LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM STEVE SYMMS AND MALCOLM WALLOP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001101480007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 17, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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E SEC E~ ARIAT
XECUTIV10U'r,14c tW
STAT
3637 ,,o-s?
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STEVE'SYMMS'
IDAHO EX_ l`.
'ZTnifeb Zfafez ,.ienafe
October 17, 1985
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
18:5- 2539/1
I note that my questions posed to you with Senator Wallop on_June 24,
1985 on Soviet violations of SALT I have not been answered.
The Soviet SS-25 mobile ICBM is now judged by both the Soviets and the
U.S. to be operational at several Soviet missile complexes previously
housing old SS-7 ICBM's. You stated in your February 1, 1985 Report to
Congress on Soviet SALT violations that Soviet SS-25 deployment at old ICBM
complexes would be a "future violation" of SALT I. Does this now confirmed
Soviet deployment violate the SALT I ICBM dismantling procedures, and also
violate SALT I by defeating its object and purpose? When will these and
other Soviet SALT violations be confirmed to Congress?
Respectfully,
Copies to:
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, JCS
Director, CIA
Director, ACDA
Attachments :
Letter of June 24, 1985
STEVE SYMMS
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,JCnUfcb %falez 'Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
June 24, 1985
The President
The mite House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. president:
we would like you to know that the senate unanimously passed on June
11, 1985 an amendment to the State Department authorization bill requiring a
Report to Congress on the Military Consequences of all Soviet SALT
violations (enclosed). This report is long overdue, Raving been repeatedly
requested from the Administration since March 1, 1984. We now request that
this report be dealt with in the November 15, 1985 Repxort.
We are enclosing our own analysis of the military consequences of the
Soviet SALT violations as well as our own analysis of the 1978 JCS
predictions on the effects of SALT II. We hope these will be of possible
use by the JCS in writing their contribution to the required report of the
Defense Department. We ask these be shown to Col. Dick Toy USAF and
Commander Mariner Cox USN.
We note that in your June 10, 1985 Report to Congress on Continued
U.S. SALT II Compliance, the Administration stated that 'the Soviets have
complied with the letter of SALT I' and that 'the Soviets have not violated
the SALT I limits on ICBM and SLBM launchers.'
These statements completely contradict our 1980 and 1984 Republican
Party Platform charge that there was a Carter-Mondale Administration cover-
up of Soviet SALT I violations. The 1980 Republican Party Platform stated:
"The Republican Party deplores the attempts of the Carter Administration to
cover-up Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements... We pledge to
end the Carter cover-up of Soviet violations of SALT I and II..." The 1984
Republican Party Platform repeated its condemnation of "Carter-Mondale
efforts to cover-up Soviet violations of the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation
agreement..."
Moreover, the June 10, 1985 statements also totally contradict your
own GAC Report released to Congress on October 10, 1984. The GAC Report
states that Soviet deployment of the heavy SS-19 ICBM to replace the light
SS-11 was a circumvention of SALT I defeating its objective and purpose. it
also states that the Soviets violated SALT I by exceeding the SALT I SLBM
ceiling and violated the prohibition on deliberate interference with U.S.
National Technical Means of verification by their extensive camouflage,
concealment and deception.
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ongoing Soviet deployment of the mobile SS-16, SS-24, and SS-25 103Ms
also defeats the object and purpose of SALT I, because it is inconsistent
with the U.S. SALT I Unilateral Statement against mobile ICBM deployment.
Further, reported deployment of operational SS-25 mobile ICBMs at the
Yurya old SS-7 complex violates SALT I dismantling procedures for SS-7
ICBMs.
In addition, you have confirmed that the Soviets are deploying long
range SLCMs on their Stretch Yankee Class Submarine, circumventing the SALT
I dismantling procedures.
In sum, there are at least 8 violations of SALT I, five of which are
confirmed by Presidential Reports to Congress. Several others have been
confirmed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Secretary
of Defense Melvin Laird.
Additional violations of SALT I mentioned in the press include the
following:
1. Failure to deactivate old ICBMs on time, and continuous
falsification of official deactivation reports between between 1975
and 1982;
2. Keeping 18 SS-9 FOBS ICBMs at an ICBM test range illegally
operational;
3. Violation of Brezhnev's 1972 pledge not to build mobile ICBMs;
4. Violation of Brezhnev's 1972 pledge to dismantle the entire G
Class of strategic submarines;
5. Deploying SS-11 ICBMs at SS-4 and SS-5 soft sites for covert soft
launch in violation of the ceiling on ICBM launchers.
We request your comments on these additional Soviet SALT I violations.
Could you please explain to us the reasons for these important
contradictions of our 1980 and 1984 Republican Party Platforms and your own
GAC Report as soon as possible?
Sincerely,
Copies to: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, JCS
Director, ACDA
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AMENDMENT NTO. ------------ ------_______- i , -----~ Calendar No. -
Purpose: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES- -------- Cong- ------- Sess.
H.R.------------------------ SHORT TITLE
(title) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Referred to the Committee on ---------------
and ordered to be printed
Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed
INTENDED to be proposed by -- 2 --- - c -----------------------------
Viz :
1 At the end of the bill add the following new section:
10
11
12
13
"The Department of Defense shall prepare a report, to be submitted
to Congress in both classified and unclassified form by July 15, 1985,
that describes in detail the direct and indirect military consequences
and effects of all Soviet violations of all arms control treaties and
agreements."
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February 28, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL' RECORD -SENATE
52363
does to those New Zealanders who have not Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence on SALT U. Using the sanitized general con-
yet drifted off on cloud nine. Agency. Accordingly, as a courtesy to the clusions of this document, we can now in
Executive Branch, we request that our un- 1985 evaluate retrospectively how accurate
classified letter be reviewed by the above U.S. intelligence and planning assumptions
SALT II WAS NOT IN THE NA- agencies. were In 1978, and make an overall assess-
TIONAL SECURITY INTEREST It Is our intention to release our letter to ment of the actual national security effects
OF THE UNITED STATES the Senate and to the public on March 1, of SALT 11 from a historical perspective. A
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask 1985, and we will do so at that time unless sanitized extract of general conclusions
there are any specific objections from the from this JCS document is Attachment A.
unanimous consent that two letters, Executive Branch. We also have various classified Defense
one signed by myself and one by With warmest personal regards, Intelligence Agency estimates of Soviet, stra-
myself and my distinguished col- Sincerely, tegic force structures, and classified Defense
league, Senator JOHN P. EAST, of STL'VR SYMMS, Department tabulations of U.S. strategic
North Carolina, be printed in the U.S. Senator. force programs. Our sanitized and declassi-
RECORD. fled chart based upon our classified DIA
The first letter, dFebruary 24, U.S. SENATE, and DOD sources are Attachment B.
1985, and addressed dated o the Pre:;idr.2 , Washington, DC, January 24, 1985. We recognize that our estimate of Soviet
The f nmiRr.mT, forces at the. end of 1985 Is somewhni
staters in my name and that of Scuutor 7%ec While Iluusc? higher than agreed Executive ilr[utch Nit-
EAST: Washington, DC. tional Intelligence Estimates. This is largely
It is our intention to release our letter to DEAR Mn. PRESIDENT: This is a sanitized, because we have tried to take account of
the Senate and to the public on March 1, unclassified version of an important letter certain of the military effects of some of the
1985, and we will do so at that time unless we sent to you on January 18. 1985. classl- Soviet SALT II violations. Regretably, we
there are any specific objections from the fied Top Secret Sensitive. have still not received the Executive
Executive Branch. A crucial decision point approaches involy- Branch's assessment of Lite military hnplien-
Mr. President, we have waited until ing whether or not the United States should Lions of Soviet SALT II violations which we
continue to comply precisely with the unr?a-
1984. . Accordingly,
the close of business today, February tified SALT II Treaty, which last year you requested
have done done last our March own assessment, 1, . 1we
28, 1985, to hear from the executive certified to Congress that the Soviets were
branch. We have received no commni- violating in multiple ways. We iwilcve that believe to be reasonable, and while soundly
nication in writing and no specific ob- there needs to be a historical evaluation of based on classified sources, wholly snnlli,:cQ
the negative effects on American national and unclassified.
In on
je from the executive branch. security of U.S. unilateral compliance with Several assumptions underlying our est i.
In fact, we a are not t aware aware of any ex-
the unratified SALT II Treaty. We have mate chart should be specified at the oui.sei.
First ecutive branch objections at all. We carefully conducted such an evaluation, and Fand most significantly, we are count-
believe wg have given the executive we wish to make It public. In sum, we have ing up to about 400 Backfire bombers and
branch ample time to review our found that, there is now historical evidence their weapons In the Soviet force totals for
letter. that the Senate Armed Services Committee the end of 1985. We believe this Is complete-
Accordingly, we are releasing our let- was correct in December 1979, when It con- ly reasonable. In 1979, General Rowny testi-
ters in the knowledge that they are cluded by overwhelming majority vote that fied that the Soviets would have about 400
wholly unclassified, have been careful- the proposed, unequal, destabilizing SALT Backfire bombers by the end of 1985, and
ly researched in open sources, that all II 'T'reaty "was not in the national security yv oeu d yourself on stated Inn the 1nationally tcle-
data given can be supported from open interest of the United States." "SALT II is illegal, because the law of the
sources and are necessary for Senate I. OVERALL SUMMARY lan8, passed by Congress, says we cannot
and public debate on the unratified In fact, Mr. President, our analysis con- accept a treaty in which we are not equal,
SALT II Treaty. firms that the Soviet Union has built up its and we're not equal in this treaty for one
addition, Mr. President, I ask strategic forces during the period of the reason alone: our B-52 bombers are consid-
In
unanimous consent Mr. to have printed in 1979 SALT II Treaty through the year of ered to be strategic weapons; their Backfire
1985 to a level much higher than the Joint bombers are not."
the RECORD an excerpt from Alerting Chiefs of Staff predicted in 1978 that the This is a strong indication that the
America: The Papers of the Commit- Soviets would have by the end of 1985, even Reagan Administration should count the
tee on the Present Danger. This ex- if no SALT II Treaty had been signed by Soviet Backfire bomber in its SALT II force
cerpt is a series of unclassified esti- the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Since 1979, estimates, as well as in our START and
mates of United States and Soviet Soviet Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles "umbrella talks" proposals. The reason that
strategic forces first published in 1979 increased by about one fourth, and Soviet you wanted to count Backfire as an inter-
nuclear warheads more than tripled by the continental bomber in 1980 is that U.S. In-
our They most emi- end of 1985. In contrast, the U.S. will have telligence agreed that it had intercontinen-
during by the a Mr. SALT SALTl II I Nitze, debate.
strategic forces by the end of 1985 even tal range and refueling capabilities. The
nent and distinguished arms control lower than the Joint Chiefs of Staff predict- 1981 first edition of Soviet Military Power
expert, and former Director of Policy ed in 1978 that the U.S. would have by the states on page 63 that the range of the
Studies for the committee. end of 1985, even within SALT II con- Backfire bomber is in excess of 8,900 kilome-
These estimates demonstrate that str?aints. In fact, U.S. forces are lower today tees, and on page 02 it states that the range
our own estimates are unclassified, be- than they were in 1979. of the Bison bomber is only 8,000 kilome-
cause our own estimates and data are II. SOURCES AND ANALYTIC ASSUMPTIONS ters. The Bison counts as an intercontinen-
in fact derived from Paul Nitze's. We These significant conclusions about the tal bomber in SALT IT, and the longer
have great respect for Mr. Nitre, who adverse impact on American national securi. ranged Backfire should therefore also
is now the Chief Advisor on Arms Con- ty resulting from U.S. unilateral compliance count. (Backfire also has longer range than
trot to our distinguished Secretary of with the unratified SALT lI Treaty are two some variants of the U.S. R-52 bomber, all
of five conclusions we have derived from our of which count in SALT II.) Further, the
objection, the mate- analysis of authoritative, official, classified Soviets tried to deceive the U.S. on whether
Stale, There George being Shultz.
documents. We have carefully santitized the Backfire was an intercontinental
rials were ordered to be printed in the and declassified our analysis and conclu- bomber, despite Its intercontinental range
RECORD, as follows: sions. Our data is bounded by unclassified and refueling capabilities, another reason
U.S. SCNA?rI. and authoritative data. Our unclassified for counting it In SALT II. The strategic sig-
Washington, DC, February 24, 1985. conclusions confirm your own statement on nificance of counting Backfire in SALT II is
The PRESIDENT, August 18, 1980: "I cannot, however, agree that this force alone can deliver about 30
The White House, to any treaty, including the SALT II Treaty, per cent of the huge Soviet megatonnage
Washington, DC. which in effect legitimitizes the conaanu? advantage. making Backfire a formidable
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I believe that our at- ation of a one-sided arms build-up." second strike force.
tached letter is completely unclassified. It We have long had in our possession a clas- Second, we are counting In Soviet forces
contains only data already in the public sified document written by the Joint Chiefs at the end of 1985 at least 100 88-18 mobile
domain, and it analyzes this d[Fta to make of Staff on January 4. 1978 describing illus- ICBM launchers, because on January 23,
judgments which are bounded by already trative U.S. and Soviet strategic forces 1984, you informed Congress that the
unclassified and authoritative estimates. through 1985, with and without a SALT II mobile 88-10 ICBM is "probably deployed"
Our letter does make reference to data Treaty. This is an Important historical docu- operationally. Open sources indicate that
^:ginating in the Defense Department, the ment, because it was used in 1978 and 1979 the Soviets have probably deployed over 100
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint in the U.S. decision-making and negotiating 88-10s.
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S2364 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --'SENATE February 28, 1985
vivt
Third, as required by Article VI 1 of the 3. IN 1978, the JCS estimated that U.S. ed deceptively order to pr tertho same
SALT II Treaty itself, we are counting at SNDVs would increase by 2% with SALT II, programs from , while
ng the US. c
Delivery SVethose Soviet hicles (SNDVs "in the by the end of 1985. In actuality. U.S. SNDVs SALT sI lwould consttrain~Sovieti programs. rmed ti-
the lear end
final stage of construction" and "undergo- decreased 8bthe out 99S% estimated d of 1085.. We Yh avA 6 ee i to to theat threet in teethe
warheads would increase by 61% with SALT Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Congress were
t 4. In version." Th, repair, e press reports m con-
Ing ndre o press pl ym nt impend- II, and increase by about 95% without SALT not aware in 1972 of this evidence of Soviet
silo and mobile deployment of the II by the and of 1985. In actuality, U.B. war- intentions to deploy prohibited systems
Soviet 138
are authoritative ctive and u88-25 nclassified ICBMs. And reports there that heads remained almost constant, rising by fully in the face of SALT I constraints. The
are SS-24 and F.-25 are 9 .only about 2%. Senate Intelligence Committee confirmed in
the on ( and R. Military arc In r. 1984, Pro. In warn, during the 1979-1985 period of late 1979 that key evidence on Soviet com-
W0 ction Soviel t modest e of a about SALT 11, Soviet SNDVs increased by about pliance intentions had In fact been still-
have estimated a modest force of one fourth, but the warheads carried tripled pressed. Consequently, we believe it reason-
Anti-Bal-
100 of these by la
1 nally, we have 1985. through Soviet exploitation of their huge able to conclude that the SALT I AFiwarhead capacities demonstrated sed the onximumre throw-weight advantage by MIRVing and iistic Missile Treaty and the SALT I Interim
ported e d Soviet ICBMs and because ALCM loading. Our summary conclusions Offensive Agreement were ratified and ap-
M t"Hie a that ICBMs anSLBMs, nal way are fully consistent with Defense Secretary proved in August and September 1972 under
we tea that rthis eal is Soviet tile only rational way Weinberger's atat4:suont In the Washington the proved I pretense tSA1;1 I would under
te A I X arill.
