THE SOVIET-CUBAN CONNECTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001602440011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2009
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 11, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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I I MAR ;985
THE SOVIET-CUBAN CONNECTION
IN
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
as edited 27 February 1985
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INTRODUCTION
We Americans should be proud of what we're trying to
do in Central America, and proud of what, together with
our friends, we can do in Central America, to support
democracy, human rights, and economic growth, while
preserving peace so close to home. Let us show the
world that we want no hostile, communist colonies here
in the Americas: South, Central, or North.
RONALD REAGAN
May 1984
This booklet provides information about Soviet and Cuban
military power and intervention in Central America and the
Caribbean. The threats resulting from this factor are as much
a part of the region's crisis as are better known indigenous
and historic factors.
United States policy in the area is based on four mutually
supportive elements that are being pursued simultaneously:
o To assist in the development of democratic institutions
and to encourage creation of representative governments accoun-
table to their citizens.
o To address on an urgent basis the economic and social
problems of the region by providing economic assistance to
stimulate growth, create opportunity, and improve the quality
of life of the people.
o To provide security assistance to enable the countries
to defend themselves against Soviet-bloc, Cuban and Nicaraguan
supported insurgents and terrorists intent on establishing
Marxist-Leninist dictatorships.
o To promote peaceful solutions through negotiation and
dialogue among the countries of the region and among political
groups within each country.
This policy is working. Democracy is now emerging as
the rule, not the exception. Four of the five countries in
Central America have conducted elections widely judged free
and fair. Only in Nicaragua did people go to the polls with
no real choice, due to Sandinista harassment of the democratic
opposition.
Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union are the principal
threats to democracy in Central America. In El Salvador, the
guerrillas are fighting the reforms of President Jose Napoleon
Duarte and his elected government with arms channeled through
Nicaragua with the active support of the Sandinistas. Since
1979, guerrilla actions have cost the Salvadoran people endless
suffering and their economy more than $1 billion. The goal of
the guerrillas, acting in concert with Havana and Managua, is
to establish a Marxist-Leninist government in El Salvador.
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Marxist-Leninists promise freedom, national development,
and a classless society. In reality, they deliver repressive
governments that are unable to produce economically, but are
ever ready to give assistance to foreign groups trying to
seize power in other countries. Castro's Cuba has been the
prime example of this form of government in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Sandinista Nicaragua is following the Cuban example.
Grenada was on the same path until October 1983.
Soviet interest in exploiting the economic, political, and
social problems of Central America and the Caribbean is evident
in a document found by U.S.-Caribbean security forces during
the Grenada rescue mission. In a 15 April 1983 meeting with
Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko was quoted as describing the region as "boiling
like a cauldron" and saw Cuba and Nicaragua as "living examples
for countries in that part of the world."1
Over the last five years, the Soviet Union has sought to
exploit this "boiling cauldron" by providing more military
assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua than the United States has
provided to all of Latin America. The Sandinista military
buildup began in 1980, two years before there was any significant
armed opposition to the Managua regime. From July 1979 through
April 1981, the United States was providing generous economic
assistance to Nicaragua ($117 million) and providing only
small amounts of military assistance to Nicaragua's neighbors.
Subsequent increases in U.S. military assistance to these
neighboring countries has been a direct reaction to the military
buildup and support for guerrillas undertaken by Nicaragua,
Cuba, and the Soviet bloc.
The Soviet Union sees in the region an excellent and low-cost
opportunity to preoccupy the United States--the "main adversary"
of Soviet strategy--thus gaining greater global freedom of
action for the USSR. While the Soviets are not likely to
mount a direct military challenge to the United States in the
Caribbean Basin, they are attempting to foment as much unrest
as possible in an area that is the strategic crossroads of the
Western Hemisphere. Working through its key proxy in the
region, Cuba, the Soviet Union hopes to force the United States
to divert attention and military resources to an area that has
not been a serious security concern to the United States in
the past.
President Reagan outlined the challenge faced by the United
States in his 9 May 1984 televised speech to the nation:
As the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America,
chaired by Henry Kissinger, agreed, if we do nothing
or if we continue to provide too little help, our choice
will be a Communist Central America with additional
Communist military bases on the mainland of this
hemisphere, and Communist subversion spreading southward
and northward. This Communist subversion poses the
threat that 100 million people from Panama to the open
border on our south could come under the control of
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pro-Soviet regimes.
If we come to our senses too late, when our vital interests
are even more directly threatened, and after a lack of
American support causes our friends to lose the ability
to defend themselves, then the risks to our security and
our way of life will be infinitely greater.
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CUBA: THE KEY SOVIET PROXY
The 1959 revolution carried out by Fidel Castro and his
26th of July Movement has been of inestimable value to the
Soviet Union. The first proof that the USSR understood the
strategic advantages it could gain from Cuba came in the early
1960s. At that time, the USSR lagged behind the United States
in long-range nuclear systems, and in 1962, the opportunistic
Soviets secretly introduced medium- and intermediate-range
nuclear missiles in Cuba. Had they succeeded in keeping the
missiles in Cuba, the Soviets would have controlled a nuclear
base only 90 miles from the Florida coast.
The Soviets now have in Cuba 7,000 civilian advisers, a
2,800-man combat brigade, another 2,800 military advisers,
plus about 2,100 technicians at the Lourdes electronic intelli-
gence facility. Since 1969, the Soviet navy has deployed task
forces to Cuba and the Caribbean 24 times. Soviet long-range
naval reconnaissance aircraft are also deployed to Cuba. From
there, they operate along the U.S. East Coast and in the Caribbean,
shadowing carrier battle groups and spying on other U.S. military
forces and installations. The Soviets also use Cuba as a
stopover point for reconnaissance aircraft enroute to Angola.
To protect their military investment in Cuba, the Soviets
are making a sizeable economic investment as well. Each year
the Soviets provide more than $4 billion to the Cuban economy.
During the last four years alone, they have given the Cubans
almost $3 billion in military aid. In fact, since the early
1960s, Cuba has not paid for any of the military assistance it
has received from the Kremlin.
This substantial investment in Cuba gives the Soviet Union
both military and intelligence capabilities in an area that
is a lifeline for the U.S. economy. The Caribbean and Gulf of
Mexico maritime routes carry about 55% of imported petroleum
to the U.S., as well as approximately 45% of all U.S. seaborne
trade. Furthermore, in any NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation,
more than half of all NATO resupply would be shipped from Gulf
ports and would have to pass by Cuba.
Cuba's strategic location makes it an ideal site for an
intelligence facility directed against the United States.
