NICARAGUA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001802780022-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 4, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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entry Intc igence Agency
4 October 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: William F. Martin
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
SUBJECT: Nicaragua's Public Diplomacy Strategy
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Same Subject,
Dated 26 September 1985
The attached typescript memorandum, "Nicaragua's
Public Diplomacy Strategy", is forwarded in response to
reference request. I hope you will find that it meets
your needs.
Exec ive Secretary
Attachment:
Typescript #ALA-M-85-10104C
copy 1 of 25
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from attachment.
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Washington. D. C. 2050S
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
NICARAGUA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY (C NF)
Summary
The Sandinistas' public diplomacy strategy is aimed at discrediting the armed
insurgents, undermining US policy in Central America, and preserving critical political and
economic ties with Latin America and Western Europe. At the same time, it is intended
to defend the regime against charges of human rights abuses, domestic political
repression and economic mismanagement. Using well-focused propaganda themes and a
range of dissemination techniques, the Sandinistas have, in our view, successfully
exploited inherent suspicions of US intentions, despite growing foreign disillusionment
with Managua. Given these successes, we foresee the Sandinistas maintaining their
basic propaganda thrust, but developments in Nicaragua the region offer the regime
both new opportunities and challenges. 25X1
We believe the Sandinistas see the next few months as critical in containing the
rebels and convincing both the US public and the Congress that even with US funding
the guerrillas cannot win or force policy changes in Managua. They therefore have to
(Continued)
This. Memorandum was requested by the staff of the National Security Council.
Information as of 3 October was used in the preparation of this paper. It was prepared by 25X1
f Afri
,
Middle America Caribbean Division Office
o
can and
directed to the Chief, Middle America Caribbean Division, ALA 25X1
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convince their audiences that continued US backing for the insurgents only prolongs the
devastation of the war and heightens the risk of direct US involvement in coming
months. The Sandinistas will undoubtedly trumpet their new constitution as democratic
progress. They will lobby hard to internationalize the Central American situation, having
achieved some success with the formation of the Contadora support group in South
America. Managua reportedly will use the likely favorable decision from the International
Court of Justice regarding its charges against the United States for propaganda purposes
and to request action by the UN. The Sandinistas next will work to engage more actively
the Europeans, either individually or via the EC. Finally, the new governments in Costa
Rica, Honduras and Guatemala are likely to be subjected to a blitz of diplomatic peace
initiatiuoc
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The Sandinistas' public diplomacy effort is a vital tool for achieving key foreign policy
objectives, such as discrediting the armed insurgents, marshalling international pressure on
Washington to change its polices in Central America, preserving support in Latin America and
Western Europe, and defending the regime against charges of human rights abuses, political
repression, and economic mismanagement. To this end, the Sandinistas have controlled
information at home while developing a sophisticated apparatus for disseminating pro a an
abroad, including the use of media, leftist solidarity groups, and personal diplomacy.
Recurrent Propaganda Themes
Discrediting the Rebels. The armed insurgency is a priority target for Sandinista
propagandists, who seek to discourage political and material support for the rebels from
non-US sources and to build international pressure on Washington to cut off aid. The regime
portrays the insurgents as US-backed mercenaries with no popular base in Nicaragua and
claims that the largest rebel group--the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)--is dominated by
members of former President Anastasio Somoza's hated National Guard. Further, the regime
alleges that the rebels are responsible for over $1 billion in damage to economic targets that
has cost thousands of Nicaraguan jobs and lives, as well as hindered economic development.
The Sandinistas also frequently report that significant numbers is--nearly 2,000 in
the past two years--have accepted offers of amnesty.
Allegations of human rights abuses against prisoners of war and civilians has also been
a potent propaganda weapon against the rebels. Government newspapers constantly report
attacks on farming cooperatives and civilian truck convo s, as well as routine kidna in s of
peasants by roving bands of rebels.
Testimony by civilian victims and defectors and occasional photographs of insurgent
t
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..
executions lend credibilit
a_ ---
y
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andinis
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important adversary. In addition to holding the US responsible for human rightseviola~ ons,
they maintain that Washington seeks a military solution to regional problems. As evidence
they point to:
Undercutting the US. The Sandinistas have long viewed Washington n th
-- US aid to the anti-Sandinista insurgents, focusing most recently on the US
Congressional vote in June to provide non-lethal assistance to the rebels. They
accuse President Reagan of "war-mongering" and supporting state terrorism, and
they have chastised Congress for its lack of independence.
-- The threat of a US invasion. The Sandinistas portray themselves as besieged by
the US, pointing to the frequent presence of US naval combatants off both
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Nicaraguan coasts, joint military maneuvers with Honduras, and military training for
Costa Rican security forces. The Sandinistas also claim that the Foley
Amendment--intended to limit the President's power to insert US combat forces in
Nicaragua--provides the administration with clear "pretexts" for launching an
invasion.
