IMPACT OF THE AFGHANISTAN WAR ON THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001702570037-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: February 28, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539R001702570037-7
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01085-85
28 February 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Impact of the Afghanistan War on the USSR
It is my
impression a as understated or
given insufficient emphasis to what we know about the impact of this war
already on the USSR. By focusing too heavily on the performance of the
resistance and strictly military aspects of the war inside Afghanistan, the
larger impact of the war and its potential impact in the future may not be
adequately registered with policymakers and oversight figures.
2. This imbalance can easily be corrected, although we cannot claim to
have a definitive view of the impact of the war on the USSR.
3. The resources for doing this are at hand:
paper of last fall.
the Soviet military.
Draft material in preparation for a SNIE on near-term Soviet
prospects.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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Interviews and other reporting from Soviet POW/deserters in the
Western and emigre press.
4. The major themes deserving stress are the following:
5. Soviet material and manpower resources committed to Afghanistan are
not large in percentage terms. Yet these figures understate the potential
impact on the USSR of Soviet involvement.
This is the biggest Soviet military operation since World War II.
It is a longer war than World War II, and could last years more.
It is being fought almost entirely by Soviets of the post-war and
post-Stalin generations.
6. Our estimate of casualties and killed (20,000/5000) does not depict
a massive bloodletting, although it is probably conservative. Yet the
casualty level has been high enough to sprinkle a lot of zinc coffins and
wounded into the USSR. The Soviet command is clearly concerned about
casualty levels because of their impact at home, and this is an operational
constraint.
7. Some 50,000 Soviet troopers cycle back into the USSR from the war
ever year. That means about a quarter of a million veterans.
8. Returnees have, so far, been instructed not to talk about the war
with relatives and friends. But they surely do so. The net affect of this
situation, plus what they say about the war, is to magnify the image of a
dirty, shameful struggle.
9.I lindicate bad human and
morale conditions among Soviet forces in Afghanistan: drugs, alcohol, poor
health conditions, abuse by officers, black marketeering, officially and
unofficially committed atrocities.
10.1 Ian almost uniformly dark view of the
war, how the Soviets are faring, and ultimate prospects for victory among
troops and mid-level officers. These Soviets appreciate that they are
fighting on the al peoples' war and don't see how they can
win it, although 7 usually report Soviet determination to
soldier on.
11. Soviet internal propaganda over the years indicates considerable
wariness on the part of the leadership in depicting the war to the
population.
For several years, the Soviets refused to admit that this is a real war,
but stressed the "civic action" side.
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Now this is changing, with increased emphasis on real combat, heroic
exploits, care for veterans, etc.
No doubt this shift is intended to stir patriotic sentiments. Yet there
could be the reverse effect and Soviet authorities are clearly worried about
this.
12. It is remarkable that top Soviet leaders hardly ever mention
Afghanistan in domestic speeches and almost never venture an extended
interpretation of the war to internal, public audiences. They may be
operating from an overly rosy view of how the war is actually going, but
their reluctance to say anything serious about the war probably springs from
worry about how the whole issue is playing in popular attitudes.
13. Soviet leaders have some understanding of Russian history: It
tells them that protracted, costly wars on the periphery, which fail to
mobilize patriotic sentiments, at a time when the system is facing other
serious problems at home, including the effectiveness of the leadership
itself, can make for a dangerous situation.
001K 'r ""r W"40
George Kolt
Fry tz W. Ermarth
cc: D/SOVA
DDO/C/NE DIVISION
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SECRET
NIO/USSR/FWERMARTH:bb, 28 Feb 85
Distribution:
Orig. - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - C/NIC
1 - D/SOVA
1 - DDO/C/NE DIV.
1 - EXEC. REG. (Blind Memo)
1 - NIO/USSR (Chrono)
1 - NIO/EUROPE
Approved For Release 2009/09/08: CIA-RDP87M00539RO01702570037-7