CONTADORA TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001802770006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 2, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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ACIS-1317/85
2 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of
Deputy Dire
Deputy Dire
Central Intelligence --EYES ONLY--
ctor of Central Intelligence
ctor for Intelligence
FROM:
Chief, Arms
Control Intelligence Staff
SUBJECT:
Contadora T
reaty
REFERENCE:
Memo for C/
ACIS, fm DCI, dtd 27 June 1985, subj Contadora
__
Treaty F
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1. This "fast track" memorandum responds to the reference and is for
your information -- although you may want to task more work once you have read
this text.
2. You requested my thoughts on the correspondence you had received
earlier from NIO/LA, in which he responds to an earlier request of yours in
this same topic.
3. My opinion is that more can be done here and, moreover, I think this
additional work ought to improve our understanding of the verifiability of the
Contadora Treaty, as well as make Senator Durenberger feel more comfortable.
4. My sense is that Senator Durenberger wants more specifics about the
US ability to verify any Contadora Treaty. My sense is that what he has in
mind is something like the monitoring work we provide the policy community in
the arms control arena. I have no idea whether this is in fact so, but my
guess is that Senator Durenberger is looking at the Contadora Treaty the same
way I would like at the treaty. That is, an arms control accord which deals
with non-nuclear, small-sized weapons, and with use of such weaponry in a
relatively small, regional arena.
55 The following paragraphs were written by an ACIS analyst
They describe how the experience in ACIS, in conjunction with the
Substantive help of Central America analysts, could be applied to any
Contadora Treaty.
6. Intelligence Community assessments regarding the monitoring of the
prospective Contadora Treaty can be made richer by applying certain procedures
and formats already being used in the arms control arena. If this were done,
the Intelligence Community work would not only be more complete but more
readily recongizable to those policymakers,and legislators who are familiar
with such products on arms control topics.
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7. In short, a monitoring matrix on the provisions of a Contadora Treaty
can be formatted to identify specific monitoring tasks, associated monitoring
confidences, plausible cheating scenarioes, and the associated Intelligence
Community confidences in detecting such cheating. In addition, the matrix can
list the active and passive cooperative measures being contemplated and show
how each measure enhances or fails to enhance Intelligence Community
monitoring confidence. An example of such a matrix is attached.
8. To construct this type of a matrix, the following work would have to
be done:
-- Identify all monitoring tasks in the treaty;
-- Determine the current practices being carried out by the parties to
the treaty that are relevant to the monitoring tasks (i.e., how do
the parties carry out their operations now?);
-- Identify plausible cheating scenarios (i.e., look at realistic ways
the parties could act which are not permitted by the treaty
provisions);
-- Given our current collection capabilities, assess how well US
Intelligence thinks it could monitor each treaty task and detect each
cheating scenario; and,
-- Assess the effectiveness that each cooperative measures has on the
IC's monitoring confidence, as appropriate.
9. We have learned in the process of constructing such matrices for arms
control topics how important it is to have an appropriate meeting of the minds
of intelligence analysts from CIA, DIA, NSA, INR, the IC Staff (and elsewhere,
as appropriate) in doing this work. In particular, it is essential that all
analysts totally understand what collection systems are available and what
definitions and assumptions are being used in the matrix.
10. ACIS, which leads the Intelligence Community coordination process for
arms control topics, takes the lead in identifying what the monitoring tasks
and cooperative measures are and makes sure all analysts fully understand what
collection systems are being considered. All the analysts together agree on
what constitutes "current practices," plausible cheating scenarios and the
monitoring and detection confidences for the matrix. Background papers
sometimes have to be provided which fully describe current practices and
cheating scenarios. This entire process involves an iterative sequence of
research, writing, coordination drafts, and meetings.
11. ACIS is ready to assist Latin American analysts as they try to
determine monitoring confidences relevant to the Contadora Treaty. I do think
the matrix approach would be a useful tool in this process. An analyst in
ACIS has primary responsibility to ensure consistency in our
approach to monitoring issues across the board in the arms control arena.
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12. My estimate is that if we were to embark down this road, it would
take US intelligence some two to six weeks to:
-- Create an ad hoc interagency group and solve the group and human
dynamics; and,
If you want to go down this road, the key question will be: Who is in
charge? If you are most interested in the substance of the Treaty itself, the
leader should be NIO/LA; if you are most interested in the process and in the
creation of this matrix, the leader should be C/ACIS; and if you want both,
then assign it jointly.
13. If I can do more to assist you here, please call.
Attachment:
As Stated
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SECRET
Monitoring
Task
Count the
number of
foreign troops
participating in
internationl
exercises in
Nicaragua
EXAMPLE OF MONITORING MATRIX APPLICABLE TO CONTADORA TREATY
Will Treaty-Cited
Cooperative Measures
Monitoring Help? (See Comments) Potential
Confidence Under Cheating Detection Current Monitoring
Current Practices Scenarios Confidence Practices Cheating Enhancements Comments
L
(Guess)
Foreign troops VL Yes No Hire two Treaty specified onsight
dressed as host (Guess) experienced inspection regimes would
country troops COMINT analysts improve monitoring
at NSA confidence under current
practices to moderate
because foreign troops
can be identified by
personal inspection. OSI
would not improve detection
confidence for cheating
scenario because of the
ease with which foreign
troops can be disguised.
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