SOVIET PROPAGANDA ALERT NO. 29

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R002404010003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
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United.States
Information
Agency
NOV 2 55, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
FROM: Charles Z. Wick
Director
2660/3
SUBJECT: "Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 29"
Attached is the latest "Soviet Propaganda Alert" produced by
our Office of Research.
During the period October 1 - November 10:
o Soviet propagandists maintained that the Reagan
Administration is "deeply divided" and has not been
preparing seriously for the November 19-20 summit.
o Soviet spokesmen publicized Gorbachev's proposal for
a 50-percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet nuclear
arsenals and claimed that the USSR's bold "initi-
atives" had had a profound impact on world opinion.
o High-level Soviet officials continued an all-out
attack on SDI and accused U.S. officials of mis-
interpreting the ABM treaty.
o They also warned that without an agreement on the
"nonmilitarization of space," it would be impossible
to limit or reduce nuclear arms, and an unchecked
arms race would ensue.
o Soviet propaganda continued to charge that the U.S.
supports "state terrorism."
o It also linked AIDS to U.S. research for bacterio-
logical warfare.
Attachment:
"Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 29"
1--,316
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No. 29
Soviet Propaganda Alert
November 15, 1985
This report discusses Soviet propaganda between October 1 and
November 10. It concentrates on arms control and other issues
relating to the November 19-20 meeting between President Ronald
Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev.
During this period, as the Soviet Union intensified its pre-
summit propaganda, Soviet commentators claimed that the USSR's
bold "initiatives" had had a profound impact on world opinion.
The Soviet media portrayed Gorbachev as a dynamic and effective
statesman during his visit to France and subsequent trip to
Bulgaria. Meanwhile, Gorbachev gave every indication of being
firmly in control at home, where he made additional high-level
appointments and unveiled a draft of the new party program.
Prospects for the Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting ......... See pp. 1-6
As in prior months, Soviet spokesmen maintained that success in
the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachev meeting depended on the serious-
ness and good faith of the U.S. Challenge to the U.S.: Con-
tinue to affirm that the U.S. combines a strong commitment to
peace with a realistic assessment of the Soviet Union.
Soviet Commentary on Arms Control Issues .......... See pp. 6-11
In early October, Gorbachev disclosed that the USSR had pro-
posed a 50-percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet nuclear
arsenals. While attacking SDI, Soviet spokesmen accused the
U.S. of distorting the ABM treaty and seeking to "neutralize"
Soviet "initiatives" on arms control. Challenge to the U.S.:
Stress that the U.S. placed serious proposals on the table in
advance of the Soviet counterproposal, responded quickly to the
counterproposal, and remains willing to negotiate.
The USSR also made several moves which appeared designed to
create fissures in the Western alliance. Gorbachev called for
separate talks with France and Britain over intermediate-range
missiles and sought to forestall the Netherlands' decision to
deploy U.S. cruise missiles. Challenge to the U.S.: Emphasize
that the Western Alliance remains unshaken in its commitment
both to its common defense and to negotiations with the USSR.
Other Current Propaganda Themes .................. See pp. 11-12
Soviet propaganda charged the U.S. supports "state terrorism,"
was implicated in the kidnapping of Soviet diplomats in Beirut,
and had kidnapped and drugged KGB official Yurchenko. It also
linked AIDS to U.S. research for bacteriological warfare.
Office of Research
United States Information Agency
Washington, D. C.
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PROSPECTS FOR THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING
Virtually all the public gestures of Soviet leader Gorbachev
appeared calculated to improve Moscow's position prior to his
November 19-20 summit meeting with President Reagan.
Q
Gorbachev's Visit to France Hailed as Success
On October 1, the eve of Gorbachev's departure for Paris,
French and Soviet TV aired an interview between the Soviet
General Secretary and French journalists. The interview, which
was given wide coverage in both Soviet domestic and foreign
media, was crafted to project an image of an open, reasonable,
and flexible Soviet leader and to stress that the USSR and West
European countries shared common interests.
When asked whether he thought his forthcoming meeting with
President Reagan would achieve substantive results, Gorbachev
saia that "it would be a great luxury for the leaders of such
countries as the USSR and the USA...to go to Geneva in order to
exchange handshakes, take a look at one another, and smile
pleasantly for television." He called for "the President of
the USA and his colleagues... to carry out sound preparations
for our meeting in Geneva so that...good bricks can be laid in
the edifice of future peace."
