NET ASSESSMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R002804630003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 26, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
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STAT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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DCI
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DDCI -
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EXDIR
>4
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D/ICS
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DDI
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DDA
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DDO
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DDS&T
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Chm/NIC
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GC
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IG
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Compt
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D/Pers
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D/OLL
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D/PAO
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SA/IA
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AO/DCI
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C/IPD/OIS
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NI.00~
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SUSPENSE
Date .
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Executive Registry
26 January 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
1. I would like to review our posture with respect to net assessments.
We produced what I thought was rather a good product a year or two ago in
the way of a net assessment of Strategic Forces.
2. At that time it is my recollection that we had planned, at least
tentatively, a net assessment on missile defense. What happened to that?
Is it still a good idea?
3. I noted recently a reference to a net assessment which Ray Cline,
then DDI, and Admiral Radford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did
together in the 1950s. I tried to get a line on this and all I come up
with are pages from Ray Cline's'book on'the CIA which I attach. It seems
to me that in the light of the vast change in Soviet capabilities, as
spelled out in our estimates on Soviet global reach and the ongoing one on
Soviet capability for multitheater war, as well as our work on strategic and
conventional forces and our knowledge of Soviet subversion and insurgency
support capabilities, together with the forthcoming estimate on SPETSNAD,
certainly a net assessment covering the total range of Soviet-US military
and paramilitary capabilities would be a formidable undertaking but would
be a challenging and probably a very revealing one.
4. I would like the addressees of this rote to think about it and
schedule a time to discuss it.
William J. Casey
SECRET
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by nayS.N90O
AN ORACLE TRADEPAPERBACK
ACROPOLIS BOOKS LTD. ? WASHINGTON. D.C. 20009
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a very special estimative process in which I participated during
the latter part of 1954 when I was detailed to the Pentagon to
assist in preparing a Net Estimate on the USSR. The several
months I spent on this endeavor were extremely enlightening
and, again, I am sorry that this experiment in intelligence
processing ended after a few years and is imperfectly
understood today. We prepared an excellent Net Estimate in
1954 and it had a marked influence on military strategy and
policy-mainly because the President-Eisenhower-and his
two top technical advisers in the matter, Dulles of CIA and
Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the JCS, enthusiastically
endorsed the project and paid attention to the findings.
The concept of a net estimate is basically a military one and it
had evolved into a preliminary pilot project while I was in
London. It was agreed at the NSC level to go all out on the 195.;
effort. The concept is that while intelligence agencies are able to
gauge enemy capabilities and intentions, these are most
meaningful if weighed against an estimate of U.S. forces'
capabilities and intentions. This latter estimate is prepared by
planning and operations staffs of the JCS. If these two analytical
processes are integrated intellectually and combined in one
estimate of the probable balance of potential forces and the
probable outcome of conflicts, this is a "net" evaluation or what
in military tradition was called a "commander's estimate." The
NSC under Eisenhower, who was familiar with this terminolo-
gy, asked Dulles and Radford to prepare such a commander's
estimate on the probable outcome of a war between the USSR
and the United States.
In characteristic Washington procedure, Dulles delegated his
responsibility to General Bull of the National Estimates Board,
an experienced army operations staff chief with a fine analytical
mind, and Bull chose me to go to the Pentagon and actually
write the paper. Radford chose a brilliant but somewhat
lackadaisical representative, Rear Admiral Thomas H. Robbins,
who was quite content to let his staff assistants, some able
young officers who initially had not a clue as to what we were
supposed to do, take their lead from me.
I discovered what power there is in a military organization
very quickly; with what amounted to a free-hand mandate from
both Bull and Robbins, I could invoke Admiral Radford's
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authority over the military services and have things happen
instantaneously. Early in planning the project, f-decided we had
to reduce the complex war-gaming of attack and defense forces
to thc? then novel technique of computerized formulas. I
discovered that I could preempt the time of the vast vacuum-
tube computer then filling the basement of the Pentagon and I
learned that the services had one really experienced war-
gaming staff-outside of Washington. Consequently, I argued
that we should use the computer and the war-gaming staff to
make a computerized war-game for the first time part of what
Would then be the most ambitious Net Estimate yet written. On
Friday this was cleared with Radford; on Monday the war-game
experts were on hand and we went to work.
