LETTER TO JAMES A. MCCLURE FROM M. B. OGLESBY, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01152R000400490016-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 29, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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Office of legislative Liaison
Routing Slip
STAT
STAT
STAT
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.,
~~
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
Remarks FYI -The 25 Mar.Ltr was sent to you on
4 Apr, ER 85-1469.
1 Apr 8~5
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ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
}{
4
D/ICS
X
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
}{
8
DD58T
~{
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
/Pers
/OLL
}{
15
D/PAO
16
SA/IA
17
AO/DCI
18
C/IPD/OIS
19
NIO Sp
20
C/ACIS
X
21
NIO USSR
22
D/BONA
}{
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March 29, 1985
Deaz Senator I~ScClures
Thank you for your March 25 letter to the
President cosigned bl~ Senators Svmiss srd EBet,
with respect to the issue of Soviet
ncncotepliance.
This is to assure you tha*_ paur request that
neap violat1.ons be raised with Soviets is
receiving close attention and review. You
should be hearing further aC soon &s we ht~vc~
had an opportunity tc fully study your
specific recommendatiorza.
With hest wishes,
vincerely,
M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant tt~ th? President
The #ianorable Jams A. McClure
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 24510
cc: w/copy of inc to Will Ball, Cong Affrs,
State - for DIRECT response
cc: w/copy of inc to Russ Rourke, Cong Affrs,
DOD - FYI
CC: W/COpV Of 1riC Kcn hAPlman_ ACDA, - FYI
c w/copy of inc to Charles Briggs,
Liaison, CIA - FY
cc: inc to Gen Vessey, Chrm. JCS -
FYI
cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - FYI
MBO:RRJ:hlb
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ItICOMItTG
DAVE RECEIVED: MARCH 2"R, 1985
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE JIM MCCLURE
SUBJECT: iIRrES THE PRESIDEtIT TO RAISE ALL SIX OF TF?E
CLASSIFIED NEW VIOLATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS
IDS 300521
OFFICE/AGEPICy (GTAFF NAME) ~ COD? YY/MM/DD R?SP D YY/MM/PD
M. P. OGLESBY _ ORG 85/03/28 ~!/~ `~' ~/?~'~~
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REFER (QUESTIONS ArID ROUTIrIG UPDATES TO CErdTRAL FEFEREtICE
(ROOM 79,OEOB) EXT. 2590
KEEP TINS 41ORKSH?ET A'~TACHED TO THE ORIGINAL IPICOMIrIG
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STEVESYMMS? ~?~ ~G~~ '-
' IDAHO
'~?.~C~rfeD ,~ifofe~ .~ierrafe
March 25, 1985
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Your February 1, 1985 Presidential Report to Congress on Soviet
Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements contains several important
new Soviet SALT violations. Unfortunately for our national security,
however, these violations were only recently agreed upon unanimously
by the national security bureaucracy. These Soviet violations would
probably still be under debate within the bureaucracy, had we not
imposed the Congressionally mandated report deadline of February 1,
1985. We have now been informed that Congressional debate and the
right of the American people to know about these new Soviet SALT
violations is still being hindered by the further resistance and
procrastination of the bureaucracy, principally the State Department.
The State Department stated in a recent letter to us that: "the
U.S. believes that Soviet non-compliance is a serious matter and will
continue to press these issues with the U.S.S.R." The State
Department added: "The Secretary stated that one of our objectives
for the new arms control negotiations will be to reverse the erosion
of the ABM Treaty regime." These are fine statements, but only if
they are put into effect.
In the past, the State Department has argued that Soviet arms
control violations could not be made public while they were under
discussion with the Soviets in the SALT Standing Consultative
Commiss.ion.. This policy severely inhibited both Congressional and
public discourse of the Soviet SALT violations for years, because the
practice of diplomatic confidentiality took precedence over the
traditions of open democratic politics and the public's right to know.
But now the State Department is arguing that Soviet SALT violations
can not be made public until they are first raised with the Soviets in
diplomatic channels. Thi new policy is again anti-democratic,
because it places "fairness" to our Soviet adversary already confirmed
in multiple violations, ahead of the open nature of democratic
political discussion and the right of the American people to know
.about issues affecting their national security.
The State Department has thus had it both ways in attempting to
prevent Congress and the American people from knowing about Soviet
SALT violations vitally affecting our national security. It remains
an anachronistic anomaly of the detente era of the 1970s that Soviet
SALT violations can even today remain classified by the Executive
Branch and unfit for public discussion, yet can be discussed in some
detail and at a leisurely pace with our Soviet adversary.
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The President
March 25, 1985
Page Two
As you know, there are six new Soviet arms control treaty
violations treated in the February 7, 1985 classified annex to the
President's February 1, 1985 Report to Congress on Soviet
Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. As you also know, renewed
strategic arms control negotiations resumed with the Soviets on March
12, 1985, in Geneva.
Indeed, Dr. Ken Adelman, Director of ACDA, has confirmed that
the violations are part of the negotiations in Geneva. In the
Washington Times of March 25, 1985, Adelman stated:
" ..this is going to be the first time ever, that I'm aware of,
where violations of existing arms control agreements is made a
central point in on-going negotiations...it means that our
negotiators bring it up and feel very strongly about it, and
don't let the matter rest."
We would think, therefore, that this statement means that the
six new still secret violations have already been raised with the
Russians in Geneva.
