REQUIREMENTS FOR UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS TRIP TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN, NOVEMBER 13-19, 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R003205330016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 24, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
' ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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DCI
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Compt
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122
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STAT
25 Oct 85
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S/S 8531609 thru 8531639
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
COPIES:
S/S-S (2)
S/S
TMA
RF:vhd
'85 OCT 24 P11 :06
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(WITH SECRET ATTACHMENTS)
MEMORANDUM TO: D
P
E
T
M
C
CA
EB
EUR
H
HA
INM
INR
10
L
NEA
OES
PA
PM
RP
S/NP
S/P
AID
TREAS
USDOC
OPIC
USTR
USDA
CIA
STAT
INR/B
USIA
October 24, 1985
- Mr.
Whitehead
- Mr.
Armacost
- Mr.
Wallis
- Mr.
Schneider
- Mr.
Spiers
- Mr.
Derwinski
- Ms.
Clark
- Mr.
McMinn
- Ms.
Ridgway
- Mr.
Ball
- Mr.
Moser
- Mr.
Thomas
- Mr.
Abramowitz
- Mr.
Keyes
- Judge Sofaer
- Mr.
Murphy
- Mr.
Negroponte
- Mr.
Kalb
- Mr.
Holmes
- Mr.
Purcell
- Mr.
Kennedy
- Mr.
Rodman
- Mr.
Richard Meyer
- Ms.
Cooksey
- Ms.
Robbins
- Ms.
Sullivan
- Mr.
Frierson
- Mr.
Russell
-
-
Peter Hirsch
- Mr. William LaSalle
SUBJECT:
Requirements for Under Secretary Wallis' trip to
India and Pakistan, November 13-19, 1985
COORDINATOR FO
COORD
FOR PAK
R INDIA: Ray
I
Riemer,
NEA/INS, Room 5251,
632-0701
.
-E COORDINA
STAN: Jim
Larocco,
NEA/PAB, Room 5247,
632-9823
TOR:
John
Malott,
Room 7260, 632-8854
S/S-S ACTION OFFICER: Glyn T. Davies, Room 7241, 632-8338
This memorandum assigns responsibilities for the preparation
of briefing materials for use by Under Secretary Wallis during his
trip to India and Pakistan. Bureaus wishing to suggest additions
or changes to this tasker should contact the S/S-S Action Officer
as soon as possible.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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1. COUNTRY SCOPE PAPERS: NEA should prepare scope papers, in the
form of briefing memoranda from the Assistant Secretary (sample
attached), for each country Mr. Wallis will visit. The papers
should address the following questions: 1) Where does our
relationship stand? 2) What do we want to accomplish with this
visit? 3) What does the country visited want from us? 4) What can
we realistically hope to achieve? The papers should be cleared by
E, P, S/P and other bureaus as appropriate. All scope papers are
due in S/S-S by COB November 6.
2. SCHEDULE: NEA should work closely with the Embassies involved
to prepare an overall schedule for the trip for inclusion in the
briefing book. This overall schedule should be kept as short as
possible, without going into scenario-like detail. In addition, NEA
should prepare an annotated agenda for Mr. Wallis' use in the
US-Pakistan economic subcommission meeting. The schedules and
agenda are due in S/S-S by COB November 6.
3. BRIEFING MEMORANDA: NEA should prepare a briefing outline for
each meeting scheduled. The briefing outlines should use the stan-
dard format (sample attached), and should be cleared with E, S/P,
and other bureaus as appropriate. All briefing outlines are due in
S/S-S by COB November 6. The only meeting tentatively scheduled at
this time is with Pakistani Finance Minister Mahbub ul-Haq.
4. ISSUES PAPERS: The following issues papers should be prepared
for Mr. Wallis' use at all stops on the trip. They should be
prepared on plain bond paper and should normally be no more than one
page in length. The issues papers (including talking points) should
be classified, with drafting and clearing information on a separate
page. These papers should provide concise background information,
followed by comprehensive talking points giving the most up-to-date
information and perspectives available. The talking points should
be the focus of the issues paper. Unless otherwise noted, these
papers should be cleared in draft by E staff and are due in S/S-S by
COB November 6.
