LETTER TO WILLIAM CASEY FROM MORTIMER B. ZUCKERMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R002904800014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2009
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 11, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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1934/1
2400 N Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20037 ? [phone]
Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Chairman
Mr. William Casey
Director f
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Mr. Casey:
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed for
the June 17 issue of U.S.News & World Report.
Your insights into Soviet espionage and the recent
case involving the Walkers should prove very
interesting for our 11 million readers.
Sincerely,
rtime.r, B. `;Tuckerman
airman and Editor-in-Chief
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June 7, 1985
2400 N Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20037 ? [phone]
Lester Tanzer, Managing Editor
Mr. William Casey
Director
Central intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
LG;
1934/2
Dear Mr. Casey:
Our interview with you will appear in the current issue of U.S.News
& World Report, which will reach our subscribers early next week.
We will deliver ten copies of the magazine to your office on Monday,
and we sincerely appreciate the time you gave us for the interview and
your cooperation in so promptly clearing the manuscript.
Sincerely,
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'^, [phone]
George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs
~FO sraies os "-~'?E.
6 May 1985
; :mot-", , ;r= :
Dill~pl'.V"4 6)
Joe Fromm of U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT has
asked if you might be interested in doing another
interview with them, similar to the one you did
last year (copy attached). Again they will give
you final approval of the text.
Fromm says the new regime there is
interested in meeting with you and that the
interview would be followed by an off the record
luncheon with chairman and editor-in-chief Mort
Zuckerman and editor Shelby Coffey. Their
schedule is flexible, but they'd like to do it
within the next month.
Accept interview with U.S. NEWS
E:dFN~F~ Washington, D.C.
Georg V. Lauder
14 MAY 1985
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Inter view
E, VIC tnd
Washington's ultimate goal, the
CIA chief contends, is heading
off a massive refugee crisis on
America's southern border.
Cl Mr. Casey, with so much attentlon fo-
cused right now on Nicaragua and the con-
tras, can you give us your assessment of
the impact of the anti-Sandinista guerrillas?
A They're creating a great deal of dis-
array and pressure on the regime.
They've damaged the economy. Daniel
Ortega Saavedra (leader of the Sandinis-
ta junta) said a couple of weeks ago that
the contras have cost them about one
third of their exports. .
The main impact, however, is to di-
vert Sandinista leaders from supporting
the insurgency in El Salvador and bring
pressure on them to negotiate sensibly
to a more peaceful situation in that
whole area They are perceived to be
the threat to the peace by all the surrounding countries
because Nicaragua is the base for supporting insurgencies
not ooh in El Salvador but in Costa Rica, Guatemala and
Honduras as well.
Q While the United States may want to pressure the Sandi-
nistas to end support for Marxist guerrillas elsewhere, is that
really the goal of the contras in Nicaragua? Aren't they bent on
overthrowinc the regime?
A Those things are always mixed. They would like to
unseat the regime. The question is: What is th'e U.S. govern-
ment's purpose? After all in World War fl were helping
the Communists, the Royalists, the Caullists and everybody.
They were all trying to get power. We didn't care about
that, we just wanted to get help against the Nazis. It's an
analogous situation we have here. Our own national inter-
ests need not be strictly tied to any one group's goals.
Q What chance do the contras have of overthrowing the
Sandinista regime?
A I think there's no chance that they will be able to
overthrow the government In the resistance, you have, it is
said, perhaps 15,000 men with rifles scattered around the
open, unpopulated parts of the country, which is where
guerrillas can hide. They can't go into the cities, which the
government is protecting with tanks and 75,000 men in the
Army, the militia and the security forces. So they're not
going to overthrow that government
It could be-but it's a very long shot and unlikely-that
the government would dissolve because the people would
get fed up and fall away from the regime. But it's hard to
change a government that operates a system of control
where everybody in every block is counted and any strang-
ers who show have to explain themselves.
Q What is your response to published reports that the CIA
was involved in the mining of the Nicaraguan ports?
A I can't comment on such allegations.
Q What about reports that the CIA Is actively running this
V/im V/illia,,-l Casey, Director, Cent; al Intelligence Aoencc
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mining operation with a mother ship
offshore?
A I never comment on such reports,
Q Are the Cubans still heavily in-
volved in Nicaragua or have they reduced
their presence there as some recent re-
ports suggest?
A While the Cubans have been
talking about lowering their presence,
they've actually been moving in more
people. The Cubans run the security
services that manage the block-popu-
lation-control system.
