SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEE PROGRAM -- ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001502030004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 22, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Understand
SIG (per O/DDCI ,
is to attend this
xe five Secretary
3637 (10-81)
26 Jul 85
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UNITED STATES COORDINATOR
FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS
July 22, 1985
TO: Mr. Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Mr. Malcolm Butler
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development
Colonel David R. Brown
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
Mr. David A. Rust
Acting Exec. Secretary
Department of Health
and Human Services
FROM: Ambassador H. Eugene Douglas
Mr. Stephen Galebach
Senior Special Assistant
to the Attorney General
Department of Justice
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence
Agency
Mr. Alton Keel
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management
& Budget
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs
SUBJECT: Southeast Asian Refugee Program -- Issues for
Consideration
Attached are Southeast Asian refugee program policy issues
for consideration at the July 29 Senior Interagency Group.
Agencies should be prepared to discuss their views and
recommendations on the issues outlined in the attached papers.
Final recommendations on proposed policy changes will be
developed following the SIG meeting and circulated to agencies
for comment.
The following papers are included for agency review:
1. Current Status of USG Southeast Asian Refugee Program.
2. Residual Refugee Populations in the Region.
3. Regional Program Consolidation.
4. Expanding First-Asylum Holding Capacity.
5. Shifting Emphasis to Immigration Processing.
e-3e)9
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I. Current Status of the Southeast Asian Refugee Program
The international community's response to the Indochinese
refugee situation -- in which the United States has played a
major role -- has been one of the great humanitarian success
stories of this century. To date, 1.4 million refugees from
Southeast Asia have been resettled in third countries,
including over 750,000 in the United States.
Although we have passed the crisis stage, much remains to
be done. Until there is an overall political solution,
refugees will continue to arrive in first asylum countries. We
are faced, for example, with such immediate problems as: how
to deal with the continuing influx of Lao into Thailand, which
has resulted in Thailand's first-asylum population increasing;
and how to formulate USG policy with regard to the 225,000
displaced Khmer now in Thailand. In addition, growing
Southeast Asian residual refugee populations who are without
current third-country resettlement prospects have become a
critical problem which must be addressed. We must also address
the problem of the continuing refugee boat flow from Vietnam
which persists, despite the dangers of piracy and loss of life
at sea, as a primary method of fleeing Vietnam.
These problems must be dealt with in the overall context of
our refugee policy. This policy must uphold several important
principles, including maintaining refugee first-asylum
stability, reducing first-asylum populations in the region, and
maintaining good bilateral relations with the ASEAN
first-asylum states. The policy must be conducted in the
context of the overall costs and effectiveness of the Southeast
Asian refugee program, and must not ignore the important
relationship between our Southeast Asian refugee program
efforts and the U.S. domestic resettlement program.
In pursuing these policy goals, our objectives have been to
ensure effective burden-sharing by our refugee resettlement
allies, that the USG not continue to be the principal guarantor
of Southeast Asian refugee resettlement, that refugees are
adequately prepared to be resettled in the United States, that
the UNHCR substantially increase its efforts to develop
non-resettlement solutions for Southeast Asian refugees, and
that commitments made by the United States and other
governments to do their fair share with regard to residual
refugee populations in Southeast Asian countries are honored.
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Our expectation that the first-asylum population in
Thailand would be substantially diminished by the end of 1985
as a consequence of concluding Khmer processing and developing
non-resettlement options for the Highland Lao population will
not be met. The evacuation of large numbers of Khmer from the
border, who are unlikely to return to the border encampments
because of the continuing Vietnamese presence and destruction
of the border camps, will likely increase over time the Thai
Government's anxiety about their first-asylum population.
