NICARAGUAN INSURGENCY CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001802780018-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: October 16, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
Q0'
Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539R001802780018-4
6 September 1985
tv 10RANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of African and Latin American Analysis
SUBJECT: Nicaragua Insurgency Conference Summary
1. Attached is a summary of the principal presentations made at
the July 1985 Agency-sponsored conference on the insurgency in Nicaragua.
Although there were few issues on which there was a consensus, several
conclusions did receive strong support from a majority of those present.
The anti-Sandinista insurgents have demonstrated an encouraging
capacity to overcome many of their organizational and logistical
difficulties.
-- The rebels' greatest need now is to develop a political program
that provides the people of Nicaragua with a viable alternative.
-- The insurgents have made the war costly for the Sandinistas and
their continued growth over time will pose an increasingly serious
threat to the regime.
- There is a limit to Soviet and Cuban willingness to provide
military and economic support to the Sandinistas. er will
send combat troops to intervene militarily.
2. Again, thanks for your opening remarks. The participants were
obviously pleased that you would join them, and at the signal that their
hn L. Helgerson
Attachment:
As stated
-T - Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539R001802780018-4
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
23 August 1985
SUBJECT: Nicaraguan Insurgency Conference: A Summary of the Proceedings,
2 July 1985: Headquarters Building, Central Intelligence Agency
Opening Remarks (Mr. William Casey, Director of Central Intelligence)
Mr. John Helgerson, Director of the Office of Africa and Latin American
Analysis, introduced Mr. Casey. The Director underscored the importance of the
meeting and hoped that the discussions would generate new approaches to the
Central American problem. He emphasized the importance of the region to the
administration and suggested a number of issues he believed needed to be
addressed, including: the viability of the insurgency in the face of the
Sandinistas military buildup; popular support for the resistance; how long it
might take to win; Soviet and Cuban strategy; and what lessons could be learned
about insurgencies in general and what ideas about other insurgencies might be
The Historic and Comparative Perspective
The Geographical Context of the Insurgency
CIA) 25X1
Media coverage notwithstanding, Nicaragua is not all jungle, and significant
portions of it, including the core area in the western part of the country, are
not conducive to guerrilla warfare. That is, they lack sufficient cover and food
sources to support the insurgents. The most suitable--albeit less
populated--area is in the east and the insurgency has gradually moved in that
direction. The far south, where Eden Pastora's forces operate, is also well
suited for guerrilla warfare and helps explain the longtime survival of his
forces. The Indian guerrilla operating areas in the marshlands along the east
coast also afford good protection because the terrain hinders counterinsurgency
efforts. Indeed, the east would always be a problem for the Sandinistas. The
only anomaly in Nicaragua is in the region around Boaco, which geographically is
not especially suited for guerrilla warfare but yet is an area of intense
Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
The Evolution of the Insurgency
` CIA) 25X1
Guard; and the absence of long range strategic and political plans.
of self-sufficiency; an image problem in that it is widely viewed outside of
Nicaragua as a creation of the US, dominated by former members of the National
The insurgents have evolved into a force that can challenge and perhaps
eventually defeat the government. The resistance, however, suffers from: a lack
The evolution of the insurgency can be divided into three periods:
--The Formative Years (1979 to late 1981): The insurgency was launched by
scattered groups composed mostly of former guardsmen. , who 25X1
advised the rebels, forced the disparate bands to form the FDN in 19 1.
The Miskitos under Steadman Fagoth also began anti-government operations
as the regime began resettlement programs along the northern border. 25X1
--The Insurgency Ascendant (Early 1982 to mid-1984): By the end of 1982
the insurgency was still
operating largely along the northern border. By 1983, penetration into
Nicaragua had increased and Pastora began operating in the far south. By
yearend FDN forces stood at about 8,000. The FDN undertook some internal
reforms to enhance the image of the resistance, including the formation of
a civilian leadership and the reorganization of the general staff. Ties
with the internal political opposition increased, and the Catholic Church
became increasingly vocal in its criticism of the regime and in its calls
for a national dialogue. In September 1984, the Nicaraguan Unity for
Reconciliation (UNIR) was formed. It was composed of the FDN and two
other rebel groups, but Pastora refused to join. Regime leaders saw the
creation of UNIR and the Church's activism as a direct challenge to their
rule and these events encouraged them to intensify repression of internal
political opponents, to increase forced conscription to bolster
counterinsurgency efforts, and to undertake resettlement of Indians and
pro-FDN peasants away from border areas to create free-fire zones.
