NAZIS AND AXIS COLLABORATORS WERE USED TO FURTHER U.S. ANTI-COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE--SOME IMMIGRATED TO THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
L1
REPORT BY THE
Comptrol lr General
OF THE UNITED STATES
Nazis And Axis Collaborators Were Used To
Further U.S. Anti-Communist Objectives In
Eu rope--Some I m m ig rated To The U n ited States
The Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary,
requested GAO to inquire (1) whether there
were any U.S. government programs to help
Nazi war criminals and Axis collaborators
immigrate to the United States and to conceal
their backgrounds and (2) whether U.S. agencies
worked with and protected Klaus Barbie,former
Gestapo chief in Lyon, France.
GAO did not find evidence of any U.S. agency
program to aid Nazis or Axis collaborators to
immigrate to the United States. However, GAO
did identify five Nazis or Axis collaborators with
undesirable or questionable backgrounds who
received some individual assistance in their
U.S. immigrations. Two of them were subse-
quently protected from investigation. GAO
cannot be sure that it obtained all relevant
information or identified all Nazis or Axis col-
laborators whom U.S. agencies helped to
immigrate. With respect to U.S. agencies' in-
volvement with Klaus Barbie, GAO did not find
any discrepancies between what it found and
the Department of Justice's 1983 report which
stated that Barbie had been employed and
protected by a U.S. intelligence agency.
GAO/G G D-85-66
JUNE 28, 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
Request for copies of GAO reports should be
sent to :
U.S. General Accounting Office
Document Handling and Information
Services Facility
P.O. Box 6015
Gaithersburg, Md. 20877
Telephone [phone]
The first five copies of individual reports are
free of charge. Additional copies of bound
audit reports are $3.25 each. Additional
copies of unbound report (i.e., letter reports)
and most other publications are $1.00 each.
There will be a 25% discount on all orders for
100 or more copies mailed to a single address.
Sales orders must be prepaid on a cash, check,
or money order basis. Check should be made
out to the "Superintendent of Documents".
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
The Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr.
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
This report is in response to your May 17, 1982, request
that we investigate allegations that federal agencies aided
the immigration of Nazi war criminals and collaborators to the
United States and concealed their backgrounds once they were
admitted. The report describes the conditions that existed fol-
lowing World War II and the actions U.S. intelligence agencies
took in response to those conditions. These actions included
the utilization of the above types of individuals, some of whom
immigrated to the United States.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce
its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this
report until 30 days from the date of the report. At that time
we will send copies to the Department of Justice, the Department
of Defense, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence
Agency, congressional committees with a jurisdictional interest,
and other interested parties. Additionally, we will make copies
available to others upon request.
Sincerely yours,
Acting Comptroller General
of the United States
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
Allegations that Nazi war criminals immigrated to
the United States have been publicly raised since
the end of World War II. At the request of the
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, GAO
addressed two questions:
--Were there any U.S. government programs to help
Nazi war criminals and collaborators immigrate
and to conceal their backgrounds?
--Did U.S. intelligence agencies work with and
protect former Lyon, France, Gestapo chief
Klaus Barbie?
BACKGROUND After World War II, some 550,000 refugees and
other displaced persons entered the United States
under the Displaced Persons Act and the Refugee
Relief Act. These acts, as amended, as well as
other postwar legislation, prohibited immigration
of war criminals and other persecutors. (See p.
1.)
Before World War II ended, the Allied nations
of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union began planning to prosecute
individuals who were believed to have committed
war crimes. The Army's Counter Intelligence
Corps was the U.S. military's primary group for
finding and arresting Nazis. (See pp. 8 and 9.)
Although the United States and Soviet Union made
agreements and cooperative efforts to bring Nazis
to justice, postwar rifts between the two coun-
tries developed over such issues as the makeup of
Eastern Europe and Middle East oil concessions.
By mid-1946, U.S. intelligence units were being
asked to obtain military and political data on
the Soviet Union in the shortest time possible.
The growth of Communist parties in France, Italy,
Germany, and Greece further increased U.S. suspi-
cion and mistrust of the Soviet Union. In March
1947 President Truman, addressing the Congress,
asked Americans to make a global commitment
against communism. (See pp. 13 and 14.)
U.S. intelligence units found themselves ill-
prepared to obtain the information needed on
Soviet intentions and capabilities. Wartime
intelligence units had been disbanded and many
experienced personnel had returned to private
Page i GAO/GGD-85-66
JUNE 28, 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
careers. Efforts began to build new organiza-
tions (the CIA was established in 1947) and to
increase U.S. covert intelligence capabilities.
(See pp. 14 to 16 . )
RESULTS IN As the Cold War began, U.S. intelligence units
BRIEF knowingly employed alleged Nazis and Axis col-
laborators in order to obtain information about
Soviet intentions and capabilities. (See pp. 19
to 21.) GAO did not find evidence of any spe-
cific program to help such persons immigrate to
the United States, and most of those used re-
mained in Europe. (See pp. 25 and 26.) However
GAO did find some evidence that intelligence
agencies aided Nazis and Axis collaborators to
immigrate on an individual basis. Two of them
were subsequently protected from investigation.
(See pp. 29 to 35.)
A special 1983 Department of Justice report on
Klaus Barbie found that U.S. Army Counter-
Intelligence Corps officers had employed him,
protected him from extradition to France where
he was wanted for war crimes, and organized his
escape to South America. The report commented
that often there is a need for information that
.necessitates dealing with criminals, former
enemies, and other undesirable persons.
GAO's ANALYSIS Lacking an intelligence network targeted against
its former ally, the Soviet Union, U.S. intelli-
gence units turned to European anti-Communist
resources to fill information gaps. These re-
sources included former German and East European
intelligence operatives and East European emigre
political groups. Among them were Nazis (includ-
ing Gestapo and SS members) and members of East
European Fascist organizations. They were con-
sidered invaluable as informants. For example,
GAO was told that in order to learn more about
German Communists, U.S. intelligence officers
decided to question former Gestapo and SS members
who had worked against such Communists. (See
pp. 19 to 21.) GAO did note instances in which
use of some Nazis and collaborators was rejected
on the basis of their pasts. (See pp. 23 and
24.)
Page ii GAO/GGD-85-66
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
Immigration GAO analyzed the files on 114 Europeans (see
Assistance pp. 5 and 6 for selection methodology) and iden-
tified 12 Nazis or Axis collaborations who immi-
grated to the United States and who appeared to
have undesirable or questionable backgrounds.
(See p. 18 for definition.) Of the twelve
identified, GAO found that five received
assistance; four of these had assisted U.S.
intelligence agencies; and the fifth may have.
Among the five were two alleged war criminals, a
Nazi SS officer, a convicted conspirator in an
assassination, and a traitor. (See p. 29.) The
level of assistance varied. For example, one
individual was brought into the United States
under an assumed name (see p. 34); another was
accompanied to the consular office by an
intelligence officer whose agency followed up on
the immigration. (See pp. 32 and 33.) The other
seven immigrants, who were associated with U.S.
or allied intelligence, were not given
immigration assistance. (See pp. 35 to 40.) GAO
could not generalize as to the total number of
individuals whose immigrations were so assisted.
During the course of the review GAO had access to
thousands of classified and nonclassified docu-
ments at all of the departments and agencies.
GAO was not denied access to any documents re-
quested; however, intelligence agencies often
assign projects innocuous names which do not
reflect the projects' purposes and, therefore,
GAO cannot assure that it requested all relevant
projects' files. In addition, some documents
requested could not be located or had been de-
stroyed. However, these instances were the
exception rather than the rule. The deaths of
certain officials and unclear recollections of
others made it impossible to reconstruct certain
situations and events. GAO cannot be sure that
it obtained all relevant information or iden-
tified all Nazi and Axis collaborators whom
U.S. agencies helped immigrate. However, GAO
believes its review was sufficiently broad and
unrestricted to state that this report fairly
portrays the conditions that existed following
World War II.
Page iii GAO/GGD-85-66
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
Protection of GAO detected no discrepancies between what it
Klaus Barbie found in its independent evaluation of the
documentation relating to Barbie and its own
interviews and what was in the Department of
Justice report. (See pp. 21 to 23.)
RECOMMENDATIONS This report is to provide information only. GAO
is making no recommendations as the result of
this work.
AGENCY The Department of State, the CIA, the Depart-
COMMENTS ment of Justice, and the Department of Defense
reviewed the report and had no comments or sub-
stantive suggestions for revising the report.
(See p. 7.)
Page iv GAO/GGD-85-66
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
C o n t e n t s
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION 1
Displaced persons and refugee legisla-
tion prohibited immigration of war
criminals and other persecutors 1
Alleged war criminals and collaborators
were able to enter the United States
under the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 1952 2
Controversy concerning alleged Nazis in
United States triggers governmental
responses 2
Objectives, scope, and methodology 4
Agency comments 7
POSTWAR RESOLVE TO DESTROY NAZISM IS
SUBORDINATED TO COLD WAR FEARS 8
Allies committed to punishing war
criminals 8
Axis collaborators were difficult to
identify and not vigorously pursued 11
U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorate
and the Cold War ensues 13
Cold War pressures reveal weaknesses
in postwar U.S. intelligence
capabilities 14
3 NAZIS AND AXIS COLLABORATORS EMPLOYED BY
U.S. INTELLIGENCE IMMIGRATED TO THE
UNITED STATES--SOME WERE ASSISTED BY
FEDERAL AGENCIES
Nazis and their Axis collaborators
were employed by U.S. intelligence
agencies
Intelligence agencies initiated programs
to aid defectors and former agents to
emigrate
Allegations about emigres employed by
OPC sponsored projects were inves-
tigated
United States government brought Nazi
scientists and engineers to the
United States
Aliens with undesirable or questionable
backgrounds were assisted in immigrat-
ing to the United States
Aliens with undesirable or questionable
backgrounds immigrated without U.S.
assistance
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
ABBREVIATIONS
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIC Counter Intelligence Corps
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAO General Accounting Office
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
OPC Office of Policy Coordination
OSI Office of Special Investigations
OSS Office of Strategic Services
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
Force
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Abwehr - The foreign and counterintelligence department of the
German High Command of the armed forces.
Allies - The nations aligned against the Axis during World War
II, consisting principally of the United States, Great Britain,
and the Soviet Union.
Axis - The nations aligned against the Allies during World War
II. It originally applied to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy but
later included Japan.
Gestapo - A secret police force dedicated to the maintenance of
the Nazi regime by identifying and eliminating all dissidents,
complainers, and opponents.
SS - Originally the black-shirted personal guard of Hitler, the
SS served as a political police organization of the party dedi-
cated to maintaining Nazi principles. It was also assigned the
duty of administering concentration camps and extermination
camps.
Allgemeine-SS - The overall body of the SS.
Waffen-SS - The military arm of the SS which became noted
for its tough fighting qualities.
SD - The intelligence branch of the SS. The SD was
responsible for the entire security of the Third Reich
and included several police forces including the Secu-
rity Police and the Criminal Police.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, requested
that we investigate allegations that federal agencies aided the
immigration of Nazi war criminals and collaborators to this
country and concealed their backgrounds once they were admitted.
