CONGRESSMAN SCHEUER'S REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF DI INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000901210013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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- vv1.- v~J~y ,~F~ ~
CenUal Intelli~erxe Ageixy
6 MAR 1~~ 5
I was pleased by your high praise of our Third
World population paper.
Unfortunately, I do not think it would be wise
to declassify the study at this time. As you recognize,
much of the paper's value comes from the candor with
I3~ ~li~
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
The Honorable James H. Scheuer
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
DC~
EXEC
R~r l
a /,/
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1 MAR 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director
FROM: Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
S UBJECT: Congressman Scheuer's Request for
Declassification of DI Intelligence
Assessment (U)
1. Action: Please sign the attached letter to Congressman
Scheuer. (-~
2. Background: Congressman Scheuer's request for
declassification of Population, Resources, and Politics in the
Third World: The Long View (U) (GI 84-10022; January 1984) is
only the most recent of a number of formal and informal inquiries
from members of Congress and the press, all of which have been
denied. These requests a parently stem from a classified
briefing that the author of the paper, gave to
Congressman S her members of the Development and
Population Committee of the Arms Control and Forei n Polic
Caucus in March 1984.
3. We continue to believe that its release would jeopardize
US interests since the paper takes a very candid look at the
problems and failings of close n~ ne;nhhnra nr a7i;o~ ~,,,.h ,~
25X1
2bX1
25X1
ease y is or some projections to indicate a lack of faith
In the future of these natinnc by ~ha i1C fs,cscrnmcn~
4. The paper is classified on the basis of sensitivity
rather than sources and methods; thus we do not believe that it
could be sanitized and remain a useful paper. (C)
Attachment:
As stated
er s
n nnn nm
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SUBJECT: Congressman Scheuer's Request for Declassification of
DI Intelligence Assessment (U)
RD/OG (27 February 1985)
Distri ution:
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SECRET
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
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To # 14: Ple~lwe res
prepared for DCI signature.
Ex utive Secretary
2 Feb 85
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JAMES H. SCHEUER
~ DutRirT, NEw YORK
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, auscOMMfTTEE ON
NATURAL RESOURCES, AGRMULTURE
RESEARCH AND ENVNIONMENT
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
~on~re~~ of the ~nite~
~-touoe of '~epresentative~
~IDA~I~I1~COii, ~.~. 20f) f
February 20, 1985
-..:r:e Registry
2102 RAYBURN HOUSE
OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20516
TELEPHONE: [phone]
DISTRICT OFFICES:
137-08 NORTHERN BLVD.
FLUSHING, NEW YORK 11364
TELEPHONE: [phone]
BRONX: [phone]
NASSAU: [phone]
Dear Bill:
It was good chatting with you for a moment this afternoon.
The CIA Report on the Global Population Exnlosi~n wac ~~no
STAT
about a year ago. Our contact person was
It is an excellent piece of work and should be available
to decision makers. Why can't this highly professional, informa-
tive piece be liberated so it can be of use?
It predicted the problems the Mexican government was going
to have some day in limiting the continued growth of the capital.
Here, a year later, are two articles I am forwarding, one from
the Wall Street Journal and one from The New York Times published
within t e ast 0 days dotting the i s and crossing the is --
and presenting precisely the picture that the CIA predicted.
We are grappling with all kinds of legislation for which a report
of this kind would be extremely useful and relevant. I think the
CIA would make some Brownie points releasing such a professional
and helpful piece of work. If it has to be somewhat sanitized,
so be it.
All warm best wishes, Bill.
urs,
s
MES H. SCHEUER, M.C.
Honorable William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Aaency
Washington, D.C.
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l~~ali to Liliiit (~apita~'s Growth 1 rl~s Uther 117exican
By Sir:vt fluzl-7t
SIUJf Rrpurlrr nJ THF. tBALL SrNr:6T .tuV NN AL
ACAPlt1,C0, M+xicu-Th(? winter wave
of tourists is washing ashore frum cruise
ships arafiumd in sparkling Acapulco Bay,
and a tid}? array o! Iligh?rise hotels, restau-
rants and discos awaits them.
Un the inland side of the hills surr(:und-
ing the bay lies another Acapulco: a
sprawling, dismal slum that includes what
government planners call Renaissance
City. Renaissance City is a resettlement
place for squatters evicted frum the slopes
overlooking the tourist zone.
It's an unlovely soot. Flclclding drowns
people during rainstorms, and d(xaors say
they are kept busy trrating gastrointcsti-
nal disesesand malnutrition. Renaissance
City reflects Acapulco's severe gro,cy
~ pr .: +:r can be travfrrrc.i
re-.vy~re e!se.
~l..+
.,"'tea=~ .;:--::
Udttd Prey Ieer+r.~tloo~l
Makeshltt homes near Atzcapotzalco oil refinery in Medco Clty. The populatloa o[ the metropolitan area,
believed to be 18 million, is estimated to be growing by about 100,000 people a month.
Under a plan announced recently
by President Miguel de la Madrid,
more than 50 Government agencies
and Government-operated Indus.
tries will be moved Into the cotrrr-
tryside.
The National Commission on
Arid Zones, for example, will be
tratuferred to an acid zone. the
northern state of Coahulla; the
management of Mexico's ferries
will be relocated from the land-
locked capital to La Paz, Baja Cali-
fornia South, where ferries actu-
ally operate; the headquarters of
various Government forestry in-
dustries will be moved to areas
where they are more likely to en-
counter living trees.
Cortsciotu of the limited effects
of past Government efforts, Mr. de
la Madrid warned that that the re-
sults of the move, which will in-
volve some 40,000 federal employ-
ees, will not be "sudden or spectac-
ular." But he said the strong cen-
tralization of Me-+tico to Its federal
capital had become "one of the
causes of inefficiency and low, pro.
ductivity in our ecorwmic appara_
tus" and had to be reversed,
The federal Government L~ offer-
ing aseries of incentives - a share
of equipment replacement and
relocation casts as well as Out
breala - to private comp.tnies
that wish to go som~~?place else. And
Mexico City officials are working
wiN the go?:ernurs of Ic?;s puFu-
latcd states on a plan to find }obs
and a piece of land -outside the
capital -for jobless migrants will-
ing to relocate.
The Secretary of Programs and
Budgeting, Carlos Salirtas de Gor,
tari, said the Government recog-
nized worker concerns over such
issues as moving casts as well as
schooling, housing and health care
in what are commonly known here
as "the provinces," and that the
? Government would "fully respect
the rights of the workers."
Many Rorkers Resist Move
Nevertheless, many workers are
resisting a move away from what
is widely viewed as the bureau-
` cratic fast track of the federal Gov_
ernment, not to mention a disrup-
tion of the tr.+ditlorrtrlly strung, ex-
tended family ties pn:valent in
Mexico. Onc report said that three
quarters of the approximately 100
employees of the Arid ZOnls Com-
mission are threatening to resign
rather than accept a transfer. With
Mexican labor laws inquiring
severance pay of several months'
salary, this could make the decen-
' tralization program an expensive
prospect.
Perhaps one of the mo.t effect
five aids to the Government's ef-
forts is a grvwtng perception -
buth here and to the countryside -
that the co~LS of living in 4trztcp
City, with its pnllut:un and strexs
next crime, have bc?bun to uutweig,.h
Lhc traditional bcne!iLs?
The city's air pollution has be-
come so bad that the American
State Department last summer de-
clared it - an "unhealthy post-??
Those who work in the United
States Embassy here, one of Wash-
ington's largest outposts in the
world, will now receive additional
retirement .credits -one extra
year for every two year's stay. A
spokesman said it was believed to
be the only place where Foreign
Service employees receive extra
benefits simply for having to
breathe.
The change was the work of Am-
bassador John Gavin, who prohib-
itssmoking in his office and admits
being nearly obsessive about the
health dangers here. For years,
Mr. Gavin has bombarded ~'ash-
ington with emb:.ssy research,
cablegrams and news clippings
from the local and foreign press
Nat paint a truly grim picture of
lI[e in Mexico's capital -such as a
study showing that employees din-
ing in the embassy commissary
were getting an unusual dose of
deadly carbon monoxide with their
soup.
A spokesman for the embassy,
John 14a!sh, who Ls himself leavinc
for a ne?+v post in 0.'ashininon, said
that while the embassy was net
having trvuble attracting pcrs.:n-
nel, "lt eertsiray du~.~n't li?: a up to
its re,,ctation of IS or'_t) years a~,~
a5 the g:r:VC:I SF~.t Of Lat1:I Aner-
ICa.??
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U,S, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
PUBLIC DOCUMENT
Hon. William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Politics in the Third
World: The Long View
Population, Resources, and
An InteWgence Assessment
Secret
Secret
GI 84-/0022
January 1984
Copy
460
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Population, Resources, and
_
Politics in the Third
' World: The Long View
the Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Research
This paper was prepared by~
Director, OGI, on
Secret
GI 84-10012
January 1984
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Secret
Population, Resources, and
Politics in the Third
World: The Long View
Key Judgments In this paper we expand upon several lines of research currently under way
/nlormation avai/ab/e in the DI to take a speculative look at the Third World in the year 2000.
as ctl31 December /983 We examine how trends in population, ethnic composition, urbanization,
was used in this report.
resources, water, and food may impact upon a selected number of cities,
countries, and regions of interest to the United States. The momentum
behind these trends is great-they will not be halted, and they are unlikely
even to be seriously deflected during the next two decades. Their political
impact is less certain, however, and present and future policy choices will
have an effect in this area. Our approach in examining these trends is
illustrative rather than exhaustive.
Rapid population growth, in addition to having other harmful effects, can
lead to the encroachment of one nation upon the territory of another
through migration, war, or colonization. The great and increasing differ-
ences in population density (relative to resources) between Mexico and the
United States, El Salvador and Honduras, Egypt and the rest of the Arab
world, and Vietnam and Kampuchea and Laos will give rise to serious
international problems well before the end of the century.
