IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES A BILL TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987 FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01007R000501300002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REGULATION

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9th CONGRESS
2nd SWTON
(Notes.-Flll In all blank line. ezeept
those provided for th* date, am-
ber. and reference of bill.)
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. DURENBERGER from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following original bill; which was read
twice and (pursuant to the order of May , 1986)
referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services,
the Judiciary, Foreign Relations, and Governmental
Affairs for the 30-day time period provided in section
3(b) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, provided
that the Committee on the Judiciary be restricted to
the consideration of title V and section 603, the
Committee on Foreign Relations be restricted to the
consideration of title VI, and the Committee on Governmental
Affairs be restricted to the consideration of sections
401 and 409, provided that if any of said Committees
fails to report said bill within the 30-day time limit,
such committee shall be automatically discharged from
further consideration of said bill in accordance with
section 3(b) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress.
A BILL
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1987 for intelli-
gence activities of the United States Government, the Intel-
(Insert title of bill here)
ligence Community Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the
"Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1987".
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TITLE I - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for
fiscal year 1987 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of
the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the
Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS
SEC. 102. The amounts authorized to be appropriated under
section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September
30, 1987, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the
elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classi-
fied Schedule of Authorizations prepared by the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate. That Schedule of Authorizations
shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the schedule,
or of appropriate portions of the schedule, within the executive
branch.
PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS
SEC. 103. The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize
employment of civilian personnel in excess of the numbers authorized
for fiscal year 1987 under sections 102 and 202 of this Act when he
determines that such action is necessary to the performance of
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important intelligence functions, except that such number may not,
for any element of the Intelligence Community, exceed 2 per centum
of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such sections
for such element. The Director of Central Intelligence shall
promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this
section.
TITLE II - INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 201. There is authorized to be appropriated for the
Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1987 the sum of
$22,338,000.
AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL END STRENGTH
SEC. 202.(a) The Intelligence Community Staff is autho-
rized two hundred and thirty-nine full-time personnel as of
September 30, 1987. Such personnel of the Intelligence Community
Staff may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community
Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United
States Government.
(b) During fiscal year 1987, personnel of the Intelligence
Community Staff shall be selected so as to provide appropriate
representation from elements of the United States Government
engaged in intelligence activities.
(c) During fiscal year 1987, any officer or employee of
the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed
to the Intelligence Community Staff from another element of the
United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis,
except that any such officer, employee, or member may be detailed
on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for
the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director
of Central Intelligence.
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF ADMINISTERED IN SAME MANNER AS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 203. During fiscal year 1987, activities and personnel
of the Intelligence Community Staff shall be subject to the provisions
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et
seq.) in the same manner as activities and personnel of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE III - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 301. There is authorized to be appropriated for the
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for
fiscal year 1987 the sum of $125,800,000.
TITLE IV - ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS RELATED
TO INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
CLASSIFIED RECORD DESTRUCTION SCHEDULES
SEC. 401. Section 3303a of title 44, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
"(g) The requirement in subsection (a) of this section
that the Archivist provide notice in the Federal Register
of the list and schedule of records proposed for disposal
shall not apply to lists or schedules of the Central
Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency
that are properly classified pursuant to Executive
Order 12356, or its successor order.". .
EMPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
IN THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 402. Paragraph 1604(e)(1) of chapter 83 of title 10,
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United States Code, is amended by striking out "1985 and 1986"
and inserting in lieu thereof "1987 and 1988".
CLARIFICATION OF DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY AUTHORITIES
SEC. 403.(a) Chapter 167 of title 10, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
"2795. Exchange of Mapping, Charting and Geodesy
Data with Foreign Nations.
"The Secretary of Defense may, subject to the requirements
of Section 112b of Title I, United States Code, and the
regulations promulgated thereunder (22 CFR Part 181), and under
such additional regulations as are deemed appropriate,
authorize the Defense Mapping Agency to exchange or furnish
mapping, charting and geodetic data, supplies or services to a
foreign country or international organization pursuant to an
agreement for the production or exchange of such data.".
(b) The table of contents of Chapter 167 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof:
"2795. Exchange of Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Data
with Foreign Nations.".
MEDICAL EVACUATION OF DIA CIVILIAN
EMPLOYEES STATIONED OVERSEAS
SEC. 404. Subsection 1605(a) of Chapter 83 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by inserting "(5)" after
"paragraphs (2), (3), (4)" and after "22 U.S.C. 4082 (2), (3),
(4)"
PROCEEDS FROM DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
SEC. 405.(a) The Secretary of Defense may authorize,
without regard to the provisions of section 3302 of title 31,
United States Code, use of proceeds from counterintelligence
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operations conducted by components of the Military Departments
to offset necessary and reasonable expenses, not otherwise
prohibited by law, incurred in such operations, if use of
appropriated funds to meet such expenses would not be
practicable.
(b) As soon as the net proceeds from particular
counterintelligence operations are no longer necessary for the
conduct of those or similar operations, such proceeds shall be
deposited into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.
(c) The Secretary of Defense shall establish policies
and procedures to govern acquisition, use, management and
disposition of proceeds from counterintelligence operations
conducted by components of the Military Departments, including
effective internal systems of accounting and administrative
controls.
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SURVIVOR BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN FORMER SPOUSES
OF CIA EMPLOYEES
SEC. 406. (a) Part C of title II of the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain
Employees is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new section:
"SURVIVOR BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN OTHER FORMER SPOUSES
"SEC. 224. (a)(1) Any individual who was a former
spouse of a participant or former participant on November
15, 1982, shall be entitled, to the extent of available
appropriations, and except to the extent such former spouse
is disqualified under subsection (b), to a survivor annuity
equal to 55 percent of the greater of --
"(A) the full amount of the participant's or
former participant's annuity, as computed under section
221(a); or
"(B) the full amount of what such annuity as so
computed would be if the participant or former partici-
pant had not withdrawn a lump-sum portion of contribu-
tions made with respect to such annuity.
"(2) A survivor annuity payable under this section
shall be reduced by an amount equal to the amount of retire-
ment benefits, not including benefits under title II of the
Social Security Act, received by the former spouse which are
attributable to previous employment of such former spouse
by the United States.
"(b) A former spouse shall not be entitled to a
survivor annuity under this section if --
"(1) an election has been made with respect to
such former spouse under section 223;
"(2) the former spouse remarries before age 55;
"(3) the former spouse is less than fifty years of age.
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"(c)(1) The entitlement of a former spouse to a survivor
annuity under this section --
"(A) shall commence --
"(i) in the case of a former spouse of a participant
or former participant who is deceased as of the effec-
tive date of this section, beginning on the later of --
"(I) the 60th day after such date; or
"(II) the date such former spouse teaches age
50; and
"(ii) in the case of any other former spouse,
beginning on the latest date of --
"(I) the date that the participant or former
participant to whom the former spouse was married
dies;
"(II) the 60th day after the effective date
of this section; or
"(III) the date such former spouse reaches age
50; and
"(B) shall terminate on the last day of the month
before the former spouse's death or remarriage before
attaining age 50.
"(2)(A) A survivor annuity under this section shall not
be payable unless appropriate written application is provided
to the Director, complete with any supporting documentation
which the Director may by regulation require, within 30
months after the effective date of this section.
"(B) Upon approval of an application provided under sub-
paragraph (A), the appropriate survivor annuity shall be
payable to the former spouse with respect to all periods
before such approval during which the former spouse was
entitled to such annuity under this section, bdt in no event
shall a survivor annuity be payable under this section with
respect to any period before the effective date of this
section.
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"(d) The Director shall --
"(1) issue such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out this section; and
"(2) to the extent practicable inform each individual
who was a former spouse of a participant or former
participant on November 15, 1982, of any rights which
such individual may have under this section.".
(b) Section 14(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 (59 U.S.C. 403n(a)) is amended by inserting
"224," after "222, 223,".
(c) For fiscal year 1987, not to exceed $500,000 shall
be available from amounts appropriated under the authority
of section 101(1) of this Act for survivor annuities under
section 224 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
Act of 1964 for Certain Employees and under the amendment
made by subsection (b) of this section.
(d) The amendments made by this section shall take
effect on October 1, 1986.
HEALTH BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN FORMER SPOUSES
SEC. 407. (a) The Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 is amended by adding at the end thereof a new section,
as follows:
"HEALTH BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN FORMER SPOUSES
OF CIA EMPLOYEES
"SEC. 16. (a) Except as provided in subsection (c) (1) ,
any individual --
"(1) formerly married to an employee or former
employee of the Agency whose marriage was dissolved by
divorce or annulment before May 7, 1985;
"(2) who, at any time during the 18-month period
before the divorce or annulment became final, was
covered under a health benefits plan as a member of the
family of such employee or former employee; and
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"(3) who was married to such employee for not less
than 10 years during periods of service by such employee
with the Agency, at least five years of which were
spent outside the United States by both the employee
and the former spouse,
is eligible for coverage under a health benefits plan in
accordance with the provisions of this section.
"(b)(1) Any individual eligible for coverage under
subsection (a) may enroll in a health benefits plan for
self alone or for self and family if, before the
expiration of the 6-month period beginning on the
effective date of this section, and in accordance with
such procedures as the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management shall by regulation prescribe,
such individual --
"(A) files an election for such enrollment; and
"(B) arranges to pay currently into the Employees
Health Benefits Fund under section 8909 of title 5,
United States Code an amount equal to the sum of the
employee and agency contributions payable in the case
of an employee enrolled under chapter 89 of such
title in the same health benefits plan and with the
same level of benefits.
"(2) The Director of Central Intelligence shall take
all steps practicable --
"(A) to determine the identity and current address
of each former spouse eligible for coverage under
subsection (a); and
"(B) to notify each such former spouse of that
individual's rights under this section.
"(3) The Director of the Office of Personnel Management,
upon notification by the Director of Central Intelligence,
shall waive the 6-month limitation set forth in paragraph
(1) in any case in which the Director of Central Intelligence
determines that the circumstances so warrant.
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"(c)(1) Any former spouse who remarries before age 55
is not eligible to make an election under subsection (b)(1).
"(2) Any former spouse enrolled in a health benefits
plan pursuant to an election under subsection (b)(1) may
continue the enrollment under the conditions of eligibility
which the Director of the Office of Personnel Management
shall by regulation prescribe, except that any former spouse
who remarries before age 55 shall not be eligible for
continued enrollment under this section after the end of the
31-day period beginning on the date of remarriage.
"(d) No indidividual may be covered by a health benefits
plan under this section during any period in which such
individual is enrolled in a health benefits plan under any
other authority, nor may any individual be covered under
more than one enrollment under this section.
"(e) For purposes of this section the term 'health
benefits plan' means an approved health benefits plan under
chapter 89 of title 5, United States Code.".
(b) The amendment made by this section shall take
effect on October 1, 1986.
PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FACILITIES
SEC. 408. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50
U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by deleting section 11 and
inserting in lieu thereof the following new section:
"Sec. 11. (a) The Director of the National Security
Agency may authorize National Security Agency personnel
within the United States to perform the same functions as
special policemen of the General Services Administration
perform under the first section of the Act entitled 'An Act
to authorize the Federal Works Administrator or officials of
the Federal Works Agency duly authorized by him to appoint
special policemen for duty upon Federal property under the
jurisdiction of the Federal Works Agency, and for other
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purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318), with the powers set forth in that
section, except that such personnel shall perform such
functions and exercise such powers only within Agency
installations, and the rules and regulations enforced by
such personnel shall be the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Director.