We made some interesting discoveries-among them that it
was a pretty desperate move for the USSR to attack us with
their substantially inferior long-range air force, that extensive
U.S. radar tactical warning systems would make it impossible
for surprise to be achieved in an all-out attack, and that the
characteristics of defensive radar made it much more profitable
to attack at low-level where "ground-clutter" returns confused
the radar rather than at the high altitudes for which our
bombers were designed. This last point, I believe, gave the main
impetus for a revision of bombing tactics by the U.S. Air Force
and helped it ready our aircraft and future aircraft design well in
advance of the time when really effective ground-to-air Soviet
Missiles made it imperative for the United States to go to low-
level attack.
With the war-game results and all of the latest NIE detailed
estimates of Soviet capabilities at my fingertips, I wrote every
word of that year's Net Estimate, cleared it with everybody, and
prepared the text for an oral briefing on the findings, complete
with visual aid charts, which Admiral Robbins presented at the
White House: Eisenhower insisted that all top officials of the
Defense Department attend this special briefing . Dulles and
Bull and I of course went along, the encomiums were great, and
I believe we did demonstrate how useful a genuinely coopera-
tive, interagency net estimate can be if the high command
shows a real interest in it. The process was repeated for several
years, without startling new findings, and the Net Estimate
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system eventually lapsed, although the term lingers on in
various other contexts.
This Net Estimate and the NIEs of this 1950s era succeeded in
reducing the Soviet military threat to the United States to
reasonable proportions in the minds of war-planning staffs.
CIA probably never accomplished more of value to the nation
than this quiet, little-remarked analytical feat.
It is hard to remember now that from about 1948 on,
beginning with the Berlin Blockade and accelerating with the
Korean War, Washington was inclined to expect a direct
military assault by the Soviet Union and, later, by Communist
China in Asia. Taiwan and Korea were the anticipated targets in
Asia, whereas in Europe Soviet armies were expected to sweep
across the North German plain to the Atlantic. The JCS in this
period repeatedly estimated in their own papers that the USSR
was bent on "world domination" and that the "time of greatest
danger" of attack was two years hence. I believe this latter
figure of speech died out about 1954.
In any case the ONE staff and Board members valiantly
worked throughout the 1950s to moderate this black-and-white
approach to estimates on the USSR, trying to suggest that an
"ultimate" intention of "world domination" was not a sure
indicator of specific near-term military action and that, on
balance, the USSR would be unwise to resort to direct military
attack to achieve its unquestioned purpose of increasing its
political influence in Europe and the Mideast.
Most of the more moderate language describing, qualifying,
and accurately quantifying the Soviet threat came from CIA
draftsmen, and had to be fought through up to the DDI and DCI
decision levels. It was an educational process for all concerned,
as we adjusted to a postwar world of ideological, economic,
political, and military conflict. Gradually military intelligence
officers and civilian analysts alike became more sophisticated,
the short-of-war kind of conflict became better understood, and
U.S. policy became based on strategic deterrence and politico-
economic alliance-building as a way of containment. My own
belief is that a handful of CIA analysts and their chiefs served
the country well in building this estimative foundation on
which U.S. strategy and policy in its broad outlines rested for
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
Compt
Per Mr. Gates: No further action: required
he will handle. with DCI and this paper
has been sent to VC/NIC by Gates. 14 Feb
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 Approved For Release 2009/09/03: CIA-RDP87M00539R002804630003-3 25X1
J Executive Registry
&5" 402
26 January 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Estimates and Net Assessments
Here are some matters I would like to talk to you about.