We are very concerned to learn that as of March 20, 1985, over a
full week after the start of negotiations, the State Department has
still not raised any of these six violations with the Soviet Union.
We were under the impression that in response to our requests you had
ordered our negotiators to raise all violations, especially new ones,
with the Soviets at the outset of the negotiations. Is this tardiness
the way the State Department intends to "press these issues" in the
new negotiations?
Mr. President, we believe that it is of utmost urgency to raise
these issues with the Soviets, so that in turn they can be revealed to
the Congress and to the American people. These six new still secret
violations are of great significance to us, because we intend to use
them in our legislative efforts to end U.S. unilateral compliance with
the unratified SALT II Treaty. We are enclosing our Senate Resolution
90, for your information. The Resolution has been referred to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for hearings.
Given the urgency of making a full public report of all new
Soviet violations to the American people, it is necessary for us to
offer this resolution as an amendment to an appropriate bill soon.
We therefore strongly urge you to raise all six of the still
classified new violations with the Soviets as soon as possible, so
that the Administration will be in a position to at least not oppose
our amendment. We would of course prefer that the Administration
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The President
March 25, 1985
Page Three
supported our amendment, or better yet, released these six secret
violations itself, making our amendment moot. We anticipate that like
previous amendments asking you for reports on Soviet arms control
violations, our amendment will pass the Senate unanimously.
With warmest personal regards,
cerely,
Attachments:
Senate Resolution 90
Letter to the President
Letter to the Majority Leader
Letter from the Majority Leader
Letters from the State Department
Copies to:
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, CIA
Director, ACDA
Chairman, JCS
P
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- S ~;;30 COI~GRESSIO:~AL RECORD -SENATE ~4lart?h ~, 19.5
ident on
h
P
res
e
Cori:miu~ on Small Business: Mr. Bump- SEDATE RFSOLUTIOIr' 90-RELAT- bar 1984 GAC Report to t
erx wt: r'unn- MI. Gasser, MI. Baucua. Mr. ING TO THE SOL'IET ARMS Soviet Arena Control Violations stated l3
__ - . _ _ _ _ ____ ,.-.~...,.., more eoncluatve 6ovlet arena control viola?
t~ ?~ and fir. Kerry OF 1985 - ern] agreement a'Ithin the Administration
I
- M
'
~
r.
s
Affalnr.
~ Corcmfttee on Veterans
d
s 4~, ton Mr. Mataunsga, Mr. DeConeinl. Mr. SYMN.S ,(for himself and Mr. as a Presidential Report to Congress.
d the following res- a?as the result of a McClure-Mattinci)??Cour-
itt
b
" '
e
m
MCCl.t;tu) su
3 ' ~ ._~ ~ 1/iuhell, and Mr. Rockefeller.
~+ ~4. SelttK Commltt.ee on Etltla:.ltdr. Heflin, olution; R?hich v,?as teferred to the ter unanimous Amendment. The February.
- 1985 presldentlal Report Lo Concreaa on
?; ~=~ Mr. Pryor, and Mr. Eagleton. .: 7 '?- Committee on Foreign Relations. Soviet Arms Control Violations (dasslfled -
Melcher, Mr. Inouye, Mr. ?Del.onrW. and ~ -Resoived,?1t fa the sense of the Senate that lationa conclusively wltn unanimous u~K~-
Mr. Burdict .' - -' ??= ' ? the people of the United States should be agency agreement. Thk is the result of a
? Special Committee on Aging: Mr. Glenli, triformed urgently and, consistent with the McClure amendment.
Mr. Chiles, Mr. Neither, Mr. Pn?or, Mr. protection of intelligence sources and metb- There are thus a total of 24 Soviet arms
Bradley, Mr. Burdick. Mt. Dodd, Mr. John- ~. ~ the fullest extent possible regarding control treaty violations for which the evf?
ston, and Mr. Bingamaa. - Soviet noncompliance with the unratified Bence is?conclusive, and more signlficanlly.
Joint Economic Committee: 1+F.r. Bentsen.~S,~;T Il Treaty or any arras control agree- the entire Reacari Adrnlnl5tration unanl-
Mr. Proicmire, Mr. Sennedy, and Mr. bar- meat to which the Soviet Unfoa !a a Party. mously agrees that these 24 are conclusive
banes. ~ - and, pursuant to this 1lnding, requcstb the ? violations. There are nine more probable,
- d b
SENATE RESOLIITION 88=
AMENDING . THE STAIr'DING
RULF~ OF THE SEIQATE - .
Mr. DOLE submitted the folloA?ing
resolution; which a?as considered and
agreed Lo: - -
? s. Res. ss
ReaoIved, That paragraph 3ta) of Rule
~'~' of the SLandinC Rules of the Senate is
amended for the 89th Congress as follows:-
Strike "12" after "Rules and Adlilinistra-
tion" and insert in lieu thereof "15". ~. ?.~?
