LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM SENATE ON SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 9, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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ecutive Secretary
1 Oct 85
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' iCnYfea Zfofez Ze afe
September 9, 1985
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
J
As loyal Reagan supporters, we are writing to share the strong
concern you expressed to us on June 10, 1985 about the military
implications of the Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty
violations. We agree with your resolve to respond to the
expanding pattern of Soviet violations. We strongly urge you to
raise yet again the 32 Presidentially reported or confirmed
Soviet violations with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev at the
November 19, 1985 Geneva Summit Meeting. Until the Soviets admit
and reverse SALT violations, the existing arms control treaties
and negotiating process only undermine the security of America
and the Free World. Soviet SALT Violations
You have courageously reported three times since January 23,
1984, on Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty violations.
We agree that the most dangerous Soviet violations are:
1. Disregard of qualitative constraints of SALT II, in
particular, Soviet large-scale deployment of the
prohibited second new-type ICBM, the mobile SS-25;
2. Hundreds of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles
exceeding the SALT II launcher ceilings, when equality
was mandated;
3. The prohibited Soviet SS-NX-23 heavy SLBM;
4. Expanding Soviet disregard for SALT I ABM Treaty
limits, including Soviet ABM-mode tests of air defense
missiles and radars;
5. The Krasnoyarsk ABM Battle Management Radar violation;
6. Soviet deployment of a prohibited radar and mobile ABM
capability base for a nationwide ABM defense; and
7. Violation of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement by
sending offensive weapons to Cuba.
C__
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The President
September 9, 1985
Page 2
Attached for public reference is a comprehensive list of 32
Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty violations which you
and your administration have reported or confirmed in the three
reports you have sent to Congress, together with a list of 22
additional Soviet violations or circumventions reported in the
press. This is the first time that these violations have been
aggregated.
There are now reports of impending Soviet probable violation of
the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibiting nuclear weapons in
Latin America, by their sending of a Soviet naval warship
squadron with nuclear missiles to visit the Mexican port of
Veracruz. Proportionate Responses
As you correctly pointed out in your June 10, 1985 statement to
Congress on interim restraint, "proportionate responses" to these
Soviet violations are necessary, and Congress responded by
authorizing such proportionate responses in the FY 1986 Defense
Authorization Bill.
Your three reports have been important steps in educating the
American people about the Soviet threat, as was the declassified
National Intelligence Estimate on the unprecedented Soviet
offensive and defensive strategic buildups released to the Senate
at White House request in June. We support your continued
declassification efforts.
We are anxiously awaiting the study that you directed the Defense
Department to prepare, the "Response to Soviet Violations Paper,"
due to you by November 15, 1985. Because you have announced that
you intend to make this study part of your FY 1987 Defense Budget
request to Congress in January, 1986, we request consultation on
the results of the "RSVP" study effort, as well as an advance
copy of a summary of its most important conclusions as soon as
you can make it available to Congress.
Against this background of these 32 Presidentially reported and
confirmed Soviet violations, we hope that you will not give final
approval to proceed with scrapping our highly survivable Poseidon
submarines in order to comply with the unratified and "fatally
flawed" SALT II Treaty which the Soviets are clearly violating.
As you are well aware, there are serious Constitutional and legal
problems involved in prolonged U.S. compliance with an unratified
SALT II Treaty, beyond the severe dangers to U.S. national
security of U.S. unilateral compliance.
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The President
September 9, 1985
Page 3
As you correctly stated to Congress on June 10, continued U.S.
SALT II compliance and progress in arms control requires that
"the Soviet Union take the positive, concrete steps to correct
its non-compliance... and reverse its unparalled and unwarranted
military buildup." The impending Geneva U.S.-Soviet Summit may
be the Soviets' last chance, and your best opportunity to remind
the Soviet leadership of the necessity of reversing their arms
In this regard, we call your attention to the following bold
claim of Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Gorbachev in
the September 9, 1985 issue of Time magazine:
There are also still in effect such treaties as the ABM
Treaty, the SALT II provisions ... the banning of nuclear
weapons tests in three environments. To this day, so far,
they are in operation. But even today, attempts are being
made to remove these restraints or at least to raise the
question of overturning the treaties, of abrogating them."
(Emphasis added.)
