WORST-KEPT SECRETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000901190015-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 19, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROt TING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
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3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
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7
DDO
8
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TO-1;-P
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X
17
Ch SECOM
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1 8
19
20
21
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cutive Secretary
21 (lrt RS
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE __- . _
NOTE FOR: Director of Security
FROM: DCI
The attached is for your information.
William J. Casey
Attachment:
Texas Business article,
dtd Oct 1 885, "Worst-kept
Secrets" by William H. Inman
C?107
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19 October 1985
 I t is the most damaging espionage case since Moscow obtained the
secrets of America's H-bomb in the 1950s. Its implications ripple
from the high-tech centers of California to the burgeoning Silicon
Prairie of Texas.
A tip from the former wife of John Anthony Walker set things
in motion. When FBI agents eventually raided the home of Walker,
who allegedly headed a family-based spy ring that sold secrets to
the Soviets for over a decade, they confiscated a vast cache of
secrets-including top Navy codes, blueprints for amphibious craft
and drawings of heat-seeking missile circuitry. Three of the weapon
plans, and details of their components, came from subcontractors
in Texas. It is believed they were taken from "bum bags," classified
material about to be incinerated on Navy ships, or by infiltrating
the secret files at the businesses themselves. Nobody knows exactly
how the spies obtained the documents. "We were surprised at the
extent of the contraband," a Norfolk, Va., FBI investigator told
TEXAS BUSINESS. "We have notifed those (Texas) businesses that
they must tighten up security."
For better or for worse, the state's new-found prosperity in
microprocessors, computer research and computer-aided military
hardware-Texas now ranks second behind only California in total
volume of defense electronics research work-has introduced a new
breed of observer to the state. He is the intelligence-gatherer, the
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Cross section of typical TEMPEST security layers
-.-----.
*
al workspace
I
n
al TEMPEST
CENTRAL COMPUTING CENTER
uipment
TEMPEST LAN
W or WIO Secure LAN
[
in TEMPEST room enclosure
t
Individual workspace
Master workspace
Complete
Individual TEMPEST
TEMPEST cabinets
integral designed
equipment
W or WIO Secure LAN
facility TEMPEST
W or WIO Crypto LAN
enclosure
expert in artificial intelligence who is act-
ing to steal secrets on his own or as a
proxy for some foreign power.
How real is the threat?
"We have absolutely no doubt there
are Soviet agents in Texas," says a
spokesman for one of the nation's
private firms licensed in Texas by the
National Security Agency to provide
equipment secured against computer
leaks. The company's specialty: pro-
viding anti-spy devices used in the rapid-
ly developing and little-publicized field
of TEMPEST. The name is not an
acronym. It refers to the investigation
and studies of compromising electronic
emissions.
TEXAS BUSINESS interviewed
various business executives and defense
intelligence analysts, many of whom in-
sisted on remaining unidentified, to
sketch an outline of the hush-hush
TEMPEST program and of the foreign
threat it was designed to counter. "They
(Soviet agents) are mixing well," says a
source versed in artificial intelligence.
"They're well trained. You do not see
them on the street. They're very
Americanized. The KGB (the Soviet es-
pionage branch) is very evident in
Texas. "
Intermediaries often used. When they
do not act alone, they often are willing
to hire American-born intermediaries, as
the Walker case illustrates. "Many of
those people have security clearances and
they have access to all sorts of secret in-
formation," the source relates. "These
are men willing to sell out their country
for greed or because they are disgruntled
with their job or because they want to
make a philosophical point. They ra-
tionalize that they are not doing any real
harm, but the facts speak for them-
selves. "
Pentagon documents and published
reports indicate the Soviets have installed
a huge antenna in northwest Cuba
geared to intercept electronic signals,
especially telephone calls relayed by
satellite across the southern United
States. According to H. Ross Perot,
chairman of Dallas's Electronic Data
Systems Corp., roughly 2,000 to 3,000
Soviet agents roam the nation freely in
search of America's high-technology
secrets. "We know they come to Texas
and are interested in Texas," says Perot.