The term "alleged Nazi war criminal" has been a commonly used
but somewhat misused term. The majority of the individuals
investigated for illegally entering the United States, against
whom war crimes allegations have been made, were not German
Nazis but Axis collaborators. These collaborators came from
countries which allied themselves with Nazi Germany or Fascist
Italy, many of which are now under Communist rule, e.g. Latvia,
Estonia, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary.
DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEE
LEGISLATION PROHIBITED IMMIGRATION
OF WAR CRIMINALS AND OTHER PERSECUTORS
To help resolve the problem created by the presence in
Europe of more than 1 million postwar displaced persons, meas-
ures were taken to facilitate the immigration of aliens to the
United States. On December 22, 1945, President Truman issued a
directive allowing 40,000 displaced persons to be admitted to
this country. After studying this problem, Congress passed the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948. Through June 30, 1953, 339,698
persons were admitted to the United States under the act, as
amended.
The continuing concern of the United States about the dis-
placed persons problem and the increasing numbers of refugees
and escapees from behind the Iron Curtain led to the enactment,
on August 7, 1953, of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. This act
permitted 214,000 aliens to become permanent residents of the
United States above and beyond the admissions authorized under
the then existing law (Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952).
Of these 214,000 aliens, the vast majority were refugees and
escapees from Communist persecution or from natural calamity
or military operations.
The Refugee Relief Act and the Displaced Persons Act, as
amended, contained provisions for barring entry to those who had
advocated or assisted in the persecution of other persons on the
basis of race, religion, or national origin. Section 13 of the
Displaced Persons Act, as amended on June 16, 1950, provided
that
"No visas shall be issued under the provisions of this
Act, as amended, . . . to any person who advocated or
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
assisted in the persecution of any person because of
race, religion, or national origin."
ALLEGED WAR CRIMINALS AND COLLABORATORS
WERE ABLE TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES
UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, 1952
In practice, it was difficult to exclude alleged war
criminals and collaborators from immigrating into the country
under the Immigration and Nationalilty Act, 1952, the permanent
immigration law of the United States. Accordingly, the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952, was amended on October
30, 1978, to exclude from admission into and to deport from the
United States all aliens who, between March 23, 1933, and May 8,
1945, persecuted any person on the basis of race, religion,
national origin, or political opinion under the direction of or
in association with the Nazi government of Germany; any gov-
ernment in any area occupied by Nazi Germany; any government
established with the assistance or cooperation of Nazi Ger-
many; or any government which was an ally of Nazi Germany.
CONTROVERSY CONCERNING ALLEGED
NAZIS IN UNITED STATES TRIGGERS
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES
Since the end of World War II there have been allegations
that of the thousands of displaced persons as well as others who
entered the United States, a number of these people had partici-
pated in Nazi war crimes.
The Congress received testimony in the early 1950s that a
number of aliens appeared to have been admitted to the United
States despite adverse reports in the Berlin Document Center
(a repository for captured Nazi records) of membership in the
Nazi Party or its auxiliaries. Since the 1950s, newspaper
articles, various publications, radio commentaries, and televi-
sion programs have addressed allegations of war criminals in the
United States.
In 1973 in response to continuing allegations, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) established a Project
Control Office in its New York district to give emphasis and
priority to alleged Nazi war criminal cases. The Office began
to more actively investigate, both domestically and overseas,
alleged war criminals who resided in the United States.
In 1977 INS established within its headquarters the Spe-
cial Litigation Unit. The unit's function was to coordinate
and process all pending cases in which persons residing in the
United States had been accused of having participated in war
crimes and other forms of persecution. The creation of this
unit was the culmination of a renewed emphasis placed on alleged
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
Nazi war criminals beginning in the early 1970s, largely as a
result of the House Committee on the Judiciary's interest in
these cases.
In September 1979 the Attorney General transferred the
functions of the Special Litigation Unit to the Criminal Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice which created the Office of
Special Investigations (OSI). OSI has the primary responsibil-
ity for detecting, investigating, and, where appropriate, taking
legal action to deport, denaturalize, or prosecute any individ-
ual who was admitted as an alien into or became a naturalized
citizen of the United States and who had assisted the Nazis by
persecuting any person because of race, religion, national
origin, or political opinion.
Justice officials told us that the majority of the approxi-
mately 500 individuals investigated by OSI and the 26 cases in
active litigation, as of June 1, 1985, concern individuals who
were admitted under either the Displaced Persons Act or the Ref-
ugee Relief Act. Also, these officials told us that the 1978
amendment to the 1952 act has been used to charge individuals
in all deportation proceedings filed by OSI.
GAO Previously Reported on united
States' Involvement with Alleged
Nazi War Criminals
In 1977 the Chairman, House Subcommittee on Immigration,
Citizenship, and International Law, asked us to investigate
allegations that federal agencies had obstructed investigations
and/or prosecutions of alleged Nazi war criminals. In 1978 we
issued a reportl based on our review of the investigations of
111 individuals against whom allegations had been made. Al-
though we could not find any widespread conspiracy to obstruct
investigations, we could not rule out instances of undetected
and isolated deliberate obstructions.
In that report, several agencies informed us that they had
employed or had been associated with several of the individuals
investigated. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) told us
that it had contacted 22 of the individuals as sources of in-
formation, 7 of whom were paid for information or services pro-
vided. The CIA said its contacts with some of them came at a
time when there was an acute shortage of intelligence on Soviet
intentions and on developments in Eastern Europe. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) told us that it had a confidential
relationship with two of the individuals. The Department of
1Widespread Conspiracy To Obstruct Probes Of Alleged Nazi War
Criminals Not Supported By Available Evidence--Controversy May
Continue (GAO/GGD-78-73).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
State had employed one individual as a consultant. The Depart-
ment of Defense also had employed one individual. Of the 111
individuals, at least 3 had been assisted by federal agencies
in entering the United States.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
On May 17, 1982, the Chairman, House Committee on the
Judiciary requested us to reopen our 1978 investigation. The
Chairman's request followed allegations made on a television
program that federal agencies made a conscious effort to ille-
gally bring Nazi war criminals into this country and protect
them once they were admitted.
Further discussions with the Chairman's office more specif-
ically defined our objectives. As a result, we focused our
efforts on whether there were any U.S. government programs to
aid the U.S. immigration of suspected Nazi war criminals and
conceal their backgrounds once they were admitted. In
subsequent meetings, the committee expressed its concern that
our investigation be "uninhibited" and that the resultant report
be as detailed and complete as possible.
During our investigation there was extensive media coverage
about the return of the former Gestapo chief of Lyon, France,
Klaus Barbie, to France which raised the issue of collaboration
between United States intelligence agencies and Nazi war crim-
inals. There were allegations that United States agents pro-
tected Barbie from French officials, assisted his escape to
South America, and paid him for information on other Nazis and
for other intelligence information. Subsequently, the Committee
requested us to include an investigation of this allegation in
our evaluation. About the time we began our investigation of
Barbie, the Department of Justice began a similar investigation.
To avoid any duplication of effort, an agreement was reached
with the OSI whereby OSI would conduct the investigation but
would make all documentation available to us. This agreement
was approved by the Committee.
In our 1978 report, the term "Nazi war criminal" was used
in a generic sense. Most of the allegations and subsequent
investigations that have been made over the years of aliens
alleged to be Nazi war criminals in actuality involved Europeans
who were Axis collaborators. For purposes of this report, col-
laborators are aliens from European countries that were allied
with and supported by the World War II European Axis powers.
They are referred to in this report as "Axis collaborators." As
used in this report, the term "Nazi war criminal" refers only to
aliens who were members of Nazi organizations and accused of war
crimes. Also the term "alien" is used in this report to refer
to individuals who were not native-born Americans although some
eventually obtained naturalized citizenship.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
Our investigation sought evidence that U.S. intelligence
agencies brought certain Nazis and Axis collaborators into this
country in contravention of the immigration laws. As part of
our effort, we sought evidence of any program specifically de-
veloped to aid the immigration of these types of aliens into the
United States. It was not our purpose to investigate whether
Nazis or Axis collaborators, acting on their own, entered
illegally.
Under the Displaced Persons Act and the Refugee Relief Act,
over 550,000 immigrants entered the country. As noted on page
3, the majority of cases investigated by OSI concern aliens who
entered through legitimate channels--displaced persons and refu-
gee acts. We have no basis for estimating how many who entered
by this means were ineligible due to past Nazi or Fascist activ-
ities.
We performed work in the headquarters offices of the FBI,
CIA, INS, the National Archives, and the Departments of Defense,
State, and Justice. Information was also acquired from the
National Archive's Federal Record Center in Suitland, Maryland,
and the U.S. Army's Central Security Facility at Fort Meade,
Maryland.
We requested that the departments and agencies identify
for us records or other sources of information on (1) alleged
Nazi war criminals assisted by federal agencies into the U.S.;
(2) any federal program or activity to assist alleged Nazi war
criminals to enter the U.S. or aid them after their entry;
(3) any efforts to withhold such information from the Justice
Department, the Congress, or the General Accounting office; and
(4) any investigations or mutual studies related to the above.
Additionally, we requested any and all information the depart-
ments or agencies had concerning the office of Policy Coordina-
tion (OPC), a postwar covert intelligence agency.
Initially, we judgmentally selected 11 aliens to review
from information provided by two private sources on 13 aliens.
It had been alleged that six of these aliens had been war crimi-
nals or collaborators who may have been assisted by agencies of
the federal government to enter the United States and that other
federal agencies were cognizant of their entry. Also, in nine
instances the aliens may have been sources of information for
federal agencies. We asked the departments or agencies listed
above for any information they had concerning the aliens in
question, including those documents in their files that were
originated from third parties, (i.e., documents obtained from
sources outside the agencies holding the file).
We also reviewed U.S. intelligence personnel files on
103 other aliens including the 2 aliens not reviewed from the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
initial allegations, in addition to organization and project
files such as Radio Free Europe project files. Information in
the agencies' files pertaining to the initial 11 aliens reviewed
identified many of the other aliens. In reviewing their files,
other aliens were identified but not all were reviewed. We
reviewed only those files where other information indicated that
the aliens may have been Nazis or Axis collaborators or members
of Nazi or Fascist organizations who either (1) had contact with
or participated in U.S.-sponsored intelligence operations, (2)
had immigrated or sought to immigrate to the United States, or
(3) were notorious aliens who had an association with a Nazi or
Axis collaborator who had been a contact of U.S. intelligence
agencies. In addition, some aliens were selected for review
because information obtained from intelligence agencies' project
or operation files indicated that they were East European or
German and were aided by U.S. agencies in immigrating to the
United States during the 10-year period from 1950 to 1960 and
were old enough to have participated in World War II. Before
our review of their files there was no indication of Nazi or
Axis affiliations.
Files at the agencies relating to our investigation were
not catalogued by whether a person had a Nazi or Axis collabora-
tor past. As a result, there was not a universe of pertinent
files by which, for example, a sample of Nazis or Axis collabo-
rators could be drawn. Selection of files to review, therefore,
became more an investigative process than an audit process.
Our work also included
--discussions with agencies' officials;
--discussions with 37 former government officials including
intelligence personnel; and
--a review of literature and government publications on
post World War II history as it related to the develop-
ment of U.S. intelligence agencies.