Src- 2. Paragraph 3lc) of Rule F%V of the
StandinC Rules?of the Senate !s amended
for the 59th Congress as follows:
Stril-e "7" after "Indian Affairs" and
insert in lieu thereof "9".
r
Special Committee on Ag
na: vial ~~ ordered to be printed ui the
(chairman), Mr. Cohen. Mz. Pressler. Mr. - and SALT II k to accelerate our StraLeCic
Gi?assleY. ~- Wilson, Mr. Warner, Mr. RECORD, as follows: - ? Defense Initiative. But the onl}? asc that a=e
Evans, Mr. Denton, Mr. Nickles, and MI5. AAALYSIS OT FEaP,DAP.S 1,1985, VIOLATIONS are ever goinC ~ be able to deploS SDI in
Hsv;?kins. - _ - ' ? Rrroxr the near term, or even in the long term.
Select Committee on Indian Affairs: Mr- The January 1984 Presidential Report to however, 1s to selectively abrogate the SALT
-Andreas (chairman), Mr. Golda?atei, Mr. Congress on Soviet Arms Control Violations 1 ABM Treaty. And the on1S? wa3'. polilical-
Gorton. Mr. Murkowski, and Mr. Abdnar. found 5 Soviet violations conclusively. with ly, that we can do that is to scrap the unra?
Joint Economic Coramfttee: Mr. Abdnor unanimous interagency agreement. This tified SALT II Treats. Tlius tt 1s extremely
(vice chairman), Mr. Roth, Mr. SS-mms, Mr. Report was the result of aMcClure-Helms- important to SDI and to American national
MattinCly', Mr. D'Amato, and Mr. t7Cilson- SS'm>~ unanimous amendment The Otto- security to scrap SALT II.
Rudman. Mr. D Amato. Mr. Iiastea, Mr.
Pressler, Mr. Goldwater, and ~ standin8 of the Sotiet threat to our
Vetei?elis' Affairs: Mr. Murkoa?sl:i (chair- national security.
man), Mr. Simason. Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Mr. President, I ask unanimous Con-
Stafford. Mr. specter. Mr. Denton. and Mr. -sent that the President's unclassified
Boschwitz. ~ - February 1, 1985, report be printed in
Select Committee on Ethics: Mz. Rudman the RECORD, together with my azals?sis
(chairman). Mr. Helms.. and MIS. Kassa- of this report,. ?
Baum. - '.. ~ There being no objection, the mate-
Heinz
M
a
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SENATE ~ RESOLIITION 89-
MAKING MAJORITY PARTY AP-
POII~'TI~"' ^TS TO SENATE COM-
T4ITTEES AI.'D - ELECTING
CHf.IRMEl~ AND SDCE3 COM-
MITTEES
Mr. DOLE submitted the follovring
resolution; ~chich was considered and
agreed to: ~ -
S. P.es. 89
Resolved. That the folloa-ing shall consti-
lute the majoritc party's membership On
those Senate committees listed below for
the 91?t.h Congress, or until their successors
arc aDDOinted: -
Rules and Administration: Mr. Mathias
(chairman). Mr. Hatfield, Mr. McClure, M-r.
H ]r_:s Mr R nee Mr Dole Air Stevens
e - .u -
~
President to review his classified message to likely, and possible violations reporte y
the Congress dated February 1, 1985, and as the President, eith 31 more Lo go to report
soon as possible after the adoption of this on the full 64 Soviet violations.
resolution promptly t0 make public all ma- It is now fair to say that the Arms Control
Lerisl and information therein a?hlch can be
Process has suffered a "broken back".ad?
released to the people o! the United States
consistent with the standard spectfied
herein. ?
Mr. SYIJrMS.Mr. President, I am of-
fering .this resolution for myself and
Senator McCLtnm !or a very important
reason. Soviet arms control tiolations
must be ended. But before they can be
ended, they must be revealed to the
,
' Soviets and to the American people. I -deployment and contfnued Bear H bomber
a-ant the distinguished American dale- production, together with SS-16 deploy-
gation to the Genet?a arms control
talks-the so-called umbrella talks-
confirmed today to confront the So~~-
ets on March 12, 1985, with the full
spectrum of all their arms control
treaty violations. -
I believe that the most important
findings of President Reagan's Febru-
ary 1, 1985, report Lo Congress on
Soviet Non-Compliance a ith Arms
Control Treaties are iri the classified
annex. I believe further that these
findings must be made public so that
they can be understood by the Con-
gress and by the American people.
Each of the findings has been dis-
cussed in the press repeatedly before,
and I believe that their confirmation
by the executive branch vrouid in no
~a3' jeopardize intelligence sources
and methods. No intelligence data sup-
porting these findings need be di-
vtilged at this time, just the findings
themselves.
and Mr. Garr. ~
My resolution merely requests that
Small BusL-iess: I~fI. vGeicker (chairman). the President release these findings,
Mr. Boschwitz. Idr. Gorton. Mr. Nickles. Mr. -which are so necessary to our under-
inirsisi.ered by the Sovietb. It !s also most
reasonable to conclude that the Soviets
have torn up both SALT I end SALT II.
Indeed, the Reagan Administration unani-
motuly agrees that the Soviets are conclu-
afvely violattng the core provisions of both
treaties.
Soviet SJv'DV growth is certain to continue
in 1985, with impendinc SS-24 ICBM de?
lmperding SS-25 mobile ICBM
ployaient
meat. _
The Soviets are duect)_v challcnCing the -
essence of the IIB. democratic political
system by their 24 conclusive and ab'?reed
arms control violations. Tlie3' are boldly
gambling that American democratic ler.dens
can not muster the leadership or collect the .
bipartisan political corsensus necessary Lo
demonstrate the political Rill to compensate
-tor their violatiorL They believe, with some
Iustification derived from their Dast obser-
vation of American behavior, that American
political leaders are paralyzed and demoral-
ized and unable to galvanize Dublic support
to challenge them and counteract their,
threats to our collective security.