U.S. "Not Serious," in Disarray
Throughout this period, Soviet commentators continued to argue
that the U.S. was not making serious preparations for the high-
level November meeting. Major Soviet propaganda themes were as
follows:
o SDI. President Reagan's "blind" devotion to SDI would
make any agreement extremely difficult, if not impossible.
o Administration in disarray. Because the U.S. Adminis-
tration was still deeply divided over how to deal with the
Soviet Union, it had been unable to formulate a coherent
policy -- a fact that seemed likely to "doom" meaningful
results.
o Attempts to undermine the ABM treaty. According to Soviet
commentators, Administration hardliners were doing their
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utmost to undermine the ABM treaty. The so-called "broad"
interpretation of the accord enunciated in early October
by National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane raised doubts
about U.S. intentions and whether the U.S. could be trusted
to keep its word in the future.
o Efforts to divert attention from Soviet proposals. Caught
off guard by the Soviet Union's arms reduction proposal in
early October, the Reagan Administration has tried to
divert attention from arms control and its own failure to
advance sensible proposals. The President's October 24
address to the UN General Assembly was described as an
effort to divert attention to "secondary issues."
o Words vs. deeds. Despite its high-flown rhetoric about
"peace," the U.S. Administration continued in its errant
quest for military superiority and unilateral advantage
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. People throughout the world,
however, were putting pressure on the U.S. to become
serious and do something to advance the cause of peace.
o Worldwide public opinion leaves some room for hope. As
Izvestiia stated (November 1): "The disillusionment
caused throughout the world by...[the President's October
24 UN speech] was only surpassed in strength by the denun-
ciation of Washington's obstructionist positions. The
pitch of public criticism ran so high the Administration
did not believe it could continue -- up to the start of
the actual Geneva talks -- to openly reject the demands
for a constructive approach to the Soviet Union's propo-
sals."
Soviets Claim Propaganda Effective
Meanwhile, Soviet commentators claimed that Moscow's "peace
offensive" was succeeding. For example, writing in Sovetskaia
Rossiia on October 15, Gennadii Shishkin argued that the Soviet
arms proposal announced by Gorbachev had established a "new
psychological climate" and had laid the groundwork for "a new
stage in East-West relations." He added:
This turn of events dealt a palpable blow to the stance of
militarists of all kinds. NATO has clearly been thrown
into confusion; the [Western] bloc's propaganda apparatus
was unprepared for the USSR's actions. As for the United
States, the Washington administration has been gripped by
real panic. The feelings now prevailing in Washington's
corridors of power are described eloquently by The Los
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Angeles Times: "The fact that the hardliners in the
Defense Department are anticipating the U.S-Soviet summit
in Geneva with fear and loathing is hardly new. They were
always opposed to arms control agreements and, of course,
to summit meetings. The difference is that this time the
White House, the National Security Council, and the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, as well as the State De-
partment, are trembling at the prospect of the meeting."
Shishkin asserted that in order "to counteract the Soviet ini-
tiatives," the Reagan Administration began "dismantling" the
Soviet proposals piece by piece while still refusing to give "a
constructive response." "In the opinion of many observers," he
noted, "the U.S. Administration, faced with the Soviet peace
offensive, will ultimately have to make adjustments in its un-
constructive policy unless it wants a further deepening of the
differences with Western Europe."
In a later commentary (Izvestiia, November 5), four Soviet jour-
nalists stated: "The Soviet initiatives have made a powerful
impact on the international climate. The general opinion...is
that Moscow has taken over the initiative in the political and
psychological preparations...in the period before the Geneva
meeting. The Soviet Union's arguments and practical actions
have exerted such influence that Western politicians can no
longer ignore them."
President Reagan's UN Address: "Rehash of Bankrupt Policy"
President Reagan's October 24 address to the UN General Assem-
bly was reviewed critically by Soviet commentators. An October
24 TASS dispatch charged that the President's speech offered
merely a "rehash of Washington's well-known and bankrupt for-
eign policy" and represented an effort to conceal Washington's
"refusal to take any real measures" on arms control.
Attempt to divert attention from arms control. Soviet com-
mentators maintained that the President's emphasis on the
resolution of regional conflicts was an attempt to divert
international attention to issues of secondary importance and
to justify U.S. efforts to subvert regimes it opposes.
