SUDAN: SIG-IEP CONSIDERATION OF RELEASE OF AID FUNDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001502010008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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DO,IiiMHTS CROSS-REFERENCED
ATTACHED:
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
NIC 01132-85
1 March 1985
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Economics
SUBJECT: Sudan: SIG-IEP Consideration of Release of AID Funds
1. Following up on the previous memoranda to you on this subject by
Fred Wettering, NIO/AF, the SIG-IEP chaired by Treasury Secretary Baker
on 28 February reviewed the issue of release of limited AID funds to
Sudan in the context of the forthcoming visit to Sudan of Vice President
Bush.
2. Mr. McFarlane summarized a paper which he had circulated to the
participating agencies arguing that the U.S. should release funds for
urgently needed fertilizer and pesticides for this year's crop ($15
million) and funds for petroleum ($20 million initially). David Mulford,
Assistant Treasury Secretary for International Affairs, argued that the
United States should avoid any actions which might undercut negotiations
between the IMF and Sudan which could lead to more significant economic
reform, particularly in light of the serious repayment arrearages which
Sudan has with the IMF.
3. It was concluded that the $15 million for fertilizer and
pesticides should be released as a gesture of humanitarian support for
President Nimeiri, and also because of the foreign exchange earning
potential of the spring planting. On the other hand it was concluded
that the petroleum funds should not now be released, although the
possibility of release of those funds in the near future will be kept
under review. AID will also seek to advance some food aid so that the
Vice President might mention that item. On the whole, it was thought
that the Vice President should be attempting to reinforce the need for
significant economic policy reforms.
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SUBJECT: .Sudan: SIG-IEP Consideration of Release of AID Funds
4. I understand that after the meeting the Vice President indicated
to Treasury Secretary Baker that it was necessary for the US to be more
forthcoming to Nimeiri and that Baker accepted the point. Thus, the NSC
and the Vice President's office will be working on the final package.
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SUBJECT: Sudan: SIG-IEP Considerations of Release of AID Funds
Acting NIO/Econ
Distribution:
Original - Addressees
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1 - DCl/SA/IA
-&-Executive Registry
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4 March 1985
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NIC 01132-85 STAT
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
2 7 FEB 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: US Policy Toward Sudan
Your memorandum of 27 February concisely summarizes the relevant
elements of recent intelligence and analysis on the problems facing
Sudan. The argument for addressing these problems by amending our
current policy freezing ESF funding is logical and leads to the
ineluctable conclusion that some change is warranted. The policy
recommendations appear on target and I support them.
7rl er""41.
William J. Casey
CL BY 0198983
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 29505
NIC #01067-85
National Intelligence Council 27 February 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: US Policy Toward Sudan
1. As I reported to you previously, as the result of an Interagency
Group meeting on 22 February, the NSC is proposing amendment in the
current US policy of withholding disbursement of $189 million in ESF
funds to Sudan in order to force further economic policy reforms.
2. The consensus of the IG was that Sudan has recently made some
significant policy reforms, albeit not the full list required by the
IMF. Given the political and economic problems of President Nimeiri, the
fact that he has made some reforms, and the danger that continued full
withholding of these funds ran the risk of pushing Nimeiri into foolhardy
actions, damaging our relationship, and doing some real economic damage
by their absence (such as threatening the planting of the cotton crop),
the IG felt that some of the monies should be disbursed to economically
sensible projects and to hearten the Sudanese for making some reforms. A
full disbursement would not take place in order to provide continuing
incentives for further changes. Treasury alone did not share in this
consensus.
3. Mr. McFarlane and the NSC Staff are attempting to resolve this
via this paper, but anticipate a continuing Treasury objection. If such
an objection is received, the matter will be presented to the President
for decision.
t.Z1
FreL. Wettering
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SUBJECT: US Policy Toward Sudan
NIO/AF/FLWettering:
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON February 27, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward Sudan (S)
Introduction
The Vice President will visit Sudan March 4-6. In addition
to reviewing U.S. famine relief efforts and refugee programs,
he will meet with President Nimeiri and other Sudanese leaders.