1. In reviewing the Status of Interagency Work in Process it appears
that Gershwin and[ J carry the heaviest load by far, with Ermarth, 25X1
Q Fuller, Na , Low and Wettering also fairly heavy. Nall has 25X1
listed four very important Estimates, two of them apparently Estimates and
a Memorandum to Holders on the same subject due at the same time. I consider
it important to get the ones on Soviet Sciences, Free World Advanced
Technologies and an update on Soviet Military Technology on the streets
as soon as possible during this year. What contribution are the other NIOs
making or planning to make to the estimate program? Do we need to reallocate
resources to back up Gershwin, and Nall more strongly? I think 25X1
we can get Fuller going on an evaluation of Qadhafi's position, objectives
and vulnerabilities as soon as we can.
Soviet Capabilities for Multitheater War.
2. I attach a very good memorandum that Hal Ford did on the draft
Estimate on Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan.
I have already commented on that draft which has a lot of good substance
but is too wandering and unforcused with the best part at the end and not
reflected in the Key Judgments accurately. In light of the attention that
Afghanistan is going to get during the coming months it is important to get
this Estimate cleanly and sharply done as quickly as possible. It has been
around far too long already. Hal seems to be pretty much on target with his
suggestions for reorganization. Also, let's be sure that those doing the
Afghanistan Estimate will focus on advanced Soviet capabilities in the
southern theater or are at least aware of Ermarth's memorandum on that
subject (prepared for the NSC).and Estimate due in June on 25X1
3. Also, I would like to have a discussion on whether we should be
undertaking anything else in the area in the way of net assessments. I
attach a covering memorandum which I am addressing to you, Gershwin and
William J. Casey
Attachments:
As stated
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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
15 January 1985
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Mr. Casey's Comment (Memo of 14 Jan 85)
on NIE 11/37-85: Strategic Implications
of the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan
I attach, FYI, some suggestions I made in
November re the original draft of this NIE. There
might be something in those suggestions which could
be adapted in revising the present text.
Hal (rd
NI0/AL
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
.11
FROM:
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
NIE 11/37-85: Strategic Implications of the Soviet
Presence in Afghanistan
1. I agree that the draft estimate on the strategic implications of
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is an intriguing paper. It is also an
impressive piece of work, but its very size minimizes its value. Worse
still, the most useful and important part of it, Implications of Soviet
Victory in Afghanistan, is stuck at the back and is hardly mentioned in
the key judgments. Moreover, I find it somewhat more sanguine as to where
a Soviet victory would leave Western interests in the whole area. I also
found it more sanguine than my offhand perception of the US ability to deter
the Soviets from using a consolidated Afghanistan as a base for further
movement.
2. I have made a lot of markings on these questions on pages 79-96.
Some of the questions are somewhat answered later on, but not to my full
satisfaction. It almost appears as though we have two estimates here with
Section VII being able to stand on its own; however, it is hard to disentangle
it from other strategic and political implications. Perhaps the way to resolve
this dilemma is to make an appendix out of the military analysis but to get
its implications and conclusions set out in the key judgments.
3. Throughout the draft, closer editing would probably help a lot.
4. Although in his covering memo the NIO says he spent a lot of time
on the SRP comments, I still detect some of what the SRP called the most
critical weaknesses in paragraph 3 of their 26 October comments. I still
agree with their conclusion that the discussion of US military advantage
in the Iranian area is overly reassuring and still written in the context of
a radical Islamic government, which perhaps with leverage on two Iranian borders
instead of one Iranian border the Soviets may be able to do something about.
5. It is a difficult estimate but its importance requires another crash
effort to deal with the difficulties and get it out. It has been around too
long.
14 January 1985
6. I'd be interested in knowing the degree of coordination it has received.
I want comments and suggestions from NIO/USSR and NIO/GPF. The Ermarth memo of
last fall on Soviet opportunities in the southern theater struck me as much
more trenchantly on the mark. It appears that perhaps there has not been enough
input from Soviet and military specialists.
Orig - Ch, NIC
William J. Casey
1 - D
1 DOS.
1 -ile
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