PERU: THE GARCIA ADMINISTRATION AND PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST INROADS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001602450017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: July 15, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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DOCUMENTS CROSS-REFERENCED
ATTACHED:
~2 ~ ~s ~ ~ Sys
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The Ohector of Central Intelligenc
wa~Fnn~a~Ht i~ c zosos
17 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
D/Office of African and
Latin American Analysis
That's a good piece of work on the
response to the NSC Tasker on Peru.
William J. Casey
Dist:
orig - DDI
1 - D/ALA/ DI
1 - DC I
~- ER File
l?-~2
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Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
15 July 1985
NOTE FOR: Mr. William F, Martin
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
~r r~
Attached is the material that you requested
on Peru and the Garcia administration. You
should note that after contacting Constantine
Menges' office the due date was extended from
1 July. If you need anything else in this
general area feel free to call.
Acting Director
African and Latin American Analysis
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Central Intelligrna AgFrxy
wasntrgpon. v. c. msos
DI~RATE OF INI'EI~IGQiCE
15 July 1985
Peru: The Garcia P,dministration and
Prospects for Ccmmmist Inroads
The 36~vear old Alan Garcia, who takes office on 28 July.
pe~rlayed a mac~etic Personality, Youthful dynamism, and a
vision of a more egalitarian society for Peru into electoral
victory. The leftwing social democrat c~ camt on widespread
popular support in the early cping, but the severity of the
camtry's eooc>ramic diffiailties, increasingly lethal leftist
terrorisfn, and a rapidly eApetding illicit narcotics industry
are formidable challenges. Garcia's slaa~ess in elaborating
concrete programs to deal with these problems and in selecti~
a team to help him cpvern suggest that Peru may face
considerable political uncertainty in the months ahead.
The congressional majority obtained by Garcia's American
Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APR~i) gives him an edge in
attenpting m implement new programs ~ ease Peru's problems.
His major opposition will Dame from the Marxist~eninist
dominated United Left ooalitirn and from a C~amenist~antrolled
labor confederation whose maabership comprises same 40 percent
of organized workers. We judge that moderate center-right
opposition parties, tarred by President Bel.a~=de's poor
perfornmnoe and their Dun failure tc present a unified
electoral slate, are likely to have little impact in the early
stages of the Garcia administration. By carefully cultivating
the military, Garcia has been able to overcome the officer
corps' longstanding acYtipathy toward API~i.
This typescript was requested by the National Security Council, and
prepared by the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis with contributions rom other analysts in that office as well as
from the Office of Central R.ef er?nce, the Office of Global Issues, and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. It responds to specific questions posed in the
tasking memorandtmt.
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DCI
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REG
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In ata ju3g^e~t, Garcia Mill i~le~t a Third
i~ocld-oriented foreigi policy tint Mill be serkec]ly ]~ess pre-RS
in bone aid substance than that of the oubcping ~i'?.ap
ac>bdnistratian. He already has publicly defended the
legitimacy of the Sandinista reggae in Nicaragua, celled far
the re-integration of Cuba in6e the inter~erican syate?, and
a sultilateral solution bo the Latin debt pr+oihlae. ~
Peru's eoonaoic vulnerability and the potential for a
clash between Garcia and i~estern creditors aaq offer the
Soviets and their allies new oppactinities far strengthening
their influence in Lima. The Soviets have supplied the
Peruvian Army and Air Fbcee with the bulk of their egni
since 1973. Garcia ~
Moscow if he ~ irYreasiigly bo
perceives W~astern go~vernaents and creditors are
nat_deing enough be help hid alleviate Peru's serious eoono~ic
South Amer~ics, but during Bela~nde~supro-aS ar~.i~~r~ i~
was forced be mark time. Soviet officials began courting
Garcia early in the election c~^paicgn. Mosoew doubtless has
been enoa~raged by Garcia's postelection ov~erttaes ard, in cur
jet, Mill respond by offering attractive prices ca
military hardware and by daeonstrating continued flexibility in
negotiating repe~yment of Peru's nearly $2 billion debt bo the
i~BR. Ne doubt, hoMev~er, that sigliffoant additional Soviet
aid Mill be facthao~ing because of Moscow's airrent financial
constraints. Moscow MIl1 urge Garcia to moos qui,dcly in
upgradin3 relatirns with Havana, and we eft bath Qa^^tnist
governmerrts to try to take advantage of Garcia's desire to
pr~?ote unity among Latin American debtors.