We marvel at the brazenness of these deceptive and duplicitous
Soviet denials that they are violating the ABM Treaty as well as
SALT I and II and the nuclear testing bans. Gorbachev is
attempting to blame concern about the viability of SALT I and II
on the U.S. and deflect it from the Soviets. But the Soviet SALT
violations are so obvious and so challenging to world peace that
they can no longer be hidden by Soviet lies and deceptions.
Unless reversed, these acts by themselves constitute the long
feared Soviet "Break Out" from arms control restraints.
Previous U.S. Administrations have repeatedly vowed that if the
U.S. detected any significant Soviet arms control violation, the
U.S. would reassess the entire spectrum of U.S. - Soviet -
relations. We urge you to do this. Even the Carter
Administration vowed that the U.S. would match or overmatch any
Soviet strategic buildup in violation of SALT II. Gorbachev's
brazen denials of Soviet violations indicate clearly that so far
your effort expressed on June 10 to "go the extra mile" in U.S.
interim restraint has been futile. If the Soviets will not even
admit their violations, will they ever reverse them? It is time
for you to act decisively.
As your own National Security Advisor stated on June 10,: "There
can not be a future regime of arms control without compliance."
He added that "If arms control by extraordinary Soviet-violations
were to lose its meaning, we would have to build more systems
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The President
September 9, 1985
Page 4
clearly." In fact, we strongly urge you to invoke supreme U.S.
national security interests and selectively withdraw from those
provisions of arms control treaties that the Soviets are
systematically violating. As your own National Security Advisor
also stated on June 10, "Non-compliance does entail costs."
Gorbachev's Blackmail Threats
Mr. President, we also urge your vigilance and preparation for
response to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's chilling new
threats against world peace, also recently expressed in Time
magazine:
Relations between our two countries are continuing to
deteriorate, the arms race is intensifying, and the war
threat is not subsiding. ... it looks like the stage is
s
being set for a bout between some kind of political 'super
gladiators' ... [the] situation today is highly complex,
very tense. I would even go so far as to say explosive ...
would there not be a temptation to believe 'at last we have
overtaken our partner. Is it not time then to seek to
achieve superiority and to untie our hands in the field of
foreign policy? ... time is passing and it might be too
late to reverse the crisis in U.S. - Soviet relations.]
The train might have already left the station... We must
not allow things to go so far as confrontation between our
two countries ... I would say that we would come to an
unpredictable phase in relations." (Time, September 9,
1985, Emphasis added.)
Mr. President, these Gorbachev statements should be interpreted
as explicit, extremely dangerous nuclear blackmail threats, from
the top Soviet leader himself. These threats suggest that
Gorbachev plans a confrontational Summit meeting: either you must
abandon your own Strategic Defense Initiative and acquiesce to
Soviet strategic superiority, or the Soviets may provoke a
military, even a nuclear crisis in which they have clear
preponderance and the U.S. would have to back down.
Brezhnev's Secret Boast
We remind you of the prophetic, then-secret boast by an earlier
Soviet General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, before East European
Communist leaders in Prague in the Spring of 1973, which is well
on its way, unfortunately, to coming true:
"We are achieving with detente what our predecessors have
been unable to achieve using the mailed fist ... because of
the decisive shift in the correlation of forces, by 1985 we
will be able to exert our will wherever we need to."
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The President
September 9, 1985
Page 5
The responsibility rests in your hands to make sure that
Brezhnev's goal is not satisfied. You yourself have conceded
Soviet strategic superiority publicly at least 7 times since
1982. Your National Security Advisor stated on June 10,: "there
has been, clearly, an increase in both the pace and quality of
Soviet building programs.." The declassified National
Intelligence Estimate confirms many details of this unprecedented
Soviet strategic buildup. The Soviets have gained their main
objective of strategic superiority over the U.S. through their
SALT Break Out violations, and thus they will be very reluctant
to correct these violations. Indeed, deliberate Soviet efforts
to counter U.S. National Technical Means of verification strongly
indicate a Soviet intention to persevere in their violations.
Mr. President, we urge you to continue to stand up strongly for
American national security interests by achieving the reversal of
the Soviet SALT Break Out violations, either by bilateral
diplomacy at the Summit or by selective U.S. abrogation and
unilateral U.S. defense programs which proportionately respond to
them.