It measure hshould the real d. however, ever, t. Times on December 20, 1984: the constrain Soviet that
It counting nbe noted, however, that we are .-Improvements and additions to the Second, a the basis of our Sanitized JCS
not cotilarge numbers s refire and Soviet missile force continue at a frighten- and SeDIA/DoV cond, on the f hcompared
stockpiled ICBMs and under c, construction, ing pace, even though we have added SALT a U.B. aggregate of we have a ve c the end
strategic submarines under ngetruction II restraints on top of SALT I agreements. the to the maximum force level at thend
of 19 5 t CS for the U.B. predict-
not . many additional long range bombers The Soviet Union has built more of the big 1986 t
from k-
non-
nfunctionally distinguishable nuclear warheads capable of destroying US. they the JCS SALT 197 II. This U.B. In 1985
SALT-accountable Soviet bombers. We are missiles in their concrete silos than we had 1985
also ignoring Soviet strategic SLCMs, where initially predicted they would build, even SALT II aggregate is 2,500/18,000.
they Hence, hold our estimates a huge advantage, in lac a C cantl . without any SALT agreement. We now con- By complying unilaterally with and unra-
underestimate the full do vet t significantly gnificantly front precisely the situation that the SALT tilled SALT II Treaty which you have certi-
ndcrparing the ni zed Jthreat. process was intended to prevent." fled the Soviets have violated In four ways.
Comarz the sanitized CS chart with IV. DETAILED CONCLUSIONS the U.S. therefore forfeited potential de-
the have the following wingt (attached), w con- We would now present five more detailed ployment over the six years of SALT II of
clusions expressed the following summary con- conclusions derived from a careful comp- about 500 SNDVs carrying about 8,700 war-
age tabular and in percent- son of the sanitized 1978 JCS chart and our heads. This is a measure of the security
age e starementent f f stat ormat: son sanitized DIA/DOD chart for late 19115. costs of our unilateral compliance and de
III. SUMMARY or THE ErrCCTS OF SALT iI ON First, we estimate that by the end of 1965, facto unilateral disltrmanu?nt and nppensv-
UNITED STATES Axn SOVIET STRATNIC FORCES when the unratified SALT II Treaty is due meat. These 500 SNDVs carrying 8,700 war-
.,,,n heads could have bolstered deterrence and
Note on declassification: These estimates Strategic Nuclear Delivery Venrcies, carry-
are rounded off. Using reasonable assume- ing about 13,200 warheads. But the 1978 Third, it is interesting to compare these
Lions and available unclassified data, Paul JCS chart reveals that the JCS estimated U.S. forfeitures through SALT II compli-
Nitae's unclassified 1979 estimates published that the highest force levels that the Sovi- ance with the force levels the Soviets will
in 1984 (See Attachment C) provide both ets could achieve by the end of 1985, in the probably achieve by the end of 1985 by
lower and upper bounds on Soviet force absence of the SALT 11 Treaty, was about SALT II Breakout. Considering the highest
levels. U.S. force levels for 1985 have been 3,000 SNDVs carrying about 11,000 war- SeND iwalrhe f aggrreega a th the JCS pro-
officially published without classification. heads.
The JCS in 1978 were evidently relying 1985 within about 950 RNDVs the about
d
85
dd
1973-1979:
U.S. Faces ...................................... 2.053.................... 8,500.
Soviel Fates (Pad Nitres esli- 2,504 ....................
5,105, as ousted la mMiier
Nov counlnig).
Maximum estimated m 1978 for 1985,
within SALT II:
US. Faces ........................................ aissl 2.000.......... Ahod 14,000.
Soviet Faces..................................... 2,509.................... Abed 8,500.
Maximum estimated in 1978 For 1985,
no SALT It:
U.S. Faea..... _ ................................. About 2.500.._..... A" 18.000.
Soviet Forces ..................................... Ahurt 3,000......... Abed 11,000.
Estimated end at 1985:
U.S. Forces ........................................ Ahod 2,000......... 8,300.
Swan Faces ..................................... Ahool 3100......... Atoll 13200.
n b (SWs 2.246)... (lw la :
Pam's 1985 asarmrkt SSot
00111101-
I Wwconl,ienlal SY.klne 2.646 .................... 12.928.
c
e
nave a
upon CIA estimates of Soviet forces for 19
unconstrained by SALT it. These CIA esti- 4.700 warheads above those levels. Thus the
mates, however, will turn out to significant- Soviets are much higher than estimated
ly underestimate the force levels the Soviet even if they were adhering to. SALT It.
will probably have achieved by late 1985. As Moreover, the Soviet increment above SALT
we know, the CIA significantly underesti- II ceilings Is comparable to the increment
mated Soviet strategic forces throughout the U.S. forfeited by agreeing to comply
the 19608 and early 1970s. unilaterally with the unratified SALT 11
Comparing the sanitized JCS chart to our Treaty.
sanitized 1985 estimate chart, we find that Fourth, considering SNDV/warhead levels
the Soviets will probably be about 200 estimated for the Soviets by the JCS as of
SNDVs and about 2.000 warheads above the 1978, the Soviets will have added about 700
highest levels that the JCS in 1978 estimat? SNDVs carrying about 8,700 warheads
ed for the Soviets at the end of 1985 with- during the 1978-79-1985 period of SALT II.
outs SALT II Treaty. We believes new This is a very significant increase in the
Team B critique of CIA estimates Is needed, threat to America To repeat, the Soviets in
because the 1978 competitive estimates evi- creased their SNDVs by a fourth, and tri?
denWy did not Improve the accuracy of CIA pled their warheads. As you stated
1. A1,r In your
ur
S
Wits with 3 Atcm,s W. estimates.
IiKlude 300 new OM launchas, new 3,292 .................... 17,181. This is the clearest evidence yet that the
bomoet, Plops Spud maxumrm MIRV
hadmgs. Soviets did not allow their strategic Pro-
gram to be affected in any way by SALT 11.
been ..Break.
h
ave
and that since Lvov heY
Out" of SALT it. We recall that there is
i
ns
SUMMARY STATEMENTS strong classified evidence that the SALT I
(Note.-These calculations are approxi- interim Agreement of 1972 similarly did not
mate.) affect the Soviet ICBM and SLBM deploy-
1. In 1978, the JCS estimated that Soviet ment plans throughout the 1970s. But some within
with SVs would decrease by over about 10% of this evidece was long ALT II, and increase by about 15% the Intelligence Community, and a analy-
without SALT II by the end of 1985. In ac- sis is not widely known. We call your atten-tled tuality, Soviet SNDVs probably Increased by Ttion he to the June. Strategic 97 Planning
CIA tudycen itl d
about 25% by the end of 1985.
2. In 1978, the JCS estimated that Soviet SALT (title unclassified, study classified
warheads would increase by roughly over Top Secret Codeword Sensitive). This docu-
90% with SALT II, and increase by over meat has been made available to us, and
150% without SALT II by the end of 1985. should be studied by the entire Senate. We
In actuality, Soviet warheads probably in- urge you to become familiar with it as well.
creased by over 200% by the ebd of 1985. This study also indicates that the late
This is our most important. conclusion. Soviet President Brezhnev himself negottat-
January 9, 1985 press conference,
is nothing but a limitation on how fast you
Increse weapons.'
Fifth. the Carter era JCS under General
Davy Jones planned to retain all U.S. Titan
ICBMs and B-52D bombers in the U.S.
SNDV aggregate through
It. But in addition to the labove noted U.S.
forfeiture under SALT II of 500 SNDVs car.
rying 5,700 warheads, the JCS under the
Reagan Administration will have unilateral.
52D systeemsaby the end of 1995. and in addi?
tion, all 160 Polaris SLBMs, for a total of
292/500 SNDVs/warheads the U.S. has uni?
laterally deactivated during U.S. unilateral
SALT II compliance. Moreover, the Carter
JCS planned 250 MX ICBMs which were to
be survivable, and you plan only 100 vulncr
able MX. In total. 612 SNDVs existing or
planned carrying 6.800 warheads have beer,
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February 28, 1985 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S2365
Unilaterally scrapped under the Reagan Ad- eta are violating in multiple ways. We are
ministration. extemel
co
d
h
V. RESTATEMENT
In sum, the Soviet strategic build-up from
1978 tl rpgh 1985 occurred ostensibly within
SALT IT. but was in fact much greater than
that protected for the Soviets without
SALT 11. Our conclusion confirms Secretary
of Defense Weinberger's statement in the
FY 1985 Defense Posture Statement: "The
SALT II Agreement would have codified
that unilateral Soviet buildup and allowed
additional growth in Soviet forces, therby
permitting even further deterioration of the
military balance."
The Soviets seem to believe that SALT Is
a zero sum game, with them as the winners
and the U.S. as the losers. A Soviet foreign
policy expert, speaking for the Kremlin
Ieasler'ahip, wrote In 11171):
"Signing the (SALT' 1) Interim Agreement
(was a) victory of the Soviet Union in the
arms race . (the) 1972 Moscow Agree-
ment, like the Vladivostok Agreement,
noted the defeat of the American strategic
arms race policy." (Stanislav Tumkovsky
Problems of History. Moscow. 1970)
Because Lite 1974 Vladivostok Agreement
was the basis for the SALT II Treaty and
was incorporated into SALT II, the Soviets
evidently believe that both SALT I and
0'AUI' 11 were victories for the Soviet Union
and defeats for the United States.
Finally, although we recognize and fully
support the need to protect intelligence
sources and methods and defense informa-
tion about our own forces, we also believe
that it is Imperative for the American
people to have a general understanding of
the massive increase in Soviet nuclear arms
that has occurred during the period of al-
leged Soviet adherence to SALT IT, and that
they know also the enormous advantages
which the U.S. has denied itself through a
policy of vescillation based on strict unilat-
eral compliance with an unratified treaty
our opponents are known to be violating at
will. Continued silence on these matters Is
I
t
l
n
o
erable. That is why we have sanitized
and declassified our analysis and conclu-
sions. The adverse strategic balance entails
both political and military risks. As relative
Soviet power continues to increase, the Sovi-
lone 18, 1979 End of 1985
U.S. Swint us. Snelet
strategic strategic shalegic slraleec
Faces fags laces laps
ets fully expect the U.S. and its allies to low 9000's ............. 2,053 12,504 2,130 12.246
mov i i
nereas ugly toward accommodation
and appeasement.
ncerne
y
t
at the Soviets nave
built up their strategic forces during the
period of SALT II through late 1985 to a
much higher level than we though they
would even withou SALT IT.
With warmest personal regards,
Sincerely,
STEVE SYMMS.
U.S. Senator.
JOHN EAST,
U.S. Senator.
A. Maximum U.S.-Soviet Strategic Forces,
1985, Within And Outside SALT 11 Treaty
Ceilings, as predicted by JCS in January
1978:
wilMin SAI I N -N1110. asnet SAI1 N "Iran Wi
I!MS N, 19115
NIDV's...... died 2,000 2.258 alas 2.500 AM 3,000
WNW*.. AM 14,000 AM 8,500 add 11,000 Lie 11,000
Nine N awbas are NOW oil N saryntp of "died data AN
Site) last a s arithlr ft Mils of Paw Pats't pdww a*avla, we
Bac*fa, witilmtia0ll bias, all papa Piece Pis aaaaad.
B. U.S.-Soviet Strategic Forces, Estienat-
ed for Late 1985:
5NOV's .................... _............................ "bad 2,000 abooi "3,200
WXM*.._ ..................................... _... AM 9,300 stew " 13,200
I Theme 1.1* awwstale Not Moe Saul tMat because soloed. Tolle and
1101141011 0M+1wwds, rid MNo CMPK Williams! SLIMI'S a ie ndt FM we
CAWS a asd under oautrretisa
Ceads be 400 Macau extol 11.1it a beaus with 3 ACCM's W,
I00 anode yS-16 (Sri fiwl slate M aaxlrrction, neneaspn ad
arodrwlaliars, I00
985silo sad a ids SS 24 rw SS 25 ICBM's, rsusinam
daaoaslnbd IC85 and SHIN 85V Machias.
Nato: A8 use ue are nailed oN for saritintiar M dassilied data.
f slimaMd Serial 1 waifads are below Pau Nita s 1985 wrhead
atlaata, 8 Batkbe and rNw-0eacMalad lass re added end grape ly loaded.
C. U.S.-Soviet Strategic Forces, 1979 and
1985, within SALT II Treaty Ceilings, Com-
mittee on the Present Danger, 8 November
VI. REQUESTS ' WIN* Baclfue and its weapons. Cowls MANS incorrecty as "depend
eat wrheaa.
In conclusion, we have several questions
and requests. First, we ask whether you and
your national security departments and
agencies are as concerned about our analysis
and conclusions as we are? We request their
comments. Second, we request that you con-
sider our analysis, conclusions and attached
Snare: Akrtn`` Narita, The Papers of the Committee si the Present
Danger, Ed. by trans Tyr*. Prgama Braoty's, Washinglcm, 1984, pp.
143-158.
Total Scsi) SNDV's/
warheads
charts and amendments in your torllu om. Non-SALT 0 C?n ace farces
bschelt 400 Backlae benders with 2 ALCMs
ing decision about whether to continue U.S. cash .............................. 2.646/12,928
...........................
unilateral compliance with the unratified Indrdc 254 missiles awl hpubrs ad dexlvakd 2,800/13,542
SALT II Treaty. Third, we request that Include 300 new ICBM Ira?len, prow ad
Your Administration prepare witnesses to ffiMilWA OW loaeM new .................. 3,292/17,188
send to h
i
ear
ngs on the Constitutional as-
pects of the treaty-making powers as ap.
plied to arms control. We are considering
holding such hearings. Finally, we also
intend to seek another Senate vote on the
merits of continued U.S. unilateral compli-
ance with the unratified SALT 11 Treaty
(See Attachments).
We want to support your defense budget.
request and your strategic modernization
program, including MX, but but only in the
context of U.S. disavowal of unilateral com-
pliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty
which you have already confirmed the Sovi-
FURTHER UNCLASSIFIED DATA SUPPORTING OUR
CONCLUSIONS
1. Robert McFarlane stated in a recent
public speech at the Commonwealth Club in
San Francisco that since 1975 the. Soviets
had constructed "more than 10,800 addition.
al nuclear weapons." This would give the
Soviets 13,540 warheads in 1985, which is
above our estimate.
2. As Paul Nitze accurately predicted pub-
licly on March 14, 1979: "During the span of
Lite (SALT II) agreement, numbers of nucle-
ar warheads can be expected to rise by 300
percent on the Soviet side, in comparison to
about 50 percent for the U.S."
This is above our estimates.
3. As Paul Nitze accurately predicted pub-
licly on October 1. 1979: "If the SALT II
Treaty were to approach expiration in 1925
without replacement and without a surviv-
able and durable U.S. IC13M component. I tie
U.S. could face unprecedented dangers. We
would then have to take seriously both the
then-existing degree of Soviet nuclear stra-
tegic superiority, and Soviet superiority In
break-out potential."
