LETTER TO RONALD REAGAN FROM STEVE SYMMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001501950002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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December 1, _1985
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
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I gave a copy of the attached paper, suggesting a new policy on
southern Africa, to Secretary Shultz several weeks ago. His
recent reply proposed that I raise my expressed concerns with
the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.
Having pursued discussions with key State Department officials
in the past about this issue, I believe the matter sufficiently
urgent to be dealt with at a higher level. I have
forwarded copies of my paper to several top Administration
officials, and respectfully encourage you to consider a full
review of southern African policy at the next Cabinet meeting.
Your strong supporters in Congress were heartened by your speech
at the United Nations referring to Angola, and your remarks
implying that U.S. policy towards Angola would be aligned with
that towards Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Congress is leaning
towards lending aid, either humanitarian or military, to the
Angolan freedom fighters, and a supportive Administration
position would be most helpful to that effort.
Steve Symms
cc: The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
The Honorable George Shultz
The Honorable William Casey
Mrs. Anne Armstrong
The Honorable Robert McFarland
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U.S. AFRICAN POLICY: THE OPPORTUNITY AND NEED FOR A PRO-
WESTERN STRATEGY
In January, 1985, President Reagan declared, in his State of the
Union address, that "the,U.S. should and will support those
fighting for freedom...from Afghanistan to Nicaragua..." The
Congress has now lifted the Clark Amendment restrictions, which
had prevented U.S. military or paramilitary assistance to the
pro-Western armed resistance movement in Angola. This offers a
major opportunity for a new policy with the following mutually-
reinforcing objectives:
1) Angola: shift to a U.S. policy of support for the pro-
western armed resistance movement of UNITA and its goals of a
"national unity" government, to include moderate elements o.f the
current government, leading to genuinely democratic elections
and the removal of the Cuban/Soviet bloc occupation forces.
Mozambique: shift to a U.S. policy of full support for the pro-
western armed resistance, RENAMO, and work with friendly
governments to bring about a "national unity" coalition between
RENAMO and the least pro-Soviet elements of the current
communist government.
Namibia: help the pro-democratic Namibian political groups to
organize so that they can compete effectively in genuinely
democratic elections to be held under supervision of an
international commission of genuinely democratic countries--not
the United Nations, which has a conflict of interest, since it
has already recognized the communist SWAPO guerrilla
organization as "the sole and authentic representative of the
Namibian people."
4) Republic of South Africa: It should be the goal of U.S.
policy in southern Africa to assist in the development of
capitalistic, pluralistic, multi-party, multi-racial societies
based on the consent of the governed. This is best accomplished
through a process which constructively engages legitimate
parties in a peaceful, evolutionary process leading to systems
which protect the rights of all persons and groups and is based
on non-violent change. While encouraging peaceful evolution
from the apartheid system, we must assure that the communist-led
violent opposition groups are unable to bring a hostile, anti-
western repressive dictatorship to power in the name of equal
rights for all. The U.S. should identify and enhance the
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standing of moderate and peaceful anti-apartheid groups like
Inkatha, and end the legitimization of terrorist, pro-Soviet
groups such as the ANC and the Azanian People's Organization.
The Current Situation in the Region
groups.
The communist MPLA has been
the
government
since
1976.
It has
an army of at least 60,000
which
receives
substantial
Soviet
Angola: three black groups sought independence from Portugal--
the communist and pro-Soviet MPLA, founded in 1956 by Angolans,
who were members of the Portuguese and French communist parties;
the pro-Western FNLA, which attracted a major MPLA leader and
3,000 of his troops in 1974; and pro-Western UNITA, led by Dr.
Jonas Savimbi. The Alvor agreement of January 15, 1975 was
signed by all three groups. It called for each group to
contribute 8,000 men, with these 24,000 to join with 24,000
Portuguese as an interim force to maintain order while
democratic elections decided who should govern an independent
Angola. Instead, the Soviet Union increased the flow of weapons
to the MPLA in October 1974, which increased even more in early
1975; 200 Cuban military advisors arrived in April 1975 to train
MPLA forces in the use of Soviet weapons, such as light tanks,
field artillery, rocket launchers. In August 1975, elements of
the Cuban general staff arrived; and later that month, the first
of the more than 15,000 Cuban troops arrived, with a massive
Soviet airlift of weapons which directly strengthened the MPLA.
A small South African force (1,500) entered southern Angola in
mid-October to help the FNLA. It was withdrawn in December when
the U.S. Congress refused to provide aid to any of the competing
bloc support and weapons and has continually been supported by
about 35,000 (other estimates are as high as 37,000-45,000)
Cuban troops. The MPLA has a social base in one tribe
accounting for about 23a of the population; although there is
now significant support from other tribes. UNITA represents
about 42% of the population, has an estimated 55,000 under arms,
and has established a ten-year record of military improvement,
coherent strategy, and effective government in the areas it
controls.
MOZAMBIQUE: The pro-Soviet communist government was
established in 1975. It has ruled by repression; and the
combination of communist economics and drought has led to
severe economic decline, including mass starvation in some
regions. The government is opposed by a pro-Western armed
resistance movement, RENAMO, which despite the peace agreement
between South Africa and Mozambique, continues to wreak havoc on
the Mozambique economy. In desperation, the Mozambique
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government has turned to the U.S. and other Western
countries for substantial economic aid.
