HEARING ON THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PRESENTED IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M01007R000100310006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 13, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
TO: THE MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
FROM: STAFF DIRECTOR
25
DATE: MARCH 13, 1986
SUBJECT: HEARING ON THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PRESENTED
IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.
PURPOSE OF HEARING
To review the intelligence program presented by the
National Intelligence Strategy for the analysis of the
~OVlet Union and the views of this program by key intelligence
consumers.
WITNESSES
Representing Intelligence Consumers
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense
Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of
State for Soviet and East European Affairs
Representing Intelligence Community Producers
Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, Director, Bureau for
Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Dr. Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency
Lt. General Leonard Perroots, USAF, Defense Intelli-
gence Agency
BACKGROUND
One of the Select Committee's objectives in requiring
a National Intelligence Strategy by the DCI was to make his
priorities for intelligence clear and to make these priorities
available to intelligence consumers.
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The National Intelligence Strategy the DCI presented to
the Select Committee last month emphasizes analysis of the
Soviet Union and, most especially, the military components
of the Soviet threat. For the most part, this emphasis is
already apparent in the production of CIA, DIA, and INR.
The Strategy mentions that the Soviets will face
hard choices because of tightening economic resources and
the difficulties that will result from the malaise among the
Soviet people However, the strategy does not show how
these non-military aspects of Soviet strategic power present
new demands or new opportunities for U.S. intelligence.
At issue are such questions as:
o Do the priorities laid forth in the National
Intelligence meet the needs of intelligence
consumers?
o Do the production plans of CIA, DIA, and INR
for long-range Soviet intelligence correspond to
the priorities of the National Intelligence
Strategy?
o Does the investment program for collection laid
forth in the National Intelligence Strategy
meet the needs of the producers responsible for
intelligence on the Soviet Union?
In this hearing, Secretary Weinberger and Ambassador
Ridgway will explain their own intelligence requirements
in respect to the Soviet Union. The heads of the intelligence
arms of CIA, DIA, and INR will explain how their program
will address the priorities expressed in the National
Intelligence Strategy, and whether they will be able to
carry oput those programs with the collection resources
planned. Following their opening statements, the witnesses
will accept questions from the Members.
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KEY ISSUES
1. Has the National Intelligence Strategy been developed
with an ear to the intelligence consumer?
The Select Committee intended the Strategy to connect
intelligence planning to the needs of intelligence consumers.
Secretary Weinberger and Ambassador Ridgway should be able
to inform the Members as to
o How the Defense Department and State Depart-
ment were consulted in the development of
the Strategy; and
o Whether Defense and State are satisfied with
the allocation of resources laid forth in
the National Intelligence Strategy.
2. Are Defense and State satisfied with the priorities
expressed by the National Intelligence Strategy?
The Strategy, in laying forth the DCI's vision for
long-term investments in intelligence, notes that the
Intelligence Community will not be able to cover all issues
as well as the DCI would like.
Would Defense or State prefer that the DCI change
his overall Strategy to place greater priority on the
collection and exploitation systems necessary to
o Monitor Soviet compliance with existing arms
control treaties;
o Strengthen U.S. capabilities to verify Soviet
compliance with new arms control treaties, which
might limit such difficult-to-monitor factors as
mobile missiles, missile dimensions, throwweight,
etc.
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3. Has the long-term planning laid forth in the Strategy
overlooked significant issues and trends affecting t e
Soviet Union?
The National Intelligence Strategy focuses mainly
on the military dimensions of the Soviet Union. Even
when the Strategy addresses other issues, they are usually
approached from a distinctly military perspective (e.g.,
most study of the Soviet economy focuses on Soviet defense
industries).
Some non-military components of power that could
shape the Soviet Union's overall capabilities (and which
Secretary Weinberger and Ambassador Ridgway might wish to
address) include:
o the impact of economic stringencies on Soviet
support for foreign clients and the cohesiveness
of the Soviet Bloc;
o the impact of these same economic constraints on
force expansion, force modernization, readiness,
and ability to mobilize;
o the impact of social and demographic trends on the
health, cohesiveness, and effectiveness of the
Soviet labor force and its ability to adopt
increasing sophisticated technology.
4. Will intelligence producers be able to carry out the
objectives of the National Inte i ence Strategy wit t o
collection and exploitation systems currently programmed?
The Strategy points out that the Intelligence Community
will probably fall short in collection capabilities necessary
to monitor certain aspects of arms control. However, it is
possible that intelligence producers may also lack the
collection assets they need for other missions, as well.
At issue are such questions as
o What part did intelligence producers play
in the development of the Strategy; were
they consulted in defining collection
requirements?
o Are there any significant collection gaps in the
Strategy that will prevent intelligence producers
from carrying out their assigned missions?
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5. Will the Intelligence Communit be effective in
using the resources the DCI has dedicated to stregnthen
intelligence analysis?
Money is not the only issue in strengthening the
Intelligence Communty's analysis of the Soviet Union; there
are also questions are to whether the Intelligence Community
will be able to use this money effectively.
Part of the problem is in Community's personnel policies.
The CIA, for example, loses potential new analysts
by taking too long to process recruits. On average, the DI
requires one year to bring a new analyst on board.
Retention is also a problem. Currently, half of all
analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence have less than
five years experience. About a fifth of all analysts have
less than two years experience.
At issue are such questions:
o What steps is the Intelligence Community
taking to make sure that the additional
money that will be spent on analysts is
used effectively?
o How will the Intelligence Community improve
its methods to spot-talent?
o Will any of the resources the DCI has
dedicated to analytic resources be used to
improve recruitment and retention?
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BACKGROUND ON THE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS OF CIA, DIA, AND INR
CIA intelligence on the Soviet Union is produced primarily
by the Directorate of Intelligence.
Within the DI, the Office of Soviet Analysis (SOYA) is
responsible for Soviet political and economic developments;
Soviet military doctrine, planning, and operations; Soviet
defense industries;'and Soviet policy for such foreign
relations issues as arms control.
The Office of Weapons Research (OWR) is responsible
for technical assessments of foreign weapons; virtually all
of its effort is directed at Soviet weaponry. OWR is the
source of CIA estimates of Soviet missile capabilites, for
example. OWR also offers technical support to the Arms
Control Support Staff.
In recent years, the DI has put most of its newly-added
resources in the Defense Industries division of SOVA and
OWR. Less attention has been paid to Soviet domestic and
non-military economic policy, though within the past year
SOVA reorganized its division that is responsible for such
issues.
DIA, as the primary intelligence advisor to the Joint
Chiefs, is heavily oriented toward supporting the operational
planning of U.S. forces. DIA's Soviet intelligence is
produced by a variety of directorates within the Agency;
some analysis is also delegated to other military intelligence
agencies, e.g., DIA's order of battle for Soviet offensive
strategic forces is published under the DIA logo, but produced
by the 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing.
It is not possible at this time to determine recent
investment trends for Soviet analysis within DIA, as these
were not provided by the GDIP CBJB. The staff has requested
additional information.
INR is by far the smallest of the three agencies. It is
responsible for supporting the Secretary of State. As expected,
its production is weighted toward political issues. INR has
put most of its efforts in recent years into strengthening its
division responsible for analyzing terrorism, narcotics trading,
and other global issues.
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