NEW ART FORM FOR INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R002804610001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 17, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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DOCU~1ENTS CROSS-REFERENCED
ATTACH ~/ ~~^/
U~ ~U(
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.. SECRET
DDI 402453-85
17 May 1985
NOTE T0: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: New Art Form for Intelligence Memoranda
1. Two months or so ago, we discussed experimenting with a
new kind of paper that would lay out alternative means of
resolution of key foreign policy problems. Discussion of each
would explore how it might come about and the likely reaction to
it. After reading the first two -- on Angola and Suriname -- you
indicated interest in our trying it on Afghanistan and
Nicaragua.
2. The Nicaragua paper is attached. I forward the paper
because I think you may find it of some interest even though I
think it is actually off target. Whereas the Angola paper
addressed three or four approaches or strategies in which the
conflict in Angola might be resolved, it did so in a way that
suggested more a series of scenarios rather than specific policy
alternatives for the United States. And therein lies my problem
with the Nicaragua paper. It is very specifically constructed as
a US policy options paper. In that respect it is interesting and
probably worth your reading. But, to carry out the original
charge, I think that we should be looking at a paper that would
address alternatives such as (1) collapse of.the Contras and
other internal armed opposition in Nicaragua, (2) growth of the
Contras and expansion of activity to the point where the
government control is challenged, (3) a negotiated outcome, (4)
changing .leadership and how that might come about and so on.
This type of "alternative resolution" analysis .thus would be
couched in terms of the different scenarios rather than specific
US policies. In this regard it would be more parallel to the
approach of the Angola paper.
3. Also, if we like it, we could get it around; we could
not do anything with a paper on US options. Once I have your
comments, if you agree, we will take another crack at the
Nicaragua paper
Ro er ates
Attachments:
Nicaragua: Impact of Alternative US Strategies, May 1985
Angola: Impact of Alternative Regional Settlements.,, March 19
Suriname: Impact of Alternative Policy Options; March 1985
SECRET C1 By Signer
DECL OADR
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DDI ~~02453-85
17 May 1985
SUBJECT: New Art Form for Intelligence Memoranda
1 - DDI Registry
1 - DDI Chrono
DDI/RMGates/de~
DISTRIBUTION:
0 - DCI
1 - ER
r~rr
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ANGOLA: IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE REGIONAL SETTLEMENTS
This memorandum explores alternative strategies that could
lead to a resolution of the regional conflict involving Angola,
UNITA, and~~South Africa. It seeks to provide the reader with an
understanding of the basic forces at play in the region, sets out
alternative strategies that could be employed to resolve the
conflict, and assesses the extent to which the problem is
susceptible to external influence. The format is purposely ~~
provocative; it is not intended to predict what may or may not
occur. The-paper discusses the viability of each potential
course of action, but does not endorse any particular policy
alternative. Rather, it provides a structured way of thinking
about the costs and opportunities. associated with each approach
and some idea of what new openings or dangers mi ht be emerge if
a given course of action were to be pursued. 25X1
THE CURRENT SCENE
UNITA insurgents have made steady gains in Angola's nearly
10-year civil war, despite being outnumbered and outgunned by the
Cuban-and Soviet-supported Angolan Army. The insurgents have
made good use of their advantages in quality of man ower and
leadership to take and hold the military initiative
We judge, however, that neither side is likely to gain a
decisive advantage over the other in the coming year, although
the intensity of the fighting probably will increase throughout
the country. UNITA most likely will make some gains but not at
the pace it has enjoyed in the past; nor will it be able to seize
key positions the government chooses to hold and defend.
Luanda's inventory of Soviet fighters has tripled in the past
year, and Luanda's greater use of air superiority will pose
growing problems for UNITA.
This relatively even match--despite the imbalance of
forces--could be changed significantly by outside factors such as
Namibian independence under UN Resolution 435 and some form of
Cuban troop withdrawal or if the Luanda regime and UNITA initiate
negotiations toward a reconciliation agreement. UN Resolution
435 states that following the arrival of a UN peacekeeping
forces, South African troops would be confined to their garrisons
and, in steps over a period of 12 weeks, would be reduced to a
total of 1,500 men. At the end of seven months, elections would
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be held and the remaining South African contingent would
depart. This would deprive UNITA of its main lines of outside
support, eliminate South Africa as a deterrent to n 1 ion~_
and open UNIT.~'s base areas .to Angolan attack. 25X1
UNITA's military successes over the past two years also have
forced the MPLA regime in Luanda to consider trying to end the
fighting through negotiations. Although the MPLA has maintained
a rigid public stance o osin talks with UNITA 25X1
considerable ferment continues 2bX1
within the party supporting national reconciliation. Many see a
rapprochement as a device for ending the civil war, lessening
Angola's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba and opening
the country to greater Western aid 25X1
Substantial resistance to talks remain, however,
particularly among the mulato-hardliners and a large number of
their black. supporters throughout the government and military.
Although the Soviet Union and Cuba appear staunchly opposed to
any talks, the MPLA has repeatedly been advised to negotiate by
various African neighbors, by countries in both Eastern and
Western?Europe, and by South Africa.
STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
The following list of strategies is not intended to be
exhaustive; other approaches could be constructed by combining
elements from two or more of~the strategies discussed below. Nor
is the order in which they are presented intended to endorse the
adoption of any particular approach 25X1
The four alternative approaches we examine for resolving the
conflict involving Angola, UNITA, and South Africa are:
o Complete and Simultaneous Cuban Withdrawal With
Implementation of UN Resolution 435.
o Partial Cuban Withdrawal Af ter UN Resolution 435 Is
Implemented.
o Withdrawal of All But a Small Residual Cuban Force in
Conjunction with UN Resolution 435.
o Some Form of Reconciliation Agreement involving Luanda
and UNITA in Conjunction with UN Resolution 435 25X1
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Strategy 1: Simultaneous Withdrawal and UN 435
Cuba withdraws all military personnel--combat troops,
advisers, and technnicians--from Angola over a period of twelve
weeks in such a manner that the number of Cubans and South
Africans in the re i n w e essentially equal once the process
got underway
Impact. Essentially the South African position first
advanced in May 1982, this approach would be disastrous for the
MPLA government. Luanda could not compensate for the loss of
25,000 Cuban troops defending key provincial centers, nor for the
advisers and technicians that run Angola's war machine. 25X1
UNITA iaould lose the deterrent value of South African forces
stationed in Namibia and Savimbi's base areas would become
vulnerable to sustained Angolan attack. UNITA also would lose
access to South Africa as an easy and secure arms supplier, but
would gain some propaganda advantage by claiming it now was
battling the Luanda regime unaided by foreign supporters 25X1
Viability. Luanda and Cuba would opppose this approach
because they believe it would lead to the collapse of the MPLA
regime. Savimbi would be less resistant, calculating that he
would have to strike quick and hard to settle the civil war
before supply shortages cut into his capabilities. 25X1
Other Considerations. Cuba and the Soviet Union would
risk a major propaganda debate if they were seen as unwilling
to provide the necessary support to keep their friends in
power. 25X1
South Africa might view the departure of all Cubans as a
golden opportunity to invade Angola in force--as it did in
1975--and install Savimbi as the new head of government in
Luanda. They almost certainly would find ways to continue
assisting UNITA covertly, but the level of support would fall.
