ATTACHED IS AN INTERESTING ARTICLE ON AN ARMS CONTROL TOPIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001001360035-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: August 13, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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33 G 1985
Attached is an interesting article on an," arms
control topic: Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Although
OGI is responsible for this topic, I thought you
might find it of interest. The key paragraphs are
marked with brackets on page 33 and page 39.
I hope this is helpful as background. If I
can do more to assist you here, please call.
C/ACIS
ACIS-1340-85
Date 22 July 1985
F
5.75 IVI EU DITIONSIOUS
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STAT
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SCIENTIFIC
Ml E R 1 CAN
A Critical Time
for Nuclear Nonproliferation
This month the parties to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty meet
again to debate how well the agreement is working. The continuing
arms buildup by the nuclear powers puts the treaty's future in doubt
by William Epstein
// very five years since the Treaty on
E the Nonproliferation of Nucle-
ar Weapons came into force in
1970 the parties have convened to dis-
cuss how well the agreement is achiev-
ing its purpose. This month the sig-
natories will gather in Geneva for
the third time, at what will probably
prove to be the most crucial meeting
in the series. It is already clear that an
overwhelming majority of the nonnu-
clear nations believe the nuclear pow-
ers, and in particular the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R., have not made serious efforts
to achieve arms-control agreements or
reduce the size of their strategic forces
and have thus failed to hold up their
end of the bargain. Indeed, this confer-
ence is almost certain to be the first
one confronted with a total absence of
progress on nuclear arms control since
the preceding review. The continued
credibility-even the viability-of the
treaty is therefore put in question.
The treaty (usually called the NPT)
was designed to prevent both the hori-
zontal and the vertical proliferation
of nuclear weapons. Horizontal prolif-
eration is the spread of such weapons
to nonnuclear states; vertical prolifer-
ation is the further development, pro-
duction and deployment of nuclear
weapons by the nuclear powers.
The NPT is the cornerstone of a
"nonproliferation regime" that the sig-
natory nations have built up over some
30 years. In addition to the treaty the
regime has four other main compo-
nents: the International Atomic Ener-
gy Agency (IAEA), the partial-test-ban
treaty of 1963, the Treaty of Tlatelol-
co of 1967 (creating a Latin-American
zone free of nuclear weapons) and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The IAEA was established in 1957 to
promote the peaceful use of atomic en-
ergy. The nuclear nations agreed to as-
sist nonnuclear nations in the develop-
ment of the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy on the condition that the nucle-
ar material or equipment provided not
be used for the manufacture of nucle-
ar weapons. Hence the statute of the
agency constituted a sort of nonprolif-
eration bargain between the nuclear
and the nonnuclear countries. At the
time the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and the
U.K. were the only nuclear powers.
France set off its first nuclear explosion
in 1960, China its first in 1964. In 1974
India exploded a "peaceful nuclear de-
vice," which incorporates the same
technology as a nuclear bomb. All six
countries are members of the IAEA, to-
gether with 106 others that have not
exploded nuclear devices.
The-partial-test-ban treaty prohibits
tests of nuclear weapons in the atmos-
phere, under water and in outer space.
It permits underground tests that do
not create any radioactive debris out-
side the boundaries of the testing state.
The treaty also declares that the par-
ties seek to end "all test explosions of
nuclear weapons for all time" and will
continue negotiations to that end. The
treaty was concluded by the three orig-
inal nuclear powers and now has 112
signatories. China and France are not
among them.
It is noteworthy that the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. have conducted underground
tests at a higher rate since the treaty
than they conducted atmospheric tests
before it. Consequently the treaty has
turned out to be more of an environ-
mental and health measure than a curb
on the nuclear arms race. //
The Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits
the signatories from making, test-
ing, deploying or using nuclear weap-
ons in Latin America. Cuba and Guy-
ana are the only countries in the area
that have not signed. (The treaty has
23 full parties but is not yet in force
for Argentina, Brazil and Chile.) All
five of the nuclear powers have signed
a protocol wherein they say they will
respect the treaty provisions and will
not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against the parties. This is
the only treaty on nuclear weapons to
which all the nuclear powers are par-
ties, the only one that puts a legal limit
on their right to make,_test, deploy or
use nuclear weapons and the only one
forbidding such weapons in an inhab-
ited area.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group con-
sists of 15 nations (Western, Eastern
and neutral) that seek to prevent the
diversion of nuclear materials, equip-
ment and technology to weapons.