During the course of the review we had access to thousands
of classified and nonclassified documents at all of the depart-
ments and agencies. We were not denied access to any documents
requested; however, intelligence agencies often assign projects
innocuous names which do not reflect the projects' purposes and,
therefore, we cannot assure that we requested all relevant proj-
ects' files. In addition, some documents requested could not be
located or had been destroyed. However, these instances were
the exception rather than the rule. The deaths of certain offi-
cials and the unclear recollections by others of events from the
post World War II era made it difficult and/or impossible to re-
construct certain events, circumstances, and situations. As a
result, we cannot be completely sure that we have obtained all
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
relevant information or that we have identified all Nazis and
Axis collaborators assisted by U.S. agencies to immigrate to the
United States. However, our review was sufficiently broad and
unrestricted and we believe it fairly portrays the conditions
that existed following World War II.
With the exception of Klaus Barbie, we have not disclosed
the identities of the aliens reviewed. In addition, except
where it was necessary to present certain information, we have
not revealed the federal agencies involved with the aliens or
the countries where such involvement took place. Disclosure of
certain information identifying the agencies with the aliens,
the locations of their activity, and the activities with which
they were involved is classified and we wanted to issue an
unclassified report. In addition, accusations of wrongdoing
against most of the aliens are alleged, not proven. We dis-
cussed the aliens and their activities with OSI for possible
investigation and prosecution. In no instance do we believe the
nondisclosure of agencies, aliens, or locations of their activ-
ities detract from presenting accurately the nature of U.S.
involvement with the aliens or any assistance provided their
immigration.
AGENCY COMMENTS
This report was sent for review and comment to the Depart-
ment of Justice with copies for the FBI and INS; the Department
of State; the CIA; and the Department of Defense. The agencies
had no comments or substantive suggestions for revising the
report.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
CHAPTER 2
POSTWAR RESOLVE TO DESTROY NAZISM IS
SUBORDINATED TO COLD WAR FEARS
Initially following World War II, the allies cooperated
for the most part in seeing that Nazi war criminals were
brought to justice and that alleged war criminals and Axis col-
laborators were returned to countries where they had been sought
for crimes. Within 2 years of the war's conclusion, the United
States perceived the Soviet Union and the spread of communism to
be the greater and more immediate threat. A series of rifts
with the Soviet Union resulted in a deterioration in East-West
relations and the spread of communism in Eastern and Western
Europe led President Truman to declare a global commitment to
fight communism.
The United States, meanwhile, found itself ill-prepared to
apply the tactics and strategy demanded by the Cold War. As it
returned to a postwar peacetime economy, many of its most
experienced intelligence officers had returned home and been
discharged. Additionally, the United States' principal wartime
espionage and covert action unit, the office of Strategic Ser-
vices (OSS), was being dismantled. What intelligence capability
remained in Europe generally had been trained in counterintelli-
gence techniques not in the espionage techniques required by
the Cold War, as were their less experienced counterintelligence
replacements. Furthermore, the United States lacked extensive
intelligence sources and networks targeted against the Communist
threat. As concerns over the Soviets grew, so did the pressure
on U.S. intelligence agencies in Europe to determine what Soviet
intentions were.
While intelligence agencies in Europe tried to determine
Soviet intentions, officials in Washington were identifying
gaps in U.S. intelligence capabilities. To help fill those
gaps, two new organizations were created--the CIA and the Office
of Policy Coordination (OPC). These two intelligence entities
were charged with developing clandestine intelligence collection
and covert action capabilities, respectively.
ALLIES COMMITTED TO
PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS
As the war in Europe marched toward its conclusion, the
allied nations prepared to prosecute individuals who were
1Espionage is the act of spying to learn the secrets of another
government. Counterintelligence refers to the efforts taken to
prevent another government from succeeding in its espionage.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
believed to have committed war crimes, including the European
Axis leaders and their principal agents and accessories. As
early as 1943 the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union had agreed (Moscow Declaration) to return for pros-
ecution alleged Axis war criminals to the country where their
crimes had been committed. For several years, the allied gov-
ernments had knowledge of Axis war crimes and each nation had
its own list of wanted war criminals. The United Nations War
Crimes Commission was established to centralize the listing of
alleged war criminals.
As the allied armies advanced toward Germany, each captured
prisoners of war among whom might be persons wanted by other
nations for war crimes. In early 1945, the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) recognized the need for a
clearinghouse to exchange information among nations about indi-
viduals wanted for crimes and individuals in custody. As a re-
sult, SHAEF created the Central Registry of War Criminals and
Security Suspects.
Each allied nation submitted information to create a cen-
tralized listing. This listing, periodically updated and dis-
tributed to all the allies, contained known particulars such as
nationality, rank, military unit, and if applicable, date and
place of crime about all security suspects and alleged war
criminals. The first list published in July 1945 contained
approximately 70,000 names. At that time officials estimated
that the number of security suspects alone numbered more than
200,000.
The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) was the U.S. mili-
tary's principal group for hunting and arresting Nazis. Color
coded cards, referred to as SHAEF cards, identified individuals
wanted as security suspects or war criminals and were distrib-
uted to all CIC regions to alert them to individuals subject to
arrest. However, individuals who belonged to certain organiza-
tions such as the SS, Gestapo, or Nazi Party and/or were of a
certain rank or higher were subject to automatic arrest whether
or not they had been identified on a SHAEF card. Immediately
following Germany's collapse, the CIC's primary missions were
processing displaced persons and hunting and arresting Nazis.
According to an ex-CIC officer, many Nazis sought to evade
arrest. Some used false identity documents. In anticipation
of Germany's collapse, the Nazi intelligence services prepared
false documents and distributed them to selected individuals.
In the case of Waffen-SS members, who had a small "SS" tattoo
2Security suspects included members of the Nazi SS, SD, Gestapo,
and various other Nazi organizations.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
under one arm, false documents could not provide complete ano-
nymity. The CIC was aided in locating and identifying Nazis
by non-Nazi Germans and other Nazis, including former SD and
Gestapo Nazis, who informed on those who hid from arrest or
who carried false documents.
Individuals arrested were kept in detention facilities or
prisoner of war camps until their wartime backgrounds could be
verified, possible involvement in crimes determined, and their
subjectibility to prosecution decided. Prosecutions were accom-
plished at various levels and by various courts or tribunals.
For example, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
tried the principal Nazi officials and war criminals;3 mili-
tary tribunals of the various allied governments conducted
trials for crimes committed against its country's personnel;
various national courts tried Nazis who had committed crimes
within the respective nation as well as accused traitors and
collaborators; and denazification proceedings were held in
Austria and Germany to purge those countries of all traces of
Nazism.
Although the CIC was hunting and arresting Nazis, the
following indicates that U.S. authorities may have protected
some. In 1950, a U.S. intelligence officer in a cable to
another intelligence officer stated that some Nazis were
protected by U.S. intelligence at the end of the war. He
stated,
"At the end of the war we tried to be very smart
and changed the names of several members of the SD
and Abwehr in order to protect them from the German
authorities and the occupation authorities. In most
cases these persons were so well known that the
change in name compromised them more than if they
were to face a denazification court and face the
judgments which would have been meted out to them.
In the meanwhile, the developments in Germany and
probably also in Austria have been such that member-
ship in the SS, or in the SD, or in the Abwehr no
3The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found the SS
to be a criminal organization guilty of persecuting and exter-
minating Jews, of brutalities and killings in concentration
camps, of excesses in the administration of occupied terri-
tories, of administration of the slave labor program, and of
mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war. The Allgemeine-SS
was a part of the SS specifically cited by the Nuremberg
Tribunal to be criminal. Both the SD and Gestapo were declared
to be criminal organizations by the Nuremberg Tribunal because
of their programmatic and massive participation in the commis-
sion of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
longer is regarded as a strike against any personal-
ity."
We interviewed the former intelligence officer who authored the
1950 cable. He could not recall any aspect of his statements.
Several other former intelligence officers we interviewed about
these statements denied any knowledge of such postwar actions.
AXIS COLLABORATORS WERE
DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY
AND NOT VIGOROUSLY PURSUED
Although the allies were committed to punishing Nazi war
criminals, East European Axis collaborators were not pursued as
vigorously because the allies could not easily identify them.
Reasons given by several ex-CIC officers interviewed include the
following.
--Collaborators often camouflaged themselves among the
masses of displaced persons and those persecuted by the
Nazis. Except for some of the more prominent or notori-
ous collaborationist leaders, collaborators were not well
known. Collaborators, especially less prominent ones,
who infiltrated displaced persons camps, often assumed
false identities and/or backgrounds. In addition, the
documentation that supported or refuted displaced per-
sons' backgrounds, if it existed, was located in areas
now under Communist control and was unavailable to the
CIC. Extensive personnel records like those which the
allies established for the Nazis did not exist for the
collaborators.
--Following the war, many CIC personnel were inexperi-
enced and lacked necessary skills. Experienced CIC
personnel returned home and their replacements generally
were believed to be politically naive, especially as to
their knowledge of East European political groups.
Furthermore, few interrogators were skilled, a neces-
sary requirement given the absence of bona fide identity
documents. Injecting further difficulty into an already
difficult interrogation (given a collaborator's inclina-
tion to lie about his past) the CIC investigators often
did not speak East European languages. As a result, in-
vestigators used displaced persons who spoke some English
or German but who were not trained interpreters.
--Time constraints and the large volume of persons desirous
of immigrating overwhelmed the CIC investigators. Pres-
sures caused by humanitarian concerns were placed on in-
vestigators by relief agencies, U.S. relatives, and the
Congress to expedite their investigations. At some
point, a goal was set to complete investigations within
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
30 days. As a result, the investigations were often
shallow and cursory.
Several ex-CIC officers told us that they would not be surprised
if Axis collaborators used the displaced persons camps as a
steppingstone to gaining U.S. admission. One ex-officer said
gaining admission by this route would have been relatively easy.
United States Reluctant to Return
Some Alleged War Criminals and
Collaborators for Trial
Despite the Moscow Declaration and U.S. policy which
authorized forcible repatriations of war collaborators re-
quested by their governments, the United States, in at least
three instances we identified, was reluctant or refused to re-
turn wanted war criminals and collaborators. As early as July
1945, U.S. officials sought policy guidance regarding requests
for alleged war criminals where demands for their return were
motivated by purely political reasons. Officials also ques-
tioned the fairness of trials accused criminals would receive
once repatriated because some European governments were rela-
tively unstable. And lastly, officials refused to return
alleged criminals to one country with whom the United States
had not granted political recognition.
U.S. officials were sensitive that United States reluc-
tance to repatriate accused criminals and collaborators could be
viewed by some requesting countries as harboring war criminals.
Despite this concern, some State Department officials, respond-
ing to information on the lack of justice in Yugoslavia, advo-
cated a policy that would refuse to deliver accused individuals
to countries where trials were unfair. The information the
State Department received on Yugoslavia in November 1946
asserted that
"There is no justice here in our sense of the term.
Accused often has no access to counsel, courtroom
crowd is hostile, judges prejudiced and in attitude
indistinguishable from prosecutor, defense prevented
from introducing documents or witnesses."