Strategy 2: Partial Cuban Withdrawal After UN 435
In accordance with UN 435, South Africa withdraws its Air
Force from Namibia and reduces its troop strength to 1,500 men.
Cuba then withdraws 20,000 military. personnel over a three-year
Impact. This proposal was advanced by Luanda .in November
and apparently was vetted by the Cubans and the Soviets. Angola
could still depend on a substantia; force--10,000 by Luanda's
count and 15,000 by our estimates--to defend the key provincial
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centers and provide essential technical and advisory support.
Cubans troops probably would be taken mostly from southwestern
Angola were they had helped defend against South African __
incursions and where UNITA is not particularly active: Soviet
weapons deliveries would continue, major urban areas would be,
protected, and economically vital oil production would be
secured.
UNITA would lose the support necessary to sustain the
conflict at its present levels and South African protection of
its sanctuary in the southeast. Savimbi probably would be
able to secure at least minimal levels of support from other
donors to continue the conflict for some years, but the trend
Viability. Luanda and the Cubans would support this
approach wholeheartedly and Moscow somewhat grudgingly. Both
UNITA and. Pretoria almost certainly would reject it.
Other Considerations. Lacking a South African support
structure, Savimbi might be compelled to extend his base areas
into Zambia and seek sanctuary for his troops there
With UNITA on the run, Soviet and Cuban efforts to
consolidate the Marxist Leninist regime in Luanda would receive
much greater attention.
ANC base areas in Angola would be more secure and the
guerrillas could bring considerably more pressure on South
Strategy 3: Smaller Cuban Residual Force and UN 435
Cuba withdraws its forces at a faster pace--perhaps within
two years--leaving behind only a small residual force of 3,000 to
5,000 troops. South African forces are withdrawn from Namibia in
accordance with UN 435. 25X1
Impact. UNITA would lose the South African deterrent and
sustaining supply within a matter of weeks and probably would opt
to intensify the conflict in hopes of achieving a military
victory. Luanda, however, would have substantial Cuban forces on
hand for at least one year and probably could contain a major
thrust by UNITA.
Nevertheless, we believe that Luanda's dependence on Cuban
manpower is greater than UNITA's reliance on a South African
presence in Namibia, and we expect over time that Savimbi's
forces would begin to prevail as the Cuban troop withdrawal
neared completion. UNITA would be able to concentrate its forces
on the few remaining areas of government strength and probabl
could take effective control over most of trye country. 25X1
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Viability. South Africa and UNITA might accept this package
provided they were assured of satisfactory verification and
implementation procedures. Luanda is more likely to balk at the...
deal, arguing that it would postpone the MPLA's demise by no more
than a year or two. MPLA leaders might be persuaded to go along,
however, if they believed that they could t on the timing or
extent of the Cuban force reduction. 25X1
Other Considerations. Luanda might try to compensate for
the loss of Cuban troops, for example, by forming a "civilian
construction corps" populated mostly by able-bodied young
Cubans. It also might seek Western assurances of greatly
increased economic--and possibly military--assistance as the
price for its acceptance.
The Soviet Union and Cuba would retain substantial influence
over the Luanda Government at least initially, but the door would
be opened. to an enhanced Western role and presence. Pressure
also would mount on the US Government to afford diplomatic
With UNITA's hopes of achieving a military victory
bolstered, Savimbi would press his friends hard for additional
support and start to rely more on supply routes through Zaire.
Even if Mobutu kept this a low-key operation, it probably would
not remain secret. His involvement, in turn, might prompt
the Soviet Union and Cuba to step up support to anti-Mobutu
Strategy 4: Reconciliation and UN 435
The MPLA Government enters into negotiations with UNITA.
Both sides agree to stop fighting, a coalition government is
formed, and provision is made for the reduction and eventual
withdrawal of all Cuban and South African military personnel
from Angola. The talks take place in the context of a regional
peace settlement that allows for a phased withdrawal of South
African forces from Namibia in accordance with UN Resolution
Impact. Successful talks would end the civil war,. lessen
Luanda's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba, and pave the
way for greater Western aid and improved relations with Angola's
neighbors. A decision to enter into negotiations with UNITA also
would appease those within the MPLA government who reportedly may
be pushing for a rapprochement,. including former members of the
Catete group, an amorphous group of Army officers known as the
Young Captains, and a few of President dos Santos' closest
On the other hand, reconciliation would entail major risks
for Luanda. Influential mulatto hardliners and a sufficient
number of their black supporters in the party, military, and
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government appear to believe that a compromise with UNITA--
especially one that enhances the stature of UNITA's charismatic
leader ~7onas-Savimbi--could rapidly lead to an UNITA takeover
and their own physical demise. They believe that UNITA can
eventually be defeated militarily and they might move to
oust dos Santos if he tried to engage UNITA in reconciliation
Savimbi would view reconciliation talks as a means of
removing the Cuban presence from Angola and legitimizing his
claim to represent the political aspirations of the bulk of the
Angolan people. He would risk losing direct South African
support to his movement and foreclose the possibility of gaining
a military victory over the Luanda regime. His willingness to
sit down at the same table with the enemy also mi ht cost him the
support of some of his more radical advisers
The talks could conclude with agreement on partition or
federation," with UNITA in control of the southern half of the
country. This would allow UNITA to consolidate its regional
power free from Angolan and Cuban military pressure. Such an
arrangement would significantly bolster Angola's case for
diplomatic recognition and pave the way for increased Western
assistance, thereby strengthening the Luanda government. 25X1
Viability. Serious talks between the Luanda government and
UNITA are not likely unless the MP LA's military situation
deteriorates substantially. We doubt that Luanda's agreement to
talk by itself would be enough for Savimbi to accept a package
with a sizeable residual Cuban force since the talks could fail
and leave Savimbi militarily disadvantaged. Moreover, some MPLA
leaders believe they can avoid talks through a military victory,
and they would never acquiesce to a complete withdrawal of Cuban
military personnel. Although MPLA leaders probably would find
the idea of a federation more appealing, they would be inclined
to reject it as well 25X1
Cuba would not reject reconciliation out of hand given the
economic and political costs of maintaining a substantial Cuban
military presence in Angola and their doubts that Luanda could
ever defeat the insurgents militarily. Moscow, however, would
adamantly oppose any compromise with UNITA. It views Savimbi as
a major threat to the consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist
government in Angola and believes that his inclusion in a
coalition government would severely undermine Soviet and Cuban
influence. Cuba almost certainly would acquiesce to Soviet
South Africa, however, would be a forceful proponent of
reconciliation, largely because most key officials in the South
African government believe a rapprochement would offer the
charismatic Savimbi a shortcut to taking power. Savimbi's
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capture of Luanda also would facilitate their grand strategic
plan o g Namibia with a ring of "moderate" buffer
states
25X1
Other Considerations. Partition or federation would put
Western governments in a much better position to provide military
and economic assistance to Savimbi. Both UNITA and the MPLA,
however, probably would view partition or a federation as a
holding action until the battle for total control of the country
is fought. Under such circumstances, UNITA's ability to attract
external military support once civil war broke out would improve
dramaticaYly in that it had already established itself as a
legitimate government.