They set up restrictive export guide-
lines in 1974 and 1975. In 1977 a group
of 66 suppliers and importers, with the
assistance of the IAEA, expanded dis-
cussion of the arrangements in a meet-
ing called the International Nuclear
"
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Fuel Cycle Evaluation. The aim was to
minimize the danger of the prolifera-
lion of nuclear weapons without jeop-
ardizing the development of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes. In 1980
the expanded group concluded that
no technical measures could by them-
selves ensure the separation of peace-
ful and military applications in a way
that would prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons to additional coun-
tries. The group did envision some pre-
cautionary or ameliorative measures:
the adoption of more effective and
credible international safeguards and
the establishment of regional organi-
zations that might exert a restraining
or deterring effect on nations edging
toward nuclear weaponry. It seems
clear, however, that such measures
would not stop a determined nation
from acquiring a capability to make
nuclear weapons.
What, then, of the cornerstone of
W this edifice: the nonproliferation
treaty? During the negotiations it was
clear that both the nuclear and the
STATUS OF NONPROLIFERATION TREATY is shown on this
map. The nuclear nations that are parties to the treaty appear in
dark color, the nuclear nations not party to the treaty in dark gray.
nonnuclear countries wanted to pre-
vent further proliferation. The nonnu-
clear countries insisted on a straight-
forward bargain: if they undertook to
prevent horizontal proliferation, the
nuclear powers must undertake to stop
their vertical proliferation. According-
ly $he preamble to the treaty recalled
the pledge of the three nuclear powers
in the test-ban treaty to negotiate an
end to all testing, and Article VI obli-
gated them "to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relat-
ing to cessation of the nuclear arms
Nonnuclear nations party to the treaty appear In light color, non-
nuclear nations that are not members are shown In light gray. The
colored circles identify members of the Group of 77. They can be
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race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament."
The treaty came into force in 1970
and now has 128 parties-more than
any other arms-control agreement.
China and France have not signed the
treaty; neither have some 40 other
nations, including several that could
make nuclear weapons now or will be
able to do so soon. They include Ar-
gentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakis-
tan, South Africa and Spain. Several
of them are presumably avoiding the
treaty because they have actual or
potential national-security problems;
others contend that the NPT is dis-
criminatory, favoring nuclear haves
over nuclear have-nots, and that in any
case the provisions imposing obliga-
tions on the nuclear powers are not be-
ing carried out.
The continued refusal of some 40
countries, several with advanced nu-
clear programs, to become parties to
the NPT tends to diminish the effec-
tiveness of the treaty. Yet even the par-
ties can withdraw on three months' no-
tice. Therefore adherence to the treaty
expected to oppose the policies of the nuclear powers at this month's conference on the trea-
ty in Geneva. This group argues that the nuclear powers have not met their treaty obliga-
tion to make serious efforts to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce their nuclear forces.
and acceptance of IAEA safeguards do
not provide any absolute guarantee
that a country will not at some stage
decide to "go nuclear." (Under the
terms of the treaty a conference must
be held in 1995 to decide on the future
of the treaty.)
Moreover, the treaty does not pre-
vent nonnuclear countries from devel-
oping a capability or option of having
nuclear weapons; it merely prohibits
them from acquiring or making the ac-
tual weapons or explosive devices. The
only conclusive proof that a country
has done so is a nuclear test. A country
could therefore prepare or acquire a
small stockpile of plutonium or weap-
on-grade uranium without testing an
explosive device and then begin test-
ing after giving the required notice of
withdrawal.
