mr. President, clearly the most serious issue in U.S.-
Soviet relations .is the continuously expanding pattern of Soviet SALT
violations. . The Soviets have long ago Broken Out of the SALT I and SALT II-
Treaties, thereby-dangerously--jeopardizing world peace.- There are now 32--
Presidentially- confirmed Soviet violations of arms control accords, with : :---
many more--over.-22-awaiting Presidential confirmation. =. _._
On September 9,.-1985,-9 Republican Senators wrote to you urging you-to:--
discuss in detail - each -of--the 32._-Presidentially -confirmed Soviet- SALT.
violations with Gorbachev---in-Geneva. In- response, - we were reassured by your -
- pledge at the Uni-ted Nations..on-October -24, .1985:-- - -
"We feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet
Union what we believe are their violations of a number of the
provisions in all these agreements."
. We interpreted this pledge to mean that the Soviets would be
confronted in detail with each of the 32 Presidentially confirmed-Soviet
SALT violations-at the Summit.- --On October- 29,- 1985,- -three. of-us therefore
thanked you '.for -promising in our U.N... speech. to -confront Gorbachev-.
Indeed, we also-stated- that- there sere five. dangerous--new -Sov4et=.SALT:: '-
violations detected on -the -very-eve---of . the Summit,-which-made- the: necessity--_
of confronting- Soviet SALT violations -all--the- more -serious -and -urgent: -:=.Even
after our letter;=three-more-serious.-Soviet SALT-violations.:were_repor-ted. -:
Defense Secretary -Weinberger- even promised-on October-31,-1985,-in an open
Senate Foreign Relations Comnittee'hearingi--to=.confirm-these=new:.violations:'-
publicly before-the Summit, -The--State-Depar-tment. reportedly -prevented_i~im from doing so,- however,.. thereby creating a State Department cover-up. of new _--
Soviet SALT violations detected on-the-very eve of_the Summit.- '- --
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Annex
December 11, 1985
Page 2
State Department Appeasement
We are therefore utterly dismayed to read about the State Department
cover-up at the Summit in the New York Times:
"The State Department official also said that although the -
Administration had repeatedly complained to Moscow about what it sees
as Soviet violations of arms-control accords, this subject was not -
discussed in detail at the Summit meeting.. He said that such_
compliance issues had been discussed when Secretary of State Shultz -
was in Moscow earlier in the month. - Mr.- Shultz told some columnists
today that both sides in Geneva strongly reaffirmed the need for
compliance, but that no specific violations were raised."
(November 23, 1985, emphasis added.)
Should we accept false, bland Soviet assurances about the "need" for
compliance? No one seriously- claims-that the--Soviets are-trying-to reve.rse-_
their SALT Break Out:-violations--and there-is no evidence that they will-.
After all, the_ Soviet: SALT--Break=-Out violations.--contribute--strongly- to-
Soviet military superiority, and this superiority is_ the only basis for
Soviet super-power - status.
ACDA Director Adelman- confirmed-on December- -9,--1985,,-- that-the -United - - - =--
States did not-raise the violat-ions at the Summit. - If we-did not even raise-
the -specific violations in -Geneva,- then, of course, we -wi11-encourage -the - .-
Soviets not to make-any attempt-to even pretend to reverse than. Mr.. -
President, failure to confront the Soviets -in detail with. each -of.- the 32
Presidentially confirmed Soviet SALT violations at the highest-level, will
certainly be interpreted by Gorbachev as -U.S. appeasement. If we are so
frightened of these Soviet violations that we do not even mention than at
the highest level, then in effect we condone than by our silence, which
betokens cowardice. -Dictators readily understand appeasement and cowardice,
and history shows that-when-appeased they-continue theirprovocative -.-
behavior. -:..-=_ -- -
Our best chance to challenge the -Soviets =to--reverse --their --violations
-has thus gone- completely---unused, -and worse-. our-failure now-signals U.S. weakness and -tolerance of -the-dangerous- ever-broadening -pattern,-of -Soviet -
SALT Break Out_violations.-_-U.S. unilateral --compliance with-SALT-I and SALT--
II in the face-of -manifold -confirmed Soviet -SALT-Break Out.-violations fran--
both has gone beyond ;appeasement--:and- has:_becane:vabject--U.S. - unilateral-.._ --_-=,_
disarmament.