"(b) The Director is authorized to establish penalties
for violations of the rules or regulations promulgated by
the Director under subsection (a) of this section. Such
penalties shall not exceed those specified in the fourth
section of the Act referred to in subsection (a) of this
section (49 U.S.C. 318c).
"(c) Agency personnel designated by the Director under
subsection (a) of this section shall be clearly identifiable
as United States Government security personnel while engaged
in the performance of the functions to which subsection (a)
of this section refers.".
SEC. 501. Section 1114(a) of the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)) is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(5)(A) Financial institutions, and officers,
employees, and agents thereof, shall comply with a
request for a customer's or entity's financial records
made pursuant to this subsection by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation when the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (or the Director's designee)
certifies in writing to the financial institution
that such records ar-e sought for foreign counterintelli-
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gence purposes and that there are specific and articul-
able facts giving reason to believe that the customer
or entity whose records are sought is or may be a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power as defined
in Section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
"(B) The Federal Bureau of Investigation may
disseminate information obtained pursuant to this
paragraph only as provided in guidelines approved by
the Attorney General for foreign intelligence collec-
tion and foreign counterintelligence investigations
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and,
with respect to dissemination to an agency of the
United States, only if such information is clearly
relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such
agency.
"(C) On a semiannual basis the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall fully inform the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate concerning all requests made pusuant to
this paragraph.
"(D) No financial institution, or officer,
employee, or agent of such institution, shall disclose
to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
has sought or obtained access to a customer's or
entity's financial records under this paragraph.".
SEC. 502.(a) Section 9101 of title 5, United States Code,
(1) in paragraph (1) of subsection (b) by striking out "or"
after "Office of Personnel Management" and by inserting ", or
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation" after "the Central
Intelligence Agency;"
(2) in subparagraph (3)(A) of subsection (b) by striking
out "or" after "Office of Personnel Management" and by
inserting ", or the Federal Bureau of Investigation" after "the
Central Intelligence Agency;"
(3) in subparagraph (3) (B) of subsection (b) by striking
out "or" after "Office of Personnel Management" and by
inserting ", or the Federal Bureau of Investigation" after "the
Central Intelligence Agency;" and
(4) in subsection (c) by striking out "or" after "Office of
Personnel Management" and by inserting ", or the Federal Bureau
of Investigation" after "the Central Intelligence Agency."
(b) Section 803(a) of title 8 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1986 is amended by striking
out "and" after "the Office of Personnel Management" and by
inserting ", and the Federal Bureau of Investigation" after
"the Central Intelligence Agency".
(c) The amendments made by this section shall become
effective with respect to any inquiry which begins after the
date of enactment of this Act conducted by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation for purposes specified in paragraph (b) (1) of
section 9101 of title 5, United States Code.
ACCESS TO TELEPHONE TOLL RECORDS
SEC. 503.(a) Chapter 33 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
"SEC. 538. Access to Telephone Toll Records
"(a) A communications common carrier shall comply
with a request for telephone subscriber information or
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toll billing record information by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation when the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (or the Director's designee)
certifies in writing to the communications common
carrier that such information is sought for foreign
counterintelligence purposes and that there are
specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe
that the person or entity to whom the information sought
pertains is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power as defined in Section 101 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
"(b) The Federal Bureau of Investigation may
disseminate information obtained pursuant to this
section only as provided in guidelines approved by the
Attorney General for foreign intelligence collection
and foreign counterintelligence investigations conducted
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and, with
respect to dissemination to an agency of the United
States, only if such information is clearly relevant to
the authorized responsibilities of such agency.
"(c) On a semiannual basis the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall fully inform the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the Senate concerning all requests made
pursuant to this section.
"(d) No communications common carrier, or
officer, employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose
to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion has sought or obtained access to telephone
subscriber information or toll billing record informa-
tion under this section."
(b) The table of contents for chapter 33 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof
the following:
"538. Access to Telephone Toll Records"
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TITLE VI - PROTECTION OF
UNITED STATES INTERESTS
SEC. 601. Section 202(a) (4) of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4302(a)(4)) is amended to
read as follows:
"(4) 'foreign mission' means any mission to or
agency or entity in the United States which is involved
in the diplomatic, consular, or other activities of, or
which is substantially owned or effectively controlled by--
"(A) a foreign government, or
"(B) an organization (other than an international
organization, as defined in section 209(b) of this title)
representing a territory or political entity which has
been granted diplomatic or other official privileges
and immunities under the laws of the United States or
which engages in some aspect of the conduct of the
international affairs of such territory or political
entity,
including any real property of such a mission and
including the personnel of such a mission;".
SEC. 602.(a) (1) It is the policy of the Congress that the
number of nationals of the Soviet Union admitted to the United
States to serve as members of the Soviet mission at the United
Nations headquarters shall not substantially exceed the number
of United States nationals who serve as members of the United
States mission at the United Nations headquarters, unless the
President determines that the admission to the United States of
additional Soviet nationals to serve as members of the Soviet
mission at the United Nations headquarters would be in the
interests of the United States.
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(2) Beginning six months after the date of enactment of
this section, and every six months thereafter, the Secretary
of State shall prepare and transmit to the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives a report setting forth the number of Soviet
nationals admitted during the preceding six-month period
to the United States pursuant to a determination of the
President under paragraph (1) and their duties with
the Soviet mission at the United Nations headquarters.
(3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed as
including any dependent or spouse who is not a member of a
mission at the United Nations headquarters in the calcula-
tion of the number of members of a mission at the United
Nations headquarters.
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary
of State and the Attorney General should, not later than
six months after the date of enactment of this section,
prepare and transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Repre-
sentatives a report setting forth a plan for ensuring that
the number of Soviet nationals described in paragraph
(a)(1) does not exceed the limitation described in that
paragraph.
(c) For purposes of this section--
(1) the terms "members of the Soviet mission"
and "members of the United States mission" are used
within the meaning of the term "members of the mission",
as defined by Article 1(b) of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, done April 18, 1961; and
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(2) the term "mission at the United Nations head-
quarters" of a country includes all the missions of
such country to the United Nations in New York City
and includes missions in New York City to specialized
agencies of the United Nations, as defined in Article
57 of the Charter of the United Nations.
REGISTRATION OF AGENTS OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
SEC. 603. Section 951 of title 18, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
"(e) Notwithstanding paragraph (d)(4), any person
engaged in a legal commercial transaction shall be considered
to be an agent of a foreign government for purposes of this
section if --
(1) such person agrees to operate within the
United States subject to the direction or control of a
foreign government or official; and
(2) such person --
(A) is an agent of the Soviet Union, the
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, or Cuba, unless the
Attorney General, after consultation with the
Secretary of State, determines and so reports to
the Congress that the national security or foreign
policy interests of the United States require that
the provisions of this section do not apply in
specific circumstances to agents of such country;
(B) has been convicted of, or has entered a
plea of nolo contendere with respect to, any
offense under section 792 through 799, 831, or
2381 of this title or under section 11 of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, or is the
employer of such person, except that the provisions
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of this section shall not apply to a person or
employer described in this clause for a period of
more than 5 years beginning on the date of the
conviction or the date of entry of the plea of
nolo contendere, as the case may be.".
TITLE VII - GENERAL PROVISIONS
AUTHORITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 701. The authorization of appropriations by this
Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct
of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
SEC. 702. Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary,
pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or suplemental amounts as may be
necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
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99th Congress REPORT
2nd Session 99-
Authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1987 for intelligence
activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence
Community Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability System (CIARDS), and for other purposes.
(legislative day, ), 1986.-Ordered to be printed
Mr. DURENBERGER, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
REPORT
(To Accompany S. )
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered the
original bill (S. ) authorizing appropriations for fiscal
year 1987 for intelligence activities of the U.S. Government,
the Intelligence Community Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports
favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill
do pass.
This bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1987 for
(a) intelligence activities of the United States, (b) the
Intelligence Community Staff, and (c) the CIA Retirement and
Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings as of September 30,
1987 for (a) the Central Intelligence Agency, (b) the Intelligence
Community Staff, and (c) the other intelligence activities of the
U.S. Government;
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(3) Authorize the Director of Central Intelligence to
make certain personnel ceiling adjustments when necessary to
the performance of important intelligence functions;
(4) Make several legislative changes designed to enhance
intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities and to pro-
mote the more effective and efficient conduct of intelligence
and counterintelligence activities.
OVERALL SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTION
(in millions of dollars)
FY1987
Committee
Fiscal Year
Budget
Committee
Recommended
1986
Request
Recommends
Changes
Intelligence
activities ---------------------------------------------
Intelligence
Community Staff $22.1 $22.9 $ $
CIARDS 101.4 125.8 125.8 -0-
THE CLASSIFIED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT
The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities
prevents the Committee from disclosing the details of its
budgetary recommendations in this Report.
The Committee has prepared a classified supplement to
the Report, which describes the full scope and intent of its
action. The Committee intends that the classified supplement,
although not available to the public, will have the full
force of a Senate Report, and that the Intelligence Community
will comply fully with the limitations, guidelines, directions,
and recommendations contained therein.
The classified supplement to the Committee Report is
available for review by any Member of the Senate, subject
to the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress.
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Committee conducted a detailed review of the Intel-
ligence Community's fiscal year 1987 budget request. This
included:
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-- Hearings involving some 9 hours of testimony from major
consumers of intelligence product, including: the Secretary
of Defense; the Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command;
the Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
-- Hearings involving some 30 hours of testimony from the
principal program managers for U.S. Intelligence, including:
the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence;
the Director, Intelligence Community Staff; the Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security
Agency, senior officials of the Military Departments; the
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Director,
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research;
-- Hearings involving some 9 hours of testimony from senior
Defense tactical intelligence program managers and Directors
of Defense Department and other governmental Security programs;
-- Detailed examination of over 3,000 pages of budget justi-
fication material provided by national and tactical intelli-
gence program managers and all major governmental security
activities;
-- Review of written answers from various officials to
several hundred questions for the record; and,
-- Numerous briefings and interviews with officials on
major topics of interest.
The Committee conducted a long range examination of the
U.S. intelligence system through a careful review of the National
Intelligence Strategy prepared by the Director of Central Intel-
ligence. This Strategy, specifically requested by the Conferees
in conjunction with the Fiscal Year 1986 Intelligence Authorization
Act, projected the challenges and requirements that will face
U.S. intelligence over the next decade, identified the in-
telligence programs and activities necessary to meet those
challenges, and set forth a plan for the acquisition of
needed capabilities taking into account the tight fiscal
environment faced by all government activities.
