SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENCY TACTICS IN AFGHANISTAN AND CLIENT STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001702570040-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: February 13, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3
Iq
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3
 Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3
TOP SECRETI L_
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
13 February 1985
Soviet Counterinsurgency Tactics in Afganistan:
Trickling Down to the Client States?
Summary
Accumulating evidence suggests that the Soviets may be
attempting to pass on lessons they have learned during five years
of counterinsurgency warfare in Afghanistan to their client
regimes fighting insurgents in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.
The Soviets have developed innovative tactics, most of which
employ Spetsnaz and airborne troopers supported by MI-24 gunships
and SU-25 aircraft, to effectively attack the Mujahedin. Although
none of the Soviet client states has as yet fielded forces
approaching this caliber, we see signs that more rigorous training
and an increase in deliveries of armed helicopters and ground
attack aircraft to these countries may lead to a more aggressive
prosecution of Soviet-style counterinsurgency warfare by
indigenous forces.
This memorandum was prepared byl of the NIC
Analytic Group. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
NIC/AG at
25X1
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3
 Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3 25X1
25X1
Digesting the Lessons of Afghanistan
Certain counterinsurgency tactics being employed in Soviet client states
in Africa and Central America resemble those used by the Soviets themselves in
Afghanistan. These tactics, although used on a smaller scale than in
Afghanistan, may be an early indication that the Soviets are trying to pass on
lessons learned in counterinsurgency warfare. We cannot yet make this
judgment with great confidence because we know so little about the identities
and personal history of Soviet advisory personnel serving abroad; we know of
none with combat experience in Afghanistan, nor can we confirm that any Soviet
special forces (Spetsnaz) personnel are servina in the client states.
Most importantly, the tactics used in Afghanistan seem to be
generic to modern counterinsurgency operations: they were originally developed
by the former colonial powers and the United States. Nevertheless, they are
an innovation for the Soviet armed forces, which traditionally favor large-
scale operations with rigid command and control systems, and have proved to be
effective when used in conjunction with the newer Soviet weapon systems.
Senior Soviet officers have for some time recognized the need for more
flexibility at the lowest levels of command in order to exploit fully the
potential of modern combined-arms operations. Soviet field commanders in
Afghanistan have responded by making tactical innovations that have greatly
improved the combat effectiveness of some of their units. These techniques
require highly trained and motivated troops supported by large numbers of
helicopters, attack aircraft, and artillery. The Soviets have come to rely on
Spetsnaz.and airborne troopers--with a strength of about 2,400 and 11,000
respectively, roughly ten percent of the Soviet force in Afghanistan--
supported by MI-24s and Su-25s to achieve the desired results. The Mujahedin
have developed a healthy respect for these units but remain generally
contemptuous of regular Soviet troops. Even though small-unit tactics have
demonstrated superior effectiveness, the vast majority of Soviet combat
operations in Afghanistan continue to be stereotyped large-scale campaigns
that reflect Moscow's interference in day-to-day operations, the high level
insistance on minimizing combat losses, and a rigid command and control
structure.
Innovations in the Field
Among the combat techniques we have observed in Afghanistan that have a
high potential for use in other counterinsurgency wars are:
-- Heliborne assaults. Airmobile teams of Spetsnaz and airborne troops
carried by MI-8 helicopters and supported by MI-24 gunships have become the
most effective Soviet tactic used against the insurgents. By positioning
their toughest and most reliable troops on advantageous terrain or in blocking
positions, the Soviets have forced insurgent units into exposed positions
where they are more vulnerable to airstrikes and artillery fire.
-- Hunter-killer teams. The Soviets have employed armed helicopters in
pairs or flight s of four to flush out undisciplined insurgent units. The
teams were first equipped with armed MI-8s, but as the ground threat
increased, MI-24s were pressed into service. We have recently observed
25X1
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
-2-
Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3
 Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3
heavier teams of MI-24s and SU-25 attack aircraft using similar tactics to
bring more fi;?epower to bear against the insurgents.
-- Commando tactics. Spetsnaz teams have been used on extended
reconnaissance-an -ambus missions of up to ten days. Commando patrols have
been most effectively employed against infiltration routes. The deployed team
is free to attack a small group of insurgent smugglers, but is expected to
call for air, artillery, or airmobile support to attack a large force.
Heliborne commando tactics also have been employed against insurgent
strongholds in mountainous terrain.
-- Innovative uses of airpower. The brief high-altitude bombing
campaign by TU-16s and SU-24s in conjuction with the latest Panjsher Valley
sweep has not been repeated, but formations of tactical fighters and armed
helicopters--sometimes exceeding 50 aircraft--have been used to beat down
insurgent air defenses. Airborne relay aircraft have been used to provide
communications connectivity to units in remote mountain areas.