Given the recent disturbing economic and political trends in
Sudan which threaten important U.S. interests, and questions
raised by Sudanese (and Egyptian) leaders concerning the status
of frozen U.S. economic assistance, it is important that we
reassess this and other pertinent issiles before the Vice
President's visit. (C)
Economic Situation
Sudan's economic situation has reached crisis proportions.
Critical shortages of food and fuel, lack of foreign exchange,
and inability to meet foreign financial obligations, among other
problems, threaten the regime. Nimeiri and the IMF are still at
an impasse over the financial arrears anl the extent of necessary
reforms, and the possibility of an IMF agreemmt in time to
affect near-term political stability facL..ui appears remote.
In the absence of an IMF agreement, Nimeiri can be expectei to
pursue short-term economic "fixes" to avert complete collapse,
especially if foreign donors continue to withhold financial
support. Libya has offered to replace the suspended U.S.
assistance and has publicly offered otner financial incentives.
While there is no immediate sign that Nimeiri is prepared to
accept the Libyan offers, he has not closed the door and has sent
emissaries to meet the Libyans. In the absence of a more
modulated posture on our part, we run the risk of a turn toward
Libya in thc! immediate aftermath of the Vice President's visit,
with all of the attendant symbolic and strategic problems this
would create. President Mubarak has privately urged the President
to reverse the Sudan aid freeze, saying that this has created an
impression that the U.S. is no longer supporting Nimeiri and
Sudan and is opening the door for Qadhafi. Mubarak said he would
discuss Sudan with the President during their meeting here in two
weeks. (S)
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Current Threat
A recent (February 1985) Special National Intelligence
Estimate on Sudan which addresses prospects for the Nimeiri
regime states, "... President Nimeiri's chances for remaining
in power through 1985 have diminished to even. His survival
will depend mainly on his performance in meeting economic and
political challenges, sustaining the perception by his opponents
that he retains U.S. and Egyptian support, and, most important,
retaining the loyalty of the military and security forces." The
Estimate concludes that Sudanese senior military officers are
almost certain to play a major role in any successor government
which would inherit all the current problems and which would
be less friendly to the U.S. Less likely, but still possible,
would he the emergence of a regime led by radical leftist
officers, increasing the opportunities for Soviet and/or
Libyan influence. (S)
U.S. Policy
We have enjoyed a very cooperative relationship with Sudan
for over a decade on a range of issues--political, humanitarian,
and geo-strategic--of high importance to U.S. policy in Sudan,
and more broadly, the Horn and Gulf areas. On defense issues,
Sudan continues to support our BRIGHT STAR exercises, including
the one planned for this summer. Our valuable prepositioning
facility has been expanded, and the Army and Air Force have
indicated a need to expand it further by adding equipment and
buildings to facilitate potential bare base support for 9,300
persons. The Sudanese have continued to lend strong support to
the prepositioning agreement, which ultimately depends on stable
and friendly political and economic relations with Sudan. (S)
It is in the interest of the T.S. to promote our continuing
influence as the political situation evolves, while applying
realistic use of U.S. leverage and pressures to bring about
reform. These objectives broadly serve U.S. policy toward Sudan
as spelled out in NSDb-57 (September '82) which states, inter
alia, that the U.S. must continue to give high priority to
security and economic assistance for Sudan in order to enable it
to defend itself against subversion from Libya and Soviet-backed
Ethiopia; to enhance military cooperation with Sudan, including
military exercises and military access agreement; and to strongly
encourage continued economic reform. (S)
The consequences of a hostile Sudan are directly related
to the interests of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Radicalization or
chaos in Sudan would create liew dangers for both countries.