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During the course of this review, the Committee focused
careful attention on the following major intelligence require-
ments:
-- The provision of detailed information required for the
United States to maintain an effective, assured, nuclear
deterrent in the years ahead;
-- The provision of timely and focused information in
support of U.S. military operations and diplomacy worldwide;
-- The monitoring of foreign events to provide the senior
U.S. policymakers with adequate warning of developments
inimical to U.S. or allied interests, so as to permit de-
velopment of effective policy options; and,
-- Protection of U.S. foreign policy and military activi-
ties from an increasingly sophisticated foreign intelligence
threat.
COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In previous years the Committee has reported its judgment
that intelligence activities must be assigned a very high priority
in overall national security investment. The Congress has heeded
this advice and provided significant increased investment in in-
telligence programs in all but one of the last 7 years. These
investments are now beginning to pay off in the provision of
effective intelligence support in an increasingly dangerous
world environment. However, in order to bring to fruition the
improved intelligence system these investments anticipated, and
develop other new capabilities demanded by the activities of our
adversaries, additional continued investment will be required.
The Committee is deeply concerned about the future health
of U.S. intelligence, largely due to constraints now facing
the Defense budget, where, for reasons of security, Intelligence
programs are financed. In Fiscal Year 1986, Intelligence
Community investment actually declined in real terms, forcing
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the cancellation of a number of important activities and deferral
and stretchout of many others. This situation, coupled with the
tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger and the consequences
arising from the Titan 34D launch vehicle explosion in April 1986,
combine to place U.S. intelligence in its most serious crisis in
decades.
The Committee's review of the DCI's National Intelligence
Strategy, his Fiscal Year 1987 budget request, and the require-
ments levied by the Defense and foreign policy community on
intelligence program managers, convince the Members that Intelli-
gence investment must be protected from arbitrary limits on
government spending in general and Defense spending in particular.
We come to this conclusion with great difficulty and with full
knowledge that similar claims will be made about other government
programs in this time of fiscal constraint. However, it must be
remembered that the secrecy required for the conduct of effective
intelligence and security programs leaves these activities by
necessity with only one constituency; namely, those on the Intel-
ligence Committee who must review intelligence plans behind closed
doors.
The recommendations set forth by the Committee in the
Classified Supplement to this report represent the minim Lin
essential investments that must be made to preserve and im-
prove U.S. Intelligence in a manner consistent with the world
environment facing U.S. national security. This judgment is
objective, bipartisan, and strongly held.
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SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
TITLE I - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101 lists the departments and agencies for whose
intelligence activities the bill authorizes appropriations for
fiscal year 1987.
Section 102 makes clear that, with the exception of sections
201, 202(a), and 301, the amounts authorized to be appropriated
and the personnel ceilings established by the bill for fiscal year
1987 are contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations.
This Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated into the bill
by this section.
The Committee would review with great concern the use of
the Central Intelligence Agency's reserve fund for contingencies
to support covert actions when such proposed actions have not
received the concurrence of at least one of the two intelligence
oversight committees. In the event one of the committees objects
to a program, the President should take that committee's concerns
fully into account in his final decision.
The Committee believes that the Executive branch should not
proceed with a covert action program that is opposed by both in-
telligence committees. If such action were to be taken by the
Administration, the Committee would consider placing statutory
restrictions on use of the reserve fund.
Section 103 permits the Director of Central Intelligence
to authorize the personnel strength of any intelligence element
to exceed its fiscal year 1987 authorized personnel level by no
more than 2 percent if he determines that doing so is necessary
for the performance of important intelligence functions. The
Director must notify the two intelligence committees promptly
of any exercise of authority under the section.
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It is to be emphasized that the authority conveyed by this
section is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of
personnel strength in each or any intelligence component.
Rather, the section provides the Director of Central Intelligence
with flexibility to adjust personnel end strength temporarily
for contingencies and for overages caused by an imbalance between
hiring of new employees and attrition of current employees for
retirement, resignation, etc. The Committee does not expect the
Director of Central Intelligence to allow heads of intelligence
components to plan to exceed personnel levels set in the schedule
of authorizations except for the satisfaction of clearly identified
hiring needs which are consistent with the authorizations of
personnel strengths in this bill. In no case is the authority
in section 103 to be used to provide for positions denied by
the Congress.
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TITLE II - INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
Section 201 authorized the appropriation of 922,338,000
for the Intelligence Community Staff. After careful review
of the budget request, the Committee believes that this amount
is sufficient for the staff to meet its responsibility of pro-
viding the Director of Central Intelligence with staff assis-
tance to carry out his Intelligence Community responsibilities.
The Staff supports the DCI in the execution of his responsibilities
to develop, review, and approve the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Program budget, to evaluate the performance of foreign
intelligence activities, and to develop issues, goals, and
other required guidelines for the Intelligence Community.
Sections 202 and 203 provide certain administrative
authorities for the Intelligence Community Staff. Section
202(a) authorizes full-time personnel for the staff as of Sep-
tember 30, 1987. The Intelligence Community Staff is composed
of a permanent cadre, detailed community personnel, and contract
hirees.
The Intelligence Community Staff is now made up of per-
sonnel who are permanent employees of the Staff and others who
are detailed for several years from various intelligence elements.
The purpose of section 202(b) is to authorize this staff approach
and to require that detailed employees represent all appropriate
elements of the Government.
Section 202(c) requires that personnel be detailed on a
reimbursable basis except for temporary situations. The Staff's
authorized size, in the opinion of the Committee, is sufficient
for the duties which the Staff performs. This provision is
intended to insure that its ranks are not swelled by detailees,
the personnel costs for whom are not reimbursed to their parent
agency.
Section 203 provides that the Director of Central Intel-
ligence shall use certain statutory authority to manage the
activities and to pay the personnel of the Intelligence Community
Staff. However, it is the Committee's intent that in the case
of detailed personnel, the DCI's authority to discharge personnel
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shall only extend to discharging detailed personnel from service
at the Intelligence Community Staff and not from Federal employment
or military service.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
Millions
Full-Time
Personnel
Fiscal year:
1986 program------------------
$21.0
227
1987 program------------------
$22.9
246
Committee recommended change------
S 0.6
-7
Committee recommendation-------
$22.3
TITLE III - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND
DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 301 authorizes appropriations for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS)
in the amount of 9125,800,000 for fiscal year 1987. The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain
Employees (Public Law 88-643) authorized the establishment
of CIARDS for a limited number of Agency employees and auth-
orized the establishment and maintenance of a fund from which
benefits would be paid to qualified beneficiaries.
The benefits structure of CIARDS is essentially the same
as for the Civil Service Retirement System, with several special
provisions. These special CIARDS provisions are: (a) annuities
based upon a straight 2 percent of high 3-year average salary
for each year of service, not exceeding 35; (b) under stipulated
conditions a participant may retire at age 50 with 20 years of
service, or a participant with 25 years of service may be retired
by the Director regardless of age; and (c) retirement is mandatory
at age 65 for personnel receiving compensation at the rate of
GS-18 or above, and at age 60 for personnel receiving compen-
sation at a rate less than GS-18, except that the Director may,
in the public interest, extend service up to 5'years.
Annuities to beneficiaries are provided exclusively from
the CIARDS fund, which is maintained through: (a) contributions,
currently at the rate of 7 percent, deducted from basic salaries
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of participants; (b) matching Agency (employer) contributions
from the appropriation from which salaries are paid, based on the
actual rate of contributions received from participants; (c)
transfers from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund
representing employee and matching employer contributions for
service of Agency employees prior to the date of their participa-
tion in CIARDS, and contributions for service of integrated Agency
employees included in CIARDS following termination of integrated
status; (d) income on investments in U.S. Government securities;
and (e) beginning in 1977, direct appropriations consistent with
the provisions of Public Law 94-552.
Fiscal year:
1986
program--------------------------------
$101.4
1987
request--------------------------------
$125.8
Committee recommended change------------------- -0-
Committee recommendation-------------------- $125.8
TITLE IV - ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS RELATED TO
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Section 401 exempts classified Central Intelligence Agency
and National Security Agency record destruction schedules
from the requirement contained in subsection 3303a of Title
44, United States Code, that the Archivist may approve records
disposal requests only after publication of notice in the Federal
Register and an opportunity for interested persons to submit
comments thereon.
The requirement that the Archivist publish record disposal
requests in the federal Register was added by subsection 204 of
the National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984.
Requiring the Archivist to provide notice in the Federal
Register gives the public an opportunity to comment on the
schedule of records proposed for destruction. While the pur-
pose of the provision was to give the public a role in deter-
mining what records should be destroyed, the legislative history
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makes clear that Congress did "not intend ... for such public
notice to be a paperwork burden for any affected parties or to
unreasonably delay the disposal of such records." (House Report
98-1124, pp. 29-30; this is the Conference Report on the legis-
lation.)
Unfortunately, the requirement for publication in the
Federal Register has become a paperwork burden for CIA and NSA
that has unreasonably delayed disposal of these agencies' re-
cords. The problem arises because the CIA and NSA record
control schedules submitted to the National Archives and Re-
cords Administration (NARA) are classified. NARA has determined
that the Federal Register notice concerning classified records
schedules will be limited to the identity of the requesting
agency, the NARA job number assigned to the schedule, and the
reason the schedule is excluded from public disclosure.
Because CIA and NSA record destruction schedules generally
are classified the statutory requirement that the Archivist
publish notice of them in the Federal Register serves little
purpose. Furthermore, this requirement delays approval by the
Archivist of NSA and CIA record destruction schedules, because
the public is given 60 days to comment on the notice in the
Federal Register. Exempting classified CIA and NSA record
destruction schedules from the provision requiring notice in
the Federal Register of requests to destroy records would
expedite the process of approval of requests to dispose of
records, and would not deprive the public of any meaningful
information. Section 401 would have no affect on unclassified
record disposition schedules.
Section 402 extends by two fiscal years certain authority
of the Secretary of Defense granted by subsection 501(a) of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985, P.L.
98-618. This legislation authorized the Secretary of Defense
to terminate the employment of any civilian officer or employee
of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) whenever such action
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was considered by the Secretary to be in the best interests
of the United States and he determined that the termination
procedures otherwise authorized by law could not be "invoked
in a manner consistent with the national security." As enacted,
paragraph 1604(e)(1) of Chapter 83 of title 10, United States
Code, granted this authority to the Secretary of Defense for
fiscal years 1985 and 1986. Regulations were subsequently
written to implement the authority and are now in the final
stages of coordination within the Department of Defense. The
extension of authority is designed to allow DIA an opportunity
to have two full fiscal years of experience under the imple-
menting regulations. Then, as the end of the extended time
period draws near, a determination can be made as to whether
the termination authority should be modified and/or enacted
into permanent law. The Committee notes with displeasure
that the Department of Defense has taken a year and a half
to come up with regulations to implement a statutory grant
of authority the enactment of which was represented to be
a matter of considerable urgency when the Committee considered
this matter in 1984. Failure to implement such authorities
in a timely fashion subsequent to enactment cannot help but
adversely affect the Committee's attitude toward future
legislative proposals of this kind.
Section 403 clarifies and enacts into permanent law
authority for the Department of Defense, through the Defense
Mapping Agency (DMA), to conduct mapping activities in con-
junction with foreign countries. Currently, DMA has 185 in-
ternational executive agreements with 75 countries concerning the
exchange, collection, and production of mapping data. Some of
these agreements have been in existence since the early 1940's.