Pbe its part, the Castro regime has not abandoned its goal
of assisting a Marxist go~vernm~ent be m^e tD power in Peru.
R~aRard that end. we judge that both Cuba and Nicaragua-arid the
Soviets in a mote circlaespect fashion--wi11 continue bo faster
ties with a range of radical leftist grates. In the case of
the Sandinistas, we suspect-but have not eonficaed-these
include the insurgent grd~p, Revolutionary Motet-~pac
Amaru. TeTe believe that it is highly unlikely that apro--Soviet
grog will take pacer over the neat five years. If Garcia
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stu~les badly and the Dhitsa Left avoids frac~ertting, there is
an outside cfiaooe, hoMe~ver, that a radical leftist candidate
aic~t Min the elections in 1990.
The Garcia Presidency
Garcia and his key advisers
Alan Garcia has held the political spotlight in Peru for irore than a
year, but he remains sanewhat of an enicpna. In our judgment, the prospect
of dynamic leadership by a representative of a new generation of Peruvians,
coupled with popular enthusiasm for his vaguely defined egalitarian
platform was sufficient th overcome widespread enmity toward his party and
sweep Garcia to victory. Nevertheless, the fact that the President-elect
is still seeking tD formulate concrete programs with less than two weeks to
9o until he takes office is contributing th growing uncertain about his
leadership ability, according to the U5 Embassy.
Garcia's style probably helps explain his lack of speed in making
decisions an pressing problems. According to the U5 Embassy, Garcia
frequently immerses himself in the details of poli matters rather than
ravidi foal idance.
~ Garcia's policy views are reportedly already showing signs of
vacillation. Given Garcia's lack of governing experience, the emerging
picture is of a leader who has yet to Dane to grips with the real task of
governing.
Garcia's indecision on policy matters has carried aver to the choosing
of cabinet officers and other key members of his policy-making team. As of
early July he was still considering various individuals-often representing
markedly different viewpoints-for tap government posts
On the eooncmic front, the president-elect is counseled by three
different groups, according ~ the US Embassy. The least statist-oriented
of these is led by Senator-elect Silva Ruete, a former Minister of Econany
in the Morales Bermudez goverrnnent (1975-1980) who has expressed interest
in voaperating closely with the US on economic matters. A second
group-consisting of technocrats identified with Second
Vice-President-elect Alva Castro-favors more government control of the
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economy. Finally, a third group led by Carlos Franoo--labeled an
ex-Velasquista because he was a member of the leftist military government
of General Velasoo Alvarado in the early 1970s-advocates even more drastic
centralized plaming and control measures.
On foreign policy and political matters, U5 Embassy sources also
report that the president-elect is receiving conflicting advice. Lifelong
friend and contemporary Carlos Roca is pushing for closer ties with Cuba,
Nicaragua, and North Rorea, and strongly criticizes the United States.
Nevertheless, the president-elect also apparently is listening to more
moderate advisers who favor maintaining good ties to the US. These include
Carlos Alzamora, career diplomat and political independent, and Alan
Wagner, a foreign service professional who has served over the last several
Years as the ty chief of the Peruvian Mission in Washington.
Garcia's personal entourage represents a broad spectrum of political
views. His trap political adviser, Luis Gonzales, has studied in the United
States but is a member of the left-leaning ex-Velasquista clique who are
relative newoaners to APR~-. Other members of this group are Gustavo
Saberbein and Javier Tantalean who promote "participatory socialism"-an
ideDlogy that envisions direct involvement of key sec~pments of society,
especially workers, in political decision-making and the formulation of
ecronomic policy. Deputies-elect Barnechea and Morales Bermudez are young
party moderates who the US Embassy believes will assume increasingly
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mportant positions.
Garcia is aware that the support of the armed forces will be critical
to the success of his government and, according to US Embassy reporting, he
has spent nearly two years cultivating high-level officers. In our view,
his closest contact is Army General Sinesio Jarama oa~mander of the second
military region in Lima. Garcia has warm
relations with Air Force General Cesar Enrico, codmander of the Air Force
and current chairman of the Military Joint Gormand.
Economic Policy
In recent public interviews, Garcia has outlined vague and conflicting
economic priorities. He has pranised to pay Peru's foreign debt, but has
continued to criticize the Ili' approach to Latin debt problems, even though
it is still the key to obtaining cooperation from commercial lenders.