A separate set of problems is created by uneven rates of population growth
among different ethnic groups within a country. Where population growth
creates a discrepancy between the relative size and the relative political
strength of an ethnic group, a state of tension is created. In Israel,
Lebanon, and elsewhere, we see situations arising in which new majorities
will demand greater power while old majorities now in minority positions
will fight to retain their privileges. Rapid urbanization, though sometimes
politically stabilizing, can have a variety of effects. We believe that the ne-
cessity to divert population from Mexico City will be Mexico's most serious
problem at the turn of the century; elsewhere the effects of urbanization
could range from a loss of political power (Sao Paulo) to a revolt of the mid-
dle class (Cairo).
With regard to resources, technological change is steadily reducing the real
value of such products as copper, tin, and sugar. Those countries-such as
Zambia, Bolivia, and Cuba-that depend on these and similar commod-
ities for the bulk of their export earnings could face a substantial and
continued reduction in living standards. Other resources, including water
and food, will be in increasingly short supply in some areas of the world,
and these shortages could lead to international and internal friction. We
Secret
G184-! 0011
January 1984
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expect serious water-related disputes over the Colorado and the Rio
Grande (United States and Mexico), the Jordan and the Litani (Israel and
its neighbors), and the Nile (Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt). At the same
time, natural causes and human mistakes are creating politically destabi-
lizing food shortages in the Sahel and southern Africa.
The deteriorating economic and demographic situation of most of the
developing world in the year 2000 will stimulate many Third World leaders
to look for political systems that will allow them to control their increasing-
ly unhappy populations. We believe that most of these leaders will see US-
style democracy as incapable of dealing effectively with their national
problems. Some leaders, even among those who have little sympathy for
Marxist ideology, will turn to Communism as a proven method for creating
an effective police state. Others will be attracted to the more successful au-
thoritarian states of the Third World, such as Taiwan, South Korea,
Singapore, and Mexico. On balance, we believe that the Soviets will find
their best opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the Middle East,
probable Soviet losses may not translate into US gains. In Latin America,
the rising economic cost of maintaining Cuba may limit the Soviet appetite
for meddling.
Secret iv
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Secret
Introduction: The Third World in the Year 2000
Population Growth: Four Countries
That Are Outgrowing Their Borders
-- -- _ ---
Mexico
- --
- ---
-
-- --- -- -
El Salvador
Egypt
- ----
Vietnam
Population Composition: Three Countries Where
Ctt-ii;ic Change May Drive Politics
Israel
Lebanon
---
South Africa
Urbanization: Four Cities Likely To Become Hot Spots
-----
Mexico City
----
-- -
_- _ -- ---
Sao Paulo
- --- -
-- ---
- ---
Cairo
6
7
7
10
10
Resources: Three Countries Whose
Main Products May Have No Future
Cuba and Sugar
--- -
14
Water: Three Areas United-
and Divided-by River Systems
-
_ --
15
- -- -
United States-Mexico
-- --
15
---
Syria-Lebanon-Jordan-Israel
16
Ethiopia-Sudan-Egypt
18
Food: Two Regions Where Food
Could Become a Major Political Factor
20
The Sahel
- - - -- -
20
__
Southern Africa
- - --
21
- ---
Implications for the United States
-- -
22
-- -- _
Putting It All Together
- -
22
- _ _ ---
The Political Climate in the Year 2000
- --
23
--- _
Implications for US-Soviet Competition
24
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Population, Resources, and
Politics in the Third
World: The Long View
The countries of the Third World are often considered
to be static areas where, despite superficial revolu-
tions and meaningless wars, nothing really changes. If
this description were ever true, which is doubtful, it is
no longer true today. Gradual but inexorable changes
are taking place, largely unnoticed, and by the year
2000 many Third World countries will be very differ-
ent in a number of important ways. Moreover, some
of the changes will have major implications for the
security and well-being of the United States. In this
study, we examine six areas of change as they relate
to Third World countries of particular importance to
US interests. Although this study is based on a solid
foundation of past and ongoing DDI research, because
of the extended time frame, its conclusions and
projections are of necessity more speculative than
those of most DI papers. In cases of doubt, we have
decided to study the more provocative-and trouble-
some-of possible outcomes.
Population Growth: Four Countries
That Are Outgrowing Their Borders
Rapid population growth can have a number of
different effects, one of the most important of which is
the encroachment of one nation upon the territory of
another through migration, war, or colonization. The
juxtaposition of lightly populated lands (relative to
their economic resources) with countries where popu-
lation is both large and rapidly increasing (and eco-
nomic resources are limited) gives rise to migrant
flows that, although they can be regulated by diplo-
macy, bribery, or force, cannot be completely stopped.
We will consider four such cases: Mexico and the
United States, El Salvador and Honduras, Egypt and
the rest of the Arab world, and Vietnam and Kampu-
chea and Laos.
would reach 110 million by the turn of the century;
under the high projection, it would reach 126 million.
Mexican population thus would probably range be-
tween 42 percent and 49 percent of the US population
at that time. Population densities would be between
55 and 64 people per square kilometer, compared with
roughly 29 people per square kilometer in the United
States.' Because of the age structure of the Mexican
population, the effect of demographic growth on the
labor force-that segment of the population most
likely to consider entering the United States-will be
even greater. At least 41 million, and possibly as
many as 46 million, Mexicans will be in the labor
force at the end of the century, roughly double the
current number.
By the turn of the century, if the same percentage of
the labor force chooses to migrate illegally to the
United States, the annual flow would be well over 2
million. During the austerity year of 1983, we esti-
mate that 1.5 million Mexicans crossed the US border 25X1
illegally, compared with an estimated 800,000 to
1,100,000 annually in other recent years. Although
the vast majority of these illegal migrants do not
remain permanently in the United States at present,
this may be changing. As the mix of rural agricultural
workers and urban factory and service workers
changes in favor of the latter-and this is happen-
ing-we expect the percentage of long-term migrants
to increase.
' In this paper, crude population densities have been used for the
comparison of relative population pressures in neighboring coun-
tries. Amore meaningful density based on land area with some
economic utility would be preferable, but such a measurement is
not available on a consistent basis. To be exact, overpopulation or
underpopulation must be defined in terms of the state of economic
development of a country and the economic utility of its land area,
given existing technology. In these terms, even in the absence of
precise density indexes, it is clear that most LDCs are overpopulat-
ed to varying degrees, and likely to remain so for the foreseeable
Mexico
We have made two projections for Mexican popula-
tion growth between now and the year 2000. Under
our low projection, population-now 76 million-
25X1 25X1
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Most Third World nations are overpopulated, and
demographic pressures exacerbate economic and
social problems, even iJ'they do not yet present a
direct threat to political stability. Only a jew coun-
tries, such as Brazil, have large sparsely settled areas
that can accommodate great increases in people, and
even in Brazil filling these areas would entail eco-
nomic and ecological costs as well as bents. A jew
other countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, have
small populations relative to their resources and low
population growth rates; population expansion
should not be a problem jor these nations.
Two countries, Kenya and Syria, are projected to
double their populations by the year 2000. A number
ojother countries will double their populations be-
fore 2010. All oJ'these nations will face serious
population-driven problems well bPJore that time. In
~q/rica these countries include: Algeria, Benin,
Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, Ivory
Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo,
Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In Asia they
include: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Maldives, Mongolia, Oman, Pakistan,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, and Vietnam.
In Latin America they include: Belize, Bolivia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, St.
Vincent, and Venezuela. Elsewhere, they include:
Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Solomon
Islands, and Vanuatu.
assure the return of a large majority of the workers to
Mexico after their working life is over, and reduce
political pressures on the Mexican Government. Even
with such a program in effect-but especially in the
absence of such aerogram-the US Government
might see itself obliged to take very expensive
measures both to bolster the Mexican economy and to
attempt to seal the US southern border.
El Salvador
El Salvador, with 220 persons per square kilometer, is
the most densely populated noninsular nation in the
Western Hemisphere; it shares a long border with
Honduras, which, with 38 people per square kilome-
ter, is the least densely populated country in Central
America. Population pressures that led some 300,000
Salvadorans to emigrate to Honduras between World
War II and the late 1960s also contributed to the
1969 "Soccer War" between the two countries.
Despite the current convergence of interest between
the two conservative, anti-Communist governments,
illegal migration continues and a number of border
disputes remain unresolved.
The situation can only get worse in the future. By the
end of the century, El Salvador's population, currently
4.7 million, will have grown to 7.4 million, and the
population density will be a suffocating 346 persons
per square kilometer. Honduras, although growing
more rapidly, will still have a density of only 62
persons per square kilometer. Birth control measures,
even in the unlikely case that they were adopted on a
wide scale, would do little to alleviate the problem
between now and the end of the century. Land reform
is also at best a partial answer; with 42 percent of its
small land area unsuitable for either cultivation or
pasturage, there is no way that El Salvador can
employ its expanding population in agriculture. Its
We can predict with a high degree of certainty that
Mexican population pressures will be a major
problem-perhaps the major problem-for the US
Government in the year 2000. No foreseeable degree
of Mexican economic prosperity or government coop-
eration is likely to do more than slightly moderate the
flow. The United States may well be under pressure to
legalize this situation through a massive "guest work-
er" program, in order to: channel the flow into
industries where additional workers are needed,
once-promising industrial sector, largely destroyed by
leftist violence that drove out foreign investment, is
unlikely to revive soon, even if peace can be achieved.
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Thus, we believe it is near certain that, by the year
2000, relations between El Salvador and Honduras
will have degenerated into a state of chronic hostility.
Massive illegal migration punctuated by one or more
border wars is the most likely scenario. This popula-
tion-forced hostility will probably be extreme enough
to undermine any Salvadoran-Honduran cooperation
against revolutionary elements from outside the area.
(In addition to the illegal migration to Honduras,
many more Salvadorans will be migrating to the
United States. In 1978, before the guerrilla war had
begun in earnest, 25,000 Salvadoran illegals success-
fully entered the United States.)