Specifically, these agreements permit (1) the exchange of maps,
charts and other geodesic information, (2) co-production and
collection of mapping data, (3) loan of DMA equipment so that
foreign mapping agencies can produce raw data more efficiently
and accurately, (4) DMA training of foreign personnel, and (5)
? access to foreign countries.
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DMA finds it necessary to deal with foreign map agencies
to the extent that U.S. technical collection systems cannot
provide accurate cartographic data. To fill such gaps, DMA
can send teams of U.S. personnel to do necessary work on the
ground. The cost of deployments of U.S. personnel can, how-
ever, be prohibitive. It is far less expensive to use local
foreign mapping agencies. When local mapping personnel are used,
the U.S. sends them the specialized equipment and provides the
necessary training as set forth in the executive agreement.
In exchange, the United States gets significant raw map-
ping data as well as access to the territory of another sover-
eignty. Over the years this has been a low cost, reliable, and
convenient way for DMA to fulfill its mission. It should also
be emphasized that in many instances this is the only practical
way to get mapping data from foreign countries. The data and
other materials provided to the United States through such
agreements is estimated to be valued in excess of $80 million
annually.
The authority of DMA to engage in such arrangements with
other countries has, however, been called into question. Tech-
nically, DMA lacks explicit statutory authority to undertake
these agreements, and it currently relies exclusively on in-
herent executive authority. Recent changes in statutory law
have introduced an element of uncertainty in this reliance. P.L.
97-113 prohibits no-cost loan of defense equipment. In addition,
both the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance
Act require foreign governments to reimburse the Defense De-
partment for any foreign training. Neither the cost avoidance
of DMA's use of foreign personnel, nor the $80 million valuation
of mapping data provided by foreign countries can be calculated
as reimbursement. In combination, these laws render DMA's re-
liance on inherent executive authority as the legal basis for
its international agreements somewhat uncertain. To remedy
this problem section 403 grants DMA explicit statutory authority
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to continue to exchange mapping data, supplies and services
with foreign countries.
Section 404 provides DIA with authority to pay for nec-
essary medical evacuations of DIA civilian employees stationed
overseas. Section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1984, P.L. 98-215, authorized allowances and
benefits for certain employees of DIA stationed overseas com-
parable to those provided to officers and employees of the
Foreign Service serving overseas. However, the authority to
pay the costs or expenses incurred for a medical evacuation
of a civilian employee when there is no suitable person or
facility in the overseas locality to provide necessary medical
care was not included in the list of benefits provided by sec-
tion 501. The authorities in section 501 of P.L. 98-215 were
reenacted as Section 1605 of title 10, United States Code, by
subsection (a) of section 1302 of the Department of Defense
Authorization Act, 1986, P.L. 99-145. The medical evacuation
authority is currently available with respect to Foreign Service
officers and employees, and to CIA and NSA civilian employees
(see section 4 of the CIA Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. 403(e) and
paragraph 9(b)(1) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959,
50 U.S.C. 402 note, respectively). While it is fortunate that
there is rarely the need to have such authority, DIA has
experienced necessary medical evacuations of its civilian
employees stationed overseas. Should similar circumstances
arise in the future, payment for medical evacuation of DIA
civilian employees should be handled on the same basis as for
other civilian intelligence and diplomatic employees similarly
situated.
Section 405 would permit the use of proceeds from military
counterintelligence operations to offset necessary and reason-
able expenses incurred in these kinds of operations. Current
law (31 U.S.C. 3302) can be interpreted to require that funds
paid by a foreign counterintelligence service to a counterin-
telligence double agent must be deposited in the U.S. Treasury.
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However, the established practice by counterintelligence
components of the U.S. military has been to use such funds
for double agent operations.
An opinion by the General Counsel of the Defense Depart-
ment advises that under current permanent law the proceeds
from double agent operations should be paid into the Treasury.
Legislation is therefore required to make clear that money
paid by foreign counterintelligence services to our military
counterintelligence double agents can be used to,defray
reasonable and necessary operational expenses. Such usage
is important to operational security, maintenance of agent
bona fides, and for compensating double agents for legitimate
expenses associated with operational activity. Section 405
also will avoid having to use appropriated funds to pay opera-
tional expenses that have previously been defrayed by using
money paid to double agents by foreign intelligence services.
An exemption from 31 U.S.C. 3302 for fiscal year 1986
was enacted for Defense counterintelligence components under
Section 701 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1986. Section 405 makes this provision permanent.
Section 406 provides survivor benefits for certain former
spouses of CIA employees who did not benefit from the Central
Intelligence Agency Spouses' Retirement Equity Act of 1982
(P.L. 97-269, Title VI) because they were divorced prior to
the effective date of that Act (November 15, 1982).
The CIA Spouses' Retirement Equity Act granted certain
former spouses of CIA employees a presumptive entitlement,
subject to revision by spousal agreement or by State courts
in divorce proceedings, to a pro rata share of the employees'
retirement annuities, survivor benefits, and lump-sum dis-
bursements paid from the retirement fund. Former spouses
qualified for the presumptive entitlement were those married
to a CIA employee during at least ten years of the employee's
creditable government service, at least five years of which
they spent outside the United States. The Congress provided
the benefits to these spouses in recognition of their years
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of support of the unusual professional activities abroad of
their CIA employee spouses and their own direct contributions
to fulfillment of the mission of the CIA. Both the require-
ments of their support to their CIA employee spouses and their
direct contributions often prevented the former spouse from
acquiring marketable job skills and pension rights and imposed
familial pressures and tensions which often contributed to
the breakdown of their marriages.
When the Committee considered the legislation which became
the CIA Spouses' Retirement Equity Act, it noted that, because
the benefits of the Act were prospective only, spouses divorced
prior to the effective date of the Act would not benefit, despite
their important contribution. The committee noted that "...
at some future date the Congress may wish to consider providing
additional benefits to this group in recognition of their im-
portant service." (S. Rept. 97-484, p. 15) The Committee believes
that the time has arrived to provide to this group of former spouses
of CIA personnel the benefits they deserve and thus includes Section
407 in the bill.
Section 406(a) adds a new Section 224 to the Central In-
telligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees
(50 U.S.C. 403 note) to provide survivor benefits for certain
former spouses of CIA personnel divorced prior to November 15, 1982.
Section 224(a) of the CIA Retirement Act as contained in the
bill provides a survivor annuity to a "former spouse" of a CIA
employee who was a participant or former participant in the CIA
Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS), if they were divorced
prior to November 15, 1982, the effective date of the CIA Spouses'
Retirement Equity Act of 1982. The term "former spouse" as defined
in Section 224(b) of the CIA Retirement Act includes only a
former wife or husband of a present or former CIARDS parti-
cipant who was married to the participant during at least
10 years of his creditable service, at least 5 years of
which were spent together outside the United States. The
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survivor annuity is paid in an amount equal to 55% of the
greater of (1) the full amount of the present or former
participant's annuity or (2) the full amount of what the
present or former participant's annuity would have been
if not for the participant's withdrawl of lump-sum portions
of contributions made with respect to the participant's
annuity; the amount is reduced by the amount of any federal
government annuity (other than Social Security benefits) the
former spouse receives that is attributable to the former
spouse's own employment by the United States.
Section 224(b) of the CIA Retirement Act as contained
in the bill disqualifies an otherwise qualified former spouse
from receiving the survivor annuity benefit if (1) the present
or former participant to whom the former spouse was married
has elected under Section 223 of the CIA Retirement Act to
provide a survivor annuity to the former spouse, (2) the
former spouse remarries before age 55, or (3) the former spouse
is less than 50 years of age.
Section 224(c) of the CIA Retirement Act as contained in
the bill specifies rules for determining the dates upon which
the survivor annuities to former spouses shall commence and
terminate and provides for application to the Director of Central
Intelligence for such annuities.
Section 224(d) of the CIA Retirement Act as contained in
the bill requires the DCI to issue implementing regulations and,
to the extent practicable, notify former spouses of their rights
under Section 224. Regulations issued by DCI under Section 224(d)
will be submitted to the intelligence committee of the Congress
before they take effect, as required by Section 201(a) of the CIA
Retirement Act.
Section 406(b) of the bill makes a conforming amendment
to Section 14(a) of the CIA Act of 1949 to ensure that former
spouses of CIA employees who participated in a federal retire-
ment system other than the CIA Retirement and Disability System
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(CIARDS), receive the same benefits as former spouses of CIA
employees who participated in the CIARDS on the same basis.
The same benefit eligibility requirements regarding years of
marriage and overseas service that applied under the CIA Spouses'
Retirement Equity Act of 1982 apply to benefits for former
spouses of both CIARDS and non-CIARDS employees under the amend-
ments made by Section 407.
Section 406(c) provides for funding the survivor benefits
granted by the amendments to the CIA Retirement Act of 1964
for Certain Employees and the CIA Act of 1949 by subsections
407(a) and (b).
Section 406(d) provides an effective date of October 1, 1986
for the amendments made by section 407 to the CIA Retirement
Act of 1964 for Certain Employees and the CIA Act of 1949.
Section 407 adds a new Section 16 to the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 permitting a former spouse of a CIA employee
to enroll in a federal employee health benefits plan (see chapter
89 of title 5, United States Code) if they were divorced prior
to May 7, 1985. To qualify, the former spouse must have been
married to the CIA employee during at least 10 years of the
employee's creditable service, at least 5 years of which were
spent together outside the United States, and must have been
covered under a federal health benefits plan as a member of the
family of the CIA employee at some time during the 18 month
period before the divorce or annulment became final. The
eligible former spouse need not enroll in the same plan as
that which covered the spouse at some time during that 18
month period.
The eligible former spouse may enroll for self alone
or self and family during a special enrollment period beginning
on the date of enactment of this legislation and ending 6 months
thereafter, except that the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management shall waive the 6 month limitation when the Director
of Central Intelligence notifies him that circumstances so warrant.
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The legislation disqualifies an otherwise eligible for-
mer spouse from enrolling in a health plan if (1) the spouse
remarries before age 55 or (2) the spouse already is enrolled
in a federal health benefits plan.
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management is
to prescribe the regulations for enrollment and payment by
eligible former spouses. The DCI will determine the identities
and addresses of eligible former spouses and notify them of
their health plan benefit rights.
The Committee limited the eligibility for health plan
enrollment under this section to former spouses divorced prior
to May 7, 1985 because similarly situated former spouses
divorced after that date are eligible already for such bene-
fits under the Civil Service Spouse Retirement Equity Act of
1984 (P.L. 98-615).
For health plan coverage under the amendment made by
Section 407 the former spouse pays both the amount a federal
employee would pay for the same benefit and the amount that
the federal government would contribute on behalf of the
federal employee. Thus, since the former spouses pay the
equivalent of both an employee's contribution and the govern-
ment's associated contribution, the former spouses receive the
health plan benefit at no cost to the government, other than
incidental costs associated with administration.
Section 408 enacts a new section 11 to the National Security
Agency Act of 1959 to provide for effective physical security of
NSA installations within-the United States. Currently, officers
of the Federal Protective Service of the General Services Admin-
istration (GSA) provide physical security at NSA facilities.