Peru's foreign debt is on the order of $14 billion, with $2 billion in
repayments due this year. He has signalled a willingness to undertake new
austerity measures to stabilize the economy-inflation is running at 155
percent and the budget deficit equals 10 percent of GDiP-but says these
ww.wL ..L L.-ALL _~ ____.___!-~
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Contradictions also are evident in Gazcia's private discussions, where
he has adcnarledged that adjustments must be made.
He is worried that social programs will be squeezed out by
requirements for debt servicing, government salazies, and military
spending. As aie tentative option, according tD the i~ Embassy Gazcia is
oDnsiderirg heavier taxes on wealthy individuals and oorporaticns. He also
has appealed privately to congressmen-elect from his
___--_-__-- ,--_ ,_ ~ _ party to help restrain
Even if the ac~ministraticn canes up with policies the INS' would find
favorable, the party's debt expert has told LAS Embassy officials that the
new administration will not sign an agreement with the Ftmd in the short
run. Instead, the president-elect evidently hopes th negotiate directly
with private creditors for financial concessions. i
As another tactic in dealing with Peru's debt repayment problems,
Garcia is seeking to foster ration r Tonal debtors. ~
Gazcia's tough line with the Ili' could gain domestic acquiescence to
additional belt-tightening measures. This could permit aself-imposed
stabilization progr~n-mrnitor~ by the INS"-that would break the current
financial impasse with creditors. Given Gazcia's vacillation, however, we
see sane danger that his adjustments will be implemented in patchwork
fashion, leading bo worsening economic performance aver the near term.
Moreover, an anti-Il-g' stance and rhetorical backing for unified debtor
action could caouse bankers to cease financial support. With exports
weakening, Garcia would soon face intensified cash strains that would
inhibit even token debt payments and quickly create econanic and political
Anti-Nazootics Programs
Gazcia appears genuinely concerned about the illicit narcotics problem
and has assured LIS officials he will continue bilateral cooperation in
narcotics control. According to the US Embassy, Garcia is planning an
ambitious program that deenphasizes crop eradication and enforcement in
favor of land reform and crop substitution. Under this plan, the
government would try to entice coca farmers to migrate to areas more suited
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to the cultivation of legal crops. This program will require substantial
foreign funding and assistance and will be difficult tD implement. We
believe few farmers would participate in such a program without the threat
of strong enforoanent and eradication efforts.
Although the government is unlikely to be able to bring the drug trade
under control, we believe Garcia will successfully implement several
aspects of his program including:
- An immediate investigation of all government anti-narcotics
organizations and projects, which Garcia believes are the principal
factors hampering the government's war on drugs.
- A law oontainirg harsher penalties for use and trafficking, as well
as provisions for drug rehabilitation centers and education
- Efforts th reduce sane of the bureaucratic rivalries that impede
the effectiveness of government sponsored anti-narcotics efforts.
- A public relatia~s program depicting the negative consequences of
d...... .L....
Garcia probably will ask the
United States to be flexible on Peru's foreign debt in return for Lima's
cooperation on drug control. We believe Garcia probably will ask for a
grace period, extended terms, special interest rates, and an absence of Ili'
control on repayment of the debt, as well as increased US assistance for
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Likely Foreign Policy
In our judgment, Garcia will implement a Third Wbrld-oriented foreign
policy that will be markedly less pro-U5 in tone and substance that that of
the outgoing Belatmde administration. According to the US En~assy, he
hopes this approadz will propel him to the forefront of Latin America's
diplomatic ranks. APRA leaders traditionally have been suspicious of the
Soviet Union, and we do not believe that Garcia intends to align his
government irore closely with Moscow. Nonetheless, Peru's econanic
vulnerability and the potential for a clash between Garcia and Western
creditors may offer the Soviets and their allies new rtunities for
strengthening their influence in Lima. 25X1
Garcia's public statements suggest he clearly intends to promote an
activist foreign policy. Over time, the realities of international and
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regional politics, as well as pressing domestic oonerns presumably will
force him bo scale bads his ambitions arrd establish more carefull defined
iorities.
The U5 Embassy reports that, at least initially, the new government
will heavily emphasize Latin American unity, particularly on the debt
question ~ enable both Peru and other Latin American governnents to
confront Washington on more equal terms. Toward this end, Garcia will try
bD strengthen such regional organizations as the Economic System for Latin
America (SELA), the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), and the
Andean Pact. He also will place a high premium on achieving a Latin
American disarmament and arms control agreement in an effort to shift
scarce resources away from military spending toward critical development
_.._~_
Although Garcia and Cuban President Castro both espouse collective
actirn on the debt issue, we believe the two leaders are more likely to
compete than tD coq~erate because of personal rivalry and ideol ical
differences.