MX and SDI Cutbacks
We note with grave concern the recent Congressionally imposed
cutbacks in your Strategic Defense Initiative and in MX
deployment, but we are especially alarmed with Defense Secretary
Weinberger's recent agreement to stop MX deployment at no more
than 50 ICBMs in existing Minuteman silos and not seek further MX
deployment funds in the FY 1987 Defense Budget now in preparation
at the Pentagon. This will delay the already long-delayed MX
program another year, for no good reason, and we may not get even
100 MXs until after 1989, if then. Even the Carter
Administration planned 200 survivable MX ICBMs, to be operational
by early 1986. And as your June 10 Report to Congress stated:
"... the integrity of the U.S. strategic modernization program
must be maintained."-
We believe that currently planned strategic force cutbacks go in
precisely the opposite direction, especially at a time when the
top Soviet leader is describing the international situation as-
of explosive." As your National Security Advisor stated on June
10, we should be "accelerating and adding to the U.S. strategic
modernization program," in light of the Soviet violations.
Finally, we are reassured by your National-Security Advisor's
statement that you will "reach some decisions based on the
[Defense] Secretary's report to [the President] in November.
These would probably be reflected in the [FY 1987 Defense] budget
submission in January."
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The President
September 9, 1985
Page 6
Arms Control Compliance Supplemental
We urge you to assemble all of your proportional response options
to the Soviet violations in a FY 1986 Arms Control Compliance
Supplemental Defense Request, so that both the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and Congress can honestly assess the threats and
requirements posed by the Soviet SALT Break Out violations in one
package, unencumbered by other defense or budgetary
considerations.
As your National Security Advisor stated on June 10, the Soviets
must "get back in compliance, or you can expect compensating
measures to be taken ... we will take action to account for what
they've already done in violation." But he added: "at the
bottom, the basic criterion must be assuring the security of the
United States." We agree.
Your Legacy
We believe that your legacy s ou d be that of the Leader who has
tried to restore American strength, power, and moral authority.
The people who gave you a landslide victory in both 1980 and 1984
gave you that mandate on the basis of this commitment. We urge
you to continue to make this your legacy.
Sincerely,
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The President
September 9, 1985
Page 7
Attachment: Soviet Arms Control Violations
Copies to:
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, JCS
Director, CIA
Director, ACDA
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ATTACHMENT: Soviet Arms Control Violations
In addition to addressing the military implications of the Soviet
SALT violations and deceptions, we need to summarize these
Presidentially confirmed Soviet arms control treaty violations.
Moreover, when these violations were first released, they wre
downplayed by both the White House and by the media, so they are not
in fact well-known at all. It is important to note further that these
are the unanimously agreed findings of the national security
departments and agencies of our government. There were no dissenting
footnotes nor disagreeing qualifications by any part of the Executive
Branch to these Presidential Reports to Congress. There are now 32
Soviet arms control treaty violations agreed and confirmed by the
Executive Branch, and reported by the.President to the Congress.
These 32 violations are summarized, for the first time aggreqated
in one place publicly,as follows according to the different treaties
violated.
32 Soviet Arms Control Treaty Violations Confirmed and Agreed
Within the Reagan Administration
BOX: 11 Presidentially Confirmed Soviet Violations of the 1979 _S_ALT_II
Treaty
1.Soviet buildup of over 378 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles
(SNDVs) above the 2504 level of Soviet SNDVs as of June, 1979;
2.Soviet failure to deactivate over 632 SNDVs down to the 2,250 SALT
II SNDV level;
3.Soviet development and operational deployment at over 20 bases of an
initial increment of 200 launchers for the SS-25 mobile ICBM is a
violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second "new type" ICBM-
4. The Re-entry Vehicle of the SS-25 is less than one half the total
missile Throw-Weight, constituting covert MIRVing with a 3 MIRV
capability;
5.The Soviet SS-NX-23 SLBM constitutes a prohibited heavy new SLBM;
6.Soviet production of more than 30 Backfire bombers per year-- over
14 extra, illegal Backfire bombers, or several illegal Backfire
squadrons--constitutes a Soviet violation of Brezhnev's Backfire
bomber production pledge, which former President Carter told the
Senate was an integral part of the SALT II Treaty;
7.Arctic basing of Backfire bombers, increasing their range, another
violation of Brezhnev's Backfire bomber pledge;
8.Probably equipping Backfire bombers with a refueling__probe, also
contrary to Brezhnev's Backfire pledge, increasing Backfire's range
illegally;
9.Soviet deliberate interference with US National Technical Means of
verification, by a continuously expandinq pattern of strategic -
Camuouflage, Concealment, and Deception;
10.Almost total encryption of all new Soviet missile testing
telemetry;
11.Probable Soviet deployment of 200 banned SS-16 mobile ICBMs.