For a number of reasons, the General Services Administration
has been unable to handle this function adequately. It would
be preferable for NSA to assume from GSA responsibility for
the physical security of NSA installations. Section 408
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grants to NSA physical security personnel powers currently
exercised by GSA personnel performing that function. Thus,
Section 408 will enable the NSA to assume from the General
Services Administration responsibility for physical security
at NSA installations.
NSA expects to realize significant budget savings by
providing its own physical security in lieu of paying GSA
to do so. I t is expected that NSA physical security personnel
positions will be counted within the authorized end-strengths
for NSA personnel provided in the annual intelligence authori-
zation acts.
The transfer of physical security authority and respon-
sibility from GSA to NSA could be accomplished by GSA delegating
its authority to the CIA. The Departments of Justice, Labor,
and Transportation, for example, provide their own physical
security under delegations of authority from GSA. The Committee
believes, however, that it is more appropriate to provide a
clear legislative grant of these powers to NSA physical security
personnel.
Section 408 will give NSA physical security personnel
designated by the Director the same limited law enforcement
powers that GSA special policemen, which is the statutory term
for Federal Protection Officers, currently possess under Section
318 of title 40, United States Code. NSA physical security
personnel will have those limited powers only when they are
within the boundaries of installations owned, leased, occupied,
or otherwise used by the NSA.
Under Section 408, the Director of the National Security
Agency is authorized to issue rules and regulations with respect
to NSA property and to establish penalties for their violation.
Designated NSA security personnel will be responsible for en-
forcing such rules and regulations. It is expected that the
Director will adopt regulations which are as similar as possible
to those promulgated by the Administrator of General Services
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with'respect to other federal installations, consistent with
the functions and requirements of NSA installations. Section
408 specifies that the penalties established by the Director
for violations of the rules and regulations promulgated with
respect to NSA installations shall not exceed those specified
in 40 U.S.C. 318(c) with respect to.other federal installations.
Section 408 requires that NSA security personnel performing
the physical security functions at NSA installations be clearly
identifiable as United States Government security personnel.
This requirement ensures that members of the public entering
upon any NSA installations will have due notice of the legal
authority of the designated NSA physical security personnel.
Section 408 will enable NSA guards to stop, detain, and
question persons found on Agency property without reasonable
explanation, and to conduct physical searches and make arrests
on Agency facilities in appropriate circumstances. But the
limited authority conferred by Section 408 does not extend
beyond Agency facilities. For example, NSA security officers
would not be empowered under section 408 to conduct physical
searches of persons and property located outside Agency pre-
mises in connection with an investigation of stolen classified
documents. Nor does secton 408 authorize any expansion of
Agency intelligence collection activities that are governed
by Executive Order 12333 and related procedures.
It is expected that the Director will submit any regula-
tions he may adopt pursuant to section 408 to the intelligence
committees at least 30 days before they are intended to become
effective.
It also is expected that the Agency will give prior notice
to the intelligence committees before deploying its own guards
to any locations other than the NSA headquarters complex.
Present section 11 of the National Security Agency Act
authorizes the Director of NSA to call upon the GSA to provide
the Agency with FPS guards, and 40 U.S.C. subsection 318(b)
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authorizes the GSA to provide such guards when called upon
to do so. Section 408 repeals existing section 11 and sub-
stitutes a new section as described above.
The new section 11 of the NSA Act is patterned directly
on section section 15 of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 503o),
which was enacted in section 401 of the Fiscal Year 1985
Intelligence Authorization Act.
COAST GUARD ATTACHES
The Committee endorses the assignment of Coast Guard per-
sonnel to Defense Attache Offices whenever their assignment
can help obtain information important to the Attaches' respon-
sibilities. Coast Guard personnel assigned in this manner
will be subject to all applicable provisions of law and the
provisions of E.O. No. 12,333 on intelligence activities, and
fully accountable to the Committee for oversight purposes.
TITLE V - ENHANCED FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
The Select Committee on Intelligence announced in June, 1985,
that it was conducting a comprehensive review of the Soviet in-
telligence threat and U.S. counterintelligence and security pro-
grams. As part of the review, the Committee held a series of
closed hearings to examine the nature and extent of the hostile
intelligence threat and the need for improvements in U.S. counter-
intelligence and security programs. In response to Members'
requests, FBI Director Webster agreed to submit proposals for
new legislation necessary to enhance the FBI's counterintelli-
gence capabilities. Director Webster identified as the FBI's
highest priorities: (1) improved access to financial records
in counterintelligence investigations; (2) improved access to
telephone toll records in counterintelligence investigations;
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and (-3) improved access to state and local criminal records
in background investigations. The Administration subsequently
endorsed these proposals, which are the basis for the pro-
visions of this title to enhance FBI counterintelligence
authorities.
FINANCIAL RECORDS
Section 501 amends Section 1114(a) of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)) to grant
the FBI authority to obtain a customer's or entity's records
from a financial institution for counterintelligence purposes
if the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (or
the Director's designee) finds that there are specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the customer
or entity is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). The FBI bears primary responsibility
for counterintelligence in the United States and thus devotes
substantial resources to countering espionage activities and
international terrorism activities of hostile foreign powers.
For hostile foreign powers to create, support, and operate
an espionage network or terrorist network takes money. Financial
records relating to espionage or terrorist activities can pro-
vide the FBI with the information it needs to prevent such ac-
tivities or render them ineffective. The FBI does not currently
possess mandatory authority for access to the financial records
of foreign powers and their agents under the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.), which governs
access to customers' records held by financial institutions.
Section 501 provides the mandatory access the FBI needs to
perform its counterintelligence functions effectively.
(United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)) In response
to the Supreme Court's decision, the Congress enacted the
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) of 1978 (12 U.S.C.
3401 et seq.). That Act generally provides that, when the
Government seeks the records of a customer of a financial
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institution which are relevant to a legitimate law enforce-
ment inquiry, it must employ a subpoena or formal written
request reviewable in court, or obtain a search warrant.
Thus, the customer receives notice of the Government's re-
quest for the records and an opportunity to contest the
Government's request in court.
In contrast to the general provisions of the RFPA which
require notice to the customer of a governmental request for
records and an opportunity to litigate, Section 1114(a) of
the RFPA governing intelligence and counterintelligence agencies'
requests for financial records does not provide for notice
and an opportunity to litigate and, indeed, prohibits financial
institutions from giving notice to the customers whose records
are requested. The FBI could not effectively monitor and
counter the clandestine activities of hostile espionage agents
and terrorists if it had to notify them that the FBI sought
their financial records for a counterintelligence investigation.
Currently under Section 1114(a) of the RFPA, to gain access
to financial records for counterintelligence investigations, the
FBI issues a letter, called a "national security letter," signed
by an appropriate supervisory official and certifying compliance
with the applicable provisions of the RFPA, seeking financial
records relevant to FBI counterintelligence activities. The
RFPA requires the financial institution receiving the request
to keep secret that the FBI sought or obtained access to the
records. Section 1114 currently does not, however, mandate that
financial institutions comply with FBI requests for access to
the financial records under the intelligence provisions of the
RFPA; it merely permits the banks to do so if they so choose,
without regard to other provisions of the RFPA.
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The FBI has stated that most financial institutions co-
operate with the FBI in making financial records available
in accordance with Section 1114(a) of the RFPA. However,
the FBI has advised the Committee that in certain significant
instances, financial institutions have declined to grant the
FBI access to financial records in response to requests under
Section 1114(a). The FBI informed the Committee that the
problem occurs particularly in States which have State con-
stitutional privacy protection provisions or State banking
privacy laws. In those States, financial institutions decline
to grant the FBI access because State law prohibits them from
granting such access and the RFPA, since it permits but does
not mandate such access, does not override State law. In such
a situation, the concerned financial institutions which might
otherwise desire to grant the FBI access to a customer's records
will not do so, because State law does not allow such cooperation,
and cooperation might expose them to liability to the customer
to whose records the FBI sought access. Section 501, by pro-
viding for mandatory FBI access to a customer's or entity's
financial records for counterintelligence purposes in certain
circumstances, preempts State law to the contrary which otherwise
would not permit such access. The mandatory nature of the pro-
visions also protects financial institutions from the possibility
of liability to customers or entities under State privacy law.
The Committee notes also that financial institutions located
in the United States which are organized or doing business in
foreign countries may be subject to, or may believe themselves
to be subject to, foreign bank secrecy laws. The Committee
intends that the mandatory provisions contained in section 501
of the bill override conflicting foreign law.
Section 501 amends Section 1114(a) of the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)) by addipg to it a new
paragraph(5).
Paragraph 1114(a)(5)(A) as added by section 501 provides
that financial institutions shall comply with an FBI request
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for access to financial records upon receiving the certificate
in writing of the Director of the FBI (or the Director's designee)
that the FBI seeks the records for foreign counterintelligence
purposes and that there are specific and articulate facts giving
reason to believe that the customer or entity whose records
are sought is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). The provision provides for mandatory access
to financial records not only of a "customer" (which under the
limited definition in Section 1105 of the RFPA includes only
individuals and partnerships of five or fewer individuals),
but also to records of an "entity," which includes all forms
of organization, such as partnerships, associations, corpora-
tions, and governments. The term "foreign counterintelligence
purposes" includes both the purpose of countering the intelli-
gence activities of foreign powers and their agents and the
purpose of countering international terrorist activities.
The Committee expects that, if the Director of the FBI
delegates his function under this provision for mandatory
access, he will delegate it no further down the FBI chain of
command than the level of Deputy Assistant Director.
The new mandatory FBI authority for counterintelligence
access to records is in addition to, and leaves in place,
the existing non-mandatory scheme for FBI access under Sec-
tion 1114(a)(1). Although the existing FBI non-mandatory
authority under Section 1114(a) to request a customer's
financial records for counterintelligence activities ap-
parently implicitly requires only that such records be
relevant to such activities regardless of the status or
activities of the customer, the Committee believes it im-
portant in establishing the additional authority for mandatory
FBI access to limit that mandatory authority to use only
to obtain a customer's or entity's records when there are
specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe
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that-the customer is or may be a foreign power or an agent of
a foreign power. The Committee notes that the requirement of
"reason to believe" that the customer is or may be a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power is less stringent than the
requirement of "probable cause." Statutes and executive orders
governing intelligence activities have used the "probable cause"
standard when intelligence methods or techniques the govern-
ment proposes to use intrude into zones of privacy protected
by the fourth amendment. Since, as the Miller case held,
governmental access to a customer's financial records held
by a bank does not implicate a constitutionally protected
right of privacy, the Committee concluded that the "probable
cause" standard was not warranted. Nevertheless, the Com-
mittee believed that satisfaction of an elevated standard
should be a predicate for mandatory FBI access to financial
records, in light of the judgment of the Congress embodied
in the RFPA that financial records should be afforded a measure
of privacy against governmental inquiry. Accordingly, the
Committee agreed to require a determination that there are
specific and articulable facts giving "reason to believe" that
the customer or entity whose records the FBI seeks is or may be
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
Paragraph 1114(a)(5)(B) of the RFPA as added by section
501 of the bill provides that the FBI may disseminate infor-
mation obtained pursuant to the mandatory access provisions
only as provided in the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI
Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence
Investigations, and, with respect to dissemination to an agency
of the United States, such as another federal law enforcement
or intelligence agency, only if the FBI determines that such
information is clearly relevant to the authorized responsi-
bilities of such agency. The requirement of clear relevancy
for dissemination to another federal agency ensures that the
FBI will not automatically and routinely disseminate infor-
mation the FBI obtains from a customer's or entity's financial
? records using the mandatory procedures.