Responding to these concerns, U.S. authorities established
a policy that required requesting countries to submit documenta-
tion establishing both the accused's identity and his/her prima
facie guilt. Officials hoped that careful screening of requests
would prevent repatriating political refugees. In the case of
Yugoslavia, the screening policy meant that, of its 700 sur-
render requests, the United States, as of December 1946, had
agreed to surrender 110 individuals, if they could be found in
U.S. or allied jurisdictions. Of the 110 individuals, about 20
had been turned over to Yugoslavia.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
The United States also believed that many alleged Albanian
war criminals were wanted primarily for political reasons. How-
ever, this was not the reason alleged war criminals were not
repatriated to Albania. Instead, alleged criminals were not
returned because the United States had not officially recog-
nized the postwar Albanian government.
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS DETERIORATE
AND THE COLD WAR ENSUES
Immediately after the war, the United States made an effort
to maintain good relations with the Soviets. For example, in
June 1945, shortly after his capture, a Nazi foreign intelli-
gence officer proposed turning over to American military forces
an organized East European intelligence network operating in
several countries against Russia. After considering the pro-
posal, OSS officials recognized that any exploitation of the
network would have "tremendous political implications" both in
Europe and the United States. They believed the German's offer
was an attempt to stir up trouble with the Soviets. Therefore,
they recommended that every detail of the network be obtained
from the officer and provided to the Soviets for counter espio-
nage purposes.
After verifying the network's existence, U.S. authorities
contacted the Soviet secret intelligence chief in Moscow and
proposed a joint effort to destroy the German network. The pro-
posal to destroy the network was authorized by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Despite agreements and cooperative efforts to destroy
Nazism, rifts between the United States and the Soviet Union
occurred after the war. The makeup of postwar Eastern Euro-
pean governments, Middle East oil concessions, and control of
the Dardanelles and with it access to the Mediterranean were
among some of the U.S.-Soviet disagreements that grew into
crises. In March 1946, concerned over the growing belligerency
of the Soviet Union and ignorant of its military strength, U.S.
intelligence agencies were directed to "produce the highest pos-
sible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest
time possible." By mid-1946, officials believed that the Soviets
were intent on world domination and by late 1946 cabinet offi-
cials were preoccupied with the Soviet threat.
By 1947, U.S. counterintelligence officials in Germany were
already aware that Soviet and East European intelligence agents
were operating against U.S. targets. According to a former in-
telligence officer, refugees entering the U.S. zone in Berlin
claimed to have been recruited by Soviet intelligence, and other
refugees, already in the zone, claimed to have been beaten by
Soviet agents seeking information on U.S. installations and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
personnel. Other former intelligence officials interviewed gen-
erally agreed that it was about this time that intelligence pri-
orities began to shift from concerns about Nazi and neo-Nazi
activities to concerns about Soviet aims and plans.
Concerns over Soviet aims and plans were further fueled
by the rise of Communist parties in France, Germany, Greece,
and Italy. These parties had been strengthened politically
by their roles in the resistance against the Nazis. U.S. offi-
cials feared that the Communist parties in these countries were
responsible to and directed by Moscow and, in some areas, were
of sufficient strength to assume power. Indeed the first cab-
inet of the new French Republic, although not controlled by the
Communists, contained four Communists including the minister of
defense.
The threat of Communist world domination was eventually
recognized as a threat to which the United States had to re-
spond. Not only had European Communist parties emerged politi-
cally strengthened, but the armies of the Soviet Union stretched
across the center of Europe. On March 12, 1947, President
Truman addressed the Congress asking Americans to join in a
global commitment against communism. Although the United States
continued its commitment to repatriate war criminals, the spread
of communism had become a greater threat than the reemergence of
Nazism. The Cold War had officially commenced.
COLD WAR PRESSURES REVEAL
WEAKNESSES IN POSTWAR U.S.
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
As the Cold War began, U.S. intelligence agencies in
Europe found themselves ill-prepared to respond to the Com-
munist threat. At the end of the war, U.S. forces demobilized,
the OSS dismantled, and many of the more experienced intelli-
gence agents returned to the United States and resumed their
private careers. Their replacements, besides being inexperi-
enced, were believed by some former intelligence officers we
interviewed to be philosophically and politically naive.
Furthermore, according to former intelligence officers, the
majority of intelligence officers then in Europe had been
trained in counterintelligence techniques, not in espionage
techniques needed for the Cold War. Additionally, because U.S.
intelligence had not previously been directed to collect clan-
destine intelligence or conduct covert operations against the
Soviet Union and its allies, it had not developed extensive in-
telligence sources and networks targeted against the Communist
threat. Pressure on intelligence agents in Europe to obtain
information on Soviet aims and plans and on West European Com-
munist parties intensified.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
Despite the dismantling of the OSS, the War Department
maintained a remnant of the OSS' clandestine collection activity
which it named the Strategic Services Unit. In a report dated
April 23, 1976, the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmen-
tal Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities reported
that the Strategic Services Unit in mid-1946 was merged into the
Central Intelligence Group--the predecessor of the CIA. The
Strategic Services Unit, which was intended to be only tempo-
rary, was renamed the office of Special Operations. This Office
provided the Central Intelligence Group with espionage and coun-
terespionage abilities it, heretofore, had lacked. The Central
Intelligence Group, as reconstituted, became the CIA in July
1947 when the National Security Act was passed.
In the year that followed the CIA's creation, much occurred
to fuel fears caused by the Soviet threat. In August 1947, Com-
munists took over Hungary and in February 1948 Czechoslovakia
fell victim to a Communist coup. At the same time, France and
Italy were besieged by a wave of Communist-inspired strikes.
According to the 1976 Senate Select Committee report, in
March 1948 a war scare gripped the U.S. Government. This scare
resulted from a cable sent by General Clay, Commander in Chief,
European Command, to the Director of Intelligence, Army General
Staff, which stated, "I have felt a subtle change in Soviet
attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling
that it [war] may come with dramatic suddenness." The Select
Committee reported that, on the basis of intelligence estimates,
no evidence existed that the Soviets would start a war. How-
ever, the response to Clay's cable had illustrated the suspicion
and fear of the Soviet Union that existed in government circles.
In June 1948, that fear was heightened further when the Soviets
instituted a blockade of the western sectors of Berlin.
Describing the mood that existed in Washington intelligence
circles during this period, a former intelligence officer stated
that the mood was the same as if the United States were at war.
He added that an attitude prevailed during this period that "any
SOB who was against the Russians was our SOB." Another former
officer said "we would have slept with the devil to obtain
information on communists."
The fear that was generated by General Clay's March 1948
telegram was due in large part to the lack of intelligence the
United States had on Soviet intentions. The inadequacy of U.S.
intelligence at that time is reflected in a March 1948 State
Department policy proposal draft. The Department's proposal
recognized that U.S. intelligence on the Soviet Union and the
Soviet-dominated Iron Curtain countries was deficient and as a
result inhibited the United States' ability to engage in a poli-
tical and psychological conflict with the Soviet Union. To
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
overcome this problem and close the intelligence gap, the State
Department proposed in part that U.S. intelligence systemati-
cally screen and utilize refugees from the Soviet world and, in
addition, encourage the elite of the Soviet world to defect to
the West.
In fact, many former East European government officials and
refugees had already offered their services to the United States
in the hope of eventually overthrowing the Communist regimes in
their countries. According to a former State Department offi-
cial, some former East European officials sought U.S. political
recognition as governments-in-exile and although sympathetic,
the political realities, however, demanded that the United
States recognize the Communist regimes in power. The official
stated that since the State Department had to deal with the Com-
munist governments it could not support organizations which
sought to destabilize them. Instead, it favored clandestine
support for these groups by an intelligence agency.
While the State Department's proposal was being considered,
U.S. officials also recognized that U.S. intelligence needed to
significantly improve its covert capabilities. As a result, in
June 1948 the National Security Council created the office of
Special Projects which was subsequently renamed the office of
Policy Coordination (OPC). OPC was established as a component
of the CIA. However, OPC had its own director, and it received
policy guidance directly from the Departments of State and De-
fense, bypassing the Director of Central Intelligence. In cre-
ating OPC, the National Security Council delegated to it respon-
sibility for instituting several of the State Department's March
1948 proposals.
Following its creation, OPC's staff, budget, and the scope
of its activities significantly increased. As documented in the
1976 Senate Select Committee report, OPC's staff increased from
302 in 1949 to 2,812 in 1952 plus 3,142 overseas contract per-
sonnel. For the same years its budget went from $4.7 million
to $82 million. At the outset, OPC's activities, which were
concentrated in Western Europe, were directed primarily toward
four operational areas: refugee programs, labor activities,
media development, and political action. Among the projects
sponsored by OPC during this period were Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty.
Conflicts Between CIA and OPC
Develop but are Settled by Merger
The growth of the OPC led to antagonisms between it and the
CIA's clandestine intelligence component, the office of Special
Operations. As reported in the 1976 Senate Select Committee re-
port, organizational rivalry dominated the relationship between
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
the two organizations. According to the Senate report, the
Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter,
resented that he had no management authority over OPC and
frequently clashed with the State and Defense Departments as
well as the OPC Director over this fact.
On the operating level, the conflicts were also intense.
Both the Office of Special Operations and OPC had representa-
tives conducting separate but occasionally overlapping opera-
tions at each field station. Given the related missions of the
two, OPC and Office of Special operations were often competing
for the same agents and, not infrequently, attempting to wrest
agents from each other. One former office of Special operations
officer told us that in 1950 both he and an OPC counterpart had
similar but separate and uncoordinated projects to infiltrate
agents into one East European country. He recalled one attempt
when both projects parachuted agents into the same area at the
same time. He stated that they were practically jumping on one
another.
In October 1950, General Walter Bedell Smith was appointed
the Director of Central Intelligence. Shortly after his ap-
pointment, General Smith was given administrative control of OPC
and with it both State and Defense Departments' policy guidance
was channeled through him rather than directly to OPC. General
Smith made several changes to improve coordination between the
Office of Special Operations and OPC but rivalry and antagonism
persisted. In August 1952, General Smith decided to settle the
rivalry by merging the two offices thereby creating the CIA's
Directorate of Plans.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
CHAPTER 3
NAZIS AND AXIS COLLABORATORS EMPLOYED BY U.S.
INTELLIGENCE IMMIGRATED TO THE UNITED
STATES--SOME WERE ASSISTED BY FEDERAL AGENCIES
The outbreak of the Cold War found U.S. intelligence agen-
cies' ill prepared to respond to it and caused them to seek out
resources that could be immediately utilized against the Commu-
nists. Included among those employed were former Nazis and East
European Axis collaborators. Although we were told by various
intelligence officers that war criminals were not supposed to be
used, some were. In addition, although most U.S.-employed Nazis
and collaborators remained in Europe subsequent to their employ,
some were assisted by U.S. agencies to emigrate to other coun-
tries including the United States.
