THE THIRD STRIKE IN NUCLEAR WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
HIGH FRONTIER
1010 Vermont Ave., N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20005
The Honorable William Casey
Director of the CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
 Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
From the Desk of
Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham
Director, High Frontier
Thought you might find
the attached of interest.
?Y .+Mti :ti:.%~iar xPe~ ;:^^rfY"~.ri30a4?,t,~;i~?~isti~!,~r.}v
1~'`3~~rnAh? ; %I~..hi fir.': .S1N't!'.
?cY~s~'~~'atFs?3s;ais3;;s~Y,gr ti.. .?.t~,., . 1!.fr_ ..!..
Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
C~i
 Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
The Third Strike in Nuclear War
Arms builders, arms-controllers and nuke freezers suffer a
common delusion about the nuclear balance. They cling to the
false notion that the Soviet Union, like the US, is dedicated to
maintaining a "second strike" capability with strategic nuclear
weapons. The,fact is, the Soviets have created and will attempt
to maintain "first" and "third" strike strategic forces. The
Soviets are quite'content to let the West concentrate on its
second strike capability.
This fundamental disparity of basic architecture between
Soviet and US strategic nuclear forces could have been predicted
in the mid-1960"s, but it was not. During that time, we adopted
the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine. This doctrine, with the
apt acronym of MAD, seeks to avoid nuclear war by limiting both
the US and the USSR to strategic forces capable only of wreaking
a terrible vengeance if attacked. That is, both sides were to
limit themselves to a single "second strike" force comprised
essentially of inaccurate, city-busting weapons. A necessary
corollary to this doctrine was that both sides should forego
defending their populations lest the terribleness of the
vengeance on which the whole idea depended be weakened.
We adopted this doctrine in the mid-1960's and followed it
in both our force structure and arms-control efforts. The
Soviets did not. From Moscow's point of view, the US can count
on its own Assured Destruction if we wish, but they will by no
means allow it to be "mutual." They declared the MAD doctrine as
nothing less than "bourgeois naivete" Sad to say, they are
Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
 Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
right: MAD's "no defense" policy is "bourgeois" in that it is a
doctrine concocted in essence to save money, i.e., by avoiding
the costs of defensive systems. It is naive because it assumes
that both major powers would forego for all time the natural
imperative of defending themselves against nuclear attack. It
was also naive to assume that the Soviets would declare null and
void large chunks of Marxist-Leninist dogma which would have been
required if Moscow were to 11
go along with MAD.
The Soviets steadfastly maintained that while a nuclear war
would be very destructive, the' Soviet Union would emerge
victorious. Western adherents to the apocalyptic vision of total
destruction, "Nuclear Winter," and "no winners" can hoot at the
Soviet position on the matter, but they ought to realize that,
rightly or wrongly, the Soviet are deadly serious in their view
of nuclear war.
One need not just accept Soviet statements about. thier
prevailing in a nuclear war. Their strategic forces provide
unequivocal evidence that they mean what they say.
One quite obvious indication is that the Soviets totally
reject the MAD notion that defending one's homeland and people
against nuclear attack is "provocative and destabilizing." If
one looks at Soviet military expenditures over the past 15 years,
one, finds that startling fact that they have put one ruble into
active and passive strategic defense systems for every ruble they
have put into offensive nuclear systems. The Soviets have been
investing at least the equivalent of two billion dollars a year
in Civil Defense alone. For more expensive is the massive Soviet
2
Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
 Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
array of active strategic defenses to include anti-ballistic
missile systems already deployed and a vigorous development
program for country-wide ballistic missile defense. (Part of the
latter is the big anti-missile radar which has been much in the
news since it violates the ABM Treaty.)
As for their nuclear offensive systems, the Soviets have
shown their disdain for the MAD theorists' insistence on "second
strike" forces only. They have concentrated enormous energies
and resources to create first and third strike forces instead.