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-Paragraph 1114(a)(5)(C) of the RFPA as added by section
501 of the bill requires the FBI Director to report semiannually
to the intelligence committees of the Congress concerning all
FBI requests for access to financial records made pursuant to
the mandatory provisions added to the RFPA by Section 501.
This reporting requirement is in addition to the requirements
contained in Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, which
concerns congressional oversight of intelligence activities.
The report should follow the model of the semiannual report
required under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Paragraph 1114(a)(5)(D) ensures that no financial institution,
or officer, employee, or agent of such institution, will dis-
close to anyone that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
sought or obtained access to a customer's or entity's financial
records under the mandatory access provisions. The effective
conduct of FBI counterintelligence activities requires such
non-disclosure. The Committee expects the FBI, in implementing
the new mandatory authority, to ensure that certificates executed
pursuant to Paragraph 1114(a)(5)(A) by the Director of the FBI
(or his designee) and shown to a financial institution to gain
access to records, remain on file with the FBI, both to satisfy
internal and congressional oversight needs and to provide pro-
tection from any possible legal liability for the financial
institution.
STATE AND LOCAL CRIMINAL RECORDS
Section 502 would allow access for the FBI to state and
local criminal records for national security purposes similar
to that granted to the CIA, DOD, and OPM in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986. The FBI has also
faced difficulties in recent years in obtaining criminal re-
cords information from state and local agencies for purposes
of conducting background investigations, primarily because
of state and local legislation triggered by, and similar to,
the Privacy Act.
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An example of the difficulty in obtaining criminal
history record information for purposes of conducting a
background investigation can be found in one State where
the FBI's offices have been precluded from access to the
criminal justice information system for the purpose of
conducting background investigations because the State's
Department of Justice has interpreted the State's Freedom
of Information/Privacy Acts, which prohibit use of infor-
mation developed by law enforcement agencies for other than
law enforcement purposes, to exclude background investiga-
tions from the realm of law enforcement purposes. Even
with a release from the applicant, some information has
been withheld.
Other states have similar laws restricting the use of
criminal record information for employment purposes. To date
these laws have not been interpreted to preclude FBI access
to the records for the purpose of conducting background in-
vestigations. There is no guarantee, however, that these
states may not take a different position in the future. A
change in position by these states to deny the FBI these
records could drastically reduce the ability of the FBI to
obtain complete criminal record information for background
investigations.
To address these current and potential problems section
502 adds the FBI to those agencies entitled under section
9101 of title 5, United States Code, to obtain access to
state and local criminal history records. This will ensure
that the FBI can adequately fulfill its responsibilities
in conducting background investigations.
TELEPHONE TOLL RECORDS
Section 503 amends chapter 33 of title 28, United States
Code, to grant the FBI authority to obtain telephone sub-
scriber information or toll billing record information from
a communications common carrier for counterintelligence pur-
poses if the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(or the Director's designee) finds that there are specific and
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articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or
entity to whom the information sought pertains is or may be a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power as defined in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
The legislative history of the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act explains the vital importance to the FBI of in-
formation about the communications used by persons engaged in
espionage or international terrorism. That Act provides
authority for the FBI to monitor such communications by acquiring
the contents of a wire communication or by other means that
would require a warrant for law enforcement purposes. The FBI
does not currently possess any similar mandatory authority for
access to telephone subscriber information or toll billing record
information. Section 503 provides the mandatory access the FBI
needs to perform its counterintelligence functions effectively.
The FBI has stated that most communications common carriers
cooperate voluntarily with the FBI in making available telephone
subscriber information or toll billing record information. Cur-
rently, to gain access to such records, the FBI issues a letter,
called a "national security letter," signed by an appropriate
supervisory official and seeking telephone subscriber information
or toll billing record information relevant to FBI counterintelli-
gence activities. Pursuant to an agreement reached approximately
ten years ago between the Department of Justice and AT&T, national
security letters are generally sufficient to provide access to
such information without use of suboenas in counterintelligence
investigations. However, the FBI has advised the Committee that
in certain significant instances, communications common carriers
have declined to grant the FBI access to such records. The FBI
informed the Committee that the problem occurs particularly in
States which have laws or regulatory bodies prohibiting communi-
cations common carriers from granting such access.
Section 503, by providing for mandatory FBI access to tele-
phone subscriber information or toll billing record information
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for counterintelligence purposes in certain circumstances, pre-
empts State laws or regulatory orders to the contrary which
otherwise would not permit such access. The mandatory nature
of the provisions also protects communications common carriers
from the possibility of liability under State privacy law.
Section 503 amends chapter 33 of title 28, United States
Code, by adding to it a new section 538 on "Counterintelligence
Access to Telephone Toll Records."
Subsection 538(a) as added by section 503 of the bill pro-
vides that communications common carriers shall comply with an
FBI request for access to telephone subscriber information or
toll billing record information upon receiving the certificate
in writing of the Director of the FBI (or the Director's designee)
that the FBI seeks the records for foreign counterintelligence
purposes and that there are specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that the person or entity to whom the infor-
mation sought pertains is or may be a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). The term "entity" includes all forms
of organizations, such as partnerships, associations, corporations,
and governments. The term "foreign counterintelligence purposes"
includes both the purpose of countering the intelligence activities
of foreign powers and their agents and the purpose of countering
international terrorist and activities.
The Committee expects that, if the Director of the FBI dele-
gates his function under this provision, he will delegate it no
further down the FBI the chain of command than the level of Deputy
Assistant Director. The Committee also recognizes that the Director
may delegate to the head or acting head of an FBI field office the
authority to make the required certification in exigent circum-
stances where time is of the essence, provided that the Director
is notified as soon as possible of the circumstances involved.
The new mandatory FBI authority for counterintelligence
access to records is in addition to, and leaves in place, existing
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non-mandatory arrangements for FBI access based on voluntary
agreement of communications common carriers. Although the
existing FBI non-mandatory arrangements require only that
a "national security letter" state that the requested in-
formation is relevant to FBI counterintelligence activities
regardless of the status or activities of the person to whom
the information pertains, the Committee believes it important
in establishing the additional authority for mandatory FBI
access to limit that mandatory authority to use only to obtain
records where there are specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that the person or entity to whom the infor-
mation sought pertains is or may be a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power. The Committee notes that the requirement of
"reason to believe" is less stringent than the requirement of
"probable cause" which is used as the standard for authorization
of electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. The federal courts have not required
either a judicial warrant or a probable cause standard for
access to telephone subscriber information or toll billing
record information. Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the
Press v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 949 (1979). The Committee believes that both First
and Fourth Amendment principles are fully satisfied by requiring
a determination that there are specific and articulable facts
giving "reason to believe" that the person or entity to whom
the information sought by the FBI pertains is or may be a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power. The meaning of "reason
to believe" in section 503 is the same as in section 501.
In addition, the Committee recognizes that in some circum-
stances the target of an investigation may use the telephone
of another person. Therefore, the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act authorizes the surveillance of a,telephone line
based on its use by a foreign agent, whether or not the tele-
phone is listed in the foreign agent's name. For the same
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reason, section 503 authorizes access to telephone subscriber
information or toll billing record information which pertains
to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power who is believed
to use a particular telephone, whether or not the telephone is
listed in the name of the foreign power or agent of a foreign
power.
Subsection 538(b) as added by section 503 of the bill pro-
vides that the FBI may disseminate information obtained pursuant
to the mandatory access provisions only as provided in the
Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection
and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations, and, with respect
to dissemination to an agency of the United States, such as another
federal law enforcement or intelligence agency, only if the FBI
determines that such information is clearly relevant to the auth-
orized responsibilities of such agency. The requirement of clear
relevancy for dissemination to another federal agency ensures
that the FBI will not automatically and routinely disseminate
telephone subscriber information or toll billing record informa-
tion the FBI obtains from a communications common carrier using
the mandatory procedures.
Subsection 538(c) as added by section 503 of the bill requires
the FBI Director to report semiannually to the intelligence
committees of the Congress concerning all FBI requests for access
to telephone subscriber information or toll billing record infor-
mation made pursuant to the mandatory provisions added to title
28 by section 503. This reporting requirement is in addition to
the requirements contained in Title V of the National Security Act
of 1947, which concerns congressional oversight of intelligence
activities. The report should follow the model of the semiannual
report required under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Subsection 538(d) ensures that no communications common
carrier, or officer, employee, or agent thereof, will disclose
to anyone that the FBI has sought or obtained access to telephone
subscriber information or toll billing record information under
the mandatory access provisions. The effective conduct of FBI
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counterintelligence activities requires such non-disclosure.
The Committee expects the FBI, in implementing the new mandatory
authority, to ensure that certificates executed pursuant to
subsection 538(a) by the Director of the FBI (or his designee)
and shown to a communications common carrier to gain access to
information, remain on file with the FBI, both to satisfy in-
ternal and congressional oversight needs and to provide protection
from any possible legal liability for the communications common
carrier.
TITLE VI -- PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES INTERESTS
Since 1984, the Committee has sought the establishment of
national policies to restrict the presence in the United States
of intelligence officers from the Soviet Union and other nations
whose intelligence activities within the United States are con-
trary to our national interests. The Intelligence Authorization
Act for FY 1985 contained a requirement that the President submit
annual reports on the numbers and treatment of official repre-
sentatives in the United States from those countries and on the
numbers and treatment of U.S. representatives in those countries.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1986 contained a provision
offered by Senators Leahy and Cohen which established a policy that
the number of Soviet embassy and consular officials in the United
States should be substantially equivalent to the number of U.S.
embassy and consular officials in the USSR. The fundamental pur-
pose of these provisions was to achieve, through a policy of equiv-
alence, a lessening of the burdens placed on FBI counterintelligence
by the large number of intelligence officers operating under official
cover in the United States.
While the Administration has taken some steps in this direction,
the Committee is very disappointed with the response to the
two legislative requirements. The first Presidential report
under the FY 1985 Act was due in November, 1985, but has not
yet been submitted to the Committee. The Committee has re-
ceived from the Secretary of State and the Attorney General
the plan for achieving "substantial equivalence" between
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U.S. and Soviet embassy and consular officials, but the plan
does not meet the intent of the Committee as set forth in
the Committee Report on the FY 1986 Act. The Report stated
that the Executive branch should develop "an approach for
attaining equivalence within a reasonable time through
attrition of Soviet personnel in the United States, an in-
crease in the number of American personnel in the Soviet
Union, or a combination of both." The plan submitted to
the Committee fails to reduce the number of Soviet embassy
and consular officials in the United States. Instead, the
plan provides for an increase in the numerical ceiling on
Soviet personnel on the grounds that the Soviets need additional
positions for their new consulate in New York. Any additional
staffing required for the New York consulate should be ac-
complished within the current 320 ceiling, and the ceiling
itself should be gradually reduced by attrition.