Managua also became-more a ressive in pressing its case internationally.
--Prolonged Popular War (mid-19814 to present): The FDN has expanded--to at
least 15,000--and has not yet suffered a military defeat. Insurgent unity
has also grown, but the resistance has not been able to translate its
gains and declining internal support for the regime into increases in its
own popularity in urban areas. For its part, the regime has decided to
slow consolidation because of the insurgent threat.
2.5X1
25X1
L CIA) 25X1
A Generic Approach to the Insurgency
2
SECRET
r_T--- 1 -- --- - --____ Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
On one hand, the Nicaraguan armed opposition shares characteristics with
other insurgencies. It is a rural-based movement that stresses military over
political action and hopes to translate popular unrest into broader support for
the resistance. Further, the FDN suffers from the same weaknesses as other
insurgencies that lack a well-developed political organization, including:
decentralization, unreliable logistical support, and the lack of an economic and
political program. Moreover, the Sandinistas aying the traditional role
of the repressor state.
On the other hand, the Nicaraguan insurgency is unique because it represents
a reversal of the traditional relationship between regime and resistance. In
Nicaragua, a leftist government faces a rightwing insurgency; that is, leftists,
who historically have led revolutions, now must fight a counterinsurgency
campaign, including a political program to win the hearts and minds of the
populace. The regime has adopted no new counterinsurgency strategies but rather
is following the US pattern as established in Vietnam. For their part, the
insurgents are operating without the benefit of the well-established support
network that has aided leftist insurgents and, t erefore, they have had to
create their own.
Indicators of how the war is progressing include:
--International support.
--Domestic support: control of population and territory; willingness of the
people to take risks to oppose the government; perception by the
population that they feel secure in the areas controlled by either side;
and the ability of either side to deliver services in the areas it
controls militarily.
Discussion
Two points were made in subsequent discussions:
--We have a tendency, according to one member of the audience, to look at
this insurgency in terms of its weaknesses and at the regime in terms of
its strengths. This is because we have inherently more confidence in
leftwing insurgencies to achieve their goals. We should be mindful of
such biases in presenting our analysis. Moreover, the commitment of the
West to provide long term support for an insurgency is untested.
--Most insurgencies fail, and this fact also shaped our thinking about the
Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Objectives
3
SECRET
______ Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
The Insurgents ( ICIA)
Understanding insurgent objectives is complicated that 25X1
is, making distinctions between the rebels' objectives 25X1
is difficult. The FDN is very conventional in its political program and is
hardpressed to generate enthusiasm. Based on a survey of the backgrounds of
rebel leaders, the FDN chiefs are in the center of the political spectrum, with
the southern rebels more to the left and those in the north more to the right.
The rank and file is almost exclusively drawn from the easantr --onl a total
of 30 former National Guardsmen are in the FDN. 25X1
The peasants joined because the Sandinistas
somehow hurt them or their families or because of the regime's anti-Church
positions. Most recently, they have joined because they see the regime as a
threat to the peasant economy; that is, forced collectivization and cooperatives
undercut traditional landholding and social patterns. Some urban residents are
now protesting the draft; these recruits could become pivotal in taking the
insurgency into more highly populated areas. 25X1
The Insurgency ( IDIA)
The resistance is more appropriately viewed as a civil war rather than a
traditional insurgency. By definition, an insurgency comes from within, whereas
in this case it is externally based and has no political or military space
inside Nicaragua. The opposition is active only outside the country. The rebels
still occupy the same ground they did in 1982, and there is no activity in
populated areas. The war does not touch the majority of the population.
its actions with the insurgents.
Internally, the population must be willing to defy the regime, and coordinate
The Sandinistas CIA)
While assuming the role of a member of the Sandinista directorate, Mr.
reiterated the regime's basic strategy.
--Accept no compromises that would betray revolutionary objectives as
outlined in the "72-hour document" of September 1979.