Egypt
Egypt, with a population of 45.9 million squeezed into
a largely arid country where less than 3 percent of the
land is suitable for agriculture, has no place to go but
out.Z Unlike Mexico and El Salvador, however, Egypt
has not relied upon illegal migration or war but upon
the legal export of labor. Egyptian office workers,
teachers, doctors, and laborers can be found through-
out the Middle East and in Western Europe and
North America as well. In 1982 an estimated 1.7
million Egyptians-roughly 13 percent of the labor
force-worked abroad. The importance of these
workers to the economic viability of Egypt is even
greater than their number would suggest; the remit-
tances that these workers send home through official
channels~stimated at $2.3 billion in 1982-are a
major source of foreign exchange
By the year 2000, Egypt's population will number
between 70 and 80 million, and the labor force will
have nearly doubled to about 22 million. The demand
for Egyptian labor abroad, however, will probably
have stagnated and may well have declined. The rapid
economic growth of the oil-producing countries of the
Middle East will have long since moderated and with
it the need for Egyptian labor. Competition for those
jobs that remain will be heavy. Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, Lebanon, Jordan, Sudan, the Yemens,
South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand have all
shown themselves capable of competing with Egypt
for the petroleum dollar. We expect that, over the
=Although Egypt is one of the most industrialized of Ar
industry employs only a small portion of the labor force.
next two decades, both the competitiveness and the
eagerness of many of these countries will increase.
If, at the turn of the century, Egypt is no longer able
to export a large portion of its labor force, the effects
will probably be felt both in Egypt and throughout the
region. Given the relatively high level of education
and political awareness of the Egyptian people-
including the unemployed-mob-pressured govern-
ment decisions, rapidly changing administrations, and
general political instability are to be expected. An
external military adventure is also possible. With a 25X1
crying need for arable land, a large population, and
one of the better military establishments of the Arab
world, Cairo might see military conquest as a solution
to its problems or at least as a diversion for its people.
Vietnam
Vietnam, like El Salvador, is a densely populated
country sharing a long border with an area of much
lighter population. In mid-1983, Vietnam's population
of 57 million gave it a density of 173 persons per
square kilometer. Laos, with a population of 3.6
million, had a density of 15 persons per square
kilometer, while Kampuchea, with a population of 6
million, had a density of 33 persons per square
kilometer. Although a quest for security, combined
with ideological and historical factors, fueled the
recent drive to the west, which resulted in a thinly 25X1
veiled takeover of government in Laos and
Kampuchea, areas of Kampuchea have for years been
colonized by Vietnamese civilians. This movement,
which was reversed during the Pol Pot years, has
reemerged and now involves 300,000 to 400,000
people.
At the turn of the century, Vietnam is projected to
have a population of between 75 and 90 million, which
could give it a density of as many as 273 people per
square kilometer. During the period, the population of
Kampuchea probably will have climbed to only 8.1
million (density 45) and that of Laos to 5.2 million
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(density 22). Thus, from the standpoint of population
pressure, Vietnam would continue to have strong
incentives to maintain and expand the colonization of
the rest of Indochina.
The danger that this situation poses for US interests is
that what was initially a problem of localized aggres-
sion could evolve into a major international confronta-
tion. Given Vietnam's military superiority, it is
unlikely that the people of Laos and Kampuchea
could effectively oppose Vietnamese imperialism
without the active aid of a major power, almost
certainly China. In the event of Chinese intervention
on a large scale-and no small-scale intervention
would deter Hanoi-the Soviet Union would be under
pressure to give Vietnam whatever support was need-
ed to counter the Chinese effort. This could take the
form of military operations on the Soviet-Chinese
border. Although caution and good sense on the part
of both China and the USSR may preserve the peace
for years or decades, the situation is unlikely to
improve. The pressures for Vietnamese colonization
will grow in pace with the population. It is a time
bomb that cannot be defused.
Population Composition: Three Countries Where
Ethnic Change May Drive Politics
In addition to the problems created by rapid popula-
tion growth in general, there is a separate set of
problems associated with uneven rates of population
growth among different ethnic groups in a single
country. In nondemocratic as well as democratic
nations, the size of an ethnic group tends to determine
its political power. Where a discrepancy exists be-
tween the relative size and the relative political
strength of a group, a state of tension is created. New
majorities demand greater power, while old majorities
now in minority positions fight to retain their privi-
leges. In extreme situations, this can lead to partition,
revolution, or genocide. We will consider three coun-
tries-Israel, Lebanon, and South Africa-where
ethnic change could affect political stability. ~~
Israel
Israel, despite being the Jewish homeland, is a multi-
ethnic, multireligious country. Israel proper has a
population of a little over 4 million, of which roughly
1.5 million are Jews of American or European origin,
1.8 million are Jews of African or Asian origin, and
0.7 million are non-Jews. An additional 1.2 million
non-Jews live on the Israeli-occupied West Bank and
Gaza Strip. Outside of Israel and Israeli-occupied
territory live some 2 million Palestinians. Almost all
of these Palestinians consider Israeli-controlled areas
as home, and we estimate that a large portion would
return if given the opportunity. Within Israel, the
Jewish population is growing at 1.6 percent annually
(with the non-Western Jewish population growing
much more rapidly than the European-American
Jewish population), and the non-Jewish population is
growing at 3.1 percent a year. The Palestinian popula-
tion of the West Bank and Gaza is growing at annual
rates of 2.1 and 3.1 percent respectively, while the
rate for Palestinians elsewhere is about 2 percent.
By the year 2000, according to Israel's Central
Bureau of Statistics, non-Jews will make up 23 per-
cent of the population of Israel proper and 32 percent
of that part of the population under the age of 15. If
the West Bank and Gaza were to be annexed, this
figure would rise to 41 percent, and in the early
decades of the 21st century the number of non-Jews
would exceed the number of Jews. If a portion of the
Palestinian Diaspora were allowed to return-proba-
ble only under the unlikely occurrence that an autono-
my agreement is negotiated for the occupied territo-
ries-these trends would be accelerated. At the same
time, within the Jewish community the non-Western
population would greatly increase its majority
Thus, no matter what policies are followed, Israel will
look very different by the end of the century. Even if
there is no incorporation of occupied territory, almost
a quarter of the Israelis will be non-Jewish and the
remaining three-quarters will be heavily non-Western
in origin. Under these circumstances, we believe that
the close ties between Israel and Western nations and
between Israelis and foreign Jews could be weakened,
public and private aid could decrease, living standards
could stagnate, and Israel could come more closely to
resemble the typical country of the Middle East. On
the other hand, if the West Bank and Gaza were
annexed, Israel would cease either to be a Jewish state
or a democracy.
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Most countries olATrica and Asialace a myriad of
problems caused by tribal, ethnic, linguistic, and
religious divisions. In the majority of these countries,
we expect problems to worsen over the next two
decades. North-south conflicts in the Sudan; Somali
irredentism in Ethiopia; the relationship between the
Kikuyu and other groups in Kenya; the division of
power among Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo in Nigeria; the
position oJthe Katangans in Zaire; and the Shona
suppression of Ndebele in Zimbabwe are only a few of
the ethnic situations that could cause serious politi-
cal unrest in ,gJrica well before the year 2000.
In Asia, we see continuing dangers in Syria, where the
ruling Alawites constitute a small minority of the
population; in Saudi Arabia and the Persian GuU.
where large numbers olloreign `guest workers"
could press for increased political power and where
ancient Persian-Arab, Shia-Sunni conflict could
worsen; in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, where the Kurdish
struggle refuses to die; in Pakistan, invaded by
Pushtun refugees and divided among antagonistic
Punjabi, Sindhi, and Baluch; in India, an "empire"
where northern Indian, Hindi-speaking Hindus are
trying to control a vast number o1 peoples of diflerent
ethnic, religious, and linguistic background; in Sri
Lanka, where Sinhalese-Tamil conflict could eventu-
ally lead India to intervene; and in the Philippines,
where Moros continue their centuries-old battle
against Christian central government.
In the Western Hemisphere, by contrast, the ethnic
situation is less dangerous. Indians are of political
importance only in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador,
Peru, and Bolivia. In Mexico and Bolivia, while the
Indians remain an underclass, they have ben~ted
from land reforms and other "indigenist "measures
of the revolutions 011910 (Mexico) and 1952 25X1
(Bolivia); any dangers they may present will be as
members o1 the peasantry, not as Indians. Despite the
ellorts ollej7ist revolutionaries to enlist Guatemala's
Indians, they remain politically cautious "risk
avoiders, "divided by language and custom, and
suspicious of each other. While the Indians oJ'Peru
and Ecuador have serious grievances, their im-
portance as a political factor will decrease as the non-
Indian population grows. Black-white conflict in
Brazil may increase but is unlikely to become regime
threatening. The same is true o1 black-Asian conflict
in Guyana, Suriname, and some West Indian islands.
Lebanon
In no country have ethnic and religious divisions
played a more important role than in Lebanon.
Indeed, the relative size of the various groups is of
such great political sensitivity that the Lebanese
Government has long refused to undertake a census
that could be used to justify changes in the allocation
of power. The last official census was taken by the
French in 1932, and it is suspected by many Lebanese
and foreign experts of overcounting the Christian
population. By the 1932 count, 30 percent of the
population was Maronite Christian, 23 percent was
other Christian, 21 percent was Sunni Muslim, 19
percent was Shia Muslim, and the remaining
7 percent was Druze. In the early 1940s, when
Lebanon was achieving self-rule and eventual inde-
pendence, this population distribution was used to
allocate political power; certain offices were reserved
for certain sects-for example, the president had to be
a Maronite and the prime minister a Sunni Muslim-
and in the Chamber of Deputies six Christian seats
were established for every five non-Christian seats.