To carry forward these efforts, the Committee is proposing
three additional initiatives in this bill to control the hostile
intelligence presence by broadening the scope of the Foreign
Missions Act, by establishing a policy of "substantial equiv-
alence" for the Soviet and U.S. Missions to the United Nations,
and by requiring the registration of foreign-controlled com-
mercial enterprises most likely to serve as cover for hostile
intelligence or technology transfer operations.
FOREIGN MISSIONS ACT AMENDMENT
Section 601 contains the text of S. 1947, a bill introduced
by Chairman Durenberger and Vice Chairman Leahy in December, 1985,
to enhance the protection of United States interests under the
Foreign Missions Act.
The legislation is designed to ensure that the national
security interests of the United States are sa-feguarded from the
activities of corporations or other commercial entities controlled
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by foreign elements hostile to our country. Section 601 would
clarify the definition of "foreign mission" in the Foreign Missions
Act so as to remove any doubt that such commercial entities can be
subjected to the controls in that act.
The adversaries of the United States have become adept at
using commercial cover and business dealings for espionage pur-
poses. The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations focused on counterintelligence
issues throughout 1985. Senator Roth, the chairman of the Committee
on Governmental Affairs and of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, and Senator Nunn, the ranking minority member
of that subcommittee, also are members of the Intelligence
Committee, and there was excellent cooperation between
the committees as both sought to identify, in concert with
the executive branch, actions that could be taken to improve
U.S. counterintelligence and security protections.
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`A number of important steps were taken during 1985, including
an expansion of the Foreign Missions Act definition of "foreign
mission" that was included in section 127 of the Foreign Re-
lations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 (Public
Law 99-93, August 16, 1985). That change substituted the phrase
"mission to or agency in" for the more restrictive term "official
mission." Thus, while there may have been ambiguity previously,
it now is clear that Foreign Missions Act controls can be applied
to Soviet and Warsaw Pact state trading organizations such as the
Soviet company AMTORG, because such organizations clearly are
foreign government agencies performing governmental activities.
The remaining problem involves commercial entities that
may not fall under the rubric of an agency or may not, at least
ostensibly, be involved in diplomatic, consular, or other govern-
mental activities, even if they are owned or controlled by foreign
governments or organizations. The record indicates that such
commercial entities are capable of engaging in or providing cover
for activities just as inimical to the United States as some of
the activities of state trading companies.*
In order to prevent potentially dangerous commercial
establishments from continuing to avoid Foreign Missions Act
controls, section 601 makes several changes in the act's
definition of "foreign missions." First the phrase "or
entity" is added, so that the definition would state that
foreign mission means any mission to or agency or entity in
the United States. This would permit commercial establishments
to be designated as "foreign missions" by categorizing them as
"entities" rather than as missions or agencies. Next, section 601
would strike the word "governmental" from the text above clause
(A) in 22 U.S.C. 4302(a)(4) and substitute the phrase "which is
is involved in" for the word "involving." This change would
enable commercial entities to be subject to Foreign Missions
Act restrictions on the basis of their involvement in any
----------------------
* See discussion of section 603, requiring that agents of
Soviet bloc nations who are engaged in business register
with the Attorney General. This provision is designed
? to enable counterintelligence agencies to identify and
accumulate information about such commercial entities.
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"activities" of a foreign government or organization; the
current redundent and confusing specification that such activi-
ties must be diplomatic, consular, or governmental would be
eliminated. Finally, the phrase "or which is substantially
owned or effectively controlled by" is added to the definition,
so that a commercial entity can also be subjected to Foreign
Missions Act restrictions strictly on the basis of an ownership
or control test.
The Committee believes that these changes are advisable
to clarify the ability of the Secretary of State to apply
Foreign Missions Act controls to commercial entities operating
in the United States which are involved in the activities of
foreign governments or organizations, or which are owned or
controlled by such governments or organizations. It is clear
that certain of these commercial establishments may be per-
forming activities which pose a threat to U.S. national
security. Those charged with defending U.S. interests must
have the tools that they need to deal effectively with such
threats.
It should be emphasized that section 601 would not require
application of Foreign Missions Act controls to any commercial
establishment. Instead the amendment made by section 601 would
enable the Secretary of State to apply such controls in appro-
priate circumstances. Thus, commercial establishments engaged
exclusively in legitimate business activities will not be affected.
Section 601 would impact only on commercial establishments whose
activities on behalf of foreign governments or organizations are
inimical to U.S. national security interests.
SOVIET MISSION AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Section 602 expresses the policy of Congress that the num-
ber of Soviet nationals admitted to the United States to serve
as members of the Soviet Missions at the United Nations (SMUN)
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shall not substantially exceed the number of U.S. personnel who
serve as members of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. The
U.S. government can, of course, easily increase the U.S. staff
available for work in connection with activities at U.N. Head-
quarters by assigning personnel from Washington on temporary
duty, and therefore it is not practicable to seek absolute equiv-
alence between the size of the U.S. and Soviet missions. For
purposes of this section, the number of Soviet personnel at the
SMUN would substantially exceed the number of American personnel
at the USUN if it were one-third or more greater than the annual
average number of U.S. personnel permanently assigned to the
U.S. Mission to the U.N. or its specialized agencies in New York
City.
The President could continue to admit a greater number of
Soviets than allowed under this policy, but only if he determined
that such admission of Soviet nationals would be in the interests
of the United States. In the event a greater number continued
to be admitted, the Secretary of State would be obliged to trans-
mit to the intelligence and foreign relations committees of the
Senate and House of Representatives six months after enactment
and every six months thereafter a report setting forth the num-
ber of Soviet nationals admitted during the previous six-month
period and a description of their duties with the SMUN. Further-
more, the Secretary of State and Attorney General are requested
to prepare a report within six months of enactment of this section
setting forth a plan to ensure compliance with the policy that
the number of members of the SMUN not substantially exceed the
number of members of the U.S. Mission.
The staff of the SMUN for purposes of this section include
all members of the mission included in the definition of the
term "members of the mission" in Article 1(b) of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done April,18, 1961 --
i.e., the head of the mission and the members of the staff of
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the mission, including the members of the diplomatic staff, of
the administrative and technical staff and of the service staff.
This is to make clear that, in implementing this section, the
State Department in the computation of the number of members
of the SMUN must include all its personnel.
A mission of a country to the United Nations includes all
the missions of such country to the U.N. in New York City and
includes missions in New York City to specialized agencies of
the U.N. In the case of the Soviet Union, the SMUN specifically
includes the missions to the United Nations of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the Byelorussian Socialist Republic and the
Ukrainian Socialist Republic.
A key part of the Soviet official presence in the United
States is the large staff of the Soviet mission to the United
Nations (SMUN) in New York City. The SMUN currently has a staff
of some 295, about 260 of which are assigned to the primary Soviet
mission and the others to the missions of the so-called Ukrainian
and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics. This is in addition
to the more than 300 Soviet citizens who work for the U.N. Secre-
tariat in New York. Combined with other categories of Soviet
representatives -- press correspondents, commercial representa-
tives, exchange scholars and the like -- this adds up to well
over 600 Soviets currently assigned to the New York area, in
addition to their families.
Counterintelligence specialists, especially in the FBI,
say that the SMUN in New York City is one of the chief havens
for Soviet spies in the United States. With its large staff,
the SMUN provides a major operational center for the KGB and
GRU in their activities throughout the United States.
The Soviet mission greatly exceeds the size of other dele-
gations to the United Nations. The next largest is the U.S.
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mission with a staff of about 130. China is third with a total
of 125. All other missions to the United Nations -- including
many countries with extensive activities there -- are well below
this.
Not only does the size of the Soviet mission greatly ex-
ceed the others, but its structure differs as well. The SMUN
has a bloated "support" staff of 120, many of whom do not have
duties directly related to the United Nations. In fact, the
United States Government has little official information on the
nature of the activities pursued by the Soviets at their mission
to the United Nations. The Soviets provide only the sketchiest
information about the identities of personnel being sent to the
SMUN, their positions in the mission, and their duties with
respect to the United Nations.
The FBI believes that as with other Soviet organizations
in the United States, more than one-third of the Soviet per-
sonnel at their U.N. mission -- at least 100 people -- are
professional intelligence officers. The chief damage of this
large intelligence component is espionage and other clandestine
collection by the Soviets of defense, science and technology,
and national security information within the United States.
Their large presence at the United Nations also provides the
Soviets a great opportunity to attempt to recruit foreign officials
at the United Nations as their agents.
It is extremely difficult for the FBI to cope with the large
number of Soviet officials and their family members in New York
City -- over 800 people. Operational conditions for the FBI in
in New York are poor. The FBI has difficulty getting its best
agents to work in New York due to the high cost of living in
the area. As a result, the FBI cannot effectively monitor the
activities of all the Soviet officials stationed in New York in one
capacity or another. If Soviet espionage is to be controlled, there
must be substantial reduction in the size of the Soviet U.N. mission.
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-Chairman Durenberger and Vice Chairman Leahy, in a statement
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on October 22, 1985,
indicated that the Committee's ongoing review of counterintelli-
gence and security problems had revealed that a key element in re-
ducing the occurrence of espionage in the U.S. is reduction and
restriction of the hostile intelligence presence in the U.S. For
the most part, foreign intelligence officers in the U.S. operate
under the cover of foreign diplomatic establishments and other
official or quasiautonomous entities controlled by foreign govern-
ments.
Members of the Intelligence Committee have been active in
recent years in limiting the hostile intelligence presence in
the U.S. The Huddleston-Leahy Amendment to the Fiscal Year 1984
Intelligence Authorization bill declared the policy of Congress
to be that the numbers and treatment of diplomatic officials from
countries engaged in intelligence activities against the U.S.
should not exceed the equivalent numbers and conditions of American
officials assigned to those countries. The Leahy-Cohen Amendment
to the Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 Foreign Relations Authorization
Act further established in statute that with respect particularly
to the Soviet Union, the number of Soviet diplomatic and consular
personnel admitted to the U.S. shall not substantially exceed the
equivalent number of U.S. personnel in the Soviet Union. The
Roth Amendment to the same Act authorized the Office of Foreign
Missions of the State Department to regulate the travel of all
U.N. employees outside the U.N. Headquarters District and in
general directed the State Department to apply the same re-
strictions to U.N. employees as are applied to the foreign
missions of their home countries.
Section 602 derives from S.1773, a bill to limit the size
of the SMUN. This bill was originally introduced by Senators
Leahy and Cohen, and has nineteen additional Senate co-sponsors.
The bill to limit the size of the SMUN was a logical successor
to the earlier Leahy-Cohen bill on diplomatic equivalence and
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reciprocity with the Soviet Union. This is because by far the
largest Soviet official establishments in the U.S. are the
Soviet embassy and consulate, currently at 320 persons, and the
Soviet mission to the United Nations.
The combination of these two measures will greatly impair
the ability of the Soviet Union to conduct human intelligence
operations in the U.S. As Stanislav Levchenko, a former high
level officer in the KGB who defected several years ago, stated
recently (Washington Times, Oct. 1, 1985):
"The most practical means of disrupting
KGB operations in America is to require parity
in the number of Soviet Diplomats in the United
States and American diplomats in the Soviet
Union, and to limit drastically the size and
operations of the huge Soviet mission to the
United Nations.