There are about 7,000 to 9,000 Cu-
bans in Nicaragua including 3.000 to
3,500 military advisers intertwined
with the Nicaraguan military. They
also have 5,000 to 6.000 teachers,
construction and health workers who
are regularly taken back to Cuba on
rotation. The replacements now be-
ing sent have had military training
and are under 40.
As we saw in Grenada, Cuban con-
struction workers carry rifles as well
as shovels. There have been occasions
where these Cuban construction
workers joined in the fighting in Nic-
aragua when contras tangled with the
Nicaraguan military.
Cl Is there any evidence that Cuba or
the Soviet Union Is'converting Nicaragua into a kind of strategic
base along lines you've warned about in the past?
A We were concerned about that because they were
lengthening airfields in Nicaragua to make them long
enough to handle supersonic planes. And we know, Nicara.
guan fliers were going to Bulgaria, to the Soviet Union and
Cuba to be trained- Now, that has continued. The training
has been completed. We believe that MiC-23s are in Cuba
earmarked for Nicaragua and that Nicaraguan pilots are
practicing in them. We believe the planes haven't been
sent over to Nicaragua, because they're concerned about
our response.
Q How many Nicaraguan pilots have been trained?
A We don't have an exact figure, but it's substantial-
something like 40 pilots, enough to handle a squadron of
planes, which is what we think they have in Cuba.
One thing you've got to understand is that both the
Soviets and the Cubans go to great lengths to keep their
military' support for Nicaragua quiet and ambiguous. The
heavy Soviet weapons come largely in Bulgarian and Alge-
rian ships. Soviet and Cuban ships bring. n the lighter stuff
mixed with commercial cargo. We have intelligence that
the Cubans in Nicaragua shave their mustaches and hide
their dog tags. They are mixed in with Nicaraguan units,
not kept in separate Cuban formations that could be
identified..
Q You mentioned that an objective of the contras was to
divert the Sandinistas from their support of the Marxist guerrll-
ias in Et Salvador. Are they having an, impact on the flow of
supplies to the Salvadoran rebels?
A Oh, they certainly have had an impact, though it's
hard to ouantify. To start off with, the Nicaraguans have to
use their weapons and ammunition to fight the contras
instead of sending them to El Salvador to fight the govern-.
ment. That's got to have an impact The supplies are.stili
coming in from Nicaragua, but we think it's in reduced
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amounts. We know -that the, Nicaraguan government and
the Army are having to pay greater attention to dealing
with the internal resistance, which means that there's
much less attention they, can give to exporting revolution.
But I can't be very much more specific than that.
Q It Nicaragua is being forced to divert Its attention from El
Salvador, why do the Marxist guerrillas In El Salvador seem to
have been gaining In recent months?
A Well, they might be doing better without that diver-
sion. We do know that the Salvadoran guerrillas have been
able to increase their numbers by training and. arming
some of their support people. At the same time, we have
pretty good reporting that they're short of ammunition and
they're short of funds and they're not as effective as they
would be if Nicaraguan support were unimpaired.
Also, the Salvadoran Army has been getting more effec-
tive. Before the period leading up to the elections, the
Army had the guerrillas pretty well broken up and pushed
back into their bases in mountainous areas.
Q How do you reconcile your claim that the Salvadoran Army
is getting better with the constant criticism that It's still too
Incompetent to make headway against the guerrillas?
A It has a lot of deficiencies but it is improving steadily
through better training, better leadership, more-aggressive
tactics and more-sustained operations. It needs more mobil-
ity. It is not a perfect world, and there is still plenty of room
for improvement. That can be said about any army.
The main problem in El Salvador from the military stand-
point is this: As a rule of thumb, experts say that an army
needs an 8 or 10 to 1 advantage to win a guerrilla war. Look
at the Nicaraguan Army and militia 75,000 men under
arras---and they are unable to cope with 15,000 contras.
Now the ratio of the Salvadoran Army to the guerrillas is
something like 4 to 1, and the guerrillas have a safe haven, a
supply and a command-and-control base right across the
border in Nicaragua. Given that situation, the Salvadoran,
Army is not doing badly.