/ The president-elect has told U5
officials that. he objects tD Castro's efforts bo portray debt as part of
the East-i~Test struggle when, in Garcia's view, it is a North-South problem;
he also asserted his intention not to let Castro take the issue away from
him. Castro's recent suggestion to a member of Garcia's party-reported by
the US Embassy in Lima--that Garcia "let others take the lead" on the debt
question because of Peru's econatdc vulnerability may have especially
r~wbl..d LL. ~~~~2 ~_,~ _~ _-.
Garcia has assured US officials that he wants cordial relations with
Washington, and his party's foreign policy platform calls for the
maintenance of stable ties. The president-elect on several occasions
privately has told US Embassy officials that much of his more radical
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rhetoric is only for public consumption. His apparent concern not to
unduly offend Washington-as well as riot to be upstaged-was reflected in
his decision last month not to invite either Fidel Castro or Daniel Ortega
tD the 28 July inauguration ceremonies. The U5 Embassy reports he also has
decided rot to upgrade the status of the PIA office in Lima ror make a
visit to the headquarters of the Arab League in Tunis in order to avoid
antagonizing Israel and the United States at this time.
Nevertheless, Garcia's apparent desire to bolster his nonaligned
credentials almost certainly will cause him to adopt positions that will
complicate relations with Washington. He already has publicly defended the
legitimacy of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, called for the
reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American system, and endorsed a
multilateral solution bo the Latin debt problem. He also has criticized US
policy toward Central America, claiming Washington's relations with Latin
America are unduly conditioned by East lest perspectives and overly
concerned with events in Central America while i ring South America.j~
Garcia may look increasingly tD Moscow for help if he fails to elicit
a he considers a generous response from Western goverrmnents and
creditors. We believe Western creditors will demonstrate little
flexibility in renegotiating Peru's debt, although sane additional
assistance from Western governments is possible.
Foreign Camnmist Activity in Peru
Foreign canmmist activity has been part of the Peruvian political
landscape since the leftist military regimes of the 1970s. In our view,
Garcia-given his Third World orientation-is likely to build upon Lima's
.......as ~ __~ _~- --- --- ~,_ ..
Soviet Involvement
According to the U5 Embassy, the total number of Soviet personnel in
Peru is 350-the largest Soviet presence in South America. This figure has
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remained fairly constant for the last several years. Of these, 152 are
military advisers-39 with the Army and 113 with the Air Force-and 96
Soviet personnel are assigned to the F~nbassy. The remaining Soviet
persosv~el are dispersed in their econan~ic missirn, Aeroflot, a ca~mercial
office, a consulate, their media outlets, and in SOVIlJCA and SpVRYgFtp-P,
their fishing organizations. We estimate that of this total ~resenve
To carry out their extensive propaganda placement efforts the Soviets
rely on a press attache office, as well as separate offices for Novosti,
Tass, Pravr3a, Ransa~blskaya Pravda, Trud, and Soviet radio and TV. In
addition tD the leftist Peruvian newspaper "E1 Diario Marka", the country's
highest circulation daily and the organ of APRA regu ar y receive press
The Soviet Peruvian Cultural Association maintains venters in Lima and
18 of the vamtry's 24 departments. These entities sponsor cultural
events, Russian language classes, and lectures on the USSR. They also
serve as focal points tD advertise Mosvow's extensive scholarship program
and identify potential grantees. The US Embassy estimates that about 150
Peruvians leave do study in Ccmmunist vountries each year and that about
450 Peruvian students are in the USSR at any one time.
The Peruvian Communist Party is Moscow's most trusted vehicle for
exerting influence in Peru, aovording to the US Embassy. Although the
party has only about 1,500 members, it plays a significant political role
because of its dominance of the oaantry's largest labor group, the General
Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CC~TP), and its participation in the
United Left (N) coalition. In addition, aver the years the Soviets have
carefully nurtured their ties to APRA's leftwirg leader Armando Villanueva,
who has visited the USSR and Cuba on several occasions.
Fran 1973 bo 1980 the Soviet Union became Peru's single largest
military supplier by delivering aver $1 billion worth of equipment to the
Army and Air Force. Peru continues to receive Soviet assistance to
maintain the operational readiness of its major ground forces weapons
systems, fighter bombers, air defense artillery, and missiles. The
Intelligence Crnmtmity estimates that 2,000 to 3,000 Peruvian military and
intelligence personnel have been trained in the USSR since the mid-1970s.
that of the Soviet mission.
well under half
The dissemination of US viewpoints
is aimed by eight binational centers and numerous media
placements.