While refugee boat arrivals have dropped sharply in Thailand,
they have increased in Indonesia and Malaysia. Vietnamese
continue to appear at the Cambodian border via the land route
through Phnom Penh and Sisophon. This movement continues
despite heavy fighting along the border. A growing Vietnamese
population at the border (from 900 in may 1984 to 4,300 in
December 1984), who are now located in an evacuation site,
further exacerbates an increasingly difficult situation for the
Thai Government and the international community. Moreover,
approximately 19,000 Lao crossed the border into Thailand in
1984, over twice the amount of the preceding two years. A
screening system has been established by the Thai Government to
separate bona fide refugees from other border crossers. We are
encouraged by the Thai Government's agreement to screen Lao
border crossers with UNHCR participation, but its effectiveness
cannot yet be predicted. Posts are aware of the static refugee
population in Hong Kong. The efforts of the House of Commons
to encourage the United Kingdom to accept additional refugees
from Hong Kong are encouraging, but have not been successful to
date.
Despite efforts of the United States, Australia, Canada, .
and Japan during the past year to convince the UNHCR that they
must increase their efforts to develop and implement effective
non-resettlement solutions for Southeast Asian refugees, there
has been no discernible movement away from the emphasis on
third-country resettlement. Continuing to resettle Southeast
Asian refugees in the traditional resettlement countries is
becoming more difficult as the principal method of maintaining
first-asylum stability and reducing Southeast Asian
first-asylum refugee populations.
Maintaining a large Southeast Asian refugee resettlement
program is becoming increasingly difficult for the United
States as well. While the United States will continue to
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CONFIDENTIAL
accept Indochinese refugees, there is increasing resistance to
maintaining high levels of Southeast Asian refugee admissions
from certain segments of the Congress and from certain state
governments. There is virtually no support for a substantial
increase in refugee admissions from Southeast Asia. Much of
the resistance to an expanded U.S. refugee program is a
function of the extremely high costs of a few state programs,
and the inefficiencies and disincentives of managing a refugee
resettlement program through our state-run public assistance
systems. Efforts to modify the public assistance programs of
some of the more heavily impacted states have not achieved the
cost reductions and improvements in program operations that are
regarded as important and necessary to the domestic program.
Nevertheless, we must continue to pursue our current
efforts to pressure the international resettlement community to
maintain at least current levels of offtake from Southeast
Asia, actively encourage the development and implementation of
non-resettlement solutions, and continue preparing Southeast
Asian refugees for resettlement in the United States by
maintaining and improving our overseas medical and training
programs.
We will continue, however, to face problems of first-asylum
stability in Southeast Asia and a potentially static
first-asylum population, principally in Thailand, and to a
slightly lesser extent in Indonesia and Malaysia. Annual
reductions in first-asylum will not be as high as in recent
years. The consequences of recent events on the Thai-Cambodian
border for weakening first-asylum stability, or for additional
outflows from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into Southeast Asian
countries of first-asylum, are speculative at this point. We
should be cautious, however, about assuming an overly
optimistic view that these problems will resolve themselves
without thoughtful and effective intervention.
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CONFIDENTIAL
II. Residual Refugee Populations in Southeast
Asian First Asylum
Since May 1982, when the U.S. Government stopped processing
Priority 6 refugees in Southeast Asia, there has been a steady
build-up of refugees in this category in Southeast Asian
first-asylum locations. The increases in this residual
caseload are creating significant bilateral problems for the
U.S. with ASEAN first-asylum governments. It is clear that
appropriate action must be taken by the international community
to resolve this growing residual population.
We face the twin challenges of managing the current
Southeast Asian refugee resettlement volume and the problem of
the increasing non-refugee character of the population in first
asylum. Our system of priority categories and processing
guidelines exists in its present form and content because the
United States can neither cope with the number of refugees
potentially seeking admission to the United States, nor can we
accept the refugee credentials of many already in first asylum
as well as many new arrivals. The pressing need to deal
quickly with boat populations (due to Thai, Malaysian, and
Indonesian sensitivities) leads to a sort of "warehousing" of
tens of thousands of Vietnamese who are unlikely to be
voluntarily repatriated and whom ASEAN states will not absorb.
A similar situation prevails with Lao refugees currently in
Thailand and those who are still arriving. These people make
up the so-called "longstayers" or "residual" population who are
of great concern to the first-asylum governments and who should
be of greater concern to the major resettlement countries who
may eventually have to receive many of them.
