LATIN AMERICA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING AUGUST 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R002604360009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 23, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
23 August 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: 25X1
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting
August 1985
1. The following items were discussed at the Warning and Forecast
Meeting held on 21 August 1985.
2. NICARAGUA
SECRET
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WARNING ISSUES: If insurgent forces maintain their current
momentum, the Sandi nistas are likely to respond with a greater effort.
This might well include a larger and more direct Cuban participation in
direct combat with the insurgents.
3. GUYANA
President Hugh Desmond Hoyte's succession to power has been
orderly and uneventful thus far. Prime Minister Hamilton Green has
supported the President, apparently content to wait for his turn at power
at some future time. The indications are that the Guyanese government
may move toward a more moderate (or at least less radical) position both
domestically and internationally.
-- The left-wing of the PNC believes that Hoyte and Green intend
to remove most of the leftist ideologues now in the
government.
-- Most of these individuals represent channels of influence for
the USSR/Cuba.
-- In order to demonstrate their more moderate orientation,
Hoyte and Green might decide not to go ahead with the
agreement to acquire Soviet helicopters.
-- Cheddi Jagan and his opposition People's Progressive Party
(PPP) now have even less chance of gaining a meaningful share
of power. The talks for a coalition government will probably
drag on without offering the PPP any real concessions.
Thus far the Guyanese government has not signaled any intention to
improve relations with the United States, but such overtures are likely.
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There is no doubt that the USSR intends to offer President
Garcia more economic and military assistance at attractive terms in an
effort to expand its influence in Peru.
-- Garcia will probably accept increased trade and aid projects,
especially as the terms are likely to be favorable, i.e.,
repayment can be made in "non-traditional" goods, such as
fish meal.
-- In order to retain the support of the Peruvian military
forces, the President will go on accepting Soviet equipment
which is offered at generous terms.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that this will lead to any real influence or
leverage over President Garcia in the international arena.
-- Garcia intends to take a Third World, non-aligned position
with a north vs. south orientation. If other countries were
to match Soviet terms, President Garcia would probably switch
in order to underscore his non-alignment.
-- In order to establish his credibility, he must keep his
distance from the Soviet Union.
however, Garcia's options to Soviet aid are limited given Peru's dire
economic condition, and he may accept Soviet offers to accept repayment
by channeling assistance to Nicaragua.
WARNING ISSUES: Will the USSR be able to increase its influence in
Peru by means of more favorable economic terms and assistance to the
Garcia government?
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President Pinochet seems determined to ride out the current
spate of demonstrations and bombings that are intended to pressure him
into relaxing his harsh policies and speed up the transition to civilian
rule. The radicals continue to use violent tactics in an effort to bring
about the reimposition of a state-of-siege. This would not only have a
polarizing effect domestically, but would also have a damaging impact on
the Pinochet government internationally. If a state-of-siege were
imposed, some members of the military high command might begin to
re-examine their support for Pinochet.
-- Opposition forces, including both moderates and radicals, are
cooperating in the demonstrations.
-- The moderates have attempted to convince the radicals to give
up the bombings without success.
-- The Communists are increasing their commitment to the armed
struggle; however, they do not represent a serious challenge
to the security forces at this time. US facilities/personnel
do not appear to be a primary target.
If Pinochet is removed, he would most likely be replaced by an Army
General. General Canessa, Vice Commander of the Army, is the likeliest
contender even though he is past retirement age.