The Soviet Union established such a site at Lourdes near Havana
in the mid-1960s. Lourdes is the most sophisticated Soviet
collection facility outside the Soviet Union itself. From
this key listening post, the Soviets can monitor U.S. commercial
satellites, U.S. military and merchant shipping communications,
as well as NASA space program activities at Cape Canaveral.
Lourdes also enables the Soviets to eavesdrop on telephone
conversations in the United States.
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It is no surprise that a 1983 article in Forbes asked,
"Why do the Russians pump $4 billion to $5 billion as year into
Cuba's collapsing economy? Because they know it is their best
buy when it comes to making trouble for the U.S. For less
than the annual cost of supporting a single aircraft carrier
task force, the Soviet Union has developed a wondrous weapon."2
Castro and Communism
It is sometimes asserted that Fidel Castro took Cuba into
the Soviet orbit because the U.S. turned a cold shoulder
to his 1959 revolution. This is a double distortion.
In April 1959, Fidel Castro made his first visit to the
United States after comimg to power. The U.S. was ready to
discuss foreign aid with the new government. Privately,
however, Castro forbade his economic minister to consent to
even preliminary discussions with the United States on the
topic of economic aid.3
During the first years of Sandinista rule in Nicaragua,
Castro advised the Sandinistas to hide their adherence to
Marxism-Leninism. This is the same pattern that Castro followed
in Cuba. To obtain and hold the support of moderates in Cuba
and abroad, Castro portrayed himself as a democrat while the
struggle against Batista was underway. After his own dictator-
ship was firmly established, Castro changed his tune. In a 2
December 1961 speech, he told the Cuban people that he had been
an "apprentice Marxist-Leninist" for years, that he had disguised
his true political beliefs, and that he would remain a Marxist-
Leninist until he died.4
In a May 1977 interview with Barbara Walters of ABC tele-
vision, Castro said that he had made the decision to become a
communist while he was a student in law school in the late
1940s.5 During a TV interview in Spain in January 1984,
Castro dismissed U.S. hostility as a major factor in his decision
to take Cuba into the Soviet camp, adding that "inexorably, we
considered ourselves to be Marxist-Leninists."6
A Garrison State
Under Soviet tutelage, Cuba's armed forces have expanded
steadily. They now include 160,000 active duty military personnel,
plus up to 135,000 well-trained and experienced reservists who
can be mobilized in two to three days. This total force exceeds
that of the active duty armed forces of Brazil, a country with
13 times Cuba's population. Through its operations in Africa
over the past decade, Cuba has gained more extensive and more
recent foreign combat experience than any other country in the
Western Hemisphere.
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Cuba has more than 950 tanks and more than 200 jet fighters,
principally the widely exported MiG-21 but also the MiG-23, a
front-line fighter of the Soviet Union's air force. In addition,
the Soviets have given Cuba an improved naval capability with
frigates, submarines, and missile/torpedo firing patrol boats.
The Cuban air force and civil air fleet could transport at least
15,000 combat soldiers anywhere in the Caribbean Basin within
two to three weeks. Important elements of this force could be
in place within a few hours. No single country in the basin,
except the United States, has the means to repel such an attack
without external assistance.
Cuba has developed the capability, through the recent addition
of two amphibious landing ships, together with smaller amphibious
craft of the Cuban navy, of placing an initial assault force
of about 1,000 men, with either tanks or artillery support, on
nearby island nations. The Cuban merchant marine could transport
personnel to any country in the Caribbean area as well. This
ability, sharpened by extensive training exercises in recent
years, is an ominous threat to Cuba's small island neighbors.
The capability of Cuban MiG-23s to support operations through-
out the Caribbean cannot be overlooked. These planes have the
range to attack targets in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico,
including key oil fields and refineries. Its operations in
Africa, especially those in Angola and Ethiopia, have shown
that Cuba can project its military power over great distances.
One more submarine, one more plane, one more ship at a
time may not seem important. However, by gradually increasing
every aspect of its military power, Cuba has made itself a
potential military threat to its Caribbean and Central American
neighbors.
A Strong Supporter of Communist Expansion
There are now about five times as many Cuban soldiers in
Africa alone as there were in the Cuban armed forces that
Castro defeated in coming to power in 1959. Ten years after
Cuban troops first arrived there, Castro still has a force of
30,000 soldiers in Angola. Since 1975, Castro has sent military
forces and/or advisers to Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South
Yemen, Congo, Ghana, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, as well as Grenada
and Nicaragua. Although the propaganda focus is on such ideals
as "socialist solidarity," Castro is known to charge many of
these countries for Cuban troops, "construction workers,"
and other "internationalists," drainin scarce foreign exchange
from local economies. According to reliable sources, recipient
governments must pay Cuba a fixed sum per month for each Cuban
soldier and each civilian technician. Thus, Castro is simul-
taneously playing the world revolutionary role he has always
desired, supporting Soviet foreign policy goals, and acquiring
hard currency.
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Cuba needs the money it gains from foreign ventures. The
state-controlled economy of Cuba has shown little growth in
the 26 years Castro has been in power. It has become heavily
dependent on the Soviet Union. As Hugh Thomas, the noted
British historian of Cuba, has written:
The Revolution has preserved, even heightened,
the extent to which the country depends on one
crop [sugar]. For that reason, if no other,
Cuba's foreign policy is as dependent on the
Russians as it used to be on the U.S. Most of
the Russo-Cuba commerce concerns sugar which
Russia buys at a price formally about three times
higher than present world market prices.?
Castro's assistance is indispensable for guerrilla move-
ments in Latin America. Since the early 1960s, Cuba has attracted
guerrillas from virtually every country in the region. Castro
has given logistical and financial support to thousands of
these guerrillas as well as providing them military training,
usually in courses lasting three to six months. The alumni of
Castro's guerrilla training range from most of Nicaragua's
current Sandinista leadership to the demolition experts sabotaging
the economy of El Salvador. A 1981 State Department analysis
of Cuba's support for violence in Latin America showed the
extent of Castro's efforts to train and supply urban and rural
terrorists.8
Cuban and Soviet efforts to gain influence are not limited
to the military realm. One of their goals is to shape the
political attitudes of foreign students who are provided
scholarships. Since the mid-1970s, more than 20,000 students--
pre-school through university--have studied at Cuba's Isle
of Youth educational complex. Students have come from several
countries, principally Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia,
and Nicaragua. In addition to this Cuban effort, the Soviets
and their Eastern European allies are providing thousands of
government-sponsored scholarships specifically to Latin American
and Caribbean students.9
The Soviet Union and Cuba have worked effectively toward
the objective of establishing additional Marxist-Leninist
regimes in Central America and the Caribbean. Although Castro
has become more calculating in his export of violence and
exploitation of poverty, his aims remain as they were in the
1960s. He publicly proclaimed in the 1976 constitution Cuba's
right and duty to support revolutionary and national liberation
movements. For its part, the Soviet Union has intensified its
efforts to create chaos or conflict near the United States to
divert U.S. attention and resources from Soviet challenges in
other critical areas of the world.