Out of 114 aliens selected for review, we identified five
with undesirable or questionable) backgrounds who were employed
by U.S. intelligence agencies and who received some form of
assistance to immigrate to the United States. In addition, we
identified seven aliens with undesirable or questionable back-
grounds who immigrated to the United States without any identi-
fiable assistance. Among the five assisted aliens were the fol-
lowing: two alleged war criminals; a former Nazi Allgemeine-SS
officer; a convicted conspirator in an assassination; and a
traitor. In each of these five cases, the aliens were aided
individually, not as part of a specific aid program for ex-
Nazis and collaborators.
Although the above aliens were not assisted as part of a
specific program to aid former Nazis, several programs to aid
the resettlement of U.S.-employed foreign agents were identi-
fied; none of which was specifically established to aid Nazis or
1An alien with an undesirable or questionable background is one
who could have been challenged for admission to the United
States on the basis of immigration law. Among aliens included
in this category are alleged war criminals, Axis collaborators,
convicts, and officials in illegal Nazi organizations. In
addition, an alien with an undesirable or questionable back-
ground is one who may not have been excludable from U.S. immi-
gration under the applicable law then in effect. However, had
the alien applied under prior or subsequent immigration laws or
other immigration laws in effect at the time of application,
he/she could have been excludable. Also included are aliens
with alleged derogatory backgrounds which could not be substan-
tiated by investigation.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
Axis collaborators. The programs resettled aliens in various
countries including the United States. In addition, each pro-
gram was coordinated with the State and Justice Departments and
each alien who immigrated to the United States with assistance
appears to have had some pre-immigration review by those agen-
cies.
NAZIS AND THEIR AXIS COLLABORATORS
WERE EMPLOYED BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES
Because of the perceived Communist threat, the resulting
time-critical need for intelligence, and the United States'
lack of an intelligence espionage network in Eastern Europe,
U.S. intelligence used anti-Communist resources that had immedi-
ate intelligence potential. These resources included former
German and East European intelligence operatives and East Euro-
pean emigre political groups with contacts in Eastern Europe.
Although the aliens employed could have been Nazis or other Fas-
cists, former intelligence officers told us that it was general-
ly agreed that alleged war criminals would not be employed. On
the other hand, these officers did not know of any guidance pro-
hibiting the use of such aliens and we found none. According to
the Department of Justice's 1983 report on Klaus Barbie and the
results of our investigation, individuals alleged to be war
criminals were used by U.S. intelligence agencies.
Former U.S. intelligence officers told us and our review of
intelligence files confirmed that ex-Nazis, including Gestapo,
SS, and members of East European Fascist organizations, were
employed by U.S. intelligence. However, as one former intelli-
gence officer stated, the use of some of these aliens may have
been a mistake but it was a mistake committed without malice.
He added that their use was a matter of weighing their present
value versus their past history. Another former intelligence
officer also endorsed this present value justification. He told
us that if a person was a war criminal, the decision of whether
or not to use him depended on what he could do for you.
As previously noted in chapter 2, former Gestapo and SD
members were used to help locate other Nazis who qualified for
automatic arrest. Those former Nazis used in this manner had
already been apprehended and in return for their satisfactory
performances were promised that such service would be favorably
considered in the disposition of their cases. The CIC reported
that an appreciable quantity of high-grade arrests were made
possible solely through the cooperation of these former Nazis.
As a result of their successful use, one CIC detachment's report
concluded,
"Their [ex-Nazis] contacts and experiences make them
invaluable as informants, and the advantages which
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
can be derived from putting them to work far outweigh
those risks inherent in placing trust in such per-
sons."
A former U.S. intelligence officer told us that around 1947
the German Communist Party was considered a threat and had,
therefore, been designated as a principal U.S. intelligence
target. At that time U.S. intelligence did not generally know
who the German Communists were but did know that the World War
II German security services, specifically the Gestapo, also had
targeted the Communist Party. U.S. intelligence decided to
question former Gestapo and SS members who had experience work-
ing against German Communists. Specifically, individuals with
experience in running operations and agents were sought, rather
than higher level Nazis who had no operational expertise.
According to this officer, Nazis with operational experi-
ence against the German Communists were sought from all over
Germany. Potential recruits were interrogated to determine,
among other things, their knowledge of the German Communist
Party and its members and whether during the war they had
beaten or tortured Communist prisoners to extract information.
He stated that they preferred to question those who had not
employed beatings because they were usually the "smart opera-
tors." He added that those who were selected were mostly pre-
Hitler police professionals who were motivated to join the Nazi
party for career betterment rather than ideology or were forced
to join. Another former intelligence official confirmed the
above but added that some of the former police were not all
"clean" and may,have employed or threatened violence to extract
information.
One former U.S. intelligence officer told us that when the
Soviets blockaded Berlin, U.S. intelligence was under tremen-
dous pressures to determine what the Soviet armored divisions
were planning. He stated that the information was needed quick-
ly and intelligence networks could not be built in time. As a
result, they purchased networks that could be used immediately.
He added that morality was not a consideration then. His supe-
riors were only concerned with results, not the ways and means
by which results were accomplished.
Several former intelligence officers told us that during
the mid-1940s, intelligence officers had a good deal of discre-
tion to operate and to obtain their intelligence sources. Orga-
nizationally, operations were decentralized and decisions about
using informants were left to the operating groups. When the
United States initially recognized and reacted to the Soviet
threat, there was little direction in identifying intelligence
needs and targets. Additionally, no uniform way had been estab-
lished for handling agents or for determining their quality and
reliability. U.S. intelligence agencies did not institute
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
standard operating procedures and tighter informant controls
until the late 1940s.
We asked a former intelligence officer why U.S. intelli-
gence would employ Nazis to fight Communists. He replied that
one could not use Communists to fight Communists but you could
use Nazis because they were the Communists' natural enemies. He
added that since the war, U.S. targets had changed and, there-
fore, the use of Nazi SS-types was necessary. However, although
he believed they were necessary, he said he did not trust them.
He found that some of the former SS-types were experienced
"operators" who took advantage of the young, less experienced
U.S. agents. Some SS-types were operating "papermills" (prepar-
ing fake information or selling information to several different
agencies) or were involved in blackmarketeering.
Klaus Barbie aided by
U.S. intelligence agency
The U.S. intelligence officers we interviewed said they had
no knowledge of assistance provided to any war criminal or col-
laborator to immigrate to the United States. According to
former intelligence officers, the services of most aliens and
informants were terminated without providing them with assist-
ance to any country.
However, on March 14, 1983, the Attorney General directed
the Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Crimi-
nal Division, to conduct an investigation of the relationship
between Klaus Barbie, former Gestapo chief in Lyon, France, and
the United States Government from the end of World War II to the
present. The resultant report2 found that officers of the U.S.
Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) employed Klaus Barbie,
protected him from extradition to France where he was wanted for
war crimes, and organized his escape to South America.
The report concluded, in part:
"It is true that the obstruction of efforts to
apprehend and extradite Barbie were not condoned in
any official sense by the United States government.
But neither can this episode be considered as merely
the unfortunate action of renegade officers. They
were acting within the scope of their official duties.
Their actions were taken not for personal gain, or to
shield them personally from liability or discipline,
but to protect what they believed to be the interests
2Klaus Barbie and the United States Government, a Report to the
Attorney General of the United States, August 1983.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
of the United States Army and the United States gov-
ernment. Under these circumstances, whatever may be
their personal culpability, the United States gov-
ernment cannot disclaim responsibility for their
actions. . ."
"The use of Barbie is a difficult question. But
there can be . . . no meaningful or enforceable regu-
lation to define whom intelligence agencies may and
may not use as informants. The very nature of intel-
ligence gathering abroad requires the use of inform-
ants and it would be grossly unrealistic to require
that they be subject to the same standards of charac-
ter, uprightness and conduct that are required for,
say, civil or military service with the United States
government. . ."
"But given the almost infinite variety of circum-
stances that an intelligence agency encounters in the
course of its operations, it would be exceedingly dif-
ficult to define a class of eligible informants based
on their background or status. And any such line-
drawing would require the comparison of. . .two
fundamentally dissimilar considerations. . . the
need for information of strategic importance versus
the repugnance of dealing with criminals, or former
enemies, or brutal thugs, or officials of evil insti-
tutions., Even if there were a consensus on whom we
ought not to deal with, any workable definition would
be so broad as to be useless to those who must apply
it, or so narrow that it would be of little practical
significance.
Such a task would have been easier in the immedi-
ate post-war years as applied to those Nazis whom we
could agree to exclude. Depending on the breadth of
the consensus, it could have excluded use of Nazi
party officials, SS officers, Gestapo officers, sus-
pected war criminals, convicted war criminals, or any
combination of these or other categories."
In order to evaluate the Department of Justice's investiga-
tion and report, we independently interviewed nine former intel-
ligence officers who had been associated with or involved in
events surrounding Barbie and reviewed intelligence agencies'
files. In addition, we reviewed documentation gathered by the
Department. We did not find any discrepancies between the De-
partment's report of August 1983 and documents and files we
reviewed and the individuals we interviewed.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
Although U.S. intelligence employed
former Fascists, some others were
unacceptable
Although U.S. intelligence employed former Nazis and their
Fascist collaborators, intelligence files showed that the use of
some former Nazis and collaborators was eschewed. Although we
found no written guidance prohibiting the use of alleged war
criminals or collaborators, we did find several instances where
the use of some aliens was rejected because their usefulness was
compromised by their wartime pasts. In some cases their use was
rejected because knowledge of their employment would have been
an embarrassment to the United States.
An example of the foregoing was the case of a former Nazi
SS intelligence officer who was employed by a U.S. intelligence
agency and was a possible war criminal. In March 1948, 3 months
after being released from confinement, this former Nazi intel-
ligence officer was in contact with a U.S. intelligence agency
for whom he would shortly control two penetration and espionage
networks in Eastern Europe. However in June 1949 another U.S.
intelligence agency criticized using this former Nazi. It com-
plained that he was a potential security threat, a Nazi ideo-
logue who was bound to attract other nefarious Nazis.
About a month later, both networks were dropped and the
former Nazi was let go. (The former Nazi was not resettled.)
In a memorandum for the record, the organization's chief of
operations wrote the following
. . although an excellent intelligence man, he is
considered dangerous. We have been requested many
times by other U.S. intelligence agencies in Europe to
discontinue our support . . . since he was an SD
leader and is feared by all present intelligence fac-
tions . . . The reason that he is feared is that he
was a notorious intelligence man in his day and actu-
ally a war criminal, who was exonerated at Nuremberg
due to the fact that he became a State's witness."
The action was consistent with an April 1947 memorandum
provided to another intelligence officer which indicated that
one U.S. intelligence organization prohibited the employment of
war criminals. (However, we could not find written agency guid-
ance to this effect.) The April 1947 memorandum discussed the
possibility of recruiting a former German Abwehr officer, and
contained the following instructions:
"It is requested that [intelligence officer]
read this report carefully and discuss with you the
possibilities of recruiting [Abwehr officer] as an
operative . . . We would be willing to finance him
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
and give him other assistances and would permit him
to build his own organization under our supervision.
. . [intelligence officer] should check on [Abwehr
officer's] present activities and determine . . .
whether or not [he] is disqualified for work with us
by virtue of criminal activities during the war, Nazi
connections, etc."
Perhaps the quandary intelligence officers encountered over
whether or not to use Nazis is best summarized by one officer's
1953 statement concerning their use.