On the other hand, pro-Soviet hardliners in Luanda might
rebel against dos Santos and install a more radical Marxist-
Leninist regime. They probably would seek Soviet support before
making their move and might promise Moscow increased access and
extensive base rights in Angola
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SURINAME: I!lPACT OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS
This memorandum explores alternative policy options that
foreign governments could employ in dealing with the situation in
Suriname. It seeks to provide the reader with an understanding
of the basic forces at play in the region, assesses the extent to
which Suri.name's problems are susceptible to external influence,
and sets out alternative policies that foreign countries could
employ in addressing the situation. The format, purposely
provocative, is not intended to be predictive. Rather, it
provides a structured way of thinking about the costs and
opportunities associated with various policies and a sense of the
opportunities or risks that might be created if each course of
action were~to be pursued.
Suriname has experienced continued political turmoil since
25 February 1980 when 16 Army sergeants led by present Commander
Desire (Daysi) Bouterse overthrew the elected civilian
government. That turmoil has been affected continually by
Bouterse's efforts to consolidate power and by the actions of
interested third parties--notably the Dutch, the Cubans, and
the Brazilians. The Bouterse regime is unpopular but has
been passively accepted out of fear that overt opposition
could provoke the military to use brutal force to suppress
Bouterse moved quickly to proscribe the traditional
political parties and ban all opposition to his regime. He was
forced to compromise in December 1983, however, after then prime
minister Alibux decided to increase taxes in an effort to deal
with a serious economic crisis. This spurred workers in the
bauxite industry to launch a prolonged and crippling strike and
protests spread to other sectors of the economy. Bouterse
responded by agreeing to discharge the Alibux government, suspend
the new taxes, and offer business and labor a voice in a newly
formed government. He also promised to keep radical leftists out
of the cabinet and take steps to return the country to
cl2mocracy. The new cabinet was headed by a moderate, Prime
Minister Undenhout, and labor and business leaders were called in
help devise a new democratic structure for Suriname
Bouterse appears to be solidly entrenched as the ruler of
Suriname, but increasing economic hardship and the potential for
mounting labor unrest over the next year could provoke another
challenge to his regime. Economic conditions have declined
rapidly under the combined impact of a deteriorating world market
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for bauxite, government paralysis, lef~ist economic meddling, and
the continued suspension of Dutch aid. Foreign exchange
reserves have dropped from $175 million in 1982 to less than
$10 million today, the government is beginning to sell gold, and
sources for foreign financing cannot be found. In order t~o cope
with a burgeoning budget deficit, the government is considering
suspending salary increases for government workers (affecting 40
percent of the country's work force), a freeze on new hiring, and
the abolition of government subsidies. Government leaders are
unwilling to raise taxes because the fear that labor unrest
could get out of control
Many of the radicals forced out of the government in 1983
found new homes in other ministries. They have used their
positions to obstruct Udenhout's initiatives, penalize
businessmen who harbor "anti-revolutionary" views, and ensure
the continuation of an "anti-imperialist" foreign policy.
Bouterse also has given new momentum to the activities of an
embryonic radical political party, the 25 February Movement,
which favors a pervasive ruling party on the Cuban model.
He has instructed cabinet ministers to vet their actions with the
Movemen rently intends to make it the only party in the
country
Labor and business leaders have been able to exert only
marginal influence over the decisionmaking process. They doubt
that any significant progress toward democratic rule is possible,
but are willing to participate in a "social partnership" with the
military in order to retain some influence over Bouterse, offset
that of the radical left, and protect their own economic
interests. Nevertheless, labor still has considerable clout
primarily because Bouterse fears that labor unrest could once
again seriously threaten his regime.
Early this year Bouterse installed a new cabinet again led
by Udenhout and composed of representatives from the military,
business, and labor. Although Bouterse hopes this gesture will
clear the way for desperately-needed Dutch aid, the Hague
continues to require that more tangible progress be made toward
returning Suriname to democracy. Meanwhile, members of the
radical 25 February Movement are exerting a rowing pressure to
1The Dutch terminated their substdntial aid program in response to
the December 1982 massacre of opposition leaders. Dutch aid accounted for
more than 90 percent of total bilateral assistance to Suriname in 1982 and
had been scheduled to reach sane $90 million in 1983. About hAlf of the
$1.5 billion package--largely grants--that was promised in 1975 remains to
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The near-term future_of Suriname hinges on the pace and
direction of change that radical leftists are able to achieve.
If Bouterse gives the 25 February Movement a more formal and
direct role to play in government, political, social, and
economic radicalization could quicken dramatically. Over the
medium and long term, this trend most likely would lead to
pauperization of the economy, nationalization of the bauxite
industry, regimentation of political and social life, and closer
ties to Cuba, the Soviet Bloc, and the hardline wing. of the
Nonaligned Movement
If, on the other hand, organized labor is able to challenge
Bouterse more effectively, moderate forces may gain greater
influence and limit the leftward drift. Bouterse then may
calculate that his best course is to permit some movement toward
democratization in order to appease labor and attract a renewal
of Dutch aid. One of Bouterse's primary concerns is the high
potential for labor unrest, and he probably will try to avoid a
confrontation with labor because it might escalate into a serious
threat to his power and possibly bring US intervention. Any
moves he made toward liberalization, however, would be largely
cosmetic and would proceed slowly and cautiously. If such moves
were unsuccessful or backfired, Bouterse would then revert to a
hardline position
The potential for military action cannot be totally
dismissed. Several of Bouterse's key military advisers oppose
any further leftward drift in the government and they may harbor
ambitions to seize power for themselves. In addition, members of
the military rank and file are complaining about poor leadership
and corruption. They are unlikely to support a move to oust
Bouterse, however, unless popular unrest appeared to be getting
SUSCEPTIBILITY TO FOREIGN INFLUENCE
The Bouterse regime has been searching frantically for
foreign assistance to stem Suriname's rapid economic decline and
keep labor unrest in check. When aid was first suspended in
December 1982 the Hague made resumption of assistance contingent
on Bouterse's removal and a return to constitutional rule.
Since then the Dutch may have softened their preconditions
somewhat, but they have yet to see sufficient progress on human
rights and democratization to resume aid. Nevertheless, their
demands remain a major factor pushing Bouterse toward reform,
largely because of his failure to find adequate alternative
Bouterse's initial approaches to other Western donors--the
United States, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia--proved disappointing
25X1
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Y
because these countries were either unwilling or unable to
provide substantial assistance. Bouterse then decided to pin his
hopes on Cuba, the Soviet_Union, and Libya. In early 1983, he --
negotiated technical, economic, scientific, and cultural
cooperation agreements with Cuba but at nowhere near the levels
needed to meet Paramaribo's immediate and growing cash
requirements. In October 1983, in the wake of the Grenada
invasion, Bouterse sent the Cuban Ambassador home, fearing that
growing Cuban involvement with Surinamese radicals threatened his
own position. Castro responded by closing his entire mission and
cancelling_...the aid program, thereby losing whatever leverage
Havana had over Bouterse. Even if Bouterse turns again to the
Cubans, Havana is not likely to gain much leverage given the
limited amount of aid it can offer, and Bouterse's reluctance to
accept large numbers of Cuban advisers because of continuing
security concerns.