In the light of such possibilities the
neutral and nonaligned nonnucle-
ar countries regard a cessation of the
nuclear arms race (the first obligation
under Article VI of the NPT) as re-
quiring a halt to the production, testing
and deployment of nuclear weapons-
in effect a freeze on nuclear weapons.
Their view is that Article VI gives this
objective priority over other measures
of nuclear disarmament and that it is
logical to stop the development of new
nuclear weapons before undertaking
to either reduce the number of or elim-
inate such weapons.
Hence these nations regard a com-
prehensive test ban not only as the
most important first step toward end-
ing the nuclear arms race but also as
the most feasible and most easily at-
tainable measure to halt both the hori-
zontal and the vertical proliferation of
nuclear weapons. The reasoning is that
with testing forbidden the nonnuclear
countries would be unlikely to com-
mit the resources required for a weap-
ons program and the nuclear powers
would not develop new weapons. Then
over a longer term the deterioration
of existing weapons would gradually
make reliance on them less likely and
their use less certain. Finally, the non-
nuclear nations regard a willingness to
enter into a complete test ban as a de-
finitive test of the intentions of the two
superpowers and of their will to live up
to their obligations under the NPT.
From 1977 to 1980 the U.S., the
U.S.S.R. and the U.K. did discuss
a comprehensive test ban, but after
making considerable progress they re-
cessed the talks and have not resumed
them. The reason is that the U.S.
changed its position after the election
of 1980, abandoning its long-time sup-
port of a ban and declaring that, al-
though a test ban "remains an element
in...four] arms control objectives, we
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do not believe that, under present cir? he said earlier this year: "It is of di-
cumstances, a comprehensive test ban rect importance to the future of hit-
could help to reduce the threat of nu- manity to end all nuclear explosions.
clear weapons or to maintain the sta- No other means would be as effective
bility of the nuclear balance." in limiting the further development of
This position did not go over well nuclear
with the nonnuclear states. Their dis-
appointment and frustration increased
when the U.S. decided in 1982 not to
resume the trilateral negotiations for a
test ban, not only because of doubts
about the verifiability of a ban but also
because of a perceived' need to keep
testing new nuclear weapons. As the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency explained in 1983, "nuclear
tests are specifically required for the
development, modernization and cer-
tification of warheads, the mainte-
nance of stockpile reliability and the
evaluation of nuclear weapon effects."
The UN secretary general seemed to
lend support to the view of the neu-
tral and nonaligned countries when
PRESENT AND POTENTIAL, NUCLEAR NATIONS now num-
her 50. This mop groups them according to whether they have al-
ready conducted explosions of nuclear weapons or devices (red) or
Another component of the back-
ground of the NPT review confer-
ence is the record of the two earlier
conferences (in 1975 and 1980). Both
of them featured an unusual align-
ment. Sharing common interests, the
U.S., the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. coop-
erated in resisting the demands of the
nonnuclear countries, particularly the
neutral and nonaligned nations (main-
ly of the Third World) known as the
Group of 77. (The group now has
more than 100 members, but the orig-
inal name persists.)
At the first conference in 1975 the
participants from the Group of 77
asserted that they had fully lived up
BELGIUM
FRANCE
WEST GERMANY
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA
r9QRTUGAL
SPAIN
T
to
to their commitments tinder the NPT
whereas the nuclear powers had not
done so. They emphasized the failure
of the nuclear powers to implement
the treaty's provisions for stopping the
nuclear arms race and cooperating in
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The group made several demands,
among them an end to underground
testing, a substantial reduction in nu-
clear arsenals, a pledge not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against nonnuclear parties to the treaty
and substantial aid to the developing
countries in the peaceful uses of nucle-
ar energy. Several of the nonnuclear
nations allied with the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. were sympathetic to these de-
mands. In the end the 1975 confer-
ence achieved a fragile consensus, ex-
pressed in a declaration in which the
nuclear powers in effect promised to
try harder to meet the demands of the
nonnuclear countries.