This hard shell of government structure has remained
in place, while its population base has radically
changed. By 1983, according to a recent CIA esti-
mate, the Maronite population had fallen to 17
percent and that of the other Christian sects to 10
percent of the total. At the same time, the Shia
population had spiraled to 40 percent, while that of
the Sunni had edged up to 26 percent and that of the
Druze had remained at 7 percent. Refugees from
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Israeli-held territory and later from Jordan swelled
the Palestinian population from almost nothing to
about 400,000. The resulting imbalance between pop-
ulation and power has been the root cause of civil
wars in the 1950s, the 1970s, and the 1980s, while
population changes that left Maronite muscle unequal
to Maronite pretensions gave rise to three foreign
interventions-by the United States in 1958, Syria in
1976, and Israel in 1982-to protect minority Chris-
tian interests. Although they may strike up temporary
alliances, no two of these groups have the same
interests: Sunni do not get along with Shia, non-
Maronite Christians have no love for Maronites,
Lebanese of all faiths resent Palestinians, and most
other sects distrust the Druze, who are neither Chris-
tian nor Muslim
The future of Lebanon-if Lebanon continues to
exist-will almost certainly be one of continued ethnic
and religious strife. By the year 2000, the Shia-
currently the most deprived segment of the country,
both politically and economically, with strong ties to
radical Iran and Libya-will make up at least 45
percent of the population. This group will demand its
share of power and then some and find itself in
conflict not only with Christians, but also with Sunnis,
who for their part will be increasingly resentful over
their loss of primacy among Muslims. The Druze and
the various Christian sects, faced with the relative
declines of their populations, will tend even more than
at present to isolate themselves in semitribal enclaves.
The Palestinians, assuming that they have found no
other home, will drift back into Lebanon in large
numbers, as Syria may promote such a move and
there will be no central government powerful enough
to stop them. Like all other elements of the popula-
tion, they will be well armed. The Maronites, as ever
playing upon their ambiguous heritage as Christian
Arabs, will alternately call upon Arab states, Israel,
and the West to protect their interests. Neighboring
states, and perhaps major powers, may be tempted to
intervene. Partition, absorption, and major war must
be included among the possible scenarios.
South Africa
Although the already large black majority in South
Africa will increase between now and the year 2000,
ethnic changes within the white community could be
more important in driving political change. The basi-
cally undemocratic situation at present, in which 15
percent of the population rules the remaining 85
percent, will not be made appreciably less democratic
when the white population drops to 13 percent at the
end of the century. Nor will white ability to dominate
the black majority be seriously undermined by the
small change in relative population sizes. Indeed, if
the Colored and Indian populations were co-opted into
at least a tacit political alliance with whites, those
with a stake in the status quo in the year 2000 would
constitute 23 percent of the total population-repre-
senting amarginal gain for the minority and its
capacity to control the black majority.
Other demographic changes, however, could modify
this scenario. The proportion of Afrikaners in total
white population is declining as a result of several
factors: the Afrikaner birth rate is falling rapidly;
intermarriage between Afrikaners and English-speak-
ing whites is increasing, with English generally be-
coming the dominant language of the offspring; and
most white immigrants are English speakers or soon
become English speakers. In the past, English speak-
ers, with ties to the rest of the English-speaking world,
have been more liberal in political and racial matters
than the "cornered" Afrikaners, who feel that they
have no homeland other than Africa. At the same
time, according to some authorities, tribal divisions
within the black population are becoming less impor-
tant. Until recently, for example, the Xhosa have been
the backbone of the African National Congress and
other violent revolutionary groups, while the Zulu and
other tribes have tended to support nonviolent reform-
ist organizations. Now, hog: ever, increasingly large
segments of the black population of all tribal origins
are reported to be supporting revolutionary move-
ments.
Thus, in the year 2000, the majority of the privileged
class could consist of relatively liberal-by South
African standards-English-speaking whites, Col-
oreds, and Indians. The conservative Afrikaners,
though still a majority of the white population and
still dominating the political process, would constitute
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only 30 percent of this expanded privileged class.
Meanwhile, the black majority may have become both
more unified and more radical. In these circum-
stances, many in the privileged class would be more
disposed than ever before both to make far-reaching
compromises and-if compromise should fail-to
leave South Africa
Urbanization: Four Cities
Likely To Become Hot Spots
Recent empirical research indicates that, all other
things being equal, rapid urbanization is politically
stabilizing. Studies in Latin America, Africa, and
Asia agree that the rural migrant to the city slums is
almost always more contented and supportive of the
government than his cousin who remains in rural
poverty. Although in general we agree with this
characterization of the relationship between urbaniza-
tion and stability, in this section we will examine four
cases-Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Cairo, and Soweto-
where "all other things" are not equal, and continued
rapid urbanization could lead to serious political
unrest (see figure 1).
Mexico City
Urbanization, particularly the rapid growth of greater
Mexico City, will be a major political problem for the
Mexican Government well before the turn of the
century. Greater Mexico City, with some 15 million
people, has almost doubled its population since 1970.
Each day nearly 1,000 migrants enter the area from
the countryside or from other cities. Moreover, the
flow appears to be increasing as other cities (such as
Guadalajara and Monterrey) that were once major
poles of rural-urban migration have lost some of their
attraction. If greater Mexico City were to continue
growing at recent rates, the population would exceed
25 million by 1990 and 40 million by the year 2000.
Even if migration to the Mexico City area were to fall
to the national urbanization rate, the area would still
have 30 million inhabitants at the turn of the century.
Indeed, natural increase alone-without any migra-
tion from the outside-would raise the population to
more than 25 million by the year 2000.
All of these scenarios are impossible; given land and
water constraints, the Valley of Mexico can only
support some 20 million people. Thus, well before the
end of the century the Mexican Government must
find some combination of carrots and sticks, not only
to stop migration to Mexico City, but also to force a
part of the native-born population out of the capital.
This will be extremely difficult. From pre-Hispanic
times, Mexico City has been the nation's center of
culture, excitement, good living, power, and opportu-
nity. Every Mexican considers it his right to go to the
capital to better himself, to escape past failures, or
simply to be part of the action. No government has
ever made a serious attempt to restrict the Mexican
citizen's freedom of movement; the extension of gov-
ernment authoritarianism into this area would be
without precedent.
Some experts believe that, as population presses hard-
er on resources, the quality of life in Mexico City will
decline to such an extent that more people will be
trying to leave than to enter the area. This seems
doubtful. Despite the massive inflow of rural migrants
to the squatter settlements around Mexico City, in-
comes are becoming more equal in the city even as
inequality grows in the nation as a whole. This means
that, on the average, one will still improve oneself
economically by moving to the city. And most mi-
grants beat the average-statistics indicate that,
when other factors are held constant, migrants to
Mexico City advance faster and achieve higher status
than native residents. Moreover, the glamour of the
capital will remain for years if not decades after
economic opportunities disappear and living condi-
tions deteriorate.
Unless other poles of urban growth can be created-
and this effort would take quantities of time, money,
and wisdom that Mexican governments may not
have-the only solution is probably to expand the
limits of greater Mexico City beyond the Valley of
Mexico. Greatly increased tax rates and a crackdown
on squatter settlements in the federal district (both
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Figure 1
Estimated Growth of Large LDC Cities, 1975-2000
Population in 2000 (in millions)
40
0 I 2 3 4 5
Population in 1975 (in millions)
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very costly in political terms) could push even native-
born residents beyond the valley. At the same time the
creation of high-speed transportation links (costly in
economic terms) could bring a greatly expanded area
into the new, greater Mexico City. These solutions,
partial at best, will only buy time, and their imple-
mentation could put severe strains on the political
syste
Sao Paulo
The problems of urbanization in Brazil are less clear
than those of Mexico-in part at least because Brazil-
ian statistics are less complete than their Mexican
counterparts-but only slightly less disturbing. Great-
er Sao Paulo, like Mexico City, has long been a
favored destination for migrants from nearby rural
areas as well as from distant parts of the country such
as the poverty-striken northeast. This seems to be
changing. Incomplete statistics indicate that the rate
of migration into the southeast has been falling for
some time and that migration is steadily becoming
less of a factor in Paulino population growth. More-
over, there appears to be a growing current of out-
migration to Brazil's frontier states. Nonetheless, net
migration remains positive and the city's population,
now more than 12 million, continues to grow.~~
Although most projections show Sao Paulo's popula-
tion continuing to expand at 4 percent or better
through the rest of the century, we suspect that these
projections are wrong. We believe that, by the year
2000 or shortly thereafter, Sao Paulo and perhaps
other parts of the industrial southeast will exhibit an
absolute population decline-much like that experi-
enced by New York and other areas of the industrial
northeast of the United States in the 1970s. Our belief
is based on several trends now in progress: foreign and
domestic industry has begun to locate or relocate in
areas of Brazil where wages are lower, government
incentives are greater, and unionization is less ad-
vanced; growth of the frontier states is accelerating,
drawing the ambitious both from Sao Paulo and from
areas that once provided migrants to Sao Paulo; and
the quality of life in Sao Paulo is declining.
1950 and 1965, rose steadily to 94.6 by 1973. Though
varying from year to year, they remain well above
levels of the early 1960s. Real wages have fallen. For
example, the cost of cassava flour, a staple of the
Brazilian diet, in terms of hours worked, rose 43.6
percent in Sao Paulo between 1969 and 1976, com-
pared with only 4.5 percent in the northeastern city of
Recife. Other fragmentary statistics reveal increasing
deficiencies in housing, potable water, nutrition, and
education, as well as increasing crime. Most recently,
Sao Paulo has been the site of a number of "hunger
riots," in which supermarkets and food warehouses
have been looted.
If our scenario is correct and the city of Sao Paulo
(and probably some other urban areas of the south-
east) begins to lose population around the turn of the
century, the accompanying political strains could be
considerable. No major shift in relative regional
power is easy in countries such as Brazil where
regions are clearly defined and have conflicting inter-
ests. If, on the other hand, Sao Paulo continues to
grow, urban services and the quality of life will almost
certainly continue to fall. This too could lead to 25X1
political frictions and change, though probably of a
less basic nature.