MINIMUM
TOPIC DRAFT CLEARANCES
1. India's External Financing Needs and
the IFIs EB E, NEA
2. India, the US and the New Trade Round EB E,-NEA
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MINIMUM
DRAFT CLEARANCES
3. Indian Economic Liberalization Measures NEA E, EB
4. US-India Rupee Fund NEA E, EB, OES
Pakistan
1. OPIC Investment Projects OPIC E, NEA
2. Bilateral Investment Treaty EB E, NEA
3. Textiles USTR E, EB, NEA
4. Tech Transfer MOU PM NEA
5. New GATT Round USTR E, EB, NEA
6. Narcotics Issues INM E, NEA
7. Bilateral Trade Issues USTR E, EB, NEA
8. Discriminatory Tax on US Shippers NEA E, EB
9. International Trade Situation: US
Perspective USTR E, EB, NEA
10. Post FY 87 US Assistance NEA E
11. Pakistan Economic Outlook: Trends,
Policy Reform, Balance of Payments EB E, NEA
5. BACKGROUND PAPERS: The following background papers should be
prepared for Mr. Wallis' use during the trip. They should be
prepared on Department of State Briefing Paper (black top)
letterhead. Background papers will not usually be longer than two
pages. Drafting and clearing information should be put on a
separate page. The papers should be cleared by E staff and must be
delivered to S/S-S through the appropriate NEA coordinator by COB
November 6.
DRAFT
MINIMUM
CLEARANCES
India
1.
Domestic Political Situation
NEA
P
2.
US Aid Program
AID
E, NEA, EB
3.
Indo-US Political & Security Relations
NEA
P
4.
Science & Technology Relations
OES
E, NEA, EB
5.
US Commercial Relations with India
6.
(including US Business Presence)
Domestic Economic Situation
NEA
NEA
E, EB
E, EB
7.
Transfer of Technology Issues
NEA
E, .PM, EB
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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MINIMUM
DRAFT CLEARANCES
Pakistan
1. US Investment in Pakistan OPIC E, EB, NEA
2. US-Pakistan Trade Trends USDOC E, EB, NEA
3. US Business Experience in Pakistan USDOC E, EB, NEA
4. US-Pakistan Agricultural Trade USDA E, EB, NEA
5. US Economic Assistance to Pakistan AID E, EB, NEA
6. Functions & Structures of E/C
Subcommission NEA E, EB
7. Pakistan Domestic Political Situation NEA P
8. US-Pakistan Relations: Non-economic
issues NEA P
6. PRESS THEMES: NEA should prepare press themes for India and
Pakistan. These should not exceed one page in length and should
follow the sample attached to this tasker. These must be cleared
with PA and are due in S/S-S by COB November 6.
7. PUBLIC STATEMENTS: NEA should work with the Embassies involved
to prepare any necessary public statements or toasts, and
contingency arrival and departure statements for Mr. Wallis' use.
These should be double spaced on plain bond paper. Pages should not
end in the middle of a sentence. Draft remarks should incorporate
as much factual and substantive material as possible. NEA also
should prepare opening and closing statements, cleared as
appropriate, for the US-Pakistan economic subcommission meeting.
They must be cleared with E, S/P and PA at a minimum, and are due in
S/S-S by COB November 6.
8. ECONOMIC DATA SHEETS: NEA should prepare Economic Data Sheets
for India and Pakistan. Particular emphasis should be placed on the
quality, relevance and conciseness of data incorporated. The data
sheets are limited to one page (sample attached), and are due in
S/S-S by COB November 6.
9. BACKGROUND NOTES: PA should provide Background Notes on India
and Pakistan to the S/S-S action officer by COB November 6.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
10. BIOGRAPHIC MATERIAL: S/S-S will request appropriate biographic
material. NEA should provide the S/S-S action officer with a list
of significant Indian and Pakistani officials Mr. Wallis is likely
to encounter by COB November 1.
NOTE: S/S-S requires the original (unstapled) and one copy of all
papers requested. Drafting and clearing information should always
appear on a separate page. Papers for the visit should be delivered
directly to the S S-S action officer or duty officer, and should not
be logged in with S/S-I.