These Soviet SALT II violations have enormous strategic
signifigance, both military and pol-itical. Altogether, they amount to
Soviet strategic offensive superiority. First, they result in about
632 more Soviet SNDVs than are allowed by SALT II. Second, they
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augment the already overwhelming Soviet first strike capability
actually codified with US agreement in the terms of the SALT II Treaty
itself. Even more importantly, US unilateral compliance with the
unratified SALT II Treaty which the Soviets are confirmed to be
violating at will actually demonstrates Soviet strategic offensive
superiority to the world. If the numbers themselves did not
demonstrate Soviet superiority, then'overt US agreement to unequal
levels of forces in complying contrary to its own laws and
Constitution with an unratified SALT II Treaty clearly demonstrates US
acquiesence to Soviet superiority. And the Soviets are estimated to be
preparing to deploy over 700 more mobile ICBM launchers by 1987 in
addition to their already overwhelming 6 to 1 superiority in ICBM
warhead. capabilities. The Soviets are already thus 10 to 15 years
ahead of the US in strategic offensive capabilities.
BOX: 7 Presidentially Confirmed Soviet Violations of the 1972 SALT I
ABM Treaty
12.The siting, orientation, and capabilities of the Soviet Krasnoyarsk
ABM Battle Management radar violate 3 provisions of the SALT I ABM
Treaty;
13.ABM-mode tests of Soviet Surface-to- Air-Missiles and radars are
highly probable violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty;
14.The Soviets may be developing and deploying a territorial,
nationwide ABM defense, which would violate the SALT I ABM Treaty ban
on developing even a base for a nationwide ABM defense;
15.Mobility of the ABM-3 system is a potential violation of the SALT I
ABM Treaty, which bans mobile ABMs;
16.Soviet rapid relocation without prior notification of a "Flat Twin"
ABM-3 mobile radar, creating the Kamchatka ABM test range, was a
violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty;
17.Confirmed Soviet falsification of their dismantling of excess ABM
test range launchers in 1974, which violated the 1974 SALT I ABM
Treaty dismantling procedures
18.Soviet deliberate concealment activities impede verification in
violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty.
These Soviet violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty have enormous
significance, both military and political. The Soviets are planning to
deploy over 3,000 mobile ABM intercepters by 1987, for a nationwide a
ABM defense. They can already defend almost 20% of their strateqic
forces, and soon they will be able to defend 50 to 66%.The Soviets are
over 10 years ahead of -the US in strategic defenses.
BOX: 4 Presidentially Confirmed Soviet Violations of the 1972 SALT I
Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons_
19.Soviet deployment of the Heavy SS-19 ICBM and the Medium SS-17 ICBM
to replace the Light SS-11 ICBM was a circumvention defeating the
object and purpose of the SALT I Interim Agreement; this violation
alone increased the Soviet counterforce threat by a factor of 6 and
was as signiqificant a setback for US national security as the loss of
the Viet Nam War itself through Communist violation of the 1973 Paris
Peace Agreement;
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20.Soviet deployment of modern submarines exceeding the limit of 740
SLBM launchers without dismantling other ICBM or SLBM launchers, which
the Soviets actually admitted, violated the SALT I Interim Agreement;
it actually took the Soviets until 1981, five years after the SALT I
Interim Agreement expired, to deactivate all 209 SS-7/8s required;
21.Soviet deliberate Camouflage, Concealment and Deception activities
impeded verification, in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement;
22.Implied circumvention of the 1974 SALT I submarine dismantling
procedures, throuqh deployment of long-range supersonic SLCMs on
Stretch Y Class submarines.