-- Washington's refusal to resume direct negotiations with Managua. The Sandinistas
blame the US for the impasse in last year's Manzanillo talks and have repeatedly
asked for a resum
tion
f th
l
p
o
e ta
ks, arguing that Washington's position
d
un
erscores its desire for a military solution to regional problems.
The alleged role of the CIA in the region is another aspect of Sandinista propaganda. In
1983, the regime presented two prisoners it claimed were involved in a CIA plot to
assassinate several high-ranking Sandinista officials. Managua also blamed the CIA for an
assassination attempt against rebel leader Eden Pastora in May 1984, and the "CIA guerrilla
manual" controversy last fall provided considerable grist for Managua's public diplomacy
effort. In May, the Sandinista press claimed that the CIA was training commandos in Panama
to carry out attacks against embassies throughout Central America in an effort to turn
international opinion against Managua. In mid-July, Sandinista security officials publicized the
"discovery" of the "CIA's Black Ea le Plan," which called for using Indian rebels to carry out
tArrnrict attarlec
The Sandinistas also blame US policy, primarily the trade restrictions imposed in early
May, for Nicaragua's chronic economic problems. Calling the embargo an attack on all
Nicaraguans and a violation of international law, the regime charged it was another step
toward military intervention. Seeking to elicit international sympathy, the Minister of Health
proclaimed that the restrictions would deny Nicaraguan children vital medicines, even though
the.embargo did not apply to health products. The refusal of the US to sell badly needed
fertilizers and pesticides has also been blamed for poor crop production this year. Indeed,
President Ortega has accused Washington of using chemical and biological weapons to bring
on the current dengue fever epidemic and a serious cotton blight. The Sandinistas have cited
the necessity of replacing lost US markets and combating Washington's "economic warfare" to
justif
closer ties with th
S
i
y
e
ov
et Union and Eastern Bloc.
Nicaragua as Democratic Peacemaker. The Sandinistas portray themselves as
committed to political pluralism and a regional peace settlement. Regime leaders point to the
pluralistic character of the draft constitution, participation in open forums with government
officials, the existence of independent newspaper La Prensa, and their tolerance of illegal
opposition political parties as evidence of their commitment to democratic government.
Further, they publicize government meetings with Church, business, and political opposition
leaders. The large pro-government vote in the November election and huge
government-sponsored rallies and marches are also cited as evidence of the regime's
popularity. Managua uses the insurgency to justify the three-year old state of emergency,
which provides the legal basis for press censorship. The Sandinistas also are quick to refute
charges of human rights abuses, claiming that the allegations are made by malcontents and
rlnfectors
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Nicaragua has tried to appear flexible in the Contadora peace talks, blaming the US and
other Central American countries for hindering progress. The Sandinistas have touted their
willingness to sign the September 1984 draft treaty--which was highly favorable to
Nicaraguan interests--and in early 1985 announced a unilateral moratorium on the acquisition
of new weapons systems and a decision to send 100 Cuban military advisers back home as
evidence of their desire to reach agreement. Managua claims Washington has used its
influence over Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica to impose unacceptable and unjustifiable
conditions on Nicara
ua
g
The Sandinista Propaganda Network
Control over the media in Nicaragua, promoting solidarity with leftists abroad, and
foreign leadership travel have been the most effective methods for disseminating Nicaraguan
views,
Controlling the Information Flow. Sandinista dominance over the media is vital in
obscuring internal dissent from outside view, giving international coverage to Sandinista
positions, and enabling the government to exploit propaganda opportunities. The regime
owns two of the three newspapers with a nationwide circulation, both television stations, two
powerful radio station
d
s, an
a network of smaller ones. The remaining newspaper. La Prensa
(sometimes as much as 60 percent of La Prensa's maten
a is proscribed.
The government also selectively prohibits the rebroadcasts of masses by Cardinal Obando V
Bravo, an outspoken critic of the regime. With such tight control, the regime can control
information project the impression of broad popular backing, and carefully orchestrate its
res
IIC
__.
onse t
p
D
o
The Sandinistas gradually have expanded the structures for dissemination of propaganda
abroad. The pro-Sandinista Nicaraguan Journalists Union, for example, is associated with
similar leftist organizations in Latin America and maintains ties with counterparts in the Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. The New Nicaraguan News Agency--publicly acknowledged
to be pro-government--competes with other wire services in disseminating stories abroad.
The extensive Cuban press service, Prensa Latina, also helps to disseminte pro-Nicaraguan
stories, according to various sources. The official Sandinista newspaper, Barricada, publishes
a monthly international edition in English and Spanish, and a bilingual monthly magazine is
devoted to sensationalist stories, anti-Americanism, and personal attacks on US officials.