1'~~~~choCo al a Platt
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
As Stated
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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a sr unnea states Uepartment of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
SPn~,OL,L-w fcopa-
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S
CLASSIFICATION Date
TO : The Secretary
FROM Bureau Symbol - Name
SUBJECT : Scope Paper: Your Bilateral Program in Capital City,
July 20, 1985
I. WHERE DOES OUR RELATIONSHIP STAND?
o Closer since Smithwho's January 1985 visit.
signing of U.S.-Altantan steel MOU defused differences
over commodities.
o Recently amended civair agreement permits direct air
service between U.S. and Atlantis for the first time.
o Increased military to military cooperation.
-- More exercises and exchange of information.
-- Handled in low-key manner to avoid impinging upon
Atlantis' non-aligned status.
o Expanded cooperation against narcotics.
-- Mrs. Smithwho attended Mrs. Reagan's Drug Abuse
Conference.
-- 40% increase in US training of Atlantans.
o Phenomenal growth in number of Atlantan students in
U.S. universities, now 20-25,000.
II. WHAT DO WE WANT?
o Expanded relations with Atlantis. -
-- Reassure Smithwho that we value personal contact.
o GOA cooperation in East-West relations.
-- We are hopeful for progress on arms control.
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CLASSIFICATION
o Coordinate global economic policies.
The Bonn Summit.
Commitment to free enterprise system, resist
protectionism.
-- Atlantan support of 1986 MTN negotations.
o Atlantan views on regional security issues.
Situation in Ruritania, Atlantan proposal for "proximity
talks," Neighboran Foreign Minister Ratmoch's initiative
on U.S.-SRV normalisation.
Change GOA view that China is a long term threat to
region, a moderate, stable, economically developing
China is in everybody's interest.
Support for our views on Middle East issues.
o Strong support for Antarctica Treaty as an important
disarmament and scientific agreement.
-- New Atlantan invitiative reflects misunderstanding of our
and others' objectives.
III. WHAT DO THEY WANT?
o U.S. recognition Atlantis plays important role in
regional and international affairs.
Chairman of NEPAC standing committee, proximity
talks proposal.
Northeast PACFA Zone of Peace Freedom and
Neutrality.
Active in Non-Aligned Movement and Islamic
Conference, Antarctica Initiative.
o Register concern about China's long term intentions in
the region.
Atlantis has large ethnic Chinese population,
history of insurgency.
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CLASSIFICATION
-3-
Periodic briefings on U.S.-China relations
appreciated.
o Encourage increased U.S. investment in Atlantis.
-- 41 U.S. electronics firms there and doing well.
good infrastructure, USAID helped build.
GOA has New Economic Policy (Guidelines call for
affirmative action for indigenous firms,
limits foreign ownership in some cases.)
o Seek US support on international economic issues.
Access to U.S market crucial.
Atlantis and other PACFAS fear protectionist
trend in industrialized countries.
o Stress importance of international cooperation
against narcotics trafficking and drug abuse.
-- Focus world attention on the problem.
-- Deputy Prime Minister Johnstone is Atlantan point
man.
-- Increased bilateral cooperation desirable.
IV. WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED FROM THIS VISIT?
o Candid exchange of views on international and regional
security issues as well as world economic situation.
o Joint press conference good oppt. to reaffirm publicly U.S.
commitment to expanded relations.
o Convince GOA that participation in new MTN round can help
ensure continued access to U.S. market.
o Increased US/GOA cooperation in supression of drug production
and trafficking.
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ANNOTATED SCHEDULE FOR UiIDER SECRETARY ARMACOST
(REVISED)
Paris, September 10-11, 1984
MONDAY
S=PTEt?18ER 10, 1984
21:30 Arrival of Armacost party at Charles de Gaulle Airport
via Air France 819; met by DCM and Control Officer;
proceed to Ambassador Galbraith's Residence.
22:15 Arrive at Ambassador's Residence, RON.
TUESDAY
SEPTEMBER 11, 1984
8:00 Breakfast with Ambassador, DCM and Miles Pendleton at
Residence.
8:55 Depart Residence for Chancery.
9:00 Meeting with Country Team at Embassy Chancery (45
minutes).