. . but one thing you can't deny is that the West
is fighting a desperate battle with the East--with the
Soviets--and we will pick up any man we can who will
help us defeat the Soviets--any man no matter what his
Nazi record was. Possibly not the worst ones--the war
criminals--but a man in [his] category certainly would
be acceptable to the West."
Axis collaborators--some
were not Fascists but
were anti-Communists
Among aliens employed by U.S. intelligence to fight commu-
nism were aliens who belonged to Axis collaborationist groups.
We found that Axis collaborators had different reasons for
supporting Germany. Although many collaborators were anti-
Communist Fascists and pro-Nazi, other collaborators were
anti-Communist but not particularly pro-Nazi. U.S. intelligence
agencies used both types of collaborators after the war to fight
communism.
During World War II, in several countries (e.g., Yugo-
slavia, Albania, and Czechoslovakia), various political or eth-
nic factions were fighting civil wars for control of their coun-
tries. Some groups aligned with the Allies were Communist-
dominated. These Communist-dominated groups received allied aid
and material which were used in part for the civil war. Some
organizations competing with the Communist partisan groups for
their countries' control found themselves in a tenuous position
which the Germans exploited. Unable to receive allied aid to
fight the Communists, they accepted German aid. Other anti-
Communist groups at various times fought against both the Com-
munists and the Germans and at various times received both
German and allied aid.
A 1944 U.S. intelligence report on one East European non-
Communist group helps to explain the Communist fear prevalent at
that time which led people to collaborate with the Germans. The
report called the group an agglomeration of individuals held
together by their hatred of communism, anarchism, and terrorism
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
and by their fear of what would happen if the partisans suc-
ceeded in imposing their doctrine on the country. The report
stated that the group's leaders included men of undoubted patri-
otism and high principles who knowingly aligned themselves with
the Germans against the partisans. The report speculated that
perhaps these men believed that the danger of communism was more
pressing than the "benevolent" German occupation or perhaps they
believed the German propaganda that the allies would join Ger-
many to defeat Russia.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES INITIATED
PROGRAMS TO AID DEFECTORS AND
FORMER AGENTS TO EMIGRATE
With the exception of Project Paperclip (see p. 28), our
review of agencies' files did not disclose any program insti-
tuted specifically for assisting Nazis or their collaborators
to immigrate to the United States. Our investigation found that
while most aliens employed by intelligence agencies did not re-
ceive immigration assistance and remained in Europe, many
aliens, including some of those employed, were aided in im-
migrating to the United States and other countries.
One program we identified was established by the CIA in the
early 1950s to, among other things, resettle some Soviet and
East European defectors and some terminated CIA-employed aliens
to other countries from the European area. Resettlement bene-
fits accrued to aliens based on their cooperation, the length of
their relationship, and the significance of their contribution
to U.S. intelligence and its objectives. The documentation we
reviewed showed that roughly 30 percent of these aliens were
resettled in the United States and the majority of these were
defectors. In addition, the documentation on the program and
the cases we reviewed showed that U.S. immigration laws were
respected.
Before the establishment of this resettlement program,
aliens employed by U.S. intelligence expressed concerns about
their future ability to immigrate to the United States. One
East European anti-Communist group found itself in a dilemma--
should its members continue their anti-Communist efforts or
should they emigrate and start new lives? Comparing their
situation with postwar emigres who already had started new
lives, they believed their sacrifice to aid the anti-Communist
struggle placed them at a loss. As a result they sought assur-
ances of U.S. immigration and financial assistance. Many of
them had families in their home countries and believed that
continuing their anti-Communist activities created constant
danger for these relatives.
Intelligence agency officials commiserated with these
aliens. In internal memoranda discussing this situation, they
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
pointed out that members of the group had given up several
opportunities to immigrate. One official wrote,
"These men can never return to [their country while
the communists are in power] and it is natural for
them to desire to immigrate to the country employing
them which they regard as the bulwark of democracy.
This seems a small commitment to make when comparing
the service of these men and the vast majority of im-
migrants to the U.S. who use their past suffering as
a ticket to U.S. citizenship without having, for the
most part, rendered any service to the U.S."
In addition to the above resettlement program, the CIA dur-
ing the mid-1950s initiated a program to bring to the United
States aliens whose service had been completed but whose
immigration was desirable to maintain the security of intelli-
gence missions and the aliens' safety. A key feature of this
program enabled the CIA to conduct the background investigations
required to assure the aliens' immigration eligibility. Such
investigations normally are conducted by State Department visa
personnel; however, in these cases the CIA believed that secu-
rity concerns warranted a revised procedure. With the coopera-
tion of the State Department and INS, the revised procedure was
instituted.
From a listing of aliens resettled, we identified and
reviewed the files of all aliens with German or East European
backgrounds who were old enough to have participated in the war
and who came to, the United States under this program, a total
of 17 aliens. Our review did not identify any questionable
background information that would have disqualified these
aliens' immigrations.
ALLEGATIONS ABOUT EMIGRES EMPLOYED BY
OPC SPONSORED PROJECTS WERE INVESTIGATED
In 1954 in response to numerous allegations about the back-
grounds of employees of Radio Free Europe and another project,
the CIA initiated an internal review of these OPC initiated
projects. An internal review committee investigated allegations
that employees were, among other things, communists, fascists,
and/or Nazi collaborators. In all, information was gathered on
about 100 individuals, including those accused, their accusers,
and other controversial emigres. The study recommended that
13 employees be terminated. One of the 13 employees had been
alleged to be pro-Nazi and another a Nazi collaborator.
From the internal review committee's files we could not
determine whether or not the recommended terminations resulted
from the initial allegations or from some other determination.
However, in making its recommendations, the review committee
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
stated that it had become evident that the derogatory informa-
tion about these aliens could never be proved or confirmed. The
committee also believed that few persons sufficiently possessed
the historical background and perspective necessary for making a
final judgment about these matters.
An early planning document discussing membership in the
projects shows that aliens with compromised Nazi pasts were not
to be included. A July 1948 memorandum to the CIA Chief for
Central Europe discussed the establishment of a national commit-
tee of emigres in the United States and its members. The memo-
randum further discussed two East European emigres, one of whom
was acceptable for the committee because he was anti-Communist
and anti-Nazi and the other who was unacceptable due to his Nazi
past. A January 1954 memorandum to the CIA Chief for Southern
Europe shows that ex-Nazis' memberships in national committees
were still shunned. In discussing an ex-Nazi collaborator and
emigre leader joining a national committee, the memorandum
stated that his collaborationist activities made his entry
into the national committee impossible.
The 1954 CIA internal review committee found that for years
emigres had been dealt with and used although their full histo-
ries and ideologies were unknown. The committee found fault
with the centralized file system used as the source of emigre
background checks. Its review found it necessary to gather
and process information from at least 11 other major sources.
A former OPC intelligence officer told us that as early as
1949, questions existed within OPC about the backgrounds of some
aliens assisted to enter the United States. The intelligence
officer told us that in 1949 and 1950 he was told by another OPC
officer that OPC was assisting emigres, some of whom had ques-
tionable backgrounds, to enter the United States. The officer
interviewed said that back then it was difficult to adequately
check an emigre's background. He added that informally and
without authority he made checks on some of the emigres who had
entered the country. The officer, a former INS officer, could
not recall any instance where it appeared that the emigre's
entry had been illegal. Subsequently, as a result of the above,
the intelligence officer was assigned to oversee alien entries.
He stated that he instituted procedures to require in-depth
security checks before assisting alien entries.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BROUGHT
NAZI SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
TO THE UNITED STATES
In addition to its use of former Nazis for Cold War intel-
ligence, the United States initiated an effort and found itself
competing with other allies and the Soviet Union to recruit and
employ German scientists and engineers. German scientists and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
engineers had been in the forefront of technological advance-
ments in areas such as aeronautics missile guidance, and chemi-
cal warfare. As early as July 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
approved a project to tap Germany's scientific and technical
expertise. This project, initially called overcast but renamed
Paperclip, authorized the recruitment and short-term employment
in the United States of 350 German scientists and engineers.
The number of scientists authorized for recruitment was later
increased to 1,000. At one point the United States had identi-
fied 24,000 German scientists. They were to assist in the de-
velopment of weaponry that could be used against the Japanese in
the ongoing war. The recruitment of the German scientists by
the United States would not only aid its scientific development
but also deny other nations, particularly the Soviet Union, an
opportunity to obtain their services.
The Departments of State and Justice, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the military services established the procedures for
processing the immigration of these scientists and engineers.
Prior to their entry the military investigated their backgrounds
and aliens who could be considered war criminals or undesir-
ables, including active participants in the Nazi regime, were to
be screened out. According to the War Department's Chief for
Intelligence, membership in the Nazi party before 1933, party
leadership at any time, conviction by a denazification board,
charges or conviction of a war crime, or a criminal record were
all presumptive evidence of ineligibility under the program.
The procedures also required the Department of Justice and the
FBI to review the aliens' backgrounds and concur in each case
before making a recommendation to the Department of State for a
visa issuance.
Although aliens who were active participants in the Nazi
regime were not to be brought to the United States, the mili-
tary's security investigations revealed that the majority of
Paperclip recruits were Nazi party members or members of its
affiliates. The investigations concluded that with few excep-
tions, such memberships were due to exigencies that influenced
the lives of every German. In April 1948 the Director of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency
said that too much emphasis was being placed on the recruits'
Nazi affiliations without giving due weight to the circumstances
under which the affiliations were formed. He added that Nazism
from a security threat standpoint had been destroyed by the war
and no longer existed.
The recruitment of German scientists and engineers under
Project Paperclip ended on September 30, 1947. Thereafter, only
in special cases could aliens be considered for entry and then
only in the interest of national security. As of April 1951,
the United States had recruited through the project 528 German
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
scientists and engineers of which 459 had immigrated to the
United States.
During the Paperclip recruitment, allegations against some
recruits arose. Project policy was that if evidence was uncov-
ered that any recruits still professed Nazi ideology or other
objectionable ideologies, they were to be returned to Germany.
In 1947, one recruit was returned to stand trial as a war crimi-
nal but was found not guilty. Paperclip records show that other
scientists were also believed questionable and were closely
watched.
In October 1984, OSI announced that one Paperclip recruit,
Mr. Arthur Rudolph, returned to Germany voluntarily and re-
nounced his U.S. citizenship rather than face denaturaliza-
tion and deportation proceedings. Mr. Rudolph, who had been
employed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
was accused of contributing to the deaths of thousands of slave
laborers conscripted to work in the development and production
of Germany's V-2 rockets.
ALIENS WITH UNDESIRABLE
OR QUESTIONABLE BACKGROUNDS
WERE ASSISTED IN IMMIGRATING
TO THE UNITED STATES
Although we found no specific program to aid the immigra-
tion of undesirable aliens, we identified five aliens with un-
desirable or questionable backgrounds who were aided in their
immigration to the United States. Before their immigration,
four of these aliens had assisted U.S. intelligence agencies in
some manner. In one case, it is not clear whether he assisted
U.S. agencies before he immigrated. The immigration assistance
provided by U.S. agencies varied. Among the five aliens were
two alleged war criminals, a former Nazi SS officer, a convicted
conspirator in an assassination, and a traitor. OSI told us
that it is taking appropriate investigative action regarding
these five cases and those noted on pages 35 to 40.