Speech overlooks major trouble spots. A report in the military
newspaper Krasnaia zvezda (October 26) pointed out that "the
President studiously omitted those regions in which the United
States together with other reactionary regimes is trampling
underfoot the right of the peoples to self-determination and
independence." The article singled out the Middle East, "where
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the United States is encouraging Israel to commit armed ban-
ditry," and southern Africa, "where the South African racists,
with Washington's connivance and support, are unlawfully occu-
pying Namibia, perpetrating acts of aggression against neigh-
boring countries, and trying to preserve the apartheid regime
with terror and repression."
"Family of free nations" based on force. Writing in Izvestiia
(October 30), political observer Aleksandr Bovin warned that it
would be-a mistake to "resurrect the notorious 'linkage' con-
cept" ana make disarmament conditional on the "state of affairs
in certain parts of the world." Bovin also ridiculed the
President's conception of the "settlement" of regional con-
flicts:
After a "settlement" the happy people will return to the
"family of free states." Everyone is well aware of what
kind of "family" this is. It is a family of capitalist
states. Allende was killed precisely in order to guaran-
tee Chile remained part of this family. And was it not
for the sake of keeping South Vietnam in the same family
that the United States dropped more bombs on Vietnamese
soil than throughout all of World War II?
In much the same vein, Vitalii Kobysh wrote in Literaturnaia
gazeta (October 30):
Understandably, the U.S. President did not mention that in
each of the countries he listed, the United States is
basically waging undeclared wars. He uttered not a word
of truth about Nicaragua, where...the United States is
continuing the task begun by their henchman and puppet,
the criminal Somoza -- that of committing genocide. The
White House chief did not mention that [in Afghanistan]
the bandits who kill peaceful inhabitants... and cut off
the heads of teachers and doctors are openly supplied with
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons...by
Washington's leaders.... And, of course, he did not
explain that this lavish assistance is provided with one
goal -- that of sending Afghanistan back to the Middle
Ages: to hunger, fanaticism, and savagery.
Reagan Interview Sharply Challenged
On November 5, the Soviet daily newspaper Izvestiia published
the text of the interview that President Reagan had granted on
October 31. Even though some of President Reagan's remarks
were. cut from the published text, most of the interview was
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reported accurately. On the facing page, however, the Presi-
dent's remarks were rebutted in a long, polemical commentary by
the four journalists who had conducted the interview.
The interview was the first with an American president since
November 1961, when John F. Kennedy was interviewed by the
editor of Izvestiia. Its publication was all the more note-
worthy because it presented a point of view at variance with
the official party line. While explaining the U.S. desire for
peace, the President was also able to tell Soviet readers that
the USSR has been engaged in research on space weapons, that
Soviet troops had used booby-trapped toys in Afghanistan, and
that the Soviet Union was occupying Afghanistan, Angola, South
Yemen, and Ethiopia.
Omissions from the text. A number of points were evidently too
sensitive for the Soviet authorities to allow. The text did
not include, for example, President Reagan's statement that the
Afghan government that "invited the Soviet troops in didn't
have any choice because the government was put there by the
Soviet Union." Gone, too, was the President's comparison of
the Afghanistan and Grenada situations. Other omissions
included the statement that Eastern European countries were
denied the self-determination promised by the Yalta agreement,
that Warsaw Pact troops outnumbered NATO troops in Europe, that
the Soviet Union had not reciprocated gestures by the U.S., and
that the USSR had not shown restraint in developing its weapons
system.
The Soviet response. The response by the four Soviet jour-
nalists received much more attention in the Soviet media than
the interview itself. The journalists emphasized that the
President's answers showed "the world seen through the eyes of
an American conservative who is prepared to forget or not to
notice obvious facts that are known to all, if they fail to
correspond to his views." After roundly criticizing the
substance of the President's remarks, they nonetheless ended on
an optimistic note:
The interview turned out to be contradictory. The good
words about peace and a striving for accord with the
Soviet Union were accompanied by unfounded accusations
about our country's foreign policy.... Still, the very
fact of the recognition of the need for extensive Soviet-
American dialogue is a positive sign.... One would like
to believe that the USSR's readiness to achieve a drastic
turn for the better in Soviet-American relations will
elicit in Geneva a constructive response from the U.S.
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Subsequent press treatment called attention to the "clarifica-
tion" that was needed for the President's comments about shar-
ing SDI research with the Soviet Union and under what conditions
the U.S. might deploy a defensive system. A TASS report from
Washington (November 5) said that the hasty "explanations" by
the President's staff raised the question "Who decides U.S.
policy?"