10:00 Meeting with Jacques Delors, EC Commission
President-Designate.
12:00 Meeting with Hubert Vedrine, Elysee Diplomatic Advisor.
12:55 Depart Elysee for Ambassador's Residence.
13:00 Lunch iho Under Secretary Armacost (1-1/2 hours).
15:15 Possible meeting with OECD Ambassador Streator (at
Residence).
15:50 Depart Residence for Quai d'Orsay.
16:00 Meeting with Roland Dumas, Minister of European
Affairs (1 hour).
17:00 Meeting with Francis Gutmann, Quai Secretary General
(1-1/2 hours).
18:30 Depart Quai d'Orsay for Charles de Gaulle Airport.
20:00 Depart for Rome on Alitalia 321.
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CONFIDENTIAL
4;1 bPiff
Issue Aaenda/Schedule for Mubarak Visit
meeting on Arrival: Saturday, March 9, 3:20 PM at the
Reflecting Pool
-- Express our pleasure at having President Mubarak back in
Washington
-- Review Mubarak's schedule and objectives of the visit
Secretary's Meeting: Monday, March 11, 4:00 PM at the Vista
International Hotel
-- Peace Process - Review developments and discuss outlook
Egypt/Israel - Welcome positive steps and stress need
for further improvement in this relationship
-- Assistance - Respond to request for supplemental
assistance
-- FMS Debt - Respond to Mubarak's request for relief from
current payments and urge elimination of outstanding arrears
-- Regional Issues - Assure Mubarak of our continuing
support for Sudan, discuss Libyan threat and Iran-Iraq war
Meeting with the President: Tuesday, March 12, 11:30 AM
-- Further discussion of issues raised in Secretary's
meeting
-- NPW Transit - Urge Mubarak to find a solution which will
allow U.S. Navy NPW's to transit the Suez Canal
The President's Lunch: Tuesday, March 12, 12:15 PM
-- Follow up on issues raised in Oval office
The Vice President's Dinner: Tuesday, March 12, 7:30 PM,
Jefferson Room, State Department
-- Review Visit
CONFIDENTIAL
DLCL: OADR
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CONFIDENTIAL
-- Nuclear Power Program - Vice President to urge use of
American firms and Eximbank credit for construction of Egypt's
first nuclear power plant
Continue discussion of topics raised during meeting with
the President
Farewell, Wednesday, March 12, 8.25 PM, Vista International
Hotel
-- Express appreciation for frank exchanges during visit
Drafted:NEA/EGY:DBooth:nn
2/26/65 x22802 W*0758C
Cleared:NEA/EGY:DDunford
NEA:RPelletreau
P:SJohnson
CONFIDENTIAL
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ECRET MPL-
Middle East 'S SSA
background
Regional events have not favored Arab-Israeli negotiations
toward achieving an overall Middle East peace. Key parties
have awaited the outcome of Israeli and U.S. elections. In
Israel the political situation remains confused. Prospects are
for a weak government unable to take bold initiatives on the
peace process. The military impasse continues in the Gulf
War. Khomeini clings to a futile military strategy, and the
Iraqis are unable to force negotiation through shipping
attacks. Western minehunting and sweeping efforts continue in
the Gulf of Suez and Red Sea. The Egyptians are coordinating
U.S., UK, French and Italian efforts in the Gulf of Suez; the
Saudis are coordinating U.S. and French efforts in Saudi
waters, and the Dutch have now dispatched minesweepers for the
Red Sea at Saudi request.
Talking Points
-- We see no value in UNGA and Soviet proposals for an
international conference on the Middle East, which would only
provide a forum for maximalist positions.
-- The situation following the Israeli elections remains
confused. Labor and Likud share a consensus that Israel should
withdraw from Lebanon as soon as conditions permit and that
Israel's economic crisis must be urgently addressed.
-- In the Gulf War the UN-brokered ceasefire against attacks
on civilian populations is still holding, despite claimed
violations, but we see scant possibility of a wider ceasefire.
-- Iran appears anxious, at least for tactical reasons, to
present a more moderate and reasonable image, but its recent
diplomatic overtures to the Gulf states remain without results,
so long as Iran refuses even minor concessions.