Of course, the Soviets are very sell confi-
dent. They have reason to be. The Soviets
know full well that theS now have an over-
a-helming 4 to 1 numerical advantage In
ICBM a'srheads (counting DL9'e reported
best estimate of 74 warheads on each of 3U8
superheavT SS-18 ICB%s? reportedl3? giv-ine
the Soviets 8.500 ICBM warheads to onl)?
2,100 for the U.S.). and their accuracy and
megatonnage advantages give them over a 6
to 1 advantage ir. first strike, counterforce
offensive capabilities. The Soviets have over
a 14 to 1 advantage in Intermediate Range
Nuclear Force Warheads aCairist NATO.
The Sovieis are also developing and deploy-
L~g s nation-aide ABM defense, capable of
soon defending not on1S Moscow, but also
ICBM fields, and the whole nation. Thus
_ the Soviets are over a decade ahead of the
~.S..in both offelssive and defensive'capa?
bilities.
The most sensible and cost effective U.S.
response to Soviet break-out from SALT I
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11-larch?.5, 1985 COtiGRESS1c~ti~L xr.~-vnL - ~L~?~"'-
- The Reagan Adminbtration has either To the Conpr!sa Ntlie United Stotes? eonLol, and could create new security risks.
eeafftrmed or strengthened its conclusions During 1984, at Lhe request of the Con- It undermines the confidence essential to an
Indleed, thettwo mostnslgniticant Soviet vio- grass onfarms coentrol comDllsace~The first, Wlthtlregar3~toothe Lssues analSt'~d f~ the
latlona have now been upgraded from "Drub- forwarded last January, was an tn~epth Ja-iuary 1984 report. the Soc-fet IInion has
able" and "al_nost certain" to unqua:i!ted, analysis of seven specif!e issues of violations thus fat not provided aatsfactory eaplana-
certatn. clearcut, eonclustve violations. or probable violations by the So~zet IInion Lions nor undertaken corrective actions suf-
These violations are the SS-25 as the second of arms control obligations and commit- flclent to alleviate our concerns. The IInltcd
new type ICB\S and the glasnorarsk AB2d menu. The setrond report? forwarded in Oc- States Government has vigorously pressed.
Radar. Moreover,? as Was the case in the tuber, was sn advisory study Drepazed lade- and willtont!nue to press these cempllance
January 1984 Presidential Report, the Feb- pendently by the General Advisory Commit- issues With the Soviet IIaloa through dlplo-
ruary Report b the unanL~nous Judgment of .tee on Arms Control sad Disarmament. mOur e~proach ~ Purs~g these Issues
the enttre AdmirlstraUon, with no dissent-? ! base iep~ ~nC~~ regaza~ge~ ~~~et nth the Soviet Union !s to ensure that both
lag footnotes or reservations. the letter and taiga! of treaty obllgationa
Flzrther, the neW report states that "there' anion's conduct arith respect Lo ohservarce
are other compliance issues that wt11 not be - of arms control agreements. end the~Admilustrstit~on !s: analyzing f?,:rther .
publicly diulosed at this time but Which In the FY-1985 Defense Authorization issues of possible noncomRUance; as noted
remain under revieW:'.Aad the report adds Act and the Conference Report oa that Act, above, seeking from the Soviet IInion
' ominously: "With regard to the issues ana- the Congress called for additional classified through diplomatic charnels explanations.
lyzed !n the January 1984 report, the Soviet and unclassified reports reeazdinB s wide ciazificattons, and. where necessazY. cor*~'
Upton has thus [ar not provided satisfactory range of questions concerning the Sovtet Live actions; reporting on st:ch Lssues Lo the
explanations nor undertaken corrective ac- Union's comp'.lance with arms control cum- Co-ieress. and taking ~~ account to our de-
tlons sufficient Lo alleviate our concerns." mitments. The Administration b responding Tense modernization plans the security im-
Thus the Soviets are refusing II.S. dlplo- to these requests by pro~~ding both class!- pllcations of arms control vtolatioris. AC the
matic inquiries and II.S. requests that they fled and unclassified reports which update
the IInited States Is continuing
sues initially analyzed trn the
ame time
i
,
s
s
cease their violations Their stonewall+r.B the seven
~ carry out its oa-n obligations and conlmit-
has gone on for over one year and a half. January 1984 report, and analyze a n.im5er meats under re'_eva.^.t agreements. Ot:r ob- .