The Soviet Union has increased its level of activity and
influence in Suriname since Cuba's departure. They have not
stepped forth, however, with substantial economic aid or trade
offers. Bouterse also has approached North Korea and Libya
for military and economic assistance, but neither country is
likely to be in a position to exert much influence over the
regime .
Brazil decided to offer Paramaribo economic, technical, and
military aid in mid-1983, in hopes of displacing the then growing
Cuban influence with the regime. Their efforts met with some
initial success but now are proceeding more slowly than
expected. There is some evidence that Brazilian influence on
Bouterse is weakening primarily because the economic assistance
program has been largely unproductive. Trade relations also have
been stagnant primarily because of Surinamess foreign exchange
problems
The following list of potential foreign policy options is
not intended to be exhaustive; other approaches could be
constructed by combining elements from two or more of the
approaches discussed below. Nor is the order in which they are
presented intended to endorse the adoption of any particular
approach
The four policy sets examined for dealing with the situation
in Suriname are:
o Western States Treat the Regime with Benign Neglect.
4
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o Friendly Western Countries Like Brazil Become More
Involved with the Regime, but Washington and the )Hague
Maintain Cooler Relations.
o Western States, Lead by the United States and the
Netherlands, Openly and Actively Support the Bouterse
Regime in an Effort To Entice It Fully into their
Camp
25X1
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Option 2. Benign Neglect
The United States and other Western states would dedicate
few, if any, resources toward supporting the
regime in the expectation that Bouterse's position would become
increasingly weaker. Diplomatic relations would be maintained,
25X1
Impact. T
he ec
onomic
im licat
ions o
f this strategy wo
uld be
similar to
Alt
hough
the impact would b
e
25X1
extended over a
long
er per
iod of ti
me. M
oderate leaders wo
uld be
increasingly reluctant to push for change, and the prospects for
any more toward democraticization would be dimmer. 25X1
25X1
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Lacking any positive signal from Washington, Bouterse would
continue to suspect US and Western intentions and fear that the
United States might be planning an invasion. As a result, he --
would be careful not to embrace the leftists in his government
too openly nor to push too strongly for improved Soviet, Libyan,
or Cuban ties. Popular dissatisfaction with the regime would
mount, but there would be no stimulus for taking direct action
against Bouterse.
Likelihood of Success. This option would be very difficult
to sustain._.._~As economic pressures mounted, Bouterese would renew
his plans for Western economic assistance, thereby forcing
Western countries to take a stand, particularly in multilateral
fora such as the IADB and the World Bank. Bouterse also could
try to force the US or Dutch hand by nationalizing their bauxite
facilities _25X1
Other Possible Risks. Bouterse might interpret US inaction
as hostility and turn increasingly to the Soviets and their
radical friends for support
Sensing a loss in the moderates' postion or vacillation on
the part of Bouterse, the radical leftists could move--possibly
in collusion with the Cubans and the Soviets--to oust Bouterse
and install a more progressive Marxist-Leninist regime.
Other Possible Gains. The West could not be portrayed as
openly meddling in another country's affairs.
Option 3. Use of Friendly Surrogates
Friendly Western countries like Brazil would provide
economic, military, and technical assistance to the Bouterse
regime in the expectation that this would further limit Soviet,
Libyan, and Cuban influence. The United States and the
Netherlands would agree to the initiation of some modest
assistance programs in non=controversial areas, but continue to
keep the regime at an arms length until significant progress is
made on human rights, democratization, and continuing or greater
restrictions on the Soviet, Libyan, and other radical state
presence. 25X1
Impact. .Economic problems would become more manageable,
,iving Bouterse more room to deal with political matters.
Bouterse would be more amenable to reforming the system, perhaps
by giving a greater political role to the National Assembly,
but he would not allow any change that would undercut his
dictatoral powers. However, if he were to show even limited
progress on the economic front and some moves toward
democratization, additional aid would be forthcoming. The West
would obtain slightly more leverage and influence over the
regime, but Bouterse still would be inclined to play one side
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(the Soviets, Libyans, North Koreans, etc.) against the other
(the United States, the Netherlands, Brazil).
Likelihood of Success. Despite Brazilia's commitment to
become more involved with its neighbor, it has been able to
provide only a modicum of economic assistance and the chances
that other countries such as Venezuela or Colombia could increase
trade or assistance are far more limited. Although significant
amounts of aid probably could be obtained from multilateral
institutions such as the IADB and the World Bank, Bouterse still
would require additional support. This option would go a long
way toward meeting Bouterse's needs and probably would succeed in
limiting--but not eliminating--the radical leftist presence and
Other Possible Risks. If this approach spurs Bouterse to
move to the center domestically and turn away from the Soviets
and Cubams,~radical leftists might decide to launch a countercoup
before economic conditions im roved d popular disgruntlement
with Bouterse began to wane. 25X1
Bouterse might opt for a two track approach--taking money
from the West, while im sing a radical/socialist or Cuban model 25X1
of government.
Brazil or other donor states could be portrayed as US
"lackeys", thus damaging their standing among non-aligned
Other Possible Gains. Brazilian involvement in Suriname
could set a valuable precedent if the situation in Guyana takes a
serious turn for the worse. ~~ 25X1
,Option 4. Open and Active Support .
The United States would be responsive to Bouterse's
entreaties for economic, technical, and military assistance and
urge other Western countries to be forthcoming (within certain
bounds) in the expectation he could be coopted fully into the
Western camp. Basically, Bouterse would receive the benefit of
the doubt while the West tried to use the increased assistance
and the access-it provided to various segments of government and
society as a lever to reduce or eliminate Soviet, Cuban, and
Impact. Over time, Suriname's economic slide could be
halted, a'nd the door might be opened to a turnaround--assuming
some increase in the demand for bauxite. Soviet and other
radical state influence would diminish as their activities were
increasingly proscribed. Moderate business and labor leaders
would gain influence and a greater role in managing the day-to-
day affairs of government. Bouterse probably would acquiesce to
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some additional reforms, but any moves toward liberlization
would be mostly cosmetic and proceed slowly and cautiously.
He would not alter his commitment to revolution and would never ~~~
concede any real authority to any of th edo-democratic
structures that would be created. ~~ 25X1
Likelihood of Success. If Bouterse allowed some form of
democratic opening, The Hague would be inclined to resume its
assistance program. Given differences on this issue within the
Dutch Government, however, aid would begin to move only slowly.
Brazil would be in a position to offer some modest assistance,
but most other countries lack the resources to make a significant
commitment. US efforts to assist the regime also would be
impeded by language problems. Bouterse would never be won over
entirely, and the leftist rhetoric would continue--albeit at less
inflamatory levels. 25X1
Other Possible Risks. Although most Surinamers probably
would welcome a greater US and Western role in their 'country, a
significant proportion might resent it bitterly, arguing that
such a strate served only to keep a brutal and repressive ruler
in power. 25X1
Other Possible Gains. Bouterse, believing his position was
secure, mioht reiect Libyan assistance and possibly oust the ____.
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
X
4
D/ICS
5
DDS
X
b
DDA
7
DDO
8
DD58T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/Pers
14
D/OLL
15
D/PAO
16
SA/IA
17
AO/DCI
18
C/IPD/OIS
19
NIO
0
~
21=
-
22
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SECRET
3 April 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Development of New Art Form for
Intelligence Memoranda
practical twist.