Sudan could serve as a launching pad for intrigues against Egypt,
and Saudi Arabia would find its oil exports through the Red Sea
increasingly vulnerable to a Sudanese-based threat. In such an
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event, Egypt, in particular, but perhaps Saudi Arabia as
well, might be forced to intervene directly in Sudan, in which
case the U.S. would be called on to assist through indirect
support. Finally, maintenance of a moderate, pro-West regime
in Khartoum is essential to deterring and countering attacks
and destabilizing efforts by Libya against its neighbors,
especially Chad, and to contain and reduce Soviet Bloc
presence and influence in Ethiopia. (S)
Economic Next Steps
The question is whether partial release of aid funds,
against partial reforms, will help in the process of structural
reform and eventual international support for Sudan, or will
only encourage Nimeiri to believe that he will continue to be
rescued by the U.S. and possibly Saudi Arabia even if he does
not take the more far-reaching reforms. Given the reforms the
Sudanese have recently taken, and which they will be presenting
to the IMF and ourselves in the next few days, we believe we
should undertake a partial release to show good faith and as an
incentive to further reform. Reforms thus far undertaken
will not fulfill all of the recommendations of the IMF, but
will meet the specific conditions of the petroleum initiative
and will go some way toward meeting IMF 'demands on exchange
rate management. (S)
The Sudanese need to know by February 28 whether we release
funds for the petroleum initiative ($40 million from frozen FY84
funds), in order for them to use the $20 million for this purpose
from Saudi Arabia; otherwise, they will simply have to draw down
the Saudi money for petroleum outside this valuable initiative.
The GOS will also point to urgently needed funds for fertilizer
and pesticides in order to plant the cotton crop, Sudan's largest
export earner. It makes sovnd economic sense (as well as
political) to assist a country Lc) produce its main export crop,
thereby reducin?its dependoncc on the U.S. for famine-re-ated
assistance. By releasing the first portion of our petroleum
funds ($20 million), together with the $20 million from the
Saudis, the petroleum sector will be put on a sound footing.
This will incidentally solve a political problem for Nimeiri
in assuring a steady and ..:easonably priced sup2ly of petroleum
products into Sudan. The structure of the petroleum facility
also enhances the role of the private sector in Sudan and gives
us a chance to demonstrate to Nimeiri that the private sector
can be an ally, not an enemy, of his objectives for development
of the economy. (S)
In addition to our reiease of frozen funds for fertilizer
and pesticides, we should also urge the IBRD to do the same, if
the Sudanese in their presentation indicate that (a) the exchange
rate will be reviewed and adjusted quarterly, (b) that steps
are being taken to control the budget deficit, and (c) that the
private sector is not being starved for credit by advances to the
public sector. (S)
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The release of petroleum, fertilizer, and pesticide monies
will reduce the immediate pressure on the GOS, but not the
crisis. Even if the GOS package of reforms is acceptable as a
basis for a new IMF standby, there is a yawning financial gap,
estimated at between $400 and $450 million, which must be closed
before the standby can be concluded and a Paris Club rescheduling
initiated. The most plau:3ible option is to seek more generous
debt relief terms than were given Sudan in 1984. El:eluding
repayments to the IMF, with a rescheduling on the 1984 basis
Sudan would still have to pay creditors $590 million. Much of
this gap could be filled by better debt-relief terms. Failing
that, the U.S. and perhaps Saudi Arabia are the only possible
sources of significant additional assistance. This would
require a supplemental for Sudan, since existing ESF funds
are very tight. Considering the U.S. budget deficit, a
supplemental is not likely. (S)
Finally, to convince Nimeiri that we are not bailing him
out, we must make clear that without an internationally accepted
package of reforms, by this spring, debt rescheduling will become
impossible and our own assistance will be blocked by the Brooke
amendment, in any case. Thus, Nimeiri must see our partial
release as an opportunity for him to continue what he has just
barely started (after a year of inaction, in terms of serious
economic readjustment. In taking these interim steps, we
must indicate strongly to the Sudanese, including in the Vice
President's meetings with Nimeiri, that we are indeed responding
to steps taken by the GOS, but that we are far from being out of
the economic crisis. (S)
Other Donor Assistance--Eaypt and Saudi Arabia
For Egypt, maintaining a friendly regime in Khartoum is a
vital national interest, .?nd explains Mubarak's frantic reaction
to our reported suspensinn of assistance. Saudi Arabia also
recognizes that an economic collapse could lead to Nimeiri's