--The US and the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie are the regime's most important
enemies.
--By proclaiming a moderate political program, holding elections, and
participating in Contadora, the regime has retained Western support and
bought time for the consolidation of power. The West has helped to build
Sandinismo.
4
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539R001802780018-4
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
--Export of revolution to neighboring countries is essential to protect the
Nicaraguan Revolution.
--Cuban and Soviet support is crucial.
Counterinsurgency Strategy
The Sandinistas, as well as the insurgents, continue to view overcoming the
resistance in military terms. This could be fatal to the regime, if it forgets
the socio-economic aspects of fighting the war. Regime goals and progress thus
far include:
--Neutralizing forces in the south and east to avoid a multi-front war. The
Sandinistas have weakened Pastora in the south, but efforts to placate
east coast Indians are as yet unsuccessful.
--Reduce external support for insurgents, especially by eliminating
sanctuaries in Costa Rica and Honduras. The regime has had some success
here but could opt for a Contadora agreement to seal the borders.
--Concentration of forces against the FDN in northwest. More Sandinista
troops have moved into the area, but they have not yet decisively defeated
the rebels in combat.
As a result, the conflict has become a stalemate.
External Support
The Cuban Role CIA)
Under current conditions--US troops in Honduras, US ships in the Caribbean
Sea, and the lesson of Grenada still fresh--Castro remains concerned about the
willingness of Washington to use force. Castro sees the Sandinista revolution as
a repetition of his own, and he wants Managua to avoid his mistakes. After
Grenada he warned the Nicaraguan leadership to stay united because the US would
be looking for internal divisions. Castro also told them that he would not be
able to assist them in the event of a US invasion. Further, if the Contras began
to win he would not send combat troops. He does not want to be in a position
where he is seen to be helping Nicaraguans to kill other Nicaraguans, and he
does not want to trigger US intervention. Nevertheless, the Cubans will
continue to provide technical support, radar operators, special training
contingents, and military hardware to the extent they calculate tolerable to
Washington; that is, no MIGS will be supplied during the next 12 months.
Further, the Cubans are well aware of the political dimension of the
5
SECRET
-- Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
counterinsurgency effort and will help build international leftist solidarity
for the regime. Castro also sees Latin American unity as important and will use
other issues, such as the debt owed to Western banks, to strenghten regional
ties that the Cubans calculate can then be redirected toward opposing US policy
The Soviet Role
the US over Nicaragua.
The Soviets believe that the Sandinistas will remain in power and,
therefore, Moscow will remain committed to supporting the regime. They believe
that US popular opinion currently is working in their favor in Central America,
and they want to avoid building a national consensus in the US in favor of a
hard line. Gorbachev currently sees Nicaragua as a worthwhile investment for
Soviet interests and therefore agreed to supply 80 percent of the Nicaraguans'
oil needs in 1985. Long term economic assistance to Nicaragua is likely because
it is a small amount relative to the political gains. The Soviets will
reevaluate the terms of their commitment to the Sandinistas if the Contras
appear to be winning. Because their power projection capabilities in Central
America are low, the Soviets would most likely avoid military confrontation with
The Honduran Role
the armed forces and the upcoming political cam ai ns--could also prompt a
CIA)
Honduras has traditionally been a crossroads for insurgents in Central
America, and Tegucigalpa has tolerated their presence. Only after the fall of
Somoza did it become actively involved in supporting any insurgency. While
strongly anti-Sandinista and pro-FDN, Honduras will not commit troops.
Nicaraguan political pressure and cross-border raids have forced some changes in
Honduran policy, but the government continues to lend support to the resistance.
Long-term support, however, should not be taken for granted. Honduran attitudes
toward the FDN could shift: if the insurgents fail to make real gains against
the regime; if the Sandinistas increase their cross-border raids; or if there
are Honduran casualties. Domestic political developments--factionalism within
Regional Implications U
Regional governments favor the removal of the Sandinistas. Honduran support
has been the most critical to the EDN, but Guatemala and El Salvador have filled
the gaps when necessary. Costa Rica's support has been generally passive,
consisting largely of ignoring insurgent operations along its northern border.