1. The new art form addressing alternative means of resolving specific
problems is an interesting experiment which should be pressed further.
I would like to see it tried on Afghanistan and Nicaragua.
2. The Suriname paper indicates a bleak outcome no matter how it is
addressed. The Angola paper is more interesting and potentially useful.
I am going to as to see if he can give it a more lively and 25X1
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DDI X01682-85/1
29 March 1985
NOTE T0: Director of Central Intelligence
1. About a month ago, you asked that we experiment with a
new kind of paper that would attempt to address a few key foreign
policy problems with a view to laying out alternative means of
resolution of those problems. Discussion of each alternative
would explore how it might be formulated and the likely reaction
to it. You suggested that we simply take an earlier Angola
paper, and reformat it to see what it would look like using this
approach.
2. Attached are two prototypes of such papers, one on
Angola and the other on Suriname. I would be interested in your
reaction to the approach. If you think it has merit, we could
next tackle Afghanistan and perhaps Nicaragua.
3. My criticisms of the attached papers is that the
alternatives put forward are pretty conventional and do not
demonstrate very much creativity in looking at these problems.
If this type of paper is to have real value, it seems to me we
need to deal not only with the rather routine alternatives but
try to dream up two or three that perhaps people haven't given
serious attention to so far. This would be particularly true in
Afghanistan and Nicaragua.
4. Alain, gout thoughts on this approach would be
welcome.
Ro ert ates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
As Stated
SECRET CL By Signer
DECL OADR
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
VIA:
FROM:
Chief, Instabi ity and Insurgency Center/OGI
SUBJECT: Development of a New Art Form for.
Intelligence Memorand
1. The attached memoranda were prepared by the Instability
and Insurgency Center in response to your request for a new art
form that will help policymakers focus on resolutions to
particular issues or problems. As we understand it, the
inspiration for this project was a typescript memorandum,
An ola: Im act of Alternative Re Tonal Settlements drafted b
the Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
2. In developing these two sample papers our primary
objective is to provide the reader with a structured way of
thinking about the costs and opportunities associated with
pursuing specific policy sets. We applied our model first to the
Angolan settlement issue, but felt the situation was unique given
the complexity of this problem and the number of actors
involved. In order to test the flexibility of new art form and
further develop some of its elements., we prepared a second
paper addressing the impact of alternative strategies the
West could adopt toward Suriname. This version allows for a
fuller discussion of the underlying conditions in a country,
future directions a country could take, and'the extent to
which it is susceptible to foreign influence. To this end,
it is more representative of future issues open to similar
treatment.
3. In drafting these papers, it quickly became evident that
the simple act of thinking about issues in this way has
25X1
gs
stimulated analysts to be much more creative. On the whole we
found the exercise stimulating and look forward to your reactions
and comments on its utility .I
l
25X1
1
r
.
Attachments:
As stated
Secret Noforn when se arated
25X1
from Attachment.
25X1
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ANGOLA;, IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE REGIONAL SETTLEMENTS
This memorandum explores alternative strategies that could
lead to a resolution of the regional conflict involving Angola,
UNITA, and South Africa. It seeks to provide the reader with an
understanding of the basic forces at play in the region, sets out
alternative strategies that could be employed to resolve the
conflict, and assesses the extent to which the problem is
susceptible to external influence. The format is purposely
provocative; it is not intended to predict what may or may not
occur. The paper discusses the viability of each potential
course of action, but does not endorse any particular policy
alternative. Rather, it provides a structured way of thinking
about the costs and opportunities associated with each approach
and some idea of what new openings or dangers ~i~h~,e emerge if
a given course of action were to be pursued.
UNITA insurgents have made steady gains in Angola's nearly
10-year civil war, despite being outnumbered and outgunned by the
Cuban-and Soviet-supported Angolan Army. The insurgents have
made good use of their advantages in quality of manpower
leadership to take and hold the military initiative.
We judge, however, that neither side is likely to gain a
decisive advantage over the other in the coming year, although
the intensity of the fighting probably will increase throughout
the country. UNITA most likely will make some gains but not at
the pace it has enjoyed in the past; nor will it be able to seize
key positions the government chooses to hold and defend.
Luanda's inventory of Soviet fighters has tripled in the past
year, and Luanda's greater use of air superiority will pose
This relatively even match--despite the imbalance of
forces--could be changed significantly by outside factors such as
Namibian independence under UN Resolution 435 and some form of
Cuban troop withdrawal or if the Luanda regime and UNITA initiate
negotiations toward a reconciliation agreement. UN Resolution
435 states that following the arrival of a UN peacekeeping
forces, South African troops would be confined to their garrisons
and, in steps over a period of 12 weeks, would be reduced to a
total of 1,500 men. At the end of seven months, elections would
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be held and the remaining South African contingent would
depart. This would deprive UNITA of its main line s. of outside
support, elimit~ate South Africa as a deterrent to Angolan action,
and open UNITA's base areas to Angolan attack.
UNTTA's military successes over the past two years also have
forced the MPLA regime in Luanda to consider trying to end the
fighting through negotiations. Although the MPLA has main 'ned
a ri id ublic stance o o in talks with UNITA; 25X1
considerable ferment continues 25X1
wi in a par y suppor ing national reconciliation. Many see a
rapprochement as a device for ending the civil war, lessening
Angola's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba and opening
the country to greater Western aid. 25X1
Substantial resistance to talks remain, however,
particularly among the mulato-hardliners and a large num ber of
their black supporters throughout the government and military.
Although the Soviet Union and Cuba appear staunchly opposed to
any talks, the MPLA has repeatedly been advised to negotiate by
various African neighbors, by countries in both Eastern and
Western Europe, and by South Africa.
The following list of strategies is not intended to be
exhaustive; other approaches could be constructed by combining
elements from two or more of the strategies discussed below. Nor
is the order in which they are presen d to endorse the
adoption of any particular approach.
The four alternative approaches we examine for resolving the
conflict involving Angola, UNITA, and South Africa are:
o Complete and Simultaneous Cuban Withdrawal With
Implementation of UN Resolution 435. ?
o .Partial Cuban Withdrawal Af ter UN Resolution 435 Is
Implemented.
o Withdrawal of All But a Small Residual Cuban Force in
Conjunction with UN Resolution 435.
o Some Form of Reconciliation Agreement involving Luanda
?and UNITA in Conjunction with UN Resolution 435. 25X1
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Strategy 1: Simultaneous Withdrawal and UN 435
Cuba withdraws all military personnel--combat troops,
advisers, and technnicians--from Angola over a period of twelve
weeks in such a manner that the number of Cubans and South
Africans in the rPninn wPra essentially equal once the process
got underway.
Impact. Essentially the South African position first
advanced in May 1982, this approach would be disastrous for the
MPLA government. Luanda could not compensate for the loss of
25,000 Cuban troops defending key provincial centers, nor for the
advisers and technicians that run Angola's war machine.
battling the Luanda regime unaided by foreign supporters. 25X1
Viability. Luanda and Cuba would opppose this approach
because they believe it would lead to the collapse of the MPLA
regime. Savimbi would be less resistant, calculating that he
would have to strike quick and hard to settle the civil war
before supply shortages cut into his capabilities. 25X1
would gain some propaganda advantage by claiming it now was
UNITA would lose the deterrent value of South African forces
stationed in Namibia and Savimbi's base areas would become
vulnerable to sustained.Angolan attack. UNITA also would lose
access to South Africa as an easy and secure arms supplier, but
Other Considerations. C ba and the Soviet Union would
risk a major propaganda deba~ if they were seen as unwilling
to provide the necessary support to keep their friends in
power.