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GRENADA: A FAILED REVOLUTION
Grenada turned toward the Cubans and the Soviet bloc in
1979 when Maurice Bishop led a coup to depose the unpopular
prime minister, Eric Gairy. Contrary to Bishop's promise that
his revolution would modernize the economy, improve living
standards and promote democracy, life in Grenada deteriorated
steadily during his four-year regime, 1979-1983. Bishop
secretly planned to impose a single-party dictatorship while
promising a pluralistic democracy. The Soviets and Cubans
were party to the entire deception.10
A basic objective of Bishop was to consolidate power in
his New Jewel Movement (NJM). The NJM was organized along
classic Marxist-Leninist lines, with power concentrated in a
single leader and exercised through a small central committee
and political bureau. Bishop called his regime the People's
Revolutionary Government and established close ties with the
Soviet Union and Cuba, and to a lesser extent, Libya, North
Korea, and Vietnam.
Grenada Followed Cuba's Model
Following Castro's strategy, the NJM first established a
broad coalition. It was led by the radical left, but it also
included non-communist elements. "This was done," Bishop
explained in his famous 13 September 1982 "Line of March" speech,
"so imperialism won't get too excited."11 Later, he removed the
moderates from government, as Castro had done 20 years before
in Cuba. Elections were never held. Opposition was dealt
with firmly, often through imprisonment. The media was controlled.
Church leaders were denied access to radio since they were
seen as a principal impediment to the goals of the
NJM.
As in Cuba, Bishop adopted the control and surveillance
measures normally found in totalitarian regimes. The Ministry
of the Interior kept Western diplomats, businessmen, and
local opposition groups under surveillance. The right to
privacy of Grenadians and foreigners was routinely violated.
Telephones were tapped and mail intercepted as were personal
records and private bank accounts. The People's Revolutionary
Army was given police functions, conducting searches and detaining
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suspects without warrants. Human rights violations included
torture, beatings, imprisonment, and psychological intimidation.
Opposition political parties were forced to disband or go under-
ground. Some opposition leaders left. Independent churches
were seen as a threat. The so-called "People's Laws" gave
Bishop and his top lieutenants nearly unlimited power. An
important step in assuring Bishop and the NJM total control
was a propaganda and indoctrination campaign. Children and
adults were required to attend political orientation classes.
Ideological training was given to virtually all Grenadians,
with the army a special target. In many respects, Bishop was
repeating the steps taken by Castro in consolidating power in
the early 1960s.
The Soviet-Grenadian Connection
Cubans and Soviets were key actors in Bishop's Grenada,
but the extent of Soviet-Grenadian relations after the 1979
coup was not made known until after the Bishop visit to Moscow
in July 1982, and even then key details were kept from the
public. Among the 35,000 pounds of documents collected in
October 1983 were five secret military agreements signed by
Grenada--three with the Soviet Union, one with Cuba, and one
with North Korea.
The Soviet Union used Cuba to funnel military, economic
and technical assistance to Grenada. This included Soviet and
Cuban material and equipment to build the Point Salines airport.
This airport, ostensibly for civilian use, was built primarily
by armed Cubans, despite the high unemployment on the island
of Grenada. The Point Salines airport project was a key issue
for Maurice Bishop in his 15 April 1983 meeting with Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Bishop's "Outline of Presen-
tation" for this meeting emphasized the economic benefits of
the project, but also included the cryptic phrase "There is
also the strategic factor which is well knownl!"1L
Once completed, Point Salines could have provided a stopover
point for Cuban flights to Africa, an additional facility for
Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft, and possibly a
transshipment point for arms and supplies for Latin American
insurgents and for the Sandinistas. Had the Point Salines air-
port been operational in April 1983, for example, the Libyan
aircraft detained in Brazil, while clandestinely ferrying a
cargo of military supplies to Nicaragua, could have refueled
in Grenada instead of in Brazil.
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Military Assistance
The Soviets and Cubans were quick to exploit the potential
of Grenada. Only a month after Bishop seized power, the first
large shipment of Eastern-bloc manufactured arms arrived from
Havana. This included 3,400 rifles, 200 machine guns, 100
heavier weapons, and ammunition.13
Cuban military advisers were assigned by Fidel Castro to
organize and train the Grenadian military and internal security
forces. Hundreds of young Grenadians were sent to Cuba for
military training.
The covert nature of much of this assistance was exemplified
by boxes of ammunition labelled "Cuban Economic Office" shipped
to Grenada by Cuba. By October 1983, tiny Grenada had more
men under arms and more weapons and military supplies than all
of its Eastern Caribbean neighbors combined.
Support for Soviet/Cuban Policies Leads to Instability
Under Bishop and the NJM, Grenada fully supported Soviet/Cuban
policies, including the Soviet invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan.
From the beginning, Bishop and his followers were anxious
to prove their usefulness to the Soviet Union. In June 1983,
the Grenadian Ambassador to Moscow sent a message to his Foreign
Minister reviewing Grenadian-Soviet relations. He emphasized
the continuing need to convince the Soviets that the Grenadian
revolution was part of a
world wide process with its original roots in the
Great October Revolution (Note: a reference to the
Russian Revolution of October 1917). For Grenada to
assume a position of increasingly greater importance,
we have to be seen as influencing at least regional
events. We have to establish ourselves as the authority
of events in at least the English-speaking Caribbean,
and be the sponsor of revolutionary activity and pro-
gressive developments in this region at least.14
To further Grenada's regional ambitions, the Bishop govern-
ment adopted an active program of meeting with "progressive
and revolutionary parties in the region" twice a year. Bishop
apparently saw such meetings as a means to convince the Soviets
of the pivotal role Grenada could play as the Soviets' Eastern
Caribbean agent. The meetings concentrated on developing
strategies to counter the U.S. sponsored Caribbean Basin Ini-
tiative. Belize, Suriname, St. Lucia, Dominica, and St. Vincent
were seen as ripe for exploitation.15
Ultimately, of course, it was the Grenadian government that
disintegrated when a power struggle erupted within the NJM
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during-the fall of 1983. The assassination of Bishop, three
of his closest deputies, and a number of innocent persons by
troops of the People's Revolutionary Army led to the collapse
of the NJM. All ports of entry and departure were closed and
a 24-hour shoot-on-sight curfew was declared.