The only way you're going to resolve the conflict in El
Salvador is if two things happen: You have to deprive the
guerrillas of their safe haven and further reduce the flow of
1atn Ports Made-b CIA Dcector-,
'Controversy over inlning People are 4ess:con-}=
._cemed'.about .reports-cf a'riin-ng ..Nicaraguan harbors"
han :. ley .are -;about _bangers , f ''f anotf -er _f~rba" -.: in .
impact of contras In Nicaragua. While?e
=atirig a Qraat -deal of orsarray and;pressure.;on he
egime ; _ :theres :no. c?tance that They will be'-able'to
-overthrow r povemme-nt "
Arms to "Salvadoran iebel& 'Guemlla .operations
against-Nicaragua's Sari Wiis a-Tegirrie 'certainly;have
::gad ail rr~pacY-Dri1ow of ,Weapons to Marxist insur -..
ilS_=concern about destii vquade The real issue is
',ti;rhether. oue. primary -purpose is to establish abetter'
~.. .
soceety Tn Sa}va~or .. : -to protect the security vrter
':gists f 3tie ~l}iiited States-S-*':, ~,4 `?~ -' ,`
~2rart~lraq war. "Prevailing opnion is Thai in.2 -
' would pose grave dangersfor entire gull regiorL
- -zState~porsored terrorism ~lnternabonal communt-
ty, hould isolate diplomatically-and Impose sanctions
-against countries sponsoring terrorism.
supplies and build up the Salvadoran Army by 25 percent
to 40 percent to improve the ratio of Army to guerrillas.
Q How do you handle the growing pressure In Congress to
cut otl military aid to El Salvador if the death squads continue to
operate there? Why Is the Salvadoran government unwniing or
unable to deal with the death squads?
A I think?it's a cultural problem. It's a violent society like
most of the societies down there. Everybody talks about the
right-wing death squads. During recent months, most of
the assassination victins have been supporters of the Ro-
berto D'Aubuisson mdvement, the so-called right wing. So
there are left-wing death squads. The guerrillas practice
intimidation, and the}' slaughter people as they did in Viet-
nam. It's a civil war. And they also have this special kind of
free-lance, nongovernmental death squad that practices re-
venge. That works both ways right across the society.
Besides that, the judicial system in El Salvador leaves
much to be desired. They have a hard time getting any
convictions. But basically what we're talking about is
whether our primary purpose is to establish a better society
in El Salvador, which isn't likely to happen quickly under
present circumstances, or to protect the security interests
of the United States and give Salvadoran democracy a
chance to develop.
Q Are you worried that Central America will become a major
Issue In the political campaign and undermine popular support
for the administration's strategy there?
A I think that people in the long run are less concerned
about reports of mining Nicaraguan harbors than they are
about the danger of creating P. wave of immigration into
this country if Central America or any part of it should fall
under Soviet-Cuban domination. If we have another Cuba
in Central America, Mexico will have a big problem and
we're going to have a massive wave of immigration- The
effort to prevent this from happening is not going to excite
Americans as much as the threat they would face if things
go wrong.
Also, I think people are concerned about the military
danger. If the Communists solidify their hold on Nicaragua,
the other countries down there would have to accommo-
date in some way. The Communists would next be looking
at Mexico, to find problems that they specialize in exploit.
ing. So what you're looking at for your children and your
grandchildren is a long-term prospect of a hundred million
hostile people immediately south of our border if we fail to
give democracy a chance to develop in Central America.
Q To turn to the other spot that worries Americana-the
Middle East What is the likelihood of an Iranian victory In the
war with Iraq?
A The Iraqis should be able to stave off this current
offensive because they have such a preponderance of air
power and artillery and tank power. But the Iranians have
the numbers; they have the staying power; they've got the
economic resources. The Iraqis are in bad shape economi-
cally. They've also got a big Shia population with religious
ties to Iran. I think the prevailing opinion is that in the long
run the Iranians have some important advantages.
Q. What dangere might the United States face if Iran does
win?
A If Iran prevails and a radical Shiite regime is estab-
lished in Baghdad similar to the Khomeini regime in Tehe-
ran, there are a lot of people they could turn loose against
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the gulf states, which have sup-
ported Iraq.
The Iranians are in a vengeful frame of mind. We have
seen what they can do with the terrorist attacks on the
American Embassy in Kuwait and the Marine barracks in
Beirut. They are taking people from those gulf states to
camps in Teheran fox terrorist training and sending them
Continued
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back. So already they hpve a
pretty potent subversive poten-
tial in those small countries.
Q What would the United States
do if Iran moved against these oil
states in the gulf region?
A I can't speculate on that.
The U.S. government said that
we would keep the Strait of Hor-
muz open. As to something hap-
pening in one or another of these
countries around the gulf, any re-
action, I would suppose, would
depend upon the circumstances
at the time.
Q That brings up the problem of
state-sponsored terrorism that Sec-
retary of State Shultz has been talk-
ing about: What can the United
States do to counter terrorism
sponsored by Iran and other gov-
ernments-assassinate their peo-
pie, bomb their capitals or what?