South Africa might view the departure of all Cubans as a
golden opportunity to invade Angola in force--as it did in
1975--and install Savimbi as the new head of government in
Luanda. They almost certainly would find ways to continue
assisting UNITA covertly, but the level of support would fall.
Strategy 2: Partial Cuban Withdrawal After UN 435
In accordance with UN 435, South Africa withdraws its Air
Force from Namibia and reduces its troop strength to 1,500 men.
Cuba then withdraws 20,000 military personnel over a three-year
Impact. This proposal was advanced by Luanda in November
and apparently was vetted by the Cubans and the Soviets. Angola
could still depend on a substantial force--10,000 by Luanda's
count and 15,000 by our estimates--to defend the key provincial
period.
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centers and provide essential technical and advisory support.
Cubans troops probably would be taken mostly from southwestern
Angola were they had helped defend against South African
incursions and where UNITA is not particularly active. Soviet
weapons deliveries would continue, major urban areas would be
protected, and economically vital oil production would be
secured.
UNITA would lose the support necessary to sustain the
conflict at its present levels and South African protection of
its sanctuary in the southeast. Savimbi probably would be
able to secure at least minimal levels of support from other
donors t~ cnntiniia the conflict for some years, but the trend
Viability. Luanda and the Cubans would support this
approach wholeheartedly and Moscow somewhat grudgingl Both
UNITA and Pretoria almost certainly would reject it.
Other Considerations. Lacking a South African support
structure, Savimbi might be compelled to extend his base areas
into Zambia and seek sanctuary for his troops there.
With UNITA on the run, Soviet and Cuban efforts to
consolidate the Marxist Leninist regime in Luanda would receive
much greater attention.
ANC base areas in Angola would be more secure and the
guerrillas could bring considerably more pressure on South
Strategy 3: Smaller Cuban Residual Force and UN 435
Cuba withdraws its forces at a faster pace--perhaps within
two years--leaving behind only a small residual force of 3,000 to
5,000 troops. South African forces are withdrawn from Namibia in
accordance with UN 435.
Impact. UNITA would lose the South African deterrent and
sustaining supply within a matter of weeks and probably would opt
to intensify the conflict in hopes of achieving a military
victory. Luanda, however, would have substantial Cuban forces on
hand for at least one year and probably could contain a major
thrust by UNITA.
Nevertheless, we believe that Luanda's dependence on Cuban
manpower is greater than UNITA's reliance on a South African
presence in Namibia, and we expect over time that Savimbi's
forces would begin to prevail as the Cuban troop withdrawal
neared completion. UNITA would be able to concentrate its forces
on the few remaining areas of government strength and probably
could take effective control over most of the country.
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Viability. South Africa and UNITA might accept this package
provided they were assured of satisfactory verification and
implementation procedures. Luanda is more likely to balk at the
deal, arguing that it would postpone the MPLA's demise by no more
than a year or two. MPLA leaders might be persuaded to go along,
however, if they believed that they c on the timing or
extent of the Cuban force reduction.
Other Considerations. Luanda might try to compensate for
the loss of Cuban troops, for example, by forming a "civilian
construction corps", populated mostly by able-bodied young
Cubans. It also might seek Western assurances of greatly
increased economic--and po itary--assistance as the
price for its acceptance.
The Soviet Union and Cuba would retain substantial influence
over the Luanda Government at least initially, but the door would
be opened to an enhanced Western role and presence. Pressure
also would mount on the US Government to afford diplomatic
recognition to the MPLA Government.
With UNITA's hopes of achieving a military victory
bolstered, Savimbi would press his friends hard for additional
support and start to rely more on supply routes through Zaire.
Even if Mobutu kept this a .low-key operation, it probably would
not remain secret. His involvement, in turn, might prompt
the Soviet Union and Cuba to step up support to anti-Mobutu
Strategy 4: Reconciliation and UN 435
The MPLA Government enters into negotiations with UNITA.
Both sides agree to stop fighting, a coalition government is
formed, and provision is made for the reduction and eventual
withdrawal of all Cuban and South African military personnel
from Angola. The talks take place in the context of a regional
peace settlement that allows for a phased withdrawal of South
African forces from Namibia in accordance with UN Resolution
435.
Impact. Successful talks would end the civil war, lessen
Luanda's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba, and pave the
way for greater Western aid and improved relations with Angola's
neighbors. A decision to enter into negotiations with UNITA also
would appease those within the MPLA government who reportedly may
be pushing for a rapprochement;. including former members of the
Catete group, an amorphous group of Army officers known as the
Young Captains, and a few of President dos Santos' closest
advisers.
On the other hand, reconciliation would entail major risks
for Luanda. Influential mulatto hardliners and a sufficient
num ber of their black supporters in the party, military, and
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government appear to believe that a compromise with UNITA--
especially one that enhances the stature of UNITA's charismatic
leader Jonas Savimbi--could rapidly lead to an UNITA takeover
and their own physical demise. They believe that UNITA can
eventually be defeated militarily and they might move to
oust d he tried to engage UNITA in reconciliation
talks.
Savimbi would view reconciliation talks as a means of
removing the Cuban presence from Angola and legitimizing his
claim to represent the political aspirations of the bulk of the
Angolan people. He would risk losing direct South African
support to his movement and foreclose the possibility of gaining
a military victory over the Luanda regime. His willingness to
sit down at the same table with the enemy also minter t~ncr him the
support of some of his more radical advisers.
The talks could conclude with agreement on partition or
federation, with UNITA in control of the southern half of the
country. This would allow UNITA to consolidate its regional
power free from Angolan and Cuban military pressure. Such an
arrangement would significantly bolster Angola's case for
diplomatic recognition and pave the way for increased Western
assistance, thereby strengthening the Luanda government.
Viability. Serious talks between the Luanda government and
UNITA are not likely unless the MPLA's military situation
deteriorates substantially. We doubt that Luanda's agreement to
talk by itself would be enough for Savimbi to accept a package
with a sizeable residual Cuban force since the talks could fail
and leave Savimbi militarily disadvantaged. Moreover, some MPLA
leaders believe they can avoid talks through a military victory,
and they would never acquiesce to a complete withdrawal of Cuban
military personnel. Although MPLA leaders probably would find
the idea of a federation more anDealing, they would be inclined
to reject it as well.
Cuba would not reject reconciliation out of hand given the
economic and political costs of maintaining a substantial Cuban
military presence in Angola and their doubts that Luanda could
ever defeat the insurgents militarily. Moscow, however, would
adamantly oppose any compromise with UNITA. It views Savimbi as
a major threat to the consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist
government in Angola and believes that his inclusion in a
coalition government would severely undermine Soviet and Cuban
influence. Cuba almost certainly would acquiesce to Soviet
South Africa, however, would be a forceful proponent of
reconciliation, largely because most key officials in the South
African government believe a rapprochement would offer the
charismatic Savimbi a shortcut to taking power. Savimbi's
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capture of Luanda also would facilitate their grand strategic
plan of surrounding Namibia with a ring of "moderate" buffer
states.