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The amnsal ntaober of trainees going th the i~SR has declined sharply,
however, fray hundreds in the late 1970s to only a few dozen in recent
Although it is reasonable to assume that the Soviets have made
recruitments among Peruvian military officers aver the last 12 years-sane
of whom may now be at relatively senior levels-we lack reliable evidence
that this is the case. In our judgment, Peru's senior military leadership
remains f~n~daanentally anti-oommaiist and wants to reduce heavy dependence
on Saiiet equipment. Peruvian armed forces personnel trained in the USSR
have not openly behaved in a pro-5oviet manner. In addition, the various
elements of the US mission have not unearthed convincing evidence of
Soviet-directed subversive activity within the military,
Sov et advisers in Peru, however, apparently
have little influence outside their areas of military expertise.
The obvious
diplomatic and political impact of Soviet military a d has been relatively
shall aver the past few years; Peru has taken few pro-Saviet positions in
That may change under the leadership of a friendlier administration.
In the ecaxmic sphere, Peruvian exports th the Soviet Union have risen
steadily since 1982. Last year such exports more than doubled, primarily
as the result of an agreement that calls for the repayment of $215 million
of Peru's total debt of nearly $2 billion bD the Soviet Union in goods over
a two--year period. For the first time, the LRSSR agreed to accept
repayments in non-traditional goods as well as minerals and other products
instead of hard currency. Peruvian exports probably will continue to
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increase in the years ahead as agreements similar to the one covering 1983
L_ 7 Heft _~ __~_
Cuban Involvement
Although relations with Havana have been restricted tD the charge
level since 1980, 63 Cubans are assigned do the diplanatic mission in
Lima. President-elect Garcia has expressed publicly interest in upgrading
relations after he takes office, and this mare will offer the Cubans new
opportunities ~ expand their activities. In so cbirg they can build on
extensive ties the Embassy reports that they have with various leftist
leaders. Regarding trade ties, Peruvian exports to Cuba have fluctuated in
the $10 to $20 million range since the mid-1970s. In addition, Cuba may
receive sane Peruvian goads under a trilateral arrangement among Limas,
The Nicaraguan Presence
Nicaragua has a five--person embas in Lima headed by an ambassador.
In our judgment, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua share three
eamiori goals for their policy toward Peru:
- To increase their influence within Peru as well as over Peruvian
foreign policy.
- To erode U5 influence within Latin America.
- To create a regime in Peru more favorably disposed to the USSR,
Cuba, and Nicaragua.
Although each nation has separate items on its agenda as
well-Nicaragua, for example, wants Peruvian support for the existence of
the Sandinista regime while Cuba seeks to upgrade relations with Lima to
the ambassadorial level-they will work separately and in tandem to achieve
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Crnmimist Strategies
The Soviet Approach
Fran Moscow's perspective,
dealing with Garcia, who already has expressed interest in increased Soviet
military and economic assistance, offers the greatest promise of political
payoff with the least risk. If the prospects for maintaining acceptable
state-to-state relations with his government decline markedly, the Soviets
arr] their allies could retreat from this approach by increasing assistance
to the United Left (N) parties or even by offering support to the
Revolutionary Movement~upac Amaru or-far less likely-Sendero Lumino?o.
Mosoow probably reasons that these tactics hold out little promise in the
near term, however, in view of Garcia's strong electoral mandate and the
disarray in the N. Nevertheless, we expect the Soviets-with an eye to
the future- to continue funneling money do the N, while seeking to
persuade the coalition's leaders to t aside their differences
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Based on Moscow's past actions we
believe the Soviets (along with the Cubans and the Nicaraguans) will act as
follows in support of their goals:
- Continue to offer the Peruvians attractive deals on military
hardware and undercut US and Western prices and terms whenever
- Use propaganda, the media and public or private counsel to support
the Peruvian position on the Latin American debt issue. They can
be expected bo enphasize III' arbitrariness, while pointing cut
their own willingness th restructure repayments on the Peruvian
debt to the USSR. At the same time, by arranging three-way trade
deals involving Nicaragua or Mexico with Peru and the USSR, the
Soviets are opening new avenues to expand ties within Latin
--
- Provide little additional eoonanic aid but offer services or
advisers, and to maintain or expand arrangements that assure a
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- Implement the new Soviet-Peruvian cultural accord signed last May
and prarote scholarshi or other long term training of Peruvians in
the USSR.