Promoting Leftist Solidarity. Managua places particular emphasis on promoting
solidarity committees in foreign countries in order to spread favorable information about
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Nicaragua, develop political and financial support, and mobilize pressure on other
governments to criticize US policies. Solidarity committees in Latin America and Western
Europe have mounted vigils and demonstrations, organized letter writing campaigns, collected
clothing and money for Nicaragua, placed newspaper advertisements, and mobilized
contingents of international volunteers to visit Nicaragua. Last July, Managua hosted
delegates from the various international solidarity committees to discuss strategy, according
to press reports. The Sandinistas also sponsor seminars in Nicaragua countries to
provide forums to strengthen ties with leftists Their support
for the so-called "popular church" in Nicara u tracted the support of liberation
theologians throughout the Third World.
The Sandinistas have devoted considerable effort to cultivating leftists in Costa Rica and,
to a lesser extent, in Honduras. Their objective is to bring pressure on those governments to
deny anti-Sanindista guerrillas safehaven and to promote flexibility in the Contadora eace
talks
the Nicaraguan Embassy regularly places advertisements in Costa Rican
newspapers to explain Managua's policies and challenge San Jose to demonstrate its
independence from the US. The Nicaraguans have placed similar advertisements in the
Honduran press and and accuse Honduras of being Washinaton's Rini[ 2Q roviding
some funding to leftist political parties,
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Diplomatic Efforts. The Sandinistas have used a range of diplomatic initiatives to
generate international support. They frequently dispatch high-level delegations abroad to
defend Sandinista policies. Vice President Ramirez, for example, toured Western Europe in
June and South America in July to explain the regime's position in the Contadora talks. Also,
in the wake of the US trade sanctions, Sandinista representatives aggressively presented their
case before a range of multilateral organizations, even those only marginally involved in
commercial matters, to gain publicity. Moreover, Managua continues to foster support in the
Nonaligned Movement and has sustained considerable sympathy for its policies in the United
Nations. They have also made propaganda gains from diplomatic protests, especially in
calling attention to ongoing Honduran and Costa Rican support for the insurgents. 25X1
Propaganda Targets
The US Market. In our view, the Sandinistas consider US public opinion the most
important target for their propaganda, and believe the can influence US olic b
manipulating public perceptions. 25X1
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The regime also is generally receptive to US journalists and Congressional visitors; indeed
such openness becomes a propaganda theme in itself and is contrasted with US visas to a few high-ranking Sandinista officials. These visits
are carefully orchestrated to to include model schools, factories, and arm cooperatives.
The Sandinistas appeal to US citizens primarily on moral grounds. Managua constantly
reports alleged atrocities committed by US-backed guerrillas and discredits defectors who
accuse the regime of similar human rights violations. The Sandinistas also compare
Nicaragua to Vietnam, including accusations that the US is supplying the insurgents with a
defoliant used in Asia. The regime paints the US President as war-crazed, contemptuous of
public opinion, and willing toe lars and risk thousands of American lives
in a repeat of the Vietnam War.
Such appeals are aimed especially at US religious and lay groups. I 25X1
they almost certainly welcome--if not sponsor--the now weekly
demonstration in front of the US Embassy by US citizens resident in Managua. They also
host contingents of private US visitors. Last spring, for example, Managua hosted a group of
US entertainer
h
h
s, w
o t
ey anticipated would become critics of US policy back home,
according
to press
In Latin America and Western Europe. In South America, the Sandinistas are
concentrating on leaders of the democratic governments as well as leftist politicans and
clergy. Their goal has been to generate regional solidarity for their position and against US
policy. Managua bases its appeal on traditional Third World themes, including the doctrines
of non-intervention and self-determination. They argue that US involvement in Central
America poses a threat to all of Latin America and that a Sandinista defeat would set a
precedent for future US "aggression" in the region. Regime leaders travel throughout South
America to ively seeking endorsements from Latin American
legislatures.