The continued support for the Contras within these countries will depend upon
several variables:
--Success of the insurgency.
6
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
.r-T----7- - -____ ---- Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
--Internal political dynamics.
--Other diplomatic objectives. For example, Guatemala may balance its
support for the insurgents against the need for good relations with
neighboring Mexico, which is pro-Sandinista. Pressure from the UN or other
specialized agencies could also lead to diminished support.
Discussion
have and that the limits of their support had not yet been reached.
There was some questioning of the reassuring message on the potential for
expanded Soviet and Cuban support for the Sandinistas in the event that the
Contras begin to win. Some in the audience argued that Soviet limits--both in
terms of willingness to expand or reduce assistance--is less certain than
presented. Another commented that perhaps the Hondurans could do more than they
Popular Support ( ICIA)
Popular support is critical to both guerrillas and the regime. There is
considerable data underscoring discontent, but thus far this has not been
translated into su ort for the insur ents.
troops has further undercut support.
rThe
State surveys of socio-economic conditions in different regions is also useful.
Other indicators of anti-regime attitude include the 25 percent abstention rate
in the November elections and the large turnout for the return of newly elevated
Cardinal Obando y Bravo from Rome. The draft, forced relocation, economic
shortages--especially in Managua--and Marxist indoctrination in the schools have
also alienated the populace. Indians and blacks are hostile because of regime
policies on the east coast, and in heavy combat areas the behavior of Sandinista
On the other hand, the regime still commands some genuine support. Some in
the lower class have benefitted from health and education programs and peasants
F__ I
7
SECRET
25X1
25X1
.r-r---_- - -- -------- Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87MOO539RO01802780018-4 ----
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
Discussion
Discussion focused on what might tip public opinion against the regime.
Possible developments might include: more agricultural collectivization; a sharp
military defeat for the regime; the assassination of Cardinal Obando; widespread
atrocities; intense political repression. The FDN must develop a comprehensive
psyops program to exploit regime activities.
The Net Assessment Ro ert Vick rs, NI0/LA; George Allen, CIA;I I, CIA;
CIA)
noted that in assessing anti-Sandinista prospects, it is
important to keep in mind whether the analyst considers it the contras' war or
Washington's. As analysts, we also tend to focus heavily on the negative, when
the positive often deserves as much attention. We need to look at the
opportunities as well as the problems the contras face. For example, we should
be asking:
--What would cause the Soviets to cut off oil supplies to Nicaragua?
--How might increased Sandinista repression jar the Nicaraguan people into
active resistance?
--Could the amnesty program provide a convenient means for infiltrating the
urban areas with contra supporters?
--Given the difficulty of operating in the cities, could block leaders be
bought off easily by the contras?
--How might current difficulties with the Hondurans be turned to the
contras' advantage, forcing them to develop greater self-sufficiency
inside Nicaragua?
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
--What are the prospects for a growing regional commitment to the contra
struggle? 25X1
Developing urban operations is also crucial.
underscored the constraints on Sandinista troops. There is a
growing sense that conscripts serve as "cannon fodder" in an army intended to
keep the regime in power and not defend national interests. The war is a strain
on popular morale. concluded that there may be limits to the regime's
ability to sustain the war. This would be especially true if the Cubans or
Soviets limited arms sales.
8
SECRET
Mr. Allen emphasized the importance of external support both in terms of
providing supplies and maintaining sanctuaries in Honduras and Costa Rica.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
 Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4
Mr. Vickers stated that events over the past year pointed to the viability
of the insurgency. The rebels face problems, but none of them are critical. He
predicts an increase for the insurgents in the next 12 months, but still no real
gains. The Sandinistas will tough it out and continue their military buildup.
The regime will look for more su ort and may seek shelter in a Contadora
agreement.
Additional points made include:
--There is some question about which side can better sustain casualities.
One audience member opined that casualities will not be a factor for the
insurgents because recruitment has been easy. Time, therefore, is
probably with the insurgents.
--The issue of a negotiated settlement to the conflict is still open, but
the regime will never talk directly with the rebels. There was general
agreement on this point
9
SECRET
_ FT_--, - Approved For Release 2009/09/16: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01802780018-4