4. Further, Paul Nitze again accurately
predicted Soviet forces publicly on May 16,
1979: "From the beginning of 1978 to the
end of 1085, Lite number of Soviet warheads
will have doubled; ours will have increased
by half ... the capability of their weapons
1.11 kaauek out hurslenetl targols, sects its nil.-,
site silos, will have increased tenfold ... by
the end of 1985, tinder the limits of SALT
Ii, (U.S. prompt counter force hard (nrgei
capability) will be an eighth of that of the
Soviet Union .... This will be compounded
by the fact that they will have twice as
nanny hard targets as we, and their targets
will be, on average, twice as hard as ours."
This is the same as our estimate.
Nitze added ominously: "A more sober
evalliaflon of 1"he balailev, at a Ilnae W114,11 It
is too Irate to reverse Lrends, could result in
forced accommodation to the Soviet Union
leading to a situation of global retreat and
Finlandization."
5. As Nitze again accurately predicted pub-
licly on May 16, 1979: "Under SALT II ...
the capability of Soviet missiles to destroy
hardened military targets is expected to rise
by 1,000 percent."
AMENDMENT --
Add at the end of the bill the following
new section:
"SEC. -. Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law or of this Act, no national securi-
ty program of the United States shall be
terminated, impeded, or delayed in order to
comply with any provision of the unratified
SALT II Treaty, unless and until the Presi-
dent shall have certified to Congress that
the Soviet Union is in full compliance with
SALT II.".
AMENDMENT --
Add at the end of the bill the following
new section:
"SEc, -. Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law or of this Act. no funds author-
i-red or appropriated by this or any other
Act may be obligated or expended to deacti.
vate or remove from operational service any
Minuteman ICBM or any Poseidon missile
or missile submarine for any purpose includ-
ing specifically that of complying with any
provision of the unratified SALT II Treaty.
unless the President shall have certified to
Congress prior to any such deactivation or
removal from service that tht; Soviet Union
is in full compliance with SALT II.".
ALERTING AMERICA
(Edited by Charles Tyroler IT, Introduction
by Max M. Kampelman)
APPENDIX
The following charts and graphs were pre-
pared by Paul H. Nitze and distributed as
appendices to the above statement.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 12
(Prepared by Paul H. Nitze, 1 November
1977-8 November 1979)
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S 7670 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June $0, 1984
from coming into this country to rob
the minds of our youth.
All of that is being held hostage, Mr.
President, in this legislation.
So I just want the President and my
colleagues in the Senate to know that
when this matter, House Joint Resolu-
tion 492, comes up next Monday, this
Senator will move that we recede from
our item in disagreement with the
House, the $21 million in covert assist-
ance for the Contras in Nicaragua. I
want to make that clear to my col-
leagues, because it is the only way we
will obtain this legislation in time for
the summer youth employment pro-
grams in America, the nutritional pro-
grams for the feeding of our Infants
and mothers in this country, to answer
the needs of hungry folks in Africa
who are suffering through the worst
drought in many decades In that im-
poverished area.
I am sorry we are going to do this on
a Monday. I hope that my friends and
colleagues will hear the sound of my
voice and will come here next Monday,
a day when our attendance is notori-
ously rather small from time to time,
because I think this is a fundamental-
ly important issue.
I hope that every Member of the
Senate will rise above party and think
of this great country of ours and cast
his or her vote with the sense of re-
sponsibility and integrity of purpose
that every Senator always should
employ.
I say to my friends in the Senate
that we should send this conference
report back to the House, concurring
in all the 22 items in agreement, or in
technical disagreement, and dropping
the one item of disagreement, the $21
million in covert assistance to Nicara-
gua.
I have talked to many Members of
the House, and there are none who be-
lieve there is any possibility that these
funds can survive and that this legisla-
tion can survive if the 22 items of Im-
portance to the country are held hos-
ta?e to that covert assistance question.
Mr. President, I think the minority
leader for the interest he has shown in
this matter. I thank the majority
leader. He is a fine man, a considerate
and fair man, who has bent over back-
ward to accommodate this Senator.
But the administration is in error in
persisting in trying to hold this hos-
tage to that one question, which we
have thoroughly debated here.
I put the Senate on notice that next
Monday, we will urgently request our
colleagues to do the right thing, the
responsible thing, to pass this measure
without the item of disagreement that
cannot possibly survive in the hands of
the House.
ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, there will now be a
period for the transaction of routine
morning business until 11:45 a.m., with
statements therein limited to 2 min-
utes each.
SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS LIMI-
TATION TREATY VIOLATIONS
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, today
we live in a very dangerous world. The
Soviet Union is violating every major
arms control agreement in force today.
These Soviet arms control violations
have paid very handsome dividends for
the Soviets. They have allowed the So-
viets to gain overall strategic superiori-
ty in both offensive and defensive ca-
pabilities. In fact, according to De-
fense Secretary Weinberger, the Sovi-
ets "have stepped up their own strate-
gic modernization program."
Using only the Strategic Arms Limi-
tation Treaty [SALT] counting rules,
the Soviets now have an overwhelming
6-to-1 strategic offensive superiority
over the United States, a true first-
strike potential so long feared by our
strategists. The Soviets are 10 years
ahead of the United States in strategic
offensive capabilities. This Soviet first-
strike potential grows evermore omi-
nous each year, and its utility for po-
litical blackmail and intimidation Is
even more apparent. The Soviet ad-
vantages derived from their SALT
cheating are even greater. The Soviet
first-strike capability throws an ever
darkening shadow over all the world's
politics, and Is a direct result of the
Soviet violations of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty [SALT].
And now we have recent revelations
from defense officials that the Soviet
Union is also 10 years ahead of the
United States in defensive antiballistic
missile capability, and may in just a
year's time be able to defend over one-
third-a significant proportion-of
both its population and offensive
forces from the U.S. retaliatory deter-
rent. The Soviets may also at any time
launch the first laser antiballistic mis-
sile battle station into space, where
they already have had an operational
antisatellite capability for over a
decade.
These Soviet offensive and defensive
advantages threaten the credibility of
the U.S. retaliatory deterrent, which
has preserved the world's peace for 38
years. If the Soviets can threaten a
devastating first strike, and then also
threaten to defend against a signifi-
cant part of the U.S. retaliatory re-
sponse, deterrence is gravely weak-
ened. Peace could be in jeopardy, and
the United States is not only vulnera-
ble to Soviet first strike, but more im-
portantly, because of this vulnerability
we are increasingly subject to Soviet
attempts at intimidation through nu-
clear blackmail.
President Reagan stated in a press
conference on March 31, 1982:
The Soviet Union does have a definite
margin of superiority-enough so that there
is risk. and that is what I have called a
window of vulnerability.
President Reagan also stated on
March 23, 1983:
The Soviets have enough accurate
and powerful nuclear weppons to destroy
virtually all of our missiles on the ground.
President Reagan then added that
the Soviets have a ?'? ? ? present
margin of superiority."
The Soviet Defense Minister, the
late Marshal Grechko. stated openly
as long ago as March 1975:
The correlation of forces [i.e., the strate-
gic nuclear balance] has changed In favor of
socialism and to the detriment of imperial-
ism.
A Soviet military journal, "Red
Star" stated threateningly in January
1980.
With respect to the military balance. the
correlation of forces has shifted, once and
for all and irrevocably.
As the Joint Chiefs of Staff conced-
ed ominously in their military posture
statement to Congress for fiscal year
1985:
The Soviets have now developed strategic
offensive and defensive rapabilittes that
erode the credibUify of the U.S. deterrent
and increase the risk that Soviet leaders
would consider launching a surprise nuclear
attack. (Italic added.)
The JCS concedes that "the Soviets
hold a distinct advantage in terms of
total numbers of strategic offensive
forces," and that "Soviet strategic
forces are more effective than those of
the United States." The JCS have also
conceded that the Soviets have a "sur-
vivable superior offensive capability."
The U.S. Air Force has stated offi-
cially to Congress that there is "a do-
stabilizing imbalance between U.S. and
Soviet strategic forces."
Defense Secretary Weinberger
stated to the Senate on May 24, 1984:
The Soviet military buildup, both quanti-
tative and qualitative, has produced a major
shift in the nuclear and conventional bal-
ance.
Secretary of State Shultz stated on
May 14, 1984: "Arms control will
simply not survive in conditions of in-
equality."
America's strategic decline has not
even bottomed out yet. Our military
leaders have been telling us for several
years that even after all our currently
planned strategic offensive modcrniva-
tion programs are deployed by 1990,
we will still not be able to regain stra-
tegic offensive parity with the Soviets,
and this assumes that Congress will
fund them. Thus we are over 10 years
behind the Soviets in strategic offen-
sive capability. If we are also 10 years
behind In ABM's and space lasers and
antisatellites as well, then it is an
urgent national security priority to
bolster deterrence and to quickly ac-
quire defenses.
The role of the false doctrine of
arms control in speeding and assuring
the U.S. strategic decline needs at long
last to be carefully examined. The his-
torical evidence Indicates that arms
control has been used as an instru-
ment In the Soviet game plan for stra.
tegic supremacy. As President Reagan
has pointed out, our strategic nuclear
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megatonnage is now only one quarter
of what it was In 1965, and the number
of U.S. nuclear warheads has declined
by one-third of what it was in 1965.
Arms control has unilaterally re-
strained U.S. strategic programs, while
allowing all Soviet strategic programs
to progress unhindered. In a real
sense, arms control has been an enor-
mous Soviet strategic deception, and a
very successful deception indeed. In
contrast, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have stated that "The Soviets have in-
creased their strategic warheads more
than threefold since 1973."
Actually, Soviet warheads have in-
creased over fourfold since 1973. The
April 1984 edition of the DOD's Soviet
Military Power also states that "with
the (Soviet] deployment of new nucle-
ar weapons systems their stockpile
megatonnage has again started to
rise."
Mr. President, the relentless momen-
tum of the Soviet strategic nuclear
weapons buildup, which started before
1962, is destined to continue into the
1990's and beyond. This Soviet strate-
gic buildup, unprecedented In history,
has not been constrained by existing
strategic arms limitation treaties. The
Defense Department has testified to
Congress recently that "this Soviet
buildup of strategic nuclear forces
shows no sign of slowing." The De-
fense Department added that "we see
no letup in the rate of deployment of
Soviet [strategic] systems over the
next ten years."
As Dr. Eugene Rostov, former
Reagan administration Arms Control
Director, has written about the first
SALT agreements of 1972 and the
decade of the 1970's culminating in
SALT II in 1979:
The SALT I Agreements and the process
of negotiating SALT II did not prevent the
worst decade of the Cold War or the ex-
traordinary build-up of the Soviet nuclear
arsenal.
And Dr. Richard DeLauer, Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and
Development in the Reagan Defense
Department, has testified to Congress:
The Soviets In fact never slowed or even
perturbed their strategic development and
deployment programs in spite of detente.
active arms control negotiations, or the
SALT Agreements.
Mr. President, Assistant Secretary of
Defense Perle recently testified to
Congress that there has been almost a
75-percent increase in Soviet nuclear
warheads aimed at the United States
since the SALT II Treaty was signed
in 1979. Perle added that the Soviets
have deployed 3.850 ballistic missile
warheads since 1979, and this does not
even count refines. This means that
the Soviets have almost doubled their
nuclear warheads aimed at us since
former President Carter's SALT II
Treaty was signed.
Using only SALT counting rules, the
Soviets now have over 895 more strate-
gic nuclear delivery vehicles than the
United States and over 1,000 more
warheads than the United States. And
this does not even count the effects of
their SALT violations. The strategic
impact of their SALT violations gives
the Soviets a force an order of magni-
tude larger. The Soviets also have over
30 strategic offensive programs under
development for future deployment.
Thus SALT II did not stablize Lite
strategic balance. It did Just the oppo-
site.
But in stark contrast, since 1980, the
Reagan administration has gone in
Just the opposite direction from the
Soviets. The Reagan administration
has unilaterally deactivated over 292
strategic delivery vehicles carrying
over 500 warheads counted in the
SALT II Treaty. The United States
has thus deactivated gratuitously over
33 percent of existing American strate-
gic megatonnage.
Indeed, the Reagan administration
plans to continue these unilateral de-
activations in unilateral U.S. compli-
ance with the unratified -SALT II
Treaty by dismantling two Poseidon
submarines carrying 32 SLBM's and
320 warheads, and 90 B-520's carrying
over 1,000 air-launched cruise missiles.
The Reagan administration has also
significantly reduced the MX ICBM
program and the B-IB bomber pro-
gram, by one-half and two-thirds, re-
spectively, below previously planned
deployment levels. And the Reagan
administration plans to completely
cancel the only two U.S. strategic of-
fensive systems now being produced
for operational deployment the
ALCM-B and the Trident I SLBM.
This Reagan strategic cutback is part
of a larger trend in declining U.S. stra-
tegic capability. As I have noted, since
1965, the number of U.S. strategic nu-
clear warheads has declined by one-
third, and their megatonnage by three
quarters. Thus the United States has
been exercising unilateral restraint for
almost 20 years.
A top Reagan defense official recent-
ly stated to the Senate that:
The President's Strategic Modernization
Program won't match the Soviet buildup
that first.became visible twelve years ago
after we digned the SALT I argeements.
(Emphasis added.)
This statement seems to mean that
even President Reagan has conceded
strategic superiority to the Soviets
after 1990.
The Secretary of Defense stated to
Senators on April 5, 1984, that he is
"deeply concerned" about the military
implications of the Soviet SALT viola-
tions. He added that "Far more serious
are the implications for the overall de-
fense posture of the United States rel-
ative to that of the Soviet Union."
Caspar Weinberger was thus likewise
implying that Soviet SALT violations
are another sign that the Unite'I
States has conceded strategic superior-
ity to the Soviets. This conclusion Is
strengthened by Weinberger's added
judgment that:
. Some possible outcomes of an effceiive
(Soviet) ABM system or a new mobile ICBM
could provide the Soviets with a decisive
edge in strategic offensive and defensive ca-
pabilities .. ," (Emphasis added.)
This statement suggests also that
the developing Soviet strategic superi-
ority will soon be "decisive," because
the Soviets are indeed developing an
effective ABM and a new mobile
ICBM both of which will be operat ton-
al before the late 1980's.
As a top Nixon administration arms
control official wrote as long ago as
1971:
If, after a reasonable period. SALT negot I-
ations prove unproductive, or If the
U.S.S.R. resumes land-based ICBM deploy-
ments or moves to modernize or expand its
Moscow ARM system, Lite United States
would take whatever steps are necesanry to
maintain its strategic deterrent, Including
possible deployment of a more advnueed
Hard Site Defense-(H8D defense of land.
based ICBMs. (Emphasis added.)
Unfortunately, all these conditions
set in 1971 are now being met. Strate-
gic arms treaties and negotiations are
broken, the Soviets are deploying land
mobile ICBM's, expanding and mod-
ernizing their ABM, and yet, the
United States is doing very little to
maintain Its strategic deterrent.
As Defense Secretary Weinberger
has stated to Congress:
Unilateral Soviet deployment of an ad.
vanced system capable of countering West-
ern ballistic missiles-added to the Soviela'
already impressive air and other defense ca-
pabilities-would have maJor, adverse conse-
quences for deterrent stability and for the
security of the United Stags and Its allies.
Juxtaposed against this ominous
statement are the following Judgments
for the April 1984 edition of the
DOD's Soviet Military Power:
The U.S.S.R. has an improving potential
for large-scale deployment of modernized
ABM defenses well beyond the 100 launcher
ABM treaty limits. The Soviets have devel-
oped a rapidly deployable AHM system (I.e..