- Encourage the upgrading of diplomatic relations between Cuba and
Peru in order to increase Castro's prestige in Latin America, build
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momentwn far other Latin American states to recognize Cuba, and
permit an increased Cuban presence in Peru.
- Exploit political maneuvering or public venality among offical
Peruvians and seek out and maintain agents of influence or covert
agents.
- Support Garcia's stance on nonaligned issues and especially
encourage his pro-Sandinista position.
- Watch for conflict between the United States and Peru and where
possible exploit these differing views by publicly agreeing with or
fawrably portraying the Peruvian position.
The Cuban Approach
Based on Fussy reporting, we believe the Castro regime is pursuing a
two-track strategy in Peru. Over the short term, Havana is promoting
improved diplomatic relations with the incoming administration. At the
same time, Cuba is cultivating contacts with more revolutionary Peruvian
leaders in hopes of furthering its long term goal of establishing a
pro~uban regime in Lima.
Castro's refusal to allow same of the Cuban asylum seekers who flooded
the Peruvian embassy in Havana in 1980 bo depart the country has been a
major impediment th improved relations, in our view. We believe Havana may
seize the opportunity of a change in government to resolve this issue.
Underscoring the Cuban leader's interest in seizing the initiative with
Peru, an APRA deputy who met with Castro recently told U5 diplomats that
the Cuban leader displayed a detailed factual grasp of Peruvian politics.
Havana also may hope to use its links to legitimate opposition
political parties and other legal interest groups to move the Garcia
administratirn toward more radical, anti-U5 positions. Among members of
the United Left (N), the Cubans probably will continue to emphasize
contact with the Soviet-aligned Peruvian Communist Party, the Revolutionary
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Socialist Party and the Mariateguist Unified Party.
Nicaragua
Managua will almost certainly look for both Wert and covert ways to
maintain Garcia's pro-Sandinista sympathies. We believe that independently
and in tandem with Cuba and the Soviet Union, Managua will cultivate the
new president in bilateral and international forums. The Sandinistas
probably welcomed Garcia's expression of interest in joining Contadora, and
recent Embassy reporting suggests that Nicaragua would strongly support his
participation in the negotiation process. Managua probably will also name
an aggressive ambassador to Lima and promote propaganda campaigns using
~f11R'fat}'leati n mmnFer~ ..F at... .~_._.___ __ _ _ -..
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The Nicaraguan ~bessy is also likely bo follow Managua's practice of
Pranctin4 relations vrith opposition leftist groups that could be called
upon tD pressure Garcia, if his support foc Nicaragua appears to waver. We
suspect-but have not confirmed-that Managua has ties with menders of the
Revolutionary Mov~ement~l'upac Amaru, and the Sandinistas might pursue this
option more vigorously if relations with Garcia deteriorate.
Possibility of afro-Soviet Group Taking Power
In our view, it is unlikely that apro-Soviet group will take power in
Peru over the next five years. Nevertheless, prospects are good for
significant Soviet and Cuban gains at Washington's expense.
The most likely scenario by which the Soviets and Cubans would
substantially strengthen their influence in Peru would be by continuing to
ail.tivate Garcia, particularly through such means as exploiting his
grievances against the West on econanic matters. The US Embassy reports
that Garcia already has begun to condition the political environment for a
tough stance against Western creditors by calling a national conference of
mayors. In our view, it will be difficult for him to backtrack abruptly
from such an approach. If he is unable to deliver on his campaign promise
of quickly alleviating Peru's economic woes, he may explore more vigorously
the prospects for expanded oomaercial and economic ties with the Soviet
bloc. A forthcoming response from Moscow-for example by offering to
increase significantly its purchases of Peruvian goods-might pave the way
f
or greater Soviet bloc influence in other areas.
We believe there is an outside chance that apro-soviet group could
take power in 1990 through an electoral triumph. At the present time, with
the center-right parties in disarray, the Marxist IU coalition represents
the most serious, legitimate opposition to the Garcia administration. If
the new president proves incapable of dealing with Peru's serious econanic
an9 social problems, the 1TJ will be well positioned to exploit Garcia's
drop in popularity and emerge the favorite in the next presidential race.