Cairo
In the opinion of some experts, Cairo is already on the
edge of a civic breakdown. It is the largest urban area
in the Middle East and Africa, with a population that
has grown from 2 million in 1947 to about 10 million
in 1983. Overall density is approaching 25,000 per-
sons per square kilometer, triple that of New York
City. In some older neighborhoods, density reaches an
incredible 100,000 persons per square kilometer. Ac-
cording to one study, Cairo's urban infrastructure and
public facilities are adequate to handle only 2 million
people, a fifth of the population. There is a housing
shortage of close to 1 million units. Only about two-
thirds of existing housing is connected to the antiquat-
ed public water system. The public sewerage system,
which does not reach many sections of the city, is
notorious for its breaks, which regularly flood some 25X1
sections of Cairo. Public collection of solid waste is
Evidence for this decline in the quality of life may be
seen on a number of fronts. Infant mortality rates in
Sao Paulo, after having fallen from 160.5 to 69.4-
exceptionally good by Brazilian standards-between
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Population growth projections for most of the largest
cities in the LDCs are foreboding. While there is no
certainty that this crowding and growing di.~1'unction
of urban structures will translate into political insta-
bility at national levels, there are many reasons to
believe that it will. Each city is a separate case, but
there are several perspectives Jrom which all must be
examined.
First, there is the magnitude of the problem. Al-
though early estimates are already being revised
downward, and thelorecasts in this paper may also
change, reasonable projections of current trends in
migration and natural increase will produce monu-
mental numbers. Jakarta, Jor example, will have to
accommodate an additional population greater than
Los Angeles or Chicago in just 16 short years. Many
would predict even greater numbers there and in
Karachi, Bombay, Cairo, and other key cities.
Next, the socioeconomic and environmental-irt/ra-
structural bases on which these numbers will be
imposed must be considered. Given the extensive
shanty housing, lack gJ'sewer, water, or electrical
connections in large areas of Jakarta, Karachi,
Lagos, and elsewhere, a doubling in size would leave
a majority of citizens without basic services and in
even more primitive and anarchic conditions than at
present. In Karachi, Jor example, only 22 percent of
households reportedly have water and sewer connec-
tions. Research sponsored by the World Bank in the
1970s showed many large Third World cities already
had more than SO percent living in slums and uncon-
trolled settlements. Because of the continuing high
rates of in-migration, conditions in many places have
probably worsened, despite local and UN programs in
thefeld of water supply and sanitation.
government in budgetary, structural, and political
terms. Most large Third World cities, especially the
capitals, have a cadre of trained professionals in city
management and planning, but the bureaucratic, ~s-
cal, and political constraints within which they must
Junction, added to the magnitude of the problem,
make increasing failure of authorities to meet mini-
mal needs almost inevitable. Indeed, so long as entry
restrictions are not imposed, metropolitan govern-
ments arelurtherfaced with the dilemma that, iJ
they improve conditions within the city, more people
will come. Even now, Jor example, ref'ugeeslrom civil
strife in Bangladesh or rural conditions in eastern
India see Calcutta much differently than better off
Calcuttans do. If'governments act firmly to restrict
entry, force exit, and impose other distasteful
measures to make these cities-many of which are
capitals Junction again, it may be at the expense of
whatever democratic institutions that remain, and
could lead to civil disorder directed against the
authorities. At the present time, most of the Third
World countries are placing great hope in voluntary
measures such as regional planning that place em-
ployment magnets well beyond the city proper and
elsewhere within the country to attract migrants now
moving into the largest cities. So far these efforts
have had limited success in slowing growth.
Last, factors external to the city itself enter into the
equation. Many of the swollen LDC megacities ex-
ploded in an era of rising commodity prices, and-in
some cases-oil revenues, and classic boomtown con-
ditions prevailed. Nobody cared so long as the future
looked promising. They are now entering an era when
the population growth momentum remains, but the
ability of governments to finance basic services has
deteriorated sharply, and the squalid realities and
economic disparities of IiJe in cities that have grown
Perhaps the most telling factors deciding whether
rapid population growth translates into political in-
stability will be the efjtcacy of metropolitan govern-
ment and the relationship of the city to the national
too fast are apparent to all.
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woefully inadequate. Street congestion, pollution, and
public transportation deficiencies are serious problems
even by Third World standards.
These problems often interact with each other. Inade-
quate water pressure disrupts waste water disposal.
Leaking sewer and water lines interfere with electrical
service. Electrical outages disrupt water pumping
stations, sewerage facilities, and traffic lights. Inade-
quate solid waste collection contributes to blocked
sewers and pipeline overflows. Unpaved roads cause
residents to use water to control dust, thereby reduc-
ing water pressure. Construction work to repair one
service frequently interferes with other services, as in
the January 1983 case when subway construction
severed a water main in central Cairo.
By the year 2000, Cairo's population will have
doubled to 20 million (despite some reduction in
internal migration to the city) and its problems will
have worsened. We do not foresee any likely combina-
tion of economic prosperity and foreign assistance
that would allow the Egyptian Government to keep up
with Cairo's problems, much less to solve them.
Moreover, we expect the deterioration in the quality
of life-hitherto most obvious in the poorer sections of
the city-to increasingly affect all its inhabitants.
Traffic gridlocks, water and electricity outages, sani-
tation and health problems, flooding, overcrowding,
and general frustration will be the lot of the middle
classes and even the rich, as well as the poor.~~
The political risks of this situation are obvious. Cairo,
unlike many Third World capitals, is a middle class
city. According to one scholar, almost 80 percent of
Cairenes rank in the middle class by Egyptian
standard The typical resident-liter-
ate, perhaps even with a university degree~ertainly
aspires to a middle class lifestyle. During the next two
decades, the aspiring middle class could be swelled by
the return of many overseas workers and professionals
who are accustomed to high wages and (sometimes)
superior living conditions in the Persian Gulf coun-
tries and elsewhere. Both old residents and returnees
will feel increasingly cheated. It is a truism among
students of political instability that, while the poor
make riots, the politically aware middle classes make
Soweto
The problems associated with rapid urbanization do
not always hit entire urban areas; they can have a
disproportionate effect on sections of a city, especially
ghettos such as Johannesburg's Soweto. Johannesburg
proper, South Africa's largest city with a population
of more than 1.5 million, dates only from the late
1880s. According to official history, it was built
around a mining camp in an area completely empty of
native peoples. It grew up as a prosperous, largely
white city with parks, clean, well-planned streets,
skyscrapers, and pleasant residential districts. It
would appear to face no extraordinary urbanization
problems between now and the turn of the century.
The same cannot be said for Johannesburg's black
suburbs, the largest of which is Soweto (Southwest
Township). Greater Soweto, with a population offi-
cially estimated at 1.2 million but believed by many
experts to be much higher, has a population density at
least twice that of Johannesburg as a whole. And
Soweto's population is expected to double before the
year 2000.
Although Soweto, being based on race rather than
social class, has both rich and poor, it is mostly poor
and, according to some statistics, getting poorer. In all
areas of public service, transportation, housing, sani-
tation, health, education, and personal security,
Soweto ranks far below Johannesburg. Only 15 per-
cent of the houses in Soweto have indoor plumbing
and 20 to 25 percent have electricity, for example,
while living conditions in Johannesburg are equal or
superior to those of Europe and North America.
Despite recent infusions of government money, condi-
tions in Soweto will almost certainly worsen with the
revolutions
increase in population.
We cannot say for sure how Soweto's urbanization
problems will affect political stability; much will
depend upon developments elsewhere in South Africa.
At a minimum, we would expect occasional outbreaks
of frustration like the violent uprising and even more
violent repression that took place in Soweto in 1976.
At a maximum, the year 2000 might see Soweto as a
de facto independent city-state in a state of semihosti-
lity with the rest of the country. Sowetans would still
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enter Johannesburg to work, but white South African Resources: Three Countries Whose
authority would only be nominally exercised over Main Products May Have No Future
Soweto. In such a situation, any effective movement
to assert South African control would probably Although in the very long term-well beyond the year
require either a siege or a full-scale military attack. 2000-the supply of certain resources may present
critical problems, such shortages are unlikely during
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the next two decades. Indeed, the problem is likely to
be one of overabundance and falling real prices. In
this section, we examine three countries-Zambia,
Bolivia, and Cuba-whose principal products-cop-
per, tin, and sugar-may be worth much less at the
turn of the century than they are today
Zambia and Copper
The days of rapid growth in copper demand are gone,
and prospects for even modest increases to the year
2000 seem poor. While substitution, conservation, and
recycling limit demand, output continues to increase.
As a result, the real price of copper has fallen to about
40 percent of what it was in 1970. Any marked
increase in copper demand is most unlikely to come
from the mature economies of the West, where substi-
tution and conservation are farthest advanced and
basic infastructure is largely complete. The LDC
economies, which provided most of the increase in
demand for copper since 1960, are now stagnating
and the chances that they will return to the robust
growth rates of the 1960s and 1970s are slim. While
favorable combinations of circumstances will un-
doubtedly cause rises in the real price of copper in
some fortunate years, the trend will continue down-
ward. By the year 2000, a ton of copper will buy much
fewer goods and services than today.
A number of countries, such as Chile and Zaire, are
suffering and will continue to suffer from the decline
in the copper market, but no country stands to lose as
much as Zambia. Zambia depends upon copper for 90
percent of its export earnings, compared with 45
percent for Chile and 40 percent for Zaire. Moreover,
unlike Chile, where some diversification of exports is
taking place and the share of copper in total exports
has fallen sharply, Zambia seems unable to reduce its
dependence-when copper export earnings fall, total
export earnings tend to fall by a like amount. This is
due in large part to the fact that the market for
Zambia's second most important export, cobalt, is
little better than that for copper
Zambia has the reputation for being one of the more
orderly and pro-Western states of southern Africa;
because of the decline in copper, it is unlikely to retain
that reputation at the turn of the century. In a Third
World country such as Zambia, with strong and
independent trade unions and at least somewhat
meaningful elections, a ruler needs prosperity~r at
least the promise of prosperity-to stay in power.