Other Considerations. Partition or federation would put
Western governments in a much better position to provide military
and economic assistance to Savimbi. Both UNITA and the MPLA,
however, probably would view partition or.a federation as a
holding action until the battle for total control of the country
is fought. Under such circumstances, UNITA's ability to attract
external military support once civil war broke out would improve
dramatically in that it had already established itself as a
legitimate government.
On the other hand, pro-Soviet hardliners in Luanda might
rebel against dos Santos and install a more radical Marxist-
Leninist regime. They probably would seek Soviet support before
making their move and might promise Moscow increased access and
extensive base rights in Angola.
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SURINAME: IPIPAC? OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS
This memorandum explores alternative policy options that
foreign governments could employ in dealing with the situation in
Suriname. It seeks to provide the reader with an understanding
of the basic forces at play in the region, assesses the extent to
which Suriname's problems are susceptible to external influence,
and sets out alternative policies that foreign countries could
employ in addressing the situation. The format, purposely
provocative, is not intended to be predictive. Rather, it
provides a structured way of thinking about the costs and
opportunities associated with various policies and a sense of the
opportunities or risks that ,might be created if each course of
action were to be pursued.
THE PRESENT SCENE
Suriname has experienced continued political turmoil since
25 February 1980 when 16 Army sergeants led by present Commander
Desire (Daysi) Bouterse overthrew the elected civilian
government. That turmoil has been affected continually by.
Bouterse's efforts to consolidate power and by the actions of
interested third parties--notably the Dutch, the Cubans, and
the Brazilians. The Bouterse regime is unpopular but has
been passively accepted out of fear that overt opposition
could provol 'litary to use brutal force to suppress
dissent.
Bouterse moved quickly to proscribe the traditional
political parties and ban all opposition to his regime. He was
forced to compromise in December 1983, however, after then prime
minister Alibux decided to increase taxes in an effort to deal
with a serious economic crisis. This spurred workers in the
bauxite industry to launch a prolonged and crippling strike and
protests spread to other sectors of the economy. Bouterse
responded by agreeing to discharge the Alibux government, suspend
the new taxes, and offer business and labor a voice in .a newly
formed government. He also promised to keep radical leftists out
of the cabinet and take steps to return the country to
democracy. The new cabinet was headed by a moderate; Prime
Minister Undenhout, and labor and business leaders were caltPrl ;n
help devise a riew democratic structure for Suriname.
Bouterse appears to be solidly entrenched as the ruler of
Suriname, but increasing economic hardship and the potential for
mounting labor unrest over the next year could provoke another
challenge to his regime. Economic conditions have declined
rapidly under the combined impact of a deteriorating world market
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for bauxite, government paralysis, lef~ist economic meddling, and
the continued suspension of Dutch aid. Foreign exchange
reserves have dropped from $175 million in 1982 to less than
$10 million today, the government is beginning to sell gold, and
sources for foreign financing cannot be found. In order to cope
with a burgeoning budget deficit, the government is considering
suspending .salary increases for government workers (affecting 40
percent of the country's work force), a freeze on new hiring, and
the abolition of government subsidies. Government leaders are
unwilling to raise taxes because they fear that labor unrest
could get out of control.
Many of the radicals forced out of the government in 1983
found new homes in other ministries. They have used their
positions to obstruct Udenhout's initiatives, penalize
businessmen who harbor "anti-revolutionary" views, and ensure
the continuation of an "anti-imperialist" foreign policy.
Bouterse also has given new momentum to the activities of an
embryonic radical political party, the 25 February Movement,
which favors a pervasive ruling party on the Cuban model.
He has instructed cabinet ministers to vet their actions with the
Movement and aoDarently intends to make it the only party in the
Labor and business leaders have been able to exert only
marginal influence over the decisionmaking process. They doubt
that any significant progress toward democratic rule is possible,
but are willing to participate in a "social partnership" with the
military in order to retain some influence over Bouterse, offset
that of the radical left, and protect their own economic
interests. Nevertheless, labor still has considerable clout
primarily because Bouterse fears that labor unrest could once
again seriously threaten his regime.
Early this year Bouterse installed a new cabinet again led
by Udenhout and composed of representatives from the military,
business, and labor. Although Bouterse hopes this gesture will
clear the way for desperately-needed Dutch aid, the Hague
continues to require that more tangible progress be made toward
returning Suriname to democracy. Meanwhile, members of the
radical 25 February Movement are exerting orowing pressure to
1The Dutch terminated their substantial aid program in response to~
the December 1982 massacre of opposition leaders. Dutch aid accounted for
more than 90 percent of total bilateral assistance to Surina?ne in 1982 and
had been scheduled to reach sane $90 million in 1983. About half of the
$1.5 billion ack - rgely grants--that was pranised in 1975 remains to
be drawn.
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The near-term future of Suriname hinges on the pace and
direction of change that radical leftists are able to achieve.
If Bouterse gives the 25 February Movement a more formal and
direct role to play in government, political, social, and
economic radicalization could quicken dramatically,. Over the
medium and long term, this trend most likely would lead to
pauperization of the economy, nationalization of the bauxite
industry, regimentation of political and social life, and closer
ties to Cuba, the Soviet Bloc, and the hardline wing of the
If, on the other hand, organized labor is able to challenge
Bouterse more effectively, moderate forces may gain greater
influence and limit the leftward drift. Bouterse then may
calculate that his best course is to permit some movement toward
democratization in order to appease labor and attract a renewal
of Dutch aid. One of Bouterse's primary concerns is the high
potential for labor unrest, and he probably will try to avoid a
confrontation with labor because it might escalate into a serious
threat to his power and possibly bring US intervention. Any
moves he made toward liberalization, however, would be largely
cosmetic and would proceed slowly and cautiously. If such moves
were unsuccessful or backfired, Bouterse would then revert to a
The potential for military action cannot be totally
dismissed. Several of Bouterse's key military advisers oppose
any further leftward drift in the government and they may harbor
ambitions to seize power for themselves. In addition, members of
the military rank and file are complaining about poor leadership
and corruption.' They are unlikely to support a move to oust
Bouterse, however, unless popular unrest appeared to be getting
SUSCEPTIBILITY TO FOREIGN INFLUENCE
The Bouterse regime has been searching frantically for
foreign assistance to stem Suriname's rapid economic decline and
keep labor unrest in check. When aid was first suspended in
December 1982 the Hague made resumption of assistance contingent
on Bouterse's removal and a return to constitutional rule.