Negative Reaction to the President's VOA Address
Responding to President Reagan's address to the Soviet people
(broadcast on the Voice of America on November 9), TASS and
Soviet television said that his remarks included deliberate
falsifications and raised doubts about U.S. attitudes toward
the Geneva meeting. TASS observed that Reagan had "uttered a
good many words about peace," but that "one cannot so far...
conclude that the U.S. Administration is prepared...to make its
contribution to the cause of preventing an arms race in outer
space or of radically curbing it on earth."
Appearing on the evening news the same day, Vitalii Kobysh
noted that Reagan used "good words" about Soviet-American rela-
tions. But, he said, "if one familiarizes oneself thoroughly
with what they are saying in Washington now, there are grounds
for...a gloomy conclusion" about the prospects for the summit
meeting.
SOVIET COMMENTARY ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
Clearly, much of Moscow's maneuvering prior to the November
Reagan-Gorbachev meeting related to arms control issues. As in
the previous several months, Soviet propaganda focused on the
importance of preventing the "militarization of outer space,"
the dangers connected with SDI, and alleged U.S. efforts to
undermine the ABM treaty.
In his October 1 interview with French journalists, Gorbachev
repeated his opposition to the arms race "on earth" and to
"transferring" it to space. As evidence of Moscow's sincerity,
he cited the Soviet Union's recent moratoriums on the testing
of nuclear weapons and anti-satellite weapons. Without men-
tioning the U.S. explicitly, he went on to contrast Moscow's
purported restraint with the "new nuclear explosions" and the
tests of anti-satellite weapons that occurred after the USSR
had announced its unilateral moratoriums.
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Soviet Counterproposals Disclosed
In his October 3 speech to the French parliament, Gorbachev
publicly confirmed that the Soviet Union had presented propo-
sals to the U.S. negotiating team in Geneva. As described by
Gorbachev, the proposals had three main components:
o Deep cuts in nuclear strategic forces. Gorbachev said
that the Soviet proposal called for a 50-percent reduction
in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. (Gorbachev included
in this category U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces
that could reach the Soviet homeland.)
o A ban on "space strike arms." The speech called for a
"total prohibition" of space-based weapons, but whether
such a ban would rule out the research envisioned by SDI
was unclear. (In his August 28 Time magazine interview,
Gorbachev had argued that a ban on space weapons must
"embrace every phase of their inception," but had added
that a research ban would not extend to the "fundamental
sciences." In agreement with this position, Yulii
Kvitsinskii, the head of the Soviet space weapons dele-
gation in Geneva, was cited by Western media as having
said on October 3 that "basic research" would be permitted
under the proposed ban.)
o Separation of INF from the other arms control issues..
Gorbachev proposed that the matter of intermediate-range
missiles could be resolved separately from the issues of
space weapons and strategic arsenals. Previously, Soviet
statements had stressed that, in accordance with the U.S.-
Soviet understanding of January 1985, all three issues had
to be dealt with in their "interrelationship."
Gorbachev's Appeals to the West Europeans
Concurrently, the Soviet leadership made appeals to the West
Europeans. The intent was clearly to drive a wedge between the
West Europeans and the U.S., or at least to encourage the West
Europeans to put pressure on the U.S. to modify its arms control
negotiating posture.
In his October 1 interview with French journalists, Gorbachev
sought once more to stress the commonality of West European and
Soviet security interests. He emphasized that the Soviet Union
and the West Europeans "live in the same house" and expressed
a belief that the West Europeans "will not, be found wanting in
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wisdom" when it comes to protecting the continent's security.
(In a February speech, he had emphasized the same point by
urging the West Europeans to prevent "Europe, our common home,
from being turned into a theater of military actions.")
On October 3, addressing the French parliament, Gorbachev put
forth two proposals which appeared designed to try to separate
the West Europeans from the U.S.:
o Dealing separately with Britain and France. For the first
time since the December 1979 NATO decision to deploy U.S.
Purshing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe,
the Soviet leader advocated separate talks -- and impli-
citly a separate agreement -- with France and Britain.