Finding a solution to the residual refugee population will
be difficult because we cannot simultaneously continue to
resettle new arrivals in first asylum and, at the same time,
turn our attention to resettling the residual refugee
population. The attitude of Congress is clear on this point:
short of a new life-threatening crisis, they are not likely to
support increased admissions of refugees from Southeast Asia.
Nor will we be able to rely on resettlement as the sole means
of solving the residual refugee issue. We must insist that the
UNHCR be far more determined to bring about voluntary
repatriation as well as regional programs which would permit
certain "longstayers" greater self-sufficiency.
Liberalizing the current USG processing guidelines is being
considered as a means of reducing this residual population.
However, we must proceed cautiously in evaluating proposals to
liberalize our processing guidelines to increase the number of
residuals who may be admitted to the United States. Modifying
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USG processing regulations to expand refugee admissions
eligibility to the current P-6 population may have the adverse
effect of increasing the first asylum and resettlement pull
factor from the Indochinese states. We must also be aware that
there may not be a direct correlation between expanded
eligibility of residuals for the U.S. program and a similar
expansion of refugee admissions eligibility for residuals from
other resettlement governments. Moreover, modification of U.S.
refugee processing regulations must ensure that the
requirements of section 101 (a) (42) of the Refugee Act of 1980
are upheld.
Issues for consideration are:
1. The extent to which U.S. processing guidelines
should be liberalized, if at all;
2. What specific modifications to the processing
guidelines would be most appropriate;
3. Should the administration, and at what point in
time, consider other alternatives (such as restora-
tion of some form of humanitarian parole) in
conjunction with a multilateral effort to reduce
Southeast Asian residual refugee populations?
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CONFIDENTIAL
III. Regional Program Consolidation
It has been ten years since the fall of Indochina and the
development of a large and complex refugee resettlement program
in which the United States has played the principal role. The
United States processes refugees for resettlement at three
locations in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Indonesia and the
Philippines) and operates large language and cultural
orientation training program in these three locations. In
addition, a comprehensive medical/dental facility is maintained
in the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Bataan to
upgrade the health of Indochinese refugees prior to their
arrival in the United States. These programs are crucial in
preparing refugees for resettlement in the U.S. and are
regarded as an important part of our overseas programs both by
the Administration and by the Congress.
As the number of refugees eligible for resettlement has
declined over the past few years and with the resultant
decreases in our annual refugee ceilings from this region, we
need now to consider whether a regional program consolidation
effort is appropriate in the context of improving program
management and achieving greater cost savings in our Southeast
Asian refugee program. Continuing to maintain three processing
centers and three separate training programs may now be less
efficient than it was several years ago when the numbers of
Southeast Asian refugees eligible for resettlement in the
United States was significantly higher than it is today. There
is no question that our processing and training activities in
Southeast Asia must continue.. What we must now determine is
whether the time has come to begin consolidation of these
activities.
Proposals have been made to gradually phase out the
processing facilities at Galang, Indonesia and Phanat Nikhom,
Thailand and to expand the Philippine Refugee Processing Center
to consolidate the Galang and Phanat Nikhom populations and
training programs at this site. Expanding the PRPC would allow
maximum utilization of its health care facilities and ensure
adequate holding capacity and training facilities for future
processing of Indochinese refugees who have been accepted for
admission to the United States. The government of the
Philippines has advised us informally that an expansion of the
PRPC would be acceptable. Current cost estimates of an
expansion in the PRPC's holding capacity of approximately
10,000 refugees is $3.5 million. Additional costs will accrue
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as a result of expanding the training and health care
programs. These increased costs would be offset by phasing out
processing and training activities in Thailand and Indonesia.
In assessing the cost and management effectiveness of a
proposed expansion of the PRPC, careful consideration must be
given to the stability of the Philippine Government and
security of the PRPC. Recent opposition activities in central
Luzon may have an important impact on a proposed expansion of
the PRPC.