When a convincing promise of prosperity cannot be
made-and it will be more and more difficult to make
such a promise as the century comes to a close-the
leader either falls or stays in power through increas-
ingly less democratic means, often with the help of an
outside power such as the Soviet Union. Zambia
already appears to have taken the first steps along this
path.
Bolivia and Tin
Of all the metals, tin has been the hardest hit by
substitution and conservation. Over the past two
decades, growth in tin usage has averaged less than
1 percent a year, and in the United States, the world's
largest consumer of tin, consumption has actually
fallen by about 30 percent since the late 1960s.
Aluminum, plastics, and other materials have made
substantial advances in tin's major application-can-
ning. Moreover, even where tin is still used in canning,
the amount needed has declined because of advances
in electrolytic tinplating. These factors have signifi-
cantly cut the growth in tin demand, and we expect
this trend to intensify as other countries incorporate
these technologies.
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Bolivia, which depends upon tin for roughly 40 per-
cent of its export earnings, will be harder hit than
most major producers. It is the highest cost producer
because its tin is mined by expensive underground
methods as opposed to the surface methods used by
other major producers. Moreover, the outlook for its
other major export, natural gas, which currently
provides another 40 percent of export earnings, is
clouded by a number of factors. Even if reserves are
sufficient to allow expansion of natural gas exports to
counteract the effect of declining tin earnings-
something that has not been determined-greatly
increased exports would require costly additions to
pipelines and facilities, as well as increases in Argen-
tine and/or Brazilian demand.
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Other Countries Threatened With
Loss of Commodity Markets
/n the years to come, Western demand for basic raw
materials is likely to be dampened both by techno-
logical change and a movement to more service-
oriented economies. The impact of these changes is
likely to be strongest in regions that remain heavily
dependent on a few basic raw materials. In Sub-
Saharan ,grrica, for example, the percentage of coun-
tries in which three or fewer commodities account for
more than ha(f'of total exports increased from
61 percent in l 970 to 85 percent in 1977.
Liberia and Mauritania, which depend on iron ore for
roughly three-l"(1~ths of their total export earnings,
could be among the hardest hit of Sub-Saharan
countries. This threat stems from a slowdown in the
intensity of steel usage in the developed West and
from an increase in recycling and substitution. At
present, roughly a quarter of all steel in the devel-
oped West is recycled. Competition from other prod-
ucts, such as composites, graphites, and plastics is
intensifying, and this will also limit demand growth
for iron ore in the years ahead.
Even in regions where exports are less concentrated,
individual countries will end themselves in for rough
sledding. Countries that depend heavily on the sale of
natural fiberslor export earnings, for example, will
continue to lose market shares to synthetic materials.
Bangladesh, where jute accounts for more than SO
percent of export earnings, and Upper Volta and the
Yemen Arab Republic, where cotton supplies more
than two-f"ifths of export revenues, will face rapidly
declining markets as synthetics gain momentum.
Manmade~bers, which represented only 2 percent of
total world fiber output in the 1950s, now account for
44 percent of the market. In the United States,
synthetics hold 75 percent of the overall textile
market. As other countries approach the US level of
synthetics use, prospects for natural fibers will
further deteriorate.
run, a decline in the importance of the mining sector
and its powerful unions is as likely to bode well as ill
for political stability.) Rather, the principal impact on
US interests will probably result from a great increase
in the production and export of cocaine. Bolivian
groups, often with the help of government officials,
already produce almost half of the coca paste that
eventually reaches the US market in refined form.
The possibilities for expansion are virtually unlimited;
the cost of producing coca paste in Bolivia is probably
somewhat less than in Peru and certainly less than in
Colombia, the other main producers. If, as seems
possible, cocaine becomes Bolivia's only viable substi-
tute for tin as a foreign exchange earner, many
Bolivians who have heretofore abstained from the
trade may be forced to adopt it. The nation's small
middle class and its politically powerful military could
feel that it is the only way to maintain "civilized"
living standards
Cuba and Sugar
Except for a few years of major crop failures, world
sugar production has consistently outpaced consump-
tion since World War II, and the value of sugar in
real terms has trended downward. Areas such as
Western Europe that were once net importers are now
substantial exporters, and sugar stocks have risen to
about 40 percent of global consumption. Overhanging
stocks and falling prices have not led to a reduction in
output for a variety of reasons:
? Exporters, especially from "one crop" nations, at-
tempt to maintain total export earnings by increas-
ing production to offset falling prices.
? Governments encourage production with subsidies
to protect farm incomes and minimize imports.
? Major consuming nations, including the USSR and
the United States, pay prices well above those of the
world market to selected LDC producers.
? Sugarcane will produce for a number of years
before replanting is necessary.
? The shift from cane to other crops is often difficult
and expensive.
? Factories built to refine sugar cannot be used for
other purposes
The decline in export earnings is unlikely to have a
great impact either on political stability or on the
living conditions of the nation's rural Indian major-
ity-both are already abysmal. (Indeed, over the long
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The territory problem is perhaps the most soluble.
According to the most recent treaty (1970), when a
river changes its channel and shifts not more than
617.76 acres and 100 inhabitants from one side of the
river to the other, the country from which the tract is
separated has the right to restore the river to its
original channel within three years. If restoration is
not performed, sovereignty passes to the other country
with the original country receiving later compensation
of an equal area elsewhere on the river. If the
separated tracts exceed the area or population re-
quirements, the two nations will jointly restore the
river. In practice, the difficulties of finding equal
areas elsewhere on the river and the expenses of
rechanneling the river will probably lead to more
frictions and additional treatiesl
Most future problems are likely to arise in the related
areas of water supply and water quality. Mexico is
almost certain to consider present supply agreements,
based largely on past usage, inadequate as Mexican
population, industry, and agriculture expand in the
border region. The issue of ground water, which is
unregulated by treaty, will become increasingly im-
portant. Salinity problems, especially in the Colorado,
have already caused serious disputes, not least be-
cause even a temporary solution would require the
construction of very expensive projects in the United
States that would almost exclusively benefit Mexico.
Water pollution is an issue that cuts both ways,
however. Sewage from Mexican cities affects US
cities in many border areas. The New River, for
example, which rises in Mexico and flows through
California's Imperial Valley is so badly polluted that
US health officials have predicted epidemics. Given
the huge costs of the measures required to combat
salinity and pollution and the financial constraints on
both Mexico and the United States, these problems
are likely to worsen.
In the year 2000, water conflicts will almost certainly
reinforce whatever other differences may exist be-
tween Mexico and the United States. Despite efforts
by both Washington and Mexico City, it has proved
almost impossible to depoliticize the water issue.
Politically powerful local interests on both sides of the
border that have been directly hurt by water problems
often see politicization of the issue as the only means
to move the foreign policy establishments of their
Other River Systems That Could
Become Focuses ojCortJlict
Asidelrom the three cases we examine in the body of
the paper, we do not believe that water disputes will
become major sources o.J'Jriction in the absence of
other causes oJ"cort/lict. There are, however, a,few
troublesome situations that should be watched. The
use oJthe waters of'the River Plate-Parana-Para-
guay system for irrigation, navigation, and power
generation has long been a source of dispute between
Argentina and Brazil. As Brazil continues to build
dams on the upper part of the system to supply its
growing power needs-and in so doing exerts an
increasing hegemony over Paraguay-Buenos Aires
could come to,feel that its interests are seriously
threatened. Another South American "water"dispute
that is likely to continue to cause international
problems is Bolivia's demand,jor an outlet to the sea.
Elsewhere in the world, we would not be surprised to
see continuing corVlict between Bangladesh and India
over the Ganges. Disputes are also likely among
Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over water usage and bound-
ary questions related to the Euphrates River system.
(cJ
respective governments. Moreover, as past experience
has shown, presumed threats to the health and em-
ployment of masses of people in either country are by
their nature emotion laden and easy to dramatize.
Syria-Lebanon-Jordan-Israel
The four countries tied together by the Jordan River
system share a tangle of historical claims, a proclivity
for violence, a mutual hatred, and, not least, water.
As a result, water rights have been the subject of
endless disputes that have even led to military strikes
and threats of strikes on each other's water facilities.
Syria and Lebanon, which control most of the head-
waters of the Jordan, attempted to cut water supplies
to their enemies in Israel for political reasons but were
thwarted by Israeli airstrikes. Israel uses the lion's
share of Jordan's waters and has long wanted to divert
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Figure 3
Li~~ni and Jordan River Systems
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the waters of Lebanon's Litani for its own use. Jordan
and Israel, though complaining heatedly about each
other's water consumption and practices, begrudging-
ly accept the duty to share water.
We doubt, however, that this standoff will continue
over the next two decades. Israel's military victories
on the Golan Heights and in Lebanon have given it
control over the Litani and most of the northern
tributaries of the Jordan. Its demand for water is
projected to grow by at least 30 percent between now
and the turn of the century. There are only two ways
that Israel can obtain all the additional water it
believes it needs: by constructing extremely expensive
facilities for desalinization, reclamation of waste
water, and the like, or by taking water that is now
used by Lebanon or Jordan.' Tel Aviv is proud of its
technically very efficient use of water and regards its
neighbors as being wasteful of this resource. Some
Israelis appear to believe that this more efficient
usage gives Israel the right to water now being
"wasted" by the Arabs and are pushing Tel Aviv to
take the second course. Given the expense and uncer-
tainties of the first course and the economic con-
straints that Israel faces, we believe that the tempta-
tion to take the second course could eventually prove
irresistible. Indeed, it has already taken this course
with regard to much ground water formerly controlled
by West Bank Arabs.