Since then the Dutch may have softened their preconditions
somewhat, but they have yet to see sufficient progress on human
rights and democratization to resume aid. Nevertheless, their
demands remain a major factor pushing Bouterse toward reform,
largely because of his failure to find adequate alternative
Bouterse's initial approaches to other Western donors--the
United States, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia--proved disappointing
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because these countries were either unwilling or unable to
provide substantial assistance. Bouterse then decided to pin his
hopes on Cuba; the Soviet Union, and Libya. In early 1983, he
negotiated technical, economic, scientific, and cultural
cooperation agreements with Cuba but at nowhere near the levels
needed t:o meet Paramaribo's immediate and growing cash
requirements. In October 1983, in the wake of the Grenada
invasion, Bouterse sent the Cuban Ambassador home, fearing that
growing Cuban involvement with Surinamese radicals threatened his
own position. Castro responded by closing his entire mission and
cancelling the aid program, thereby losing whatever leverage
Havana had over Bouterse. Even if Bouterse turns again to the
Cubans, Havana is not likely to gain much leverage given the
limited amount of aid it can offer, and Bouterse's reluctance to
accept large numbers of Cuban advisers because of continuing
The Soviet Union has increased its level of activity and
influence in Suriname since Cuba's departure. They have not
stepped forth, however, with substantial economic aid or trade
offers. Bouterse also has approached North Korea and Libya
for military and economic assistance, but neither country is
likely to be in a nosir_ion to exert much influence over the
Brazil decided to offer Paramaribo economic, technical, and
military aid in mid-1983, in hopes of displacing the then growing
Cuban influence with the regime. Their efforts met with some
initial success but now are proceeding more slowly than
expected. There is some evidence that Brazilian influence on
Bouterse is weakening primarily because the economic assistance
program has been largely unproductive. Trade relations also have
been stagnant primarily because of Surinamess foreign exchange
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ASSESSING FUTURE FOREIGN OPTIONS
The following list of potential foreign policy options is
not intended to be exhaustive; other approaches could be
constructed by combining elements from two or more of the
approaches discussed below. Nar is the order in which they are
presented intended to endorse the adoption of any particular
The four policy sets examined for dealing with the situation
in Suriname are:
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Western States Treat the Regime with Benign Neglect.
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o Friendly Western Countries Like Brazil Become More
Involved with the Regime, but Washington and the vague
Maintain Cooler Relations.
o Western States, Lead by the United States and the
~Ne therlands, Openly and Actively Support the Bouterse
Regime in an Effort To Entice It Fully into their
Camp.
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Option 2. Benign Neglect
The United States and other Western states would dedicate
few, if any, resources toward supporting the
regime in the expectation that Bouterse's pose ion wou become
increasingly weaker. Diplomatic relations would be maintained,
Im act. The economic im lications of this strategy would be
similar to Although the impact would be 25X1
extended over a onger perio of time. Moderate leaders would be
increasingly reluctant to push for change, and the pros ects for
any more toward democraticization would be dimmer. 25X1
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Lacking any positive signal from Washington, Bouterse would
continue to suspect US and Western intentions and fear that the
United States might be planning an invasion. As a result, he
would be careful not to embrace the leftists in his government
too openly nor to push too strongly for improved Soviet, Libyan,
or Cuban ties. Popular dissatisfaction with the regime would
mount, but there would be no stimulus for taking direct action
Likelihood of Success. This option would be very difficult
to sustain. As economic pressures mounted, Bouterese would renew
his plans for Western economic assistance, thereby forcing
Western countries to take a stand, particularly in multilateral
fora such as the IADB and the World Bank. Bouterse also could
try to force the Us or Hutch hand by nationalizing their bauxite
Other Possible Risks. Bouterse might interpret US inaction
as hostility and turn increasingly to the Soviets and their
radical friends for support.
Sensing a loss in the moderates' postion or
the part of Bouterse, the radical leftists could
in collusion with the Cubans and the Soviets--to
and install a more progressive Marxist-Leninist regime.
Other Possible Gains. The West could not be ortra ed as
openly meddling in another country's affairs. 25X1
Option 3. Use of Friendly Surrogates
Friendly Western countries like Brazil would provide
economic, military, and technical assistance to the Bouterse
regime in the expectation that this would further limit Soviet,
Libyan, and Cuban influence. The United States and the
Netherlands would agree to the initiation of some modest
assistance programs in non-controversial areas, but continue to
keep the regime at an arms length until significant progress is
made on human rights, democratization, and continuing or greater
restrictions on the Soviet, Libyan, and other radical state
presence.
Impact. Economic problems would become more manageable,
giving Bouterse more room to deal with political matters.
Bouterse would be more amenable to reforming the system, perhaps
by giving a greater political role to the National Assembly,
but he would not allow any change that would undercut his
dictatoral powers. However, if he were to show even limited
progress on the economic front and some moves toward
democratization, additional aid would be forthcoming. The West
would obtain slightly more leverage and influence over the
regime, but Bouterse still would be inclined to play one side
vacillation on
move--possibly
oust Bouterse
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Likelihood of Success. Despite Brazilia's commitment to
become more involved with its neighbor, it has been able to
provide only a modicum of ,economic assistance and the chances
that other countries such as Venezuela or Colombia could increase
trade or assistance are far more limited.. Although significant
amounts of aid probably could be obtained from multilateral
institutions such as the IADB and the World Bank, Bouterse still
would require additional support. This option would go a long
way toward meeting Bouterse's needs and probably would succeed in
limiting--but not eliminating--the radical leftist presence and
(the United States, the Netherlands, Brazil).
(the Soviets, Libyans, North Koreans, etc.) against the other
with Bouterse began to wane.
Other Possible Risks. If this approach spurs Bouterse to
move to the center domestically and turn away from the Soviets
and Cubans, radical leftists might decide to launch a~countercoup
before economic conditions improved and popular disgruntlement
Bouterse might opt for a two track approach--taking money
from the West, while im 'ng a radical/socialist or Cuban model
of government.
Brazil or other donor states could be portrayed as US
"lackeys", thus damaging their standing among non-aligned
Other Possible Gains. Brazilian involvement in Suriname
could set a valuable precedent if the situation in Guyana takes a
Option 4. Open and Active Support
The United States would be responsive to Bouterse's
entreaties for economic, technical, and military assistance and
urge other Western countries to be forthcoming (within certain
bounds) in the expectation he could be coopted fully into the
Western camp. Basically, Bouterse would receive the benefit of
the doubt while the West tried to use the increased assistance
and the access it provided to various segments of government and
society as a lever to reduce or eliminate soviet, Cuban, and
Impact. Over time, Suriname's economic slide could be
halted, and the door might be opened to a turnaround--assuming
some increase in the demand for bauxite. Soviet and other
radical state influence would diminish as their activities were
increasingly proscribed. Moderate business and labor leaders
would .gain influence and a greater role in managing the day-to-
day affairs of government. Bouterse probably would acquiesce to
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some additional reforms, but any moves toward liberlization
would be mostlX cosmetic and proceed slowly and cautiously.
He would not :alter his commitment to revolution and would never
concede any real authority to any of the psuedo-democratic
Likelihood of Success. If Bouterse allowed some form of
democratic opening, The Hague would be inclined to resume its
assistance program. Given differences on this issue within the
Dutch Government, however, aid would begin to move only slowly.
Brazil would be in a position to offer some modest assistance,
but most other countries lack the resources to make a significant
commitment. US efforts to assist the regime also would be
impeded by language problems. Bouterse would never be won over
entirely, and the leftist rhetoric would continue--albeit at less
Other Possible Risks. Although most Surinamers probably
would welcome a greater US and Western role in their country, a
significant proportion might resent it bitterly, arguing that
such a strate only to keep a brutal and repressive ruler
in power.
Other Possible Gains. Bouterse, believing his position was
secure, might reject Libyan assistance and possibly oust the
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