Namibia: SWAPO (Southwest .Africa People's Organization) is a
pro-Soviet guerrilla organization which seeks power over Namibia
and which the U.N. (General Assembly) has designated as the
"sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people." It
has an estimated armed strength of 7,000 and has been
consistently supported by the Soviet bloc/Cuba and by the pro-
Soviet regimes in the area, including Angola and Mozambique.
Pro-democratic political organizations exist in Namibia, and
these include the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. Pro-Western
and democratic Namibians believe that a U.N.-supervised
electoral process, under the terms of U.N. Resolution 435, would
result in a SWAPO victory because the U.N. has declared itself
in favor of SWAPO, and therefore, cannot be a guarantor of
impartial elections, and because SWAPO's terrorist apparatus
would be used to coerce voters. South Africa recently
established a Namibian transitional government, and thereby
initiated the move towards democratic self-government.
Republic of South Africa: There are several competing
coalitions: communist-led organizations, such as the ANC, and
its front organization, the UDF, which use violence and anti-
apartheid sentiment in order to destabilize the current
government with the aim of taking power; elements of the white
population which seek peaceful evolutionary change which will
end apartheid; a minority of whites that want no further reform
and fear erosion of their status; and non-violent black groups,
as well as coloureds and Indians that also seek the peaceful
elimination of apartheid and political accommodation. The South
African communist groups are supported by and cooperate with
SWAPO, the Soviet bloc, Cuba, the pro-Soviet regimes in the
region (Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe), as well as other elements
of the pro-Soviet terrorist network, such as Libya, and the full
range of communist propaganda and front organizations. The U.S.
government should promote and enhance the image and influence of
the moderate, non-violent reform groups of all races within the
RSA, and encourage their cooperation in the abolition of
apartheid.
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The basic premise of the current policy is that if South Africa
pern-its U.N.-supervised elections in Namibia, these will be
genuinely democratic, and Cuba will concurrently withdraw a
substantial number of its troops from Angola. There are two
basic flaws in this approach. First, U.N.-supervised elections
will most likely produce a Namibia dominated by the communist
SWAPO movement because the U.N. has long been biased towards
SWAPO. Second, Cuba is unalterably opposed to withdrawal of
troops below the level required to continue propping up the pro-
Soviet regime, unless military casualties and losses force
Castro to do so.
The State Department describes four goals of its policy. The
following is a summary of claimed progress and an alternative
assessment.
Claimed progress--"seized strategic initiative from
Soviets, shifted focus from military to diplomatic solutions";
"Mozambique and Angola looked to U.S., not Soviets for solutions
to their security problems."
Our assessment--Soviet influence continues as long as the
pro-Soviet regimes remain; pro-Soviet groups are expanding their
violence against South Africa; Mozambique and Angola look to the
U.S. for economic aid, and hope misguided U.S. diplomacy will
demoralize the pro-Western armed opposition groups and give the
communist governments more time to consolidate and build their
power.
Reduce regional violence:
Claimed progress--U.S. diplomacy helped Mozambique and
South Africa reach the Nkomati Accord which ended both
governments' support for cross-border violence; U.S. brought
South Africa and Angola to the Lusaka Agreement to end South
Africa's activities in Angola, and SWAPO's in Namibia.
Our assessment--the first agreement has helped the
communist government in Mozambique and hurt the pro-Western
armed resistance there; the second agreement is consistently
violated by SWAPO (SWAPO: 150 violations; RSA: 4 violations)
and, again, has the effect of helping a communist government
rather than the pro-Western resistance movement. The ANC claims
Nkomati actually precipitated the current violence in South
Africa by transplanting ANC militants from Mozambique back into
South Africa.
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.,
Claimed progress--obtain South African recommitment to
U.N. Resolution 435 along with SWAPO and regional states
agreement to this.
Our assessment--this U.N. Resolution will, if implemented,
result in unfair elections leading to SWAPO dominance.
Suggestions for Specific U.S. Actions to Implement a Pro-Western
Strategy
Shift diplomatic objectives to the attainment of a pro-
Western coalition of UNITA and current moderate government
elements.
Under terms of current U.S. law, immediately begin
providing humanitarian assistance to UNITA, encourage all U.S.
allies to do the same, and consider military aid options.
Work with Portugal where both the Social Democrats and
Centrists are realistic about communism, and persuade European
allies to shift to a pro-Western strategy (Portugal, the U.K.,
the F.R.G. most likely could cooperate immediately with U.S.
encouragement).
U.S. and allies should immediately begin providing help to
the genuinely democratic leaders and institutions.
U.S. and allies should agree upon a democratic group of
countries to supervise future elections.
U.S. and allies should seek to reverse the U.N.
endorsement of SWAPO and mount a major communications effort to
tell the truth about the communist affiliations of the
organization.
Portugal, West Germany, and the U.S. should cooperate in
designing the specific political strategy.
U.S. should demonstrate a new approach by proceeding with
certain clearly defined acts leaving no doubt about our
position, to include opening an interests section in Namibia,
and withdrawing the current official State Department letter
which discourages American business investment in Namibia.
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U.S. diplomacy should shift its objectives to obtaining a
pro-Western Mozambique through a coalition between RENAMO and
elements of the current government.
U.S. and allies should immediately provide aid to RENAMO.
U.S. should use its economic aid and humanitarian
assistance to strengthen pro-Western political organization.
U.S. and allies should mount a public diplomacy effort as
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