SOUTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950018-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 22, 2010
Sequence Number:
18
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 8, 1985
Content Type:
MEMO
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CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950018-9.pdf | 294.4 KB |
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council NIC #00118-85
8 January 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Africa
Southwest Indian Ocean
REFERENCE: Memo for NIO/Africa from DCI, dated 4 Jan 1985,
Subj: Comoros Islands
1. The Southwest Indian Ocean Islands of Mauritius, Madagascar, the
Seychelles, and the Comoros remain an area of relatively low-level
competition for. influence between the West and the Soviet Union. We have
no evidence at,present that the Soviets have embarked on or are preparing
to embark on a major effort to radically upset the current balance. More
likely, in our view, the Soviets and their surrogates will continue to
show the flay, provide diplomatic/political and military support to
friendly governments such as the Seychelles, press wherever possible for
increased military access while denying the same to the US, and expand
economic cooperation without making major commitments of economic
assistance. Furthermore, in our view--supported by a recent joint
DOD/CINCPAC working level conference on the area--the Southwest Indian
Ocean is likely to remain an area of relatively low strategic priority to
the Soviets and that logistic difficulties alone make it unlikely that
the Soviets will devote major resources to the area. For their part, the
economically beleaguered islands are likely to continue to swing back and
forth between East and West in an effort to maximize economic and
military assistance from-all donors.
2. The Business Week article--along with other recent articles in
Newsweek, Le Point, Th-e--Tconomist, and Jack Anderson's column--correctly
notes leftist President Rene's dependence on the Soviet Union, North
Korea, and others for security and military assistance; this dependence
is longstanding, however, rather than a recent development. The US
Embassy notes that these articles (some of which probably are plants by
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the London-based opposition to Rene) along with an attempted coup last
Fall have placed the already jittery Rene on the political defensive at
home and abroad. In recent months the Embassy reports that Rene has
attempted in public and private to tilt the "other way" in an effort to
prevent any fall off in the critically important tourist industry or
cutbacks in essential western economic aid (both of which his government
cannot live without), and to dispel the image that he is beholden to any
foreign power. For example, the Soviet presence was reduced by at least
14 advisers who left when their mission was completed, Rene has allowed
for the first time a senior army officer to accept an offer of US
training, and the local press has taken a slightly more balanced approach
to the US. At the same time, initial moves suggest that Rene would
rather successfully renegotiate a treaty on the US tracking station that
gives him more money rather than score political points in some circles
by closing it down.
3. Mercurial, pro-Western President Abdallah's decision to accept
13
Soviet scholarships probably is designed to quiet leftist politicians
in
the Comoros, to vex the French, and to demonstrate his "nonalignment"
rather than to serve as a precursor of a turn to the East. The Soviets
probably will continue to attempt to gain inroads by focusing on
continuing French control of the island of Mayotte, claimed by the
Comoros. The planned establishment of a US Embassy in the Comoros,
however, should reassure Abdallah and help convince him to continue
rebuffing Soviet overtures.
4. The Comnunity currently is producing two estimates that assess
Soviet policy, actions, and prospects in southern Africa and the
Southwest Indian Ocean.
-details the evolving Soviet position in southern Africa
(particularly in Angola and Mozambique) over the next two years, The
second--Memorandum to Holders o
in part updates
recent Soviet activities in the Southwest Indian Ocean and assesses the
region's strategic significance. This Estimate is being done in
conjunction with the current IG on the Island nations.
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SUBJECT: Southwest Indian Ocean
A/NIO/AFB I(8 Jan 85)
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
--4! ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/ALA
2 - NI0/AF
1 - DOI Registry
SECRET/NOFORN
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SUSPENSE 1W Jan 85
Dar.
Remarks Pis provide comments to DCI.
Executive Secretary
4 Jan 85
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/Pers
14
D/OLL
15
D/PAO
16
SA/IA
17
AO/DCI
18
C/IPD/OIS
19
,
X
20
21
22
3637 (10-81)
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ER 85-017
4 January 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Africa
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Cormoros Islands
In addition to this bit about the Seychelles, Jeane Kirkpatrick
expressed concern to me about the Cormoros Islands. She said this
is the only pro-Western position along the southeast coast of Africa
and she says it is under external pressure.
William J. Casey
Attachment:
International Outlook, Business Week
19 November 1984
CL BY 0008074
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? ? ??