BOX : Presidential Confirmation of Manifold Soviet Nuclear Test Ban
Violations - - --- ---- - 23.The 1958-1961 Nuclear Test Moratorium
The Soviets breached a unilateral commitment by engaging in
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in Auqust, 1961;
24.The Li-mte Test Ban Treaty of 1963
The Soviets violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty by extra-territorial venting of radioactive nuclear debris from underground nuclear
weaapons tests;(There have been over 30 conclusively confirmed Soviet
extraterritorial ventings, and hundreds of other probable and likely
violations. )
25.The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
The US Government has determined that the Soviet Union is liklely to
have violated the underground nuclear testing yield limit (150
kilotons) of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. (See chart.There have now
been well over 16 Soviet high yield tests violatinq the TTBT. )
The many Soviet nuclear test ban violations have allowed the
Soviets to develop and test much more lethal warheads for their new
ICBMs, SLBMs, and cruise missiles. Thus, these Soviet violations have
enormous strateqic significance.
BOX: Presidential Confirmation of Soviet Violations of the Kenned-
Khrushchev Agreement on Cuba of 962
26.The Soviets breached a unlateral commitment by sending offensive
weapons--intercontinental nuclear-delivery capable bombers, nuclear-
delivery capable fighter-bombers, and various kinds of nuclear missile
submarines--back to Cuba, beqinninq in 1969.
On September 14, 1983, President Reagan for a second time
confirmed that the Soviet Union had violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev
Agreement which ended the Cuban Missile Crisis :"-That agreement has
been abrogated many times by the Soviet Union and Cuba in the bringing
of what can only be described as offensive weapons, not defensive,
there." This Presidential statement has been backed up by the CIA
Director, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. Even the State Department concedes
that the Soviets have violated the "spirit" of the Agreement.
BOX: Other Soviet Arms Control Treaty Violations Confirmed by the
President
27.The 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons
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SOVIET NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
(SHAGAN RIVER TEST AREA)
GLOBAL MAGNITUDES (N.E.I.S.) VS TIME
11 SOol?1 l.?1? .bone 160 KT inc. 1078
- - - - -- - -~?~~~~..T-ITM, II-ind,C.IM
/ ? ? ? ' .I.CIW DI 71'41d.
1977 1978
Tier
/4.Ap.,
Senn. Foreign
RN.ton? Comedic..
- 1 1 I
11979 1980 1981 1982
YEAR
Note M IhoSo 4.b e?v teeeno uD to 111. ISO KT
Gmd of the 1107 In the W Du.. Y.115 of In. T te.1y
I.. -OwId be ?.D.CIed ? the US cennrny dal. tt.
Soneb u. now le.lm0 uo to 000 KT. AII-Db $y,
A they ue Ie.I,ng Wbw 150 KT now. Ivey moat
five teftrlclod 1o0n01o Selo. 75 KT dump tM
tnt S I/! yeely TT4? r on IMo?.lletIc .aunWnn,,
Pml July 1077
110W11SO KT
A e Jury 1077
Sovlel 150 KT
US ISO KT
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The United State's Government has determined that the Soviet Union is
violating the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons by the prohibited
first use in war of chemical weapons in Laos, Cambodia, and
Afghanistan.
28.The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
The United States Government has determined that the Soviet Union is
violatinq the Biological Weapons Convention by maintaining an
offensive bioloqical warfare proqram and capabilities.
29.The Conventional Weapons Convention
The Soviets violated the Conventional Weapons Convention by using
booby-trap mines and incendiary devices against civilians in
Afghanistan.
30.The 1975 Helsinki Final Act
The United States Government has determined that the Soviet Union is
violating the Helsinki Final Act by its inadequate notifications of
its Warsaw Pact military exercises.
31.The Montreux Convention of 1936
The Soviets violated the Montreux Convetion by transiting the Turkish
Straits repeatedly with aircraft carriers.( The Greek- ,overnment, a
signatory of the Montreux Convention, repeatedly protested these
violations to the Soviets, to no avail.)
32.The 1982 Brezhnev SS-20 Moratorium
The Soviets breached their unilateral commitment to end SS-20
deployment by completing SS-20 launcher positions and continuinq to
deploy new SS-20s.
In sum, 11 of the 32 Presidentially confirmed Soviet violations
relate to the SALT II Treaty, 7 relate to the SALT I ABM Treaty, and 4
relate to the SALT I Interim Agreement. Many relate to the nuclear
weapons test ban agreements.
* There have been three Presidential violations reports:
January 23, 1984;
October 10, 1984 -- The "GAC Report",-and
February 1, 1985.