Aside fran the possibility that Garcia may prove an effective
president, several other significant in~ediments would have tD be overcane
for this scenario to eventuate. First, the N will have to survive intact
over the next five years. In our view, there is an aLnost even chance that
growing internal power struggles, which are based on personal rivalries and
divergent ideological positions, will cause the organization to
disintegrate before 1990. But even if the Ii7 holds together, and emerges
as the favorite in the election in 1990, it would have bo tone dawn
dramatically most of its radical positions before the military world allow
the IU standard bearer ~ take office. Embassy reporting indicates that if
Barrantes had upset Garcia last April, the armed forces would have staged a
t
coup
o prevent his assumptiai of the presidency.
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A third, lees likely scenario centers around a challenge to Garcia
fran within his own party. APRA's left wing-led by longtime Saviet ally
Armando Villanueva-might seize control of the party and nominate its
candidate in 1990. We believe Garcia has several advantages that would
assist him in beating back such a challenge. Most importantly, the
numerous patronage positions available should help him stem any severe
erosion of his position within APRA. Even if Villanueva were to capture
the APRA presidential nomination, his drubbing by Belaunde in the 1980
election suggests Villanueva would be a flawed candidate. Moreover, if
Garcia were sufficiently discredited by 1990 to lose control of the party,
we believe that any APRA candidate probably would stand little chance at
4L. ...7 7 .
A fourth manner in which apro-Soviet group oou].d take power would be
via a leftist military coup. In this scenario, Garcia's ineptitude in
dealing with Peru's economic decline and indigenous terrorist violence
would lead to a virtual paralysis of the country that wand prompt a
military takeover. The ~P leaders would establish a leftist military
dictatorship ar~d facilitate a major expansien of Soviet influence. In our
view, even though Garcia faces formidable challenges, the chances are
relatively remote that the situation under Garcia will degenerate to the
point where the public will clamor far a military solution. Moreover, for
this scenario ~ eventuate, the military would have bo overornie its current
reluctance to assume responsibility for the daunting problems facing the
civilian government. Lastly, even if a coup were to take place, our
understanding of the Peruvian military suggests that pro-Soviet leftist
ffi
o
cers would not be in eotmiand.
Even beyond the question of a pro-Soviet takeover in Lima, ha~aever, we
judge that following on the heels of what is widely viewed as a failed
Belaunde presidency, an inability by Garcia successfully to grapple with
the country's eeonondc and political difficulties would have grave
implications for the survival of democracy in Peru. In such a context it
is plausible that "progressive" forces in the military waild again
emerge-especially given the leftist military dictatorships of the 1970s.
Although it is difficult to imagine such a group being willing to advocate
a deal with either insurgent movement, leftists in the armed forces might
beeane sufficiently influential to press far expanded ties with the Soviet
tt.,4 ~.., ~...a : L.. _7 7 : __
Mindful of the Peruvian experience in the 1970s as well as similar
developments elsewhere in Latin America during that time frame, Fidel
Castro publicly has predicted that progressive officers will return to
power in the region. We have no evidence that Cuba ar the Soviet Union
have made significant converts in the Peruvian officer corps to this point,
but-having identified the armed forces as a majar recruitment target-both
governments probably will step up their efforts in this area once Garcia
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Finally, neither guerrilla mave~nent-especially the Revolutionary
Mov~enent-Ji'upac Amaru (1~IItTA) which is the most likely tD embrace Cuba and
the USSR-appears likely to take power over the rext five years.
Nevertheless, a collapse of democracy by the end of Garcia's term would
give a major boost to domestic insurgents. The ~ probably would have an
advantage in competing for recruits anbng radicalized youth because of its
less doctrinaire approach. In that context, we believe Cuba and the Soviet
Union almost certainly would give serious consideratirn to funneling
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Alan Garcia Perez
Alan Garcia, a masterful politician who heads the center-left American
Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), will take office as President on 28
July. Only 36, he will be the world's youngest democratically elected
chief of state. His accession will mark the first constitutional
transition from one civilian government to another in Peru in 40 years and
the first tame that APRA Peru's oldest and largest party-has governed the
President of All Peruvians
US diplomats attribute Garcia's success bo his personal appeal and the
dee~rrooted strength of APRA. In just three years, Garcia has made APRA
the nation's leading political force. He took advantage of widespread
dissatisfaction with the government of Fernando Belaunde Terry and
assiduously courted all sectors of Peruvian society. He drew votes from
the powerful Marxist-led labor unions and established contacts with the
military tD the point where Gen. Julian Julia, Belaunde's Minister of War,
has publicly proclaimed that the military will support the Garcia
The possessor of considerable political talent, Garcia
is a gifted extemporaneous orator whose
i ity to seem responsive to the expectations of different audiences
appears tD have helped him capture the middle ground of the political
spectrum. During the caanpaign, he successfully dealt in generalities and
avoided debates with his opponents. He portrayed himself as a man of the
people-even spending several nights in the slums-and his party as the
only group capable of extricating Peru from its severe economic and
security problems (he calls himself President of all Peruvians). He also
traveled abroad frequently, in part to create an image of a statesman.