A Don't put words in my
mouth. As Secretary Shultz said,
we're dealing with a new phe-
nomenon in state-sponsored ter-
rorism--a new weapons system
that obliterates the distinction
between peace and war.
Contras: "Perhaps 15,000 men with rifles scattered
around the unpopulated parts of the country."
The Iranians use their diplomatic facilities as a platform
to make revolutionary guards, communications facilities
and money available for terrorist planning and action.
They've attacked us twice in Beirut-the American Embas-
sy and the Marine barracks. They turn up in many coun-
tries in Africa, Asia and Europe, and we are likely to see
them here. They send their missionaries across the whole
Moslem world, from Morocco to Malaysia and Indonesia,
preaching Khomeini's brand of radical religious-social gos-
pel. It's a force that we're going to have to reckon with in
many dimensions.
Q But what can you do about It? Do you get-into the business
of assassinating terrorist leaders?
e more
ntensively on the
A We don't engage in assassinations. We have to depend screening and surveillance at entry and departure points of
on a combin tion of `t
i`'.
-- -d - . - -
rong secur
measures
-- coopera on to deter and defeat terrorism.
Let's look at the problem of state-sponsored terrorism'-
and international terrorism in a little more detail. There
are more than 50 major terrorist organizations, and hun-
dreds of mom and pop shops-little groups that take on
operations for hire. We can count scores of terrorist-train-
ing camps in Iran, Libya, Syria, South Yemen, Bulgaria, the
Soviet Union, Romania, Cuba and other bloc countries.
Now, there are several things you can do to cope with
this kind of terrorism. You can handle it by defending
yourself, defending potential targets. That's pretty tough
because you haven't got enough policemen to protect ev-
ery target and you don't know where they're going to hit
So we are engaged in helping security organizations in a
great many countries to improve their training and opera-
tional proficiency. These countries have their own intelli-
gence capabilities to watch the terrorists. They're apt to be
better at it than we are because they've got to live with
them all the time and they're closer to them. A qualified
antiterrorist network has developed through the liaison
relationship between intelligence and security organiza-
tions. It is being improved by intensified intelligence ex-
changes and by training and other forms of assistance.
On top of that, there's a question of deterring terrorism
by sending the message that if
the terrorists attack there will be
retaliation. It's not necessarily a
matter of striking back directly at
the terrorists. The Israelis, for ex-
ample, send the message: "If
we're hit from your territory,
that's your responsibility and
we're going to kick you in the
teeth somehow." I think you will
see more of that-retaliation
against facilities connected with
the country sponsoring the ter-
rorists or retaliation that just
hurts the interests of countries
which sponsor terrorism.
Some people say that you've
got to find out who the terrorists
are and make sure you hit the
people who hit you. Well, usually
that means you're not going to do
it at all. If retaliation is going to
be a deterrent, the countries
sponsoring terrorism have got to
know it's going to happen quick-,
1), and with certainty.
Now, there's a third way to
handle state-sponsored terrorism
which, in my view, needs to be
developed faster.
Q What's that alternative way?
A That's a kind of international, diplomatic counterof-
fensive against international terrorism. In effect, it would
apply a modern version of the 18th-century international
law on piracy that charged every nation with responsibility
for picking up pirates and putting them away where they
could do no more harm. It's a little hard to get acceptance
of that in today's world, and I'm not quite sure just how you
would implement it.
But nations could join together to invoke economic sanc-
tions against and isolate diplomatically countries, such as
Iran and Libya, that practice terrorism as a matter of state
policy. They could collaborat
i
They could agree to respond more quickly and surely to
requests from other countries for extradition and assistance.
So there are three ways you can deal with state-spon-
sored terrorism short of sending out hit squads. You can
defend, you can retaliate and you can impose international
barriers and sanctions of a nonviolent nature.
Q If we can turn finally to the Soviet Union: What, as you see
It, has been the effect of the change In leadership there from
Andropov to Chernenko?
A Minimal. Chernenko is clearly a transitional leader,
but nobody knows whether he's going to be around six
months, two years or five years, and it doesn't make much
difference. We predicted that China's Mao Tse-tung would
die 20 times before they finally buried him. So we are very
shy about predicting how long Chernenko will last.
My view is that under the Soviet system today everything
is worked out in a collegial way. Certainly with this kind of
short-term leader, no one man is going to have the power
to make a drastic change of direction. And there's no reason
to assume that when Chernenko goes, the situation will
change. What you've got in the Soviet Union is a generation
of septuagenarians who are reluctant to forfeit their perqui-
sites by passing power. to a younger generation. They're
intent on hanging on to power. 0
3.
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