will be able to acquire the technical capability to explode such a
device within a year or two (blur), the or six years (yellow-) or by
the year 2000 (gmn). India Is classified here as a nuclear power
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In 1980, when the second conference
was held, the nuclear powers had not
met any of the demands. The confer-
ence failed to reach agreement on any
aspect of stopping the nuclear arms
race. The U.S. led the nuclear powers
in refusing to make concessions on
measures for the control of nuclear
arms. As a result, even though the par-
ticipants had achieved a consensus on
plans to advance international cooper-
ation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, the conference ended without
a final declaration or even any formal
reaffirmation of support for the NPT.
T he outlook for this year's confer-
ence is as bleak or bleaker. The
frustration of the neutral and non-
aligned countries appears to be turn-
' ing into resentment and anger because
they believe the nuclear powers have
misled them. These nations will no
doubt renew their long-standing de-
because in 1974 it exploded a "peaceful nu-
clear device," which in fact incorporates the
same basic technology as a nuclear bomb.
mends for a comprehensive test ban,
nuclear disarmament, assurances that
nuclear weapons will not be used or
held out as threats against nonnuclear
countries and greater assistance in the
peaceful use of nuclear energy. It
seems clear that they will concentrate
more than they did in 1980 on press-
ing their view that the nuclear pow-
ers must stop vertical proliferation. In-
deed, many members of the Group of
77 believe that an end to vertical pro-
liferation is the only way to stop hor-
izontal proliferation and that both
must be halted or neither will be.
In the view of that group the situa-
tion has worsened considerably since
1980. The members cite the rapid pace
of the nuclear arms race; the abandon-
ment of negotiations for a comprehen-
sive test ban and of talks on intermedi-
ate-range nuclear weapons and on the
reduction of strategic arms; the spread
of the arms race to earth orbit and near
space; the unlikely prospect of early
progress in the resumed talks between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on nuclear
and space-based weapons, and the es-
calation of global military expendi-
tures to some trillion dollars per year.
Members of the group also cite the
absence of progress over the past live
years on any substantive issue of nu-
clear arms control.
At the same time the fear of a possi-
ble "nuclear winter" has helped to cre-
ate the growing demand for greater ef-
forts to reduce and prevent the risk of
nuclear war and to end the nuclear
arms race. Many governments, organi-
zations and individuals are calling for
a freeze on nuclear weapons, to be fol-
lowed immediately by substantial re-
ductions in nuclear forces, and for a
declaration by each of the nuclear
powers that it will not be the first to
use nuclear weapons.
The nonaligned countries are there-
fore considering new approaches to
their goals of first halting and then re-
versing the nuclear arms race. They
seem to be searching for ways to awak-
en the nuclear powers to the serious-
ness with which they regard the cur-
rent situation and its impact on the
proliferation problem.
One strategy under consideration re-
lates to voting at the conference. The
previous conferences operated on the
basis of consensus, not purely as a mat-
ter of preference but because neither
the nuclear powers and their allies nor
the Group of 77 could muster the two-
thirds vote needed to make a decision.
In 1975 only 57 of the 96 countries
then party to the treaty attended and in
1980 only 75 of 115. Most of the ab-
sentees were small nations belonging
to the Group of 77. The group is there-
fore pressing for a larger turnout this
year in the hope of assembling a two-
thirds majority..
If the conference is able to muster a
decisive vote, the decisions would not
be legally binding on the nuclear pow-
ers or other parties to the treaty. Nev-
ertheless, they would carry a good deal
of political, moral and psychological
weight. Their impact could affect the
credibility of the policies of the three
nuclear powers and also the viability
of the NPT if the three powers failed to
bring their policies into line with their
treaty obligations. Some members of
the Group of 77 believe their views
should be put to a vote even if only a
simple majority favors them.
Another scenario is envisioned by
some members of the Group of
77. They would concentrate their ef-
forts at the conference on ending the
nuclear arms race and controlling nu-
clear arms. Discussion of such other
issues as peaceful uses and internation-
al safeguards on nuclear programs and
facilities and on traffic in nuclear mate-
rials and technology would be de-
ferred or downgraded.