-- Improved close-air-support. The Soviets are steadily increasing the
numbers of MI-24 helicopter gunships and SU-25 ground attack aircraft in
Afghanistan. Forward air and artillery observers have been integrated into
some Soviet units down to company level in an effort to reduce response time
and improve the accuracy of supporting fire. Some armed helicopters now are
permitted to respond directly to urgent requests from ground commanders. More
aggressive tactics, including the use of multiple axes of attack, have been
observed periodically.
-- Upgrading intelligence. The Soviets--recognizing that success in
counterinsurgency operations depends upon the availability of accurate, timely
intelligence to field commanders--have continued to improved their
intelligence collection, analysis, and response capabilities since entering
the war. Their latest effort in this area was the establishment of a joint
command post at Bagram to improve the quality and timeliness of their
reporting to combat commanders.
Similarities in the Client States
For the most part, the Soviet client states lack the resources--
particularly the skilled troops--to apply the counterinsurgency tactics
effectively, and the Soviet's ability to supply them--short of introducing
their own military units--is limited. Nonetheless, there is evidence that
changes are occuring in the organization, equipage, and tactics of the
counterinsurgency efforts in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua that may be at
least a pale reflection of what the Soviets are trying to do in Afghanistan.
In Angola:
-- We have observed a consolidation and reorganization of the effort
against UNITA since the return of former Defense Minister Iko Carriera from
two years of training in the Soviet Union. We believe Carriera was
responsible for dividing the nation into military regions for a more effective
regional approach to the conflict, and for advocating the formation of 2000-
man commando units in each region. Although the commando units suggest a
parallel to the use of Spetsnaz in Afghanistan, we are unable to ascertain the
TOP SECRET
-3-
Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3
 Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3
degree of Soviet influence on this effort. Commando tactics were widely used
by the Portugese prior to their departure, and leftist Portugese mercenaries
were brought to Angola to train at least the initial 2000-man class.
-- In 1984, the Soviets delivered eight SU-22 ground attack fighters in
addition to increasing the number of MI-25 (the export version of the MI-24)
helicopter gunships to about 24. The SU-22s have yet to see action, but
combined Cuban and Angolan crews reportedly have used MI-25 hunter-killer
tactics against the insurgents. Lack of spare parts and trained technicians
keep most Angolan aircaft on the ground.
-- The Angolans have designated a few "air assault" brigades, but since
there are too few helicopters available to lift a unit of this size, we
suspect that the designation is primarily wishful thinking. Special
intelligence has indicated that the Angolans have conducted some small
airmobile reconnaissance and blocking operations, however.
In Ethiopia:
Ethiopians with
the assistance of Soviet advisers are training elite units with special
uniforms. We have been unable to confirm such training, but small-unit
operations have predominated in the northern territories since the failure of
the 1982 offensive there. Ethiopian patrols seldom remain in the field for
more than two days.
-- The Ethiopians have used MI-25s to attack insurgent positions, but we
have no indication of the tactics employed. They too are plagued by poor
maintenence and logistics support that limit their operational rate to 50
percent or less.
In Nicaragua:
-- The Sandinistas have begun to conduct long-range commando patrols
into the northern border areas to disrupt insurgent base camps and interdict
supply routes. Whether these patrols were suggested by the Soviets and
Cubans, were copied from Salvadorian and Contra tactics, or were the natural
response to the local situation is unknown.
-- The Sandinistas have received a few of the ubiquitous MI-25s. Only a
handful are presently operational, but these have already been used against
insurgant positions and infiltration routes.
-- MI-8 armed helicopters are being used to transport irregular troops
into battle, lift forces into blocking positions, and provide close-air-
support to engaged units. The small numbers of MI-8s available for
counterinsurgancy operations has limited their effectiveness, however.
Steps to Improved Effectiveness
The future effectiveness of these tactics depends in large part on other
areas in which the Soviets have experimented in Afghanistan--improving close
air support coordination, communication links, and intelligence support.
While we have observed some investment in these areas by Soviet clients, none
have been sufficiently improved to permit local forces to exploit fully their
new tactics. In addition, all three client states would require more
aircraft--both helicopters and fixed-wing ground attack types--in order to
replicate the degree of mobility and firepower the Soviets feel is essential
in Afghanistan. Maintenance and logistics support, now most frequently
TOP SECRET
-4-
Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3
 Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3
i ur ~r tat-Li
performed by Soviet and Cuban advisers aided by a handful of local talent,
also demands attention.
Perhaps the single most important performance criteria remains the
training and reliabilty of the combat forces. The Soviets and their clients
use short-term conscript armies to fill out the bulk of their forces. The
Soviets themselves assign Spetsnaz and airborne units--the best available in
Afghanistan--to the most demanding tactical situations. Soviet client states,
whose armies are plagued by high rates of desertion and exhibit generally poor
morale, have no units that approach the caliber required for aggressive small-
unit operations. The possibility exists that Moscow might turn to Havana to
fill this void either by providing more rigorous training to local forces or
by assigning Cuban troops to a more active role in combat. To date, however,
Cuban units generally have been reluctant to engage in counterinsurgency
operations.
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
-5-
Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570040-3