Lite ABM-3I for which sites could be built in
months instead of years ... The new, large,
phased-array radars under construction in
the U.S.S.R. along with Lite Hen House. Dog
House, Cat House, and possibly the Push-
kino radars appear to be designed to provide
support for such a widespread ABM defense
system.
. The complete network (i.e., over 251 of
these radars, which could provide target
tracking data for ABM deployments beyond
Moscow, probably will be operational by the
late J980s.. .
Both the SA-10 and SA-X-12 may
have the potential to Intercept some types
of U.S. strategic. ballistic missiles an well.
(i.e.. The mobile version of the SAM-10 will
be operational by 1985. The mobile SAM -12
will probably also be operational by 1985.1
These systems could, if properly supported,
,rid signlfieunt point-target coverage to a
widespread ARM deployment ...
The Soviets seem to have placed them-
selves its a position to field relatively quick-
ly a nationwide ABM system, should they
decide to do so. (Emphasis added.)
Thus it is fair to conclude, from offi-
cial testimony, that the Soviets have
already seriously eroded the U.S. de-
terrent capability with their ever-
growing ABM capability.
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S 7672 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
As Drs. Colin Gray and Keith Payne
stated In the spring 1984 Issue of For-
eign Affairs:
A unilateral Soviet BMD System of even
limited effectiveness could be highly
destabilizing in the context of existing
Soviet offensive first-strike capabilities and
extensive air defense and civil defense prep-
arations: The U.S. deterrent threat could be
severely degraded by the combination of the
Soviet first-strike potential to destroy Amer-
ican strategic nuclear forces and a Soviet de.
fense against surviving American forces.
This Is the situation today.
Soviet strategic defensive activities
were roughly five times U.S. outlays in
1970 and increased to 25 times U.S.
outlays in 1979.
In effect the ABM treaty provided
Soviet SS-18's and SS-19's unimpeded
access to U.S. ICBM silos.
As Senator TOWER, chairman of the
Senate Republican Policy Committee
and the Senate Committee on Armed
Services stated on April 3, 1984:
The military imbalance between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union still exists as a threat
to our national security. Although signifi-
cant progress has been made in the last
three years to regain military partly with
the Soviet Union, congressionally mandated
reduclinns In the President's defense plan
have seriously impaired efforts to achieve
this goal. In fact, the current imbalance will
continue to widen, though at a lesser rate.
(Emphasis added.)
As the Scowcroft Commission report
to President Reagan on strategic
forces stated in April 1983: '14" ? ? ef-
fective deterrence is in no small meas-
ure a question of the Soviets' percep-
tion of our national will and cohe-
sion."
President Reagan himself has on
two occasions in 1982 and 1983 public-
ly and explicitly accused the Soviet
Union of violating the 1962 Kennedy-
Khrushchev agreement which ended
the Cuban missile crisis, the most dan-
gerous nuclear crisis in world history.
This agreement was supposed to
"halt further introduction of such
weapons systems-that is, Soviet of-
fensive missiles and other offensive
weapons, which Khrushchev even de-
fined as including Soviet troops-into
Cuba "as firm undertakings" on the
part of both the United States and the
Soviet governments.
President Reagan stated at a press
conference in May, 1982:
You know, there's been other things we
think are violations also of the 1962 agree-
There Is conclusive physical evidence
of Soviet military activity in Cuba in
violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev
agreement:
THE SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS AND CUBA
Mr. President, I would like to discuss
today the full spectrum of Soviet vio-
lations of arms control agreements. As
my colleagues know, I have been con-
cerned about Soviet arms control vio-
lations and their implications for
American national security since 1982.
Our distinguished colleague, Senator
Jna McCLURE, made his first speech
this problem back In 1975. Senator
MCCLURE successfully sponsored an
amendment in 1977 designed to pre-
vent extended U.S. compliance with
the expired SALT I interim agreement
from hindering our strategic options,
and both Senator MCCLURE and I have
been leading opponents of the unenlual
and destabilizing SALT II Treaty.
Mr. President, while Soviet SALT
violations are dangerous, this danger is
overshadowed by another even more
ominous development. The Soviets are
deploying nuclear weapons delivery ca-
pable offensive systems to Cuba, such
as TU-95 Bear bombers Mig-27 Flog-
ger fighter-bombers, and strategic sub-
marines like the Victor III class re-
ported to be equipped with long-range
cruise missiles. The Soviets auto have
nuclear warhead storage facilities in
Cuba, and the United States is report-
edly unable to rule out the presence of
Soviet nuclear weapons themselves in
Cuba.
On September 14, 1983. President
Reagan repeated his accusation. He
stated:
As far as I'm concerned, that agreement
has been abrogated many times by the
Soviet Union and Cuba in the bringing of
what can only be considered offensive weap-
ons, not defensive, there.
The President's two statements have
been backed up by stronger state-
ments by the CIA Director, the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
by an Under Secretary of Defense.
As I said, Mr. President, the Kenne-
dy-Khrushchev agreement was the
agreement that ended the Cuban mis-
sile crisis, and it can be regarded as an
arms control agreement because it os-
tensibly forbade Soviet offensive mis-
siles and bombers In Cuba and it. en-
tailed United Nations onsite inspection
against Soviet reintroduction of such
weapons. But of course the Castro
regime refused to agree to U.N. onsite
inspection, and since 1969 many Soviet
offensive nuclear delivery capable
weapons have been gradually, returned
to Cuba. Thus the Soviet threat from
Cuba is today greater than it was in
1962, as can be Inferred from the
Soviet activities and President Rea-
gan's statements. This fact suggests
that we miuzy soon find ourselves back
in a Cuban missile crisis situation, but
now we are much weaker than the
Soviet Union and the danger may be
even :greater for U.S. national security
interests.
The State Department has stated re-
cently to the Senate that:
The basing of any nuclear-armed subma-
rine in Cuba would Contravene the U.&-
U.S.S.R. understanding on Cuba. The Sovi-
ets are aware of this, "(Emphasis added.)
Thus the State Department must
surely consider the acknowledged
Soviet basing of Golf and Echo class
nuclear armed missile submarines in
Cuba in 1970, 1972, 1973, and 1974 to
be Soviet violations of the 1962 Ken-
nedy-Khrushchev agreement. The
State Department has therefore con-
firmed Soviet violation of the Kenne-
dy-Khrushchev agreement.
June 20. 1984
The State Department has also
stated recently to the Senate that:
The Department of State does agree with
the President and the other officials. .
that the Soviet Union has on occasion vio
laced the spirit of the Kennedy. Khrushchev
underrttnnding.
The State Department has also re-
cently conceded that:
All Soviet tactical aircraft in Eastern
Europe, Including Floggere are rated as po
tential nuclear delivery systems.
Some top Reagan administration ui-
ficials are predicting that the Soviet
Union will play high risk politics in
the year of 1984 prior to the Novem-
ber Presidential election. This predic-
tion, too, suggests another Caribbean
crisis, but this time perhaps with the
roles reversed. I will return to this
problem later, but It Is against this
ominous background of a nascent
Soviet strategic threat from Cuba that
we now have confirmation of a whole
series of Soviet arms control viola-
tions.
Mr. President, after many months of
careful study, President Reagan finrtl-
ly reported to Congress on January 23,
1984, that the Soviet Union had violat-
ed six arms control treaties In nine dif-
ferent cases.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the President's let ter and
report be printed in the RECORD at (.Iu
end of my speech.
There being no objection, the letter
and report were ordered to be printed
In the RECORD.
President Reagan stated that five of
these nine Soviet arms control treaty
violations, including two related to the
SALT II Treaty, were clearcut, un-
qualified, and unequivocal violations.
The President's Report To the Con-
gress on Soviet Noncompliance Wit Ii
Arms Control Agreements stated su-
cinctly:
The U.S. Governnumt has (letcrnflywd
that the Soviet Union Is violating-
1. The Geneva Protocol on ('hernirai
Weapons:
2. The Biological Weapons Convent ion;
3. The Helsinki Final Act, and two provi-
sions of SALT II:
4. Telemetry encryption; and
5. A rule concerning ICBM modernization.
In addition, we have determined that the
Soviet Union has-
6. Almost certainly violated the ISA1:TI I
ABM Treaty,
7. Probably violated the SALT 11 limit on
new types:
8. Probably violated the SS-16 deploy-
ment prohibition of SALT II; and
9. Is likely to have violated the nuclear
testing yield limit of the Threshold Test
Ban Treaty.
To repeat, there have been nine
Soviet arms control violations of six
treaties confirmed by the President,
five of 'which were conclusive and two
of these conclusive violations relate(]
to SALT II. A total of four of the nint?
violations reported related to SALT II.
The Defense Department has re
cently stated authoritatively that the
Soviets currently have two new types
of land-based ICBM's under advancu(i
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June 20, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
stages of development, thereby teloco Treaty for the Prohibition of
making this another unqualified viola- Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, by
lion of SALT II, for a total of three their deployment of nuclear delivery
unqualified Soviet SALT II violations. capability to Cuba.
As Under Secretary of Defense Fred The Soviet Union has a long history
Ikle has stated: "It's not alleged cheat- of treaty violations. A study done in
ing, it's cheating-period." And as 1955 by the Senate Judiciary Commit-
Governor Reagan stated in 1978, "We tee established the fact that the Sovl-
know that they-the Soviets-violated ets had violated over 50 treaties since
the entire spirit ar)d terms of SALT I." 1917. I put this study into the RtcoRD
Mr. President, President Reagan's on February 1, 1984. The study even
report is historic and unprecedented. found that the Soviets were violating
It is the first time In history that a the very agreement which established
U.S. President has ever accused the United States-Soviet diplomatic rela-
Soviet Union of a violation of a Strate- tions, the 1933 Litvirtov agreement, by
gic Arms Limitation Treaty. It indi. continuing to support revolutionary
Cates that the Soviets are violating activities inside the United States de-
every maJor arms control treaty in spite their 1933 pledge to cease this
force today. It Is an Irrevocable report. support.
Unfortunately, however, It covers In the latest edition of the Soviet
only the tip of the Iceberg of Soviet Military Encyclopedia-for 1983, the
arms control and treaty violations. As Soviet military openly states:
Assistant Secretary of Defense Rich- Achievements in biology and related sci-
ard Perle testified to the Senate on ences (biochemistry, biophysics, molecular
March 14, 1984, the violations in the biology, genetics, microbiology, and experi-
President's report were illustrative mental aerobiology) have led to an increase
only and he mentioned 20 to 25 addi- in the effectiveness of biological agents as a
tional existing violations. means of conducting warfare. Improved
methods of obtaining and using deal have
OTHER SOVIET VIOLATIONS Or INTERNATIONAL resulted in a qualitative re-examination of
SECURITY TREATIES the very concept of biological weapons.
What is the full scope of Soviet arms This Is an explicit Soviet military
control and other treaty violations? It recognition of their Interest in and
is well known that there are over 40 knowledge of biological warfare, which
more Soviet SALT and other arms is outlawed by the 1972 Biological
control treaty violations alone which Warfare Convention.
have not yet been reported on to Con- Official State and Defense Depart-
gress by the President, but which can inent documents from 1959 and 1962
be confirmed by other authorities. I in turn confirmed the Senate report
will describe each of these later. that the Soviets had violated over 50
In addition, other Reagan adminis- treaties since 1917. Most of these
tration spokesmen have publicly and Soviet violations were of nonaggres-
authoritatively accused the Soviet lion, peace, or friendship treaties. In
Union of violating: fact, the only international security
The Yalta Agreement and the Pots- agreement that the U.S.S.R. scrupu-
dam Agreement of 1945 by suppressing lously abided by was the August 1939
freedom in Eastern Europe; Hitler-Stalin Pact, which allowed the
The United Nations Charter by Soviets to conquer Poland, and which
threatening to reinvade Poland in led to the outbreak of World War II.
1981; According to official U.S. Govern-
Various International agreements ment sources, the Soviets have thus
governing civil aviation by the brutal violated arms control treaties in over
Soviet shooting down of Korean Air- 40 cases, and violated over 50 other
lines flight 007 and the murder of 269 international security treaties. In addi-
innocent civilians; and tion there have been over 120 cases of
The 1972 Incidents at Sea Agree- Soviet diplomatic forgeries and decep-
ment during the U.S. attempts to re- tions.
cover the KAL-007 black box. With Soviet aid and encouragement.
Indeed, there is strong evidence that North Vietnam broke the Puris ac-
the Soviets shot down KAL-007 in cords on peace in Southeast Asia
order to cover up their planned flight- throughout the 1973-75 period.
testing that very night of September The conclusion emerges, Mr. Presi-
1, 1983, one or more of their new type dent, from official U.S. Government
ICBM's which violate SALT II. And documentation, that the Soviets have
since the KAL-007 shoot-down, the violated, evaded, or circumvented
Soviets have reportedly been jamming almost every international security
U.S. national technical means of SALT treaty they have signed since 1917.
verification, an altogether new and ten- The only security treaty they kept led
precedented SALT violation. This Jain- to World War II. This Is a sobering
ming could bring arms control negotia- conclusion.
tions to a complete halt, because it is There is also strong evidence that
an act of extreme hostility. the Soviet Politburo even planned and
Our West German allies have ac- executed the plot to assassinate Pope
cused the Soviets of violating the John Paul II in June 1981. This plot
United Nations Charter and the 1973 violated all standards of morality and
Agreement on the Prevention of War decency, and was a threat to all man-
by their brutal invasion of Afghani- kind: Not even the diabolical mass
stan In late 1979. And I believe that murderer Adolf Hitler is k:rown to
the Soviets have violated the 1967 TIa- have attacked the person of the Pope.
S 7673
The evidence of history shows that
the Soviet Union Is truly an outlaw
nation.
The confirmed Soviet violations of
the chemical and biological warfare
treaties are more than Just simple
arms control treaty violations. They
are genocidal atrocities. Over 10.000
Innocent men, women, and children in
southeast and southwest Asia have
died horrible and cruel deaths. All for
the sake of Soviet aggression, in viola-
tion of other solemn International
agreements.
PEACE THROUGH SPACE DEFENSE
Nevertheless, Mr. President, the
United States should continue always
to seek peaceful relations with the
Soviet Union. Surely we must always
seek to resolve our differences with
the Soviets through peaceful diploma-
cy and negotiations. We must also
always be willing to continue to n'go-
tiate arms control agreements exit h
the Soviet34, despite the sordid history
of their past treaty violations. We
must convince the Soviets, howe cr,
that arms control negotiations now
must first be focused upon ending
their violations of existing treaties,
before there can be further progress
toward any new agreements. This is
simple commonsense, and It should be
easy for the Soviets and the whole
world to understand. Soviet deception.
treachery, and violations should result,
in some penalties for the Soviets, be-
cause these actions have Jeopru diced
American security and threat rnr'd
world peace.
Mr. President, if nrnis control invn-
ties have been ineffective In rciludrig
the risk of nuclear war, and if .ion iet
SALT violations are increasing the
risk of nuclear war, what other alter-
natives to preserve peace are available
to us? After we detect Soviet arms con-
trol treaty violations, what should we
do?
I believe that a space based, layered
antiballistic missile defense is the lit?:;t
way to reduce the risk of nuclear war.
The United States can unilaterally
deploy strategic defenses in space, and
these U.S. ABM defenses in space are
not necessarily a threat to the Soviet
Union. Strategic defenses are non-
threatening, nonprovocative, and
could even use nonnuclear technology.
This response to Soviet arms control
cheating could be made indepenu,?ntIy
of arms control. An American space
based antiballistic missile deli nse
could make the Soviet strategic offen-
Rive capability, so laboriously built up
over the years, totally obsolete. I will
have more to say about stratet;n' de-
fenses later this year.
SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS PLANNED 12 YEARS
AGO
Mr. President, in light of the con-
firmed Soviet violations, it is fair to
conclude that arms control has hcr'n it
traditional Soviet tactic used to disarm
opponents by misleading them regard-
ing Soviet intentions. This has brcn
especially noticeable, to those who are
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S 7 674 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 20, 198.4
to see. in the modern age where the of the SALT I Interim Agreement, May 25. 1 will discuss this evidence in
technological lead times can be trteccd which prohibited heavy ICIIM's from more detail later. But let me summit.
backward to show that Soviet agree- replacing light ICBM's. Thus we can rite this evidence now by simply
ment to arms control treaties were Infer from the history of the Soviet saying that it clearly shows that Lite
only deliberate acts of deception, tin- heavy SS-19 program that the Soviet Soviet leaders themselves explicitly
dertaken with plans to violate or abro- leaders intended to violate the SALT I planned to violate the fundamental
gate the treaties even before the trra- Interim Agreement from the very date provisions, article Ti, of the RA1T I In-
s ies were made final. of its signing In 1972. te'rim Agreement by Illegally deploy-
There are many clear examples Also in early 1973, the Soviets began ing their heavy SS-19 ICBM to replace
strongly supporting this conclusion. constructing the first of what became their light SS-11. In fact, the Soviet.
These include the 1958 nuclear test a total of six large antiballistic missile leader Brezhnev himself made the de-
moratorium, the 1972 SALT I interim battle management radars. These six cislon to violate the SALT I Interim
agreement and AIM Treaty, Lhe 1972 large radars, each the si7.e of two Agreement by deploying the heavy
Biological Weapons Convention, and Egyptian pyrtunids, form an Integral. 88-19 Just before he actually signed
the 1979 SALT II Treaty. coherent pattern. Five of the six are the Interim Agreement and t fit' ABM
The Soviet violations or abrogntions on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. and' Treaty on May 26, 1972.
that were planned at the very time the point outward. But the sixth radar, The top level Soviet political deci-
treaties were signed include: discovered well along in construction sion to violate the ABM Treaty also
The massive breakout of the 1958 only last July, is in the middle of Sibe- dates from May 1972, because as I
nuclear test moratorium in August ria and points inward toward the Pa- have mentioned, construction on the
1961 with the largest, most extensive cific coasts of Russia. These six large first of what became a pattern of six
nuclear test series ever conducted; radars are part of one Integral pattern, or more huge ABM battle manage-
The deployment of the SS-19 ICBM because their radar coverage cones co- ment radars was started In 1973. The
in violation of the 1972 SALT I inter- verge and close all but one gap in cov- decision to build the entire network
im agreement; erage-this one gap is from the Medl- logically also predated Lite May 1972
The testing in an ATIM node of the terranean Sea. Thus when looking at Soviet decision to sign the SALT I
SAM-5, SAM-10, and SAM-12 systems these six large radars, first started in ABM Treaty.
in violation of the 1972 SALT I ABM 1973, and now almost completed, we In addition to the now public sensi?
Treaty; can discern a pattern. No single radar five Intelligence evidence and Lite SS-
The deployment of a comprehensive itself makes sense without the others; 19 and ABM radar deployments sup-
and coordinated pattern of ABM they are integrally linked, because the porting this conclusion, the Soviets
battle management radars; radar cones of their coverage overlap. themselves seemed to confirm this
The continued development, manu- But the SALT I ABM Treaty speci- judgment when they openly stated in
facture, and stockpiling of both toxin fies in article I. the most important 1980 that detente began to erode after
:uxl biological weapons; provision, that the Soviets can not 1973. The Soviets in fact were telling
The encryption of all essential mis- have a nationwide ABM defense, or us that, from the start. to them dt-
sile test data; even the base for a nationwide de- tente only meant increased competi-
A;,d the testing and deployment of fense. These 6 radars clearly provide a lion.
two disallowed ICBM's. base for a nationwide ABM defense, The Defense Department Report to
In all of these cases, the violations when linked up with AMB-3, SAM-b, Congress for weal fiscal Department Report to
or abrogation were planned by the SAM-10, and SAM-12 mobile missiles tabove evidence ayear 1985 nd my conclusion
confi ms
Soviets at the time they signed Lite and radars now in mass production the h
treaty. The treaties can thus only be and deployment. Moreover, the last of stating:
regarded as deceptions designed and the 6 radars, the newly discovered Several of these violations must have been
used by the Soviets to gain unilateral Abalakovo or Krasnoyarsk radar, vie- planned by Soviet authorities ninny years
advantage, latex article VI of the ABM Treaty, ago, in some cases perhaps at Lite very time
The Soviets signed the SALT I Inter- which specifies that all early warning the Soviet Union entered into the agree-
im Agreement on Strategic Offensive radars must be on the periphery of the menu.
Weapons and the SALT I Anti-Ballis- U.S.S.R. and pointed outward. This And a top Defense official, Ricard
tic Missile Treaty on May 26, 1972. radar is in the interior and pointed Perle, recently testified to Congress
These two agreements are linked to. inward. that:
gether in their preambles and in their Indeed, a third violation of Lite The Soviets have not hesitated to mislead
internal provisions. SALT I ABM Treaty is entailed by the us. deliberately and all too successfully.
Only now, 14 years later, can we fi- location of the Krasnoyarsk radar. Assistant Secretary of Defense Rich-
nally begin to understand what the This is of article III, and the protocol and Perle testified to the Senate on
Soviet leaders intended in agreeing to to the ABM Treaty, which allow only March 28, 1984 that the Soviet Union
sign the SALT I agreements. There one Soviet ABM site, to defend either deliberately signed I he SAT,T I agree-
are two types of evidence of Soviet in- the capital or ICBM's. The Krason- ment fully Intending to later violate
tentions in signing the SALT I agree- yarsk ABM radar Is very near about SALT I with weapons giving them a
ment?s. We can first trace their actual 200 Soviet ICBM silos, and is ideally sixfold increase In nuclear warheads
behavior as observed in their offensive suited by its location to control inter- aimed at the United States. Pei-it,
and defensive strategic programs. ceptor ABM missiles to defend these added that there is a great deal of evi-
From the patterns of their behavior, ICBM's. Hence this radar Is at least a dence of the Russian' Intent, some of
we can infer the intentions of the triple violation of the SALT I ABM which was obtained through secret in-
Soviet leadership in signing the SALT Treaty. Its orientation, siting, and ca- telligence sources.
I Agreements. Second, we . have very pabilities each violate the treaty, and Perle accused the Soviets of placing
unusual and dramatic direct evidence the complete pattern of radars sug- loopholes In the SALT I agreements,
of the Soviet leadership's intentions in gests that this was planned in 1972, which they later exploited with weep-
signing SALT I. when the treaty was signed. ons that were unknown to the United
In early 1973, the Soviets began In addition to the 88-19 and the States at the time of the negotiations.
flight testing their new ICBM, the SS- ABM radar programs, which provide The single most Important violation
19. It took the United States until strong inferential evidence of the in. was the development of the giant SS-
early 1975 to determine with confi- tentions of Soviet leaders, there is also 19 ICBM, which Perle called a very
dence that the SS-19 was regarded by evidence from now public sensitive in- much larger missile than U.S. negotia-
the Soviets to be a heavy ICBM, and telligence sources. This evidence was tors believed would be allowed upder
that the Soviets intended their heavy first discussed in public in 1976, and SALT I. Perle added the we believe
SS-19 to replace 360 light SS-11 Senator McCLtfae mentioned it before they refrained from testing It in the
ICBM's. This was contrary to article II himself in his speech on the MX last closing months of the negotiations so
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June 20, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7675
that we would be unaware of it when to violate the agreements. Admiral The USSR has stretched the limits and
we signed the treaty. Immediately Zumwalt revealed for the first time spirit of both the SALT I and SALT II
after the treaty was signed, we saw the that this evidence had been withheld agreements in expanding and modernizing
Its strategic arsenal.
first test of the SS-19. from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the This confirms the facts that the So
Perle added that "the Soviets knew summer of, 972 until after the JCS viets have gamedhe facts
unthe So-
there was the loophole in the treaty. had testified in favor of SALT I. In vietfrom B.
We know they knew it. The SS-19 pro- fact, a CIA Inspector General's report advantages
Mr. President, ALT therefore should
gram resulted in an increase by six of October 1978 confirms this coilclu come as no surprise to us that the So-
di
'
he So-
s withhol
times in the number of ballistic war- sion regarding Kissinger
ng viers likewise signed the ti
na
S
t
l
h
e
c
e
a
heads aimed at the United States." from the JCS. Finally, t
Test Ban Treaty in 1974, the Helsinki
d that
fi
rme
This Soviet intention to violate tor Jackson has also con
SALT I from the outset in 1972 is also the Senate was "lied to" on SALT I. It Final Act in 1975, and the SALT II
confirmed by the following inter- is, therefore, reasonable to conclude Treaty in 1979, fully intending from
change between Senator JIM MCCLURE that the SALT I ABM Treaty and the the start to violate these solemn anus
and the former Chief of Naval Oper- SALT I interim offensive agreement. control treaties, just as they in fact
ations at the time of SALT I, Adm. were ratified and approved under false did in the case of the 1972 SALT 1 ill-
Elmo Zumwalt: pretenses. Had the JCS and the terim agreement and ABM Treaty,
fit tti kc and the Biological Warfare Conven-
TRANsr itlrT of QUESTION AND ANSWER Srs?
SIGN BF.-rWECN SENATOR MCCLURE AND AD-
MIRALELMO ZUMWALT BEFORE THE DSPENSE
APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE. MARCH 28,
1984
MCCLURE. In 1972, you testified on SALT I
that if the Soviets deployed a heavy ICBM
to replace light ICBMs, this would violate
SALT I. Do you believe the Soviets' heavy
SS-19 IC13M deployment violated SALT I?
ZUMWALT. I believe that it does. Directly
violates SALT I as SALT I was reported and
lained to the Congress of the United
x
p
e
e
The ev
States during Its ratification process, and I some new biological warfare facilities Glavbeal Is flatly wrong. and he
believe there was information available to were even constructed after 1972 and
the government at the time, but unknown should have known he was wrong
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that confirmed after 1975, when the convention was wllcn he testified.
t fiat a violation was going to be made. ratified by the United States and the SU h esNTAeES /IIOM SALT VIULATWNS
MCCLURE. That's an interesting comment. Soviet Union. IET I don't want to get diverted too far, but I Thus there is a pattern of Soviet be- What have the Soviets gained from
want to underscore your statement that our havior spanning the two SALT I almost a decade and a half of SALT
government had Information that the Joint agreements and the Biological War- violations intended from as early as
Chiefs of Staff did not have. Did I under- fare Convention, all signed in 1972. 1972? The Soviets have achieved an
stand you correctly? The evidence indicates clearly and overwhelming shift in both the strafe
. That is correct, Ise r eate issue. , conclusively that in 1972 the Soviet gic and in the overall military balance
ZUMWALTr. Chairman MCCLURE That, to me, is a s
CCt
but not entirely separate, and a very sy serious leaders signed these three solemn since SALT began 15 years ago in
charge. Because if our Joint Chiefs can't international arms control treaties 1969. The United States and the West
have all the information we have, how in fully intending to violate the principal are far more insecure today than when
the world can they make their judgment? constraints of the treaties from the strategic arms limitation talks began
ZuMWALT. This is a matter that, at some very outset. in 1969.
point, we will have to go into in classified The Soviets likewise knew in 1974 Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sesshn. when they signed the Threshold Test sent that the following two articles be Perle The sedioSenat of the RE'S state- Ban Treaty that they were planning to printed at this point in the RECORD.
meat and al Zumwalt isfu th dialog deploy new warheads with yields much The first article is from the Boston
with Admiral Zumwalt n fustier illus- larger than 150 kilotons on their new Globe of February 11, 1977, by Wil-
ttor Jackson As the h se laedd distinguished Sena- fourth and fifth generation ICBM's. liam Beecher, and is entitled he Senate June Armed Serv- d Seto -Thus they knew they would hue to acv Termed Detente a Ruse, 1973
i e My interpretation Comon Ar t violate the threshold test ban yield of Report Said." The second article is
ices: My Sovietcould [in 1972] as to 150 kilotons. The reason is that also in from the New York Times of Septem-
SS 1 the Soviets do with the 1974 the Soviets began developing ber 17, 1973, by John Finney. These
true. has turned out to be absolutely their new SS-X-24 and SS-X-25 new two articles demonstrate the evidence
true. [Jackson direpl in 1 the light that type ICBM's, both of which eventually that the Soviets consider detente and
the Sovieets replace large as would also violate the SALT II Treaty SALT to be a huge deception effort SS-11 w the SS-19th And what the understand- a hevy ICBM n erand- then being negotiated. These new aimed at achieving decisive superiority
the as on part of the President's 's ICBM's are estimated to carry war- over the West.
representatives was the peas s c o that. heads with yields much larger than There being no objection, the arti-
wSecretary aithat. 150 kilotons. cles were ordered to be printed In the
And ash at know, Secretary Laird has And as Under Secretary of Defense RECORD, as follows:
e Richard DeLatler testified to the (From the Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1977 1
the understanding hat it a ag that complete they violation [the
ta
Nix xon administration) had * * ? We Senate on March 13, 1984: BRPEHNEV Ttra-MtID DETENTE A RUSE. 1973
REPORT SAID
[the Senate] were lied to in SALT I Major programs recently deployed or now
? ? ? We were lied to by the Secretary, late In development were generally Initialed (By William Beecher)
the now Secretary of State Kissinger at the highest levels of Soviet leadership WAsHINOTON.-A suppressed report from
? ? ? It turned out that the things we about ten years ago. (Emphasis added.) British intelligence in early 1973 quoted
predicted were right ? ' ? Secretary of This statement confirms that the il- Soviet loader Leonid Breahnev was privately
Defense Melvin Laird has since cor- legal Soviet SS-X-25 and the illegally declaring that detente was a ruse designed
roborated it, that they [the Nixon ad- encrypted SS-X-24 programs began in to lead to a decisive shift in the balance ul
ministration) were misled [by the So- 1974 at the direction of Brezllnev and power.
Ogarkov. The report was denigrated and dismissed
viets]. Ustinov and Marshal by Henry Kissinger, according to well
Thus we can confirm that there is According to the April 1984 third placed sources. But the first reference to it
the
edition
the
that
con ive evidence
e latest signcedsSALT I in 1972 fully in ending book Soviet MilitaDefe ry PowDc,partlnetlt Brice Estimate in)1970 sour Jestsaid. Intelli
Senate been made aware o 1 . 1,1011.
evidence on the Soviet Intent to vlo But Sidney Graybeal, former U.S.
late SALT I 1972, SALT I might Commissioner on the SALT Standing
never have received congressional ap? Consultative Commission from 1912 to
But proval. there is more. The Soviets also 1978 testified to the Senate in 1979
signed the Biological Warfare Convert- that:
Lion in 1972, and there was Immediate I do not believe that the Soviets would
evidence that their existing biological enter Into any agreement which required
warfare plants continued to expand, them to cheat in order to attain their Inili-
instead of being dismantled, as re- Lary objectives, or on which they planned to
cheat.
quired by the BW Convention. In fact.
nce indicated that Mr.
id
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S 7676 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 20, 1984
The sources who have seen the report say
it was represented by the British as dyna-
mite, comparable in importance with Lite
texts of the 1956 speech by Nikita Krusch-
chev detailing the sins of Stalin.