Garcia received only a plurality (48 percent) of the rotes in the April
1985 election. After his nearest rival, who garnered only 21.2 percent,
withdrew from the constitutionally mandated second round, Garcia was
declared President-elect by the National Election Board and was thereby
spared a runoff. APRA won a majority of the seats in both houses of the
Alan the Autocrat
Garcia has been partly successful in erasing his earlier image as a
brash, irresponsible, and radical gadfly and projecting himself as a
moderate, mature leader. US Embassy officers have described him as the
brightest, most attractive, anti most articulate of APRA's under-40
generation. Yet, despite his efforts to give the impression of good
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judgn~+nt aid maturity, negative aspects of his personality remain. v5
diplomats report that he has a sizable ego and that he is accustomed to
being courted by those around him. He seems to consider himself well
informed about Peru's problems and uniquely able to solve them. He is
loath to admit that he and his colleagues lack experience in governing. To
'
augment the party
s meager technocratic expertise, Garcia is seeking the
collaboration of t~olitical independents, technocrats, and diplomats ~
Garcia ~
likes bo appear open in
dealings with party officials but who actually retains tight control over
policy decisions. In our judgment, he will retain that same strong hand
over affairs of state. Since the election, Garcia has been traveling a
great deal, partly, say US Embassy officials, tD avid unpleasant
confrontations with colleagues in Lima. He has not allowed his advisers to
act for him during his absences, so that decision-making Danes to a
Beyond the Rhetoric
The vagueness of APR~- ideology-the party is linked to European social
democratic movements, but it retains a streak of Latin American
populism-will allow Garcia ample latitude for action on a variety of
issues. On the basis of press and Embassy reports, we expect him to pursue
pragmatic policies aimed at slowing the serious economic deterioration,
countering the terrorist threat, and controlling drug trafficking.
Garcia has not revealed a detailed economic program, but he has
publicly stated that he will restructure the econany to stimulate
agriculture and fishing and that he will regulate foreign investment and
protect industry to a greater extent than the Belaunde government has
done. He has frequently declared that his administration will benefit the
poor (75 percent of the population) more than the wealthy, and he has
called on the rich wluntarily to sacrifice sane personal gain for the
benefit of the country as a whole. We do not anticipate, however, that he
will undertake large-scale nationalizations or forced reallocation of
wealth. In fact, Garcia stro~ly opposes statism and appears to be
seriously oamnitted to reduce the size of the bureaucracy and decentralize
government functia~s. Furthermore, he has publicly promised to initiate an
anticorruption campaign within the government.
Deeply concerned by the threat of Sendero Luminoso terrorists, Garcia
has stated that he intends to transfer responsiblity for counterterrorist
operations from the police to the army and that he will attack the root
causes of terrorism by promoting develgx~~ent projects in the emergency zone
where the terrorists operate. Such a development program may be hindered,
i,,.._....._.... ~- - -L--~--- -
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Growing Dp in the Party
The son of APRA stalwarts, Garcia joined the party at the age of 13
and has since made it his profession. He earned a la~v degree from the
Oniversity of San Marcos in Lima but practices law only briefly. During
1972-77 he studied in Madrid, did constructicn work for a few months in
Geneva, and pursued doctoral studies in sociology at the Sorbonne. He
returned to Peru at party founder Hays de la Torre's behest, accepted a
t
iti
par
y pos
on, and then won election to the legislature.
In October 1982 Garcia became secretary general of P,PRA aver the heads
of senior party leaders. Colleagues credit him with reinvigorating the
party after Hays de la Torre's death in 1980 by resolving internal
disputes, placing younger activists like himself in leadership positions,
conductin
f
g
avorable public relations for the party tD erase its nest
violence-prone image, and broadening the party's appeal.
Personal Data
Garcia has made periodic trips to Europe; he is friendly with Spanish
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. He has made two unofficial visits to the
fTw: Lw~ ni~i~~ L_1L t ~~~.
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Distributirn:
Original - 1ZSC
1 -Executive Director
1 - SA/bCI/IA
~ - rrto/tA
l - tQlo/t~,R~c
l - rt