(In prior INF negotiations, the French and British mis-
siles had been repeatedly cited as a major obstacle by
Moscow. The U.S., France, and Britain maintained that
these missiles constitute independent strategic forces and
are not a subject of negotiation in the U.S.-Soviet talks.)
o Appeals to the Netherlands. Gorbachev announced that some
SS-20s had been "withdrawn from standby alert" and that
the number of such missiles deployed in the Soviet Union's
"European zone" had been reduced to 243. He also stated
that the "stationary installations" used to house these
missiles would be dismantled "within the next two months."
These shifts seemed designed to forestall the Dutch govern-
ment's decision in November on whether to deploy U.S.
cruise missiles according to the NATO plan. In subsequent
weeks, the USSR continued to try to influence Dutch public
opinion by arranging high-visibility placements in the
Dutch media.
Meanwhile, Soviet spokesmen continued to reach out to members
of the West European peace movement. On October 5, for example,
TASS carried a message from Gorbachev to participants in the
"Perugia-Assisi" peace march. Gorbachev said that "the sword
of Damocles of a nuclear catastrophe and 'Star Wars' is raised
above mankind today." But through the efforts of all peace-
loving people, he stressed, "it is still possible to avert this
threat." Citing the Soviet Union's proposal for a total ban on
space weapons and a 50-percent reduction in the U.S. and Soviet
nuclear arsenals, Gorbachev asserted: "We have demonstrated our
good will convincingly and visibly. Now it is up to our negoti-
ating partners."
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Marshal Akhromeev Blasts SDI
Over the next several weeks, Soviet spokesmen continued to
stress that the USSR had adopted a reasonable and forthcoming
posture in the negotiations and that a response from the U.S.
was due. Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, chief of the Soviet General
Staff, assumed a leading role in the attacks on U.S. policy
addressed to foreign and domestic audiences. (An interview
with Akhromeev was published in The New York Times on October
18; an article by him appeared in Pravda the following day; and
a translation of the article was reprinted as a full-page adver-
tisement in The Washington Post on October 25.)
In the Pravda article, Akhromeev described the Soviet Union's
latest proposal on nuclear arms control as "realistic and
far-reaching." The USSR, he said, had "gone its half of the
way," so now it was up to the U.S. "to go its part of the way
and try to bring the positions of the [two] sides...closer
together." At the same time, Akhromeev sharply criticized SDI,
asserting that if no ban were imposed on the development of
"space strike weapons," an unchecked arms race would ensue.
Moscow Media Event Focuses on SDI
To focus public attention on arms control issues, Soviet offi-
cials organized a high-visibility press conference in Moscow on
October 22. The conference featured Marshal Akhromeev along
with first deputy foreign minister Georgii Kornienko, and
Leonid Zamiatin, chief of the Central Committee's International
Information Department.
Although the press conference covered a wide range of issues,
most Soviet accounts gave greatest attention to arguments
against SDI and emphasized the Soviet view that reductions in
nuclear arms must be conditional on a ban on space weapons.
o Reinforcing a point made in his Pravda article, Akhromeev
insisted that the ABM treaty was the basis for negotia-
tions on limiting strategic arms. In this connection, he
cited Gorbachev's Time magazine interview to the effect
that without an agreement on the nonmilitarization of
space, it would "prove impossible to reach an agreement on
the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons."
o Akhromeev once again denied that the'Soviet Union was con-
ducting work in any way comparable to SDI. "The Soviet
Union," he said, "does not have offensive weapons in space.
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We are not conducting work on the creation of offensive
space-based weapons, nor are we developing systems for the
country's anti-missile defense.... The Soviet Union is
faithfully fulfilling the treaty on the limitation of ABM
defense systems."
o Akhromeev also reiterated previous warnings that U.S.
deployments of space-based missile defense systems would
leave the Soviet Union with "no choice" but to take
countermeasures.
Shevardnadze Once More Appeals for "Star Peace"
In his October 24 speech marking the 40th anniversary of the
United Nations, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze gave
greatest emphasis to arms control issues. He sharply criti-
cized SDI as a violation of the ABM treaty and blamed the U.S.
for pushing the world to the brink of nuclear war. As he did
in his September 23 speech to the UN General Assembly,
Shevardnadze contrasted the Reagan Administration's prepara-
tions for "Star Wars" with the Soviet Union's quest for "Star
Peace." Touching on regional issues, the Foreign Minister
criticized "hired assassins" in Afghanistan and Nicaragua and
denounced "Israeli and South African terror."