Their stonewalling b not lil+ely to end In of additional issues. jectives In the neW aegotla_ic
Genus aexi week_ In this unclassified report the IInlt.ed ~ ns which begin
The February 1. 1985 Report to Congress States Government reaffirms the canclu- ~ Marrh are Lo reverse the eroslor. of the
was widely reported in the press before its sions of its January 1984 report that Lhe ~~ Treaty and to sego equitable, e!fec-
release to rnntsiD evidence on 19 Soviet IISSR his violated the Helsintsl Final Act? Lively verifiable arms control agreements
arms control violations. IC did, and the the Geneva Protocol on Chemical ~Feapoes, which wt1 result in real reductions and en-
_ report eonfil'ms several mare violations. On the Biolegical and Toxin Weapons Conven- ~c~ mobility, While all of these steps
Ja_zusry 4, 1985, Senators East and Helms Lion, and two provisions of SALT II: teleme- can help. however, it b fundamentally tm-
- and I wrote to the President stating that try encryption and ICBM modernization. portent that the Soviet IInion take a tron-
there were 43 outstandir_g Sovtet era's con- The IInlted States Government also real- structive attitude toward full 'compliance
trot violations PemaSning to be reported t0 firms [tS previous conclusions that the W1th ~ arms control obligations and cdm-
Congress. Noce there are still 31. Moreover, IISSR has probably violated the SS-18 de- mitm~nts '
Senators East and Helms and I stated: "We Dioyment prohibition of SALT II and b ,The Ada!-.IStrat:oa and the Congress
feel that omiss[on of even one of these [31] likely to have violated the nuclear testing have s shard interest !n suPPOrting the
issues would not be in accord with the yield limit of the Threshold Test Baa arms control process Fbr this reason, in-
McClure_He1msS;-mms amendment which Treaty. In adGitfon. the United States Gov- creased understanding o[ soviet violations
? passed the Sena:.e unanimously on Septem- ernment has determined that the IISSR has or probable violations, and a strong Con-
ber c3, 1983, on a 93-0 roll call vote." Thus violated the AB:+i Treaty (through the greSSional ~~~~ on [he importance of
with he lsc~e d has node eatpromised a siSrasnoyarsk Rtiadaz~vioiceated the oI,tmited compliance to achieving effective arms con-
subsequent report on additional violations. Test Ban Trea[y, and violated the SALT II trot, will streng'.hen our efforts both la the
~~y, the February 1 presidential provision prohibiting more than one neW new negotiations and In seeking corrective
Report states again that "the IInited States type of ICBM. and probably violated the actions from the Soviet IInion.
is continuing to carry out its own obllga- AB!d Treaty restrict[on on concu.-rent Lest- I look forrard to continued close consults'
Clone and commitments under relevant ing of SfiM and ABbI components. Evidence flux with the Congress as we seek to make
agreements." This means that no matter regarding the IISSR's compliance with the progress ~ resolving comPl~ce Issues and
how badly the Soviets cheat, the II.S. 15 not ABM Treaty provbion on component mobil- to negotiattzlg sound arms control agree-
In ad- meats. -
uous
bi
be
.
g
am
even seeking negotiations to modify or selec- ity was determined to
dltion, the IInited States Goverment b Sincerely,
Uvety abrogate arms control treaties to
arations for a
re
t
i
S
p
p
ov
e
which We are a DartY- concerned about
This b Duce and simple unL'ateral dlsar- prohibited territoral t.B:d defense. Ftir-
mameat, and therefore outright appease- Cher, Lhe IISiR was determined to be cur-
ment of the Soviet IInloa. ~ _ rently !n compliance with those provisions
- Ia conclusion, [t should be point out that of the SALT I Interim Agreement and its
the Februa--y 1, 1985 Report states that the implementing procedures Lhat deal with
U.S is "taking into account In our defense reuse of dismantled ICBM sites and with
- molernizattoa plans the security tmpuca- the reconfiguration of d+smantled 5aliistic
Hors of arms control violations." This mill missile launching submarines-
pe examined carefully in futue Senate Beyond the issues that are treated in the
hearings. because the Senate has still not unclassified report released today. there are
received a report on the Mllltary Impiica-- other compliance issues that a-tll sot be
Lions of Soviet SALT violatiors requested publicly disclosed - at this time but Which
almost a year ago. Myself and Seraton remain under review. N cue continue to
McClure, Helms. Esst and others have been Wort on these issues, we -Will brief and con-
presaing the Administration for a report on salt with the Congress to deta.ll and Will. to
the mllltary imDllcatfons of the Soviet the maximum eateat possible, keep the
cen[ly they reaff(rmed the[r request on Jan- - ~ order for arms control to nave meaning ?6 - ------
uary 4 and 25, 1983. and credibly contribute to national security that all D~~p ~ aa~ement~tcomp Ye w1 h
They areatill waiting for fhb report. and to global or regional atab[llty, It b ce- them. Because I seek genuine arms control.
_ aeatial that all parties to agreements tally
(From the White House. Feb. 1.19857. comply with then Strict compllarice with I am committed to ensuring that eitlsting
Tffi parsraa:rr'a IInczassvz>m Raroaz To all provisions of arms control agreements b agreements arc observed."
.~ Concatss oi. Sovizr Noi?coi+~z.w~ca fundamental, and this Administration will The President further noted that: "Sovtet
. Wrrs Aaxs Corrraoz. Acaaaac>~?s not accept anything less. To do ao would un- noncompliance b a serious matter. It calls
(The. toilowtng b th `kat [he Pres dents damage Lhetchan~cess focer establlslzing a more from germs eontroLoan cd ould cret to newisa
Lhe Congress trans:ni :lag Curity risks. IC undermines the confidence
unclassified Report oa Sovtet Noncompll- constructive IIS-Soviet relatlonshlp.
once with Arms Control Agreements as re- As I stated last January Soviet nontrom- essential to an -effective srav control Dra-
quired by the FY-1983 Defense Authortrs- uoan~~~LO~~tye~neft~ts from germs the a ltabtLty of the USSR as sox Qotla Ding
lion Act l
Roxnl.n R~ca.*t.