We are pleased with the response to requests for assistance
in nineclearing operations in the Gulf of Suez and Red Sea.
-- Given the complexities involved in the operations, their
ultimate duration is unknown and will have to be coordinated by
the Egyptians and Saudis with each participant.
-- We are watching closely the buildup of Soviet mineclearing
efforts in the southern Red Sea but believe the Soviets share
our common interest in free navigation through this waterway.
SECRET
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Interest Rates and Protectionism SQ~ 4 'A-
US interest rates -- relative to our inflation rate -- have
been very high during the past 3 or 4 years. Notwithstanding
the level of interest rates in this country, the US economy has
led the world in recovering from the recessions of the early
1980's. The strength of the US economy, coupled with the
perception of the United States as a politically and socially
stable nation, have induced many foreigners to invest here.
The foreign demand for dollars to invest in this economy has
driven-up the foreign-exchange value of the dollar, making it
more difficult for US firms to compete with imports in the
domestic market. This difficulty has bred protectionist
political pressures here.
TALKING POINTS
-- Foreigners see US as stable country with strong economy,
want to invest here.
Foreign demand for dollars to invest has driven up
foreign-exchange value of dollar, making imports cheaper here
and US goods more expensive abroad. As a result, US exporters
and import-competing firms have seen sales, profits fall.
Facing stiffer competition in domestic market, US firms
and labor seek protectionist measures from government.
(Examples: autos, steel, textiles).
Introduction of protectionist measures in any country
(especially a major trading nation like the United States) may
prompt retaliatory measures by trading partners. Such measures
reduce real incomes in nations adopting them.
-- Protectionism increases inflationary pressures, promotes
economic inefficiency, retards long-run growth, represents
government interference with the free market.
-- Reagan Administration opposes protectionism for all of
these reasons, fights protectionist bills in Congress (such as
domestic-content legislation for automobiles).
-- Despite claims of some Europeans, the US federal deficit
is not responsible for high nominal interest rates here. Rates
are sum of real interest rate plus premium for expected future
inflation, which market is currently overestimating.
-- US interest rates will fall as increasing numbers of
investors realize that we have inflation under control and
reduce the inflation premium they demand in interest rates.
-- Review of literature by economists at State failed to
find significant relationship between federal deficits and
interest rates in this country historically.
UNCLASSIFIED
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?RIEFING RAPER 5 ID NTIAL
NORTHERN IRELAND
The Northern Ireland problem has centered on the question
of whether Catholic nationalists should continue to remain a
minority (40 percent) in Northern Ireland or the Protestant
unionists, by coercion or consent, should become a minority in
a federal or united Ireland. Today, resolution of the problem
seems as distant as at any time in the last decade. However,
both the Irish and British Governments, and the principal
political parties in the Republic, generally agree that any
change in the status of Northern Ireland should come about
within a democratic context, and with the support of a majority
of the people in the North.
In 1972, Britain suspended majority (Protestant) self-rule
in the North, and now governs the province through a Northern
Ireland Secretary. Successive British governments have
developed proposals for a return to self-rule combined with
power-sharing between the two communities, which could open up
potential avenues toward Irish unity. All such efforts have
failed. In 1982, a Northern Ireland Assembly was elected, but
is boycotted by nationalists, who complain that the British
plan failed to provide guarantees for power-sharing or any
'all-Ireland dimension.' Some unionists also are refusing to
participate in the Assembly, complaining that London has not
taken a serious stand against IRA terrorism.
Despite the traumatic events of recent years, little
fundamental in Northern Ireland has changed, though the level
of violence continues to decline. The major internal forces
remain locked in political combat, without movement toward
consensus. Within the nationalist community, there has been
some shift of electoral support away from the democratic,
constitutional nationalists (SDLP) toward the nationalism of
Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF), the political wing of the Irish
Republican Army (IRA).
The Irish Government is alarmed by trends in the North,
especially by the political rise of Provisional Sinn Fein; by
the continued deadlock on constitutional issues; and by the
stagnation of the Northern Ireland economy (unemployment
approaching 25 percent). The Irish see PSF as an eventual
threat to democratic institutions in the Republic, and are
using PSF's political advances to try to shake the British out
of what they see as complacency arising from Mrs. Thatcher's
big electoral win. But Ireland's leverage on Britain
ultimately remains limited to its cooperation on cross border
security and its support for peaceful, rather than violent,
reunification.