It quoted Brezhnev as telling a secret
meeting of East European Communist party
leaders in Prague that detente was a strata-
gem to allow the Soviets to build up their
military and economic power so that by
1985 "a decisive shift in the corollation of
forces" would enable the Russians Co "exert
our will wherever we need to."
The report came during the height of eu-
phoria in the United States about the prom-
ise of detente, a policy of which Kissinger
was the principal architect and exponent.
"The report was as welcome as a dose of
chicken pox as far as Henry was concerned,"
one source recalls. "I suspect that had it
been more congenial to what he was trying
to accomplish it would have gotten wider at-
tention and credence."
The British said they obtained the ac-
count from a man who attended the lengthy
Prague meeting called by Brezhnev to as-
suage fears that he was ready to sacrifice
East European interests at the altar of de-
tente.
British intelligence was so sensitive about
the source that one copy was hand carried
to Washington for the director of Central
Intelligence, He in turn sent copies to only
six officials: the President, his national se-
curity advisory, the secretaries of State and
Defense and the intelligence chiefs of the
State Department and the Pentagon.
The document classified top secret, car-
ried the unusual admonition not to dupli-
cate it or discuss it with any but the ad-
dressees.
That admonition not withstanding,
sources say, the matter was discussed among
a tight circle of high officials. Kissinger and
others reportedly suggested that since the
account came from an untried source and
couldn't be corroborated, it should be re-
garded as untrustworthy and dismissed.
Others said that even if It . genuine,
the report represented the kind of thing
Drczhnev might be expected to say to calm
nervous Communist bloc leaders without re-
flecting his true thinking or plans.
An attempt to reach Kissinger for com-
ment this week before he left on a Mexican
holiday was unsuccessful.
The British report was based on the recol-
lections of ... Lite Prague meeting. There is
no way of knowing whether specific quotes
attributed to Brezhnev were entirely accu-
rate.
According to three senior ... will have
consolidated our position. We will have im-
proved our economy. And a decisive shift in
the corrolation of forces will be such that
come 1985, we will be able to exert our will
wherever we need to."
Even in retrospect, senior analysts say
they cannot be sure how faithful was the
account of the Brezhnev speech. But they
say the words are consistent with subse-
quent public statements by Brczllnev and
with certain Soviet actions.
So in the National Intelligence Estimate
for 1976, drawn up late last year after a
major debate between CIA analysts and a
team of outside specialists headed by liar-
vard Professor Richard Pipes, for the first
time reference was made to the Prague
meeting and the reported Brezhnev state-
ments there, well placed sources say ... was
the gist of the report.
Brczhncv said he was aware of the con-
cern of the East European leaders that de-
tente initiatives seemed to be moving so fast
that their interests might be sacrificed.
But he Insisted that his pursuit of detente
was designed to serve their common inter-
eats not to compromise them. "We are
achieving with detente what our predeces-
sors have been unable to achieve using Lite
mailed fist," he reportedly said.
He then went through an appraisal of
trends in various Western countries, report-
edly saying that Finland was in the Soviet
pocket. Norway was still troublesome, but
trends were moving In the right direction.
Denmark, he said, was no longer a viable
element of western strength.
In the United Kingdom, Brczhncv contin-
ued, the USSR's fondest expectations were
being exceeded because of the efforts of its
fellow socialist brethern. French foreign
policy, he said, was Marxist. Trends in Italy,
he remarked, were favorable.
But he reportedly said it was in West Ger-
many that "our greatest achievements are
being realised." He said "our great and true
friend, fellow socialist, Willy Brandt, has
brought about a miracle" by making It pos-
sible premanently to consolidate contested
borders and by pushing through his Ostpoll-
tik.
"We have been able to accomplish more In
a short time with detente than was done for
years pursuing confrontation policy with
NATO," he said.
He noted that while negotiations proceed-
ed on SALT and on Mutual Balance Force
Reductions the United States was unlikely
to build up militarily in reaction to the
Soviet buildup, he reportedly concluded.
"Trust us, comrades, for by 1985 as a con-
sequence of what we are now achieving with
detente, we will have achieved most of our
(?) objectives in Western Europe. We ...
IFrotn the New York Times, Sept. 17, 19731
(By John W. Finney)
WASHINGTON, September 16.-According to
Intelligence reports recently received here,
Leonid I. Brczhncv, the Soviet Community
party leader, has emphasized to Eastern Eu-
ropean leaders that the movement toward
Improving relations with the West Is a tacti-
cal policy change to permit the Soviet bloc
to establish its superiority in the next 12 to
15 years.
Although there is some question about
the authenticity of the reports, they are
contributing to a debate within the Admin-
istration over whether the current Soviet
course really represents a basic change in
intention or is merely a temporary shift.
As summarized by Defense and State De-
partment officials who have studied the In-
telligence reports, the Brezhnev explanation
went like this:
To the Soviet Union, the policy of accom-
modation does represent a tactical policy
shift. Over the next 15 years or so, the
Soviet Union intends to pursue accords with
the West and at the same time build up its
own economic and military strength.
At the end of this period. in about the
middle nineteen-eighties, Lite strength of
the Soviet bloc will have increased to the
point at which the Soviet Union, instead of
relying on accords, could establish an Inde-
pendent, superior position In Its dealings
with the West.
HOW UNITED STATES GOT REPORTS
The intelligence reports are for the most
part third- or fourth-hand accounts of
Brezhnev statements that have filtered
through Eastern European sources to West?
ern intelligence agencies and finally to the
United States Intelligence community.
The authenticity of one report of a Brezh-
nev conversation with an Eastern European
leader last spring, before the Soviet leader
met in June with President Nixon. was said
to have been vouched for by British Intelli-
gence, which received the report and turned
it over to the United States. American offi-
cials said that similar intelligence reports
have been received rncerning other such
Brezhnev statements, both In Moscow and
In Eastern European capitals.
SUSPICIONS AMONG MILITARY
The attitude among specialists on the
Soviet Union is to accept the Intelligence re-
ports as probably accurate. Differences have
developed within Lite Administration over
how to interpret the statements.
Some high-ranking military officials
regard the intelligence reports as confirma-
tion of their suspicions that the Russians
are Intent upon using accommodation as n
way of disarming the West and establishing
a military superiority that will permit a
more aggressive Soviet foreign policy.
Most civilian analysts of the Soviet Union
place less ominous Intrepretation on the In-
telligence reports. They tend to consider the
reported Brezhnev statements an Internal
tactic designed to mollify the hardline oppo-
siton within the Communists camp as the
Soviet leader pursues a policy of detente
with the West.
The reports have had considerable impact
on the Pentagon. When they are asked to
document their contention that the Soviet
Union was Intent on establishing military
superiority over the United States, high.
ranking officers immediately cite the intelli-
gence reports on what U coming to be
known within the Pentagon as "the new
Brezhnev doctrine."
TURNING SCREWS ON UNITED STATES
From the first concrete steps toward East-
West accommodation, military officials have
tended to suspect Soviet Intentions, as re-
flected in the reservations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff about last year's agreement
limiting offensive strategic arms. A common
military judgment Is that the Soviet Union
may be using accommodation In part to
lower the guard of the West while it pursues
a build-up in the 1980-85 period to achieve
military superiority.
This judgment tends to be supported by
the intelligence reports on Lite Hrezhncv
statements about pursuing accords for 12 to
15 years. To United States military officials,
the implication Is that by the end of that
period the Soviet Union believes It will be to
an economic and military position at which
It can begin, as one high officer put it, "to
start turning the screws on the United
States."
Perhaps not completely by coincidence.
the reports began to appear at a time when
the defense budget faced a serious challenge
on the Senate floor. The Senate begins
debate this week on the annual military
procurement bill, with moves planned to cut
away at various weapons and manpower
programs.
In the face of a growing view tit the
Senate that accommodation should permit a
re-examination of defense policies, the De.
fense Department has been going to consid-
erable lengths to emphasize that detente
does not permit cuts in the defense budget.
In assailing moves to reduce defense spend-
ing, for example, Defense Secretary James
R. Schlesinger emphasized recently that de-
spite the hopeful atmosphere. Soviet bloc
military strength was still growing. He char.
acterized the Soviet Union as having "a
mailed fist encased In the velvet glove of de-
tente."
CIVILIAN-MILITARY DPSATE
It appears that the Intelligence reports
have contributed to the differences between
military circles in the Pentagon and civilian
circles in the State Department tit assessing
Soviet Intentions.
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June 20, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
. Civilian analysts of the Soviet Union read
the Brezhnev statements as emphgsizing ac-
commodation as a way of achieving an eco-
nomic, rather than military, build-up of the
Soviet bloc-not some long-range master
plan for military superiority over the
United States.
It was also the prevailing belief in civilian
circles that the Brezhnev statements were
motivated by internal political consider-
ations within the Communist bloc.
Within the Communist party in the Soviet
Union. as well as in some of the Eastern
Fruopran countries, according to Soviet ape-
cialists, there appear to be some lingering
reservations about the desirability of a coop-
erative policy with the West. The Brezhnev
statements, therefore, were Interpreted as
an attempt to provide a rationale and justi-
fication that would permit all factions, In-
cluding the ideological hardliners to join
behind a policy of cooperation with the
West for 12 to 15 years.
As one Government specialist on Soviet
affairs put 1t: The self-proclaimed tactical
shift Is probably a tactic in itself."
Mr. SYMMS. There is a relationship
between the intentions of Soviet lead-
ers and the capabilities they develop
and control. They have developed a
tremendous strategic superiority, both
offensive and defensive. We can Infer
from these deliberately developed ca-
pabilities that the intentions of Soviet
leaders are to use these capabilities for
intimidation and blackmail.
BRU..HNS'V INTENDED SOVIET WORLD
DOMINATION BY 1866
New credence should therefore be
given to the 1973 intelligence report of
a secret speech by the late Soviet
leader Brezhnev to Warsaw Pact Com-
munist Party leaders. Brezhnev stated
explicitly that detente with the West
was a gigantic deception and ruse de-
signed deliberately to enable the
Soviet Union to gain military suprema-
cy. Brezhnev predicted that detente
would lull the West into complacency
while allowing the Soviets to achieve
worldwide, global dominance by 1985.
The Soviets may not be ahead of this
schedule, given their flagrant SALT
breakout In 1983, resulting from their
SALT violations decisions made in
1972.
MARSHAL OGARKOV, SALT, AND STRATEGIC
DECEPTION
Soviet Marshal Nlcolal Ogarkov, now
chief of the Soviet General Staff, was
the top Soviet military delegate to the
SALT I negotiations from 1969 to
1971. Ogarkov has remained closely in-
volved in devising the Soviet SALT ne-
gotiating strategy and positions since
1971. because we know that the Soviet
military establishment plays the most
influential role in both defense plan-
ning and SALT negotiating. The
Soviet military formulates its 5-year
defense plans, and then devises its
SALT negotiating strategy and posi-
tions In order to protect these plans
from being constrained by SALT.
Mr. President, what is not widely un-
derstoods in the United States is the
now well documented fact that Mar-
shal Ogarkov was simultaneously the
creator and first Director of the Gen-
eral Staff's Directorate of Stategic De-
ception. The purpose of this Director-
ate of Deception is to coordinate
Soviet strategic camouflage, conceal-
ment, and deception with the Soviet
SALT negotiating and compliance
policy. If detente and SALT have been
a gigantic but highly successful ruse
for the Soviets, then Ogarkov and his
Deception Directorate are largely re-
sponsible. But the top Soviet political
leadership, including the late Soviet
Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov,
were just as deeply involved in the de-
cisions on Soviet SALT negotiating de-
ception and violations. Indeed, I have
already mentioned the conclusive doc-
umentation of the Soviet leadership's
deceptive intentions in SALT dating
from as early as 1972.
SOVIET SALT BREAKOUT
In fact, the Soviets use arms control
negotiations to gain unilateral advan-
tage. After negotiating SALT agree-
ments with loopholes that leave all of
their strategic programs uncon-
strained, the Soviets then go further
to violate and circumvent the SALT
agreements.
The Soviets are are now flight-test-
ing a new small mobile ICBM, the SS-
X-25, which will probably carry sever-
al MIRY warheads each with yields
well above 150 kilotons.
The Soviets are also constructing
new ABM battle management radars
and mass producing new mobile sur-
face-to-air interceptor missiles and
radars with ABM capabilities and new
mobile ABM interceptor missiles and
radars.
Thus America may now be witness-
ing the Soviet SALT breakout deploy-
ment of an illegal new mobile ICBM,
carrying illegal new MIRVed war-
heads, and defended by an illegal
ABM system using illegal large battle-
management radars and illegal mobile
ABM and ABM capable SAM intercep-
tor missiles and radars.
Again, all of this was decided upon
in 1972 and 1974, 12 to 14 years ago.
In fact, the Soviets may soon have
not only an illegal nationwide ABM
system which could protect key indus-
trial areas, but this same illegal ABM
system could also protect a significant
percentage of the Soviet ICBM force.
The Moscow ABM complex is being
modernized and expanded with new
radars and new interceptor missiles,
Including interceptors which can be
rapidly reloaded and refired. The
Moscow ABM system can already
defend several hundred MIRVed
ICBM silos deployed near Moscow.
The new Siberian ABM radar at Kras-
noyarsk, moreover, is ideally located
and oriented to help defend hundreds
of nearby MIRV'd ICBM silos and
mobile ICBM and IRBM deployment
areas.
Hence it is reasonable to conclude
that the Soviets are now deploying
ABM systems which could defend up
to about 30 percent or even more of
the Soviet ICBM warheads. This
would give the Soviets not only a first
strike capability, but also an invulner-
able first strike capability, and an In-
S 7677
vulnerable second strike capability.
These Soviet capabilities already
greatly erode the U.B. deterrent retali-
atory capability.
Moreover, there is evidence that the
Soviets have deployed 12 to 14 war-
heads on each of their giant SS-18
super-heavey ICBM's. SALT 11 allows
them only 10 warheads on each SS- 18.
The Soviets have over 308 88-18's.
Such a SALT II violation could thus
allow the Soviets to increase the
number of their ICBM warheads by
from 616 to 1,304 warheads. This prob-
able Soviet SALT II violation has not
yet been confirmed by the President,
but I am confident that it is a Soviet
violation.
SOVIET SALT DUPLICITY
Mr. President, as I have pointed out,
the Soviet record of SALT violations
and diplomatic duplicity is a long one.
As former President Jimmy Carter
stated on December 31, 1979, Soviet
President Brezhnev's response to
Carter's note requesting an explana-
tion of the reasons for the Soviet Inva-
sion of Afghanistan "was obviously
false ... The tone of his [i.e. I3rezh-
nev's) message to me . was com-
pletely inadequate and completely
misleading. He is not telling the facts
accurately ... My opinion of the Rus-
sians has changed more drastically in
the last week than even the previous
two and a half years before that ...
This action of the Soviets has made a
more dramatic change in my opinion
of what the Soviet's ultimate goals are
than anything they've done in the pre-
vious time I've been in office."
As our distinguished colleague, Sena-
tor JOHN WARNER, stated in a Senate
floor speech on January 2. 1980:
In view of the President's (i.e. Carter's)
statement that Brezhnev lied to him about
Afghanistan, It might well be that Brezhnev
lied during the SALT II negotiations.
And as President Reagan stated on
January 29, 1981, "? ? ? they [the So-
viets] reserve unto themselves the
right to commit any crime, to lie, to
cheat ? ? ?"