Souza: Noxcoiapt.zsx~ a'z'I'g Artxs Cairraot.
Ayor~wr:-YTg M1
IIR80DGCTI0r1 -
In January 1984. the President; in rc?
spouse to Cocgressiona! requests, reported
to the Congress on severs! issues tnvoh-tng
violations or probable violations by the
Soviet IIalon of existing eras control agree-
ments, tncludlzlg: the Geneva Protocol on
Chemical Weapons, the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention, the Helsinki
Final Act, the ABM Treaty, SALT II. and
the Threshold Test Bas Treaty. - -
- In that report the President stated: "If
tnP mncent of arcs control Is to have mean-
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COI~GRESSIOI~AL RECORD-SE'~ATE 111arrh 3, 19~~
S 232 '
? ~ is ptvtner, and thus damages the f`t1RTtxs SOT SCebed Arms control treaty. the Enriron? vial ilmllb of the Su1R under whose juriadir-
' .;~ esubltshirtg a more constructive US-Sotiiet mental Modifimtion Com?entlon, and U /aru~~The1CS- examined a'h Lhert the
`'?; relaUo:tahlp" others.
i .? The current unclassified report provides The Lssues ire base sna])zed raise very ae` USSR's undergrotmd nuclear testa ve
;,
. ~i.?+ updated information on-the seven issues rious concerns. The United States Govern? caused radsoactlce debris to be preacnt ou '-
,. Dretiotuly reported and additlonally' retiiesrs anent firmly believes that to order for arms side of !u territorial limits.
~~ ' etx other compliance issues that have been control to have meaning and credibly oon- Finding: The UB. Government judges
ts. intensively studied since the January 1984 tribute to national securltY sad to global that the Sotlet Onion's underground nu c?
,. i~:~
t,g - report tray completed, !or s?t?otal of ihirteea and regional atab111ty, It 16 essential that all ~ t.est practlcea have resulted in the van
.d?.;,
t: ~ ~ issue:. The six nets cases involve questions parties to agreements hilly oomplY Kith tng of radioacUre matter and caused radio-
?~? of Soviet compUance a~th provislonE of the. them. Strict compliance trltb all provisions naive matter W be Present outside the
:~ t ~ SALT I Interim Agreement, the Limkzd ? of arms control agreements !e fundamental, Sot ~ Ve o0 ob)iFa ton to the Limited Ted
:' ~ Test Ban Treaty (LT'BT) and the Ant1?Ba1= grid the Untied States Government will not
'>1 '~ italic bdlasile (ABM) Treaty. accept anything Less: to do so Rould under- Ban Tmaty. The Sotiet Union hsa felled to
y) ~ 9; vvlth regard to the SALT I Interim Agree- mine the arms control process and damage take the precautions necessary to ctirtimize
~11'.:- meat, this report examines the et?fdence on the changes for establtahing a mon eon? the contamination of men's environment by
~ E'~' ta?o issues: li) crhether the USSR has made strtutfve IIS-Soviet relatioruhip. ~. radioactive atrbstanoes desDiLe U?S? r'eGuest
r~:? ?rrnt rirrnI>,cs - Sor corrective action. ,
~, DrohiDlled use of remaining iacillttea at dia? s
,~ ~ mantled former ICBM sites: (2) whether the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convrntion ? Threshold Tcst Ban Treaty ;
>s , USSR has reconfigured dismantled ballistic enQ 1925 Gencoa Protocol ~ 8. Nuclear TeS.ing and the 150 Kiloton '
t? 1 missile submarines to .e manner prohtbiled
'`- ' ' by Treaty or Protocol provisions. L Chemical, Biological. and Toxin 'VPeapona _ - _ L1m1t -`.
~ ` 1, ~~ ypllh regard to the Limited Test Ban Treaty Status Tht -1972 Biological and Treaty Status_ The Threshold Test San
?~ ..~..._ ., ?.-n?r, *r,s~ .wnnrt exeatlnes Tnzfn VS elspons Convention (the BWC) and -~?~ty (TI'BT) ass signed to 1974. The
-- -
,..t` ! territorial? limits in contracentton or znc and,tae bonez vuruci ,~,~ ~d,..~.....?...- - ,a~,,,............_. __---_
s not !n accord with these treaties and the obligation under customary internation-
li
?
on
LTBT. ~
,
,~~. ~ R'ith regard Lo the ABM Treaty. _thla customary-internaUo_na] lea-_relating Lo the ~ iga?_to refrain from acts a'hlch would
_ _ _ _~ ,_...,i ~_ _.,~. ~.,w n?TI,GO nt Lhe TT$T.