If such steps lead to a reduction of 100 or
more Soviet officials, KGB activities in the
United States would be seriously damaged. The
KGB would lose many offices who otherwise would
be handling active cases. But Moscow still would
need to maintain contact with various offices of
the U.S. government. So more of the remaining
officials would be occupied with legitimate diplo-
matic activities, rather than with espionage."
On March 7, 1986, the State Department announced that it
would require the Soviet Union to reduce the number of personnel
at the SMUN from 275 to 170 by April 1, 1988. The Department
has indicated that if the Soviets do not comply voluntarily
with the order, then the Department will proceed to implement
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it through denials of new requests for admission to the United
States of members of the SMUN. In taking this action, the State
Department was acting on a mandate developed by the Administration
through the National Security Council.
Enactment of Section 602 remains necessary even after the
recent action of the State Department. An an administrative
measure the State Department decision is subject to modification
in the future. Over the years, a large number of Soviets have
been permitted to enter the U.S. as diplomats and consular officers,
members of the SMUN, representatives assigned to quasi-nongovern-
mental entities such as trade associations and press bureaus,
and visiting officials. It is, therefore, desirable to apply def-
inite statutory limitations on such admissions whenever possible.
In the case of the SMUN, there is no difficulty in establishing
reasonable limits on its size, vis-a-vis the U.S. Mission, by
requiring that the size of the SMUN be substantially equivalent
to that of the U.S. Mission, taking into account that as a result
of the special circumstances, the size of the SMUN may be con-
sidered substantially equivalent to that of the U.S. Mission
provided it does not exceed it by more than one-third.
The clear authority of the U.S. to take such an action on
national security grounds rests largely on previous Congressional
attention to this matter. Specifically (as explained in greater
length below), Congress adopted legally binding reservations to
both of the principal international agreements governing the
status of the U.N. and national missions to it in the United
States. These reservations were designed to preserve the
U.S. right to protect its national security through reasonable
limitations on the privileges of the U.N. organization and
national missions to the U.N.
The basic principles governing the obligations of the United
States toward the United Nations and national missions to the
organization are the general Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations -- the general convention --
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adopted in 1946 but not ratified by the United States until 1970,
and the agreement between the United Nations and the United
States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations
-- the headquarters agreement -- adopted by joint resolution
of the Senate and the House of Representatives in 1947.
Neither of these agreements, as submitted to the Congress,
contained explicit provisions permitting the United States to
restrict the activities of the U.N. organization or the national
missions to the United Nations based on national, security grounds.
But Congress, in approving the agreements, adopted legally bind-
ing reservations to both the general convention and the headquarters
agreement preserving U.S. rights to protect its security. Section
6 of Public Law 80-357 which adopted the headquarters agreement,
states:
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as in any
way diminishing, abridging, or weakening the right of
the United States to safeguard its own security.
The U.S. Government has specifically maintained, both in
principle and through its actions, that section 6 permits the U.S.
Government to control the entry of foreign nationals into the
United States in connection with the United Nations, including
not only national missions to the United Nations but also employees
and invitees of the United Nations itself. A valuable collection
of materials on the development of U.S. policy in this regard is
contained on pages 195-312 of the State Department publication,
"Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954," volume III,
United Nations Affairs (1979).
The claim has been advanced from time to time that the U.S.
may act against the admission of particular persons to the U.N.
or national missions to the U.N., but not with respect to the
overall size of missions. As host country for U.N. Headquarters,
however, the U.S. retains the inherent power (as well as the
legal authority arising from Congressionally-mandated reserva-
tions to the pertinent international agreements) to regulate
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such-missions when their size and the conduct of their personnel
raise legitimate national security concerns. The State Depart-
ment has now agreed to this proposition through its recent action.
The key issue is the principle of reasonableness in inter-
preting the responsibilities of the U.S. Government under the
general convention and the headquarters agreement. The agreements
simply cannot be read to prevent the United States from taking
reasonable measures to protect its national security by refusing
to tolerate an abnormally large mission serving as a base for
highly damaging espionage. There are an extraordinary number
of Soviet officials assigned to the SMUN, many of whom appear
too highly qualified for their official work as janitors, ground-
keepers, and the like. The United States clearly has the right
under our agreements concerning the United Nations to take an
overall look at this situation and put restraints on the size
of the SMUN that would ensure that it remains reasonable in light
of its structure and legitimate activities at the United Nations.
Further information concerning the legal situation on limiting
the size of the SMUN can be found among the materials printed in
the Congressional Record at the time the original bill S.1773 was
introduced. (See Cong. Rec., October 8, 1985, pp. S13573-S13583.)
REGISTRATION OF AGENTS OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
Section 603 amends 18 U.S.C. 951, which makes it a criminal
offense for an agent of a foreign government to fail to register
with the Attorney General. Current law exempts diplomats and
other officials as well as one engaged in a "legal commercial
transaction." Section 603 would narrow the exemptions by adding
new subsection (e), which would require registration by those
engaged in commercial transactions who are agents of the Eastern
bloc nations, specifically, the Soviet Union, East Germany,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, or Cuba,
or those who have been convicted of espionage or export law
violations.
The section derives from S. 1900, which was introduced
by Senator Roth (for himself and Senators Nunn and Cohen)
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on December 2, 1985. S. 1900 would have amended the Foreign
Agents Registration Act (FARA), which, like 18 U.S.C. Section
951, requires that agents of foreign nationals register with
the Attorney General. (FARA likewise exempts diplomatic
and other officials and those engaged in commercial trans-
actions.) Senator Roth, as Chairman of the Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations, held hearings and heard testimony
that commercial entities are regularly used as fronts by Soviets
and their bloc allies. Current reporting statutes are in-
tended to provide the Government with information about the
activities of foreign agents. But they impose no such require-
ment on Soviet and Soviet-bloc businesses or even persons
convicted of espionage violations. While those businesses
are ostensibly engaged in non-political activity, it is common
knowledge that the businesses are used as cover for espionage
operations. S. 1900 was intended to provide information to
the Government to enable it to protect itself and its citizens
from the activities of agents of hostile foreign powers.
Following discussions with the Department of Justice,
Senator Roth agreed that because there are a number of reporting
statutes, a better approach would be to amend the Code section
directed at those engaged in espionage.* Accordingly, Senator
Roth developed an alternative proposal, now included as Section
603. The section accomplishes the two goals of S. 1900 --
requiring the registration of those engaged in business but
working for Soviet bloc nations and also those previously
convicted of espionage violations -- but preserves the dis-
tinction between registration requirements for political
representatives and spies.
---------------------
* FARA was originally aimed at subversives and propagandists,
and required that all representatives of foreign governments
register. Over time, it has been limited to those who attempt
to influence public opinion or government action. Other laws,
including 18 U.S.C. 951 and 50 U.S.C. 85-1, have focused on
subversives and those engaged in espionage.
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Section 951 of title 18, U.S.C. currently requires prior
notification to the Attorney General by any person who acts
in the United States as an agent of a foreign government, with
four exemptions spelled out in subsection (d), which defines
"agent of a foreign government" to mean:
an individual who agrees to operate within the
United States subject to the direction or control
of a foreign government or official, except that
such term does not include --
(1) a duly accredited diplomatic or consular officer
of a foreign government, who is so recognized by the De-
partment of State;
(2) any officially and publicly acknowledged and
sponsored official or representative of a foreign govern-
ment;
(3) any officially and publicly acknowledged and
sponsored member of the staff of, or employee of, an
officer, official, or representative described in para-
graph (1) or (2), who is not a United States citizen; or
(4) any person engaged in a legal commercial trans-
action.
Under current law, the Attorney General is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations establishing requirements for
notification. In addition, the Attorney General is required,
upon receipt, promptly to transmit one copy of each notification
statement filed under section 951 to the Secretary of State for
such comment and use as the Secretary of State may determine to
be appropriate from the point of view of the foreign relations
of the United States. Failure of the Attorney General to do so
is not a bar to prosecution under section 951. Violations are
punishable by a fine of not more than $75,000 or imprisonment
for not more than ten years, or both.
Section 603 of the bill amends section 951 of title 18
by adding a new subsection (e) which provides that, notwith-
standing the exemption in paragraph (d)(4) for persons engaged
in legal commercial transactions, a person engaged in such a
transaction shall be considered an agent of a foreign govern-
ment if such person agrees to operate within the United States
subject to the direction or control of a foreign government
or official and such person meets one of two criteria. The
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first is that the person is an agent of the Soviet Union, the
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Bulgaria, Romania, or Cuba, unless the Attorney General after
consultation with the Secretary of State determines and so
reports to the Congress that the national security or foreign
policy interests of the United States require that the pro-
visions of section 951 should not apply in specific circum-
stances to agents of such countries. The second criterion
is that the person has been convicted of, or has entered a
plea of nolo contendere with respect to, any offense under
sections 792 through 799, 831, or 2381 of title 18 or under
section 11 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, or is
the employer of such a person, except that the provisions of
section 951 shall not apply to such a person or employer for
a period of more than five years beginning on the date of the
conviction or the date of the entry of the plea of nolo con-
tendere.
The Committee intends that the registration of a person
under subsection (e) should be the basis for the State Depart-
ment to impose appropriate requirements under the Foreign
Missions Act, as amended by section 601 of this bill. The
Committee also recognizes that the Attorney General has the
authority under subsection (b) of section 951 to establish
whatever requirements for notification he may deem justified.
The Committee further intends that the requirement for
notification by a person engaged in a legal commercial trans-
action should apply to a?person employed by a commercial entity
that transacts business in the United States, without regard
to whether such person might be considered an officially and
publicly acknowledged and sponsored official or representative
of a foreign government under subsection (d)(2) or a member of
the staff, or employee of, such an official or representative under
subsection (d)(3). The purpose is to require notification by
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officials, representatives, staff members, and employees of com-
mercial entities, whenever such persons engage in commercial en-
terprises and agree to operate in the United States under the
direction or control of one of the named countries. The current
exemptions in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) should not be applied
to defeat the objective of this bill to enhance U.S. counterin-
telligence efforts.
TITLE VII - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 701 provides that the authorization'of appro-
priations by the fiscal year 1987 Intelligence Authorization
Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the con-
duct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise
authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 702 provides advance authorization for such
additional appropriations as may be necessary for increases
in Federal employee compensation and benefits which are authorized
by current or subsequently enacted law during fiscal year 1987.
Section 702 obviates the necessity for separate authorizations
for such matters during the fiscal year.
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COMMITTEE ACTION
On May 15, 1986, the Select Committee on Intelligence,
a quorum being present, approved the bill as amended and
ordered it favorably reported.
EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT
In accordance with Paragraph 11(b) of Rule XXVI of the
Standing Rule of the Senate, The Committee finds no regulatory
impact will be incurred in implementing the provisions of this
legislation.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT
The Committee has complied with Section 403 of the Con-
gressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to the
extent possible.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to dispense
with the requirements of Section 12 of Rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the business of the Senate.
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