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States made a formal
request to the United States for assistance. In addition, the
sole remaining source of governmental legitimacy, the Governor-
General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, made an urgent and confiden-
tial appeal to the regional states to restore order on the
island. The United States, responding to these requests and
concerned over the safety of 1,000 American citizens on the
island, participated in a combined U.S.-Caribbean security
force that landed on Grenada on 25 October 1983. Peace and
public order were restored.
The reaction of the Grenadian people to the U.S.-Caribbean
security force was overwhelmingly supportive. A CBS News
poll of 3 November 1983 found that 91% of the Grenadian people
expressed strong approval for the actions taken by the United
States. On 3 December 1984, the people of Grenada formally
closed the books on the failed Marxist-Leninist revolution by
successfully holding the island's first election in eight
years.
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NICARAGUA: A BETRAYED REVOLUTION
In July 1979, a broad and popular coalition led militarily
by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew the
government of General Anastasio Somoza and ended a family dynasty
that had ruled Nicaragua for more than four decades. The new
government owed much of its success to international support for
the anti-Somoza forces. The Organization of American States
(OAS) had even adopted a resolution calling for the "definitive
replacement" of Somoza and free elections as soon as possible.16
In gaining this support, the Sandinistas had pledged to have
free elections, political pluralism, a mixed economy, and a
non-aligned foreign policy. The first junta formed after Somoza
fled appeared to confirm the belief that Nicaragua was on the
road to democracy.
Since those hopeful early days, Nicaragua has moved not
toward democracy, but toward a new dictatorship tied ever more
closely to Cuba and the Soviet Union.
The Sandinistas' betrayal of the ideals of the revolution
and the establishment of a closely controlled society have driven
many of their key allies and thousands of their former rank-and-
file supporters out of the country. Former junta members Arturo
Cruz and Alfonso Robelo, and even the legendary "Comandante
Cero" (Eden Pastora, who served as Deputy Defense Minister), left
Nicaragua to take up the fight against their former colleagues.
In a 1984 interview, Pastora explained his reasons for leaving
the Nicaraguan government. Speaking of the Sandinista leaders
he said: "They isolated themselves from what Sandinismo is
supposed to be about. Violations of human rights, Cuban troops
in Nicaragua, the alignment toward the Soviet bloc, the moral
deviations, it's a long list."17
By words and deeds, the Sandinista leaders have demonstrated
that they are, in fact, dedicated Marxist-Leninists. On 25
August 1981, Comandante Humberto Ortega, the Minister of Defense,
told his subordinates that "Marxism-Leninism is the scientific
doctrine that guides our revolution.... We cannot be Marxist-Leninist
without Sandinismo, and without Marxism-Leninism, Sandinismo
cannot be revolutionary....Our doctrine is Marxism-Leninism."18
Tomas Borge, the powerful Minister of the Interior whose
responsibilities include internal security and censorship,
stated in a September 1983 interview that he was a communist.19
According to an article on 24 December 1984, he reconfirmed his
views in Cuba: "You cannot be a true revolutionary in Latin
America without being Marxist-Leninist."20 Borge controls
the feared turbas divinas, or "divine-mobs," composed of Sandinista
militants used by the government to raid Catholic churches,
break up political rallies, and otherwise harass opponents
of the regime. The turbas were used in the government's efforts
to intimidate potential voters for opposition presidential
candidate Arturo Cruz before the November 1984 elections.
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Revealing statements of the Sandinista political philosophy
were made in May 1984 by Comandante Bayardo Arce who had been
assigned to run the Sandinista election campaign. Speaking in
what he thought was a private and off-the-record meeting with
one of the Marxist-Leninist parties "competing" with the Sandi-
nistas, Arce stated that the upcoming elections were a "nuisance"
and should be used "to demonstrate that...the Nicaraguan
people are for Marxism-Leninism." He further stated that "if
we did not have the U.S.-imposed state of war, the electoral
problem would be totally out of place in terms of usefulness."
He concluded his lengthy remarks by stating that the election
process could have "positive benefits: the unity of the Marxist-
Leninists of Nicaragua."21 (This speech was not reported in
the Nicaraguan press.)
In the view of many former supporters of the Sandinistas,
the Managua regime has demeaned the name of their patron,
Cesar Augusto Sandino. This fervent nationalist of the 1930s
was opposed to all forms of foreign intervention, by inter-
national communism as well as the United States. The guerrilla
leader Augustin Farabundo Marti, commenting on Sandino, said:
"[Sandino) did not wish to embrace the Communist program which
I supported. His banner was only for independence, a banner
of emancipation, and he did not pursue the ends of social
rebellion."22
Today in Nicaragua, the banner of Sandinismo is giving way
to the reality of communism. Since 1979, the Sandinistas have
consolidated control over the government and the armed forces.
They have placed under direct state control nearly half of
Nicaragua's industry and forty percent of its agriculture.
By the selective application of monetary and labor laws, they
exert pressure against the remainder of the industrial and
agricultural sectors. The Sandinistas control all media outlets
through censorship. La Prensa, the only major oppposition news-
paper, is continually censored and its writers and editors
harassed. Neighborhood watch committees, informant networks,
rationing of many basic necessities and enforced participation
in Sandinista organizations are all used as forms of population
control and intimidation.
The Sandinistas' economic mismanagement, human rights
violations, and abuse of governmental authority have driven
more than 120,000 Nicaraguans into exile. An even greater
reflection of popular discontent has been the number of Nicaraguan
citizens who have taken up arms against the Sandinistas. The
armed opposition, which began in 1982, has now grown to a
strength of some 15,000, most of whom were sympathetic to the
ideals of the 1979 revolution. It is interesting to compare
this strength with that of the Sandinistas in their long struggle
against Somoza. As of late 1978, the Sandinista guerrillas
numbered less than 1,000.23 By the July 1979 victory, they
still had only 5,000 in their ranks.24
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The Sandinista Military Machine: Central America's Largest
Armed Forces
The comandantes realized from the outset that they would
need a large, politicized military to pursue their revolutionary
objectives and maintain themselves in power once the bloom of
the revolution had worn off and their true political orientation
was exposed. In their five years in power, the Sandinistas
have followed Cuba's example in developing a massive military
establishment. Nicaragua today has the largest, most powerful
armed forces in the history of Central America.