There are six considerations which support the fact that the GAC
Report is an authoritative Presidential Report:
1.
The President requested it in 1982;
2.
The President has embraced it publicly on June 14,
1984;
3.
The GAC Report largely overlaps the January 23,
report;
1984
4.
The GAC Report was reviewed within the Government;
5.
Most of the GAC Report's conclusions are identical to
those of the President's January 23, 1984 Report;
6.
The President's National Security Advisor himself has
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BOX: 6 Other Reaqan Administration Charges of Soviet Treaty Violations
1. Soviet violation of the 1945 Yalta Agreement, by denyinq free
elections in Poland;
2. Soviet violation of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, by occupying
Eastern Europe;
3. Soviet violation of the United Nations Charter, through threatened
aqgression against Poland in 1980-1981;
4. Soviet violation of the Paris Peace Accords on ending the Indochina
War, by continuing to buildup the North Vietnamese military;
5. Soviet violation of various international agreements governing
civil aviation, by the brutal KAL-007 shoot-down murder incident of
1983;
6. Soviet violation of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement during the
attempts to recover the KAL-007 "Black Box". In fact, there is strong
evidence that the Soviets shot down KAL-007 in the first place in
order to cover-up some of their SALT II violations ( such as a test of
their illegal SS-25 second new type ICBM with full encryption of
electronic telemetry signals ) planned for that very night of 31
August-1 September 1983.
The Defense department has stated that: " The US should
vigorously pursue compliance issues with the Soviet Union and demand
that the Soviets take corrective action when we detect violations. If
this fails, the US should be prepared to take those measures necessary
to maintain our national security in the face of Soviet violations.`
But the Soviets are directly challenging the essence of the US
democratic political system by their 32 confirmed, conclusive agreed,
arms control violations.. They are boldly gambling that American
democratic leaders can not muster the leadership or collect the
bipartisan political consensus necessary to demonstrate the political
will to compensate for the Soviet SALT violations. The Soviets
believe, with some justification derived from their direct experience
with American cowardice and appeasement, that American political
leaders are paralyzed and demoralized and unable to galvanize public
support to challenge them and counteract their threats to our
collective allied security.
The Soviets are already quite self-confident, and have reason to
be. The Soviets know full well that they have an overwhelming 4 to 1
numerical advantage in ICBM warheads -{counting DIA's best estimate of
14 warheads on-each-of 326 super heavy SS-18 ICBMs,giving the Soviets
8,500 ICBM warheads to only 2,100 for the US ), and their accuracy and
megatonnage advantages give them over a 6 to 1 or even an 8 to 1
advantage in first strike, counterforce capabilities. The Soviets also
have simultaneously over--a 14 to 1 advantage in Intermediate Range
Nuclear Force warheads against NATO. The Soviets are also deploying a
nationwide ABM defense , capable soon of defending not only Moscow,
but also ICBM fields and the whole nation. Thus the Soviets are able
to threaten the US with a strategic offensive first strike, and soon
they will even be largely immune from a limited US retaliation.
BOX: 22 Additional Soviet SALT Circumventions or Violations
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Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle has testified to the
Senate tha~-?he existing violations reports from the President are
"illustrative only" , and that "twenty to twenty-five" more Soviet
violations remain to be publicly confirmed by the President to the
Congress. The following 22 additional Soviet SALT violations have been
widely discussed in the press.
1.Deploying 12 to 14 warheads on each SS-18 ICBM, when SALT I7- allows
only 10, increasing the Soviet ICBM warhead total by over 1,200; The
latest NIE reportedly reaches this conclusion.