Their presence is shadowy and subtle,
in part because their signal-gathering
equipment is so small and easily dis-
guised. "It (the equipment) used to
come in the form of a grocery van, some-
thing you would see delivering soda pop
with a unique sort of TV antenna on
top," reports one analyst. "Today's
models are totally portable. They come
in suitcase varieties. Honeywell makes
them."
Because of the portability of these
"suitcases," an enemy agent can slip
undetected with all his equipment to a
point near a secret testing facility or test
zone, authorities say. Without ap-
propriate precautions, the agent can sift
the secrets he wants from the air-
microwave emanations coming from a
variety of sources, including electronic
typewriters. Window panes provide an
excellent medium for these wave trans-
missions. "A favorite," says one artificial
intelligence expert, "is attaching sen-
sitive equipment to water pipes. Water
pipes greatly magnify vibrations."
And don't think the Soviets lack the
ingenuity or initiative to use America's
high-tech resources against her. Former
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CIA director Stansfield Turner details in
his book Secrecy and Democracy the
gathering methods of Soviet consulates
throughout the United States. Many of
the diplomatic buildings bristle with ar-
rays of antennae and, in some cases, are
equipped to pick up the weak signals
from typewriter keys. They planted just
such typewriter receiving devices in the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow recently. "The
face of spying is, indeed, changing,"
Turner says. "We will have to adapt our
countering techniques by placing more
emphasis on uncovering technical
systems that steal our secrets and by be-
ing more alert to detecting swashbuck-
ling adventurers who spy for kicks."
That alertness begins at home; our
phone coversations are not as private as
we might think. Former CIA deputy
director and NSA chief Bobby Inman at-
tests that the Soviets are constantly
monitoring our microwave telephone
transmissions via satellite. "Americans
simply do not realize the security
breaches possible each time we pick up
the telephone," says Inman, a retired
Navy admiral who now heads Microelec-
tronics and Computer Technology Corp.
BLACK DESIGNATION: A designation applied to wirelines, components,
equipment and systems that handle only unclassified signals, and to areas in
which classified signals occur.
COMPROMISES Any occurrence that results in unauthorized persons' gain-
ing access to classified or other information requiring protection.
COMPROMISING EMANATIONS Unintentional data-related or
intelligence-bearing signals which, if intercepted and analyzed, disclose the
classified information tran miffed.
EQUIPMENT RADIATION TEMPEST ZONE (ERTZ)S A zone
established as a result of determined or known TEMPEST equipment radiation
characteristics. The zone includes all space within which a successful hostile in-
tercept of compromising emanations is considered possible.
LIMITED EXCLUSION AREAS A room or enclosed area to which securi-
ty controls have been applied to provide protection to information-processing
system equipment.
ON-LINE CRYPTO-OPERATIONS The use of crypto-equipment that
is directly connected to a signal line, making encryption and transmission, or
receptions and decryptions, or both together, a single continuous process.
TEMPESTS Name referring to investigations and studies of compromising
emanations. It is sometimes used synonymously with the term compromising
emanations, as in TEMPEST tests of TEMPEST inspections.
in Austin. NSA employees, in fact, have author of KGB Today, the Soviets
been told to minimize telephone com- monitor the calls of hundreds of
munications. According to John Barron, thousands of Americans each day.
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Inter-company thievery. Foreign
powers are not the only ones interested
in stealing data. An electronics company
seeking the secrets of a rival can turn to
the many free-lance intelligence experts
in the field for help. A law firm seeking
to pull the rug from under a competitor
in court in a million-dollar case or an
employee of a bank seeking to embez-
zle funds through the hidden channels
of a computer can draw upon a wide
range of sophisticated techniques and
private enterprise spies. Says one busi-
ness analyst: "If you are in the habit of
leaving classified data or important data
on a disk in your computer overnight,
then you could be a hit. Such data are
retrievable unless properly encrypted. A
gatherer can make a copy and go merri-
ly on his-or her-way, nobody the
wiser. "
A team of professionals on the top
floor of a bank building in Dallas or
Houston or Austin could launch silent
raids against a myriad of unsuspecting
businesses. "You get on the right floor
of the right building and aim a device
called a spectrum analyzer at the window
of your target," explains the analyst,
"and you zap everything you need in a
very short time, and the company would
never know it had been robbed." The
devices come in a variety of forms, some
as small as a man's umbrella.