The Soviets don't need a "second strike" force. It's assumed
purpose would be to deter a first strike by the United States.
The Soviets, whatever their rhetoric may convey, know that a
first strike by the United.Sttes is an extremely remote
possibility. The nature of our society and our history of
restraint, even when we had both the capability and good military
reasons to use nuclear weapons, are well known in the Kremlin.
More important, perhaps, to Moscow is the obvious incompetence of
the US strategic force for a first strike. A few of our weapons
could be used in a counterforce role, but the bulk of them are as
advertised -- "second strike" retaliatory forces. No special
effort is required to deter a. US first strike. Certainly the
Soviet first strike force is more than adequate to deter such a
move.
The Soviet strategic nuclear force concentrates almost
exclusively on long-range ballistic missiles, land-based and
submarine-based. These are the weapons that can deliver a first
strike because they can reach their targets within thirty
minutes after launching. They have shown far less interest in
Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
 Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
slow-reacting second strike weapons such as bombers and cruise
missiles. Only a small fraction of the 2300 long-range missile
launchers in the Soviet inventory -- certainly less than one
third -- would be required for a first strike against US and
Allied retaliatory forces.
Why all the additional force, then? For those who mirror-
image our "second strike," Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine
into the Soviet minds, the only reason for all this "overkill,"
as they choose to describe it, is to be sure the Soviets have
enough surviving missiles presumed after a US first strike to
wreak a suitable nuclear vengeance. After all, that is why our
side needs more than "enough."
This is blatant and dangerous nonsense. The rest of those
missiles are the Soviet version of "deterrence" -- deterrence of
the real US threat, a second strike. They constitute the "third
strike" force, the force that makes the first strike a viable
military option.
The evidence for the third strike force is also crystal
clear to anyone whose powers of observation are not crippled by
our years of adherence to MAD. Most striking is the Soviet
penchant for reloadable missile launchers. Over half of their
missile silos are constructed so that after the first missile is
fired, a second one can be inserted and ready for launch after
several hours. It is even easier for the Soviets to reload their
mobile missile launchers which are currently being deployed. The
uncounted and uncountable extra missiles for these launchers
constituted one of gaping flaws in the SALT II Treaty which
Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
 Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
counted launchers only.
The number of reload missiles almost certainly exceeds 1000.
They, of course, make absolutely no sense as first strike
weapons. They make precious little sense as second strike
weapons. They make eminent good sense as third strike weapons.
So what do we do?
We can, of course, continue to rely on Mutual Assured
Destruction as we have in the past. We can continue to search
for ways and means to create better offensive weapons and deploy
them in enormously expensive ways to prevent their destruction by
the Soviet first strike capability, ignoring the growing
deterrent to the credibility of second strike inherent in the
burgeoning Soviet third strike force, and hoping for the day when
we can talk the Soviets into a reduction of a substantial portion
of their missiles. In a curious sort of alliance, the all-
offense elements of the Pentagon and the arms-control-only lobby
will both press for this course of action, each, naturally
stressing a different aspect of the MAD plus SALT formula.
The other course of action is the one laid out by President
Reagan on March 23, 1983 -- do away with MAD by defending
ourselves from first strike, the High Frontier strategy. We can
and we must negate the usefulness of the Soviet first strike
threat by making it incompetent. We do this by applying superior
technology, especially space technology, which can so effectively
filter a Soviet missile strike that it will never occur. No
Soviet leader will ever seriously consider a 5, 10, or even 25
percent effective first strike with nuclear weapons. We must
deter, but not by vainly striving to make a second strike
Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
 Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4
effective; we must make a first strike ineffective.
When we do this, the Soviets will have little need to
maintain a massive third strike capability -- it will become
irrelevant, and we might just be able to start a build-down of
these most awesome and dangerous of nuclear weapons.
6
Approved For Release 2009/12/11 : CIA-RDP87M00539R001001350032-4