1. Should the Administration begin consolidation of the
Southeast Asian refugee program overseas processing
and training activities by gradually phasing out
Galang and Phanat Nikhom processing centers and
consolidating program activities at the Philippine
Refugee Processing center;
2. Is the proposed consolidation justified on the basis
of increased cost savings and improved program
management;
3. Should the Philippine Refugee Processing Center be
expanded to permit processing and training program
consolidation given the uncertainties about the
stability of that government?
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IV. Expanding First Asylum Holding Capacity
The complexion of persons fleeing the countries of
Indochina has changed in recent years. While there are still
those who can make a legitimate claim to national resettlement
programs as political refugees, there are an increasing number
who appear to be fleeing for economic motives or for reasons of
family reunification in third countries, principally the United
States. As our Southeast Asian refugee processing posts see
additional numbers of persons whose claims of refugee status
are questionable, even with the relatively generous categories
of persons presumed to be persecuted in the Indochinese
countries enumerated in the Worldwide Processing Guidelines, it
has become increasingly difficult to continue justifying their
admission to the U.S. as refugees under the authority of
Section 101 (a) (42) of the Refugee Act. Our principal
resettlement allies have also observed this change and have
informed us that they are also concerned about continuing to
admit persons into their resettlement programs whose refugee
bona fides are in doubt. This attitude is reflected in
decreased offtake from first-asylum (Australia), refocussing
efforts toward refugee populations in other geographic regions
(Australia and Canada) and emphasizing family reunion through
equivalents of our Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam
(Australia). In our own program, the expanding P-6 population,
a population which has no links to the United States, contains
many individuals who also cannot meet the requirements of the
refugee definition either under the UNHCR Convention and
Protocol or under the 1980 Refugee Act. Persons who continue
to arrive in Southeast Asian first-asylum from Indochina
frequently are unable to justify claims of individual political
persecution in their countries of origin.
In addition to the problem of questionable claims to
refugee status among a large portion of the first-asylum
population in Southeast Asia, there is also the problem of
continuing first-asylum stability in the region and attitudes
of the first asylum governments. This is becoming particularly
important as first-asylum offtake decreases and host
governments express concern that they may be left with large
first-asylum populations who cannot be resettled in third
countries. The cap imposed by the Government of Indonesia has
become a bilateral irritant. The refugee population in
Indonesia is usually at the ceiling and occasionally exceeds
it. The Indonesians have informed us recently that they are
contemplating reducing their refugee ceiling from 10,000 to
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7,000. If the Indonesian Government takes this step, it will
create considerable problems for us in our processing
activities and training programs. The attitude of the Royal
Thai Government is well known concerning their first-asylum
population. We have no reason to believe that they will not
continue to act responsibly with regard to refugees in Thai
first-asylum, but the decrease in offtake from Thai
first-asylum will be a substantial concern of that government.
While boat arrivals in Thailand have decreased significantly,
arrivals from Laos have increased over the past year. It is
too soon to predict whether the recently inaugurated Lao
screening program will have the desired effect of stemming the
flow of Lao into Thailand. Although the 230,000 displaced
border Khmer are not considered refugees and do not fall under
the protection mandate of the UNHCR, they cannot be ignored in
the larger context of Thai concerns about their first-asylum
population and the efforts of the international community to
preserve first asylum in Thailand.
Despite the problem of increasing numbers of persons in
Southeast Asian first asylum whose refugee status is
questionable, the larger humanitarian issue remains: what
durable solutions can be found for an increasing population of
Indochinese in Southeast Asian first-asylum for whom third-
country resettlement as political refugees is a decreasingly
viable option? Until such time as the international community
can design and implement alternative solutions (such as,
perhaps, a major shift to normal immigration programs, an
international "camp clearance" program, or restoration of some
form of humanitarian parole), we must ensure adequate
protection and care of Indochinese who have fled their
countries.