On 5 October 1979 the Sandinistas distributed to their
followers the results of a three-day meeting held the previous
month for the Sandinista political cadre. In discussing the
security situation, the document stated that "at present there
is no clear indication that an armed counter-revolution by
Somocista forces beyond our borders is going to take place and
jeopardize our stability."25 Nevertheless, they began to
build a large and well-equipped military. In February 1981,
the Sandinistas announced that they would build a 200,000-man
militia to "defend the revolution" against "counter-revolution-
aries." But, as the 20 February 1981 New York Times article
reporting this announcement pointed out, there was "surprisingly
little counter-revolutionary activity" faced by the Sandinista
government at that time.26
The lightly armed Sandinista guerrilla force of about 5,000
in 1979 has now grown to a 62,000-man active duty force, with
an additional 57,000 in the reserves and the militia. In late
1983, the Sandinistas instituted the first draft in Nicaragua's
history. This action has caused strong popular resentment,
with hundreds of young Nicaraguans fleeing their homeland to
avoid the draft. In rural areas of Nicaragua, there has been
open, active resistance by the people against conscription.27
In their struggle against Somoza, the FSLN guerrillas had
no tanks or other armored vehicles, no artillery, no helicopters.
After their victory in July 1979, they inherited from the Somoza
National Guard three tanks, 25 armored cars, seven helicopters
and three artillery pieces. They now have at least 340 tanks
and armored vehicles, more than 70 long-range howitzers and
rocket launchers and 30 helicopters, including a half dozen of
the world's fastest, best armed attack helicopter, the Mi-24/
HIND D. This is the principal attack helicopter of the Soviet
army and holds the world helicopter speed record. Its heavy
underside armor makes it less vulnerable to small arms fire.
It has a heavy machine gun, can fire anti-tank missiles, and
can drop bombs. The HIND D adds a new dimension to warfare in
Central America since areas of Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa
Rica would be within range of these flying "tanks" as they are
described in Jane's All the World's Aircraft.28
The first Soviet-made armor arrived in Nicaragua in 1981
shortly after the 200,000-man militia buildup was announced,
but still about a year before significant anti-Sandinista armed
opposition had developed. The mainstay of this armored force
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is some 110 Soviet-made T-55 medium tanks. The T-55 was the
main battle tank of the Soviet army for years. Although obsolete
on the battlefield against most modern anti-tank weapons, it
is a powerful weapon in Central America. None of Nicaragua's
neighbors have tanks with the T-55's firepower. Moreover, the
Sandinistas have received in the past year nearly 30 PT-76
light tanks. With their river-crossing capability, these
amphibious tanks provide more flexibility than the T-55s.
The Soviets have considered the Central American terrain
in tailoring the Sandinista armed forces. They have provided
about 40 flatbed trucks, which are designed to carry the T-55
tank. The Sandinistas have also been provided with six large
ferries, which will enable the tanks to be shuttled across
rivers to fighting zones, a significant capability given the
fact that much of the borders with Honduras and Costa Rica is
demarcated by rivers. The PT-76s, of course, can cross rivers
and be used to secure a beachhead while the T-55s are shuttled
across.
The Sandinistas have also been provided with more than 1,000
field kitchens, a number of mobile maintenance workshops, and
about 75 gasoline tankers, all requirements for an offensive-
minded army. However, logistics support continues to be a major
problem for the Sandinista army.
Honduras shares a 570-mile border with Nicaragua. Should
the Sandinistas decide to launch offensive operations against
Honduras, the most obvious avenue of approach would be through
the area known as the Choluteca Gap, in the northwest coastal
plain of the Honduran/Nicaraguan border. The Sandinistas have
conducted training with tanks, armored personel carriers and
long-range artillery in areas close to the Choluteca Gap. This
narrow routing could prove difficult for the Sandinista tanks
if the Honduran Air Force retains the air superiority it currently
enjoys. But, if this Honduran deterrent capability is suffi-
ciently neutralized by a strengthened Sandinista air force
and an effective air defense system, then the disadvantage of
a restricted route into Honduras would be appreciably reduced.
The regime in Nicaragua poses both a real and a psychological
threat to the countries of Central America. This fact is
readily perceived by the citizens of Nicaragua's neighboring
countries as was revealed in a public opinion poll conducted by
Gallup International in 1983. This poll showed that Nicaragua's
growing military strength and support for subversive movements
in other countries was a source of concern throughout the
region. In Honduras, for example, about 80% of the respondents
saw Nicaragua as the principal cause of instability and as the
primary military threat faced by their country.29
Panama played a key role in providing military support
to the Sandinistas in 1978 and 1979. After the Sandinistas came
to power, however, they rejected Panama's advice and offers of
assistance. Recently, General Manuel Noriega, Commander of
Panama's Defense Force, told the editors of Costa Rica's principal
newspaper, La Nacion, that the Sandinista arms escalation
posed a danger to the entire region. In the article reporting
Noriega's views, La Nacion's editors, reflecting widespread
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preoccupation in that most democratic of Latin American
countries about the militarization of Nicaragua, wrote that
"Sandinista militarism has to be halted before it produces a
holocaust in the entire Caribbean region."30
The Honduran army is striving to modernize and professiona-
lize, but it lags behind the rapid expansion of the Sandinista
army. Costa Rica has no army. The Salvadoran armed forces
are fully occupied with combating Sandinista-supported insurgents.
Clearly, Nicaragua's military power threatens--and is not
threatened by--her neighbors.
Cubans in Nicaragua
Fidel Castro clandestinely provided weapons and other aid
to the Sandinistas during their struggle against Somoza. The
first military advisers to the new government were Cuban,
arriving on 19 July 1979, the day the Sandinistas took over.
This was the beginning of the Sandinisita military alliance
with the Soviet bloc. Soviets and East Germans have followed
the Cubans as advisers to the Sandinista military. Members of
the armed forces of Libya and members of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), which has collaborated with the Sandinistas
since at least 1970, are also playing a minor role in the develop-
ment of the Sandinista armed forces.
Although there have been upwards of 9,000 Cubans in Nicaragua,
recent reports indicate that about 1,500 teachers have returned
to Cuba. Out of the total 6,000 Cubans now present in Nicaragua,
some 3,000 are military or security personnel attached to the
armed forces, internal security and intelligence organizations.
These military and security advisers have made possible the
rapid development of Nicaragua's military and security machine.