II(qN Mt
THE ISLAND PARADISE THAT'S
BECOMING A COMMUNIST STRONGHOLD
The degenerating political situation in India gives new
weight to concern among Western strategists over devel-
opments on the small Seychelles island group, 1,000 mi.
off the African coast in the Indian Ocean. The islands lie on
the supertanker route between the Cape of Good Hope and the
Persian Gulf, and they can electronically keep an eye on the
important U. S. naval base 600 mi. away on the tiny island of
Diego Garcia.
The Diego Garcia base, which Washington keeps under tight
security, is a crucial jump-off point for U. S. naval and air
power protecting the Persian Gulf oil-supply routes and U. S.
ships in the Indian Ocean. U. S. submarines moving through
that ocean are equipped with new Trident I missiles that could
strike at the Soviet industrial heartland in the Urals.
FAMOUS MERCENARY. Now Soviet surrogates-East Germans,
Cubans, North Koreans, and Libyans-have moved in to back
up the regime of Seychelles strongman Albert F. Rene and a
group of hardline communist sympathizers who took over the
islands in 1977. The East Germans have put up three radar
units that monitor Diego Garcia. The North Koreans bolster a
contingent of Tanzanian soldiers, Ren6's bodyguard, who
helped put him in power. In 1981 these foreign troops helped
Rene foil an attempt to overthrow him that was sponsored by
South Africa and led by the famous mercenary, Colonel Mi-
chael "Mad Mike" Hoare. The Cubans are supplying other
support services. And the Libyans, recently thrown out of a
neighboring Indian Ocean ministate, Mauritius, are handling
weapons deliveries for the Soviet bloc.
SAUDI ARABIA
DEMOCRATI O'I`'
1EMEN
~ YEMEN OF AoEN
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MAURITIUS ,
SRI LANKA
Russian ships, working out of the port of Aden in th
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, are already using th
islands for refueling as part of their elaborate maneuvers t
maintain a permanent Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. 0
the Western powers, only the French maintain a permanent-
though small-naval force in the Indian Ocean. The U.
battle group in the Indian Ocean is there on a part-time basis
The Soviets have a disproportionately large Seychelles err
bassy that has given Rene aid, including an in-progress surve?
of the islands' continental shelf that could be the first step F
planning a Russian naval base. That could be extremely impoi
tant to Moscow, since the Soviets are losing their base in th.
Mozambique port of Maputo. Mozambique is turning awa,
from Moscow toward South Africa for help in ending its ow
civil war.
The events in the Seychelles are a microcosm of a problen
dogging U. S. strategy worldwide. In the era immediately foi
lowing World War II, there was a consensus in Westeri
circles that tiny remnants of empire like the Seychelles ha,
been rendered useless by the growth of air power and moderi
communications. But as the Soviets have made themselves
global naval power, these far corners of the earth have b(
come exactly what they were in the 19th century: focal point
for the expansion of empire.
Moscow infiltrates and organizes small and easily intimidai
ed populations-often through its satellites-in an effort t?
establish political and then military hegemony at strategi
world crossroads. Maurice Bishop's Grenada, at the Atlanti
gateway to the Caribbean, was a classic example.
STAND BACK AND WATCH. The U. S. and its Western allies
which long ago gave up old-style political imperialism, eithe ??
stand back and watch-powerless to halt expanding Sovie
power and influence-or call the fire brigades, as they-did
Grenada when the strategic threat to U. S. and Western- inter
ests grew too strong. There are at least a half-dozen potenti:,
Grenadas around the world: Suriname (formerly Dutch Gui.i
na) on the northeastern coast of South America; Guinea-Bissa
(formerly a Portuguese colony) on the West African coast, any
Fernando Po, an island nearby; and islands in the South Pacii
ic, such as New Caledonia.
The Seychelles are typical of the problem. It has only 63,00'
people, most of whom live on the main island of Mahe. More u
the multiracial, French-patois-speaking Seychellois live outsid,
the country in Australia and London. But the island group i
undergoing the familiar chain of events. It is a country undo
communist rule suffering declining living standards and polit
cal oppression and supporting a growing military establisl
ment. Some 4,000 Seychellois have emigrated since Rene too
over. Tourism was once the mainstay of the islands' econom
because of its beautiful beaches and a year-round temperatur??
of 86?. But the political situation has frightened off Sout
African tourists-only 21/2 hours away by air-and cruis
ships no longer halt in the Seychelles.
Rene is opposed mainly by a stalwart anticommunist Cath(
lie bishop, Felix Paul, who runs an independent weekly news
paper. An anticommunist resistance movement dedicated 1
overthrowing Rene is headquartered in London. But it will b
hard put to succeed before Moscow brings the isolated island
under rigid communist control.
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GULF OF '
y OMAN
AIPAB/AN SEA,
SEYCHELLES