By the year 2000, if not long before, the water
problem will begin to affect US interests. (Indeed, the
United States already finds itself in the uncomfort-
able position of go-between in Israeli-Jordanian water
disputes.) Jordanian demand for water has already
grown beyond available supplies, and Lebanon plans
to use all its resources when the security situation
permits. Although these two nations could obtain
some additional water through the construction of
dams and other facilities and the use of more efficient
methods, they-like Israel-will be constrained finan-
cially from making the huge investments required to
greatly increase supplies. In this situation, unless
foreign donors are willing to finance extensive water
projects in one or more of the nations, any advances
' Syria is already making increasing use of Jordan tributaries to
expand farming in its southern region, further impinging upon the
water supplies of both Jordan and Israel and further complicating
by Israel are likely to be made at the direct expense of
its neighbors. All of the countries involved may well
request US or Arab aid. We believe, however, that the
richer Arab countries would be very reluctant to
finance projects that could be seen as condoning an
increased share of water for Israel. If US financing is
not available-and perhaps even if it is-water
resources would give Israel additional incentive to
maintain, its occupation of (or to reoccupy) foreign
territory.
Ethiopia-Sudan-Egypt
It is a truism that Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Sudan
owe their existence to the Nile. The Nile is the basis
of agriculture in both countries and supplies nearly all
of the household and industrial water needs of Egypt
and more than half of those of Sudan. Although the
two countries have peacefully shared Nile water
under a series of agreements since 1929, requirements
are growing and both countries must either find new
sources of water or sharply improve their manage-
ment of existing resources. Egypt's gross water
requirements, for example, are expected to rise
between 16 and 25 percent by the year 2000. Given
the already intensive use of the waters of the lower
Nile, any attempt to meet these needs fully would
require that Cairo not only take unilateral
measures-better management of drainage water,
higher water charges, and introduction of better
irrigation systems-but also join with Khartoum in a
number of very expensive projects~anals, dams, and
reservoirs-to shift unused water from the swamps of
southern Sudan to the thirsty north
The water supplies of both Egypt and Sudan face a
potential threat from Ethiopia, which controls the
headwaters of the rivers that together provide about
85 percent of the Nile's total annual flow. Ethiopia
has not participated in any Nile water-sharing agree-
ment and has gone on record to affirm the right of any
riparian state, in the absence of a formal international
agreement, to unilaterally develop the water resources
within its boundaries. Although at present Ethiopia
uses relatively little Nile water and does not have the
technical or financial resources to undertake the types
of projects that would divert major amounts of water,
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Figure 4
The Nile Basin
-' l ~ ~ ~~~~ Red
' ~~ Sea
Vie... + ...`
o -.~:~
k ~;~~
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it could at some point in the future receive powerful
help from the Soviet Union. Ethiopia is a quasi-
Marxist ally of the USSR and an enemy of Sudan and
Egypt; it is certainly conceivable that Moscow might
be tempted to reward Addis Ababa for its friendship
and punish Cairo and Khartoum for their rejection.
This would be all the more tempting because Moscow
could portray the project as a humanitarian effort to
help a needy country develop the means to feed its
masses.
The waters of the Nile are so essential to Egyptian life
that we have no doubt that Cairo would be willing to
go to war to protect its rights in this area. In the worst
of cases, Soviet citizens or even Soviet troops could
become involved-a development that could also draw
in the United States. Under a different set of circum-
stances, Cairo might see itself obliged to intervene
militarily in Sudan if Khartoum faced a revolt in
those southern areas where joint water projects were
under construction.
Food: Two Regions Where Food
Could Become a Major Political Factor
In sharp contrast to other areas of the developing
world, where food supplies are increasing, per capita
food production in Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen by
more than 20 percent from its 1961-65 average;
caloric intake is well below nutritional requirements
and is getting worse. This reflects not only persistent
climatic problems and technological and management
failures, but also the highest population growth rate
for any region of the Third World. Food shortages
and rising prices, which have already sparked political
turmoil from Liberia to Madagascar, will almost
certainly worsen over the next two decades. In this
section we consider two very different regions of the
continent-the Sahel and southern Africa-where we
expect food problems to have a political impact.
The Sahel
In no part of Africa has the food problem hit as hard
as in the Sahel, an area that includes Cape Verde,
Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sene-
gal, and Upper Volta. Most of these nations rank
among Africa's poorest in terms of nutrition, educa-
tion, per capita income, and other indicators of social
and economic well-being. The northern parts of Mau-
ritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad are desert, with little
or no agricultural or pastoral potential. The southern
parts of these countries and much of Senegal and
Upper Volta form a semiarid savannah suitable
mostly for pasturage. The Gambia, small areas of
southern Senegal and Upper Volta, and the extreme
south of Chad constitute the only part of the Sahel
with a reasonably favorable climate for such crops as
millet, sorghum, corn, cassava, peanuts, and cotton. In
no country is more than a quarter of the land suitable
for cultivation; in most countries it is well under
15 percent.
The situation is rapidly worsening. From the late
1960s through the mid-1970s, the area suffered a
drought that many climatologists believe is part of a
long-term fundamental shift that will render much of
the region uninhabitable by the turn of the century.
Since the end of the six-year, Sahel-wide drought,
smaller areas of the region have been hit by severe
droughts of shorter duration. In effect, according to
some authorities, the Sahara has been encroaching
upon the savannah and the savannah upon the agri-
cultural area at a rate of several kilometers a year. At
the same time, the number of people the land must
support is rapidly increasing. The total population of
the eight countries, 31.7 million in 1980, is projected
to reach 55.8 million in the year 2000, a 76-percent
increase.
The worsening food-population problem is almost
certain to affect political stability and US interests.
As northern pastoralists move south to escape starva-
tion-some 100,000 are said to have died in a single
year during the drought of the early 1970s-their
herds will speed the desertification of the savannah
through overgrazing. Food imports, already high in
most of the area, will have to rise at a time when the
countries will be increasingly hard pressed to produce
the agricultural exports-peanuts and cotton-
needed to pay for them. Requests for massive food aid
from the West are likely. Moreover, as the northern-
ers-whose ethnic, religious, and cultural makeup is
often different from that of the southerners-move
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Beyond the Sub-Saharan region, Third World food
availability increased dramatically between 1960 and
1980. At the beginning of this period, less than 40
percent oj'the 54 countries surveyed met the World
Health Organization's recommended minimum per
capita requirement o.1~2,.100 calories a day and only
six nations consumed sign~cantly more (110 percent)
than this minimum. By 1980 more than 80 percent oj'
these countries surpassed the minimum and nearly
haU'consumed more than 2,500 calories per person
per day. Nonetheless, the average daily caloric con-
sumption in these countries remains less than
110 percent of the minimum, well below the
131 percent average enjoyed by the industrial market
countries.
Projections oJjood availability to the end oJ'the
century are unavailable. [)'present trends continue,
the average level oj'daily per capita calorie consump-
tion among these countries could exceed the mini-
mum requirement by a substantial margin. However,
recent World Bank~gures indicate that, in spite oj'
strong growth in agricultural production, the average
index oJper capita food production during 1978-80
was lower in 23 oj'the survey countries-including
such nations as Egypt, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Peru,
and Uruguay-than it was in 1969-71. Rapid popula-
tion growth, coupled with increased consumption, is
outpacing the growth in food production.
The estimates for minimum caloric needs in the
aggregate-lor a nation as a whole-are minimums
indeed. The distribution o.1'lood to all households
and the cs1,fordability of sufjicient quantities oj'jood
to meet the requirements ojpoorer segments oj'the
population are likely to be highly uneven. Whether
current levels of caloric consumption are above or
below the recommended minimum, all oj'the develop-
ing world will need to increase either food production
or food imports by substantial margins if they are to
satisfy the needs oJ'the year 2000.
Southern Africa
The countries of southern Africa-Botswana,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique,
Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe-are
better off in almost every respect than those of the
Sahel. Life expectancy, infant mortality rates, nutri-
tion levels, per capita incomes, and education general-
ly are relatively good within the African context,
though considerable differences exist among the
states. Areas of these countries are considered among
the most suitable in Africa for production of beef,
rice, sorghum, corn, millet, tobacco, tea, and sugar.
Commercial farming is advanced in countries such as
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and
Swaziland. Moreover, unlike much of Africa, nonag-
ricultural activities such as mining in many of the
countries and manufacturing in Zimbabwe are well
developed. Urbanization is also relatively high, with 25X1
one southern African country, Zambia, having the
Now, however, a number of factors-internal and
external, natural and manmade-are combining to
create serious food problems. Only two countries,
Malawi and Zimbabwe, remain self-sufficient in food,
and the outlook even for these two is not promising.
The other countries are increasingly dependent on
food imports from a semihostile Republic of South
Africa. The reasons for this situation are many. Civil
war, guerrilla activity, and South African military
operations are disrupting agriculture in most of the
larger states. The departure of the Portuguese from 25X1
Mozambique and the ambiguous status of the large,
white-owned farms in Zimbabwe are bringing about
serious management problems and some decapitaliza-
tion of agriculture. State management of formerly
private commerical farms in Madagascar and
Mozambique has resulted in a sharp fall in produc-
tion. Traditional communal grazing in Botswana,
Lesotho, and Swaziland has led to considerable eco-
logical damage. Governments in mineral-exporting
states such as Zambia and Botswana have neglected
agricultural investment. Virtually all countries in the
area have discouraged farm output by attempting to 25X1
hold down food prices for their large urban popula-
tions. Agricultural infrastructure has been allowed to
south, both intrastate and interstate conflict become
probable. In this situation, radical Libyans or others
may be tempted to step in and "help" one or another
party.
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deteriorate, breeding stock has been killed, and live-
stock diseases long under control are making a viru-
lent comeback. In addition to all this, occasional
droughts greatly worsen the situation of all countries
and force even self-sufficient Zimbabwe and Malawi
to import food.
We do not expect the situation in most southern
African countries to improve over the next two
decades. Although most of southern Africa's food
problems-unlike those of the Sahel-are man made,
this does not greatly improve the outlook for their
solution. White expertise and agricultural capital are
not likely to pour back into the area. Tribal and
ideological conflicts are likely to continue to take their
toll of farms and farmers. South Africa probably will
continue to make trouble on a selective basis. Scarce
funds will continue to be spent to pacify volatile urban
populations and interest groups, rather than to sup-
port agriculture. And the area's population will soar
by 86 percent, to 78.6 million, by the turn of the
century. A few countries, through an extraordinary
combination of good luck and wise policy, may do
well, but southern Africa as a whole is almost certain
to be worse off in the year 2000 than it is today.