Mr. President, I have already men-
tioned the sensitive intelligence evi-
dence that Brezhnev lied to the
United States in the SALT I negotia-
tions over the Soviet heavy SS-19
ICBM. Brezhnev also lied to the
United States again In SALT II over
the capabilities and production rate of
the Backfire bomber, according to
Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle
and many other experts.
As Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard Perle testified to Congress on
February 22, 1984:
The Soviets have not hesitated to mislead
us. deliberately and all too successfully.
In fact, there have been over 14
cases of Soviet negotiating deception
in SALT I and SALT II which can be
fully documented with unclassified
evidence.
Mr. President, despite protestations
of seeking only equal security and no
unilateral advantages. there is a pre-
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S 7678 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 20, 1984
dominant objective in the Soviet ap-
proach to arms control. The evidence
shows that the Soviets have used arms
control negotiations and agreements
in order to gain unilateral advantages
and to achieve overall strategic superi-
ority over the United States. This has
clearly been the Soviet goal and
achievement in the SALT I Interim
Agreement and ABM Treaty, the Bio-
logical Warfare Convention, the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Hel-
sinki Final Act, and in the SALT II
Treaty. But the Soviet circumventions
and violations of these arms control
treaties have destroyed all of the basic
objectives that the United States had
in entering into these treaties.
The official Soviet propaganda pub-
lication entitled "Whence the Threat
to Peace" published in 1982 denies the
existance of any Soviet arms control
treaty violations. It states:
The Soviet Union's attitude to its interna-
tional commitments Is clearly formulated In
the Constitution of the USSR. The Soviet
Union has never violated the standards of
international law or any treaties or agree-
nwnts. It has always been a reliable partner
in international affairs. "If we put our sig-
nature under a treaty," Leonid Brezhnev
pointed out, "We mean that we are fully re-
solved to adhere to its letter and spirit
strictly and entirely." (Emphasis added.)
Tilr SV..Vr.N MOST SIGNIFICANT SOVIET
VIOLATIONS
The problem of Soviet noncompli-
ance with arms control treaties has to
be dealt with as a matter of the high-
est national priority. I would like, Mr.
President, to remind the Senate that
on April 14, 1983, Senator Jim
MCCLURE pointed out on the Senate
floor the seven most military signifi-
cant Soviet arms control violations. I
would like to recall again for my col-
leagues those seven most dangerous
Soviet arms control violations as
pointed out by JIM MCCLURE:
First, Soviet deployment of heavy
ICBM's replacing light ICBM's ena-
bling them to quintuple their counter-
force capability.
Second, Soviet ICBM rapid reload/
refire, stockpiling of extra missiles,
covert soft launch and mobile ICBM
capability, circumventing all SALT
launcher ceilings, and also adding a
strategic reserve with strong counter-
force capabilities.
Third, Soviet flight-testing of two
new type ICBM's, in violation of SALT
II, which adds to an already over-
whelming counterforce capability.
Fourth, Soviet violation of the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty in militari-
ly significant ways, which also adds to
their counterforce capability.
Fifth, Soviet development of a na-
tionwide ABM defense, through their
construction of ABM battle-manage-
,
ment radars, three types of SAM's for former Secretary, of state Kissinger five of the United States. Obviously, It has
not a
t been i.e., th. TK ned -K her been
ABM mode use, and a mobile and rap- conceded that Illegal Soviet SS-19 de- th
shchev
...
idly deployable new ABM in mass pro- ployment was sharp practice, and that afireleemen ( II. he a
duction. All of these capabilities give Soviet resistance to a heavy ICBM def- agreement) was t was eroded d incrementally ly o
the total effect of such small changes, how
the Soviets a real ABM breakout capa- Inition In SALT II constituted a signif- ever, has been-over five Administrations of
bility. leant failure in the SALT II Treaty's both parties-an enormously increased milt
Sixth, Soviet violation of the Biolog. negotiation and drafting. Finally, even
ical Warfare and Chemical Weapons the Senate Intelligence Committee
Conventions. under former Senator Birch Bayh
Seventh, Soviet deployment of of- stated in its October 1979 report on
fensive weapons to Cuba, In violation the verifiability of SALT II that
of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agree- Soviet SS-19 deployment at least cir-
ment of 1962.
Of these seven most militarily signif-
icant Soviet SALT violations that Sen-
ator JIM MCCLURS already long ago
pointed out to the Senate, tour have
been confirmed by President Reagan
in his report of January 23, 1984.
President Reagan confirmed that
the Soviets are:
One, illegally testing two new type
ICBM's, in violation of SALT II, which
adds even more to an already over-
whelming Soviet counterforce capabil-
ity;
Two, Soviet violation of the Thresh-
old Test Ban Treaty, which also adds
to their already overwhelming coun-
terforce capability;
Three, Soviet development of an ille-
gal nationwide. ABM defense, as exem-
plified by their Illegal Krasnoyarsk
radar and their tests of SAM missiles
and radars in an ABM mode. More-
over, Dr. Henry Kissinger, chief nego-
tiator of SALT I. conceded in Septem-
ber 1982 that the Soviet tests of
SAM's in an ABM mode violated SALT
I. The President's violations report
added that: Soviet violation of the
ABM Treaty could be very significant.
Four, Soviet violations of the biolog-
ical and chemical warfare treaties.
Thus four of Senator MCCLURE'S
original seven most militarily signifi-
cant Soviet SALT violations have been
confirmed by President Reagan.
Of these seven most militarily signif-
icant Soviet SALT violations that Sen-
ator McCLURE pointed out, three are
not included in President Reagan's
report to Congess. These are.
One, Soviet deployment of heavy
SS-19 ICBM's to replace light SS-11
ICBM's, in violation of article II of the
SALT I Interim Agreement;
Two, Soviet rapid reload and refire
ICBM capability and illegal stockpil-
ing of extra ICBM's, in violation and
circumvention of SALT II's provisions
and all five SALT II launcher ceilings;
Three, Soviet deployment of offen-
sive weapons, including nuclear weap-
ons delivery vehicles and storage facili-
ties, to Cuba, in violation of the 1902
sr-n-1 -Khrushchev a recmnnf
cumvented the SALT I interim agree-
ment. Thus, there Is strong support
for my charge.
The Defense Department has ex-
pressed public concern that Soviet
stockpiled missiles have at least cir-
cumvented the four SALT 11 ceilings
on launchers, 2,250, 1,320, 1,200, and
820.
In September 1983, and in May 1982,
President Reagan himself explicitly
and publicly accused the Soviets of ab-
rogating or violating the 1962 Kenne-
dy-Krushchev agreement by their
military activities In Cuba. These
charges have been backed up by three
top officials.
The Kissinger Commission report re-
leased In January 1984, emphasizes
that there Is an acute and urgent crisis
in Central America. The main security
problem in the region is the Soviet
military base in Cuba and Soviet-
Cuban support for the Sandinista ef-
forts to attack the peaceful states in
the region. The Soviet military base in
Cuba and Soviet support for revolu-
tion in the Western Hemisphere vio-
late the accords which ended the
Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
The Kissinger Commission report on
pages 107 and 108 makes a-very signifi-
cant reference to the Kennedy-Krush-
chev agreement, which ended the
Cuban missile crisis in 1962 by requir-
ing the Soviets to remove their offen-
sive weapons from Cuba. The report
reaffirms President Kennedy's impor-
tant warning to the Soviets and the
Cubans on November 20. 1962:
If all [Soviet] offensive weapons systems
are removed from Cuba and kept out of the
hemisphere in the future, and if Cuba Is not
used for the export of aggressive Commu-
nist purposes, there will be peace in the Car-
ibbean.
But the Soviets have reportedly
brought' bombers, fighter-bombers,
and strategic submarines and support
bases back into Cuba. These forces
have more nuclear delivery capability
than the Soviet missiles and bombers
discovered In October 1962. The Sovi-
ets reportedly also have a combat bri-
which ended the Cuban missile crisis. gale, nuclear warhead storage facili-
On each of these three militarily Sig- ties, and even biological warfare facili-
nificant Soviet violations, however, ties in Cuba.
there is strong confirmation of Sena- The Kissinger Commission report
tor McCLURE's original charge. points out the consequences for Inter-
In 1974, former Defense Secretary American security of the failure of the
Laird charged that Soviet SS-19 de- Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement ? of
ployment was a clearcut Soviet viola- prevent Soviet-Cuban offensive base
tion of the SALT I interim agreement. and aggression in the region:
Many other top defense leaders and (Kennedy's warning) was more than an
expectation. It was a declared policy objec-
experts agree with Laird. 11; 1979
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June 20, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7679
tary power and capacity for aggression con- mans to function as an equal with the complying with the arms control pro.
centrated on the island of Cuba, and the other powers of Europe, a position to visions of the Versailles Treaty. In t lit,
projection of that threat into central Amer-
Ica . . . which most Germans felt entitled by House of Commons, Churchill stated
Senator MCCLURE, Senator HELMS, reason of Germany's economic, educa- that:
and
and I have been the leaders in the tional, scientific, and technological The worst crime is not to tell the truth to
painting out the aders of the prowess. In, the view of those German the public, and I think we must ask r he
Soviet-Cuban military bases and age military and political leaders who vlo- Government to assure us that e)ermany has
Sovie Kennedy- lated the disarmament provisions of observed and is observing her treaty oblign-
ession on in
K hev violation agreement, of the both to Amer- Versailles, or who covered up such vlo- tlolrs in respect to military avintlon.
ican security and to the security of the lations, the fact that neither the Brit- Unfortunately, the British Govern.
Western Hemisphere. I believe that i.,h nor the French tried to enforce ment lied to the British people, and
President Reagan should enforce German disarmament Justified Germa? did assure the British people, contrary
Soviet compliance with the Kennedy- ny in its resistance to the disarma- to the facts of German rearmament,
Khre compliance
by requiring that Hitler was not violating the Ver-
the Soviets to remove their nuclear ing The result of this situation was that sallies Treaty. Thus, Britain slept
the S capable ets tbmbeth and subme- Germany was able to take actions until it was too late to avoid World
rives and othbo offensive subma which clearly violated the disarma- War II.
r
for to iness from then, and offensive stop using ment provisions of Versailles, and the In the summer of 1935, high-ranking
Coca as a military base for the export allies did not even attempt enforce- naval officers of Hitler's Germany sp-
ba as Lion in Central America, ment. The Allies did little or nothing proached officials of the British Gov-
Thuo all seven of l At rica 's about the German violations. In most ernment with a one-time offer. The
original all
evenn ofJI Soviet SALT cases, the German Government bland- Nazis promised to limit their surface
violations have either bconfirmed ly denied that disarmament violations naval fleet to one-third the size of the
vy President Rbeen e have strong were taking place, and the denials British fleet, if only Germany enmrltl
by President Reagan,
I believe that Senator were accepted, especially by the Brit- have 100 percent of Britain's subma-
ofM al McCLuRz support. is, believe that
a very or ish, at face value as true. The Allied rive tonnage. Ignoring the fact that
redible spokesman a aSoviet SALT Control Commission met evasions and the Nazis were already in violation of
credibons, passive resistance in many of its at- the 1921 Versailles Treaty ending
Mr. President, even the Arms Con- tempts to inspect illegal German mu- World War I by having any navy at
tro] President, has the that: nitions factories, and was continually all, the British eagerly grasped the
tViolations io arms control cede a tree: thwarted in its attempts to monitor Nazi straw. The Germans began pro-
menla cannot b overlooked oex- the German Army. during U-boats, and the grim story of
ments nno even the most extreme Mr. President, eventually the Allied Nazi aggression unchecked by demo-
arms control
cused." Thol advocates even hmost the si extreme political lcadcrs,'and even the Allied cratic military power led to World War
of the Soviet SALT viola- military establishments, increasingly II,
ahiic c of th and arms SALT have accepted German protestations either Barton Whaley summarized the r?f-
tions. If detente control have specific violations had not taken fects of Axis arms control breaches
buildup in she restrain the Soviet
9the Soviet 19strategic a, arc place, or that they were being correct- and the failure of allied enforcement
appeasement ildup the
war out only 1980's, are ed. measures before World War II:
vo out othe failure The Weimar policy of evading, -cir- The national leaders were entry prey for
of we tie? We detente have to ar before recognize can begin to cumventing, and violating their obliga- deception. By failing to demand rigorous
shade a new policy for peaceful r'l o tions under the Versailles Treaty en- verification of alleged infractions they
shag with new p
Soviet olicy ~s. abled the Germans to lay the ground- allowed apathy. By falling to apply sanc-
work for the expansion of their army, Lions when Intelligence did occasionally
APPEASEMENT IN THE 1020'S AND 1930'S to keep their munitions industry in bring undeniable proof of infractions to
COMPARED TO THE 1970's being, to create and expand their air their attention, they showed themselves ini-
Mr. President, there are compelling force and navy, and to establish the potent as well. And the opponents' perct,p-
reasons to compare th pof nee foundation for the expansion of their more audacious uspinfractions8 aspur of even
1970
tent' and n 1980's, 8
aftermath, to p0's, the period
the hire- munitions industry supporting their il-
legal army, air force, and navy. Thus, U.S. failure to enforce Soviet
war period of the 1920's and 1930's. These obJectlves were accomplished arms control compliance or U.S. fail-
Many astute observers have noticed in the early 1920's, ironically, with the ore to take countermeasures can again
striking but alarming parallels be- active help and complicity of the lead to world war.
tween these two periods of modern Soviet Union. Arms control violations in the 1030's
history. The Inter-Allied Control Commis- actually contributed to the outbreak
The disarmament provisions of the sion that supervised the disarmament of World War II. In the 1930's, clear
1921 Treaty of Versailles were unpopu- provisions of the Versailles Treaty evidence of Japanese and German vio-
lar with the German people, because withdrew from Germany In January lation of the naval treaties was not
they were generally considered to be 1927, and Issued a final report stating: challenged by the West. Technical dc-
unfair by the German people. Thus Germany fects in the treaties, loopholes or am-
ther was popular German support for had the has ver disarmed, has never biguous intelligence evidence were not
evasion measures, which the German seven he years has s done everything vrthiand her
army, the Relchswehr, devised. The In her responsible for the West's failure to
power to deceive and "counter-control" the challenge the violations. Bad policy
democratic German Weimar and the Commission appointed to control her disar. and weak will were responsible.
British and French Governments mament. Today, we face an increasingly clear
knew about some of these German Does this remind us of Soviet behav- pattern of Soviet violations of existing
Army evasions, circumventions, and for in the 1970's and 19130's? As Assist- arms control treaties. American failure
even outright violations of the Ver- ant Secretary of Defense Richard to challenge these Soviet violations
sailles Treaty, but the civilian leaders Perle testified to the House Armed will be more dangerous that any other
looked the other way. Many leaders of Services Committee on February 22, course of action because an American
the Weimar Republic shared the per- 1984: failure of nerve will only encournct'
ception that the disarmament provi- We must, if we are not to face an expand. more aggressive Soviet violations.
sions of the Versailles Treaty were ing pattern of Soviet violations, see that Is this history of appeasement going
unfair to Germany. These German such violations carry costs at least equal to to be repeated? Is another great West-
leaders saw these disarmament provi- the gains they derive from them. ern democracy-this time America-
sions as designed to keep Germany in In 1934. Sir Winston Churchill also turning its face away from scrioro;
a permanently inferior position to the challenged the British Government treaty violations on the part of an nt
allies, rather than permitting the Gcr- over whether or not the Germoims were gressive totalitarian regime? Far
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S 7680 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
graver potential consequences for the
fate of the world are now at stake.