~'
concurrently tested Sf+1d ana t-nm wu,yar ob:tgataons ?,..~. o...,...... -?-- - ---
Dents: developed, tested or deployed mobile Obligations: The BWC bans the develop- and ptuDose of the TTBT are therefore v1o-
al obligation. The United
f essfon
1
ns
e
th i
f
,
g
t
e
laUons o
ABM components; and/or hsa pronded a went, produtK-ton, st.ockDlllag o po
basedor territorial defense. - sad bansfer of: microbial or other bfologf- States ~ 6eelcing to negotiate improved verl-
In this report the United States Gocern-1 ca] agents or toxins a=cept for s smaD qusn- iication measures for the 77eaty. Both Pay-
ment reaffirms the conclusions of its Janu- illy Sor prophylactic, protective or other ties have seDaTa~u ~~ they could ob-
arT 198! report that the USSR has violated peaceful purposes It also harts treapons, serve Lhe 150 kiloton threshold of the
the Helsinki Final Act, the Genera Protocol equipment and means of delivery of agents ~-gT? _ _
on Chemical Weapons, the Biological and or toxins The 1925 Genera Protocol and r-e- nn?ieatinn: The Treaty prohibits anT trn-
Toxin Weapons Convention, and ta?o grout- ~~ ~~ of ctt_ct.otna~ international lets'
e..,.W- -
t any place
t
i
-
-
a
r-
slonc of SALT II: telemetry encrSption and prohibit the first use !n pcar of asphS
poisonous or other gases and of all anal-
1CBM moderaiTation- The United Sates ~
?
? government also reEffirtns its Drerious con? ogous Lquids, materiels o: derives: and pro-
clusfons that the USSR has probably violet- hiblts use of bacteriological methods of Bar-
ed the SS-lP deloymeni probibition of SALT tare. . _ ~ -._
II and is likely to have violated t5e nuclear 1saues-' The Jent:ary 1964 compliance
,
repor
currently under reciety shish cannot be ar 1Jt'eapon Teats !n the A..mosphere, Soviet actions not !n axortd ts-lttt that aocu-
publicly disclosed at this time and shish Re Outer Space and Under VCster (Limited _
L'ttend to brief to the Congress on a-classi- Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)) is an multileter8l amitment vlola:iona of their political com-
iied basis-in Lhe near iutur-e -- . treats that entered into force Sor the United
In examining the issues in this unclass!- Sates and Lbe Satiet Union w 1963. Sotiet Obligation AL signatory States of the
fled report. as well es in the classified report actions sot in accord aith this treaty ar'e $ oel~n ~ ~~n of, and'o~ details eon-
folios ce have focused on questions of violations of a legal obligation. ~ oerning meJor tailftary maneuvers, drllned
t
ll
testing yield limit of the Treshold Test Ban report addressed Rhether the Sotiets are in
Treats-. In addition, the United States Gov- r{olsUon of provLsions that ban the develop-.
e.-nment h~ determined that the USSR has mgt p-oduction, traa~er. possession and
violated the !Bbd Treat:c -through the ttse of biologi;81 and toxin Reapons. Sorlet
siting. orientstiot, and capability of the compliance Ras reexamined for Lhis report.
Krs.~toya?st Radar and Lhe Limited Tesi Findins' The DS. Government judges
ban Treats; be testing the SS-%-25 ICBM in t,~t evidence dtt:ing 1934 confirm and
addition to the S5?%-24 ICBM, ciola:,ed the 6tr'enEthen Lhe conclusion of the JeauarS
SALT II "nett tS'pes ' Drorision limiting ;ggq, report that the Soviet Union has
each PartT to one neR type ICBIt1: and maintained an oifen9ce biological Rarfart
probably ciolsted the prohibition against ptp~am and capsbf2ity In viclation of its
conruzrent testing of ABM and components. let; obllgattons tinder the Biologi~l and
Moreover, the Sot~et Union's AEI and Toxin Weapons Contention of 1972
~~~,:-related action. suggest the: the USSR Although there haze been no con`i-~med
may be preparing an ABM defense of its na- ~PTjt`gj and toxin attacl= tII Kampuchea,
Lionel territory. Evidence regarding the ~, or AfBhanyctAn m 1984, there IS no
U-CSR's eomDliance with the ABM Treats basic for amen3ing the January 1964 eonclu-
procision on component mobilitS Ras deter- IDon that the Soviet Dtvon has been in-
mined to be ambiguous, and the USSR Ras t?oh?ed is the pro3uctior., L-aa_sfer and use of
determined to be currenty in compliance trichothecene mS~~n~ for hostile pur-
cith provisions of Lhe SALT I Interim pow ~ Twos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan
Agreement. and its ImalementinB Drocedures in violation of its legs] obligation under
'that deal frith .re-use of dismantled ICBM ~te*nytional laR as codified In the Geneve
cites and the recenfiguratioa of dismantled protocol of 19_5 sad the Biological and
ballistic missile lsunc2?.izg submarines Toxin Weapons ibncention of 1972.
In addition to-the it;sues regarding Soviet Limited Test Bcn T~eatY -
comD1~-ce Kith arms control e?reements - 2. IIndergrottnd Nuclear Test Venting
shish are addressed in ibis unclassified
there are other eAmP~r-ce matters Treaty Status- The Treaty Banning Nucl~
t
o
y ~ro-
? Soviet noncompliance. Questions of Soviet ., Ob1iDa=to>u-' The LTBT specif-ca
? 'noncompliance hate not arisen cvlth regard habits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, as those Lncolving mom than 25,000 ground
Le several other Drot?LSions of these agree- ~ outer space, and under crater. It also Pro- 1TOOpa. ~ .
ment8, nor Kith certain other treaties, such habits .nuclear explosions in env other-entf- Issues' The January 1969 compliance '
as the An:aretic Treaty. the Outer Space rorunent "if such eaplosouts doe thse~rrito- So~et mili:ary~exerrise Z.epad-81iRas ~ad-
Tresty, the non-proliferation Treats. the five debris Lo be present -
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yield exceedirtg 150 kilotons a
under the jurisdiction or control of Lhe Par-
ties, Der;i:.nirts h;arcD 31, 1976. In yietc of
the technical uncertainUea associated a-itb
estimating the precise yield of nuclear
Rcapons tests, the sides agreed that one or
tRO alight urtint.ended breaches per Sear
trould not be considered a violation.