The other Cubans are involved in construction, teaching, medicine,
and similar programs. The bulk of these civilians are younger
men who have received some military training.
The total of 3,000 Cuban military and security personnel
in Nicaragua is almost half the total of Somoza's entire National
Guard until the last two years of its existence. This dispro-
portionate presence of Cuban military and security personnel
is resented by many Nicaraguans and is often cited by refugees
fleeing Nicaragua as a factor contributing to their decision
to leave their homeland.
Nicaragua--Growing Soviet Investment
Several huge construction projects backed by Cuba and other
members of the Soviet bloc represent the investment of hundreds
of millions of dollars, to include $70 million for nearly 40 new
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military facilities. In addition, Nicaragua's allies, such as
Bulgaria, East Germany, and Cuba, are building critical infra-
structure facilities which will have important military uses.
The 10,000-foot runway at the Punta Huete airfield, when
completed, will be the longest military runway in Central
America. Sandinista leaders long claimed that the Punte Huete
airfield was intended for civilian use. But as the base took
on the unmistakable signs of a military air base, such as
protective earthen mounds (or revetments) for fighter aircraft,
the Sandinista Air Force Commander admitted that it would be a
military air base.31
When Punta Huete becomes operational, it will be able to
accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet-bloc inventory. The
potential threat to Nicaragua's neighbors would then increase
dramatically. The recent acquisition of Mi-24 attack helicopters,
along with the existing inventory of Mi-8 troop-carrying heli-
copters, provides the Sandinistas with a powerful helicopter
force. The Sandinista regime has declared repeatedly its
intention to acquire combat aircraft, and Punta Huete would be
a logical base from which such aircraft could operate. Nicaraguan
jet pilots and mechanics have been trained in Eastern Europe
and are reportedly now flying in Cuba. Sandinista acquisition
of such jet aircraft would further destabilize the regional
military balance; the United States has consistently made
clear in diplomatic channels its concern about such weaponry.
The Soviets could decide in the future that it is to their
advantage to fly long-range reconnaissance aircraft from
Punta Huete along the West Coast of the U.S., just as they
currently operate such flights along the East Coast of the U.S.
by flying out of Cuba.
The decisions of the Soviet Union and Cuba to make this
investment in Nicaragua indicates that Soviet leaders consider
Nicaragua an important complement to Cuba in the Soviet
strategy to increase pressure on the United States in the
Caribbean Basin.
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EL SALVADOR: A DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
For more than five years, El Salvador has been a target of
violence carried out by Cuba and Nicaragua, with the support
of the Soviet Union. With a population density greater than
India, a feudal land tenure system, and a violent history, in
1979 El Salvador seemed a logical place for communist exploi-
tation. An indigenous guerrilla force, which developed in the
mid-1970s in reaction to government-sponsored political abuses,
began receiving extensive support from Nicaragua soon after
the Sandinistas came to power in July 1979.
Having seen the Somoza regime in neighboring Nicaragua resist
social change and subsequently collapse in the face of a popular
uprising, reform-minded Salvadoran military officers overthrew
the authoritarian government of General Carlos Romero in October
1979. Romero was replaced by a civilian-military junta that
pledged social and economic reforms and democratic elections.
The successive governments of El Salvador have worked to
follow through on these pledges and El Salvador has begun to
build democracy for the first time.32
Since 1982, the people of El Salvador have shown their
support for the democratic process by going to the polls three
times in the face of threats and harassment by the guerrillas.
In March 1982, they selected a constituent assembly in an
election considered fair and free by the many distinguished
observers and journalists from Western democracies that monitored
the process. Jose Napoleon Duarte, a reform-minded Christian
Democrat previously jailed and sent into exile by the military,
was elected president in the spring of 1984.
The guerrillas had initially attempted to encourage the
people of El Salvador to boycott the 1982 election. When it
became apparent that this tactic would not succeed, they resorted
to violence, burning buses, and otherwise trying to intimidate
the people to prevent them from voting. The response of the
people was dramatic; more than 80% of those eligible to vote
did so. They repeated their strong support for democracy in
the 1984 presidential elections. Again impartial international
observers and journalists saw these elections as a true expression
of the popular will, and a repudiation of the guerrillas.
Commenting on the electoral process, the official voice of the
Salvadoran Catholic Church said:
... we can say with absolute certainty that three
elections in a two-year period have contributed to a
true plebiscite in which the people have expressed their
will, their faith in democracy, their desire for peace,
their rejection of violence, and their intrinsic condem-
nation of the guerrillas.33
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Among numerous economic reforms, the most sweeping has
been agrarian reform. Although extremists at both ends of the
political spectrum resisted these changes, more than 25% of the
rural population now either own their land outright or parti-
cipate as co-owners of agricultural cooperatives. These people
have a personal stake in seeing a democratically oriented
system flourish in their country.
El Salvador is, in fact, moving toward the goal of esta-
blishing a government that is accountable to its citizens.
This is being carried out behind the shield of the much improved
armed forces, whose initiative on the battlefield, combined
with President Duarte's popular mandate, moved the guerrillas
to participate in a dialogue with the government beginning
on 15 October 1984.
The Guerrillas
Lacking broad popular support, the guerrillas continue to
be a potent military force because of the extensive support
they receive from Nicaragua, Cuba, other communist countries
such as Vietnam, and radical regimes such as Libya. The unifi-
cation of the Salvadoran guerrillas was coordinated by Fidel
Castro. Shortly after General Romero was overthrown, Castro
brought Salvadoran guerrilla leaders to Havana, and directed
them to forget past rivalries and forge a united front. This
led to the creation of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN), in which five previously separate guerrilla
military factions banded together. Along with the FMLN, the
Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), a parallel political
arm, was established.
The newly united guerrillas attempted a Nicaraguan-style
"final offensive" in January 1981. Their defeat by the Salvadoran
army was made possible by the Salvadoran people's refusal to
respond to the guerrillas' call to rise up against the government.
After this defeat, the guerrillas shifted their tactics to
destroying the economic infrastructure of the country. They
later openly acknowledged this decision in an April 1983
guerrilla radio broadcast when they declared: "With these acts
of sabotage to the country's economy, we mark the start of our
campaign to destroy the economy".34 This "campaign" has
included the destruction of bridges and electrical towers, as
well as the cash crops so vital to the Salvadoran economy.
The government's budget has been severely strained to repair
the damage caused by this systematic sabotage. The armed
forces have been stretched thin to defend vital facilities and
areas of agricultural productivity.
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Through mid-1984, the war was a military stalemate. But
the Salvadoran army now has the initiative. This has been
made possible by the expanded training and additional mobility
permitted by increased U.S. military assistance.