Mr. President, I am confident that
we can avoid repeating the mistakes of
the past. The best way to keep the
peace is through continued deterrence
and through enforcement of Soviet
compliance with existing arms control
treaties.
APTER DETECTION, WHAT?
On July 18, 1979, even the Carter ad-
riiinistration's Defense Secretary
Harold Brown testified on the conse-
quenses of possible Soviet violations of
the SALT II Treaty to the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee:
In considering Soviet compliance with the
provisions of SALT II ? ? ? there is a differ-
ence between detection of a violation and
enforcement, bringing a detected violation
to an end. The SALT II Treaty will not be
enforced in the courts ? ? ? The issue is not
whether we could prove a case to a jury. We
do not need proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, nor even evidence we can discuss- in
detail, to challenge Soviet action. In inter-
national agreements, the ultimate enforce
moat mechanir:m is our own actions, ? ? ?
We could insist on taking certain actions
ourselves outside the Treaty to compensate
militarily and politically for the violation.
Our ultimate remedy would be termination
of (the] SALT II Agreement ? ? ? If a prob-
lem were not resolved or If we detected a
violation which threatened our security, I
twedd not hesitate to recommend to the
I'r ;ide'nl ? ? ? the ultimate slop of Trealy
;throe:arson.
Former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger long ago stated what the
United States should do in the case of
Soviet SALT violations. Dr. Kissinger
warned Senators and Congressman on
June 15, 1972:
The possibility exists that the Soviets will
treat the Moscow Agreements (SALT Il as
r hey have sometimes treated earlier ones, as
just another tactical opportunity in the pro-
tracted conflict. If this happens, the United
States will have to respond. If this agree-
ment were being circumvented, obviously we
would have to take compensatory steps in
the strategic field.
During the decade since SALT I, the
Soviets have In fact circumvented and
violated all the most important provi-
sions of SALT I and SALT II, just as
they violated most treaties since 1917.
I wonder whether the United States
,may now need to fulfill Dr. Kissinger's
pledge to take countermeasures.
Addressing Congress after signing
the SALT II Treaty in June 1979.
former President Carter stated:
Were the Soviet Union to take the enor-
mous risk of trying to violate the treaty in
any way that might affect the strategic bal-
ance, there is no doubt that we would dis-
cover It in time to respond fully and effec-
thely.
Thus even former President Carter
promised to take responsive counter-
measures to offset Soviet SALT II vio-
lations.
What is remarkable about President
Reagan's report on Soviet SALT viola-
tions is the fact that the Reagan ad-
ministration plans to continue comply-
ing with all the six arms control trea-
ties which the Soviets are violating, in-
cluding two unratified treaties.
Even more remarkable is the fact
that the Reagan administration plans
to make absolutely no changes in its
military budget or defense programs
to offset the military implications of
the Soviet cheating. An objective ob-
server must conclude either that the
Soviet arms control cheating has no
military significance at all, or alterna-
tively, that U.S. strategic programs are
so robust already that they inherently
compensate for any Soviet cheating.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS or save,T sAt:r
VIOLATIONS
I would like to discuss each of these
alternatives in sequence. First, I be-
lieve that the Soviet cheating does
have profound military significance.
In fact. Soviet arms control cheating
has decisive military significance. In
particular, the Illegal Soviet biological
and chemical offensive warfare capa-
bilities have the effect of severely low-
ering the nuclear threshold, making
attempted U.S. nuclear deterrence of
the Soviet BW/CW capability more
likely to result in nuclear war. More-
over,, the President's report states for
the first time in public that the Sovi-
ets have maintained "an offensive bio-
logical warfare program and capabili-
ties." This is extremely dangerous to
world peace, because these weapons
are nonnuclear weapons of mass de-
struction.
The illegal Soviet SS-X-25 and the
illegal SS-16 are both mobile ICBM's,
and up to 400 of these mobile missiles
may be deployed. They are very sur-
vivable and therefore of high military
significance. This many of these two
ICBM's could carry over 800 warheads.
The Illegally encrypted SS-X-24 will
carry over 1,000 additional counter-
force warheads if only 100 are de-
ployed; or 2,000 warheads if 200 are
deployed. If the SS-X-24 can carry 14
warheads each, like the SS-18, then
200 could carry 2,800 warheads. The
encryption of the SS-X-24 suggests
this kind of throw-weight and payload.
The Illegal Soviet ABM radars will,
along with mobile interceptors, signifi-
cantly contribute to an illegal Soviet
nationwide ABM defense, making it
extremely significant militarily.
Indeed, over 30 percent of Soviet
ICBM warheads can be defended.
Finally, the Soviet violations of the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty probably
allowed the Soviets to develop more'
powerful warheads for their new even
more highly accurate ICBM's, also
making this very significant militarily.
Thus it Is reasonable to conclude
that at least five of the nine Soviet
arms control violations reported by
the President are militarily signifi-
cant.
Second, are U.S. military programs
already robust enough to coenpeusate
for the military implications of the
Soviet violations?
The defense and military posture
statements for fiscal years 1981
through 1985 indicate that the U.S.
strategic decline will not even begin to
be arrested until after 1990, and If
June .YO, IN 84
Soviet strategic advantages continue
to accelerate, the United States may
never return to strategle parity with
the Soviets. It is thus reasonable to
conclude that U.S. military programs
are not now robust enough to offset
the Soviet strategic advantages gained
from their arms control cheating.
More significantly, President
Reagan has already conceded the first
point, that there are military implica-
tions of the Soviet violations, in his
report on Soviet arms control cht'at-
ing, President Reagan stated: "Soviet
violations of arms control agreeinenis
could create new security risks,"
Even more ominously, President
Reagan stated:
Such violations deprive us of the security
Itenefitx of amts control directly because of
the military consequences of known viola-
tions and Indirectly by Inducing suspicion
about t.lie existents of tindrtected violations
that might have additional military rouse
quences.
These statements concede that U.S.
national security has In fact been
harmed by the Soviet cheating. Thus,
the only question is how to measure
these military implications of the
Soviet SALT violations.
And as President Reagan stated on
January 16, 1984:
We must take the Soviet cutlpliauce
record into account, both In the develop-
ment of our defense program and in our ap
proach to arms control.
This statement means hnplicitly
that the Soviet SALT violations have
military implications that may not
have been factored into our defense
programs.
At the very least, the full funding of
President Reagan's strategic weapons
program is essential in view of their
confirmed violations. The President's
strategic weapons program itself is
quite modest, even In comparison to
the strategic program planned by
former President Carter.
ARE WE IN A NUCLEAR /RSi;zs ALNP.AUY?
For example, the Department of De-
fense budget request for last year,
fiscal year 1984, called for production
of zero air-launched cruise missiles 13,
ALCM-B. The fiscal year 1984 defense
request also planned to Nero produc?
Lion of the Trident I submarine
launched ballistic missile, SLAM, in
fiscal year 1985. Last year. however,
Congress Increased ALCM-B produe-
lion for fiscal' year 1984 from zero to
240.
The fiscal year 1985 Defense budget
request again entirely cancels the pro-
duction of ALCM-B and reaffirms the
planned zeroing of Trident I SLIHM
production this year. These are the
only two strategic offensive weapons
systems which are currently produced
for operational. deployment by the
United Staten.
I know that ALCM -B production has
been curtailed because of plans for an
advanced cruise missile, and Trident I
production has similarly been cur-
tailed because of plans for Trident II
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June 20, 1.984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
production- But Trident II is still only
in the design phase and cannot
become operational until 1989 at the
earliest. And the ACM will also take
several years to become; operational.
There will thus be a gap of at least
several years between the 1985 produc.
tion stoppage of both of these two mis-
siles before their successor missiles
can finish R&D testing and achieve
initial operational capability and begin
production.
Thus the perception could be cre-
ated that the Reagan administration is
observing a "nuclear weapons freeze"
by canceling production of the only
two strategic offensive systems now
being produced and deployed. But the
Senate soundly defeated the Kennedy-
Hatfield "nuclear weapons freeze" res-
olution last October, by a vote of 58 to
40.
Perhaps the United States should
continue ALCM-B and Trident I
SLBM production until production can
begin on the ACM and Trident II
.
More than Just 12 of the 31 Poseidon
SLBM
.
submarines could be equipped
with the Trident I SLBM, thereby in-
creasing their survivability during the
dangerous "window of vulnerability."
Up to 20 ALCM-B's could be deployed
on each of the 120 B-52 bombers
equipped with cruise missiles allowed
by SALT 11. It may be unwise to have
a production gap for both of our only
currently deployed new systems in
these precarious times of apparent
Soviet breakout from SALT I and 11.
I know that tight budgetary con-
straints are the main reason for the
apparently premature production
stoppages, but this constraint may
demonstrate either that our defense
program priorities could be wrong or
that we may need somewhat more de-
fense funding In selected areas.
Continued U.S. unilateral compli-
ance with the unratified SALT II
Treaty may also be a factor in the ease
_r .. ,.
viouslY achieve by waiting. (Emphasis
added.)
Moreover, in March 1981, President
Reagan stated that the Soviets have:
Sat on the other side of the table no far,
knowing that we have unilaterally disarmed
to a great extent ? ? ? maybe if we do a little
building-it'll be a two-way street.
But the following tables illustrate
the fact that, despite the above 1980
platform commitments and early
Reala it statement, the United States
has continued under President Reagan
to reduce our strategic forces unilater.
ally, and thus has continued to prac-
tice unilateral restraint and unilateral
disarmament. Prior to even beginning
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks-
START-the Reagan administration
has made or planned the following
unilateral reductions:
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STRATEGIC FORCE CUT BACKS
S 7681
initial operational capability one year to 1)e?
cember 1982.
Caneellstlun of KC-10 tanker aircraft pro-
curement.
Planned B-1 force cut from 250 under
1;'ord to only 100.
Failure to deploy sufficient ALCMs on B -
1, reduction to SALT 11 limit of only 20
ALCMs per B- 1, or by 200 ALCMs.
No Inland basing and Increased alert rate
for B-52 force.
Rrtiuclloll of 11 52 alert rate from J:1,,, to
20%, concurrent with accept suer - of addl.
tional conventional, sea control and pro Te-
ton missions for some B 52s.
Planned deactivation of 90 B-52 Os carry-
ing over 1,000 ALCMs,
UErENSM
Reduction of proposed funding for space
laser research development.
Reduction of Patriot Air Defense missile
system.
No acceleration of ABM R&D.
Ilkaclivated, WKskd. a ptawied 10 deactraatwn, 111aletw nuclear Jcpetry The net effect of this is that the
wbaesl Reagan strategic program will have
fewer weapons than the Ca t
r
yeMths
100 Mom-mm MI ICDM's (repla:ensntsl .................................
has M MXsm's ......................................................... 54..
14talis ROM's .. ......
....... 160
................................. a 52-D Im"s ........................................ 80
2 Ildw subs ................. .............
.............. 18
B-1 bombers e ........................................................
1
2 F%vWm subs so
3/
70 6 8 57 57 G ACM canwrs .. ........ .... ........................... .. 90
Ni ICUM's' .......................................................... 100
ToW ............................................................ 724
200
160
370
3.300
370
1.080
1.500
6,121
Polaris deaclivats bean sadB Cris, but was coepitttd under Rufm.
The United States prrmUf pity ay 100 8-1-8 taaibes, as oprparod
ro'TB. Boiled by Fad.
es ens
compared Is 200 Iervwtlk M8 t>Lmmid by yteis, unsurvwade MX's p
SBMACMHRS Y UoNr DECONTINUIZ) U.S. STRATEGIC CTr-
DErsNSK SECRETARY WI.IN-
BaRGER, 1981-85
ICBM's
No deployment of 100 stockpiled Minute-
man Ills despite Its authorization by Con-
gress In FY 1981 and 1982, and appropria-
tion in PY 1982.
No upgrade of Minuteman power and air-
borne launch control.
United States is allowed no more than mode, with no ABM defense. (Only 40 MaXs
120 ALCM-equipped bombers, and we were planned at one point.)
reportedly now have planned 90 B- Premature and abrupt deactivation of 52
52's, each equipped with only 12 Titan Ila, carrying a high Percentage--33
ALCM-B's. Percent-of our ICBM megatonnage.
I would now like to describe the stand's
Reagan strategic builddown in some Continued Polaris submarine deactiva.
detail. Despite thepopular myths, the tion-loss of 160 high megatonnage
Reagan administration is unilaterally SLBM-26 percent of our SLBM megaton.
freezing and building down, nage.
The July 1980 Republican Platform Cutback of two Trident submarineo
stated: Reduction of Trident construction rate
Despite clear danger signals Indicating f tDelay to 1992 completion of Kings Bay
that Soviet nuclear power would overtake Trident sub base.
that of the United States by the early One-year delay in ELF deployment deci-
1980's, threatening the survival of the sion. with Initial Operational Capability
United Slates and making possible, for the further delayed to 1986.
first time in postwar history, political corer. Delay and cutback in SLCM deployment
cion and defeat, the (Carter] administration on submarines.
reduced the size and capabilities of our nu. Planned deactivation of two Posoltlun subs
clear forces. (Emphasis added,) carrying 32 SLBMs.
The platform went on to say:
eacti
... Unilateral restraint by the United Band abrut AND dALC'l
States has failed to bring reductions by the B 52Ds, carrying h avy megatoni geef 80
Soviet Unione? ? ? (the Carter administra. percent of our bomber megatontlake.
done has practiced unilateral disarnla- Reduction of ALCM yearly proditetIol
ment and removed any Incentives for the rate first from 480 to 440, then to 360, then
SovicL to negoLlaLc for what they could ob- to 240, then to zero, delay of B-52 ALCM
ca strate-
gic program throughout the 1980's and
into the early 1990's. The effectivent?ss
of the bomber Improvements will be
reduced by the fact that they will
mainly carry gravity bombs, rather
than advanced penetration weapons
and cruise missiles.
Moreover, the rump Reagan MX
program has yet to be given a surviv-
able basing mode-and It is very un-
likely that the Reagan 'administration
will ever come up with a really vinble
alternative to the multiple protectile
structure basing mode.
Under Secretary of Defense Richa rci
DeLauer testified to the Senate De.
fense Appropriations Subcommittee
on March 13, 1984, that:
The foundation of our strategy and pro-
gram is built on the adequacy of our strate-
gic nuclear forces to deter aggression or co-
erelon, thus denying (he Soviets the oppor
tunity to checkmate us through nuclear
dominance. The opportunities for modern
conventional defense depend upon this
foundation having been established.
DeLaucr added that "the President's
No. 1 priority is strategic moderniza-
tion." This testimony seems refuted by
the strategic cutbacks noted above.
Thus we must conclude that the
Soviet cheating does have military sig-
nificance, and that the Soviets already
have strategic superiority over the
United States.
As President Reagan said on March
31, 1982: "The Soviet Union does have
a definite margin of superiority-
enough so there is risk, and there is
what I have called a window of vulner-
ability." President Reagan again
stated in his speech to the Nation on
the MX ICBM on November 22, 1982,
that the United States is inferior to
the U.S.S.R. in strategic capability. On
March 23, 1983, President Reagan fur-
ther declared that the Soviets had n
"present margin of superiority."
Defense Secretary Weinberger
stated in the fiscal year 1984 defell`e
posture statement that "the tovivts
have acquired a margin of nuclear su-
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June 20, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET SALT AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL TREATY VIOLATIONS --Contintud
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