Issue- The JeauarT 1984 report examined
erheLher the Soviets have conducted nuc3est
tuts in e:oess of 150 kilotons. This issue
Ras reexamined Sor this report.
Finding: ?The US. Government judges
that, chile ambiguities !n the pattern of
Soviet teStirt6 a: d verLficaUOn uncertainties
continued in 1984, evidence available
L-trough the year confi.-ms the January 1984
finding that Sestet nudear 1,estlrtg actititiea
for a IIumbeI OS tests CQI`SL1tutE s likely cio-
lation of legal ebligationu`PSON ifor Mr. Doi.>L, jor
hisself, and Mz. Brim) submitted the
follor^'inB resolution; which Ras .con-
sidered and agreed to: ~ .
ender the ASM Treaty. Vi harass In the case of Lear Siegler, Inc.,
Finding: The' US. Gorern_~nent fudges
that Soriet-s,^tions with respect to ABM etc v. John Lehman. etc, et al.. filed in the
component mobilitF are ambiguous. but the United State: District Court for L'le Central
?VS~R'a development of components of s District of California, the consLltutionality
nea? AB11~ system, t;hich apparently are de- of the procurement protest system estsli-
sir:.led Lo be deployable at sites requiring lisped bF the Competition in Contracting
re]ativelF little or no preparation. represent Act of 1964. Public Lew 9B-3ti9, 98 Slat.
e potential violation of its legal obli6'ation 1115, 1199-1203, has been placed in issue;
under the AB)1C Tracts. This sad other . Vi'hereas the Department of Justice has
ABM-related Soviet actio:LSSUr=Pest that the notified the Seaste that the Department
USSR mac be preparing an ABM defense of 'trill assert In this rase and in other cases
its national territory - ~ tinder the Competition in Contzacting Act
12. Concurrent Testing of ABM and S_SM that the pewe:s g-anted bg that Act of Con-
Components grey to Lhe Comptroller General riolate the
Oblipn:ion: The ABM Treaty and its Pro- oonstitutiorta]1F DrescrTbed sepa^ation of
t,ocol limit the parties to one ABI~C deploy- pow-era -
went area In addition to the ABM systems oChereas y-,want to sect)ons 703(c),
and components at that one deployment 706(e), and ?13(s) of the Ethics in Goverll-
area the parties may pare ABM systems meat Act of 1978, 2 US.C. i4 288b(c),
and components for development and Lest- 268e(e) and 211811x) (1982), the Senate may
ing pu.~poses so long as they are located st dit~t its Cotussei Lo intervene in the name
agreed test ranges. The TreatF also p~hib- of the Senate ifl anS legs] action In which
its giving components, other rt,Tlan AEM thr powers and responsibilities of Congress
system components.. the capability "m tinder the Constitution are placed in issue:
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their Now, therefore, be it - -~ -
elements In flight Lrs,ieCtorY" and prohibits
the parties from testing them in "an ABM ResoZaed, That Lbe SenateZegal Counsel
mode"- The parties screed that the concur- u directed to int,ers?ene 3n the name of i*le
rent testing o1 SAA; and ABM system com- Senate in the case of Lear Siegler, Inc., etc
ponents is prohibited. - ~ .. v. John Lehman. etc_. et al - -
NOTICES OP HEARINGS
ooxxr:Ta oR rlu acnctct
Mr. DOriE1:ICI. Mr. President, the
Senate Committee on the Budget will
meet on the first concurrent budget
Teso]ution for fiscal year 1986, Tues-
day. March b, .1985, through Friday.
March B, ]985. The markup a?Ill be
held each day at 10 e.m. and 2 psn.
For further infol-matioa, contact
Susan Yurko at ?the Senate Budget
Committee at 224-0536.
SIIBCOMDG7Tr1z Ord GOt-IRr'1aFJCTAL gTICIENCY
. Mr. ?7rdATHIAS. Mr. .President, ? I
Rould like Lo announce Lhat the Sub-
committee on -Governmental Efficien-
cy and the District of Columbia of the
Governmental Affairs Committee Rill
hold a 3oint hearing Kith the Commit.
tee on Environment and PublJc Works
on the subject of "Government Global
Forecasting Capabllity." The hearing
Rill be held on Tuesday, March 28,
1985, at 9:30 ate. in room 6D-392 of
the Dirksen Senate Office Building.
For further information, contact
Marion Morris of Lhe subcommittee
staff at 224-4161. - '
AUTHORITY FOR COI`iMITT~ES
_ TO MF~T
sn.ECr coz`-~aTZ'ct ox sn-r-zxuu.rca+rs
Mrs. HAVGrSINS. Dir. President. I
ask unanimous consent that the Select
Committee on Intelligence be author-
ized to meet during the session of the
Senate on Tuesday, March 5, 1985, to
conduct a dosed hearing on the fiscal
year 1986 budget. ?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
COML~