The Logistics Network
The guerrillas depend on an elaborate logistics pipeline
to support their military operations. The majority of the
U.S.-made M-16 rifles captured from the guerrillas by the
Salvadoran military have been traced, by individual serial
numbers, to shipments made by the United States to South Vietnam,
and subsequently captured by communist forces after the 1975
fall of Saigon. But guerrilla propaganda efforts seek to
create the impression that virtually all of their weapons are
taken from government troops. In fact, only a small portion
have been captured from Salvadoran forces. Alejandro Montenegro,
a former high ranking guerrilla, has stated that it was guerrilla
policy, directed from Managua, to mislead international media
on the true source of guerrilla arms.35
Soviet-bloc countries have played a key role in sending
weapons to Cuba and Nicaragua, which in turn have moved them
into El Salvador through a complex land, sea, and air infiltra-
tion network.
The principal land route for supplying the guerrillas
originates in Nicaragua and passes through Honduras into El
Salvador. A road and trail network has been developed, with
the actual flow of ammunition, supplies, and weapons varying
to meet the tactical requirements of the guerrillas.
Seaborne delivery of arms and supplies is carried out
largely by 30-foot ocean-going canoes powered by 100-horsepower
engines. These canoes are difficult to detect on radar because
of their low profile and wooden construction. Leaving Nicaragua
after sundown, the canoes make their drop at predetermined
points along the southeast coast of El Salvador and return to
Nicaragua by dawn.
Aerial deliveries are also employed by the guerrillas.
Light planes fly at low altitudes across the Gulf of Fonseca
from Nicaragua, landing at isolated airstrips and unloading
their cargo of arms and ammunition. Air drops are also used.
Within El Salvador, pack animals, and vehicles with com-
partments designed to conceal their contents, are used to move
supplies to more than 200 camps, which are linked by an elaborate
series of corridors. Within these corridors, guerrillas select
multiple routes and patrol them frequently to assure their
security.
Government forces are having some success slowing the arms
infiltration, but geography favors the insurgents: a 200-mile
coastline, 6,000 miles of roads, 150 airstrips, and a mountainous
ill-defined northern border.
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Disinformation and Propaganda
Another aspect of the FMLN's "total war" effort is the
utilization of classic Soviet disinformation, propaganda, and
deception techniques. The guerrillas' goal in applying such
measures is to gain sympathy for their cause. At the same
time they wish to sway international and United States public
opinion against the Salvadoran government and U.S. economic
and military assistance. The political leaders of the guerrilla
movement realize the importance of the media in shaping political
attitudes in the United States. In February 1982, one of the
FDR's political leaders, Hector Oqueli, told the New York Times:
"We have to win the war in the United States."36
The guerrillas back up their disinformation operations with
constant propaganda, flowing from their own radio stations
(Radio Venceremos and Radio Farabundo Marti), friendly embassies,
and solidarity committees formed to prow a propaganda outlets
within the United States, Latin America, and Europe.
The Soviet Union also contributes to the guerrilla cause
through its extensive "active measures" program. This is a
term used by the Soviet KGB for its program of overt and covert
deception operations, including use of forged documents, front
groups, agents of influence, and clandestine broadcasting.
One example that follows the pattern of Soviet active measures
targeted on Central America is the forged "State Department
dissent paper," which surfaced in 1981. The paper purported
to be the thoughts of State Department, National Security
Council, and CIA staff officers who disagreed with U.S. policy.
Actual "dissent papers," in fact, are used within the government
to allow expression of views at variance with current policy.
The paper in question warned that further U.S. aid to El Salvador
would soon result in U.S. combat involvement. The paper also
supported U.S. recognition of the guerrillas, long an insurgent
goal. However, this "dissent paper," originally accepted as
genuine by the news media, was checked carefully and found to
be a forgery.37
Soviet front groups have accused the United States of con-
ducting chemical and biological warfare in Central America.
Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, a well-known disinformation
outlet, has broadcast such inflammatory allegations as:
The CIA kidnaps children of Salvadoran refugees in
Honduras.... Some are sent to special schools for
brainwashing. Others, because they are inept for
these activities, are sent to CIA research centers.
Here they are used as guinea pigs.38
U.S. military advisers participate in torturing
Salvadoran rebels and prisoners....39
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ILLEGIB
Everything that is known, up to the present time,
indicates that the Yankee CIA, corporation of
murderers, is implicated in the death of Torrijos.40
Broadcasting by the guerrillas follows this Soviet disin-
formation pattern. One such example occurred in November 1984
in Suchitoto, a small town 50 kilometers northeast of San
Salvador. The guerrillas attacked the town in the early morning
hours of 9 November. Their Radio Farabundo Marti announced
that the Salvadoran air force had indiscriminately bombed the
town to include "the church, the hospital, the kindergarten
and the central market of Suchitoto."41 In reality, as reported
by the Washington Post the following day, "The quaint, whitewashed
central Catholic church, the hospital and the kindergarten,
which rebel broadcasts had said were bombed by the government,
were found undamaged. Residents of the city denied that ggovernment
forces had bombed the city during the fighting today...."~+2
The Future of the Guerrillas
The future does not appear bright for the guerrillas. They
now enjoy far less support from the Salvadoran people than at
any time in the last five years. It has become increasingly
obvious that they represent only a small segment of the population.
The 1981 guerrilla decision to resort to the tactic of
destroying the economy, as a means of undermining the confidence
who ultimately pay the price. It is the people who suffer
when the guerrillas down the towers that carry the cables
of electric power; it is the people who suffer when the
guerrillas dynamite telephone installations; it is the
people who suffer when the guerrillas recruit youths by
force....Therefore, I ask myself, in whose favor are they
really fighting?43
of the people in the legitimate government, has failed. The
guerrillas continue to operate as a viable military force
largely because of the support they are receiving from the %
Soviet Union and it allies.
The a va oran Cat olic Church has been in the forefront
in the battle for social and economic change. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, church leaders were critical of the
government's unwillingness or inability to implement required
changes. By 1984, however, Salvadoran church leaders noted
that the political and economic conditions for the people had
improved significantly. San Salvador Auxiliary Bishop Rosa
Chavez argued this way in a July 1984 sermon:
This then, is the great question the guerrillas have
to ask themselves. No matter how often they attempt
to justify their actions of sabotage with arguments
that they fight against the government, against oppres-
sion and what they call the oligarchy, it is the People
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CASTRO TODAY
Acting to fulfill his own revolutionary ambitions as well
as being an agent of Soviet influence, Fidel Castro is working
closely with subversive elements throughout Central America
and the Caribbean. Castro's goal in the 1980s remains much
as it was when he assumed power: to oppose the United States
and create Marxist-Leninist regimes that mirror his own dicta-
torship. But the means to achieve this goal have become more
sophisticated, in part, because of the lessons he learned from
guerrilla failures in the region during the 1960s.