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Participating in the NIO/Latin America Warning Meeting of 21 August 1985
were representatives of the following agencies:
INR/IAA/Department of State
DIA: DIO/DIA
DIAC/DE-3
DIAC/DB3C2
JSI-4B
AT-5
OS-1B
Department of the Air Force (Intelligence)
Office of Naval Intelligence
National Security Agency
Vice President's Office
Natinal Defense University
CIA Participants:
ALA
OGI
OIA
CRES
OCR
DO/LA~
FBIS
NIO/W
ICS/HC
NPIC
SECRET]
23 August 1985
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SUBJECT: WARNING REPORT FOR LATIN AMERICA
DATE: 23 August 1985
DISTRIBUTION:
Copy No. 1 - DCI
2- DDCI
3 - EXDIR
4 - ER
5-DDI
6 - C/NIC
7 - VC/NIC
8 - DDI Registry
9 - 15 - NIO/W
16- NIO/AF
17- NIO/EA
18- NIO/GPF
19- NIO/NESA
20- NIO/AL (Ford)
21- NIO/FDIA
22- NIO/USSR
23- NIO/Europe
24- NIO/SP
25- NIO/ECON
26- NIO/S&T
27- NIO/CT-NARC
28- SRP
29- IPC/DDI
30- D/CPAS (Room 7F17, HQS))
31- D/OCR (Room 2E60 HQS)
32- D/SOVA (Roo
33- D/OIA (Room
34- D/NESA (Room bUUU,
35- D/OEA (Room 4F18, HQS)
36- D/OSWR (Room 5F46 HOS)
37- D/NPIC R
38- NPIC
39- FBIS
40- NPIC
41- D/AL
42- D/OGI
43- C/DDO/ L A . Room 3C2016- Has
44- DDO/LA
45- DDO/C oom s
46- DDO
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23 August 1985
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47- C/ALA/MCD, 4F29 Hqs)
48- C/ALA/CA/North m 4F39 Hqs)
49- C/ALA/CA/Sou Room 4F29 Hqs)
50- C/ALA/MCD/MX Room 4F39 Hqs)
51- C/ALA/Carib Room 4F21 Hqs)
52- C/ALA/Cuba Room 4F39 Hqs)
53- C/ALA/SAD, Room 3F24 Hqs)
54- C/ALA/SAD/ Room 3F23 Hqs)
55- C/ALA/SAD/S oom 4F21 Hqs)
56- C/ALA/SAD/R Room 3F24 Hqs)
57- OGI/ISID (Room 2G18 Hqs)
58- OGI/ISID/IO (Room 3G46 Hqs)
59- 0GI/RD om 2G00 Hqs)
60- OGI/TNAD/TAB Room 2G17 Hqs)
61- OGI/IIC (Room 3G13, Hqs)
62- OGI/IIC/PI ~ Room 2G18 Hqs)
63- 0GI/IIC/PI
64- OGI/GD/AWH
65- 0GI/ECD/TW
66- DDO/PCS
Room 2G09 Hqs)
67- OCR/LA/AF/EUR (Room 1H39 Hqs)
68- OCR/Dissemination Branch/Attn: Branch Chief
69- OSWR/PPC Room 5G03 Hqs)
70- DDO Room 5B48 Hqs)
71-1JUI/CRES ~Room 3E58 Has)
72-
73-
74- SOYA/TWAD LA
75- OIA/D.
76- NIC/AG
77- NIC/AG
78- OHC/IC
79- OLL/DDI Rep
Hsi
Room 7807 Hqs)
B07 Has - Attn~
(GE47 Hqs)
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23 August 1985
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SUBJECT: Warning Report for Latin America
DATE: 23 August 1985
DISTRIBUTION:
80- Department of State (DeWitt)
81- Department of State/INR/IC/RD
(Suzanne 0. Kuser, Room 6845)
82- NSA
83- NSA
84- Treasury (Mulholland)
85- DIA
86- DIA
87- DIA
88- DIA
89- DIA/
90- DIA
91- DIA/
D/C-4
AT-5
OS-1B
92- Vice President's Office (Hughes)
93- NSC (Burghardt)
94- USMC (Call)
95- ONI (LaBauve)
96- NAVOPINTCEN (Clendenin)
97- USArmy (Brown)
98- USA-ITAC (Lane)
99- USA/SOUTHCOM (Col. Cummings for Col. Taus)
100- USAF (Harmon)
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