CONFIDENTIAL
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FitzGerald understands that a precipitous British
withdrawal from the North could provoke sectarian chaos and
threaten the stability of the whole island. Be is following a
two-pronged policy. In his fifteen months in office, he has
restored harmonious relations with London, and will host a
Dublin summit with Mrs. Thatcher this summer. Second,
FitzGerald has convened a 'New Ireland Forum,' a congress of
democratic nationalist parties from both North and South. The
Forum is studying the problems and prospects for achieving
Irish unity within a democratic, constitutional context. It is
expected to make a final report this spring.
Successive Irish governments from time to time have asked
the US to intercede with Britain on the Northern Ireland
issue. However, FitzGerald in January told our Ambassador that
involvement by the US is not needed at this stage.
The US has carefully avoided a direct role in the Northern
Ireland question, convinced that the Irish and British
governments should work together to promote reconciliation and
resolution of the problem within a democratic context. In his
successive St. Patrick's Day statements, the President has also
emphasized our commitment to end any American links with the
violence in the North by vigorously prosecuting those involved
in gunrunning or other illegal activity. We have supported
efforts t.o promote reconcilation between the two communities in
the North and also have encouraged US firms to consider
job-creating investments in both parts of Ireland.
The Administration has declined to comment publicly on
either the Northern Ireland Assembly or the New Ireland Forum,
but we have expressed our hope privately that each will
contribute to progress.
The bipartisan congressional 'Friends of Ireland' has
generally supported the Administration on the Northern Ireland
issue, but takes the position that Irish unity is essential for
achieving peace and reconcilitation. Senator Moynihan has
introduced a resolution proposing that the President appoint a
special envoy for Northern Ireland, to examine how the US might
better promote reconciliation in the province. Moynihan's
proposal is not now supported by other members of the Friends.
The Administration reacted negatively to the proposal,
primarily on the grounds that none of the major parties
concerned has asked for the appointment of a special envoy and
that the US should not get in the middle of this contentious
dispute.
CONFIDENTIAL
March 5, 1984
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I I. G VEPARTMENT OF STATE ~~1IGRet~N~
lu V OftIEWING PAPER 1` 2
MILITARY COOPERATION WITH ALGERIA
SAMPC5'
o Bilateral military relationships have evolved gradually
after Bendjedid's accession: exchange of defense attaches,
USN ship visits, sale of 17 C-130s, FMS eligibility for
defense services, and a small IMET program begun in 1984 are
present elements.
o The GOA's pursuit of more rapid expansion of the military
relationship is part of its effort to diversify sources of
military supply and decrease dependence on Soviets.
o There has been a marked reduction in Soviet military
presence since 1981. No new Algerian orders for Soviet
equipment in 4 years, although deliveries under $3 billion
1980 agreement have continued. However, arsenal is still
predominantly Soviet in origin and must be sustained.
Hence, GOA will not terminate purchases from Soviets.
o We seek to diminish Soviet influence in Algeria and
concomitantly to serve our long-term goal of enhanced access
to the Algerian military, the most influential institution
in Algeria. We are constrained by continuing Algerian
support for the Polisario, superiority of its weapons
inventory vis-a-vis Morocco and presence of Soviets.
o Nevertheless, a Presidential Determination making Algeria
eligible to purchase defense articles using FMS procedures
has been signed prior to the Bendjedid visit.
o We now are prepared to consider Algerian requests for
purchase of equipment and components on a case-by-case
basis. Consideration will reflect our concerns about
regional balance of power and possible impact on issues such
as the Western Sahara dispute.
o Algerians are currently discussing with US commercial
suppliers bothpurchase of US equipment and obtaining U.S.
technology and training with the aim of upgrading their
Soviet-supplied equipment:
Light armored vehicles -- outright purchase and
co-production; decision on export license pending;
Upgrade of MiG 21s -- proposal under review pending FMS
eligibility;
Extensive air force training -- At Algerian request,
USAF is preparing detailed proposal for Algerian
consideration.
o Algeria will use limited IMET funds for professional
training with emphasis on staff colleges. Algerian AF
commander could not accept General Gabriel's invitation for
April visit, but would like to come this fall.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
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b. Sample Press Points
PRESS POINTS ON KOREA AND KIM DAE JUNG
BASIC MESSAGE
While we have protested the incident at the airport and we continue to
deal with it, the far more important issue is whether Korea will
continue to make progress toward a more open and democratic society.