In addition to the aid provided the above aliens, we found
that two of the aliens were protected from investigation. In
one case, the CIA invoked national security reasons to legalize
an alien's immigration status. In the other case, we were un-
able to identify any action taken by an intelligence agency once
it learned of derogatory information about one alien's wartime
background.
We have no basis for assuming that these aliens represent
the universe of such immigrations. The following summarizes
these cases.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
Subject A
This subject, now deceased, was an operational contact and
collaborator for a U.S. intelligence agency beginning in the
late 1940s. During World War II, he was a paid Nazi intelli-
gence agent and a cabinet member in a German-sponsored East
European government. Following the war, the subject was listed
as a wanted war criminal by the United Nations War Crimes Com-
mission based on information submitted by an East European Gov-
ernment that he planned and ordered the executions of suspected
Communist sympathizers. In the mid-1950s he immigrated to the
United States with the assistance of a U.S. intelligence agency.
U.S. authorities were aware of the charges against the sub-
ject as they discussed the legitimacy of the war crimes charge.
Additionally, U.S. authorities had reliable wartime intelligence
which described his collaboration with the Germans and which
contained war crimes accusations.
In 1949, a U.S. intelligence officer contacted the subject.
This contact was initiated by another country's intelligence
service for whom the subject was a source of information. The
officer reported that although headquarters undoubtedly held
voluminous files of adverse information on the subject, he found
the subject to be a "person of uncompromising personal honor"
who was "motivated by purely patriotic considerations." Despite
his wartime record, U.S. intelligence officers in Europe found
the subject's ardent anticommunism appealing.
Subsequently, the subject became an operational contact and
source of information in Europe for a U.S. intelligence agency
but was never a paid agent. After several years of collabora-
tion with U.S. intelligence, the subject applied for immigration
to the United States as an escapee under the Refugee Relief Act.
To assist the subject who was applying through normal immigra-
tion channels, the intelligence agency's field office contacted
its counterpart office in the city where the subject had applied
for a visa. The field office requested the counterpart office's
assistance in seeing that the subject's immigration application
was processed through the consulate with minimum delay.
Upon learning of the proposed immigration, the intelligence
agency's headquarters office cabled the field office stating
that it was unaware that the subject had wanted to immigrate to
the United States and inquired about his plans after immigrat-
ing. Although headquarters knew the subject's background, the
memorandum raised no questions about the subject's eligibility
for immigration.
Approximately 1 year later, the subject, still seeking a
visa, encountered problems after undergoing a routine interroga-
tion at the consulate. He refused to answer certain questions
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
which would have revealed work he had performed for U.S. intel-
ligence. The interrogators apparently understood his dilemma
and explained that they needed some form of assurance in the
matter. Subsequently, the field office again contacted its
counterpart office. The field office attested to the subject's
collaboration with U.S. intelligence and its belief that the
subject would make a credible U.S. citizen.
Shortly afterwards, the Department of State contacted the
intelligence agency's headquarters asking it to check its files
on the subject. The intelligence agency informed the Department
about his German collaboration and that he used his position to
perpetrate extreme brutalities against the Communist-led parti-
sans. It also informed the State Department that the subject
was a leader in the fight against communism and a man motivated
by purely patriotic considerations. Six months later, the sub-
ject received a visa.
An intelligence agent who thought highly of the subject
said that collaboration is somewhat of a misnomer as it is
applied to people of this East European country. He stated that
the upper classes in this country were always educated in other
countries and, therefore, had close ties to those countries. In
this particular case, the subject had been educated in Austria,
spoke fluent German, and was an acquaintance of some high rank-
ing German officials. Because of the above, his serving with
Germany would not be surprising especially considering his
staunch anticommunism. The agent stated that he was unaware
of war crimes charges against the subject.
Subject B
Subject B, now deceased, occupied many positions of trust
as part of a Nazi-appointed government in Eastern Europe. Dur-
ing this period he was alleged to have been involved in massa-
cres of several thousand civilians, predominately Jews. For
such acts he was denounced in 1947 as a war criminal in the
U.N. General Assembly.
About 1951, this subject was approached in the U.S. zone
of Germany by a Soviet agent who attempted to recruit him.
He reported this approach to a U.S. intelligence agency and
assisted that agency in the Soviet agent's eventual apprehen-
sion and conviction. For his actions, the intelligence agency
assisted him in immigrating to the United States several years
later.
Before and after his emigration, he was employed on a proj-
ect that was financed and supervised by another U.S. intelli-
gence agency. Although he held an official position in this
project, he was unaware of the intelligence agency's relation-
ship to this project. The intelligence agency, however, was
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
aware of the subject's background and had established a file
on him in 1949.
As the subject advanced to higher positions within the
project, the U.S. intelligence agency had to approve him for
each position. In a 1961 memorandum considering the subject for
a position, one intelligence official after reviewing derogatory
information about his past stated,
"The unfavorable information . . . reflects that Sub-
ject . . . has been and perhaps remains ardently Fas-
cist in his political orientation. In view of this
probability, the concern of this office is . . . that
he would manifest anti-American and for that matter
anti-democratic sentiment. In view of this probabil-
ity, this office recommends against the Subject's use
. . . It is felt that his continued use might be a
source of embarrassment to the Project and/or the
[intelligence] Agency."
The intelligence agency, however, approved him for the position
but stipulated, among other things that his products, if any, be
monitored for any possible anti-American sentiments.
In the late 1970s, OSI initiated an investigation of the
subject who, by that time, had acquired naturalized citizenship.
Their investigation found that prior to his naturalization, no
intelligence agency had provided INS with derogatory information
on the subject, although background checks were requested and
derogatory information was available in their files. OSI also
found that the subject did not provide derogatory background
information requested on his naturalization application. Before
OSI could initiate prosecutive actions to denaturalize the sub-
ject, he died.
Subject C
This subject, now deceased was a principal agent for U.S.
intelligence beginning in the late 1940s. He was an early mem-
ber of the Nazi party and an officer in the Allgemeine SS and
the SD. During the war's final months, he offered his services
to the U.S. military where he assisted in the capture of many
high ranking Nazis. In 1947, he was employed by a U.S.-
sponsored intelligence agency and in 1949 by a U.S. intelligence
agency. As a reward for many years of faithful service, the
intelligence agency in the mid-1950s sponsored the subject's
immigration to the United States. He immigrated under provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952.
Although most details of the subject's Nazi career and his
Nazi affiliations were known by the U.S. intelligence agency,
the agency was unaware that during the late 1930s he had been
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
involved in the confiscation of Jewish properties and the reset-
tlement of Jews. During a preimmigration interview, the subject
lied about his early Nazi career. Also, captured Nazi personnel
records failed to disclose details of his early career. Not
until the early 1960s did the intelligence agency, through other
captured Nazi documents, learn of his early Nazi assignments.
We were unable to identify any action taken as a result of this
discovery.
In aiding this subject's immigration to the United States,
a U.S. intelligence officer accompanied him to a U.S. consulate
where the consular officers considering issuing the visa knew
the intelligence officer's agency affiliation. The intelligence
officer also had procured, and provided to the consular offi-
cers, a military background check on the subject which provided
no derogatory information. The intelligence officer informed
the consular officers that the subject also had a security
clearance from the intelligence agency. In the course of his
interview at the consulate, the subject admitted that he had
been a Nazi party member. However, he said that he had been
an officer in the Waffen-SS rather than admit his membership
in the more detested Allgemeine-SS. The visa was granted.
After learning of the visa's issuance, the Department of
State queried the consul as to why a visa had been issued to
the subject. Shortly after learning of the State Department's
query, the intelligence agency cabled its headquarters suggest-
ing that it forestall any State Department orders to cancel the
visa. We could not ascertain whether any headquarter's action
resulted from this suggestion.
Headquarters did, however, contact the INS and advise it of
the subject's entry. Headquarters informed INS that the subject
had been employed abroad for several years, that the agency had
conducted a full investigation of the subject, had no reason to
believe him inadmissible, and requested INS to expedite his
entry. Yet, some within the intelligence agency did have ques-
tions about his admissibility. Only 5 months earlier, intelli-
gence personnel discussed how to ease the subject's U.S. entry
because he was inadmissible due to his Nazi party and SD member-
ships. Furthermore, they said it was apparent that the Depart-
ment of State's background investigation would have to be con-
trolled.
Agency correspondence, however, implied that INS would be
fully informed of the subject's true background. In one cor-
respondence, the agency headquarters informed the field office
that the subject would not be entering the United States under
false pretenses and that INS would have information about his
past record in a secret file. (Our check at INS failed to iden-
tify the existence of any classified file associated with the
subject's entry or any ruling allowing his entry.] Headquarters
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
speculated that his entry into the United States would be legal.
Headquarters stated that it was requesting INS to give this case
favorable treatment. However, headquarters warned that for both
the subject's sake and the agency's, the subject should not ap-
ply for any sensitive jobs or government positions, even after
becoming a citizen.
Subject D
This subject was used by U.S. intelligence in Europe after
the war. Documentation reviewed shows that during the 1930s the
subject, a member of an underground nationalist revolutionary
organization, was convicted for complicity in planning the
assassination of a high East European official. Sentenced to
death, he appealed the conviction. A higher court upheld the
conviction but his sentence was subsequently commuted to life
imprisonment. When the Nazis invaded this East European coun-
try, he was able to escape from prison. During the war he was
alleged to have cooperated with the Germans initially but later
fought against them. He was also alleged to have committed ter-
rorist acts and to have fought against the Communists. Follow-
ing the war, a high German source reported that this nationalist
revolutionary organization rendered valuable services to the
German war effort.
The subject was considered extremely valuable by U.S.
intelligence. Because of fear for his personal safety and his
familiarity with U.S. intelligence operations, the CIA brought
him to the United States under an assumed name. Before his im-
migration, the,CIA provided INS with some details of the sub-
ject's background including that he had been sentenced to death
for nationalistic activities. However, his true identity was
not disclosed. About 2 years after his entry and after learning
his true identity, INS informed the CIA that it was investigat-
ing the subject and that the investigation could lead to the
subject's deportation. According to the CIA file, INS had
learned that the subject's conviction had been for involvement
in an assassination and that allegations of terrorism existed
against him.
Subsequently, the CIA requested approval for the subject's
permanent residence in the United States under Section 8 of the
CIA Act of 1949 which allows the CIA to bring 100 individuals a
year to the United States for national security reasons regard-
less of their past. The request included a justification which
contained details about the subject's background including his
assassination conviction and the alleged terrorism acts. In
1952, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney Gen-
eral, and the Commissioner of INS agreed to admit the subject in
the interest of national security without regard to his inadmis-
sibility under any other laws.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
Subject E
This subject, an alleged traitor, was brought to the United
States by an intelligence agency because of his expertise on the
Soviet Union and the Far East. In 1942 he was caught by the
Germans when the area where he was located was overrun. Because
he spoke German, he acted as an intermediary between the occupy-
ing forces and the local populace. Later he traveled to Germany
arriving there in May 1943. After his arrival in Germany, he
worked at two institutes where he did research on Mongolia.