But does Texas have the personnel
who could pull off such a cunning
assault? Indeed, it is training them every
day. The Electronic Security Command
in San Antonio, a military branch with
the responsibility for plugging computer
leaks throughout the region, employs a
battery of highly competent electronic
security sweepers, skilled in just such
jobs. There is no evidence they have ever
turned against their country or would in
the future. But there is plenty of cvi-
dence that the technology and savvy are
readily available. "The market is there,"
says one source. "There are very willing
people who want the secrets. It's just a
matter of latching onto the right peo-
ple.".
According to experts in the defense
and electronics fields, a number of Texas
industries are especially vulnerable to
electronic infiltration. They include Varo
Inc., LTV Corp., Texas Instruments,
Rockwell International, General
Dynamics, Lockheed Missiles & Space,
and E-Systems. This does not mean these
companies do not have strong safe-
guards; they do. But it does indicate they
work in areas of great interest to the
Soviets and that their work areas are not
completely secure. This is only a partial
list, of course. There are far more in-
dustries vulnerable than are completely
secure.
TEXAS BUSINESS, for example,
followed up on a tip and sent a writer,
without any credentials, into a classified
zone at the Richardson, Tex., head-
quarters of TI. A side entrance door was
not guarded, -nor was it locked. "Oh
yeah, that door needs to be fixed," an
employee said later. Among other
things, the company is at the forefront
of the HARM missile project and a key
supplier of the Army's night-vision
equipment.
"There is a good-old-boy attitude in
Texas that presupposes real espionage ac-
tivity can't happen here," relates a
TEMPEST products salesman. "That
may have been true with the old Texas.
But the Dallas/Fort Worth area and the
corridor between San Antonio and
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Approved For Release 2009/07/16: CIA-RDP87M00539R000901190015-3
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THE DUNNE COMPANY, INC.
2741 SATSUMA
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DALLAS, TX 75229
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Eternal vigilance
The Soviets call it "part of the new
wave of anti-Soviet hysteria in the
United States," but American in-
telligence agents with the State Depart-
ment's new Office of Foreign Missions
are calling it smart.
The office, headed by former "head
counterspy" at the FBI James E. Nolan,
has tightened security controls across the
country in an effort to keep under closer
surveillance Soviet and other foreign
diplomats in the U.S. Measures include
such things as reciprocal treatment: Of-
ficials from another nation will be
treated in this country in the same way
American diplomats are treated in that
particular foreign country. Though the
restrictions apply to some U.S. allies,
they are much stricter against so-called
ideologic foes of the U.S., Eastern Bloc
nations and, most specifically, the U.S.S.R.
The Office of Foreign Missions con-
trols hotel accommodations, airline
tickets, driver's licenses, car sales, prop-
Austin are full of businesses that the
Soviets would love to learn more about.
It's naive to think otherwise."
Varied vulnerability. What sort of
equipment is vulnerable to infiltration?
Just about any kind of electronic device
which emits microwaves-everything
from an ordinary pocket calculator to a
full-size mainframe computer. Some of
these devices need not be shielded, but
with others, it makes little sense to leave
them unprotected, especially consider-
ing the potential losses. Many of the
losses that do occur are never reported
to authorities.
In years past, TEMPEST was expen-
sive. But the costs have dropped
precipitously since NSA began issuing
TEMPEST certificates to private in-
dustry. It once cost perhaps two to three
times the price of an original IBM per-
sonal computer to protect it against in-
trusion. Today the cost is roughly half
that amount. Prices vary from company
to company, but here is a sampling: To
retrofit an Apple II or Radio Shack
TRS-80 Model III, it costs roughly
$4,990; a Pioneer video disk player,
around $9,450; a Xerox 610 electronic
typewriter, about $1,545, or around
25% above retail.