In a third scenario some members of
the Group of 77 would consider walk-
ing out of the conference if it becomes
clear that the nuclear powers are not
ready to proceed with speed and dili-
gence toward fashioning a comprehen-
sive test ban and halting the nuclear
arms race. A related idea is for some
parties to threaten to give notice of
withdrawal from the treaty unless the
nuclear powers move promptly to im-
plement their treaty obligations.
Also under consideration is the no-
tion of not ending the conference if the
discussions are fruitless. Instead the
Group of 77 would call for a recess of
a year or so as a means of exerting
pressure on the nuclear powers to
come tip with positive proposals.
Going further, some members of the
group talk of taking matters into their
own hands by calling a conference to
amend the test-ban treaty of 1963 in
order to prevent all nuclear tests. It
would only be necessary to delete the
provisions that permit underground
tests. The treaty stipulates that the de-
pository governments (the U.S., the
U.K. and the U.S.S.R.) "shall con-
vene" such a conference if one-third
(38 or more) of the 112 parties call for
it. An amendment would have to gain
the approval of a majority (57) of all
the parties, including the depository
governments.
One cannot suppose the nuclear
powers, particularly the U.S. and the
U.K., would approve an amendment
prohibiting underground tests. Hence
the amending conference would not
create new legal obligations for the sig-
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t
na
vt tea. t.cvel t11C1CSs, majority ap-
proval of such an amendment would
put considerable pressure on the three
nuclear parties. A failure on their part
to respond could have profound politi-
cal repercussions.
H ow might the nuclear powers deal
with the demands they will en-
counter at the conference? The U.S.
and its allies (the Western group) ap-
pear to have no new strategies. They
will probably content themselves with
the policies they pursued at the pre-
vious review conferences. Doubtless
they will again emphasize the impor-
tance of the treaty and stress the fact
V_M
will try to put a good face on the lack
of progress toward halting the nuclear
arms race or negotiating a comprehen-
sive test ban. At the previous confer-
ences they could claim some degree of
movement in those directions. They
cannot do so this time, but they can
point to the recent resumption in Ge-
neva of arms negotiations between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and to their
stated desire for drastic reductions in
the size of the nuclear arsenals. They
may also maintain that President Rea-
gan's strategic-defense initiative (the
"Star Wars" program) points the way
to the elimination of nuclear weapons
by rendering them obsolete.
ii
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1945 1950 1955 1960 1985 1970 1975 1980 1984
NUCLEAR-EXPLOSIVE TESTS by the six nuclear powers are ty of 1%3 prohibits tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere,
charted from 1945, when the U.S. exploded the first fission bombs, under water and in outer space, but it allows underground testa
through 1984. The colored bars represent tests aboveground; the The 33 aboveground tests attributed to the U.S.S.R. In that year
gray bars represent underground tests. The partial-test-ban trea- were actually carried out before the signing of the treaty in 1963.
nuclear and nonnuclear, large and
small-to strengthen the treaty and en-
large the membership.
In addition they will probably em-
phasize again their willingness to ex-
pand their cooperation in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and to provide
assurances of supply to nonnuclear
parties to the NPT. They will also
again propose various plans for inter-
national arrangements to manage the
nuclear fuel cycle better, to strengthen
and improve the IAEA's system of safe-
guards and to make the entire nonpro-
liferation regime more effective.
Doubtless too the U.S. and its allies
0
J +-L
10
-
30
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IT
The Western nuclear powers are
also hoping to achieve a consensus-on
a short and simple final declaration
that would reaffirm the importance of
the NPT in enhancing the security of
all nations. The declaration would also
reaffirm support for the treaty as well
as the need to strengthen it with strict
adherence to its obligations and goals
by moving seriously toward nuclear
disarmament and by providing greater
assistance in the peaceful uses of nu-
clear energy.
The Western nations are fully aware
of the ' demands of the Group of 77.