Both institutes were sponsored by the German security service.
Information from these institutes was provided to German foreign
intelligence.
Upon the collapse of Nazi Germany, the subject was arrested
and interrogated. A November 1946 interrogation report by an
Allied government concluded that (1) the work he performed in
Germany was a long way removed from the "seamier side" of the
security service's activities; (2) his description of his cap-
ture by the Germans and subsequent contacts with them was truth-
ful; and (3) the accusation that he was a traitor (reduced from
war criminal) appeared to be the case.
In May 1947 the allied government approached U.S. intelli-
gence with the suggestion that the subject could be of possible
intelligence interest to the United States. This government
found the subject to be a source of embarrassment because of a
request for his return and accusations against him. The govern-
ment asked if U.S. intelligence could send the subject to the
United States where he could be discreetly resettled.
Discussions about the subject took place in U.S. intelli-
gence circles as early as May 1947, but contact was not made
with him until May 1948. In October 1948, a U.S. intelligence
agency began efforts to bring the subject to the United States.
Among those agencies with knowledge of the efforts to bring the
subject to the United States were the State Department, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the FBI. Whether the INS was noti-
fied at this time is not clear. The subject entered the United
States in May 1949 on a displaced person's visa. The FBI was
notified of the subject's entry about a week before he entered.
Upon his arrival, he was presented to the INS which processed
his entry.
ALIENS WITH UNDESIRABLE
OR QUESTIONABLE BACKGROUNDS
IMMIGRATED WITHOUT U.S. ASSISTANCE
In addition to those aliens with undesirable or question-
able backgrounds who were assisted in some way to immigrate to
the United States, we identified seven others with undesirable
or questionable backgrounds who immigrated but were not
assisted. In each case,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
these individuals had an association with U.S. or allied intel-
ligence agencies either before or after their immigration.
We have no basis for assuming that these aliens represent
the universe of such immigrations. The following summarizes
these cases.
Subject F
This subject was appointed leader of the national police by
an East European country's prime minister and served in this
capacity during what intelligence reports characterized as the
cruelest Nazi occupation period. Evacuated to Germany during
the Nazi collapse of April 1945, he was soon arrested by U.S.
military and placed in a prisoner of war camp. In early 1948,
he was employed by U.S. intelligence to gather intelligence in
Eastern Europe.
In 1950, the subject attempted to immigrate to the United
States. However, his application was turned down after a U.S.
intelligence agency provided derogatory information about him.
Shortly afterwards, he emigrated to South America. In 1964
under provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, he
immigrated to the United States. In 1971, he became a citizen.
Nothing in the files reviewed indicates that either of his
immigrations were aided by U.S. agencies.
Information contained in his immigration file, however,
shows that in 1963 a U.S. intelligence agency responding to a
Department of State name-check request provided information on
his wartime background. Copies of its response to the Depart-
ment were also sent to the FBI and the INS. Further, the file
shows that prior to his 1971 naturalization, an INS Assistant
District Director for Citizenship requested a character investi-
gation on the subject based on the 1963 intelligence agency re-
sponse. That investigation did not establish any evidence or
information adverse to the subject's moral character and loyalty
to the United States.
Subject G
This subject was a Fascist youth leader and the editor of
the official newspaper of the youth branch of an East European
Fascist party. Additionally, he was a propagandist and commen-
tator on a radio station operated by occupation forces. In late
1946 after lying about the country he resided in during the war
on his visa application, he immigrated to the United States as a
displaced person.
In 1951 the subject was hired by Radio Free Europe in the
United States after providing similar false information on his
employment application. His employ brought criticism from
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
emigre circles which accused the subject of being a Fascist
youth leader during the war. An investigation completed in 1953
on the subject and other personalities of Radio Free Europe
identified only the subject as having an "unsavory" record.
Shortly after the completion of the investigation, the subject's
employment was terminated. The subject's file did not disclose
the reason for his termination. We could not identify any other
actions taken as a result of the investigation.
Subject H
This subject, now deceased, was the military representative
of an East European political group. He was accused of partici-
pating in the planning of the same executions as Subject A. As
a result, he was accused by a postwar East European government
of being a war criminal. This accusation was confirmed by an
allied military mission which identified the subject as one of
only a few from this country who could be so classified.
The subject immigrated to the United States from a Mid-
dle Eastern country in October 1951. Shortly after his U.S.
arrival, a request for a name check solicited the following
response from an intelligence agency, in part, "subject's clas-
sification as a war criminal by the present [country deleted]
government should be evaluated in the light of similar clas-
sifications of most of the important wartime anti-Communist
leaders. The extent of subject's collaboration with the Ger-
mans cannot be determined from file traces at this Headquarters;
however, it should be stated that many nationalistic and pro-
democratic [nationality deleted] did collaborate with the German
war occupation authorities because the latter were less feared
than were the leaders of the [Communists]."
This, however, may not have been the case with the subject.
In reviewing an interrogation report of a captured Nazi officer
responsible for intelligence in this East European country, he
described the subject as a leader of one of the national groups
formed by the Germans or supported with German armaments and
ammunition. The officer stated that, with the exception of the
subject, the group leaders collaborated with Germany because of
their hate of communism not their love of Germany.
After his arrival in the United States, the subject was,
to a limited extent, a source of information for an intelligence
agency and a broadcaster over Voice of America.
Subject I
This subject, now deceased, was one of the Gestapo's chief
agents in an East European country. In 1941, the Germans ap-
pointed him mayor of a large city where he had jurisdiction over
the municipal, political, and criminal police forces. In 1944
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
with the Russians approaching he went to Germany where he re-
mained until 1947.
In 1949, the subject emigrated to South America from a West
European country where he had gone as a volunteer worker. Soon
after his arrival in South America, a U.S. intelligence agency
contacted him and proposed a plan for his use as an agent.
Before his employment (which had been submitted to headquarters
for approval) could be decided, he accepted a position with a
South American government.
The subject immigrated to the United States in 1960 under
the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Subject J
This subject served for several months as the Minister of
Justice in a Fascist-imposed cabinet of an East European govern-
ment. Intelligence reports characterized this as the cruelest
of this country's Fascist-imposed cabinets. Earlier, however,
the subject, a highly respected prewar jurist, helped organize a
nationalist resistance group. In February 1949, he immigrated
to the United States as a displaced person. Several months
after arriving, he became an officer of a committee of the
National Committee for Free Europe.
Two years after his admittance to the United States the INS
investigated the subject and questioned him about his wartime
service in the Fascist cabinet. The subject responded that he
accepted the Minister of Justice position as a means to accom-
plish the goals of the resistance. He stated that the Fascists
were unaware that he was a member of the resistance. He stated
that he was neither a sympathizer nor a collaborator of fascism.
Furthermore, he stated he resigned his position because of Fas-
cist persecution of nationalists. However, shortly after re-
signing this position, he was appointed to and served in another
high-level position on the criminal court. After several years
of investigating the subject, the INS closed the investigation
due to insufficient evidence.
Before INS' investigation, the subject's wartime record
was of concern to officials of the National Committee for Free
Europe. One official wrote that his record makes the National
Committee vulnerable to attack as supporting a Fascist sympa-
thizer and a collaborator. An intelligence agency official
commenting on the above stated that the subject's Fascist sym-
pathies based on his record of several months service in the
cabinet is a moot question. He stated that it is believed that
he accepted the post as a matter of expediency and not because
of any desire to serve the Fascists.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
Subject K
This subject, now deceased, was a former official of a Ger-
man sponsored government. He was an emigre leader after the war
who lived in several countries before immigrating to the United
States in 1961 under provisions of the Immigration and National-
ity Act. He appears to have been associated with an allied in-
telligence service and later employed by a U.S. intelligence
agency.
In January 1948, a U.S. intelligence officer commenting on
the emigre groups with whom the subject was associated said in
part that some of the old time politicians who were very popular
and influential dare not meddle in politics nor even reveal
their names and addresses for fear that they may be turned over
to their country of origin for their past cooperation with the
Germans. The subject was one of the politicians mentioned. In
January 1948 another intelligence officer wrote that an evalua-
tion of the reliability of key figures in this particular emigre
movement is difficult because many of them have records of hav-
ing cooperated rather closely, though perhaps under pressure,
with the Germans. He added that over time this will become a
negligible factor, permitting these people to be approached more
safely. In February 1948 the subject told a U.S. intelligence
officer that his emigre group's collaboration with the Germans
was merely a formal and tactical cooperation.
A U.S. intelligence agency employed the subject in the
1950s despite its knowledge of his German collaboration.
Subject L
This subject, a former East European collaborator who held
several cabinet positions including Minister of Interior, was a
wanted war criminal, and was admitted as an immigrant to the
United States in the late 1950s. The government allowed his
immigration despite full knowledge of his background and despite
having rejected his entry on two prior occasions. In 1946 the
United Nations War Crimes Commission found merit in the charges
against this individual and listed him among its wanted war
criminals. In 1947 a pre-Communist East European country's
court found him guilty in absentia and condemned him to death.
Upon learning of his U.S. entry, a CIA official contacted
the Department of State to inquire how this individual could
have gained U.S. admission in light of his background. A De-
partment official replied that this individual's visa applica-
tion had engendered considerable discussion. However, regard-
less of his background and the opinion of some in the Department
of State that his admission was not in the public interest, the
visa officer and the consulate found nothing substantial upon
which to base a visa refusal.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
Department of State records show that in the late 1940s the
subject applied on two occasions for a U.S. immigration visa.
Both applications were denied because he was found to be ineli-
gible under wartime regulations which precluded the issuance of
a visa to anyone whose U.S. entry was deemed prejudicial to the
public interests.
After enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act in
1952 the subject reapplied for admission. The subject's case
was examined by officials at the U.S. consulate where the appli-
cation had been filed and their review found him eligible for
a visa. However, before granting the visa, the consulate re-
quested the Department's opinion in the matter. The Department
investigated the case and found no basis in the law with which
to disagree with the consulate's conclusion.
In a letter to a Congressman explaining its decision, the
Department stated, "membership in or affiliation with the de-
funct Nazi Party in itself does not constitute a ground of in-
eligibility . . . Therefore, previous collaboration with the
Nazi Party in and of itself is no longer a disqualifying factor
in considering eligibility for a visa." In addition, the De-
partment did not believe that the subject's conviction in ab-
sentia could be considered a basis for exclusion. Elaborating
on this point, the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization
Service replied to a citizen query objecting to the subject's
entry, "the settled administrative view which has been applied
uniformly by the Department of State and this Service is that
a 'conviction in absentia'. . . is regarded as repugnant to
Anglo-American concepts of justice. Under this doctrine the
provisions of [the Immigration and Nationality Act] did not
operate to disqualify [the subject] from admission to the
United States."
About 16 months after his entry, the subject departed the
Unites States citing his inability to make a living. Three
years later, his permanent residence card expired due to his
prolonged absence from the United States.
(183535)
40
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER
UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548
BULK RATE
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
GAO
PERMIT No. G100
OFFICAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/01 : CIA-RDP87MO1152R000300410001-8