demise--somethir,g which the Saudis view as a serious potential
threat to their own security. However, each has quite different
views and leverage in dealing with Sudan, and through bilateral
approaches we should seek to coordinate and maximize what each
is best able to provide: Saudi Arabia, economic leverage, and
Egypt, political advice. For instance, the Egyptian leadership
has tried to moderate Nimeiri's Islamization drive and to
encourage a political solution in southern Sudan. We should
encourage Egypt to keep the pressure on Nimeiri to make necessary
political concessions and to refrain from advising Nimeiri
against risking implementation of needed economic reforms. The
Saudis are interested in pressing Nimeiri to make better use of
aid funds and have expressed strong interest in seeing the
creation of the petroleum facility. The Saudis are supportive
of IMF reforms, and a proposal that they join the U.S. in
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disbursing pledged funds to Sudan would have to be argued either
(1) from a proposition that Sudan has met IMF conditions, or
(2) from the position of the seriousness of the threat to
Nimeiri. If the Saudis are sufficiently persuaded that Nimeiri's
situation is critical, they will assist in saving him, though
they will not take off all pressure for reform. In such a case,
it will be important that the Saudis understand why we think
it essential to start some funds flowing, and that we are
carrying our "fair" share of the assistance load. However,
they are determined to maintain their own freedom of action,
and are likely to resist any trilateral cooperation with us and
the Egyptians. (S)
Other Lesser Potential Donors
Although our European Allies and Japan do not have
commensurate political and strategic interests in Sudan, we
should explain to them why a moderate, stable regime in Sudan is
vital to our mutual geo-political interests, and cite examples of
Sudanese economic reform to generate their support for increased
assistance programs. Thus, we recommend that Sudan be included
as an agenda item for bilateral and multilateral donor meetings
and discussions, and similarly, that we urge the IBRD and the
IMF to accord Sudan a high priority in its discussions. These
efforts should be made both in Washington and our embassies
abroad, in order to signal the importance we attach to this
issue. (S)
Recommendations
In view of the Vice President's departure for Africa this
weekend, you are requested to provide your comments on the
foregoing approach, and specific recommendations below, to the
NSC by noon, February 28. We recommend the following courses
of action for the Vice President's visit:
We release funds for the petroleum initiative ($40 millirsn
from frczen FY84 funds, $20 million in the first tranche).
We release funds for urgently needed fertilizer and
pesticides for this year's crop ($15 million from frozen
FY84 funds).
We inform the Sudanese that selective release of the
remaining FY84 and 85 funds will be made commensurate with
continued movement on economic reform.
We approach the Saudis to release their commitment to the
petroleum initiative ($20 million), and engage them in
discussions on other potential assistance programs which
promote structural economic reform and the role of the
private sector.
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-- We encourage the Egyptian leadership to continue attempts to
moderate Sudanese internal policies and maintain pressure to
implement economic reforms.
-- That Sudan be an agenda item for discussion in donor
meetings with our European Allies and the Japanese in order
to genelate their support for increased assistance.
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Robert C. 7 ane
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National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR:
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Director of Central Intelligence
NIC #01004-85
25 February 1985
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Sudan: Proposal to Release a Portion of the
AID Funds for Sudan Currently Frozen
1. The United States Government has frozen disbursement of $189
million in grant ESF funds to Sudan since October 1984 in an attempt to
force the Sudanese government to make economic reforms mandated by the
IMF and come to a new standby arrangement with the IMF.
2. Since that time, the Sudanese have made some reforms, but not
enough to satisfy the IMF. Our recent SNIE on Sudan saw the likelihood
of a new Sudan-IMF arrangement this year as remote. Meanwhile, there are
real economic necessities to disburse part of these funds (to set up a
petroleum facility and provide fertilizer and pesticides to the next
cotton crop). The surfacing in the world press last week of the US
freeze has created a political imperative to do something or else face a
badly shaken ally (President Nimeiri). Lack of action might well push
Nimeiri into a rapprochement with Qadhafi, will make the forthcoming Vice
Presidential visit an unpleasant one, and further hearten Nimeiri's
enemies.