We expect this to affect US interests in two ways.
First, the United States and other Western countries
will be pressed to supply food aid and very possibly to
finance major water and agricultural projects.
Second, a number of what are now independent
nations are likely to lose a large measure of their
sovereignty to South Africa. Most of the food that
these countries will require in increasing quantities
will either be produced in South Africa or be imported
through South African ports. Likewise, most of the
exports-be they minerals, tobacco, or labor-that
these countries must sell to buy their food will go
either to or through South Africa. Such economic
dependence is incompatible with political
independence
the United States. US interests in the Third World
will depend not only on what happens in that area, but
also on developments at home, in the Communist
world, and among the developed nations of the West.
Unforeseeable changes in leadership, technology, and
ecology anywhere in the world could have an impact
on what the United States needs from and can give to
the various developing nations. Some things, however,
can be said. In this section, we point out a few places
where the various trends that we have discussed may
reinforce or counteract each other in ways that could
affect US interests. We also make some very tentative
predictions about the overall political climate of the
Third World in the year 2000.
Putting It All Together
The US relationship with Mexico may encompass the
most important complex of problems that the US
Government will face in the year 2000. The Mexican
Government's need to divert o ulation from greater
Mexico City, ill impact upon
migrant flows across the US border-which will
already be sharply up for demographic reasons-as
well as upon political stability in the US backyard. At
the same time, water and pollution problems along the
border could exacerbate bilateral relations while driv-
ing unwanted migrants both to overcrowded Mexico
City and into the United Staten
The most important US allies in the Middle East may
be in a much worse position both economically and
politically than they are today. Egypt, beset with
destabilizing population and urbanization pressures,
may push outward in military adventures or succumb
to revolution. Water-related problems with Sudan or,
more likely, Ethiopia could easily become the pretext
for war. Israel, increasingly less Western and very
possibly less democratic, could be in ethnic and
religious turmoil as relative populations change. It
will almost certainly be in conflict with other US
friends such as Jordan and Lebanon over the waters
of the Jordan and the Litani. Lebanon, for its part,
may no longer exist as an independent state.
Our examination of trends in the Third World
through the year 2000 has been of necessity illustra-
tive rather than exhaustive. Thus, we are in no
position to spell out in great detail the implications for
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US neighbors and friends elsewhere may be in no
better shape. Demographic differences are likely to
overcome political and ideological similarities and
The resulting refugee flows would add to
Mexico's complex of problems as well as swell the
influx across the US border. Other states of the
Western Hemisphere, of which Bolivia is a good
example, may see their raw material exports become
increasingly worthless. A number of African nations
such as Zambia may be in a similar situation. ~
The Republic of South Africa and its neighbors will
be subject to a variety of conflicting currents. Demo-
graphic change within the white and black communi-
ties may make the white (or rather "nonblack") group
more liberal and the black group more radical. An
English-speaking white-Colored-Indian coalition may
be more disposed either to compromise or to fight
than the old Boer-controlled minority, while the black
majority would be more disposed to fight than to
coexist. Black townships such as Soweto could become
flashpoints. At the same time, white South Africa
would be in a much more advantageous position with
regard to neighboring black nations, which will be
increasingly dependent upon Pretoria for food and
trade links. The declining real value of copper will
make Zambia doubly vulnerable.
Problems and opportunities will also arise in the
Communist Third World. Post-Castro Cuba, depend-
ent upon sugar sales in a chronically depressed world
market might well be willing to auction off its politi-
cal loyalty to whichever superpower is ready and able
to support an economic basket case. On the other side
of the world, overpopulated Vietnam will probably be
expanding into underpopulated Laos and
Kampuchea-and perhaps bringing the Soviet Union
and China to the brink of wart
as impossible to achieve but also as counterproductive
with respect to solving their most pressing demo-
graphic and economic problems.
Compared with the Western democracies and the
Communist states, most countries of the Third World
have extremely weak governments. Typically their
leaders, even their most brutal dictators, have little
effective power. Their legislatures and judiciaries
have even less. The typical president must spend all
his energy trying to stay on top of an uneasy coalition
of interest groups; he has no time to advance the cause
of the nation, even if he has the wisdom and desire to
do so. He must bribe with opportunities or with
unaffordable arms not only generals, but also colonels
and even NCOs. Religious leaders, tribal chiefs,
students, landowners, local capitalists, union bosses,
the urban mob, police death squads, the IMF, multi-
national corporations, the press, and representatives of
foreign powers may have an effective veto over presi-
dential action. And these are the government's sup-
porters. Enemies-guerrillas in the mountains, sub-
versives in the university, perhaps ideological
opponents within the president's own party-want not
only to bring down the ruler, but to destroy the state
itself.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that
few Third World leaders have opted for democracy.
They apparently believe that political and economic
power are already too diffused for effective govern-
ment and that to diffuse it still more would be to
invite anarchy. As the century comes to a close and
many countries begin to suffer increasing demo-
graphic, resource, and economic pressures of the types
that we have described in this paper, we suspect that
leaders will be even more reluctant to consider any
experiment that might further undermine their al-
ready shaky control over the political process.
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The Political Climate in the Year 2000
The political climate in the Third World in the year
2000 may make the preservation and propagation of
democracy in that area even more difficult than it is
today. Although many Third World leaders and
peoples will continue to admire the US political
system-and especially the US economy and standard
of living-the danger is that they will see it not only
Some leaders may well be tempted by the Communist
system. In most cases, this will not be because they
have failed to notice the injustices and failures of
Communist states throughout the world. These lead-
ers who opt for Communism "with their eyes open"
may not even have much sympathy for Marxist
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ideology. What they will be seeking in Communism is
a proven method of controlling their own people, for
allowing decisions to be enforced, for avoiding anar-
chy in the face of insurmountable economic problems.
Unlike Third World idealists of an earlier era who
were attracted to Communism, these hard-headed
leaders will not be looking for utopia but rather for an
effective police state.
Other Third World leaders, especially those who
cannot stomach totalitarianism in any form, may be
attracted to the more successful authoritarian sys-
tems
By
the year 2000, some of these may have fallen by the
wayside. The Mexican system may not be able to
stand up to the complex of problems we have outlined
in this paper. Taiwan may fall under the shadow of
China. South Korea could come apart because of its
still sloppy succession mechanism. Based on their past
record, however, most of these states will still be
around and doing well in Third World terms. These
countries, unlike the Communist states, promise eco-
nomic progress, considerable diversity, and a large
measure of personal freedom. And, unlike such Third
World democracies and "failed" authoritarian states
as Venezuela and Argentina, they also promise the
high degree of public discipline required to enforce
unpopular but necessary economic measures over an
extended period of time.
Implications for US-Soviet Competition
Although the situation in the Third World in the year
2000 will present advantages and disadvantages for
both the Soviet Union and the United States, internal
developments and policy mistakes could limit either
country's ability to make use of the advantages
presented. In this section, we will examine these
advantages and disadvantages, the opportunities for
meddling, and some possible outcomes. We do not,
however, have room in this paper to examine all the
factors that could play a role in the actual outcomes.
As we mentioned in the previous section, many Third
World leaders will look to the Communist model of
police state as a means of controlling their populations
in a deteriorating economic and demographic environ-
ment. We are already seeing the popularity of Cuban
bodyguards, East German intelligence advisers, and
Communist-style neighborhood security organizations
with Third World leaders who may have little deep
identification with Communist ideology. The negative
side of this for the USSR is that Communist troops,
technicians, and advisers are usually detested
wherever they go. Countries such as Egypt that have
once had large numbers of Soviet personnel within
their borders are unlikey to again flirt with the Soviets
once they have broken free.
On balance, we think that the Soviets will find their
best opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa. We believe
that many African countries will be drawn to the
USSR for the following reasons:
? Unlike in Asia and Latin America, there are no
outstanding "successful authoritarian" states in the
region to serve as alternate models.
? US association with South Africa will continue to
alienate black Africans.
? Conditions in some countries will have deteriorated
too far to be turned around with reasonable
amounts of economic aid (the West's strength).
? Local leaders will see police-state measures (the
Soviet strength) as their best chance to maintain
control.
In the event that the Angolan Communist regime
were decisively defeated by UNITA despite massive
Soviet and Cuban support, the Communist attraction
for Sub-Saharan leaders would be considerably
lessened.
In the Middle East, the Soviets may lose ground. Iraq,
and very possibly Syria and South Yemen, may go the
way of Egypt as the Soviet presence becomes more
onerous and other sources of military aid become
available. The passing of Khomeini and possibly
Qadhafi will probably lead to regimes in Iran and
Libya that are more open to Western influence; we
doubt that either country would move into the Soviet
camp in the absence of Soviet military action. The
USSR's losses will not translate into unequivocal
gains for the United States. Our strongest friends in
the area-Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Lebanon-may all be weaker than today and some
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may be distancing themselves from the United States.
In South Asia, there is a slim possibility that the
Soviets could make major gains in either India or
Pakistan; much will depend on the results of the
fighting in Afghanistan.
In Latin America, the USSR probably will be able to
maintain its position in Cuba-and perhaps in
Nicaragua, if that is not decided in the next year or
so-as long as it is willing to pay the increasing
economic price. There is a good chance that the
economic costs will prove so great as to limit the
Soviet appetite for extensive meddling in this hemi-
sphere. The Soviets will, of course, take anything that
falls into their lap, but little is likely to. We believe
that most Latin American states will be more
attracted by the "successful authoritarian" model
than by the Communist model. Most of these coun-
tries will try to maintain a distance from the United
States as well, and conflicts will be frequent. The US
democratic model may be seen as increasingly less
relevant to Latin needs,
At the same time, in man
countries the domestic private sector-probably a
necessary base for US-style democracy-may see its
position greatly eroded by better financed state enter-
prises and multinational corporations as an indirect
result of conditions set by the international banking
community.
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