Given the circumstances described above, it may now be
appropriate to consider expanding a first-asylum facility in
the region which will provide protection and care for
Indochinese who continue to leave their countries. An expanded
first-asylum facility, supported by the UNHCR and the
international community, would contribute to the maintenance of
first asylum in the region, afford protection and care to
persons fleeing their countries of origin, and provide the
necessary time for an international effort designed to achieve
a durable solution for these people.
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1. Does the increasingly non-refugee character of the
Southeast Asian refugee flow warrant expansion of a first-
asylum facility in the region? Would an expanded facility
enhance first asylum stability in the region thereby
permitting sufficient time for the international community
to develop and implement alternative solutions for persons
who have fled, and continue to flee, from the countries of
Indochina;
2. Would an expanded first asylum facility create a magnet
effect for Indochinese who have not departed their
countries of origin, particularly from Vietnam;
3. Which facility would be most appropriate for
expansion? Should a location not now being utilized for
first asylum be considered?
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V. Shifting U.S. Emphasis to Immigration Processing
There appears to be general agreement that emphasizing
immigrant visa processing over refugee processing for
admissions of Indochinese into the United States is an idea
whose time has come. There are a substantial number of
Indochinese in Southeast Asian first-asylum who are ineligible
for admission to the U.S. as refugees, but who may be eligible
for admission under immigrant visa family reunification
programs. The U.S. has been emphasizing IV processing whenever
applicable and increasing numbers of Indochinese are arriving
as IV beneficiaries, especially from the Orderly Departure
Program. Initiating IV processing for the P-6 residual
population, as well as others who qualify, would be a
significant step in reducing the Southeast Asian residual group
within normal immigration processing programs.
Despite the view that moving in an IV direction would be
helpful, several important problems will have to be resolved.
For example, there is an issue of waiting time that could keep
applicants in refugee camps for two to five years or longer.
It may not make sense to require would-be immigrants who are
coming to the United States in any event to be separated from
their families for extended periods of time in first asylum
camps. A major effort would have to be undertaken to persuade
Indochinese in the United States to adjust their status after
five years of residence here in order to apply for immigrant
visas for their relatives in Southeast Asia. With the
exception of a few genuine refugee cases and some cases of
special humanitarian concern, the displaced Khmer along the
Thai-Cambodian border may be admissable to the United States
only under IV family reunification procedures. There is a
special difficulty which is most pronounced among the Orderly
Departure Program IV admittees. Despite the fact the ODP IV
immigrants have increased in number, a desirable achievement
from a foreign policy perspective, there is an adverse impact
from the perspective of the domestic program. We are admitting
persons from Vietnam who are otherwise indistinguishable from
ODP refugees, but who do not receive overseas training and
health care and who are not eligible for refugee services under
the Refugee Act after their arrival in the U.S. Even though
these ODP IV beneficiaries are not eligible for refugee
services, they frequently find their way into the welfare
system. The costs which accrue to state and local governments
for these welfare services are not reimbursed by the Federal
Government. And despite the public charge clause of the INA
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which subjects IV holders to deportation proceedings if they
obtain welfare, the practical reality is such that deportations
to Indochinese countries of origin are not possible or
reasonable.
Although there will be problems in shifting to an immigrant
visa approach, we should explore IV admissions modifications to
ensure that emphasizing this approach will be workable and
effective.
1. Should the Administration propose administrative or
legislative remedies in any of the following areas? Can
these proposed changes be justified on the grounds that
persons in Southeast Asian first asylum deserve special
consideration?
as Decrease the current waiting period for refugees
resident in the U.S. to adjust their status to citizen;
b. Modify naturalization processing to decrease the
period of time between application and naturalization;
c. Permit refugees resident in the U.S. to file IV
petitions while still in permanent resident alien
status;
2. Should the Administration require ODP IV beneficiaries
and Khmer IV beneficiaries (when IV processing of Khmer is
permitted) to receive health care and language training in
Southeast Asian refugee processing centers;
3. To what extent will a significant shift to IV
processing of eligible persons in Southeast Asian
first-asylum act as a magnet or as a deterrent to
additional outflows from the Indochinese countries.
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