Castro has also had to adapt to the changing popular per-
ception of his revolution. Where once Castro was a folk hero
to most Latin Americans, today he is seen as having converted
Cuba into a bankrupt and oppressive state beholden to a foreign
power.44
Although Castro's image has dulled with Central Americans
at large, he continues to be popular with violent, radical
groups throughout the region. This support provides Castro
with political and psychological capital. The governments
of the region are acutely aware of Castro's ability to orchestrate
events in their countries. When the brother of President
Betancur of Colombia was kidnapped by guerrillas in November
1983, it was largely the efforts of Castro that eventually
gained his release. It was obvious that Castro could also
have influenced the guerrillas to keep the President's brother.
This case was a vivid example of how Castro has perfected the
techniques of political blackmail.
In addition to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have
been targets of Castro's subversion. In Guatemala, he has
provided training and some financial support to three guerrilla
factions, although he has not succeeded in unifying them to the
extent he did in El Salvador.
Honduras does not have an active insurgency at present.
Honduran territory is used principally as a conduit of support
for the Salvadoran guerrillas, but Honduras has been
a target of Cuban destabilization. In June 1983, about 100
Hondurans trained in Cuba infiltrated into eastern Honduras
from Nicaragua. The would-be guerrillas were totally defeated,
in great measure, because of the Honduran people's support of
the government forces. A year later another group of Cuban-
trained guerrillas entered Honduras and many of them met the
same fate.
A disturbing aspect of the current Castro offensive
is the apparent use of money generated by narcotics to supply
arms for guerrillas. Several high-ranking Cuban officials have
provided protection for planes and small ships carrying drugs.
The drugs move northward from Colombia to the United States,
at times via Cuba and on at least one occasion via Nicaragua.
In 1981, the Colombian government discovered that the Cubans
had been using a narcotics ring to smuggle both arms and funds
to Colombian M-19 guerrillas. When the Colombian armed forces
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and National Police entered the town of Calamar in February
1984, they discovered that the guerrilla Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia had campesinos cultivating hundreds of
hectares of coca plants.
Recent United States Congressional hearings have established
the linkage of Cuba, narcotics, and guerrillas.45 U.S. arrest
warrants have been issued for one Nicaraguan and several Cuban
officials involved in drug trafficking from Colombia. Reacting
to an all-out anti-drug campaign by the Colombian government,
the Colombian drug criminals have murdered Colombian government
officials, bombed the U.S. embassy, and issued death threats
against U.S. diplomats and their families, Colombian President
Betancur, his cabinet, and members of the Colombian supreme court.
The emerging alliance between drug smugglers and arms dealers
in support of terrorists and guerrillas is a troublesome new
threat to the Western Hemisphere.
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THE CHALLENGE AND THE RESPONSE
The countries of Central America and the Caribbean, struggling
to defend or develop pluralistic political systems, are confronted
with Soviet-backed guerrilla movements attempting to seize
power. The Soviet Union has long pledged support of "national
liberation movements," and current Soviet actions in Central
America and the Caribbean are consistent with this commitment.
Ideology plays an important role in their motivations, as the
creation of additional communist states validates the tenets
of Marxism-Leninism and bolsters the Soviet Union itself.
Most importantly, Kremlin leaders hope that ultimately the
United States could become so preoccupied with turmoil in the
Central American and Caribbean region that it would be less
able militarily and politically to oppose Soviet goals in
other key areas of the world.
The Soviets are using Cuba and Nicaragua to exploit the
instability and poverty in the area. There is a high degree
of congruence in Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan foreign policy
goals. These three countries are working in concert to train
and support guerrilla organizations in countries throughout
the area. Should these guerrillas succeed in coming to power,
they undoubtedly will establish regimes similar to those of
their patrons--one-party communist dictatorships maintained
in power by military force and political and psychological
intimidation. The consequences of a Soviet-aligned Central
America would be severe and immediate. The United States
would be faced with:
o Additional platforms for regional subversion and Communist
expansion, north to Mexico and south toward Panama, and a
perception of U.S. ineptitude and powerlessness in the
face of Soviet pressure even close to home.
o Far more complicated defense planning to keep open the
sea lanes through which pass half of the U.S. trade,
two-thirds of U.S. imported petroleum, and more than half
of the resupply and reinforcements needed by NATO in time
of war.
o Expanded centers for terrorist operations against the
United States and its neighboring countries.
The human costs of communism should also not be forgotten.
History shows that the establishment of a communist regime
brings with it severe and permanent suppression of basic human
rights, the outpouring of refugees as exemplified in Eastern
Europe, Cuba, and Vietnam, militarization of the affected
society, and economic deterioration.
The countries of Central America and the Caribbean are at
a critical juncture. But this can be the impetus for the
United States to devote the attention and resources necessary
to assist the countries of the region. As the President's
National Bipartisan Commmission on Central America stated:
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Our task now, as a nation, is to transform the
crisis in Central America into an opportunity:47
A cornerstone of United States policy is the belief that
the best means to assure the failure of communist expansionism
is the development of democratic institutions, leading to
governments that are accountable to the people and not imposed
on them by either left or right extremes. The basic social and
economic inequities which breed frustration and its offspring--
insurgent movements--must be addressed if this policy is to
succeed.
U.S. aid is designed to improve the quality of life of the
people of Central America. In the last four years, 78% of U.S.
aid to Central America has been economic. But the 22% devoted
to military assistance is essential if these sovereign nations
are to have the capability to defend themselves against the
onslaught of Soviet/Cuban-backed guerrillas.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Central America Democracy,
Peace and Development Initiative, and U.S. security assistance
programs will help to check Soviet and Cuban aggression in
this region. But this is only the beginning. The long-term goal
is to lay a foundation--a truly bipartisan policy--on which to
help build a future for the all people of the region.
If the United States and the countries of the region can
marshal the necessary will and resolve to respond to this
challenge, then, in the words of the President's National
Bipartisan Commission on Central America:
The sponsors of violence will have done the
opposite of what they intended: they will have
roused us not only to turn back the tide of
totalitarianism but to bring a new birth of hope
and of opportunity to the people of Central America.48
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