3. At a Restricted IG meeting on 22 February, State proposed that
between $55-$80 million of the frozen funds be disbursed. State was
supported by AID, NSC Staff, myself, the Vice President's office, and
Defense. Only Treasury opposed this and forced the decision to a higher
level. Treasury somewhat inflexibly argued that backing down on full IMF
conditionality will create a precedent and damage our credibility with
other governments which we want to force to terms with the IMF. The
consensus view was that Treasury's position was dogmatic and unreasonable.
4. The game plan, as the NSC tells me, is that a formal proposal to
release $55-$80 million of the ESF will be circulated tomorrow
(26 February) to IG participants (including CIA) for comment. This is
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essentially a gambit to enable Bud McFarlane to call Jim Baker and try to
twist his arm on this issue. Failing this, NSC tells me, the matter will
be referred to the President. Both NSC and I expect the State proposal
to be expeditiously approved one way or another given that the
Vice President wants it and he begins his trip to Africa this weekend.
?
Frederick L. Wettifing
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SUBJECT: Sudan: Proposal to Release a Portion of the AID
Funds for Sudan Currently Frozen
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Wet ,ering s the Addressee and will attend
unless told different.
Sent up to us for putting into the system.
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1Execweve Rsgisti
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THE WHITE HOUSE
pecan NITA IRCRET ATTACHMENIrt 14 I MOTO N
MINONANDON ram PRINCETON MAN
? Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
ROBERT R. PELLITREAV
Deputy Assistant Secretaty of State
for Near *astern and South Asian Affairs
2 0 FEB 1985
NOEL ROCR
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for African Affairs
ALTON G. RIEL, JR.
Associate Diractor, National Security and
International Affair*, OMS
MARX L. EDWIN II?
Acting Assistant Adki istrator, Bureau for Africa
Agency for Internatio al Development
JAMS CONROM
Deputy Assistant Secr tary of the Treasury
for Developing Natio $
FRIIDERICR NITTERING 1
National IntelligencelOffieer, CIA
I I
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Su an (V)
The forthcoming visit to Sudan of Vice-President, President
Mubarak's personal request for renew$d U.S. assistance to Sudan,
and U.S. humanitarian interests load!us to conclude that an
immediate reassessment of our econoa4.c assistance posture toward
Sudan is required!. (R) 1
At the direction of Robert C. McFarlime, you are invited toia
restricted meeting to discuss the V.S. aid posture and our broader
strategy toward the Sudan on Friday, February 22, a* 3:30 p.m. in
Room 374 Old Executive Office Duildin is attached, along
with a draft issues paper. (E)
-1)
Donald Gregg Donald R. Fortier
Assistant to the ViE President Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs for National Security Affairs
Attachments -
Tab A Agenda
Tab B NSC Background Paper
Parr ifsaarr Armapixorrs
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AGENDA
U.S. Assistance Posturi Toward Sudan
I. Introduction Don Fortier
//I. Intelligence Summary Fred Nettering
Nimeiri's prospects
The southern insurgency
III. Political Summary
Current U.S. policy
? U.S.-Rgyptian cooperation
Saudi assistance
Princeton Lyman
Robert Polletreau
IV. Economic Summary Jamesmlonrow
Mark 'amen
^ Reforms
Prospects
V. U.S. Options All
V/. Conclusion Don Fortier
Don Gregg
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6E.Urt.
ISSUES CONCERNING THE SUDAN
The Vice President will be visiting Sudan, March 4-6, during
which in addition to visiting refugee camps and looking into
U.S. famine relief efforts, he will be meeting with President
Mimeiri and other Sudanese leaders. Given the recent disturbing
economic and political trends in Sudan, and questions raised
concerning present economic assistance U.S. policies toward the
Nimeiri regime, it is important that the various U.S. agencies
adopt a common strategy toward Sudan in advance of the Vice
President's visit.