2. Developinq and testing the Soviet SS-18 ICBM rapid-reload and
refire capability as a circumvention of all the SALT II ceilings,
doubling the Soviet SS-18 force;
3.Soviet testing of an ABM rapid-reload and refire capability
prohibited by the SALT I ABM Treaty;
4. Soviet failure to dismantle 18 SS-9 Fractional Orbital Bombardment
ICBMs banned by the SALT II Treaty, which also circumvented the SALT I
ICBM ceiling;
5. Soviet deployment of SS-11 ICBMs at SS-4 MRBM and SS-5 IRBM soft
launch pads for covert soft launch in circumvention of all SALT I and
SALT II ceilings;
6-Soviet maintenance of several thousand stockpiled ICBMs, SLBMs, and
strategic cruise missiles as potentially operational, thus
circumventing all SALT II ceilings;
7. Soviet development and deployment of the SS-24 rail mobile ICBM,
which will be above SALT II launcher ceilings, and which reportedly
may have heavier throwweight than the Soviet heavy SS-19, and which
therefore is a prohibited new very heavy ICBM;
8.Probable Soviet exceeding of the SALT II ceiling of 820 MIRVed
ICBMs, by reportedly deploying covertly MIRVed mobile SS-25 ICBMs, and
by preparations to deploy MIRVed SS-24 mobile ICBMs;
9. Soviet failure to deactivate old ICBMs on time, in violation of the
SALT I ICBM ceilings and 1974 dismantling procedures, and continuous
falsification of official deactivation reports between 1975 and 1981;
10.Ongoing Soviet deployment of the mobile SS-16, mobile SS-24, and
mobile SS-25 ICBMs, which circumvents and defeats the object and
purpose of SALT 1, because it is inconsistent with the US SALT I
Unilateral Statement against mobile ICBM deployment.
11. Reported Soviet deployment of operational SS-25 mobile ICBMs using
old SS-7 ICBM support facilities at the Yurya old SS-7 complex, which
violates the SALT I dismantling procedures for old SS-7 ICBMs.
12. Violation of the late Soviet President Brezhnev's 1972 SALT I
pledge not-to build mobile ICBMs.-
13. Violation of the late Soviet President Brezhnev's 1972 SALT I
pledge to dismantle the entire G Class of strategic missile
submarines. -
14. Soviet violation of the SALT II ceilings of 1200 MIRV ICBM and
MIRV SLBMs, and the 1320 ceiling on MIRV launchers and intercontinal
bombers with long-range ALCMs, throuqh deployment of excess MIRV' ed
ICBM and MIRVed SLBMs and over 50 Bear H bombers and over 250
intercontinental Backfire bombers capable of carrying long-range
ALCMs.
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15.Soviet circumvention of the SALT I ABM Treaty, by qivinq the Moscow
ABM-3 complex the capability to defend over 300 adjacent MIRVed ICBM
silos.
16. Soviet violation of the 1971 Agreement to Reduce the Risk of
Outbreak of Nuclear War, by jamming US early warning detection
systems, failing to notify the US of this jamming, and failing to
notify the US of the early April1984 salvo launch of multiple SS-20s
toward the US.
17. Soviet flight-testing of their new mobile ICBM launchers
continuously concealed by camouflage, thereby violating the SALT II
provision that the US must be able to determine the relationship
between a new missile and its launcher.
18. Soviet achievement of "unilateral advantages" through their
circumventions, violations and negotiating deceptions related to SALT
I and II. These Soviet unilateral advantages violate the 1972
Aqreement on Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations, which is
specified in the Preamble to the SALT II Treaty as a fundamental
element of SALT II.
19. Soviet violation of the June 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of
Nuclear War, through their hostile actions and hostile threats in the
October 1973 Middle East War. ( The Federal Republic of Germany has
made this charge against the Soviets.)
20. Soviet direct interference with US National Technical Means of
SALT verification, in a reported 1980 incident in which Soviet
electronic warfare technology actually took control of a US
intelligence satellite, actually rendering it useless during a key
Soviet missile test. The incident is a clear violation of SALT I and
II provisions. Moreover, the Soviets have reportedly blinded US
satellites with lasers, and are jamming US electronic collection
satellites and other systems.
21. SALT II permits no increase in the throwweight of the super heavy
SS-18 ICBM, and no new type of very heavy ICBM to replace it. The
Soviets appear to be doing both: developing a 3rd new type ICBM which
is even heavier the SS-18.
22. Any follow-on to the-heavy SS-24 will have to be within 5% of its
throwweight and other chacteristics, or else it is a prohibited new
type ICBM. The SS-24 follow-on under development is a 4th new type
ICBM, when SALT II allows only one new type ICBM, and the SS-24
follow-on also appears to have even more throwweight than the heavy SS-
24, which is already probably heavier than the SS-19.
The Soviets have thus gained overwhelming strategic superiority
over the US through their SALT violations and thus they will be very
reluctant to correct their violations. Indeed, deliberate Soviet
efforts to counter US National Technical means of verification
strongly indicate a Soviet intention to persevere in circumventing and
violating treaties.
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