In Western Europe, the Sandinistas exploit inherent suspicions of US policy among
government leaders. Their goal is to preserve critical political backing and persuade Western
leaders to pressure Washington to change its policies. The Nicaraguan diplomatic presence is
i
strong
n most countries--in Sweden, for example, there are five resident Nicaraguan
diplomats while the other Central American countries are unrepresented.
further, the Sandinistas hold observer status in the Socialist International and
devote considerable attention to maintaining its support. In an apparent attempt to evoke
additional sympathy, the Sandinistas have likened the alleged atrocities of the insurgents to
i
t
those com
m
t
ed by the Nazis
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Sandinista Propaganda Effectiveness
The Sandinista propaganda machinery, in our view, effectively brings the regime's
message before world public opinion and raises doubts and suspicions about US policy, even
when specific accusations appear unfounded. Repeated charges of an imminent US invasion,
for example, have exploited fears that US involvement in Central America could result in a
repetition of the Vietnam War. The Sandinistas have also been fairly successful in portraying
themselves as victims of US intervention, while successfully deflecting charges of human
rights abuses and political repression. Further, Nicaragua's case in the International Court of
Justice, bolstered by testimony from a rebel defector and other witnesses, has drawn
considerable attention to Managua's position. Few attempts are made in the international
media to rebut Sandinista allegations or demand proof. Government censorship of the
Nicaraguan media helps propaganda efforts by stifling criticism and averting refutation of
Equally important, Sandinista propaganda has helped to sustain the doubts some
international leaders have about the insurgents and prevented any precipitous drop in
international support for Managua. The Sandinistas probably calculate that popular fears
about another seemingly endless financial and human commitment has served as a constraint
on US policy. In Western Europe the Sandinistas have successfully exploited opposition to US
policies to prevent any substantial policy shifts or reductions in economic aid, despite
growing disillusionment among some leaders with Managua's policies. In South America,
where leaders have fewer illusions about Managua's intentions, the Sandinistas have appealed
successfully to long-standing fears of US military intervention and s about leftist
backlash at home to discourage any major policy shifts.
What to Expect
Given their effectiveness, we believe the Sandinistas will sustain, and probably intensify,
the basic thrust of their propaganda themes. Moreover, events in Nicaragua and in the region
will offer new opportunities to influence international opinion. Domestically, the Sandinistas
have promised to promulgate their new "democratic" Constitution by yearend. Trips to hold
"consultations" on their charter have provided ample opportunities to demonstrate a
commitment to a pluralistic system of government. In our view, the regime may stage a
carefully controlled plebiscite on the constitution, as well as municipal elections to buttress
Regionally, we believe the Sandinistas will look for propaganda opportunities within the
newly formed Contadora support group--composed of the left-of-center governments of
Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and Brazil. Managua lobbied hard for the formation of this advisory
group, calculating, in our view, that "Latin Americanizing" the Central American conflict would
help to counter perceived US efforts to thwart the pro-Nicaragua environment of the talks.
The Sandinistas have consulted these countries frequently on the Contadora issue and almost
certainly hope that the support group will back a treaty with less stringent enforcement
provisions than sought by the other Central Americans. At the least, Managua believes the
group will dilute what it regards as increasing US influence over the members of the orginal
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 We believe the Nicaraguans consider the next few months to be critical not only for
their war against the insurgents but also for their efforts to reverse public and Congressional
opinion. The Sandinistas will continue to focus on the moral dimensions of US policy,
especially rebel human rights violations. The regime probably will focus on proving that the
rebels cannot win--even with US funding--thereby tapping Congressional concerns about a
long-term commitment to the insur
e
e rebels out of their countries.
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We expect the Sandinistas also will look for opportunities to influence the new
governments scheduled to assume office in coming months in Honduras and Costa Rica. In
recent press interviews, high-ranking Sandinista officials have indicated that they intend to
exploit divisions in those countries over the presence of rebels. We expect Managua to
further intensify its clandestine and overt propaganda efforts to p ure the new
administrations to forc
th
Moreover, we believe the Sandinistas may tr to further internationalize the Nicara uan
issue in general and the peace talks in particlar.
The regime will probably continue to calculate
that an expanded number of players offers the best route to deflect US pressures and achieve
an accord based more on general principles than linked to specific verification procedures and
controls. Western Europe is the most likely target, in our view. Last year the French, for
example, mediated border talks between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and Paris has consistently
backed Managua against the US. The Sandinistas may also approach other countries either
bilaterally or through the EC. They may also be tempted to try to move the talks to the m
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4 Oct 85
Remarks
To 5: Please have the requested assessment prepare
for transmittal to ES/NSC over my signature,
cutive Secretary
E Sept 85
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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SECRET
SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
SECRET
September 26, 1985
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Nicaraguan Public Diplomacy (U)
Please provide us with the best estimate of what you believe the
Government of Nicaragua's public diplomacy strategy to be at the
present time. This should include your idea of the GON's themes,
priority audiences and methods designed to promote their policies
overseas, and to undermine support for USG policies. (S)
It is understood that the GON's principal public opinion targets
are the United States, Europe, and South America. It.would be
helpful, however, to have an estimate of what they are doing and
will be doing in the next few months in the area of "public
diplomacy" and which are their principal audiences within those
geographic areas. (S)
, W&7)K,~
az 14(a
William F. Martin
Executive Secretary
SECRET
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
7646
FExecutive Registry
85- 3721
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