The Incident
USG awaiting results of Korean Government's investigation into
causes of incident.
Embassy Seoul immediately protested incident; took steps to
assure safety of Americans accompanying Kim.
Lost in news of unfortunate incident was fact that Kim was not.
as many had feared returned to prison.
Kim Dae Jung
- Kim remains confined to his home; he is allowed to receive visits
from family members and foreign guests.
- We have expressed the hope that the present restrictions on Kim
will be relaxed as soon as possible.
- While we follow Kim Dae Jung's case closely, more important is
our interest in continuing democratization of Korean society.
Democratization
There remains much room in Korea for democratization but
there have been many encouraging developments particularly in
the past year or so. These include the release of 401 political
prisoners, permission for students to demonstrate on campus, and
the lifting of political ban on all but 15 of 551 Koreans on whom it
was originally imposed until 1988. Many freed from the ban
formed new opposition party, supported, among others, by Kim
Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, that received 1/5 of popular vote
after a frank campaign.
We have encouraged these steps by publicly and privately
welcoming them and expressing the hope for further progress.
An important element of gradual but sustained progress toward
democratization is President Chun's pledge to step down in 1988,
which would be virtually the first peaceful transfer of the
presidency.
President Chun's planned visit to Washington will proceed as
scheduled, because we have many important issues to discuss.
Action, Information, and Briefing Memoranda (6/85)
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Basic Message
Press points: Central America
989PI
Our Central America policy of Support for democracy ancJ
dialogue is working. First Reagan term progress needs to be
consolidated in second. El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala
are joining Costa Rica as democratic societies. The
Sandinistas are preventing Nicaragua from joining the trend.
Our Objectives
-- Successful diplomacy in Central America requires that
we sustain the entire economic and military assistance
program proposed by the President.
Democracy
Trend is strongly toward democratic reformist regimes.
El Salvador situation improved markedly -- decline in
politics violence, economy growing, strict rules on
serial bombardment.
-Honduras consolidating democratic rule.
Democracy making a beginning in Guatemala.
-Nicaragua
Only in Nicaragua has clock been set back --
Sandinistas intent on establishing one-party state,
with same apparatus of repression found in otner
totalitarian states.
Events since sham elections -- censorship increased,
forced relocation of peasants, detention of leading
opposition figure -- show real Nicaraguan intentions.
Rejection of March 3 San Jose opposition manifesto is
setback to peace.
Repression and control of labor and press,
militarization of society-on Cuban model continue.
-- U.S. has moral obligation to help Nicaraguan
opposition. Experience shows pressure on Sandinistas
contributes to negotiations and regional stability.
Contadora
-- Contadora has come through a rough period caused by
Nicaraguan intransigence in asylum dispute, now ready
to resume. .
-- Key question -- is Nicaragua willing to negotiate?
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ECUAUUR -- AT A GLANCE
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o Growth weak but inflation down.
Real growth this year mdy not match 1984's 3 percent.
Agriculture rebounding from 'E1 Ninon; oil production up.
Inflation this year will be about half the 1983 peak of 53 percent.
o Good.compliance with IMF program; seeking multi-year rescliedulings.
-- Met all but one target of 1983/84 stand-by= new stand-by approved March 11.
-- Agreement in p[inpiple on $4.6 billion com'1 bank multi-year rescheduling.
-- Paris Club may approve Multi-Year Rescheduling Agreement in April.
-- Ecuadureans taking pragmatic approach to external debt issues.
o President Febres-Cordero favors private sector, tree market policies.
-- Signed OPIC Investment Guarantee Agreement last November.
-- Encouraging oil exploration by foreign companies.
-- Eliminated budget deficit, cutting subsidies, more flexible exchange rate.
Wang 4375?
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