They recognize also that the non-
aligned nations are most unlikely to be
satisfied with Western positions and
proposals. Accordingly it-seems-likely
that the Western nations will continue
their previous reliance on a "damage
limitation" strategy, wherein they will
try to prevent defections from the
NPT. Perhaps the best they can hope
for is that the debates of the- confer-
ence will proceed without undue ani-
mosity and confrontation and that the
conference will end, as in 1980, with-
out adopting any final declaration.
In aid of this strategy the U.S. initiat-
ed talks with the U.S.S.R. last Novem-
ber to coordinate nonproliferation ef-
forts. The two nations have agreed to
hold such talks every six months. The
U.S. also arranged to meet with 12
other members of the Nuclear Sup-
pliers Group to reaffirm their policies
on nonproliferation and their restric-
tions on the export of nuclear materi-
al, equipment and technology.
at the review conference. They support
a comprehensive test ban, a freeze on
nuclear weapons, no first use of nucle-
ar weapons (which is tantamount to no
use against nonnuclear states) and the
prevention of an arms race in outer
space. In addition the U.S.S.R. will no
doubt emphasize its recent agreement
with the IAEA to accept safeguards
over certain peaceful nuclear reactors
in the U.S.S.R. (The U.S. and the U.K.
had already made such an agreement.)
Some members of the Group of 77
have expressed the hope that the East-
ern group might even decide to side
with them, thereby ensuring a two-
thirds vote for a final declaration sup-
porting their common positions. A
declaration with that level of support
would give greater legitimacy to the
positions and put heavier pressure on
the Western group. Such an alliance
seems unlikely, however, because the
U.S.S.R. believes in maintaining soli-
darity with the U.S. on policies toward
nuclear nonproliferation and strength-
ening the nonproliferation regime.
he U.S.S.R. and its allies (the East-
ern group) will have an easier time
TOTAL NUMBER OF NUCLEAR TESTS through 1984 was 1,522, of which 461 were
aboveground (color) and 1,061 underground (gray). The data were assembled by the Swed-
ish Defense Research Institute and published by the Conference on Disarmament. Tests by
the nuclear powers are China 29, France 127, India 1, U.K. 37, U.S. 772, U.S.S.R. 556.
It is noteworthy that notwithstand-
ing the disagreements between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. on other aspects of
the arms race and arms control, both
countries want to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons to more nations.
Nonproliferation is the only area
where the two countries have main-
tained a common front, whatever the
current tensions between them or the
current state of their relations in other
fields. Still, the U.S.S.R. has the option
of joining forces with the nonaligned
states at the review conference in order
to increase the pressure on the U.S. and
the Western powers. The U.S.S.R. also
has the option of abstaining on any
vote, ensuring that the proposal would
be adopted but would not have the for-
mal support of the U.S.S.R.
It may also come about that the
Group of 77 will round up enough sup-
porters (without the backing of the
Eastern group) to muster a two-thirds
vote for a final declaration supporting
the Group of 77 position. In that case
the Western group would find itself in
an uncomfortable and embarrassing
position. Even if no declaration can be
formulated and the conference ends,
as it did in 1980, without a consensus,
such a second failure would have a
negative effect on the future of the
NPT. Hence there may be consider-
able support for a move to recess.
Given the present position of the
parties it is difficult to see how the con-
ference can avoid a confrontation be-
tween the Group of 77 and the nuclear
powers, mainly the U.S. That situation
would serve not to strengthen the NPT
but to weaken it, creating doubt and
fear for its future effectiveness. As
long as the treaty retains good credi-
bility it exercises a restraining influ-
ence even on nonsigners who may con-
template acquiring or making nuclear
weapons. Erosion of the treaty's cred-
ibility would make it easier for such
countries to go nuclear. Since the trea-
ty is the main bulwark against the fur-
ther proliferation of nuclear weapons,
the explosion of a nuclear device by
even one or two more countries would
put the entire nonproliferation regime
in jeopardy.
39
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