Given the cooperative bilateral relations the U.S. has enjoyed
with Sudan on a range of issues of importance to the U.S., and
in consideration of Sudan's strategic importance to U.S. politi-
cal objectives in the Horn and the Middle East, we believe that
the Vice President should carry with him a fresh, positive U.S.
approach. Such an approach is necessary to reaffirm our support
to the Sudanese government at a critical time, while underscor-
ing continued U.S. commitment to economic reform and the need
for political moderation in Sudan as the basis for national
unity and economic 'progress.
Official U.S. policy toward Sudan is to continue the
high-priority accorded to security and economic assistance for
Sudan in order to enable at, to defend itself against subversion
from Libyan and Soviet-backed Ethiopia; to enhance militeary
cooperation with Sudan, including military exercises and la
military access agreement; and to strongly encourage continued
Sudanese economic reform as the only road to long-term economic
Solvency. Underlying our policy is the assumption that our
support is necessary to support the government and people of
Sudan, not negessarily the current leadership, in order to
promote our continuing influence as the political situation
evolves. In addition, the U.S. geo-strategic interest is
directly related to the interests of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Radicalisation or chaos in Sudan would create new dangers for
both countries. Sudan could serve as a launching pad for
intrigues against Egypt, and Saudi Arabia would find its oil
exports through the Red Sea increasingly vulnerable to a'
Sudanese-based threat. In such ap event; Egypt, in particulars
but perhaps Saudi Arabia as well,! might be forced to intervene
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directly in Sudan in which the U S. would be called on to
assist through indirect support. The passing of Sudan from a
pro-Mist to an unfriendly or even a neutral country in the East
vs West, Libya vs Arab moderates truggle must be actively
countered through continued assis ance and imaginative new
approaches.
SECR
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A Complicating factor is Libya's offer to Nimeiri to replace the
suspeaded U.S. assistance amid reliable intelligence reports
that emissaries of Qadhafi and Nimeiri have met several times to
discuss a rapprochement. Though there are no immediate signs
that Dimeivi is prepared to accept Qadhafi's offers, but
continued civil unrest and economic hardships exacerbated by
suspension of U.S. and other donor aid may cause Nimeiri to
recon/der the Libyan offers. At,a minimal', increased Libyan
influipea in Sudan would I've a very negative impact on W.S.
pOlicp4objectives in the Morn and .the Arab world. President
Muhatilk has privately urged the President to reverse the Sudan
aid trees*, and this issue will almost certainly be a major
agenda item during Nubarak's visit to the U.S. in early March.
U.S;joolicy responses to Sudan's economic crisis and economic
mismanagement must be guided by a clear understanding and
realbstic use of U.S. leverage to encourage the rationalization
of Sudanese economic policies in concert with efforts to further
U.S. regional, geo-strategic and humanitarian concerns. In
addition to promoting sound economic and fiscal policies, we
should recognise that Sudanese cooperation in overcoming the
effects of a devastating drought, friendly reception of upwards
of a million non-Sudanese refugees in Sudan, cooperation in
mounting cross-border feeding operations to denied areas of
northern Ethiopia, and provision 4f timely assistance to the
exfiltration of Falasha Jews from Ethiopia in the face of Arab
and Ethiopian sensitivities has been crucial to alleviating
immense human suffering, but has also detracted from their own
priorities. This exceedingly helpful role on a range of
humanitarian issues should be recognized and furthet encouraged
through the use of positive econotic incentives.
Elements of a new approach to Sud 4n could include:
-- Measured ESF assistance lin
measures, or desirable actions (s
initiative), including recogniti
response to Secretary Shultz' Dec
t
-- Joint consultations with ot er major donors and interested
parties, such as the Egyptians, S udis, and the British, with
the view of adopting coordinated, integrated assistance .
programs. Lesser potential donor, such as the Japanese, should
also be consulted.
ed to Sudanese economic reform'
ch as the petroleum
for reforms undertaken in
r 1984 letter.
-- Diplomatic initiatives with mutual allies, such as
Morocco, to counter Libyan appeals.
-- Offer to discuss the southern insurgency problem, with the
view of promoting reconciliation with the South and creating
conditions favorable for the return of U.S. companies, such as
Chevron, to develop major natural resources.
SECRET
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