Defense Minister Stresses ABM and SALT-II Treaties
In a major Pravda article on November 6, Soviet Defense Minister
Sokolov stressed the importance of maintaining the ABM and SALT-
II agreements. Citing the U.S. commitment to. SDI and efforts
to construct radars which could provide the basis for a terri-
torial ABM defense, he accused the U.S. of trying to undermine
the agreements. Sokolov also asserted that:
o Only a total ban on "space strike weapons" will allow
radical nuclear arms reductions.
o Fundamental space research is allowed under the ABM
treaty, but "any work outside the laboratory linked with
the development and testing of individual parts and com-
ponents" of space strike weapons is not permitted. (The
same point had been made by Akhromeev on October 19.)
o Deployment of large-scale ABM defense systems by either
the U.S. or the USSR would lead to retaliatory actions by
the other.
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Soviets Propose Scrapping Kransnoyarsk Radar -- For a Price
In October, according to Western press reports, the USSR pro-
posed in the Geneva arms negotiations to halt construction of a
radar station near Krasnoyarsk -- if the U.S. were to stop
modernizing its radar facilities in England and Greenland. The
Soviet position was reported to be that if the Krasnoyarsk
radar was in violation of the ABM accord (as the U.S. charged)
so were the two American projects. (This reported proposal was
not given prominent coverage in the Soviet press.)
OTHER ISSUES
U.S. Attacked for Supporting "State-Terrorism".
.Throughout this period, Soviet propaganda continued to charge
that the U.S. instigated terrorism around the world.
After four Soviet diplomats-were seized in Beirut in October,
Soviet media insinuated that the U.S. and Israel were respon-
sible for the kidnapping. TASS cited. visiting Libyan leader
Muammar al-Qaddafi as saying that the kidnapping of the Soviet
diplomats "had been organized by the forces of world imperial-
ism and Zionism and that the action was aimed at undermining
Soviet-Arab friendship." Similarly, an Izvestiia commentator
alleged on October 14: "Like the U.S.-Israel partners, the
inspirers and organizers of the criminal act in Beirut do not
..like the fact that the Arab people have such a powerful ally as
the Soviet Union."
Following the U.S. interception of the Egyptian airliner that
was transporting the hijackers of the Achille Lauro, Moscow
again accused the U.S. of terrorism. Broadcasting in Arabic
(October 18), Moscow International Service stated: "The Soviet
Union always believes that...an end must be put to terrorism --
and above all state terrorism -- which has become one of the
bases of official U.S. and Israeli policy. One of its latest
manifestations is the. interception by the U.S. military of the
Egyptian aircraft over the Mediterranean."
A TASS report entitled "Terrorism in Stars and Stripes" (Octo-
ber 24) stated that there is no other country "whose leaders
would resort so shamelessly to diktat, arbitrariness and vio-
lence on the international scene and institutionalize terror as
state policy so openly as the U.S. leaders do." It recited a
familiar litany of charges, including the assertion that the
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U.S. spends millions of dollars to "train and equip armed anti-
Afghan gangs who...burn down peaceful villages, kill innocent
people, desecrate mosques, and blow up bridges and highways."
On November 4, another TASS dispatch reported that President
Reagan had "ordered an inquiry into the leak of information on
a large-scale CIA covert operation to overthrow the leader of
the Libyan revolution Muammar al-Qaddafi...which constitutes
nothing but a flagrant act of state terrorism."
Continuing on the same track, Soviet media gave prominent cover-
age to the press conference held at the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, where alleged KGB officer Yurchenko asserted that
he had been kidnapped and drugged by the U.S. secret services.
On November 5, the Moscow evening news program reported that
Yurchenko's "captivity" had "lasted almost three months, which
the Soviet diplomat called true torture, and which, in essense,
was none other than yet another act of state terrorism."
AIDS Traced to U.S. "Bacteriological Weapons Experiments"
Citing "foreign sources,"-an article in Literaturnaia gazeta
(October 30) expressed the view that AIDS (the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome) is the result of the Pentagon's experiments
in developing new types of bacteriological weapons. The article
cited the "reputable" Indian newspaper Patriot to the effect
that an earlier unknown virus which destroys the body's immune
system had been produced at the U.S. research center at Fort
Detrick. The new virus was supposedly tested in Haiti and on
arug addicts, homosexuals, and homeless persons in the U.S.
(This report was also picked up by Moscow radio's "World Ser-
vice" on October 30.)
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