Moreover, the State Department's continued Summit cover-up of Soviet- -
SALT violations not only contradicts your- U.N.- pledge- to us, but it also -
contradicts the State Department's own -rhetoric. In a November 19, 1985
reply to a serious letter by Senator Symms-of -October 17-, 1985 concerning - -
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Annex
December 11, 1985
Page 3
the new Soviet SS-25 mobile ICBM deployment SALT II violation, the State
Department piously stated:
"Any Soviet violation of an arms control agreement is a serious
matter. As the President has said, strict compliance with all
provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this
Administration will not accept anything less." {IIuphasis added.)
But if Soviet SALT violations are so serious and fundamental, why did -
the State Department refuse to mention then at the Summit?- Perhaps because
the State Department has already accepted for almost a decade and a half -
much less than strict Soviet SALT compliance. In fact, the State Department
has lead the cover-up of Soviet SALT violations.
Gorbachev Admission of Soviet SALT Break Out
It appears, Mr. President, that your-Strategic Defense Initiative is
more important--to the Soviets-than Soviet SALT-Break Out--violations are----
to you. Soviet leader-Gorbachev statedthat-discussions on the issues of--
your SDI and arms control were "very;-very sharp," and Gorbachev. publicly
threatened, "All-restraints will be blown-to the winds" unless you do not
agree to abandon--SDI. --Butt=-you have-already stated that the-Soviet-SDI is--=-
years ahead--of - the U.S.-program.
10
In September, Gorbachev-rattled Soviet sabres-when he said that the
international situation was "explosive," and in October he threatened "rough
times" ahead for the U.S.
Gorbachev even boasted that the Soviet SDI "will be effective, though
less expensive, and-quicker to produce" than the U.S. SDI.- These Gorbachev
boasts confirm first that the Soviets believe they are indeed ahead of the
U.S. in SDI.
But, even more ominously,- orbachev's.-threats indicate that= he -
- - -
believes all arms -control -restraints-are-=in--fact already "blown-to, __the-_--__-
winds" and- unleashed , -- as evidenced by floe Soviet=SALT -Break but ==ui olations _ - : -_ -
themselves. - This Gorbachev-threat.=is -thus-_a-bold=admission :that-=the---Soviets -= -:
-have Broken Out-of = SALT -I-and -_Zl,=as their -expanding---SALT-violations already
have long confirmed. - The- Washington -Tines -of- December-- 9 71985, -quotes -ACDA _- -
Director Adelman-as -saying.. that : at -the .Summit,-- a-Soviet-.off icial, - in a- rare-
mnonent of insight; said that- "nations -don't:--necessarily follow treaties when - -
-it's not in -their national interest -to do-so.'-'. - Thi-s- is--another-..Soviet.
admission,
Danger of Nuclear Blackmail -
In the face of admitted and confirmed-Soviet-SALT Break-Out violations
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Annex
December 11, 1985
Page 4
and in the face of their boasted lead in SDI, we strongly urge you to
propose U.S. proportionate responses. As you stated ominously on March 18,
1985:
"They [the Soviets] already outnumber us greatly in offensive weapons,
and if they alone developed a defensive weapon before us, then they
wouldn't have to worry about our deterrent--a retaliatory strike.
Then they could issue an ultimatum to the-world.".
In sum, Mr. President, we are very much closer to. Soviet nuclear
blackmail than the appeasement oriented State Department will-ever realize..
The time for decisive American leadership to restore deterrence is-overdue.
We will support you all the way in responding to the Soviet Break-Out
threat.
We request that your Response to Soviet Violations Paper be made
public as soon as possible, and that you report urgently on the 8 new Soviet
SALT violations detected on the eve of the Sunnmit._
Proportionate Responses:-
Mr. President, last January a-White.Bouse_ official- described the-- ----- --
Soviet Krasnoyarsk Radar-=ABM Treaty_ violation -as -_"a dagger :-pointed at- the heart of arms control .-"_ _We hope that you -will -now finally propose. __-- -
proportionate- responses -to-the Soviet- SALT -Break - Out= violations, whose
- - -
threatening danger-to world peace was accentuated by our failure to-confront
the Soviets over-then at the Summit.
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