If the prices still seem a bit steep, con-
erty rentals or sales, telephone installa.
tions, sales taxes, customs duties and
other government fees and license plates.
A new system using a letter code to
designate certain closely watched coun-
tries has been instituted: DC for Cuba,
FM for Libya, GQ for North Korea and
SX for the Soviet Union.
In addition, Nolan's office oversees
traffic routes by limiting areas in which
foreign diplomats may travel. For in.
stance, counties and cities in virtually
every state in the nation have been
designated off limits to Soviet officials.
Sixteen of the proscribed counties are in
Texas, including those of Harris, Dallas,
Tarrant, Bexar and Travis (except
Austin).
Nolan explains that the measures are
designed to protect national security and
sensitive facilities, and, he remarks,
"You have to have that leverage or
nobody is going to listen to you."
-Marion Buckley
sider what must be done. Although
specifics of the process remain classified
for obvious reasons, here are the general
methods:
? Enclosure. Surround all sides of the
machine with metal plates, often copper
or magnesium; a fine metal meshwork
is often fitted over the viewing screen to
reduce emissions.
? Software alteration. Get inside the
machine to the microchip level and
modify the signals they send to the rest
of the system. This is obviously time-
consuming and highly specialized.
? Combination. Combine the en-
closure techniques with the software
changes. All the modifications and
shielding must pass government testing,
and each configuration must be retested
to be certified-a source of extra and
hidden expense. One drawback of this
totally secure system: The configuration
cannot be expanded without thorough
retesting.
Technology has taken this TEMPEST
knowledge a step further. A company
called Eye Dentify Inc. now distributes
a high-level identification system based
on a unique human characteristic-the
retinal eye pattern. A person peers into
the EyeDentification System 7.5 and the
machine scans a circular area of the
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retina with a beam of ultra-low-density
infrared light. The light reflected from
the eye is picked up by a photo sensor
and measured at 320 points along a
450-degree scan. The resulting wave
form is then digitized and sent to a
microprocessor, where it is stored. Since
the retinal pattern is more distinctive
than a person's fingerprint, the security
system, if properly used, is considered
nearly foolproof. None of the systems
has yet been installed in Texas, but
Rockwell and TI have purchased the
units.
A la James Bond. Another James
Bond-like device is the crypto-equip-
ment, machines that scramble messages
to prevent interception and interpreta-
tion. A crypto device can be installed in
a computer modem to keep the tele-
phone lines secure when transmitting
data. A suitable unscrambler must be in-
stalled at the receiving end. An encryp-
tion device can even be installed within
the computer disk, so that the data can-
not be infiltrated when the disk is not
being used.
Entire desk tops can be enclosed in
armor-protected hoods, looking some.
thing like giant outdoor barbecue grills.
Defense-minded businesses can purchase
special engineering designs or hire
specialized contractors who will protect
whole floors in secured working areas.
Many rooms are essentially metal-lined
vaults and are laid out in such fashion
that the most sensitive areas are pro-
tected by layers of wall and metal.
In 1983, Systematics General Corp.,
a leader in TEMPEST-enhanced prod.
ucts, began producing one of the more
intriguing anti-spy products. It is called
MicroFix and includes a TEMPEST-
protected computer and nine specifical-
ly secured peripherals. The integrated
computer system with telecommuni-
cations, data processing storage and
retrieval capabilities has been used suc-
cessfully by the Army for years for high-
level battlefield intelligence gathering.
TEMPEST technology has grown
rapidly in recent years, paralleling the
need to protect increasingly sensitive
equipment. As Herbert Shearin, execu-
tive manager for the TEMPEST project
at the NSA, put it, "Tempest (was) once
a low-profile concern (but) is now a very
visible area of specialization in the
government marketplace."
To understand the importance of
TEMPEST is to understand the import-
ance of keeping a secret.
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